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DISCUSSIONS 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  LITERATURE, 


EDUCATION  AND  UNIVERSITY  REFORM. 


CHIEFLY  FROM  THE  EDINBURGH  REVIEW;  COR- 
RECTED, VINDICATED,  ENLARGED,  IN 
NOTES  AND  APPENDICES. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON,  BART. 

X 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY 

O 

BY  ROBERT  TURNBULL,  D.  D. 


Truth,  like  a torch,  the  more  it's  shook,  it  shines .” 


NEW  YORK: 

HARPER  & BROTHERS,  PUBLISHERS, 
329  & 331  PEARL  STREET, 

FRANKLIN  SQUARE. 


1855. 


0 If 

“Ju  “X- 


AUTHOR’S  PREFACE, 


This  publication  will  not,  I hope,  be  deemed  superfluous.  Its 
contents  have,  in  great  part,  been  collected  and  translated  in 
France  and  Italy ; in  Germany  many  of  the  Discussions  have 
been  separately  translated  ; and  their  general  collection  has  once 
and  again  been  recommended  in  the  leading  critical  journals  of 
America.  In  this  country  also  a considerable  number  are  com- 
prised in  the  “ Selections  from  the  Edinburgh  Review,”  by  Mr. 
Crosse.  M.  Peisse,  the  learned  French  translator,  has  added  to 
the  articles,  published  by  him  under  the  name  of  “ Fragmens 
de  Philosophie,”  sundry  important  contributions  of  his  own; — an 
Introduction,  an  Appendix,  and  Notes.  Of  the  last  especially  I 
have  frequently  availed  myself. 

In  reprinting  these  criticisms,  I have  made  a few  unimportant 
corrections ; and  some  not  unimportant  additions — in  length  at 
least,  for  the  new  extends  to  above  a half  of  the  old.  At  the 
same  time  I was  not  averse  from  evincing,  by  the  way,  the 
punctual  accuracy  of  certain  statements,  advanced  in  these  crit- 
icisms, which  had  been  variously  and  sometimes  even  vehemently 
assailed.  In  one  instance,  the  counter  criticism  was  indeed  of 
such  a character,  and  came  from  such  a quarter,  that  I could  not 
in  propriety  let  it  pass  without  a full  and  formal  refutation. 

In  preparing  an  Appendix,  supplementary  of  the  previous  dis- 
cussions relative  to  the  English  Universities,  I insensibly  involved 
myself  in  a complication  of  details,  which,  after  a fruitless  and 
wholly  unexpected  expenditure  of  time,  I found  that  leisure,  and 


Y1 


AUTHOR’S  PREFACE. 


strength,  and  patience  all  failed  me  either  to  disentangle  or  to 
complete ; I was,  therefore,  in  the  end  constrained  to  limit  the 
consideration  not  only  to  Oxford  exclusively,  hut  exclusively  to 
the  education  afforded  in  its  fundamental  faculty,  that  of  Arts. 
And  in  reference  even  to  this,  had  I anticipated  the  amount  of 
tedious  toil  which  the  mere  collecting  and  verifying  of  the  facts 
would  cost,  I might  have  been  disposed  to  avoid  what,  though  to 
me  a real  labor,  is  so  disproportioned  to  any  apparent  result. 

Apart  from  the  Appendices,  the  new  matter,  whether  of  text 
or  notes,  except  where  distinction  was  needless,  is  inclosed  within 
square  brackets. 

Edinburgh,  March,  1852. 


***  The  Addenda  and  Corrigenda  at  the  end  of  the  English  edition  are,  in  the 
American  republieation,  inserted  in  their  proper  places  in  the  text. 


CONTENTS 


Introductory  Essay 


PAGE 

xi 


PHILOSOPHY. 


I.  On  the  Philosophy  op  the  Unconditioned  ; in  Reference 


to  Cousin’s  Infinito-Absolute 

(Oct.  1829. — Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  1.,  No.  xcix.,  pp.  194-221.) 


II.  Philosophy  of  Perception 

(Oct.  1830. — Vol.  lii.,  No.  ciii.,  pp.  158-207.) 


45 


III.  Johnson’s  Translation  of  Tennemann’s  Manual  of  the 

History  of  Philosophy 103 

(Oct.  1832. — Vol.  lvi.,  No.  cxi.,  pp.  160-177.) 

IY.  Logic.  The  recent  English  Treatises  on  that  Science  120 
(April  1833. — -Vol.  lvi.,  No.  cxv.,  pp.  194-238.) 

V.  Deaf  and  Dumb.  History  of  their  Instruction  in  Refer- 
ence to  Dalgarno 174 

(July  1835. — Vol.  lxi.,  No.  cxxiv.,  pp.  407-417.) 


7 

r 


VI.  Idealism  ; with  Reference  to  the  Scheme  of  Arthur 

Collier 

(April  1839. — Vol.  lxviii.,  No.  cxxxviii.,  pp.  337-353.) 


185 


CONTENTS. 


iii 


LITERATURE. 


I.  Epistol/e  Obscurorum  Virorum  ; the  National  Satire  of 
Germany  


PAGE 

202 


(March  1831. — Vol.  liii.,  No.  ev.,  pp.  180-210.) 


II. 


On  the  Revolutions  of  Medicine 

LEN 


in  Reference  to  Cul- 
238 


(July  1832. — Vol.  lv.,  No.  cx.,  pp.  461-479.) 


EDUCATION. 

I.  On  the  Study  of  Mathematics,  as  an  Exercise  of  Mind.  257 
(Jan.  1836. — Vol.  lxii.,  No.  cxxvi.,  pp.  409-455.  Note,  Vol. 
lxiii.,  No.  cxxvii.,  pp.  270-275.) 


II.  On  the  Conditions  of  Classical  Learning.  With  Rela- 
tion to  the  Defense  of  Classical  Instruction,  by  Pro- 
fessor Pillans 325 

(Oct.  1836. — Vol.  lxiv.,  No.  cxxix.,  pp.  106-124.) 


III.  On  the  Patronage  and  Superintendence  of  Universities  345 
(April  1834. — Vol.  lix.,  No.  cxix.,  pp.  196-227.) 


IV.  On  the  State  of  ti-ie  English  Universities.  With  more 

especial  Reference  to  Oxford 383 

(June  1831. — Vol.  liii.,  No.  cvi.,  pp.  384-427.) 


V.  On  the  State  of  the  English  Universities.  With  more 

especial  Reference  to  Oxford  (Supplemental) 430 

(Dec.  1831. — Vol.  liv.,  No.  cviii.,  pp.  478-504.) 


CONTENTS.  is 

PAGE 

YI.  On  the  Eight  of  Dissenters  to  Admission  into  the  En- 
glish Universities 458 

(Oct.  1834. — Yol.  lx.,  No.  cxxi.,  pp.  202-230.) 

VII.  On  the  Eight  of  Dissenters  to  Admission  into  the  En- 

- glish  Universities  (Supplemental) 500 

(Jan.  1835. — vol.  lx.,  No.  cxxii.,  pp.  422-445.) 

VIII.  Cousin  on  German  Schools 526 

(July  1833. — Vol.  Ivii.,  No.  cxvi.,  pp.  505-542.) 


I.  APPENDIX,  PHILOSOPHICAL. 

(A.)  Conditions  of  the  Thinkable  Systematized;  Alphabet  of 

Human  Thought 567 

(B.)  Philosophical  Testimonies  to  the  Limitation  of  our  Knowl- 
edge, from  the  Limitation  of  our  Faculties 591 


II.  APPENDIX,  LOGICAL. 

(A.)  Of  Syllogism,  its  Kinds,  Canons,  Notations,  etc 602 

/B.)  On  Affirmation  and  Negation — on  Propositional  Forms — 
on  Breadth  and  Depth — on  Syllogistic,  and  Syllogis- 
tic Notation 609 


III.  APPENDIX,  EDUCATIONAL. 

(A.)  Academical  Patronage  and  Regulations  in  Reference  to 

the  University  of  Edinburgh ; 640 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

(B.)  Tiie  Examination  and  Honors  for  a Degree  in  Arts, 
during  Centuries  established  in  the  University  of 


Louvain 663 

(C.)  On  a Reform  of  tiie  English  Universities;  with  especial 
Reference  to  Oxford,  and  limited  to  the  Faculty  of 
Arts 669 


Index 


755 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


The  remarkable  passage,  in  which  Pascal  exhibits,  in  contrast,  the 
greatness  and  the  littleness  of  man,  has  received  a striking  illustration  in 
the  history  of  speculative  philosophy.  For,  while  it  embraces  some  of 
the  richest  and  profoundest  truth  ever  given  to  the  world,  it  abounds  in 
the  strangest  absurdities.  What  Varro  says  upon  this  point  is  as  true 
now  as  it  was  in  his  day  : nihil  tarn  absurde  did  potest  quod  non  dica- 
tur  ab  aliquis  philosophorum.  And  yet  some  of  the  greatest  names  in 
history  adorn  its  annals — -Pythagoras,  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Anselm, 
Aquinas,  Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Leibnitz,  Edwards,  Kant,  Yico, 
Schelling,  Hegel,  Reid,  and  though  last,  not  least,  Hamilton,  universally 
acknowledged  in  Europe  and  in  this  country,  as  “ the  first  philosophical 
critic  of  the  age.” 1 

Philosophy,  too,  has  often  mingled  with  the  highest  forms  of  literature 
— nay,  more — has  penetrated  into  the  life  of  whole  nations,  exalting, 
strengthening,  and  refining  their  character,  by  means  of  those  august  and 
beautiful  thoughts — 

“ Which  wander  through  eternity. 

As  an  intellectual  gymnasium  it  has  proved  of  immense  service  to  innu- 

1 Sir  William  Hamilton,  Bart.,  is  Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh.  He  is  descended  from  a noble  Scottish  family,  one  of  whom, 
it  is  said  by  De  Quincey,  drew  sword  at  the  celebrated  battle  of  Drumclog.  He  was 
admired,  even  when  a young  man,  for  his  extraordinary  literary  attainments.  His 
friends  called  him  the  Walking  Encyclopedia.  De  Quincey,  a competent  judge,  pro- 
nounces this  impression  correct,  and  says,  that  not  in  the  region  of  metaphysics  alone, 
but  in  almost  all  other  departments  of  knowledge,  he  was,  even  then,  thoroughly  read. 
His  manners  are  simple  and  dignified  ; his  whole  character  that  of  a great  and  a good 
man.  Though  rejecting  ontological  speculation  in  the  domain  both  of  philosophy  and 
theology,  he  cherishes  evidently  the  deepest  veneration  for  the  great  truths  not  only 
of  “ natural  religion,”  but  of  Christianity.  He  possesses  a thorough  contempt  for  the 
irreligious  pantheism  of  the  German  philosophy,  and  especially  for  the  mythic  theory 
of  Strauss  and  Bauer.  No  one,  however,  can  become  familiar  with  his  writings  with- 
out being  impressed  with  his  extraordinary  candor,  as  well  as  his  complete  mastery  of 
the  entire  field  of  philosophical  speculation.  His  candor  is  not  simply  a moral  qual- 
ity, but  the  natural  accompaniment  of  knowledge  and  power. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


merable  minds,  in  the  way  of  discipline.1  It  is  well  known,  also,  that  it 
lies  at  the  basis  of  all  theological  science  worthy  of  the  name,  giving 
strength  and  massive  grandeur  to  the  systems  of  Athanasius,  Augustine, 
Anselm,  and  Calvin.  Sometimes  perverting  the  simplicity  of  Christian 
faith,  it  has  often  come  to  its  rescue,  and  beaten  back  the  hosts  of  infi- 
delity and  error.  If  through  philosophy  the  Germans  have  been  se- 
duced from  evangelical  truth,  by  philosophy  they  are  returning  to  it.2 
Thought  encounters  thought,  speculation  wages  war  with  speculation, 
till  at  last  truth  emerges  from  the  strife,  vigorous  and  triumphant. 
Error,  indeed,  is  often  long-lived,  but  it  is  not  immortal.  It  may  re-ap- 
pear  in  different  ages,  but  it  must  die  out  at  last.  On  the  other  hand, 
truth,  which  has  its  essence  in  the  Divine  mind,  as  well  as  in  the  course 
and  constitution  of  nature,  is  imperishable. 

“ The  eternal  years  of  God  are  hers.” 

On  which  ground  we  vindicate  the  amplest  and  freest  discussion  in  the 
domain  both  of  religion  and  philosophy. 

It  must  be  allowed,  however,  tha.t  the  aberrations  of  speculative  in- 
quiry, thus  far,  form  the  larger  portion  of  its  history.  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton, with  all  his  enthusiasm  for  philosophical  research,  is  compelled  to 
say,  “ that  the  past  history  of  philosophy  has,  in  a great  measure,  been 
only  a history  of  variation  and  error.”3 

For  this  there  must  exist  some  great  underlying  cause.  Is  it  in  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  or  in  the  mode  of  its  investigation,  or  in  both  ? 
We  should  reply,  in  both  ; for  the  subject  is  one  of  extreme  tenuity  and 
difficulty,  and  the  mode  in  which  it  has  been  investigated  exceedingly 
variant  and  empirical.  It  embraces,  in  its  higher  relations,  a vast  and 
all  but  illimitable  range  of  inquiry,  although,  at  first  sight,  it  may  seem  to 
lie  within  a narrow  compass,  and  on  the  very  surface  of  the  soul.  But 
it  calls  up  at  the  outset  the  great  questions  pertaining  to  the  foundations 
of  our  knowledge,  with  the  possibility  of  scientific,  or  what  some  call,  ab- 
solute truth,  the  limits  of  the  human  intellect,  the  reality  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  subject  and  object,  the  world  without  and  the  world  within  ; 
and  at  a higher  point  of  inquiry,  the  relations  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite, 
the  mind  of  man  to  the  mind  of  God. 

1 For  proof  of  this  see  the  papers  in  this  volume  on  University  Reform,  the  Study 
of  Mathematics,  &c.,  most  of  which,  though  written  for  specific  occasions,  contain 
much  interesting  information  on  this  and  kindred  topics. 

- The  philosophy  of  Jacobi,  eminently  spiritual  and  favorable  to  Christianity,  has 
exerted  great  influence  in  the  restoration  of  the  German  mind  to  better  views.  The 
movement  commenced  by  Schleiermacher,  whose  last  words  were,  “ In  this  faith  I 
die,”  has  been  advanced  by  the  labors  of  Neander,  Tholuck,  Nitzsch,  Muller,  and  oth- 
ers. The  theory  of  Strauss,  based  upon  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  is  even  now  effete 
in  Germany.  The  French  philosophy,  at  one  time  sunk  in  sensualism,  has  been 
emancipated  by  the  labors  of  Cousin,  Jouffroy,  Damiron,  and  others.  In  this  respect 
a great  and  happy  change  has  been  effected. 

3 Reid’s  Collected  Works,  vol.  i.  Note  A.  p.  747. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY.  xiii 

The  main  source  of  aberration  would  thus  seem  to  lie  in  the  finite  or 
conditioned  nature  of  man  himself,  his  necessary  imperfection  of  knowl- 
edge and  experience,  and  the  extreme  difficulty  which  he  finds  in  abstract- 
ing himself  from  himself,  or  from  the  world  of  material  and  evanishing 
forms.  In  philosophy  he  is  first  to  make  himself  the  object  of  contem- 
plation, and  so  realize  within  his  own  sphere  the  two  poles  of  subject  and 
object,  and  thus  analyze  and  disintegrate  from  himself  all  the  elements  of 
his  inner  life.  Here,  even  when  possessed  of  extraordinary  penetration, 
patience,  and  analytic  power,  with  a legitimate  method  of  inquiry,  he  is 
almost  sure  to  lose  his  way,  or  become  bewildered  by  the  singularly  deli- 
cate, complicated,  and  ever-changing  trains  of  thought  and  feeling.  It  is 
like  trying  to  catch  the  changeable  Proteus  on  the  sea-shore,  and  extort 
from  him  the  secrets  of  truth.  Composed  of  diverse  elements,  a body  and 
a soul,  and  thus  linked  mysteriously  to  two  separate  yet  corresponding 
worlds,  the  world  of  matter  and  the  world  of  mind,  lying,  so  to  speak,  in 
the  bosom  of  the  infinite,  with  no  capacity,  except  in  the  way  of  contra- 
diction, to  form  a conception  of  absolutely  limited  or  unlimited  time,  float- 
ing like  a star  in  the  immensity  of  space,  between  the  transient  and  the 
eternal,  the  inquirer  can  scarcely  tell  how  much  he  owes  to  the  one,  and 
how  much  to  the  other.  He  finds  it  difficult,  at  the  very  commencement 
of  his  inquiries,  to  ascertain  how  much  he  can  know  of  either ; nay,  he 
perhaps  finds  it  impossible  to  ascertain  whether  he  can  know  any  thing 
in  a scientific  or  fundamental  way.  The  world  of  phenomena  lies  before 
him  obvious  enough,  and  these,  in  their  wide  and  beautiful  classifications, 
are  ranged  as  formal  systems,  which  men  call  scientific  ; but  he  wants  to 
get  beyond  them  into  the  real  and  immutable  cause  or  causes  of  things. 
Especially  he  longs  to  penetrate  beneath  the  surface  of  his  own  soul,  and 
ascertain  the  real  nature,  origin,  and  authority  of  human  thought.  Con- 
sciousness seems  to  be  his  only  sphere  of  knowledge  in  this  matter,  and 
there  he  finds  every  thing  given  apparently  under  a limit  and  a relation, 
which  he  longs  constantly  to  transcend,  and  transcending  which,  he  does 
not  know  whether  he  has  found  phantoms  or  realities.  And  even  when 
he  feels  that  he  has  ascertained  some  truths  satisfactorily,  he  must  con- 
clude that  there  is  yet  “ an  infinity  of  knowledge  beyond  his  reach.”  The 
more  he  knows,  as  Socrates,  Pascal,  and  other  great  thinkers  confess,  the 
more  deeply  he  feels  his  ignorance,  not  only  in  reference  to  nature  but  to 
himself.” 1 

Here  emerges,  then,  the  great  cause  of  aberration  in  speculative  phi- 
losophy. Its  very  nature  and  limits  have  not  been  adequately  defined. 
From  Thales  to  Kant,  and  from  Kant  to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  different 
methods  of  inquiry  have  been  followed  ; so  that  at  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  the  question  of  method  is  yet  in  discussion,  and  we  are 


1 See  upon  this  point  the  citations  in  the  “Discussions.” — P.  601,  et  seq. 


XIV 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


uot  ni  possession,  ns  nil  tlie  philosophers  acknowledge,  of  n complete  sys- 
tem  of  psychology,  to  sny  nothing  of  ontology,  or  the  philosophy  of  the 
nbsolute.1 

"What  cnn  we  know  ? Is  consciousness  nn  ndequate  and  supreme  au- 
thority in  nil  speculative  science  ? Are  subject  and  object,  the  Ego  and 
the  Eon  Ego  essentially  different  ? If  so,  what  are  their  true  connections  ? 
Docs  the  one  mirror  the  other  ? Is  every  thing  known  under  relation  or 
limit;  and  is  the  cognizable  to  be  determined  by  this  fact?  Are  there 
ureat  underlying  principles,  or  mental  data,  which  must  be  received  by 
faith,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  by  reason  as  the  faculty  of  intuitions, 
on  their  own  simple  authority ; and  are  these  the  basis  and  touchstone  of 
all  truth  ? Can  the  finite  transcend  itself  by  means  of  reason?  Can  we 
deduce  the  absolute  from  the  relative,  the  substance  from  its  phenomena? 
Or,  if  this  he  impossible,  can  we  discover,  by  an  inward  revelation  ( Offen - 
barung)  or  intuition  ( Anschamtng 2),  the  ground-elements  of  all  science  ; 
and  thus,  without  deduction,  grasp  the  real,  the  spiritual,  and  eternal  ? 
Or  if  this  be  denied,  must  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  manifested  and 
phenomenal,  and  acknowledge,  that  the  infinite  and  eternal  Cause  be- 
yond, though  recognized  as  an  ineffable  reality,  must  remain  unknown 
and  incomprehensible  ? Is  knowledge  thus  presentative  or  representative, 
mediate  or  immediate  ; or  is  it  both  ? Do  the  reason  and  the  understand- 
ing  differ,  so  that  the  one  is  occupied  with  infallible  convictions,  the  other 
with  mere  framework  and  form  ? Is  all  reason  based  upon  faith  (we 
mean  philosophical,  not  theological  faith),  or  is  faith  based  upon  reason  ? 
Must  we  know  to  believe,  or  believe  to  know?  In  a word,  What  is  the 
nature,  the  genesis,  and  the  limits  of  human  knowledge  ? 

These  are  high  and  thrilling  questions,  interesting  to  all  who  are  capa- 
ble, even  in  the  slightest  degree,  of  introspection  and  reflection,  and  espe- 
cially to  those  upon  whom  God  has  bestowed  the  gift  of  profound  and 
original  thought.  In  all  ages  they  have  engaged,  more  or  less,  the  atten- 
tion of  those  great  reflective  souls,  xvho  have  longed  to  realize  the  ancient 
philosophical  adage  of  yvtiOi  oeavTor. 

1 No  want  is  so  deeply  felt  by  thinkers  as  a complete  psychology,  which  must  form 
the  basis  of  all  higher  speculation.  Let  any  one  read  carefully  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s 
“ Supplementary  Dissertations,”  that  particularly  on  “ Common  Sense”  (Reid’s  Col- 
lected Works,  vol.  i.  p.  742),  and  he  will  be  satisfied  that  this  subject  has  to  be  in- 
vestigated afresh,  and  reconstructed  upon  a firm  and  permanent  basis.  We  have  in 
Reid,  Stewart,  Cousin,  and  others,  lists  of  the  fundamental  axioms  of  human  thought ; 
but  they  are  all  inadequate,  and  need  revision.  These  works  are  only  partial  prepar- 
ations for  a true  science  of  mind.  The  labors  of  the  Germans  have  been  chiefly  in  the 
field  of  the  absolute.  The  popular  treatises  which  go  under  the  name  of  psychologies, 
arc  mere  fragments  or  compilations.  Hickok’s  Rational  Psychology  is  too  rational- 
istic to  be  psychological  at  all.  It  is  based  upon  the  German  notions  of  ontological 
or  absolute  science,  and  though  indicating  extensive  research  and  considerable  vigor 
of  mind,  fails  to  solve  the  problems  suggested  at  the  very  outset  of  a true  psycholo- 
gical inquiry. 

2 Both  of  these  terms  are  used  by  Jacobi. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY 


XV 


It  might  he  inferred,  however,  from  the  very  nature  of  man,  determining 
the  character  and  scope  of  his  thought,  which  seems  to  hover  midway 
between  the  material  and  the  immaterial,  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  that 
the  aberrations  of  speculative  philosophy  would  he  likely  to  take  specific 
directions,  as  one  or  other  extreme  should  prevail.  From  its  limitation, 
as  conditioned  by  the  finite  mind,  thought  would  he  liable,  in  the  sphere 
of  philosophy,  to  fall  into  idealism  on  the  one  hand,  or  materialism  on  the 
other ; or  if  overleaping  its  apparent  boundaries,  it  would  plunge  now 
into  absolute  pantheism,  and  anon  into  universal  skepticism.  These  are 
the  actual  extremes  between  which  the  pendulum  of  speculative  thought 
has  been  found  to  swing,  apparently  resting  at  intervals  in  the  centre,  and 
then  inclining  now  to  this,  and  now  to  that  outermost  limit.  That  phi- 
losophy should  remain  in  either  of  these  extremes  is  impossible,  so  that 
until  it  find  its  true  and  immutable  rest  in  the  realty  of  things,  variation 
will  continue  to  he  its  law. 

But  we  propose  to  verify  these  general  statements  by  a rapid  survey  of 
the  progress  of  speculative  thought  from  the  earliest  to  the  present  times. 
This  will  aid  us  to  appreciate  the  vast  importance  of  a right  method  of 
philosophizing,  as  it  will  set  before  us  the  present  condition  of  the  science, 
and  the  peculiar  position  occupied  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  whose  con- 
tributions to  philosophy  and  logic,  though  occasional  and  fragmentary,  are 
of  a character  so  profound  and  fundamental,  as  to  form  an  era  in  the  his- 
tory of  mental  science.  No  one  can  be  said  to  be  familiar  with  the  pres- 
ent condition  and  future  prospects  of  philosophy  who  has  not  mastered 
these  remarkable  criticisms  and  discussions.1 

Our  survey,  of  course,  must  be  a mere  outline,  making  no  pretensions  to 
completeness,  but  touching  simply  such  points  as  may  serve  to  bring  out, 
in  more  articulate  form,  the  general  and  somewhat  imperfect  statement 
already  made  respecting  the  nature  and  sources  of  philosophical  error, 
falling  as  it  does,  now  on  this  side,  and  now  on  that  of  what  seems  to  be 
real  and  immutable  truth,  and  thus  giving  rise  to  idealism  and  pantheism 
on  the  one  hand,  or  to  materialism  and  atheism  on  the  other. 

The  history  of  Philosophy  may  be  divided  into  four  periods  — The  Ori- 
ental; the  Greek;  the  Medieval;  the  Modern.  These  we  shall  con- 
sider in  their  order. 

1.  If  we  ascend  to  the  dawn  of  speculation  among  the  Oriental  philo- 

1 We  include  those  appended  to  his  edition  of  the  Collected  Writings  of  Reid 
(Edinburgh,  1846)  as  also  his  various  criticisms  scattered  through  the  body  of  that 
work ; for  while  defending  Reid’s  fundamental  position,  in  opposition  to  Hume  and 
the  skeptical  school,  he  has  corrected  his  mistakes,  and  given  occasionally  clearer  and 
fuller  analyses  of  the  fundamental  elements  of  the  human  mind.  On  the  subject  of 
Logic,  of  which  we  have  no  room  to  speak,  he  has  defended  its  validity,  and  simpli- 
fied its  forms.  For  information  upon  this  subject  see  “Discussions,”  p.  116,  et  seq. 
p.  614,  et  seq.;  Blakey’s  History  of  Logic,  and  Mr.  Spencer  Baynes’s  Essav  on  the 
‘ New  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms.” 


XVI 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


sopkies,  or  rather  theosophies,  vast  and  shadowy,  like  the  countries 
which  gave  them  birth,  we  shall  discover  the  two  prevalent  tendencies 
referred  to ; though  the  current  of  Oriental  thought  has  always  inclined 
rather  to  idealism  than  to  materialism.  Both  of  these,  however,  are  real- 
ized among  the  Brahminical  sages,  and  are  occasionally  found  existing  in 
a blended  form,  giving  rise  to  a confused,  sensual  pantheism.  It  was  long, 
however,  before  philosophy  disentangled  itself,  in  any  degree,  from  religion, 
so  that  we  find,  lying  at  the  basis  of  all  the  speculations  of  the  Hindoo 
mind,  a complicated  system  of  mythological  worship,  in  which  a few  tra 
ditionary  fragments  respecting  God  and  the  soul  are  probably  mingled 
with  the  veneration  of  nature  or  the  universe.  For  this  reason  their 
religion  is  more  a worship  of  the  outward  and  carnal,  than  of  the  in- 
ward and  divine.  Still  the  world  is  regarded  as  a whole,  and  worshiped, 
in  its  various  elements  and  forms,  as  a manifestation  of  the  one  indivisi- 
ble, eternal  Brahm,  or  absolute  Being.  The  moment,  however,  that 
speculative  thought  took  a decisive  form,  it  vacillated  constantly  between 
the  real  and  the  ideal,  the  inner  and  the  outer  worlds.  Cousin  states  de- 
cisively that  the  first  fruit  of  their  philosophy,  the  moment  it  became  in- 
dependent of  the  Yedas,  or  sacred  books,  was  atheism.1  This  system, 
which  goes  far  back  into  the  annals  of  India,  was  called  Sankhya,  the 
author  of  which  was  Kapila,  a sort  of  Hindoo  Condillac.  According  to 
Kapila  all  thought  is  derived  from  sensation  ; consequently  there  is  nothing 
but  matter.  Synchronous  with  this  but  diverging  from  it,  was  the  phi- 
losophy of  Pantandjali,  which  as  the  other  made  nothing  of  God  made 
every  thing  of  God,  but  how  is  not  so  clearly  explained.2  Opposed  to  the 
narrow  and  atheistic  philosophy  of  Kapila  was  the  theory  of  rationalism, 
called  Nyaya,  which  is  found  to  be  nothing  less  than  a system  of  subject- 
ive idealism.  As  in  Fichte’s  philosophy,  the  soul  is  the  centre  of  this  phi- 
losophy, and  is  infinite  in  its  principle.  True,  it  is  admitted  to  be  a 
special  substance,  distinct  from  the  body,  and  different  in  different  indi- 
viduals ; so  that  this  form  of  idealism  was  not  consistently  carried  out. 
But  this  was  subsequently  done  in  the  philosophy  called  Vedanta,  which 
denied  the  existence  as  finite  realities  of  both  matter  and  mind,  and 
recognized  one  universal  Substance,  as  nature  and  God.  The  final  abso- 
lute verity  according  to  Karika,  a celebrated  commentator  on  the  San- 
khya was  this  : 

“ I neither  am,  nor  is  aught  mine,  nor  do  I exist.” 


1 Hist,  de  la  Philosopliie.  Second  Series.  Tome  ii.  p.  120.  See  also  Tennemann’s 
Manual,  p.  41. 

2 There  is  much  uncertainty  respecting  the  forms  of  the  Hindoo  philosophy.  Some, 
among  whom  is  Ritter,  doubt  whether  it  ought  to  be  dignified  with  the  name  of  phi- 
losophy at  all.  Hegel  in  his  Geschichte  der  Philosopliie,  says  that  their  philosophy 
is  “ identical  with  their  religion,”  and  that  its  “ fundamental  idea  is  this,  that  there  is 
one  Universal  Substance  from  which  all  things  proceed,  gods,  animals,  inorganic 
nature,  and  man.” 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xvn 


.Thus  pantheism,  in  its  most  decisive  form,  was  made  the  basis  not 
only  of  Hindoo  philosophy  but  of  Hindoo  worship.  All  things  come  from 
Brahm  and  thither  all  return.  Mind  is  matter,  and  matter  is  mind,  and 
all  is  God  1 Hegel  is  much  pleased  with  the  pantheistic  philosophy  of 
India,  and  quotes  with  approbation  the  Bhagavad  Gita,  in  which  the  god 
Krishnu,  an  incarnation  of  Vishnu  and  thence  of  Brahm,  is  introduced 
addressing  the  warrior  Ardjouna  : “ I am  the  author  and  destroyer  of  the 
universe,  etc.  I am  the  breath  which  dwells  in  the  body  of  the  living, 
the  progenitor  and  the  governor.  * * * * I am  the  beginning,  the  middle, 
and  the  end  of  all  things.  I am  under  the  stars  the  radiant  sun,  under 
the  lunar  signs  the  moon,  the  sweet  perfume  of  the  earth,  the  splendor 
of  the  flame,  the  life  in  animals,”  &c.2 

Hence  the  key  for  the  deliverance  of  the  soul,  according  to  the  school 
of  Vedantam,  is  in  these  words,  which  the  Hindoo  sages  have  to  repeat 
incessantly,  Aham,  Ava,  param  Brahma,  I am  the  supreme  God — the 
last  result  of  a fanatical  pantheism.3 

Tholuck  in  his  interesting  work  on  the  pantheistic  philosophy  of  the 
Persians  (Ssufismus)  informs  us  that  the  Mohammedan  heretical  philoso- 
phers, the  Soofies,  teach  that  God  is  every  thing,  in  the  most  absolute  sense 
of  the  expression,  nihil  esse  prceter  Deam,  that  the  external  universe 
is  a divine  emanation,  and  that  absorption  in  the  primal  essence  is  the 
highest  good.  In  a word,  their  doctrine  is  that  of  a sublime,  inexor- 
able pantheism,  in  which  all  distinction  between  subject  and  object,  being 
and  thought,  holiness  and  sin,  God  and  man  is  swallowed  up  and  lost. 
The  Budhists  of  India,  an  offshoot  from  Brahminism,  materialize  all 
things,  consequently  deny  an  eternal  God,  and  long  for  Burchan,  which 
is  simply  annihilation.  Thus  the  Oriental  soul  vibrates  darkly  between 
pantheism  and  atheism,  longing  for,  but  apparently  never  finding,  the 
“ Unknown  God.” 

2.  It  was  in  Greece,  however,  that  ancient  speculative  thought  devel- 
oped itself  with  the  greatest  vigor.  Somewhat  under  the  influence  of 
the  Oriental  mind,  but  acute,  restless,  penetrating,  practical,  and  pressing 
philosophy,  as  all  else,  to  its  extreme  logical  verge,  the  Grecian  thinkers 


1 See  Cousin’s  Hist,  de  la  Philosophie.  Second  Series.  Tome  ii.  Sixieme  Leqon. 
Tennemann’s  Manual  (Bohn’s  Ed.)  pp.  37,  38.  Compare  Ritter’s  Ancient  Philosophy, 
vol.  i.  pp.  60-128.  For  more  extended  information  consult  Colebrooke’s  Essay,  and 
Miscellanies.  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  vols.  i.  and  ii. 

2 See  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Schriften,  T.  13,  p.  152,  et  seq.  Hegel  is  espe- 
cially pleased  with  the  Sankhya,  and  imagines  that  he  sees  in  this  his  own  funda- 
mental principle,  especially  the  three  momenta  or  qualities  of  “ The  Absolute  Idea.” 
p.  154.  It  is  well  known  that,  in  the  Hindoo  Cosmogony,  Brahm,  the  absolute  and  in- 
conceivable becomes  manifest  in  Brahma,  Vishnu,  and  Shiva,  who  represent  the  creat- 
ing, preserving,  and  destroying  powers  of  the  Universe.  These  form  a circle,  in  which 
all  things  proceed  from  and  return  into  the  absolute.  This,  therefore,  in  the  form  of 
theosophy,  would  represent  the  three  Momenta,  or  Trinity  of  Hegel’s  AbsoluteTdea. 

3 Tholuck's  Ssufismus,  p.  214,  quoted  from  Lettres  Edifiantes. 

b 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xviii 

seized,  with  avidity,  the  great  problems  of  existence,  and  projected  an 
infinite  variety  of  plausible  and  splendid  theories.  But  “the  boundless 
Power,  the  infinite  Substance  of  the  Orientals,”  as  Hegel  suggests,  “ was 
determined,  limited,  individualized  by  the  Hellenic  genius.”  In  India, 
grand  and  colossal,  the  forces  of  nature  are  deified  ; unity,  immensity, 
eternity,  are  its  leading  ideas,  absorption  its  longing  and  aim.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  gods  of  Greece  are  “the  offspring  of  passion  and  thought,” 
and  its  philosophy  that  of  the  Kosrnos,  or  visible  universe,  as  limited,  but 
complete,  beautiful,  harmonious.  The  outward  and  formal,  indeed,  is 
finally  transcended,  and  the  essence  of  philosophy  is  recognized  in  the 
absolute  and  ideal.  But  nature,  with  its  grace,  beauty,  and  movement, 
supplies  the  chief  inspiration  of  the  Greek  mind,  and  the  absolute  or  ideal 
is  little  more  than  an  abstraction  of  material  forms. 

Never  in  the  annals  of  history  did  thought  expatiate  with  more  free- 
dom and  energy  ; and  here,  if  anywhere,  might  philosophy  have  reached 
perfection  and  solved  the  enigma  of  the  universe.  But  we  find  it  con- 
stantly vacillating  between  subject  and  object,  sensualism  and  idealism, 
atheism  and  pantheism,  and  finally,  running  out  into  a flat  and  arid 
skepticism. 

The  earlier  Greek  philosophers  are  speculative  naturalists,  who  attempt 
to  solve  the  origin  of  the  universe  by  a reference  to  natural  or  occult 
forces.  The  idea  of  a supreme  and  controlling  mind  seems  to  haunt 
them,  but  seldom  comes  out  in  clear  and  articulate  form.  Soon  they 
range  themselves  under  two  determinate  schools — the  Ionian  and  the 
Eleatic ; the  former,  with  some  exceptions,  teaching  a system  of  natural- 
ism, or  refined  materialism,  with  occasional  glimpses  of  an  all-penetrating 
Mind  or  God;  the  other,  a system  of  idealism,  which  issues  in  a lofty  but 
bewildering  pantheism.1  Thales,  the  founder  of  the  Ionian  school,  derived 
all  things  from  water,  or  moisture,  as  a generative  principle,  accompanied  or 
followed,  it  is  difficult  to  say  which,  by  a sort  of  magnetic  or  mental  en- 
ergy, pervading  universal  nature.2  Anaximander  advanced  a step  further, 
and  maintained  that  all  things,  or  the  material  universe  in  its  totality,  is  the 
only  God.  Anaximanes,  and  somewhat  later  Diogenes  of  Apollonia,  asserted 
that  air  and  not  water  is  the  true  source  of  all  existence  ; while  Hera- 
clitus of  Ephesus,  oracular  and  profound,  found  it  in  the  more  delicate 
and  resplendent  element  of  fire.  Perhaps,  as  Hitter  suggests,  he  used  the 
term  fire  in  a figurative  sense,  and  really  believed,  as  he  seems  to  teach, 

1 The  Ionian  school  varies  exceedingly,  as  Ritter  (Hist,  of  A.  Ph.  p.  201,  ct  seq.) 
has  shown.  We  do  not  find  any  decided  continuity  in  their  views. 

2 Thales  seems  to  have  regarded  the  Kosmos  as  a sort  of  animal,  having  a vital,  or 
seminal  principle,  by  which  it  is  nourished.  He  has  been  represented,  on  the  author- 
ity of  Cicero,  who  mistook  the  testimony  of  Aristotle,  as  a sublime  Theist.  If  he 
believed  in  God,  he  made  water  and  God  primary  essences.  In  his  view,  all  things 
are  “ ensouled.”  Amber  and  the  magnet,  for  example,  he  represents  as  possessing 
“ souls.”  His  term  for  soul  is  \]s vx q. — Aristotle,  De  Animo,  i.  2. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xix 


that  the  all-creative,  all-penetrating  power  is  infinite  and  eternal  Reason. 
Judging  from  the  spirit  and  scope  of  his  speculations,  he  belongs  rather 
to  the  school  of  Elea  than  to  that  of  Ionia.  His  Eternal  Fire  produces 
and  absorbs  all  individual  phenomena.  “All  is  and  is  not.”  “On  the 
same  stream  we  embark,  and  we  embark  not ; we  are,  and  we  are  not.” 
“Life  is  death,  and  death  is  life.”  “All  is  contrary,  and  yet  all  is  har- 
mony.” A doctrine  which  must  have  been  posited  in  the  idea  of  abso- 
lute and  eternal  unity.  To  him  the  universe  is  “ensouled”  and  divine; 
in  a word,  pantheism,  as  in  the  school  of  Elea,  is  the  logical  result  of  his 
system.  Whence  the  force  of  his  favorite  apothegm,  “ Enter ; for  here, 
too,  are  gods.”  1 

It  may  be  naturally  supposed,  that  according  to  the  views  of  most  of 
the  Ionian  philosophers,  the  soul  of  man  is  either  a natural  energy,  or  a 
mere  mechanical  force,  somewhat  refined ; consequently  fatalism  is  its 
logical  issue. 

From  this  source  sprang  the  atomic  theory  of  Leucippus  and  Democri- 
tus, according  to  which  the  universe,  internal  and  external,  is  composed 
of  definite  atoms.  The  soul  is  a collection  of  such  atoms,  igneous,  and 
spherical,  producing  at  once  motion  and  thought.  The  theory  was  in- 
genious, and  admitted,  in  its  elucidation  and  defense,  of  much  eloquent 
discussion,  hut  could  never  transcend  the  forms  of  matter,  or  lift  the  soul 
to  the  idea  of  supreme  and  eternal  perfection. 

Xenophanes,  a rhapsodist,  as  well  as  philosopher,  is  usually  recognized 
as  the  founder  of  the  Eleatic  school,  and  certainly  attained,  at  least  by 
glimpses,  to  lofty  views  of  God  and  the  universe  ; but  he  found  himself 
bewildered  by  the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  All,  the  All  and  the  One 
Thus  he  says,  mournfully  : 

“ Certainly  no  mortal  yet  knew,  and  ne’er  shall  there  be  one 
Knowing  well  both  the  gods  and  the  All,  whose  nature  we  treat  of : 

For  when,  by  chance,  he  at  times  may  utter  the  true  and  the  perfect, 

He  wists  not  unconscious  ; for  error  is  spread  over  all  things.”2 

Between  the  Ionian  school,  with  its  world  of  natural  forces,  and  the 
Eleatic  with  its  abstract  or  ideal  one,  we  find  the  Italian  school  founded 
by  Pythagoras,  who,  with  a profounder  insight  than  most  of  his  contem- 
poraries, penetrated  beneath  mere  phenomena,  and  tried  to  solve  the  in- 
terior relations  of  things.  His  mind,  like  that  of  Spinoza,  in  more  modem 
times,  was  eminently  mathematical,  and  so  he  constituted  the  universe 


1 Ritter,  Hist,  of  Anc.  Phil.  i.  255. 

2 Hence  the  appropriateness  of  the  words  put  into  his  mouth  by  Timon,  the 
Sillograph  : 

“ 0 that  mine  were  the  deep  mind,  prudent  and  looking  to  both  sides  ; 

Long,  alas  ! have  I strayed  on  the  road  of  error,  beguiled, 

And  am  now  hoary  of  years,  yet  exposed  to  doubt  and  distraction 
Of  all  kinds  ; for  wherever  I turn  to  consider 
I am  lost  in  the  One  and  All." 


XX 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


of  numbers,  and  recognized  the  Deity  as  a simple  numerical  unit,  from 
which  the  universe  is  evolved.  “ The  Ionians,”  says  Hegel,  “ conceived 
the  absolute  under  a natural  form  ; instead  of  this,  the  Pythagoreans  sub- 
stituted Number,  which  is  neither  a material  thing,  nor  pure  thought, 
but  something  between  them,  which  partakes  of  the  nature  of  both.” 
Chaos  is  organized  by  numbers,  and  the  universe  is  both  one  and  many. 

The  Eleatic  school  veas  formed  under  Pythagorean  influence.  Unity 
was  its  central  principle,  and  diversity,  or  plurality,  was  gradually  elim- 
inated. It  was  finally  abandoned  by  Zeno,  who  denied  the  innate  energy, 
and  the  consequent  real  existence  of  the  external  world.  Parmenides 
maintained  that  thought  is  one  with  its  object,  one  with  actual  existence, 
and  thus  approached  the  absolute  idealism  of  the  modern  German  school. 

In  this  way  the  schools  of  Ionia  and  Elea  represented  the  two  extremes 
of  philosophical  speculation,  and  combated  each  other  with  various  suc- 
cess, the  consequence  of  which  was  the  rise  of  many  Skeptics  who  despised 
them  both,  and  a very  few  Eclectics  who  attempted,  but  without  decided 
success,  to  blend  the  peculiarities  of  the  two  systems.1 

At  last  Socrates  made  his  appearance,  the  noblest  and  purest  of  all 
tbe  Greek  philosophers,  the  friend  and  teacher  of  Alcibiades,  Xenophon, 
and  Plato,  who,  like  Reid  in  Scotland,  recalled  his  countrymen  to  the 
reality  of  things  and  the  dictates  of  common  sense,  and  thus  created  an 
epoch  in  the  history  of  thought.  It  was  not,  however,  in  precisely  the 
same  import  of  the  expression,  as  that  attached  to  it  by  Dr.  Reid,  and 
explained  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  that  Socrates  appealed  to  the  dictates  of 
; common  sense.”  He  made  nn  attempt,  on  philosophical  grounds,  to 
ascertain  the  fundamental  axioms  of  thought,  or  to  construct  a psycho- 
logical system.  He  called  attention  only  to  common  convictions,  con- 
ceded principles,  obvious  every-day  uses  ; exhorted  men  to  study  them- 
selves, and  not  cheat  their  minds  by  prejudices  and  appearances,  and 
especially  by  an  unmeaning  logomachy.  His  method,  if  he  had  any,  was 
that  of  clear  definitions,  admirable  within  certain  limits,  but  liable  to 
great  abuse.  He  poured  contempt  upon  the  shallow  pretensions  of  the 
popular  teachers,  and  endeavored  to  turn  the  minds  of  men  in  upon  them- 
selves. “ Know  thyself,”  was  his  great  maxim,  goodness  his  end  and 
aim.  He  had  no  theory,  properly  speaking,  wrote  no  book,  founded  no 
school.  He  followed  common  sense,  “the  good  demon,”  as  he  symbolized 
it — the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty,  we  should  say,  “the  light  which 
lighteth  every  man,”  who  will  heed  it;  in  other  words,  the  deep  spon- 
taneous convictions  of  tbe  well-ordered  soul,  which  evermore  suggest  the 
reality  of  a Supreme  Being,  the  beauty  and  authority  of  virtue.  Man 

1 When  vve  speak  of  the  school  of  Ionia,  it  is  rather  in  deference  to  usage,  for  we 
have  already  seen  that  one  of  the  number  was  rather  an  idealist  than  a materialist. 
Indeed  there  is  so  much  diversity  among  them,  that  its  members  alone  might  be  taken 
as  representatives  of  the  two  extremes  of  philosophical  speculation. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxi 


comes  from  God,  as  he  is  made  for  God,  and  he  has  only  to  open  his  eyes 
to  see  him,  and  his  heart  to  feel  him.  “ He  is  not  far  from  any  one  of 
us ; seeing  he  giveth  to  all  life,  and  breath,  and  all  things ; for  in  him 
we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being.”  But  the  instant  man  begins  to 
speculate  on  the  absolute,  as  if  he  could  comprehend  it  in  its  essence,  he 
falls  into  error  and  doubt  the  most  bewildering  and  fatal.  By  a kind  of 
sacred  intuition,  Socrates  seemed  to  understand  this  ; and  his  glory  con- 
sists in  following  that  intuition  to  its  legitimate,  practical  results.  That 
he  had  better  views  of  the  Divine  nature  and  government  of  the  universe 
than  the  most  of  his  contemporaries,  can  not  he  questioned  ; but  he  was 
wise  enough  not  only  to  know,  but  to  acknowledge  his  ignorance,  as  he 
playfully  suggests  when  accounting  for  the  decision  of  the  oracle  of  Apollo, 
which  pronounced  him  the  wisest  of  men. 

Properly  speaking,  Socrates  was  a moralist,  rather  than  a metaphysi- 
cian, and  longed,  as  intimated  in  the  Platonic  dialogues,  for  some  higher 
light  than  reason  alone  could  furnish.  His  death,  one  of  the  most  sublime 
in  the  history  of  ancient  times,  crowned  his  life  with  imperishable  honor, 
and  produced  a deeper  conviction  than  all  the  speculations  of  the  schools, 
of  the  spirituality  and  immortality  of  man. 

Notwithstanding  the  beauty  of  his  life  and  the  excellence  of  his  max- 
ims, it  is  singular  that  under  the  eyes  of  Socrates,  and  as  one  of  the  im- 
mediate results  of  the  speculative  spirit  then  rife  among  the  Greeks, 
sprang  two  schools,  the  Cynic  and  the  Cyrenaic,  the  one  resulting  in  a 
fanatical  rigor,  the  other  in  gross  licentiousness.  Skepticism  was  defend- 
ed by  the  Socratic  dialectics  under  Euclid  of  Megara. 

But  Grecian  philosophy  culminated  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  the  first  to 
present  speculative  thought  in  a truly  scientific  form.  Apparently  diverg- 
ing at  the  outset,  we  find  these  great  thinkers  coming  together  in  the 
higher  sphere  of  speculation,  and  constituting  the  universe  of  absolute 
thought.1  The  temperaments  of  the  two  men  are  different,  but  the  re- 
sults to  which  they  arrive  are  very  much  alike.  Both  transcend  all  out- 
ward forms,  whether  of  nature  or  the  finite  intellect,  and  expatiate  in  the 
boundless  regions  of  unconditioned  being.  Aristotle  seems  empirical,  but 
in  reality  is  pre-eminently  rationalistic  ; for  while  he  rejects  Plato’s  ideas 
as  actual  entities,  and  maintains  their  simple  subjective  character,  he  is 
not  quite  consistent  with  himself,  and  in  the  end  constitutes  the  universe 

1 No  man  has  been  more  completely  misrepresented  in  modern  times  by  the  cur 
rent  writers  on  the  subject,  than  Aristotle.  He  is  constantly  charged  with  empiri 
cism,  and  in  this  respect  unfavorably  contrasted  with  Plato.  Whereas  he  was  Plato's 
proper  successor,  in  the  development  of  metaphysical  science.  Less  eloquent  and 
more  logical,  he  stands  much  in  the  same  relation  to  Plato,  that  Hegel  does  to  Schel- 
ling.  He  uniformly  begins  with  experience,  perhaps  never  entirely  loses  sight  of  it. 
Still  he  is  as  speculative  as  Plato,  even  while  he  criticises  him.  But  as  he  takes 
every  opportunity  of  criticising  his  master,  it  has  been  inferred  that  his  philosophy 
is  entirely  different. 


xxii 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


of  thought,  and  so  becomes,  in  a different  direction,  as  ideal  as  Plato.1 2 
The  two  men  possess  different  temperaments  and  different  styles  both  of 
thought  and  composition ; for  while  Aristotle  with  his  peculiarly  clear 
and  methodical  mind,  constructs  his  vast  edifice,  according  to  architect- 
ural rules,  to  borrow  the  figure  of  Goethe,  Plato,  mystical  and  imagina- 
tive, ascends  to  heaven  in  a pyramid  of  flame.  Yet  Aristotle,  while 
laying  his  foundations  on  the  earth,  advances  in  the  same  direction,  and 
according  to  Hegel,  transcends  his  master  in  the  conception  of  the  absolute 
idea.3  By  far  the  most  learned  man  of  his  age,  both  in  the  departments 
of  speculative  and  experimental  science,  more  learned  even  than  Plato, 
with  whom  he  studied  twenty  years,  the  author  of  the  syllogism,  and  the 
father  of  natural  history,  this  illustrious  thinker  made  a near  approach  to 
(he  methods  of  Bacon  and  Newton.  But  enamored  of  speculation,  Aris- 
totle finally  identified  being  and  thought,  indulged  in  the  most  subtle 
speculation  on  entities  and  quiddities,  and  fell  into  a notion  respecting  the 
primal  Essence,  first  as  absolute  or  unknown,  then  as  active  and  real- 
ized, making  God  (rather  to  Oelov  the  divine,  to  a-neepov  the  infinite), 
the  mere  thought  of  the  universe,  organized  in  matter,  and  coming  to 
consciousness  in  man,  a system  akin  to  that  of  Hegel,  and  giving  birth, 
in  its  last  result,  to  a profound  religious  indifference. 

Plato,  dialectical,  yet  imaginative,  does  not  deny  the  facts  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  any  more  than  the  facts  of  consciousness.  He  starts  from 
these,  but  speedily  transcends  them.  His  system  is  ideal  and  sublime. 
He  derives  all  things  from  ideas,  which  he  regards  not  merely  as  names 
or  abstractions,  but  as  actual  entities,  having  a necessary  and  eternal  ex- 
istence. To  him  existence  and  ideas  are  identical,  the  process  of  thought 
is  the  process  of  the  Universe.  Having  gained  this  height,  and  beholding 
all  things  in  the  absolute,  Plato  proceeds  to  construe  the  real  world  by 
means  of  archetypal  ideas.  He  naturally  despises  the  outward  and 
phenomenal,  and  while  recognizing  the  Supreme  Cause,  as  an  infinite 
Essence,  he  makes  him  so  absolute — in  other  words,  so  abstract  and  ideal 
— as  to  divest  him  of  all  personality.3  The  primal  Idea  or  Essence,  in  which 
are  included  all  other  ideas,  thus  transcends  all  our  approaches  of  thought, 
above  all,  of  affection  and  worship.  The  reason  or  soul  of  man  is  a part 
or  emanation  of  the  Universal  Reason,  and  finds  its  highest  aim  in  min- 
gling with  its  perfect  ideal  and  source.  It  is  fallen  from  its  primitive 
state,  for  it  existed  in  the  past  eternity  ; whence  the  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas,  or  of  reminiscence — as  Plato  called  it — through  which  it  must  once 
more  re-ascend  to  its  fountain,  by  abstraction  from  the  outward  and  tran- 

1 For  proof  of  this  see  the  12th  chapter  of  his  “ Metaphvsica.”  Compare  Ritter, 
Hist,  of  Phil.  iii.  pp.  176-178. 

2 See  Gcschichte  der  Philosophic.  (Schriften,  T.  xiv.)  pp.  298-301. 

Plato’s  god  of  the  Universe  (Kosrnos)  is  very  different  from  the  Supreme  Idea , or 
Reason,  for  he  represents  it  as  created  by  the  Supreme  Reason.  See  the  close  of  the 
Timaeus.  Compare  Timams,  cxiv.  ; Pha;drus,  55. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxiii 


sient  world.1  The  Supreme  Reason  organized  chaos  (Hyle,  a sort  of  re- 
fined basis  of  matter,  eternal  as  God)  into  order  and  beauty.  But  as  there 
is  nothing  beautiful  but  intelligence,  and  no  intelligence  without  a soul, 
he  placed  a soul  in  the  body  of  the  world  (Kosmos),  and  represented  it  as 
a living,  conscious  existence.  Being  an  animal,  having  a soul  as  well  as 
a body,  it  resembles  its  Creator,  as  human  beings  resemble  the  Kosmos, 
or,  to  ~dv  £o)ov,  the  universal  animal ! This  was  the  work  of  the  Su- 
preme Reason  ; so  that  the  instant  this  vast  animal  began  to  live,  think, 
and  move,  God  looked  upon  it  and  was  glad.2 

Plato  combines,  apparently,  the  peculiarities  of  the  Oriental  and  Grecian 
minds ; and  his  system  is  not  without  its  inconsistencies  and  contradic- 
tions. Unity,  however,  is  its  central  idea ; abstraction  and  idealization 
its  methods.  He  is  dialectical  and  mystical,  logical  and  poetical,  by  turns 
But  evermore  he  soars  upward  and  onward  toward  the  true,  the  beauti- 
ful, and  the  good,  in  their  perfect  and  eternal  archetypes.  The  soul, 
though  fallen  into  matter  and  sin,  has  a reminiscence  of  its  sublime  ori- 
gin, and  renouncing  the  senses,  ascends  to  purity  and  God.3  If  Plato’s 
metaphysical  views  are  developed  in  the  Parmenides,  as  his  theosophic 
and  cosmological  are  in  the  Timceus,  then  Hegel  is  probably  right,  when  he 
maintains  that  Plato  conceived  God,  cr  the  Absolute,  as  “ the  identity  of 
the  identical  and  the  non-identical,”  in  which  all  real  and  permanent  dis- 
tinction between  subject  and  object,  finite  and  infinite,  is  lost,  and  nothing 
is  left  but  relation  and  “ becoming.”  The  universe  lies  between  two 
zeros,  or  abstractions,  being  and  non-being ; so  that,  as  Plato  teaches,  “ if 
the  One  exist  it  is  nothing,”  and  yet  “ it  is  every  thing,”  that  is,  nothing 
in  itself  as  absolute,  but  every  thing  and  all,  as  realized  and  concrete.4 

But  without  entering  into  this  obscure  and  disputed  matter,  we  may  be 
permitted  to  say  that  idealism  is  the  true  genius  of  the  Platonic  philoso- 
phy. God  geometrizes  the  universe  by  ideas  and  relations.  From  the 
one  abstract  fountain,  all  existence — sun,  stars,  worlds,  gods,  animals, 
and  men — flow  into  outward,  phenomenal  existence.  It  is  but  a step 
to  say  that  the  external  world  is  only  an  appearance,  a beautiful  but  be- 
wildering masquerade  ; or,  as  Emerson  has  expressed  it,  that  “ God  is  the 
only  substance,  and  his  method  illusion.”  Plato  scarcely  says  so  : but  he 
supplies  the  premises  from  which  others  deduce  the  appalling  error.  An 
ideal  pantheism  is  the  logical  consequence  of  the  Platonic  philosophy. 

From  Plato  and  Aristotle,  then,  we  see  the  Platonic  and  Peripatetic 
schools  inclining  to  the  opposite  extremes  of  abstract  rationalism  and 

1 For  the  doctrine  of  reminiscence,  see  the  Phsedo,  47,  48,  49  ; Phsedrus,  61,  62. 

See  also  Timasus,  clxxii.  2 Timaeus,  cxiv. 

3 See  the  beautiful  mythic  hymn,  as  Socrates  calls  it,  in  which  the  fall  and  subse- 
quent re-ascension  of  the  soul  is  figured.  Phsedrus,  55,  56,  et  seq. 

4 See  the  Parmenides,  'passim,  which  seems  to  be  a discussion  on  the  relations  of 
being  and  non-being,  or,  as  it  were,  the  relations  between  yes  and  no,  something  and 
nothing. 


XXIV 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


blank  materialism.1  Epicurus,  who  founded  a school  of  his  own,  which 
nearly  absorbed  all  the  rest,  represents  sensualism  ; so  that  throughout 
Greece,  all  faith  in  the  supernatural  began  to  be  lost.  At  last,  about  the 
time  of  Christ,  the  two  prevalent  forms  of  philosophy  were,  the  stern  doc- 
trine of  the  Stoics,  founded  on  the  idea  of  pantheism  and  inexorable  fate  ; 
and  a system  of  Epicurean  indifference,  which  resolved  all  virtue  into 
a calculation  of  prudence,  or  a wise  pursuit  of  pleasure. 

The  same  views  reappeared  among  the  Romans,  with  some  revival  in 
Cicero  and  others,  of  the  Platonic  spirit.  It  had  lost,  however,  its  genius 
and  inspiration,  and  claimed  attention  only  as  a system  of  academic 
doubt.2  Indeed  a secret  skepticism  was  the  terrible  shadow  which  accom 
panied  all  ancient  speculation,  and  seemed  eventually  to  take  possession 
of  the  entire  Greek  and  Roman  minds.  The  Elder  Pliny,  who  was  willing 
to  perish  at  Vesuvius,  gives  it  mournful  utterance  in  the  following  words. 
“ All  religion  is  the  offspring  of  necessity,  weakness,  and  fear.  What  God 
is,  if  in  truth  he  be  any  thing  distinct  from  the  world,  it  is  beyond  the 
compass  of  the  human  understanding  to  know.  But  it  is  a foolish  delusion, 
which  has  sprung  from  human  weakness  and  pride,  to  imagine  that  such 
an  infinite  spirit  would  concern  himself  about  the  petty  affairs  of  man.  It 
is  difficult  to  say,  whether  it  might  not  be  better  for  men  to  be  wholly 
without  religion,  than  to  have  one  of  this  kind,  which  is  a reproach  to  its 
object.  The  vanity  of  man  and  his  insatiable  longing  after  existence, 
have  led  him  also  to  dream  of  a life  after  death.  A being  full  of  contra- 
dictions, he  is  the  most  wretched  of  creatures ; since  the  other  creatures 
have  no  wants  transcending  the  bounds  of  their  nature.  Man  is  full  of 
desires  and  wants,  that  reach  to  infinity,  and  can  never  be  satisfied.  His 
nature  is  a lie — uniting  the  greatest  poverty  with  the  greatest  pride. 
Among  these  so  great  evils  the  best  thing  God  has  bestowed  upon  man  is 
the  power  of  taking  his  own  life  !” 

The  “ nature”  of  man,  however,  must  be  met ; and  skepticism  can  never 
satisfy  the  cravings  of  the  soul.  Hence  we  find,  subsequently  to  the  Chris- 
tian era,  a revival  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  in  Alexandria,  mingled  with 
some  Oriental  elements  of  theosophic  mysticism.  Gorgeous  and  imposing, 
appealing  to  the  deepest  wants  of  our  nature,  and  promising  the  realiza- 
tion of  our  fondest  hopes,  in  union  with  infinite  beatitude,  Neo-Platonism 
now  favored,  and  now  opposed  Christianity.  Occasionally  it  was  pro- 
foundly pious,  as  in  Clement  and  Origen,  and  left  an  indelible  impression 
on  the  new  faith.  It  tended,  however,  to  the  absolute  unity  of  all  things. 
Its  predominant  element  was  pantheism.  Both  Plotinus  and  Proclus  bor- 

1 The  Peripatetics  did  not  fully  understand  their  master.  His  system  seemed  em- 
pirical, and  opposed  to  the  Platonic — which  Aristotle  constantly  took  every  opportu- 
nity of  criticising.  It  thence  became,  in  effect,  really  empirical  and  materialistic. 

2 It  is  on  this  account  we  meet  such  singular  inconsistencies  in  the  philosophical 
writings  of  Cicero.  For  now  he  seems  to  believe  in  God  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  anon  to  doubt  these  fundamental  truths. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


XXV 


rowed  largely,  not  only  from  Plato,  but  from  the  Eastern  Magi.  Their 
philosophy  had  some  grand  and  imposing  features  ; but  it  could  not  escape 
the  vortex  of  the  absolute,  and  went  out  in  a paroxysm  of  mystic  trans- 
cendentalism. 

The  same  remarks  will  apply  to  the  system  of  the  Gnostics,  who  aimed 
at  absolute  knowledge,  first  opposing,  and  then  adopting  Christianity,  in 
a modified,  or  mutilated  form.  God  according  to  their  system  is  the  abso- 
lute Being,  from  whom  emanate  all  other  beings,  seons,  gods  and  men  in 
regular  gradation  and  succession.  Creation  is  represented,  as  in  the  Hin- 
doo philosophy,  as  an  emanation,  pure  and  resplendent  at  its  first  issue, 
but  becoming  grosser  and  darker  at  its  extremities.1 

This  closes  our  review  of  the  history  of  ancient  philosophy  ; and  before 
proceeding  to  the  consideration  of  the  modern,  including  the  mediaeval, 
we  may  be  permitted  to  inquire,  what  is  the  net  result  ? Has  the  true 
method  of  philosophical  investigation  been  found  ? Has  unity  or  con- 
sistency been  attained  ? Have  the  great  truths  of  the  soul,  of  God  and 
immortality,  and  the  relations  between  them  been  scientifically  estab- 
lished ? Is  man  thoroughly  known  ? Is  God  plainly  revealed  ? If  so, 
why  all  this  variation  and  doubt,  this  “building  up  and  tearing  down’’ 
of  theories,  this  strange  and  fatal  bewilderment  ? Do  we  not  feel,  at  our 
inmost  soul,  that  the  very  beginning  of  a reliable  philosophy  is  yet  to  be 
sought ; and  that  its  foundations  must  be  laid,  not  in  wild  ontological  con- 
jectures, which  transcend  the  limits  of  the  human  mind,  but  in  a true 
scientific  investigation  of  the  elementary  facts  of  human  consciousness  ? A 
fine  thing  it  is  to  be  gods,  soaring  on  wings  of  light,  beyond  the  visible 
diurnal  sphere,  and  reading  the  secrets  of  nature  and  of  God,  in  the  very 
centre  of  the  absolute  ; but  alas  ! we  are  compelled  to  confess  ourselves 
plain  mortals  who  by  patient  and  legitimate  inquiry,  or  by  divine  aid, 
must  build  up  the  pyramid  of  human  science,  with  its  summit  bathed  in 
light,  and  penetrating  the  encircling  heavens. 

3.  We  do  not  find  the  mediajval  or  the  more  recent  philosophies  com- 
pletely severed  from  the  ancient  systems,  yet  they  have  a character  and 
a career  of  their  own.  The  same  questions,  and  the  same  modes  of  treat- 
ment reappear,  but  modified  by  new  and  powerful  elements.  Christianity 
especially  has  exercised  an  immense  influence  upon  philosophical  thought, 
now  checking  and  now  elevating  its  speculations,  and  above  all  giving  it 
a more  decisively  moral  and  practical  character.  Still  philosophical  in- 
quiry has  asserted  its  independence,  and  often  lapsed  into  the  old  extremes, 
from  which  it  would  seem  all  but  impossible  to  preserve  it.  The  earlier 
Fathers  of  the  Church,  more  practical  than  speculative,  kept  within  narrow 
limits,  contenting  themselves  with  the  divine  authority  of  the  new  and 

1 Ritter,  vol.  iv.  p.  545,  et  seq.  Histoire  Critique  Du  Gnosticisme,  par  M.  J.  Matter. 
Tome  i.  pp.  220,  339.  For  an  abridged  statement  see  same  author,  “Histoire  Du 
Christianisme.”  Tome  i.  pp.  160-178.  Neander,  Church  Hist,  vol  i.  p.  366,  et  seq. 


XXVI 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


wonderful  revelation  which  had  broken  upon  their  minds.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  they  began  to  philosophize  with  any  freedom  they  lost  themselves, 
in  the  theory  of  matter  and  spirit,  and  especially  of  emanation.  Though 
professing  a spiritual  religion,  they  found  it  difficult  to  dispossess  their  minds 
of  material  notions  and  images.  Justin  Martyr,  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
Tertullian,  Origen,  and  especially  Arius,  with  their  divergent  doctrines  on 
the  divinity  of  the  Logos,  all  fall  into  this  error.  Clement  and  Origen, 
from  their  position,  are  under  Platonic  influence,  and  rise  into  higher  re- 
gions, but  give  too  much  play  to  the  mere  sensuous  imagination.  Athan- 
asius and  somewhat  later  Augustine,  especially  the  latter,  are  more  spirit- 
ual, and  distinguish  clearly  between  matter  and  mind,  finite  and  infinite 
existence.  The  necessity  of  defending  the  great  truths  of  Christianity 
against  all  opposers  naturally  introduced  a more  logical  and  systematic 
method  of  reasoning  ; and,  in  course  of  time,  we  find  the  speculative  spirit 
becoming  predominant  in  the  Church.  The  reverence  cherished  for  the 
Scriptures  by  the  early  doctors,  who  attempt  to  philosophize,  prevented 
them  from  wandering  too  far  in  the  labyrinths  of  speculation,  but  they  fre- 
quently marred  the  simplicity  of  the  truth  by  their  subtile  reasonings  and 
fierce  polemics. 1 In  the  middle  ages  the  predominant  philosophy  was  that 
of  Aristotle,  applied  as  a form  or  method  to  the  dogmas  of  the  Church. 
This  produced  an  elaborate  system  of  theological  dialectics,  controlled  and 
limited  by  ecclesiastical  authority.  The  schoolmen  could  not,  therefore, 
well  rush  into  the  extremes  of  speculation,  and  yet  how  frequently  is  the 
God  of  their  reason,  a mere  logical  quiddity,  or  metaphysical  abstraction. 

It  must  be  acknowledged,  however,  that  this  era,  limited  as  it  was,  in 
facilities  and  resources  for  philosophical  study,  was  rich  in  all  the  elements 
of  profound  and  vigorous  thought.  The  few  that  speculated  at  all,  did  so 
with  a patience  and  a grasp  which  ought  to  command  the  respect  of  all 
succeeding  times.  The  very  names  of  the  teachers  and  theologians  of  the 
middle  ages,  suggest,  even  to  those  but  slightly  acquainted  with  their  liter- 
ature, a feeling  of  veneration.  “ Scholasticos,”  says  Leibnitz,  “ agnosco 
abundare  ineptiis ; sed  aurum  est  in  illo  coeno.”  In  truth  there  were 
giants  in  those  days,  though  confined  within  narrow  bounds,  and  beating 
with  heavy  tread  the  same  circle  of  mystic  speculation.  Anselm  of  Can- 
terbury, a genius  of  the  highest  order,  with  the  'deepest  reverence  for  the 
teachings  of  the  Church,  ranged  the  whole  field  of  speculative  thought, 
much  in  the  imaginative  spirit  of  Plato,  mingled  with  the  logical  subtilty 
of  Aristotle,  and  gave  the  process  of  “ reason  seeking  the  faith,”  and  of 
“ faith  seeking  the  reason.”  His  “ Cur  Deus  Homo,”  is  remarkable  for 
the  lofty  and  comprehensive  range  of  its  thought.  He  finds  in  the  higher 
unity  of  absolute  existence,  which  is  God,  and  the  necessity,  as  Plato  and 

1 For  an  ample  and  critical  account  of  “ Christian  Philosophy,”  see  the  5th  and  6th 
vols.  of  Ritter’s  “ Geschichte  der  Alt.  Philos.”  A French  translation  has  appeared 
from  the  pen  of  Trullard. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


Xxvii 


the  Platonics  abundantly  teach,  that  such  absolute  Being  should  limit 
himself  in  his  manifestation  through  the  Logos,  in  order  to  his  comprehensi- 
bility by  the  human  mind.  So  that  in  the  very  essence  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  he  discovers  a basis  for  the  doctrine  of  the  incarnation.  But  he 
is  not  satisfied  with  vindicating  the  essential  truth  of  Christianity  alone ; 
he  must  establish,  on  a firm  foundation,  the  reality  of  natural  religion. 
Finding  the  idea  of  absolute  or  infinite  Being  subsisting  in  the  human 
mind,  which  is  itself  finite  and  limited,  he  infers  that  it  could  not  have 
originated  there.  Its  very  possibility,  on  the  principle  of  contradiction,  as 
developed  in  the  Aristotelian  dialectics,  above  all  its  actual  presence  in  the 
soul  of  man,  proves  its  reality  : the  precise  argument  of  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz,  the  validity  of  which  has  been  vehemently  disputed  to  the  pres- 
ent day.  Anselm,  great  and  good,  is  well  entitled  to  the  appellation,  which 
he  received  in  the  middle  ages,  of  the  Doctor  T rancendentahs . 1 Others 
followed  him,  some  tending  to  idealism,  others  to  sensationalism ; some 
holding  to  abstractions,  others,  as  they  supposed,  to  realities.  Among  these 
we  have  Peter  Lombard,  Mcigister  Sententiarmn  Sapientum;  Alexander 
Hales,  Count  of  Gloucester,  the  Doctor  Irrefragibilis,  author  of  the  Sumrna 
TTniversse  Theologiee ; and  Thomas  Aquinas,  that  high  born  Dominican 
monk,  founder  of  the  school  of  the  Realists,  called  by  his  schoolmates  at 
Cologne  the  Dumb  Ox  (perhaps  from  his  early  silence  and  strength),  who 
fulfilled  the  prophecy  of  his  master  Albertus  Magnus  (Albert  of  Bollstadt) 
by  “ giving  such  a bellow  of  learning  as  was  heard  all  over  the  world.”1 2 3 
He  was  a profound  thinker  and  a pious  man,  being  justly  denominated  by 
his  contemporaries  “ the  Angel  of  the  Schools.”  He  maintained  the  reality 
of  those  great  productive  and  universal  ideas  (or  truths),  under  which  all 
phenomena,  both  as  particulars  and  as  species,  are  ranged ; and  hence 
reasoned  a priori , from  substance  to  attributes,  from  causes  to  effects. 
Having  spent  a long  life,  in  the  study  of  that  philosophy,  in  which  ideas, 
as  with  Plato,  took  the  form  of  archetypal  entities,  mingled  with  prayers 
and  canticles,  he  died  in  peace  at  Terracina,  in  Italy,  saying,  “This  is  my 
rest  for  ages  without  end.”  Somewhat  later  we  find  John  of  Fidanza,  com- 
monly called  Bonaventura,  the  Doctor  Seraphicus,  who  taught  that  religion 
is  true  philosophy,  and  rose,  like  Boehmen  and  Fenelon  in  subsequent 
times,  to  the  sublimest  heights  of  mystic  fervor ; Henry  de  Gand,  the 
Doctor  Solemnis ; Richard  of  Middletown  the  Doctor  Solidus ; Giles  of 
Cologne,  the  Doctor  Fundatissimus ; Vincent  de  Beauvais,  the  teacher  of 

1 Portions  of  Anselm’s  Works  have  been  recently  published.  They  are  very  curi- 
ous, as  containing  speculations  and  modes  of  expression  similar  to  those  of  the  Ger- 
man philosophers.  Des  Cartes,  Leibnitz,  and  even  Hegel,  are  anticipated  in  many 
things. 

2 The  Realists  maintained  the  reality  of  universal  ideas,  contending  that  they  were 
more  than  names,  as  the  Nominalists,  their  opponents,  taught.  They  thus  approached 

the  Platonic  view,  and  were  actually  the  idealists  of  their  time.  The  term  Realists 
had  a very  different  signification  then  from  what  it  has  now. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


x.wiii 

St.  Louis,  and  author  of  the  Speculum  Doctrinale,  Naturale,  Historiale;  and 
above  all  John  Duns  Scotus,  the  Doctor  Subtilis,  that  arid  but  penetrating 
Scotchman  or  rather  Northumbrian,  the  great  expounder  of  Nominalism, 
who  affirmed  with  Aristotle  that  universal  ideas  are  only  the  names  of  ab- 
stract generalizations,  under  which  all  individual  phenomena  may  be 
conveniently  classified.  He  taught  that  the  end  of  philosophy  is  to  find  out 
“ the  quiddity  of  things — that  every  thing  has  a kind  of  quiddity  or  quiddi- 
tive  existence,  and  that  nothingness  is  divided  into  absolute  and  relative 
nothingness,  which  has  no  existence  out  of  the  understanding.”  Belong- 
ing to  the  same  era  and  climbing  the  same  dizzy  heights  of  philosophic 
speculation  were  Roger  Bacon,  the  Doctcrr  Mirabilis;  Raymond  Lully 
(Lulli),  the  Doctor  Illmninatus,  a fervid  Spanish  monk,  who  invented  the 
logical  system  called  Ars  Universalis ; and  John  d’Occam,  the  Doctor 
Invincibilis , Singulciris  ct  Venerabilis,  that  redoubtable  Franciscan  monk, 
who  told  Louis  of  Bavaria,  “ that  if  he  would  defend  him  with  the  sword, 
he  would  defend  him  with  the  pen.”  He  studied  under  Duns  Scotus, 
revived  the  discussions  of  his  master,  and  taught  with  such  success,  that 
the  Nominalists  became  victorious  in  a dispute,  which,  in  the  spirit  of  the 
times,  often  proceeded  from  words  to  blows.  In  addition  to  these,  we 
ought  not  to  forget  those  other  philosophical  or  religious  doctors  who  illu- 
mined the  dark  ages,  as  we  call  them,  starred  as  those  ages  were  with  such 
brilliant  lights  ; Francis  of  Mayence,  Magister  Acutus  Abstract ionum ; 

William  Durand,  the  Doctor  Resolutissimus ; Walter  Burleigh,  the  Doctor 

. ' 

Planus  ct  Perspicuus,  author  of  the  first  history  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy  ; 
and  especially  Gerson  of  Paris,  Doctor  Cliristianissimus,  who,  familiar 
with  all  the  science  and  learning  of  the  times,  abandoned  the  -whole  for 
the  knowledge  of  Christ,  spent  a life  of  great  purity  and  devotion,  vindi- 
cated communion  with  God  as  the  only  true  philosophy,  and  wrote,  there 
is  reason  to  believe,  “ The  Imitation  of  Christ”  by  Thomas  a’  Kempis.1 

We  can  not  enter  into  the  speculations  of  these  acute  and  learned  doc- 
tors— suffice  it  to  say  that  they  anticipate,  in  forms  more  or  less  perfect, 
many  of  the  ideas  and  discussions  of  more  recent  times.  Descartes, 
Leibnitz  and  others,  often  echo  their  most  peculiar  opinions.  The  same 
speculative  and  often  extravagant  disputes  on  the  nature  and  origin  of 
ideas,  the  relations  of  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  the  quiddity  or  essence  of 
matter  and  of  mind,  the  nature  of  God,  and  the  production  of  the  universe, 
with  much  that  is  good  and  beautiful  and  true,  run  through  the  entire 
history  of  mediaeval  philosophy.  The  great  truths  of  religion,  modified 
by  the  notions  of  the  times,  were  reduced,  by  means  of  the  Aristotelian 

1 For  a brief  and  elegant  account  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy  see  Cousin,  Hist,  de  la 
Philosophic,  Second  Series,  Tome  ii.  pp.  221,  257.  See  also  the  article  “Abelard” 
in  the  “ Fragmens  Philosophiques.”  Also  “Abelard”  par  M.  C.  Reinusat.  The  3d 
vol.  Bruckcr’s  Critical  History  of  Philosophy  ; Neander’s  “Church  History,”  3d  and 
4th  vols  Tenncmann,  Gcschichte  der  Ph.  Tom.  viii. , Manual  p.  215,  et  seq 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxix 


dialectics,  to  the  region  of  pure  ideas,  and  set  to  fighting  on  scientific 
principles.  One  of  the  consequences  was  the  prevalence,  in  the  fifteenth 
century,  within  the  Catholic  church,  of  a heartless  skepticism,  making  the 
reformation  of  the  sixteenth  a matter  of  absolute  necessity. 

4.  Previous  to  this,  however,  philosophy  had  begun  to  extricate  itself 
from  the  trammels  of  ecclesiastical  authority ; but  it  was  to  fall  as  usual 
into  the  extremes  of  atheism  and  pantheism.  The  revival  in  Italy  of 
classical  literature  introduced  Plato  and  the  Greek  philosophy.  The  in- 
fluence of  Aristotle  and  the  Schoolmen  was  abjured.  Great  enthusiasm 
prevailed,  and  the  transition,  though  blind,  impulsive,  and  irregular,  was 
not  without  hope.  But  the  most  vigorous  and  independent  thinkers,  with 
slight  exceptions,  were  either  materialists  or  ideal  pantheists.  On  the 
side  of  the  naturalists,  or  materialists,  we  have  Campanella,  Vanini  and 
others,  with  a strong  tendency  to  atheism  ; on  that  of  the  idealists,  the 
more  generous  and  hopeful  of  the  two,  the  two  Picos  de  la  Mirandola, 
Ramus,  Patrizzi,  Marsilio,  Ficino,  and  Giordano  Bruno.  Bruno  the  most 
original  and  celebrated  of  these,  and  withal  the  martyr  of  the  school, 
dashed  into  the  boldest  idealism.  He  maintained  the  absolute  unity  and 
identity  of  all  things,  and  adored  the  All  as  the  true  and  eternal  God. 
The  germ  of  Leibnitz’s  Monadology  may  be  found  in  Bruno.  Several  of 
Spinosa’s  favorite  terms  as  well  as  ideas,  for  example,  his  famous  distinc- 
tion between  the  Natura  Naturans  and  Natura  Naturata,  are  found  here. 
Schelling  has  entitled  one  of  his  works  Bruno , and  makes  no  secret  of  his 
admiration  for  his  Italian  prototype.  Notwithstanding  all  his  aberrations, 
Bruno,  fickle,  fervid,  and  absurd,  was  earnest  and  eloquent,  sometimes 
even  sublime.  At  the  stake  he  welcomed  death  as  a passage  to  a higher 
life,  a transition  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite.  More  of  a poet  than  a 
philosopher,  with  the  genius  and  fire  of  his  native  clime,  he  strangely 
mingles  the  true  and  the  false.  His  method  is  imagination,  his  reason- 
ing rhapsody.  Hence  he  says  himself,  with  marvelous  simplicity,  “ Phi- 
losophi  quoad  modo  pictores  atque  poette to  which  he  adds,  “Non  est 
philosophus  nisi  fingit  et  pingit  /” 1 *  3 

Our  readers  are  acquainted  with  the  prodigious  influence  of  the  Reform- 
ation on  the  study  of  speculative  philosophy.  All  authority,  ecclesiastical 
and  scientific,  was  called  in  question.  Aristotle  was  dethroned.  Simple 
and  rational  investigation  of  nature  and  the  Bible,  divine  revelations  both, 
was  encouraged.  This  led  to  what  has  been  called  the  Inductive  Phi- 
losophy, by  the  simple  methods  of  observation  and  reflection.  Bacon  called 
men  away  from  vague  theorizings  to  the  study  of  nature  and  themselves. 
His  method  followed  to  its  practical  results  by  Newton,  has  been  de- 

1 He  was  bom  in  the  vicinity  of  Naples  in  1550,  and  was  publicly  burned  by  order 
of  the  Inquisition  at  Rome,  in  1600.  For  a complete  account  of  his  life  and  writings 

see  Jordano  Bruno,  son  Histoire  et  les  CEuvres,  trad,  par  M.  C.  Bartholomess. 

Paris  1847. 


XXX 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


nounced  as  mere  classification.,  which,  were  it  such,  would  prove  it  empirical 
enough.  But  while  he  directed  attention  less  to  the  mental  than  to  the 
material  world,  and  laid  more  stress  apparently  upon  induction  than  deduc- 
tion, he  respects  both,  and  uniformly  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  of  fun- 
damental convictions.  Bacon’s  Organon  recognizes  the  great  idea  of  cause 
or  power,  and  calls  attention  not  only  to  phenomena  hut  to  principles.  It 
recognizes  spirit  as  well  as  matter,  and  gives  us,  at  least  as  its  last  result, 
the  great  fact  of  spiritual  power,  that  is,  of  a supreme  and  eternal  God, 
“who  is  above  all,  through  all,  and  in  all.”1  The  philosophy  of  Bacon 
is  pre-eminently  a philosophy  of  fact  and  reality.  Induction  and  deduc- 
tion, analysis  and  synthesis,  on  the  basis  of  fundamental  axioms,  forms 
the  simple  and  sublime  circle  of  his  method,  the  method  of  nature  and  of 
God. 

It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  the  Inductive  philosophy  occupied 
itself  chiefly  with  material  interests,  and  the  mere  phenomena  of  exter- 
nal nature.  Its  first  application  to  speculative  philosophy,  by  Hobbes  of 
Malmesbury,  was  meagre  and  imperfect.  Misunderstanding  its  princi- 
ples, he  began  to  theorize,  like  all  his  predecessors,  and  gave  to  the  world, 
in  language  of  great  force  and  precision,  a system  of  downright  material- 
ism and  fatalism.  According  to  him  the  one  great  fact  of  mind,  to  which 
all  other  facts  may  be  reduced,  is  sensation,  “produced  by  the  impact  of 
material  objects  around  us  upon  a material  organization  which  men  call 
mind.”  A fair  beginning  in  England  of  what  Herder  calls  “ the  dirt 
philosophy.” 

Far  superior  to  Hobbes,  in  all  the  elements  of  mental  and  moral  power, 
Locke  soon  followed,  enamored  of  the  new  philosophy,  and  feeling  that 
it  might  be  applied  with  success  to  mental  science.  But  he  too,  imper- 
fectly carried  out  the  Baconian  method  ; for  instead  of  a thorough  psy- 
chological examination  of  all  the  facts  and  elements  of  consciousness,  he 
wandered  into  theoretical  conjectures,  and  failed  to  discover  some  of  the 
most  obvious  principles  of  the  human  mind.  Nay,  he  violated  his  own 
professed  method  at  the  very  outset,  by  starting  a theoretical  inquiry 
into  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  which  he  derived  from  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion. He  assumed  also  the  great  error  of  most  of  his  predecessors, 
which  makes  ideas  (cognitions)  the  mere  types  or  representatives  of 
realities,  as  if  the  mind  could  have  no  direct  or  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  such  realities,  and  must  depend  upon  shadows  or  reflections  both 
of  the  inner  and  the  outer  worlds.  Like  many  others  also  he  uses 
the  term  “ ideas”  in  all  sorts  of  senses,  and  indeed  wavers  exceedingly  in 
the  use  of  language.  Yet  Locke  possessed  great  sagacity,  and  a style  of 
much  raciness  and  strength.  Some  have  called  it  dry,  but  it  is  very  far 
indeed  from  possessing  this  characteristic.  It  is  rather  figurative  and 

1 Sec  what  Bacon  in  the  “ Advancement  of  Learning,”  says  on  the  supremacy  and 
authority  of  a “ Prima  Philosophia,”  Works  i.  pp.  193-195. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


XXXI 


popular,  than  precise  and  philosophical.  Hence  the  various  estimates  of 
his  system,  and  hence  also  its  different  influence  upon  different  minds. 
Right,  perhaps,  in  rejecting  the  “innate  ideas”  of  Descartes  whom  he  did 
not  quite  understand,  he  failed  to  recognize  the  great  primal  truth  which 
underlies  the  unfortunate  nomenclature  of  the  French  philosopher;  for  the 
very  first  movements  of  our  minds,  and  all  our  perceptions  of  external  things, 
involve  the  possession  of  fundamental  axioms  of  thought,  which  can  never 
he  derived  from  experience.  The  mind  itself  as  a unit  and  a power  implies 
this ; for  if  thoughts,  emotions  and  ideas  are  derived  from  experience, 
then  the  mind  itself  is  derived  from  experience.  Experience  or  the  con- 
tact of  mind  with  matter,  and  of  matter  with  mind,  doubtless  is  necessary 
as  an  occasion  for  the  development  of  our  essential  thoughts  ; hut  all 
these  must  first  exist  in  the  mind,  not  indeed  formally  but  potentially,  or 
matter  "would  be  nothing  to  mind,  as  mind  would  be  nothing  to  matter. 
Hence  Locke  fell  into  a great  error  when  he  represented  all  our  cogni- 
tions as  modifications  of  sensation  and  reflection.  His  generalization  is 
narrow  and  defective,  and  has  given  rise  to  much  false  theorizing  on 
mental  philosophy.  SStill  Locke’s  great  work  on  the  “ Human  Under- 
standing” contains  innumerable  valuable  suggestions,  and  many  fine  ana- 
lyses of  particular  powers  or  states  of  mind.  Nor  was  he  a mere  sensa- 
tionalist, as  some  of  the  idealist  philosophers  are  pleased  to  affirm.  Prac- 
tically he  was  a spiritualist,  and  recognized  the  great  facts  of  our  spiritual 
and  moral  nature  as  well  as  the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of 
the  soul.1  It  would  be  difficult,  however,  if  not  impossible,  on  his  theory 
of  the  origin  of  ideas,  to  demonstrate  the  spirituality  of  man  ; for  if  the 
mind  does  not  see  by  its  own  light,  in  other  words,  possess  certain  pri- 
mary intuitions  or  fundamental  convictions  of  “ common  sense,”  as  the 
Scottish  philosophers  call  them,  it  can  never  transcend  the  outward  and 
material,  or  form  the  remotest  conception  of  spiritual  and  immortal  reali- 
ties. 

It  is,  therefore,  by  no  means  surprising  if,  in  England,  the  principles  of 
Locke,  in  the  hands  of  less  scrupulous  men,  and  particularly  of  “the 
deistical”  writers,  as  they  are  improperly  called — for,  on  fundamental 
grounds,  they  are  more  atheistic  than  deistic — were  used  to  defend  all  the 
errors  of  sensualism  and  fatalism.2  It  is  the  habit  of  speculative  thinkers 
to  run  errors  of  this  kind  into  extremes — a happy  circumstance,  at  least, 
for  those  that  come  after  them ; for,  plausible  at  first,  these  errors  become 
absolutely  monstrous  when  pushed  by  reckless  theorists  to  their  logical 
results.3 

1 For  proof  of  this  we  might  cite  page  after  page  of  the  “ Essay  on  the  Human  Un- 
derstanding.” We  are  apprehensive,  however,  that  those  who  declaim  the  most  vehe- 
mently against  Locke  as  the  father  of  modem  sensualism,  are  not  peculiarly  intimate 
with  his  writings. 

2 See  the  results  in  Morell’s  Hist,  of  Philosophy,  p.  96,  et  seq. 

3 Nowhere  was  this  done  more  decisively  than  in  France.  Thoroughly  misunder- 


XXX1J 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


This  was  pre-eminently  the  case  with  the  supposed  materialism  of  the 
Lockean  school ; hence,  in  England  we  find  the  majority  of  her  ingenious 
and  profound  thinkers  uttering  against  it  a loud  and  earnest  protest. 
Among  these,  Shaftesbury,  Cudworth,  Clarke,  and  More,  are  especially 
distinguished  by  learning  and  genius.  But  the  recoil,  as  usual,  was  too  vio- 
lent; and  we  find  Berkeley,  the  amiable  and  gifted  Bishop  of  Cloyne,  the 
most  ingenious  philosophical  thinker  of  his  day,  falling  into  the  opposite 
extreme  of  idealism.  Assuming,  as  Locke  did,  the  common  philosophical 
error,  that  all  our  knowledge  of  external  nature  is  mediate  and  represent- 
ative— a something,  so  to  speak,  figured  to  the  mind  and  standing  for  the 
outward  reality,  which  we  can  never  know — he  showed,  on  the  clearest 
logical  grounds,  that  the  existence  of  matter,  separate  from  the  mind,  can 
not  be  proved  ; and  thus  cut  up  by  the  roots  all  materialism,  fatalism, 
and  atheism.  He  does  not  deem  it  necessary  to  deny  the  existence  of  the 
external  world  as  a practical  reality ; he  simply  maintains  that  its  exist- 
ence can  not  be  proved  on  metaphysical  grounds.* 1  Mind,  in  his  view,  is 
first,  is  fundamental,  and  real,  is  the  only  thing  fundamental  and  real ; and 
matter,  if  it  exist  at  all,  is  dependent  upon  mind,  and  receives  from  it 
all  its  qualities  and  forms.  Pure  and  devout  himself,  he  exulted  in  the 
evanescent  character  of  all  terrestrial  things  ; for  along  with  these  he  saw 
vanishing  all  error  and  sin.  In  the  lofty  ideal  world  still  left,  his  rever- 
ent soul,  transformed  by  Christian  faith,  saw  nothing  but  God  and  truth, 
immutable  and  immortal. 

From  the  very  same  principles,  however,  Hume,  cold  and  subtile,  de- 
duced an  absolute  skepticism.  As  a mere  mode  of  the  subjective  mind, 
according  to  him  all  is  ideal,  and  nothing  can  be  proved.  Cause,  Sub- 
stance, Spirit,  God,  Immortality — nay,  our  most  common  convictions,  re- 
specting our  own  existence,  or  the  existence  of  the  external  world,  may 
be  only  dreams  of  the  dreaming  mind.2  All  we  can  know  is  our  own 
subjective  states  ; and  these,  separated  from  realities  by  mere  represent- 
ative images,  for  aught  that  we  know,  may  be  the  grossest  illusions. 
Thus  Hume  plunged  into  the  abyss  of  atheism.  No  wonder  that  he  con- 
fesses, mournfully,  the  confusion  and  bewilderment  of  his  mind,  in  the 


stood,  the  Lockean  philosophy  was  Teduced  to  the  grossest  materialism.  This,  how- 
ever, was  accomplished  with  so  much  refinement  and  ingenuity,  that  it  required  the 
atheism  of  d’Holbach,  and  the  horrors  of  the  French  revolution,  to  reveal  its  enor- 
mity. Condillac,  facile  and  elegant,  reigned  supreme  for  years.  Cabanis  was  ap- 
plauded when  he  said,  “ Les  nerfs,  voila  tout  l’homme  !”  France,  though  much  im- 
proved, is  not  yet  free  from  the  influence  of  Condillac.  What  is  Comte's  “ Philoso- 
phic Positive”  but  a refined  and  systematized  materialism1  To  substitute  the  action 
of  fixed  laws  for  the  free  spirit  of  man,  or  the  free  spirit  of  God,  is  materialism,  with 
its  inevitable  results  of  atheism  and  fatalism. 

1 .See  for  proof  of  this,  “ Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,”  §()  35-6-7-40. 

- Hume's  views  are  developed,  partly  in  his  “Essay  on  Human  Nature,”  but 
chiefly  in  his  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Understanding.”  His  skepticism  is  brought 
out  fully  in  the  12th  section  of  the  Inquiry. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxxiii 

prosecution  of  his  metaphysical  speculations ; — for  not  even  the  consola- 
tion of  hope  was  left  to  his  spirit,  adrift  on  the  illimitable  ocean  of  specu- 
lative doubt.  “ The  intense  view,”  says  he,  “ of  these  manifold  contra- 
dictions and  imperfections  in  human  reason,  has  so  wrought  upon  me, 
and  heated  my  brain,  that  I am  ready  to  reject  all  belief  and  reasoning, 
and  can  look  upon  no  opinion  even  as  more  probable  or  likely  than 
another.” 1 

The  Scottish  philosophers  have  been  stigmatized  by  the  German  and 
French  idealists  as  “insular,”  timid,  and  empirical:  this  much,  however, 
may  be  said  of  them,  that,  with  the  exception  of  Hume,  they  have  been 
wonderfully  preserved  from  all  extremes  of  materialism  or  spiritualism, 
and  have  made  a good  beginning  in  the  science  of  mental  analysis.  Dr. 
Reid,  a Presbyterian  clergyman,  and  professor  in  Glasgow  University,  if 
we  except  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  is  decidedly  the  most  instructive  and  original 
of  them  all.  Brown  is  imaginative  and  inconsequent.  His  most  orig- 
inal and  elaborate  work  (on  Causation)  is  a splendid  failure.  Stewart, 
while  accomplished  and  learned,  is  distinguished  chiefly  as  an  elegant 
expositor  of  the  views  of  his  predecessors,  particularly  of  Reid.  The 
latter  has  the  honor  of  giving  the  death-blow  to  the  ideal  theory,  upon 
which  Hume  based  his  skepticism.  Imperfectly  developed,  the  position 
of  Reid,  sound  and  impregnable  as  a whole,  can  only  be  thoroughly 
appreciated  in  connection  with  the  comments  and  criticisms  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  who  is  Reid’s  proper  successor,  and  the  great  defender  of  the 
philosophy  of  “Common  Sense.”  With  his  explanations  and  limitations, 
the  doctrine  of  immediate  and  presentative  knowledge  may  be  considered 
as  finally  settled.  Idealism  may  be  held  as  a notion  or  a doubt,  but  never 
again  as  a well-grounded  scientific  conviction. 

But  we  must  go  back  a little,  and  take  a cursory  view  of  the  philosophy 
of  Continental  Europe,  to  understand  fully  the  aberrations  of  speculative 
thought,  and  appreciate  the  position  and  attainments  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
who  is  distinguished  as  much  for  his  criticisms  on  the  French  and  Ger- 
man schools,  as  on  those  of  England  and  Scotland. 

Descartes  is  acknowledged,  on  all  hands,  as  the  founder  of  the  Conti- 
nental, if  not  of  all  modern  speculative  philosophy.  With  a mind  pro- 
found, energetic,  and  free,  spurning  the  restraints  of  custom  and  authority, 
he  resolved  to  investigate  the  whole  subject  of  mental  philosophy,  from  its 
foundations.2  Less  sagacious  than  Locke,  he  yet  saw,  with  great  clearness, 
the  vast  distinction  between  matter  and  mind,  and  commenced  his  studies 
with  a purely  psychological  method.  He  did  not,  indeed,  carry  out,  with 
full  consistency,  his  own  fundamental  principles  of  inquiry,  and,  finally, 

1 Quoted  in  Dugald  Stewart’s  Life  of  Reid,  prefixed  to  Hamilton’s  edition  of  Reid’s 
Works,  p.  13. 

2 The  process  through  which  his  mind  passed,  is  detailed  in  the  first  part  of  his 
“Discours  de  la  Methode.” 


XXX IV 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


defended  some  egregious  errors.  At  first,  he  refused  to  take  any  thing 
for  granted  not  proved  by  the  facts  of  consciousness ; but  at  last  seemed 
to  take  every  thing  for  granted  ; so  that  D’Alembert  is  justified  in  saying 
that  Descartes  “ began  with  doubting  of  every  thing,  and  ended  in  believ- 
ing that  he  had  left  nothing  unexplained.” 

As  nature  is  to  be  studied  in  itself,  by  means  of  observation,  so  Des- 
cartes justly  concluded  that  mind  is  to  be  studied  in  itself,  by  means  of 
consciousness,  or  conscious  reflection.1  His  “ Cogito  ergo  sum,”  though 
an  apparent  petitio  j prineijni , furnished  him  with  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple or  fact  of  all  mental  science.  For  of  whatever  we  doubt,  we  can  not 
doubt  that  we  doubt.  Conscious  personality,  as  an  intuitive,  inalienable 
conviction,  is  involved  in  every  mental  act ; consciousness,  therefore,  must 
supply  us  with  all  the  facts  of  mind,  all  the  laws  of  thought.  Psychology, 
or  a well-digested  account  of  our  mental  phenomena,  must  thence  form 
the  basis  of  all  philosophical  speculations  2 

On  this  ground  Descartes  asserted  the  pure  spirituality,  or,  rather,  im- 
materiality of  mind  ; for  spirituality  is  only  a negation  of  what  we  desig- 
nate material  qualities.  The  profound  conviction  of  Descartes  upon  this 
point,  and  his  earnest  assertion  of  it,  was  of  immense  service  to  the  cause 
of  truth.  His  theory  of  “ innate  ideas,”  unfortunate  in  its  expression  and 
application,  though  founded  in  truth,  led  him  to  assert  the  validity  of  all 
ideas  lying  “ clearly  and  distinctly”  in  the  mind.  His  criterion  of  “ neces- 
sary” ideas,  “ clearness  and  distinctness,”  originally  intended  to  assert  the 
simple  authority  of  consciousness,  was  easily  abused.  Here,  for  example, 
he  found,  as  he  supposed,  the  idea  of  the  absolute  and  infinite — that  is, 
as  he  explained  it,  of  God  ; and  believing,  like  Anselm,  that  such  an  idea 
could  not  come  from  finite  nature  ; that  infinite  and  absolute,  in  his  view, 
being  positive  ideas,  and  not  the  mere  negation  of  finite  and  relative ; he 
concluded  that  it  was  a necessary  or  intuitive  idea,  an  idea  from  God 
himself,  and,  therefore,  proving  a priori,  the  Divine  existence.3 

But  all  this  is  subjective  ; how  then  do  we  prove  the  existence  of  the 
external  world,  as  well  as  the  existence  of  God  ? This,  too,  exists  in  the 
mind,  clearly  and  distinctly  ; and  it  is  not  to  be  supposed,  argues  Des- 
cartes, forgetting  utterly  his  psychological  and  truly  rational  method,  that 
God  would  deceive  us  in  such  a matter.  From  this  he  infers  that  the 
external  world  has  a real,  and  not  merely  apparent  or  phenomenal  exist- 
ence. Our  mental  faculties  prove  the  existence  of  God,  and  the  existence 
of  God  proves  the  validity  of  our  mental  faculties,  is  the  vicious  circle 
which  throws  inextricable  confusion  into  the  Cartesian  philosophy.4 

1 See  “ Meditations  Metaphysiques.” — Premiere  Med. 

2 Meditation  Seconde.  CEuvres  (Ed.  Charpentier),  p.  66,  et  scq. 

3 Meditation  Troisieme,  p.  87,  et  seq.  See  the  same  views,  re-asserted  in  the 
fourth  Meditation,  which  develops  his  idea  of  the  true  and  the  false,  and  the  impos- 
sibility that  God  should  deceive  us  respecting  necessary  convictions. 

4 Meditation  Cinquieme — particularly  the  close — pp.  107-108. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


mv 


But  what  is  the  precise  relation  of  the  finite  universe  to  the  infinite 
Spirit  ? This  is  a great  question  which  Descartes  attempts  to  answer. 
He  says,  it  is  produced  at  first  by  God,  and  not  only  so,  but  is  constantly 
reproduced.  But  the  world  of  matter,  according  to  Descartes,  is  a vast, 
formal  mechanism,  subject  to  external  laws,  and  thence  guided  and  con- 
trolled by  the  constant  interposition  of  the  Almighty.  Matter  and  mind 
are  distinct ; so  much  so,  that  they  can  have  no  direct  action  upon  each 
other.  Their  action  and  interaction  depend  upon  the  all-creating,  all-re- 
newing force.  Therefore,  concludes  Descartes,  there  are  no  single  or  sec- 
ondary causes,  and  the  whole  universe  lies,  like  a passive  machine,  in  the 
hands  of  God,  controlled  forever  by  his  resistless  might.1 

After  all,  the  existence  of  matter,  or  of  the  finite  universe,  is  not  then 
proved,  except  as  an  outward  phenomenal  thing,  which  the  next  bold, 
consistent  thinker  Avill  not  hesitate  to  reject,  falling  back,  as  he  must,  on 
his  subjective  ideas,  and  constituting  the  universe  of  a single  infinite  sub- 
stance. Thus  the  germs  of  an  absolute  spiritualism  are  lodged  in  the 
Cartesian  metaphysics,  which  found  their  natural  development  in  the 
speculations  of  Spinosa  and  Malebranche. 

In  Descartes  we  thus  see,  what  is  not  uncommon  in  the  history  of  phi 
losophy,  the  most  singular  combinations  of  truth  and  error,  of  Aveakness  and 
strength.  For  he  not  only  denied  the  existence  and  operation  of  second 
or  occasional  causes,  but  he  placed  the  essence  of  mind  in  thought — of 
matter,  in  extension  ; thus  confounding  being  or  substance  Avith  attribute 
or  quality,  and  laying  the  basis  of  a consistent,  thorough-going  panthe- 
ism. 

Malebranche  indeed,  who  embraced  these  views  as  the  basis  of  his  sys- 
tem, held  to  the  reality  of  external  things,  as  commonly  understood,  on 
the  authority  of  Revelation,  and  remained  an  orthodox  minister  of  the 
Catholic  Church ; but  he  constituted  the  universe  of  thought,  and  main- 
tained that  the  human  mind  sees  all  things  in  the  Divine,  as  “ its  intel- 
ligible Avorld.”  Like  Plato  he  blended  the  finite  Avith  the  infinite,  and 
saw  there  the  archetypal  ideas  of  all  possible  existence.  Devout  and  elo- 
quent, this  good  man,  in  the  spirit  of  Berkeley  saw  no  danger  in  that 
“excessive  bright,”  or  rather  “dark”  of  absolute  spiritualism,  into  Avhich 
Avith  unutterable  awe,  like  the  angels  of  heaven,  he  desired  to  look.2 

It  required  therefore  some  one  of  bolder  temper,  and  more  relentless 
logic,  to  take  the  vieAVS  of  Descartes  and  push  them  to  their  extreme  logi- 


1 It  is  on  this  ground  that  M.  Jules  Simon,  in  his  Introduction  to  his  edition  of  the 
Works  of  Descartes,  speaks  (p.  57)  of  Cartesianism  as  “Une  Systeme  Mecanique. 
See  the  Sixth  Med.  p.  109. 

2 Tennemann  calls  Malebranche  “ the  most  profound  of  the  French  metaphysicians.” 
His  works  have  been  published  in  a convenient  form  by  Charpentier,  under  the  super- 
vision of  M.  Jules  Simon,  who  has  prefixed  to  them  an  instructive  and  elegant  intro 
duction 


xxx  vi 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


cal  issue.  Such  a man  was  found  in  Benedict  Spinosa,  that  profound 
and  subtile  Jew,  whom  Novalis  in  a “furor”  of  admiration  calls  “the  God 
inspired  Spinosa.”1  Ignoring  as  Descartes  had  done  the  proper  idea  of 
cause,  and  really  identifying  being  with  thought,  he  posited  the  existence 
of  a single,  infinite,  all  comprehending  Substance  with  two  attributes,  or 
rather  projections  of  himself  (itself?)  thought  and  cxtensio?i,  thought  being 
manifest  in  mind,  extension  in  matter.2 

As  both  mind  and  matter  proceed  from  the  same  source,  or  rather  are 
attributes  of  the  same  substance,  he  maintained,  of  course,  their  interior 
identity.  All  things  come  from  God,  and  exist  in  God,  thence  all  things 
or  the  universe  of  material  and  immaterial  forms,  are  God — not  indeed 
God  in  his  absolute  essence,  but  God  immanent,  that  is  God  embodied  or 
manifested.3 

A fundamental  and  favorite  position  of  Spinosa’s  is  that  “ one  substance 
can  not  produce  another;”  if  God  therefore  seems  to  produce  finite  matter 
or  finite  mind,  it  is  but  an  extension  of  himself,  or  projection  into  space 
and  time  of  his  own  inscrutable  essence.  The  cause  passes  into  the  effect, 
the  effect  in  this  sense  is  the  cause,  and  vice  vena  ; so  that  the  ordinary 
idea  of  cause,  and  consequently  of  the  creation,  is  abandoned.  The  one  is 
God  absolute,  the  other  is  God  conditioned,  or  as  he  chose  to  express  it, 
the  one  is  Natura  naturans,  the  other  is  Natura  naturata .4 

Nor  can  we  deny,  if  these  fundamental  positions  are  granted  as  just, 
namely,  that  the  universe  is  constituted  by  ideas,  and  human  thought  and 
absolute  being  are  identical,  that  there  can  be,  in  the  sense  of  Spinosa, 
only  a single  all  comprehending  substance.  All  else  which  we  call  finite 
must  be  attribute,  quality,  phenomenon,  however  vast  and  varied,  how- 
ever refined  and  beautiful.  If  all  things  and  all  beings  arc  in  God,  in  an 
absolute  literal  sense,  then  God  is  in  all  things,  nay  constitutes  all  things. 
The  universe  is  not  dual,  but  one,  and  that  one,  the  absolute  all. 
Thought  is  infinite  and  eternal,  and  matter  is  its  shadow.  The  omni- 
presence of  God,  or  the  infinite  Substance,  is  what  Spinosa  calls  extension, 
not  meaning  by  extension  any  thing  gross  or  palpable,  but  the  universal 


1 As  proof  that  Spinosa  based  his  system  on  the  Cartesian  metaphysics,  we  refer 
to  the  “ Principia  Philosophise  Cartesianse,”  in  the  first  volume  of  Spinosa’s  works 
(Tauchnitz  ed.  3 vols.  edited  by  Dr.  Bruder),  as  also  to  his  little  tract,  “ De  Emenda- 
tione  Intellcctus”  (vol.  ii.  p.  7),  in  which  he  lays  down  the  true  method  of  philoso- 
phical investigation.  The  following  passage  (vol.  i.  p.  24),  deserves  particular  atten- 
tion. “ Hac  igitur  delecta  veritate  simul  etiam  invenit  omnium  scientiarum  funda- 
mentum,  ac  etiam  omnium  aliarum  veritatum,  mensuram  ac  regulam  ; scilicet  Quic- 

quid  lam  dare  ac  distincte  percipitur  quam  istud  verum  est.”  The  abuse  of  Descartes’ 
criterion  has  been  a source  of  infinite  mischief. 

3 Opera,  vol.  i.  Cog.  Meta.  p.  117.  Ethica,  pp.  187,  190.  See  also  “ Ethica,” 
Part  ii.  p.  225. 

3 Opera,  vol.  i.  p.  197.  Compare  pp.  190  and  204,  particularly  Prop,  xviii.  “Deus 
est  omnium  rerum  immanens.” 

4 Ethica,  Props,  xxix.  xxx.  xxxi.  Opera,  vol.  i.  pp.  210,  211. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxxvii 


presence  of  an  infinite  essence.1  Particular  things — souls  or  bodies,  are 
only  modifications  of  God.2  All  in  fact,  is  literally  and  truly  God.  A 
single  idea,  namely  unity,  constitutes  and  construes  the  universe.  Right 
and  wrong,  holiness  and  sin  are  only  different  aspects  of  the  same  thing. 
In  ethics  right  is  the  correlate  of  power,  while  sin  is  weakness,  negation, 
or  deficiency;  whence  the  object  of  all  law  is  the  exercise  of  force,  and  all 
law  is  limitation.  The  inexorable  unity  of  God  ought  to  he  the  type  of 
the  inexorable  unity  of  all  government  and  law.3 

How  much  all  this  differs  from  the  material  unity  and  inexorable  fatal- 
ism of  Hobbes,  or  from  the  grosser  pantheism  of  the  old  Hindoo  philoso- 
phers, it  would  require  some  ingenuity  to  say.  It  is  more  refined  and 
spiritual  perhaps,  but  the  end  is  the  same.  So  that  one  is  almost  tempted 
to  believe  with  Dugald  Stewart,  in  reference  to  the  reproduction  of  old 
errors,  “ that  human  invention  is  limited  like  a barrel  organ  to  a specific 
number  of  tunes.1’ 

It  would  seem  as  if  Spinosa  had  carried  the  rationalistic  method  of  in- 
quiry to  its  highest  point,  beyond  which  no  human  intellect  can  go.  But 
the  spirit  of  speculative  thought  is  not  to  be  repressed,  and  slight  variations 
will  satisfy  even  the  profoundest  minds  that  they  have  escaped  the  errors 
of  their  predecessors,  and  solved  the  enigma  of  the  universe.  On  this 
ground  Leibnitz,  a man  of  vast  erudition  and  almost  illimitable  range  of 
thought,  endeavored  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a vast  superstructure  of  spir- 
itual philosophy.  He  rejected  the  sensational  origin  of  ideas,  defended,  as 
he  supposed,  by  Locke,  and  carried  out  the  spiritual  views  of  Descartes 
Avith  reference  to  mind,  giving  a better  exposition  of  fundamental  ideas, 
and  enlarging  the  criteria  of  their  validity.  His  method,  however,  is  ration- 
alistic and  ontological.4 * * *  It  is  an  attempt  to  ascertain  the  possible  and  the 
actual  on  what  he  calls  the  principle  of  “ contradiction,”  and  of  li  the 
sufficient  reason.”  The  first  gives  us  the  possible,  or  what  may  be  with- 
out a contradiction ; the  second,  the  actual,  or  what  ought  to  be,  on  the 
ground  of  second  causes,  or  “ sufficient  reason.” 

Applying  these  criteria  to  things  as  they  are,  he  finds  not  only  the  idea 
of  substance,  with  its  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  (that  is,  of  em- 
bodiment, for  such  is  Spinosa’s  idea),  but  also  of  cause  or  power,  sponta- 
neous and  creative ; so  that  God,  as  the  great  primal  Substance,  or  Sub- 
sistence, not  only  is,  but  acts  and  produces.  Power  does  not  reside  in 
masses,  for  these  are  infinitely  divisible ; power  is  inherent  in  substance 
from  which  all  material  qualities  must  he  excluded,  so  that,  strictly 


1 Opera,  vol.  i.  p.  208.  2 Ibid,  vol.  i.  p.  228. 

3 Ibid,  vol.  i.  p.  115.  Compare  pp.  131,  212,  217. 

4 This  fact  is  well  brought  out  by  M.  Jaques  in  the  Introduction  to  his  Ed.  of  the 

Works  of  Leibnitz,  from  the  press  of  Charpentier,  vol.  i.  p.  31.  His  views  of  the 

human  mind  are  developed  in  his  “Nouveaux  Essais,”  his  theosophy  or  theology  in 

the  “ Monadologie,”  and  “ Theodicee.” 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xxrviii 

speaking,  we  come  to  power  or  force  as  a pure  immaterial  essence.  This 
constitutes  the  basis  of  existence.  Thence  spring  all  the  forms  and  forces 
of  the  universe,  which  is  dynamical,  and  not,  as  Descartes  taught,  me- 
chanical.1 

Thus  reducing,  as  usual,  all  things  to  the  region  of  pure  ideas,  or  ab- 
stract forms,  as  we  may  call  them,  he  endeavors  from  the  supposition  of 
an  absolute  One,  or  Monad,  to  construe  the  universe  of  matter  and  of 
mind  ; so  that  his  system  is  a monadology,  corresponding  in  some  sense 
to  the  “numbers”  of  Pythagoras  and  Plato.  His  problem  therefore  is  little 
more  than  a geometrical  proposition.  Given  one  necessary  and  eternal 
Monas,  or  Force,  to  find  all  other  monads  or  forces.2  God  “ geometrizes” 
the  universe,  and  does  so,  apparently,  by  an  evolution  of  plurality  from 
unity.  From  such  a system  all  dualism  of  course  is  excluded.  Of  mat- 
ter, in  its  ordinary  import,  there  is  none.  Identity  runs  through  the 
whole.  The  universe  is  one,  as  God  is  one. 

Yet  Leibnitz  admitted  the  distinct  existence  of  the  external  world,  and 
brought  it  into  union  and  connection  with  spirit  by  means  of  a system 
of  “ pre-established  harmony.”  The  different  monads  both  of  matter  and 
of  spirit  have  no  intercommunion ; indeed  this  is  impossible  on  Leibnitz’s 
theory ; but  they  move  in  unison,  like  automata,  by  the  preformed  ar- 
rangement of  the  Eternal  Mind.  Hence  also  the  doctrines  of  philosophical 
necessity  and  optimism. 

By  these  suppositions  it  is  evident  that  Leibnitz  wished  to  avoid  the 
difficulties  which  spring  from  the  ill-understood  distinctions  between  mat- 
ter and  mind ; on  which  account  his  monads,  or  ones  are  simple  forces, 
independent  of  each  other,  though  springing  from  the  same  eternal  source, 
possessing  inherently  the  same  characteristics,  and  capable  of  developing 
themselves  in  outward  shape  and  act.  Some  are  in  a state  of  stupor,  so 
to  speak,  and  constitute  matter,  yet  possess  a sort  of  perceptive  power ; 
others  are  conscious,  forming,  in  the  case  of  those  distinct  and  clear,  men 
and  angels,  of  those  dull  and  obscure,  the  souls  of  the  lower  animals. 
Each  has  its  separate  sphere,  and  each  is  a microcosm  of  the  universe.3 

The  original  Monas  or  Power,  however,  is  recognized  as  a conscious 
mind,  an  intelligent,  self-controlling  cause,  capable  by  a voluntary  pro- 
ductive act,  of  giving  rise  to  distinct,  inferior  agents,  possessed  of  intelli- 
gence and  will ; so  that  in  this  respect  his  views  differ  from  those  of 
Spmosa,  and  so  far  harmonize  with  some  of  the  highest  forms  of  moral 
and  theological  truth.  It  is  on  this  ground  that  in  his  Theodicee,  he 
maintains  “ The  conformity  of  Faith  with  Reason,”  and  rises  to  the  sub- 
limest  heights  of  religious  contemplation.  His  Theodicee  has  the  charm 

1 CEnvres,  vol.  ii.  p.  463.  3 See  his  “ Monadologie,”  passim. 

3 CEuvrcs,  vol.  ii.  p.  471,  “Monadologie,”  $ 51.  Hence  the  expression,  “ Chaque 
rnonade  cree  represente  toute  Tunivers.”  Monad.  $ 62. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


XXXIX 


of  a grand  moral  epic,  in  which  are  celebrated  the  perfections  of  the  eter- 
nal Jehovah.  The  distinguished  Genevese  philosopher  Bonnet  tells  us, 
that  he  used  it  as  “ a manual  of  devotion.” 

But  in  the  hands  of  others,  and  especially  of  less  devotional  minds,  the 
Leibnitzian  monadology,  involving  in  its  last  analysis  the  interior  identity 
of  subject  and  object,  of  finite  and  infinite,  and  constituting  the  universe 
of  simple  spiritual  forces,  supplied  the  scientific  basis  for  a system  of  ideal- 
ism. His  speculations  found  a congenial  home  in  the  minds  of  his  coun- 
trymen. In  nearly  all  the  theories  which  have  successively  followed  each 
other  among  that  speculative  people,  Leibnitz  constantly  reappears.  It 
is  the  same  lofty,  but  mysterious  and  fanciful  melody,  with  endless  and 
ever-recurring  variations. 

In  the  hands  of  Wolf,  who  attempted  to  methodize  the  philosophy  of 
his  master,  it  lost  its  warmth  and  grandeur,  and  appeared  as  a formal 
system  of  ideal  abstractions,  giving  rise  to  an  arid  skepticism,  which  lasted 
for  many  years. 

The  eighteenth  century  closed  with  Kant  and  the  Kantian  philosophy, 
in  which  the  possibility  of  metaphysics  or  ontology  as  a science  is  denied, 
and,  as  many  think,  completely  demolished.  Even  reason  is  shown  to  be 
not  only  weak,  but  illusive,  so  that  “ apodictical,”  that  is,  demonstrative 
judgments,  of  absolute  certainty,  are  proved  to  be  impossible.  This  is 
the  object  of  the  “ Kritik  of  Pure  Reason”  ( reiner  Vernunft'),  so  that  to 
speak  of  “the  Kantian  metaphysics,”  as  many  do,  or  to  cite  the  Konigs- 
berg  philosopher  as  an  authority  for  the  absolute  demonstrations  of 
“ Keason,”  is  a practical  solecism.  Kant  swept  the  whole  field  of  specu- 
lation ; and  though  denying  neither  the  external  nor  the  internal  world, 
as  practical  realities,  proved  that  neither  the  reason  nor  the  understand- 
ing, formal  powers  both,  gives  us  any  thing  in  its  absolute  certainty.  Both 
space  and  time,  unity  and  cause,  according  to  Kant,  are  subjective  ideas, 
by  means  of  which  we  systematize  our  knowledge,  but  can  never  be 
shown  to  have  a real,  or  independent  existence. 

Thus,  agaiir,  all  things  are  reduced  to  pure  ideas  or  abstractions. 
Reality  escapes  into  the  void,  and  truth  remains,  like  a shadowy  island 
in  the  midst  of  a boundless  gulf.  “ The  region,”  says  Kant,  “ of  the  pure 
understanding,  is  an  island,  and  inclosed  by  nature  itself  in  unchangeable 
limits.  It  is  the  region  of  truth  [an  engaging  title],  surrounded  by  a wide 
and  stormy  ocean.”1 

But  the  nature  of  Kant,  like  that  of  every  other  man,  can  not  be  satis- 
fied with  abstractions ; and  though  truth  is  not  theoretically  demonstra- 
ble, it  is  necessary,  it  is  real.  Our  moral  nature  and  practical  wants  de- 
mand it ; and  not  only  demand  it,  but  prove  it.  So  that  what  is  demon- 

1 Kritik  of  Pure  Reason. — Eng.  Tr.  p.  222.  As  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  shown,  Kant 
is  by  no  means  precise  in  the  use  either  of  Vernunft  or  Verstand.  His  island  of  the 
pure  understanding,  after  all,  is  a fabulous  one. 


xl 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


strated  to  be  illusive  on  one  side  of  our  nature,  according  to  Kant,  is 
proved  to  be  real  on  the  other — a strange  logical  contradiction — for  which 
Kant  poorly  accounts,  but  to  which  he  most  earnestly  clings.  A happy 
inconsistency  of  which  the  most  astute  philosophers  are  not  unfrequently 
guilty.  Hence  his  “Kritik  of  the  Practical  Reason,”  which  gives  us  all 
moral  truths,  God,  the  soul,  and  immortality.  The  conscience,  the  affec- 
tions, the  longings  of  the  soul,  the  wants  of  the  individual,  and  the  wants 
of  society,  demand  a God  and  a life  to  come ; and  as  all  things  are  adapt- 
ed to  each  other,  and  ail  permanent  wants  are  met,  God  and  a life  to 
come  are  given  in  the  Practical  Reason.  God  exists  for  man  ; man  exists 
for  God.  Responsibility  and  justice,  love  and  worship,  are  real  and  eter- 
nal. 

Here,  then,  Kant  lays  a broad  foundation  for  religion  and  morality. 

But  why  should  our  nature  be  in  contradiction  ? Above  all,  why 
should  Reason,  which  we  are  told  is  highest  in  man,  mislead  us  ? Them 
must  be  some  great  error  here ; and  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  to  whom  we  refer 
the  reader,  in  his  Critique  on  the  Eclectic  Philosophy,  thinks  that  the 
error  consists  in  making  reason  not  simply  “ weak,  but  delusive.” 

Fichte,  ambitious  of  absolute  knowledge  ( Wissejischaftslehre ),  young, 
ardent,  enthusiastic,  with  great  force  of  character,  and  an  imagination 
which  nothing  could  linrit,  took  up  the  problem  of  the  Kantian  philoso- 
phy, and  endeavored  to  determine  the  relation  of  subject  and  object,  of 
finite  and  infinite.  His  mode  of  solution  is  summary ; object  does  not 
exist  except  as  posited  by  subject.  That  is,  the  human  mind  creates  its 
own  intelligible  world.  Subject  and  object  are  one.  A subjective  ideal- 
ism is  the  true  philosophy.  God  exists,  but  exists  in  consciousness ; he  is 
known  only  as  the  Moral  Order  (moralische  Ordnung)  of  the  world. 1 Of 
course,  such  a system  of  subjective  idealism,  though  held  by  its  author 
with  a lofty  moral  heroism,  must  give  rise  to  the  most  startling  errors 
and  extravagancies.  “ To-morrow,  gentlemen,”  he  said,  on  one  occasion, 
with  singular  audacity,  “ I shall  create  God.”  By  this  he  meant  that 
he  would  develop  the  process  by  which  God  comes  into  consciousness  as 
subject  and  object.  Fichte  strenuously  denied  the  charge  of  atheism,  and, 
in  later  life,  somewhat  modified  his  views — but,  at  best,  he  is  seen  ever- 
more hovering  over  the  abyss  of  absolute  nothing.  “ The  sum  total,”  says 
he,  “ is  this  : there  is  absolutely  nothing  permanent  without  me  or  within 
me,  but  only  an  unceasing  change ; I know  absolutely  nothing  of  any 
existence,  not  even  of  my  own.  I myself  know  nothing,  and  am  nothing. 
Images  ( Bilder ) there  are  ; they  constitute  all  that  apparently  exists,  and 
what  they  know  of  themselves  is  after  the  manner  of  images  ; images  that 
pass  and  vanish,  without  there  being  aught  to  witness  their  transition ; 
that  consist,  in  fact,  of  the  images  of  images,  without  significance  and 


1 Sittenlehre  (1798),  pp.  184,  189.  See  also  his  “ Gottliche  Weltordnung.1 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xli 


without  an  aim.  I myself  am  one  of  these  images  ; nay,  I am  not  even 
thus  much,  but  only  a confused  image  of  images.  All  reality  is  converted 
into  a marvelous  dream,  without  a life  to  dream  of,  and  without  a mind 
to  dream ; into  a dream  made  up  only  of  a dream  of  itself.  Perception 
is  a dream ; thought,  the  source  of  all  the  existence  and  all  the  reality 
which  I imagined  to  myself  of  my  existence,  of  my  power,  of  my  destina- 
tion, is  the  dream  of  that  dream.”  1 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  give  any  detailed  account  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Schelling,  the  proper  successor  of  Fichte,  as  this  has  been  done  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  (Discussions,  p.  26,  et  seq.)  in  a manner  so  clear  and  ade- 
quate. The  philosophical  patriarch  of  Berlin  is  an  idealist,  though  labor- 
ing all  his  life  long  to  reach  “ the  real,”  and  professing  in  his  old  age,  to  be- 
lieve in  a personal  God,  in  the  divine  mission  of  Christ,  and  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul.  His  method,  however,  is  rationalistic,  and  the  result 
ideal,  and  ideal  only — that  is,  identity  of  subject  and  object,  not  in  the 
individual  .mind,  as  in  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,  but  in  the  absolute  object, 
infinite  and  eternal.  Psychology  is  abandoned  as  incapable  of  leading  to 
absolute  reality ; God,  the  absolute,  the  all-comprehending  is  discovered 
only  to  the  supernatural  intuition  of  the  human  mind.  Hence  knorvledge 
and  being  correspond.  They  are  correlates.  To  know  the  Divine,  the 
soul  must  be  divine  ; to  discover  the  absolute,  it  must  itself  be  absolute. 
Thus  the  system  of  Schelling  may  be  described  as  a transcendental  or  ab- 
solute idealism — the  title,  in  fact,  of  one  of  his  principal  works,  “ System 
des  Transcendentalen  Idealismus.”  2 

Hegel,  who  commenced  his  studies  with  Schelling,  and,  while  possess- 
ing less  imagination,  had  more  logical  power,  is  the  real  Coryphaeus  of 
German  idealism.  He  rejects  what  he  conceives  to  be  the  partial  views 
of  both  Fichte  and  Schelling,  and  attempts  to  construct  a purely  rational 
or  ideal  system,  without  assuming  “ the  finite  Ego”  of  Fichte,  or  “ the  in- 
tellectual intuition”  of  Schelling.  He  begins  with  nothing — that  is,  a pure 
abstraction — which,  existing  as  thought,  in  his  Anew,  posits  a real  idea, 
as  the  basis  of  all  logic  and  all  philosophy.  Nothing,  for  example,  is  the 
extreme  of  two  contradictory  poles — nothing — something — and  the  rela- 
tion between  them.  This  is  the  order  or  process  of  thought ; this  also 
must  be  the  order  or  process  of  the  universe.3  Thus,  unconsciously  to  him- 
self, he  assumes  the  reality  of  thought,  and  not  only  so,  but  its  identity 

1 Quoted  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton. — Reid's  Works,  p.  129.  The  translation  may  be 
relied  upon  as  precise  and  accurate.  Fichte  is  here  seen  to  be  the  most  thorough- 
going and  consistent  idealist  And  yet  in  the  “ Bestimmung  des  Menschen,”  how 
loftily  he  speaks  of  God,  of  duty,  and  of  destiny. 

° For  one  of  the  most  ample  and  satisfactory  accounts  of  Schelling  and  his  philoso- 
phy, see  M.  Willm’s  Histoire  de  Philosophie  Allemande. — Tome  iii. 

3 The  following  are  his  propositions  upon  this  point : 1.  Thought  is  the  real  essence 
of  man.  2.  Thought  is  the  essence  of  the  world — the  reality  of  things.  3.  The  true 
knowledge  of  things  is  the  work  of  my  thought ; therefore  my  thought  is  identical  with 
absolute  thought.  See  Encyclopscdie,  tj  19-83. 


xlii 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


with  existence.  He  is  consistent  enough,  however,  to  maintain  that  we 
can  know  nothing  of  either,  except  in  their  relation.  His  universe  is  one — 
hut  it  is  a universe  of  relations ; we  can  never  say  that  it  is,  but  only  be- 
coming. The  whole  is  negative  and  positive — this  and  that — nothing  and 
something  at  once  ; in  other  words,  all  is  absolute  and  concrete,  which 
we  can  never  know  except  in  their  eternal  oscillation.  Thus  subject  and 
object,  finite  and  infinite  are  lost  in  the  boundless  relations  of  absolute 
thought.1  So  that  we  may  justly  say,  that  the  entire  Hegelian  philoso- 
phy, grand  and  comprehensive  as  it  seems,  lies  between  two  Zeros,  or 
nothings.  This,  then,  is  the  sum  of  idealism,  the  apex  of  speculative  or 
ontological  thought.  Philosophy  has  reached  its  goal,  beyond  which  is 
nothing. 

We  fully  agree  with  Michelet,  of  Berlin,  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
expounders  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy,  in  his  “ Geschichte  der  letzen 
Systeme  der  Philosophie  in  Deutschland,  von  Kant  bis  Hegel,”  that  the 
true  secret  of  nearly  all  the  German  philosophy  is  idealism,  first  subjective 
in  Kant  and  Fichte  ; secondly,  objective  in  Schelling;  and  lastly,  absolute 
in  Hegel.  “ When  thought,”  says  Michelet,  “ becomes  the  leading  prin- 
ciple, then  one  of  two  things  follows  ; either  real  being  or  object  entirely 
vanishes,  and  the  subject  of  thought  remains  the  sole  reality — the  philoso- 
phy of  Kant  and  Fichte — or  thought  realizes  itself  in  the  object,  and 
reality  becomes  intelligence — the  philosophy  of  Schelling ; finally  Hegel, 
who  reunites  the  two  opposite  systems,  and  blends  together  idealism  and 
realism,  has  carried  philosophy  to  that  lofty  elevation,  that  last  degree 
of  development,  where  it  deserves  the  name  of  Absolute  Idealism.” 

What  then,  in  the  way  of  originality,  is  left  to  the  speculative  thinker, 
who  wishes  to  make  a tour  of  exploration  in  the  region  of  the  absolute  ? 
One  would  say  nothing.  Cousin,  however,  replies,  Eclecticism!  Psychol- 
ogy and  Ontology  must  be  brought  together.  The  passage  must  be  made 
from  the  one  to  the  other.  Schelling,  indeed,  has  pronounced  it  impossi- 
ble. Hegel  has  rejected  the  thought  with  disdain.  The  finite  and  formal, 
he  would  say,  can  never  give  the  real  and  the  absolute.  But  it  can,  is 
the  decisive  claim  of  Cousin,  ingenious,  learned,  and  eloquent,  and  there- 
fore bold  and  enterprising.  For,  in  his  view,  man  is  both  personal  and 
impersonal — that  is,  finite  and  infinite  ; personal  and  finite  in  his  under- 
standing and  will,  impersonal  and  infinite  in  his  spontaneity  and  reason. 
He  can  transcend  himself,  he  can  see  God  in  his  absolute  essence,  he  can 
construe  the  universe  from  this  awful  height.2  The  words  mysterious  and 
incomprehensible,  Cousin  leaves  to  theology.3  Knowledge,  absolute  and 
perfect,  the  comprehension  of  God,  and  in  God  of  all  things,  he  claims  for 
philosophy ; for  once  more  being  and  thought  are  identical,  the  process 
of  logic  is  the  process  of  the  universe. 

1 Encyclopadie,  tj  93.  3 Histoire  de  la  Philos.  (Intro.)  p.  95. 

3 See  Introduction  a l’Hist.  de  la  Philos,  p.  18,  p.  97. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


•gl  iii 


But  we  leave  him  in  the  hands  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  who  as 
Cousin  himself  confesses,  has  given  one  of  the  most  candid  and  luminous 
statements  of  the  Eclectic  theory,  and  presented  objections  to  its  funda- 
mental positions,  which  have  never  been  answered.  Cousin  has  attempted 
a reply,  but  without  changing  the  case  in  the  slightest  degree.  It  is 
quite  amusing  to  see  how  Morell.  after  dogmatically  asserting  over  and 
over  again  the  validity  of  the  Eclectic  method,  which  he  makes  his  own, 
turns  away  from  the  impregnable  positions  of  the  Scottish  philosopher. 
It  is  as  if  a besieging  general  had  proudly  carried  all  the  redoubts 
and  outworks  of  a beleaguered  city,  and  coming  up  close  to  the  walls, 
bristling  with  cannon,  had  made  a handsome  how,  and  retired  ! “ And 

here,”  says  he,  “ we  freely  confess  that  we  are  not  prepared  to  combat, 
step  by  step,  the  weighty  arguments  by  which  the  Scottish  metaphysician 
seeks  to  establish  the  negative  character  of  this  great  fundamental  con- 
ception ; neither  on  the  other  hand  are  we  prepared  to  admit  his  infer- 
ence.” 1 

We  think  Morell  does  not  fully  appreciate  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s  position, 
for  even  were  it  admitted,  it  is  not  necessary  to  abandon  our  belief  in 
God  and  the  soul,  as  immaterial  and  immortal  realities.  We  simply 
confess,  humbly  and  reverently,  that  we  can  not  comprehend  them  in 
their  essence.  It  is  only  as  revealed  to  us  in  finite,  yet  august  and 
fair  forms,  in  nature  or  in  “ Scripture,”  that  we  can  appreciate  their 
vast  and  momentous  relations.  To  us  the  Infinite  Good,  the  All  Beauti- 
ful and  Everlasting  is  known,  and  yet  unknown,  an  apparent  paradox, 
but  true  as  the  boundless  and  ineffable  nature  of  infinite  existence.2  It 
is  on  this  ground  that  the  Apostle  Paul  prays,  with  a philosophy  as  pro- 
found as  it  is  devout,  that  the  Ephesian  converts  might  “ know  the  love 
of  God,  which  passeth  knowledge.” 

But  more  of  this  presently.  In  the  mean  while,  let  us  indicate  as 
briefly  as  possible,  the  fundamental  views  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  and  the 
amount  of  his  contributions  to  mental  science. 

The  leading  principle  of  his  philosophy  is,  that  all  our  knowledge  is 
conditioned  and  relative,  true  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  limited.  Good,  of 
course,  for  all  practical  purposes,  both  of  life  and  religion,  but  not  abso- 
lute or  unconditioned,  not  infinite  or  boundless,  and  therefore  not,  in  .the 
scientific  sense,  perfect. 

It  is  a legitimate  inference  from  this  that  the  science  of  the  absolute  is 
impossible.  We  can  neither  know  (scientifically)  the  fi,7iite  absolute — 
that  is,  mind  or  matter  in  its  interior  essence,  or  unconditioned  state — 
nor  the  infinite  absolute — that  is,  the  essential  totality,  or  unity  of  all 

1 Hist,  of  the  Philos,  of  the  Nineteenth  Century. — Am.  Ed.  p.  656. 

3 We  might  have  said,  true  as  the  finite  and  conditioned  nature  of  the  human  soul. 
The  finite  may  adore,  but  can  never  comprehend  the  infinite  God.  In  this  respect, 
we  may  well  say  with  the  prophet : “ Yerily,  thou  art  a God  that  hidest  thyself!” 


xliv 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


things,  including  infinite  space  or  infinite  duration,  as  also,  infinite  Spirit, 
which  is  God  in  his  unlimited  and  eternal  essence.  To  be  known  in  any 
way,  God  must  be  manifested  under  conditions  and  limits,  as  possessing 
specific  attributes,  or  performing  specific  acts,  beyond  which  the  loftiest 
intellect  must  exclaim  reverently,  “ 0 the  depths  !” 

And  thus  philosophy,  as  well  as  religion,  is  compelled  to  acknowledge 
the  presence  every  where,  in  nature,  in  man,  and  in  God,  of  inscrutable 
mystery. 

On  this  ground  the  French  and  German  Ontologies  are  demolished. 
The  adventurous  wing  of  speculation  is  checked.  Philosophy  is  brought 
from  the  ‘-'dim  obscure”  of  the  possible  and  transcendent,  into  the  clear 
atmosphere  of  the  actual  and  concrete.  Pantheism  is  made  impossible. 
Religion  is  left  to  stand  upon  its  own  grounds ; and  man,  the  finite  and 
fallible,  is  left  to  adore  the  One  living  and  true  God,  unknown  as  essence, 
but  well  known  as  goodness,  holiness,  and  love. 

The  reason,  in  this  view,  does  not  contradict  the  conscience  and  the 
heart ; but  rather  aids  them  in  the  devout  recognition  of  the  invisible 
and  ineffable  Causa  Causarum.  Transcendent  wonder,  humility,  and 
trust,  are  its  necessary  moral  results. 

This  fundamental  principle  of  Sir  'William  Hamilton’s  philosophy,  is 
not  reached  in  an  empirical  or  merely  speculative  way.  It  is  not  an 
hypothesis  or  an  assumption ; but  a fact  reached  by  a rigid  analysis  of 
human  thought.  Nothing  is  assumed  but  the  authority  of  Consciousness, 
which  of  course  must  be  assumed,  or  thought  itself  is  null. 

Hence  it  has  been  the  life-labor  of  this  acute  and  candid  thinker  to 
ascertain  the  ultimate  facts  of  consciousness. 

Deduction,  induction — in  fact  the  first  processes  of  thought — imply  cer- 
tain fundamental  principles,  convictions,  intuitions,  or  whatever  they  may 
be  termed  of  the  “ Communis  Sensus,”  or  Common  Consciousness.  To 
these  all  our  knowledge,  all  our  reasonings,  must  be  referred  as  basis  or 
touchstone.  These  are  original  as  the  mind  itself — bringing  with  them 
no  reasons  or  explanations.  They  are  not  to  be  proved,  but  seen,  felt,  real- 
ized. Hence  they  have  been  termed,  revelations,  fundamental  convic- 
tions, axioms  of  thought,  interior  ■perceptions,  intuitions,  imvard  behold- 
ings,  decisions  of  the  reason,  categories  of  thought,  and  so  forth. 

What  these  are  is  a question  to  be  determined,  by  no  a priori  reasoning, 
but  by  a simple  appeal  to  universal  consciousness.  The  criterion  of  Des- 
cartes, “ clearness  and  distinctness”  is  not  sufficient.  They  must  possess 
other  features  ; thus  one  of  the  great  objects  of  Hamilton’s  investigations, 
has  been  to  settle  the  criterion  by  which  to  try  the  validity  of  what  are 
claimed  as  fundamental  or  infallible  convictions.  This  criterion  he  finds 
not  merely  in  clearness,  but  in  simplicity,  necessity,  and  universality. 
They  must  be  simple  and  incomprehensible — not  modifications  or  infer- 
ences ; necessary  and  universal — acknowledged  by  all  men  ; and  possess 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


Jdy 

a sort  of  unique  or  peculiar  evidence,  which  can  neither  he  proved  or 
disproved  by  any  thing  clearer  or  more  evident.1 

Hamilton,  on  these  grounds,  proceeds  to  ascertain  what  these  funda- 
mental axioms  of  thought  are.  Among  those  upon  which  he  has  dwelt 
the  most  fully,  as  defended  by  Reid,  in  opposition  to  the  idealists  and 
skeptics,  is  the  conviction  not  only  of  our  own  being,  or  the  “ Cogito  ergo 
sum ” of  Descartes,  but  the  conviction  of  an  exterior  existence.  Mind  is 
real — matter,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  the  external  world,  the  not 
me,  is  also  real. 

Hence  also  he  contends  that  Perception  is  immediate  or  direct,  present- 
ative  as  he  calls  it,  and  not  mediate  or  representative.  Idealism  therefore 
is  impossible. 

But  he  finds,  by  an  appeal  to  conscience,  to  which  all  must  respond, 
that  thought,  as  actualized,  is  brought  into  relations  or  conditions.  It 
involves  ever  the  idea  of  subject  and  object,  the  thinking  mind,  and  the 
thing  thought  of.  The  thought  of  cause  is  impossible  without  effect,  of 
substance  without  qualities,  of  matter  without  extension  or  space,  of  mind 
without  thought.  Strip  a thing  of  all  conceivable  qualities,  it  becomes  an 
abstraction,  it  is,  to  us,  a practical  ?zo-thing.  It  may  exist  in  reality,  but  it  is 
not  cognizable  in  thought.  It  escapes  into  the  void.  In  a word,  all  thought 
is  conditioned,  whence  the  absolute  or  unconditioned  as  such,  is  not  cog- 
nizable ; above  all,  can  not  be  made  the  subject  of  scientific  speculation. 

Thought  would  thus  seem  to  play  unconsciously  between  two  extremes, 
or  poles,  as  if  it  belonged  in  part  to  the  finite,  in  part  to  the  infinite,  or  as  if 
neither  finite  nor  infinite  expressed  the  true  reality,  except  by  an  apparent 
contradiction.  So  that  all  subjects  of  human  inquiry  have,  so  to  speak, 
two  sides,  or  two  poles,  which  united  give  us  reality.  For  example,  man 
is  free,  but  he  is  also  under  necessity — freedom  and  necessity  may  both  be 
predicated  of  him,  in  the  one  case  as  a finite  personality,  in  the  other  as  a 
part  of  a whole,  or  as  the  object  of  divine  control.  Space  may  be  spoken  of 
as  limited,  and  at  the  same  time  as  unlimited.  But  we  can  not  conceive 
either  of  these  as  possible — for  beyond  all  space  as  limited  is  a boundless 
region,  which  belongs  to  it  as  much  as  the  other;  but  this  also  as  unlim- 
ited we  can  not  conceive,  for  it  advances  as  we  advance,  and  beyond  our 
furthest  range  of  conception  is  unlimited  extension.  But  practically  space 
is  limited,  in  this  finite  world  of  ours,  as  we  speak  of  it;  so  that  we  are 
justified  in  saying  it  is  both  finite  and  infinite,  limited  and  unlimited. 

Hence  Sir  William  Hamilton’s  enunciation  of  the  axiom  : “ That  posi- 
tive thought  lies  in  the  limitation  or  conditioning  of  one  or  other  of  two 
opposite  extremes,  neither  of  which  as  unconditioned,  can  be  realized  to 
the  mind  as  possible,  and  yet  of  which  as  contradictories,  one  or  other 
must,  by  the  fundamental  laws  of  thought,  be  recognized  as  necessary.® 


1 .See  Reid’s  Works,  Note  A,  f)  4. 


2 Reid’s  Works,  i.  p.  743. 


xlvi 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


On  this  fundamental  principle  of  thought  being  conditioned,  Hamilton 
endeavors  to  generalize  the  cognizable  ; with  what  success  our  readers 
must  judge  for  themselves.  For  it  is  in  the  application  of  some  compre- 
hensive principle  like  this  that  the  greatest  diversity  of  opinion  is  likely 
to  prevail.  It  is  here  also  that  error  is  most  liable  to  intervene. 

We  confess  to  an  honest  doubt  respecting  the  application  of  the  princi- 
ple to  the  solution  of  what  seems  to  be  an  infallible  and  authoritative 
conviction  of  the  human  mind,  namely  that  of  cause,  or  what  may  be 
termed  perhaps  with  greater  propriety,  productive  power.  This  idea  or 
conviction  is  resolved  by  our  author  into  the  incompetence  of  the  human 
mind.  This  appears  to  us  inadequate  ; for  we  are  as  conscious,  each  of 
us,  of  being  a productive  cause,  as  we  are  of  possessing  existence,  or  a 
distinct,  self-contained  personality.  That  is,  we  are  conscious,  in  every 
voluntary  mental,  and  even  physical  act,  of  being  a productive  will. 
This  conviction  is  simple,  original,  necessary,  universal,  and  inalienable. 
It  is  given  as  a primary  datum  in  consciousness.  Hamilton  indeed  con- 
tends that  it  can  not  possess  this  character,  because  it  is  given  only  in 
specific  acts ; but  so  also  is  every  other  spontaneous  conviction.  We  re- 
member the  past — therefore  past  knowledge,  though  given  in  conscious- 
ness, when  remembered,  is  for  this  reason,  mediate  and  representative. 
It  is  not  the  source  of  our  conviction  of  our  personal  existence,  which  is 
given  only  in  specific,  mental  states  or  acts.  Properly  speaking,  we  are 
not  conscious  of  continuous  existence,  but  only  of  present  existence.  We 
infer  our  past  existence  from  memory  ; were  that  lost,  our  knowledge  of 
personal  identity  in  its  relation  to  the  past,  would  be  lost  also.  So  that 
conscious  existence  is  given  us  in  specific  and  instantaneous  acts.  The 
conviction  or  consciousness  of  being  a cause,  or  a productive  Will,  is  given 
to  each  of  us  in  the  same  way,  and  brings  with  it  equal  authority. 

But  can  we  transfer  that  idea  to  what  we  call  external  causes,  of  which 
we  have  no  consciousness ; and  can  we  claim  on  this  ground  to  know 
any  thing  satisfactorily  of  real  causes  in  nature  ? By  analogy  we  should 
seem  justified  in  doing  so;  and  yet  we  must  always  feel  that  there  is 
something  in  natural  causes  beyond  our  grasp  ; for  one  cause  implies  an- 
other, and  another,  and  so  on,  till  we  recognize  a great  first  Cause  or  Pro- 
ductive Will,  of  which  man  is  the  image.  Here  we  reach  the  infinite , 
and  how  that  is  related  to  the  finite , we  do  not  and  we  can  not  know. 
Here  then  comes  in  the  incompetence  of  human  thought,  and  the  great 
law  of  our  philosopher.  We  know  only  “in  part.”  Still  we  are  satis- 
fied, on  the  ground  of  consciousness,  that  we  ourselves  are  productive 
causes,  and  by  analogy,  we  infer  that  there  must  be  a great  Productive 
Cause  of  the  Universe.  The  inference  is  almost  as  instantaneous  and  per- 
fect as  the  act  of  consciousness.  It  seems  equally  infallible  ; so  much  so, 
that  many  have  maintained  that  it  is  not  an  inference,  but  an  original 
conviction  given  in  conciousness. 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


xlvii 


It  would  seem,  however,  that  in  their  last  analysis,  all  finite  causes, 
and  even  our  own  individual  productive  wills  may  be  resolved,  at  least 
in  thought,  into  the  one  infinite  and  eternal  Cause  or  "Will,  where  we  lose 
ourselves.  Here,  therefore,  we  are  saved,  and  so  restored  to  ourselves 
and  to  God,  by  acknowledging  our  mental  incompetence.  The  matter  is 
“ too  high,”  we  can  not  “attain  unto  it.” 

It  is  possible  that  the  defect  which  we  feel  in  the  application  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton’s  principle  to  the  primary  conviction  of  cause,  may  arise  from 
our  imperfect  conception  of  his  views,  or  from  his  own  inadequate,  per- 
haps imperfect  statement  of  it.  For  we  would  respectfully  inquire, 
whether  the  particular  position  which  he  takes  for  its  defense  and  eluci- 
dation may  not  fairly  and  logically  be  run  into  pantheism.  (See  Discus- 
sions pp.  575-583.)  It  is  true  indeed  that  something  can  never  come 
from  nothing ; for  that  would  contradict  our  very  idea  of  cause.  Ulti- 
mately God  must  be  conceived  of  as  Cause  of  all  that  exists ; so  that 
when  he  creates,  he  does  not  create  out  of  nothing,  but  out  of  himself. 
That  is  to  say,  for  the  language  must  not  be  understood  grossly  and 
figuratively,  he  creates  by  his  essential  productive  power.  How,  we  know 
not,  and  can  not  know. 

By  what  means  then  do  we  save  ourselves  from  pantheism  ? By  falling 
back  upon  our  personal  consciousness — and  so  recognizing  the  fundamental 
conviction  of  personal  causality,  as  well  as  the  distinction  between  subject 
and  object,  the  me  and  the  not  me , which  Sir  William  Hamilton  has 
demonstrated.  In  our  consciousness,  we  are  free  Productive  Wills,  all 
reasoning  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding ; and  God  himself  must  be  a 
free  Productive  Will ; as  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  his  very  explanation  of  this 
matter,  frankly  acknowledges.  So  that  if  there  is  any  difficulty  here,  we 
shall  cite  Sir  W.  Hamilton  against  himself.  For  on  the  ground  of  “men- 
tal incompetence,”  or  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  two  contradictories,  he 
asserts  that  “ there  is  no  ground  for  inferring  a certain  fact  to  be  impos- 
sible, merely  from  our  inability  to  conceive  it  possible.”  So  that,  he  adds, 
“ if  the  causal  judgment  be  not  an  express  affirmation  of  the  mind,  the 
unconditional  testimony  of  consciotisness , that  we  are,  though  we  know 
not  how,  the  true  and  responsible  authors  of  our  actions” — (conscious 
then  of  being  productive  wills,  or  causes) — “not  merely  the  worthless  links 
in  an  adamantine  series  of  effects  and  causes.” 1 

Thus,  on  the  same  ground,  though  we  find  it  impossible  to  conceive 
how  matter  can  spring  from  spirit ; or  how  the  universe  of  finite  minds, 
or  finite  forms,  can  be  created  by  Jehovah,  we  feel  assured,  that  as  we 
are  free  Productive  Wills,  he  too  must  be  a free  Productive  Will.  If  we 


1 And  again,  “ How,  therefore,  I repeat,  moral  liberty  is  possible  in  man  or  God, 
we  are  utterly  unable,  speculatively  to  understand.  But  practically,  the  fact  that  we 
are  free  is  given  to  us  in  the  consciousness  of  an  uncompromising  law  of  duty,  in  the 
consciousness  of  our  moral  accountability.”  Appendix  A,  p.  587. 


xlviii 


INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 


arc  separated,  by  our  personality,  from  the  not  me,  or  the  finite  world 
without  us,  he  too  by  his  personality  (that  is,  his  free  causative  will),  is 
separated  from  the  finite  universe  which  he  has  made.  He  may  be  in  it, 
as  a presence  or  a power,  but  he  is  above  it,  as  a free  creative  spirit,  who 
controls  it  with  the  supreme  and  eternal  dominion  of  Proprietor  and  Lord. 
If  we  say,  that  potentially  the  sum  of  being  or  existence  is  not  increased 
by  the  creation  ; or  rather  if  we  say,  that  we  are  incompetent  to  conceive 
how  the  sum  of  being  is  increased  ; no  matter ; the  incompetence  is  the 
same  in  both  cases.  We  exist — we  are  free — we  are  conscious  personal- 
ities ; that  is  enough.  And  so  it  is  enough  to  say,  that  God  exists — is 
free — is  an  infinite  yet  conscious  personality,  who  creates  all  things  “ by 
the  word  of  his  power,”  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  by  his  inherent 
creative  energy.  “ God  said,  Let  there  be  light,  and  there  was  light !” 
Here  then  we  reverently  unite  with  our  author,  in  adoring,  rvith  pro- 
found humility,  the  ineffable  Jehovah,  the  father  of  our  spirits,  who  is 
“ above  all,  through  all,  and  in  all.”  In  conclusion  also,  we  commend  to 
thoughtful  minds  the  cultivation  of  a philosophy  so  humble  and  trustful, 
and  yet  so  profound  and  comprehensive.  “For  I may  indeed  say,”  is  the 
testimony  of  our  author,  “ with  Chrysostom,  The  foundation  of  our  phi- 
losophy is  humility.  (Homil.  de  Perf.  Evang.)  For  it  is  professedly  a 
demonstration  of  the  impossibility  of  that  wisdom  in  high  matters,  which 
the  apostle  prohibits  us  even  to  attempt ; and  it  proposes,  from  the  limit- 
ation of  the  human  powers,  from  our  impotence  to  comprehend,  what 
however  we  must  admit,  to  show  articulately  why  ‘ the  secret  things  of 
God  can  not  but  be  to  man  past  finding  out.’  Humility  thus  becomes  the 
cardinal  virtue,  not  only  of  revelation,  but  of  reason.”  1 


1 The  whole  passage  is  worthy  of  careful  study  as  indicating  the  true  relations  of 
reason  and  faith,  of  philosophy  and  theology.  See  Appendix  A,  p.  588. 


Hartford,  Conn.,  May , 1853. 


PHILOSOPHY. 


I.— PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 

IN  REFERENCE  TO  COUSIN’S  DOCTRINE 
OF  THE  INFINITO-ABSOLUTE.1 

(October,  1829.) 

Cours  de  Pliilosopliie.  Par  M.  Victor  Cousin,  Professeur  de 
Philosophic  a la  Faculte  des  Lettres  de  Paris. — Introduction  a 
PHistoire  de  la  Philosophic.  8vo.  Paris,  1828. 

The  delivery  of  these  Lectures  excited  an  unparalleled  sensa- 
tion in  Paris.  Condemned  to  silence  during  the  reign  of  Jesuit 
ascendency,  M.  Cousin,  after  eight  years  of  honorable  retirement, 
not  exempt  from  persecution,  had  again  ascended  the  Chair  of 

1 [Translated  'into  French,  by  M.  Peisse ; into  Italian,  by  S.  Lo  Gatto : also  in 
Cross’s  Selections  from  the  Edinburgh  Review. 

This  article  did  not  originate  with  myself.  I was  requested  to  write  it  by  my 
friend,  the  late  accomplished  Editor  of  the  Review,  Professor  Napier.  Personally,  I 
felt  averse  from  the  task.  I was  not  unaware,  that  a discussion  of  the  leading  doc- 
trine of  the  book  would  prove  unintelligible,  not  only  to  “ the  general  reader,”  but, 
with  few  exceptions,  to  our  British  metaphysicians  at  large.  But,  moreover,  I was 
still  farther  disinclined  to  the  undertaking,  because  it  would  behove  me  to  come  for- 
ward in  overt  opposition  to  a certain  theory,  which,  however  powerfully  advocated,  I 
felt  altogether  unable  to  admit : while  its  author,  M.  Cousin,  was  a philosopher  for 
whose  genius  and  character  I already  had  the  warmest  admiration— an  admiration 
which  every  succeeding  year  has  only  augmented,  justified,  and  confirmed.  Nor,  in 
saying  this,  need  I make  any  reservation.  For  I admire,  even  where  I dissent;  and 
were  M.  Cousin’s  speculations  on  the  Absolute  utterly  abolished,  to  him  would  still 
remain  the  honor,  of  doing  more  himself,  and  of  contributing  more  to  what  has  been 
done  by  others,  in  the  furtherance  of  an  enlightened  philosophy,  than  any  other  living 
individual  in  France — I might  say  in  Europe.  Mr.  Napier,  however,  was  resolute; 
it  was  the  first  number  of  the  Review  under  his  direction  ; and  the  criticism  was  hastily 
written.  In  this  country  the  reasonings  were  of  course  not  understood,  and  naturally, 
for  a season,  declared  incomprehensible.  Abroad,  in  France,  Germany,  Italy,  and 
latterly  in  America,  the  article  has  been  rated  higher  than  it  deserves.  The  illustri- 
ous thinker,  against  one  of  whose  doctrines  its  argument  is  directed,  was  the  first  to 

A*1 


10 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


Philosophy ; and  the  splendor  with  which  he  recommenced  his 
academical  career,  more  than  justified  the  expectation  which  his 
recent  celebrity  as  a writer,  and  the  memory  of  his  earlier  prelec- 
tions, had  inspired.  Two  thousand  auditors  listened,  all  with  ad- 
miration, many  with  enthusiasm,  to  the  eloquent  exposition  of 
doctrines  intelligible  only  to  the  few  ; and  the  oral  discussion  of 
philosophy  awakened  in  Paris,  and  in  France,  an  interest  unex- 
ampled since  the  days  of  Abelard.  The  daily  journals  found  it 
necessary  to  gratify,  by  their  earlier  summaries,  the  impatient 
curiosity  of  the  public ; and  the  lectures  themselves,  taken  in 
short-hand,  and  corrected  by  the  Professor,  propagated  weekly 
the  influence  of  his  instruction  to  the  remotest  provinces  of  the 
kingdom. 

Nor  are  the  pretensions  of  this  doctrine  disproportioned  to  the 
attention  which  it  has  engaged.  It  professes  nothing  less  than  to 
be  the  complement  and  conciliation  of  all  philosophical  opinion ; 
and  its  author  claims  the  glory  of  placing  the  key-stone  in  the 
arch  of  science,  by  the  discovery  of  elements  hitherto  unobserved 
among  the  facts  of  consciousness. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  claims  of  M.  Cousin  to  orig- 
inality, and  of  his  doctrine  to  truth,  it  is  necessary  to  say  a few 
words  touching  the  state  and  relations  of  philosophy  in  France. 

After  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  and  Malebranche  had  sunk 
into  oblivion,  and  from  the  time  that  Condillac,  exaggerating  the 
too  partial  principles  of  Locke,  had  analyzed  all  knowledge  into 
sensation,  Sensualism  (or  more  correctly,  Sensuism),  as  a psycho- 
logical theory  of  the  origin  of  our  cognitions,  became,  in  France, 
not  only  the  dominant,  but  almost  the  one  exclusive  opinion.  It 
was  believed  that  reality  and  truth  were  limited  to  experience, 
and  experience  was  limited  to  the  sphere  of  sense ; while  the  very 
highest  faculties  of  mind  were  deemed  adequately  explained  when 
recalled  to  perceptions,  elaborated,  purified,  sublimated,  and  trans- 
speak of  it  in  terras  which,  though  I feel  their  generosity,  I am  ashamed  to  quote.  I 
may,  however,  state,  that  maintaining  always  his  opinion,  M.  Cousin  (what  is  rare, 
especially  in  metaphysical  discussions),  declared,  that  it  was  neither  unfairly  combated 
nor  imperfectly  understood — In  connection  with  this  criticism,  the  reader  should  com- 
pare what  M.  Cousin  has  subsequently  stated  in  defense  and  illustration  of  his  system, 
in  his  Preface  to  the  new  edition  of  the  Introduction  a VHistoire  dc  la  Philosophic, 
and  Appendix  to  the  fifth  lecture  ( CEuvrcs , Serie  II.  Tome  i.  pp.  vii. , ix.,  and  pp.  112- 
129) ; — in  his  Preface  to  the  second  edition,  and  his  Advertisement  to  the  third  edition 
of  the  Fragments  Pldlosophiqucs  (CEuvres,  S.  III.  T.  iv.) — and  in  his  Prefatory  Notice 
to  the  Pensces  dc  Pascal  ( CEuvrcs , S.  IV.  T.  i.) — On  the  other  hand,  M.  Peisse  has 
ably  advocated  the  counterview,  in  his  Preface  and  Appendix  to  the  Fragments  dc 
Philosophic,  &c.] 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  FRANCE  ; AND  IN  SCOTLAND.  11 

formed.  From  the  mechanical  relations  of  sense  with  its  object, 
it  was  attempted  to  solve  the  mysteries  of  will  and  intelligence ; 
the  philosophy  of  mind  was  soon  viewed  as  correlative  to  the  phys- 
iology of  organization.  The  moral  nature  of  man  was  at  last 
formally  abolished,  in  its  identification  with  his  physical ; mind 
became  a reflex  of  matter;  thought  a secretion  of  the  brain. 

A doctrine  so  melancholy  in  its  consequences,  and  founded  on 
principles  thus  partial  and  exaggerated,  could  not  be  permanent : 
a reaction  was  inevitable.  The  recoil,  which  began  about  twenty 
years  ago,  has  been  gradually  increasing ; and  now  it  is  perhaps 
even  to  be  apprehended,  that  its  intensity  may  become  excessive. 
As  the  poison  was  of  foreign  growth,  so  also  has  been  the  antidote. 
The  doctrine  of  Condillac  was,  if  not  a corruption,  a development 
of  the  doctrine  of  Locke  ; and,  in  returning  to  a better  philosophy, 
the  French  are  still  obeying  an  impulsion  communicated  from  with- 
out. This  impulsion  may  be  traced  to  two  different  sources — to 
the  philosophy  of  Scotland,  and  to  the  philosophy  of  Germany. 

In  Scotland,  a philosophy  had  sprung  up,  which,  though  pro- 
fessing, equally  with  the  doctrine  of  Condillac,  to  build  only  on 
experience,  did  not,  like  that  doctrine,  limit  experience  to  the 
relations  of  sense  and  its  objects.  Without  vindicating  to  man 
more  than  a relative  knowledge  of  existence,  and  restricting  the 
science  of  mind  to  an  observation  of  the  fact  of  consciousness,  it, 
however,  analyzed  that  fact  into  a greater  number  of  more  import- 
ant elements  than  had  been  recognized  in  the  school  of  Condillac. 
It  showed  that  phenomena  were  revealed  in  thought  which  could 
not  be  resolved  into  any  modification  of  sense — external  or  inter- 
nal. It  proved  that  intelligence  supposed  principles,  which,  as 
the  conditions  of  its  activity,  can  not  be  the  results  of  its  opera- 
tion ; that  the  mind  contained  knowledges,  which,  as  primitive, 
universal,  necessary,  are  not  to  be  explained  as  generalizations 
from  the  contingent  and  individual,  about  which  alone  all  expe- 
rience is  conversant.  The  phenomena  of  mind  were  thus  distin- 
guished from  the  phenomena  of  matter ; and  if  the  impossibility 
of  materialism  were  not  demonstrated,  there  was,  at  least,  demon- 
strated the  impossibility  of  its  proof. 

This  philosophy,  and  still  more  the  spirit  of  this  philosophy, 
was  calculated  to  exert  a salutary  influence  on  the  French.  And 
such  an  influence  it  did  exert.  For  a time,  indeed,  the  truth 
operated  in  silence  ; and  Reid  and  Stewart  had  already  modified 
the  philosophy  of  France,  before  the  French  were  content  to  ac- 


12 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


knowledge  themselves  their  disciples.  In  the  works  of  Degerando 
and  Laromiguiere,  may  be  traced  the  influence  of  Scottish  specu- 
lation ; hut  it  is  to  Royer-Collard,  and,  more  recently,  to  Jouffroy, 
that  our  countrymen  are  indebted  for  a full  acknowledgment  of 
their  merits,  and  for  the  high  and  increasing  estimation  in  which 
their  doctrines  are  now  held  in  France.  M.  Royer-Collard,  whose 
authority  has,  in  every  relation,  been  exerted  only  for  the  benefit 
of  his  country,  and  who,  once  great  as  a professor,  is  now  not  less 
illustrious  as  a statesman,  in  his  lectures,  advocated  with  distin- 
guished ability  the  principles  of  the  Scottish  school ; modestly 
content  to  follow,  while  no  one  was  more  entitled  to  lead.  M. 
Jouffroy,  by  his  recent  translation  of  the  works  of  Dr.  Reid,  and 
by  the  excellent  preface  to  his  version  of  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart’s 
“ Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,”  has  likewise  powerfully  co- 
operated to  the  establishment,  in  France,  of  a philosophy  equally 
opposed  to  the  exclusive  Sensualism  of  Condillac,  and  to  the  ex- 
clusive Rationalism  of  the  new  German  school. 

Germany  may  be  regarded,  latterly  at  least,  as  the  metaphysi- 
cal antipodes  of  France.  The  comprehensive  and  original  genius 
of  Leibnitz,  itself  the  ideal  abstract  of  the  Teutonic  character, 
had  reacted  powerfully  on  the  minds  of  his  countrymen ; and 
Rationalism,  (more  properly  Intellectualism ,’)  has  from  his  time, 
always  remained  the  favorite  philosophy  of  the  Germans.  On  the 
principle  of  this  doctrine,  it  is  in  Reason  alone  that  truth  and 
reality  are  to  be  found.  Experience  affords  only  the  occasions 
on  which  intelligence  reveals  to  us  the  necessary  and  universal 
notions  of  which  it  is  the  complement ; and  these  notions  consti- 
tute at  once  the  foundation  of  all  reasoning,  and  the  guarantee  of 
our  whole  knowledge  of  reality.  Kant,  indeed,  pronounced  the 
philosophy  of  Rationalism  a mere  fabric  of  delusion.  He  declared 
that  a science  of  existence  was  beyond  the  compass  of  our  facul- 
ties ; that  pure  reason,  as  purely  subjective,  and  conscious  of 


[On  the  modern  commutation  of  Intellect  or  Intelligence  (Noth,  Mens , Intellectui, 
Vcrstand ),  and  Reason  (Ad-yoy,  Ratio,  Vernunft ),  see  Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  668, 
669,  693.  (This  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  confusion  of  Reason  and  Reasoning.) 
Protesting,  therefore,  against  the  abuse,  I historically  employ  the  terms  as  they  were 
employed  by  the  philosophers  here  commemorated.  This  unfortunate  reversal  has 
been  propagated  to  the  French  philosophy,  and  also  adopted  in  England  by  Coleridge 
and  his  followers. — I may  here  notice  that  1 use  the  term  Understanding,  not  for  the 
noetic  faculty,  intellect  proper,  or  place  of  principles,  but  for  the  dianoetic  or  discursive 
faculty,  in  its  widest  signification,  for  the  faculty  of  relations  or  comparison  ; and  thus 
in  the  meaning  in  which  Verstand  is  now  employed  by  the  Germans.  In  this  sense 
I have  been  able  to  be  uniformly  consistent.] 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  GERMANY. 


13 


nothing  hut  itself,  was  therefore  unahle  to  evince  the  reality  of 
aught  beyond  the  phenomena  of  its  personal  modifications.1 2  But 
scarcely  had  the  critical  philosopher  accomplished  the  recognition 
of  this  important  principle,  the  result  of  which  was,  to  circum- 
scribe the  field  of  speculation  by  narrow  hounds  ; than  from  the 
very  disciples  of  his  school  there  arose  philosophers,  who,  despising 
the  contracted  limits,  and  humble  results,  of  a philosophy  of  ob- 
servation, re-established,  as  the  predominant  opinion,  a bolder 
and  more  uncompromising  Rationalism  than  any  that  had  ever 
previously  obtained  for  their  countrymen  the  character  of  philo- 
sophic visionaries — 

“ Gens  ratione  ferox,  et  mentem  pasta  chimsris.”1 
(“Minds  fierce  for  reason,  and  on  fancies  fed.”) 

1 In  the  philosophy  of  mind,  subjective  denotes  what  is  to  be  referred  to  the  think- 
ing subject,  the  Ego  ; objective  what  belongs  to  the  object  of  thought,  the  Non-Ego. 
— It  may  be  safe,  perhaps,  to  say  a few  words  in  vindication  of  our  employment  of 
these  terms.  By  the  Greeks  the  word  vn oKeipevov  was  equivocally  employed 
to  express  either  the  object  of  knowledge  (the  materia  circa  quam),  or  the  subject 
of  existence  >(the  materia  in  qua).  The  exact  distinction  of  subject  and  object  was 
first  made  by  the  schoolmen  ; and  to  the  schoolmen  the  vulgar  languages  are  prin- 
pally  indebted  for  what  precision  and  analytic  subtilty  they  possess.  These  correla- 
tive terms  correspond  to  the  first  and  most  important  distinction  in  philosophy ; they 
embody  the  original  antithesis  in  consciousness  of  self  and  not-self — a distinction 
which,  in  fact,  involves  the  whole  science  of  mind ; for  psychology  is  nothing  more 
Gian  a determination  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  in  themselves,  and  in  their 
reciprocal  relations.  Thus  significant  of  the  primary  and  most  extensive  analysis  in 
philosophy,  these  terms,  in  their  substantive  and  adjective  forms,  passed  from  the 
schools  into  the  scientific  language  of  Telesius,  Campanella,  Berigardus,  Gassendi, 
Descartes,  Spinosa,  Leibnitz,  Wolf,  &c.  Deprived  of  these  terms,  the  Critical  philo- 
sophy, indeed  the  whole  philosophy  of  Germany,  would  be  a blank.  In  this  country, 
though  familiarly  employed  in  scientific  language,  even  subsequently  to  the  time  of 
Locke,  the  adjective  forms  seem  at  length  to  have  dropt  out  of  the  English  tongue. 
That  these  words  waxed  obsolete  was  perhaps  caused  by  the  ambiguity  which  had 
gradually  crept  into  the  signification  of  the  substantives.  Object,  besides  its  proper 
signification,  came  to  be  abusively  applied  to  denote  motive,  end,  final  cause  (a  mean- 
ing not  recognized  by  Johnson).  This  innovation  was  probably  borrowed  from  the 
French,  in  whose  language  the  word  had  been  similarly  corrupted  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  last  century  (Diet,  de  Trevoux,  voce  Objet.)  Subject  in  English,  as  sujet 
in  French,  had  been  also  perverted  into  a synonyme  for  object,  taken  in  its  proper 
meaning,  and  had  thus  returned  to  the  original  ambiguity  of  the  corresponding  term 
in  Greek.  It  is  probable  that  the  logical  application  of  the  word  ( subject  of  attribution 
or  predication)  facilitated  or  occasioned  this  confusion.  In  using  the  terms,  therefore, 
we  think  that  an  explanation,  but  no  apology,  is  required.  The  distinction  is  of  para- 
mount importance,  and  of  infinite  application,  not  only  in  philosophy  proper,  but  in 
grammar,  rhetoric,  criticism,  ethics,  politics,  jurisprudence,  theology.  It  is  adequately 
expressed  by  no  other  terms  ; and  if  these  did  not  already  enjoy  a prescriptive  right, 
as  denizens  of  the  language,  it  can  not  be  denied,  that,  as  strictly  analogical,  they 
would  be  well  entitled  to  sue  out  their  naturalization. — [Not  that  these  terms  were 
formerly  always  employed  in  the  same  signification  and  contrast  which  they  now  ob- 
tain. For  a history  of  these  variations,  see  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  806,  sq.- — Since 
this  article  was  written,  the  words  have  in  this  country  re-entered  on  their  ancient 
rights;  they  are  now  in  common  use.] 

2 [This  line,  which  was  quoted  from  memory,  has,  I find,  in  the  original,  “furens;” 


14 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


Founded  by  Fichte,  but  evolved  by  Schelling,  this  doctrine  re- 
gards experience  as  unworthy  of  the  name  of  science : because, 
as  only  of  the  phenomenal,  the  transitory,  the  dependent,  it  is 
only  of  that  which,  having  no  reality  in  itself,  can  not  be  estab- 
lished as  a valid  basis  of  certainty  and  knowledge.  Philosophy 
must,  therefore,  either  be  abandoned,  or  we  must  be  able  to  seize 
the  One,  the  Absolute,  the  Unconditioned,  immediately  and  in 
itself.  And  this  they  profess  to  do  by  a kind  of  intellectual 
vision .’  In  this  act,  reason,  soaring  not  only  above  the  world  of 

sense,  but  beyond  the  sphere  of  personal  consciousness,  boldly 
places  itself  at  the  very  centre  of  absolute  being,  with  which  it 
claims  to  be,  in  fact,  identified ; and  thence  surveying  existence 
in  itself,  and  in  its  relations,  unvails  to  us  the  nature  of  the 
Deity,  and  explains,  from  first  to  last,  the  derivation  of  all  cre- 
ated things. 

M.  Cousin  is  the  apostle  of  Rationalism  in  France,  and  we  are 
willing  to  admit  that  the  doctrine  could  not  have  obtained  a more 
eloquent  or  devoted  advocate.  For  philosophy  he  has  suffered  ; 
to  her  ministry  he  has  consecrated  himself — devoted  without 
reserve  his  life  and  labors.  Neither  has  he  approached  the  sanc- 
tuary with  unwashed  hands.  The  editor  of  Proclus  and  Des- 
cartes, the  translator  and  interpreter  of  Plato,  and  the  promised 
expositor  of  Kant,  will  not  be  accused  of  partiality  in  the  choice 
of  his  pursuits;  while  his  two  works,  under  the  title  of  Philosoph- 
ical Fragments,  bear  ample  evidence  to  the  learning,  elegance, 
and  distinguished  ability  of  their  author.  Taking  him  all  in  all, 

therefore  translated — “Minds  mad  with  reasoning — and  fancy-fed.”  The  author 
certainly  had  in  his  eye  the  “ratione  insanias”  of  Terence.  It  is  from  a satire  by 
Abraham  Remi,  who,  in  the  former  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  was  Professor 
Itoyal  of  Eloquence  in  the  University  of  Paris  ; and  it  referred  to  the  disputants  of 
the  Irish  College  in  that  illustrious  school.  The  “Hibernian  Logicians”  were,  indeed, 
long  famed  over  the  continent  of  Europe,  for  their  acuteness,  pugnacity,  and  barbar- 
ism ; as  is  recorded  by  Patin,  Bayle,  Le  Sage,  and  many  others.  The  learned  Menage 
was  so  delighted  with  the  verse,  as  to  declare,  that  he  would  give  his  best  benefice 
(and  he  enjoyed  some  fat  ones)  to  have  written  it.  It  applies,  not  only  with  real,  but 
with  verbal,  accuracy  to  the  German  Rationalists ; who  in  Philosophy  (as  Aristotle 
has  it),  “in  making  reason  omnipotent,  show  their  own  impotence  of  reason,”  and  in 
Theology  (as  Charles  II.  said  of  Isaac  Vossius) — “believe  every  thing  but  the  Bible.”] 

1 U[liilellcctuelle  Anschauung." — This  is  doubly  wrong. — 1°,  In  grammatical  rigor, 
the  word  in  German  ought  to  have  been  “ intellectual. ” 2°,  In  philosophical  con- 

sistency the  intuition  ought  not  to  have  been  called  by  its  authors  (Fichte  and  Schcll- 
ing)  intellectual.  For,  though  this  be,  in  fact,  absolutely  more  correct,  yet  relatively 
it  is  a blunder ; for  the  intuition,  as  intended  by  them,  is  of  their  higher  faculty,  the 
Reason  (Vcrnunft),  and  not  of  their  lower,  the  Understanding  or  Intellect  (Verstand). 
In  modern  German  Philosophy,  Verstand  is  always  translated  by Intelleclus ; and  this 
again  corresponds  to  Nous-.] 


COUSIN’S  PHILOSOPHY. 


15 


in  France  M.  Cousin  stands  alone  : nor  can  we  contemplate  his 
character  and  accomplishments  without  the  sincerest  admiration, 
even  while  we  dissent  from  the  most  prominent  principle  of  his 
philosophy.  The  development  of  his  system,  in  all  its  points, 
betrays  the  influence  of  German  speculation  on  his  opinions. 
His  theory  is  not,  however,  a scheme  of  exclusive  Rationalism ; 
on  the  contrary,  the  peculiarity  of  his  doctrine  consists  in  the 
attempt  to  combine  the  philosophy  of  experience,  and  the  philo- 
sophy of  pure  reason,  into  one.  The  following  is  a concise  state- 
ment of  the  fundamental  positions  of  his  system  : 

Reason,  or  intelligence,  has  three  integrant  elements,  affording 
three  regulative  principles,  which  at  once  constitute  its  nature, 
and  govern  its  manifestations.  These  three  ideas  severally  sup- 
pose each  other,  and,  as  inseparable,  are  equally  essential  and 
equally  primitive.  They  are  recognized  by  Aristotle  and  by  Kant, 
in  their  several  attempts  to  analyze  intelligence  into  its  princi- 
ples ; but  though  the  categories  of  both  philosophers  comprise  all 
the  elements  of  thought,  in  neither  list  are  these  elements  nat- 
urally co-arranged,  or  reduced  to  an  ultimate  simplicity. 

Th e first  of  these  ideas,  elements,  or  laws,  though  fundament- 
ally one,  our  author  variously  expresses,  by  the  terms  unity , 
identity , substance,  absolute  cause , the  infinite , pure  thought, 
&c.  (we  would  briefly  call  it  the  unconditioned').  The  second,  he 
denominates  plurality , difference,  phenomenon , relative  cause , 
the  finite,  determined  thought,  &c.  (we  would  style  it  the  con- 
ditioned). These  two  elements  are  relative  and  correlative.  The 
first,  though  absolute,  is  not  conceived  as  existing  absolutely  in 
itself;  it  is  conceived  as  an  absolute  cause,  as  a cause  which  can 
not  but  pass  into  operation ; in  other  words,  the  first  element 
must  manifest  itself  in  the  second.  The  two  ideas  are  thus  con- 
nected together  as  cause  and  effect ; each  is  only  realized  through 
the  other ; and  this  their  connection , or  correlation,  is  the  third 
integrant  element  of  intelligence. 

Reason,  or  intelligence,  in  which  these  ideas  appear,  and  which, 
in  fact,  they  make  up,  is  not  individual,  is  not  ours,  is  not  even 
human ; it  is  absolute,  it  is  divine.  What  is  personal  to  us,  is  our 
free  and  voluntary  activity  ; what  is  not  free  and  not  voluntary, 
is  adventitious  to  man,  and  does  not  constitute  an  integrant  part 
of  his  individuality.  Intelligence  is  conversant  with  truth ; truth, 
as  necessary  and  universal,  is  not  the  creature  of  my  volition ; 
and  reason,  which,  as  the  subject  of  truth,  is  also  universal  and 


16 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


necessary,  is  consequently  impersonal.  We  see,  therefore,  by  a 
light  which  is  not  ours,  and  reason  is  a revelation  of  God  in 
man.  The  ideas  of  which  we  are  conscious,  belong  not  to  us, 
but  to  absolute  intelligence.  They  constitute,  in  truth,  the  very 
mode  and  manner  of  its  existence.  For  consciousness  is  only 
possible  under  plurality  and  difference,  and  intelligence  is  only 
possible  through  consciousness. 

The  divine  nature  is  essentially  comprehensible.  For  the  three 
ideas  constitute  the  nature  of  the  Deity  ; and  the  very  nature 
of  ideas  is  to  be  conceived.  God,  in  fact,  exists  to  us,  only  in  so 
far  as  he  is  known ; and  the  degree  of  our  knowledge  must  al- 
ways determine  the  measure  of  our  faith.  The  relation  of  God 
to  the  universe  is  therefore  manifest,  and  the  creation  easily  un- 
derstood. To  create,  is  not  to  make  something  out  of  nothing, 
for  this  is  contradictory,  but  to  originate  from  self.  We  create 
so  often  as  we  exert  our  free  causality,  and  something  is  created 
by  us,  when  something  begins  to  be  by  virtue  of  the  free  causal- 
ity which  belongs  to  us.  To  create  is,  therefore,  to  cause,  not 
with  nothing,  but  with  the  very  essence  of  our  being — with  our 
force,  our  will,  our  personality.  The  divine  creation  is  of  the 
same  character.  God,  as  he  is  a cause,  is  able  to  create  ; as  he 
is  an  absolute  cause,  he  can  not  but  create.  In  creating  the 
universe,  he  does  not  draw  it  from  nothing ; he  draws  it  from 
himself.  The  creation  of  the  universe  is  thus  necessary ; it  is  a 
manifestation  of  the  Deity,  but  not  the  Deity  absolutely  in  him- 
self ; it  is  God  passing  into  activity,  but  not  exhausted  in  the  act. 

The  universe  created,  the  principles  which  determined  the 
creation  are  found  still  to  govern  the  worlds  of  matter  and  mind. 

Two  ideas  and  their  connection  explain  the  intelligence  of  God; 
two  laws  in  their  counterpoise  and  correlation  explain  the  mate- 
rial universe.  The  law  of  Expansion  is  the  movement  of  unity  to 
variety ; the  law  of  Attraction  is  the  return  of  variety  to  unity. 

In  the  world  of  mind  the  same  analogy  is  apparent.  The  study 
of  consciousness  is  psychology.  Man  is  the  microcosm  of  exist- 
ence; consciousness,  within  a narrow  focus,  concentrates  a knowl- 
edge of  the  universe  and  of  God  ; psychology  is  thus  the  abstract 
of  all  science,  human  and  divine.  As  in  the  external  world,  all 
phenomena  may  be  reduced  to  the  two  great  laws  of  Action  and 
Reaction ; so,  in  the  internal,  all  the  facts  of  consciousness  may 
be  reduced  to  one  fundamental  fact,  comprising  in  like  manner 
two  principles  and  their  correlation;  and  these  principles  are 


COUSIN’S  PHILOSOPHY. 


17 


again  the  One  or  the  Infinite , the  Many  or  the  Finite  and  the 
Connection  of  the  infinite  and  finite. 

In  every  act  of  consciousness  we  distinguish  a Self  or  Ego,  and 
something  different  from  self,  a Non- ego  ; each  limited  and  modi- 
fied by  the  other.  These,  together,  constitute  the  finite  element. 
But  at  the  same  instant  when  we  are  conscious  of  these  exist- 
ences, plural,  relative,  and  contingent,  we  are  conscious  likewise 
of  a superior  unity  in  which  they  are  contained,  and  by  which 
they  are  explained ; — a unity  absolute  as  they  are  conditioned, 
substantive  as  they  are  phenomenal,  and  an  infinite  cause  as 
they  are  finite  causes.  This  unity  is  God.  The  fact  of  conscious- 
ness is  thus  a complex  phenomenon,  comprehending  three  several 
terms  : 1°,  The  idea  of  the  Ego  and  Non-ego  as  Finite  ; 2°,  The 
idea  of  something  else  as  Infinite ; and,  3°,  The  idea  of  the  Rela- 
tion of  the  finite  element  to  the  infinite.  These  elements  are 
revealed  in  themselves  and  in  their  mutual  connection,  in  every 
act  of  primitive  or  Spontaneous  consciousness.  They  can  also  he 
reviewed  by  Reflection  in  a voluntary  act ; but  here  reflection 
distinguishes,  it  does  not  create.  The  three  ideas,  the  three  cate- 
gories of  intelligence,  are  given  in  the  original  act  of  instinct- 
ive apperception,  obscurely,  indeed,  and  without  contrast.  Re- 
flection analyzes  and  discriminates  the  elements  of  this  primary 
synthesis  ; and  as  will  is  the  condition  of  reflection,  and  will  at 
the  same  time  is  personal,  the  categories,  as  obtained  through  re- 
flection, have  consequently  the  appearance  of  being  also  personal 
and  subjective.  It  was  this  personality  of  reflection  that  misled 
Kant : caused  him  to  overlook  or  misinterpret  the  fact  of  sponta- 
neous consciousness;  to  individualize  intelligence;  and  to  collect 
under  this  personal  reason  all  that  is  conceived  by  us  as  neces- 
sary and  universal.  But  as,  in  the  spontaneous  intuition  of  rea- 
son, there  is  nothing  voluntary,  and  consequently  nothing  person- 
al ; and  as  the  truths  which  intelligence  here  discovers,  come  not 
from  ourselves  ; we  have  a right,  up  to  a certain  point,  to  impose 
these  truths  on  others  as  revelations  from  on  high : while,  on  the 
contrary,  reflection  being  wholly  personal,  it  would  be  absurd  to 
impose  on  others,  what  is  the  fruit  of  our  individual  operations. 
Spontaneity  is  the  principle  of  religion  ; reflection  of  philosophy. 
Men  agree  in  spontaneity  ; they  differ  in  reflection.  The  former 
is  necessarily  veracious  ; the  latter  is  naturally  delusive. 

The  condition  of  Reflection  is  separation : it  illustrates  by  dis- 
tinguishing ; it  considers  the  different  elements  apart,  and  while 

B 


18 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


it  contemplates  one,  it  necessarily  throws  the  others  out  of  view, 
Hence,  not  only  the  possibility,  but  the  necessity,  of  error.  The 
primitive  unity,  supposing  no  distinction,  admits  of  no  error ; 
reflection  in  discriminating  the  elements  of  thought,  and  in  con- 
sidering one  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  occasions  error,  and  a 
variety  in  error.  He  who  exclusively  contemplates  the  element 
of  the  Infinite,  despises  him  who  is  occupied  with  the  idea  of  the 
Finite ; and  vice  versa.  It  is  the  wayward  development  of  the 
various  elements  of  intelligence,  which  determines  the  imperfec- 
tions and  varieties  of  individual  character.  Men  under  this  par- 
tial and  exclusive  development,  are  but  fragments  of  that  hu- 
manity which  can  only  be  fully  realized  in  the  harmonious  evo- 
lution of  all  its  principles.  What  Reflection  is  to  the  individual, 
History  is  to  the  human  race.  The  difference  of  an  epoch  con- 
sists exclusively  in  the  partial  development  of  some  one  element 
of  intelligence  in  a prominent  portion  of  mankind  ; and  as  there 
are  only  three  such  elements,  so  there  are  only  three  grand  epochs 
in  the  history  of  man. 

A knowledge  of  the  elements  of  reason,  of  their  relations  and 
of  their  laws,  constitutes  not  merely  Philosophy,  but  is  the  con- 
dition of  a History  of  Philosophy.  The  history  of  human  reason, 
or  the  history  of  philosophy,  must  be  rational  and  philosophic. 
It  must  be  philosophy  itself,  with  all  its  elements,  in  all  their 
relations,  and  under  all  their  laws,  represented  in  striking  char- 
acters by  the  hands  of  time  and  of  history,  in  the  manifested  pro- 
gress of  the  human  mind.  The  discovery  and  enumeration  of 
all  the  elements  of  intelligence  enable  us  to  survey  the  progress 
of  speculation  from  the  loftiest  vantage  ground ; it  reveals  to  us 
the  laws  by  which  the  development  of  reflection  or  philosophy  is 
determined ; and  it  supplies  us  with  a canon  by  which  the  ap- 
proximation of  the  different  systems  to  the  truth  may  be  finally 
ascertained.  And  what  are  the  results  ? Sensualism , Idealism, 
Skepticism,  Mysticism,  are  all  partial  and  exclusive  views  of  the 
elements  of  intelligence.  But  each  is  false  only  as  it  is  incorn- 
piete.  They  are  all  true  in  what  they  affirm ; all  erroneous  in 
what  they  deny.  Though  hitherto  opposed,  they  are,  consequent- 
ly, not  incapable  of  coalition  ; and,  in  fact,  can  only  obtain  their 
consummation  in  a powerful  Eclecticism — a system  which  shall 
comprehend  them  all.  This  Eclecticism  is  realized  in  the  doc- 
trine previously  developed  ; and  the  possibility  of  such  a catholic 
philosophy  was  first  afforded  by  the  discovery  of  M.  Cousin,  made 


COUSIN’S  PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


so  long  ago  as  the  year  1817 — “that  consciousness  contained 
many  more  phenomena  than  had  previously  been  suspected.” 

The  present  course  is  at  once  an  exposition  of  these  principles, 
as  a true  theory  of  philosophy,  and  an  illustration  of  the  mode  in 
which  this  theory  is  to  be  applied,  as  a rule  of  criticism  in  the 
history  of  philosophical  opinion.  As  the  justice  of  the  application 
must  be  always  subordinate  to  the  truth  of  the  principle,  we  shall 
confine  ourselves  exclusively  to  a consideration  of  M.  Cousin’s  sys- 
tem, viewed  absolutely  in  itself.  This,  indeed,  we  are  afraid  will 
prove  comparatively  irksome ; and,  therefore,  solicit  indulgence, 
not  only  for  the  unpopular  nature  of  the  discussion,  hut  for  the 
employment  of  language  which,  from  the  total  neglect  of  these 
speculations  in  Britain,  will  necessarily  appear  abstruse — not 
merely  to  the  general  reader. 

Now,  it  is  manifest  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  M.  Cousin  is 
involved  in  the  proposition — that  the  Unconditioned , the  Abso- 
lute, the  Infinite , is  immediately  knoivn  in  consciousness , and 
this  by  difference,  plurality , and  relation.  The  unconditioned, 
as  an  original  element  of  knowledge,  is  the  generative  principle 
of  his  system,  hut  common  to  him  with  others  ; whereas,  the 
mode  in  which  the  possibility  of  this  knowledge  is  explained, 
affords  its  discriminating  peculiarity.  The  other  positions  of  his 
theory,  as  deduced  from  this  assumption,  may  indeed  be  disputed, 
even  if  the  antecedent  be  allowed  ; hut  this  assumption  disproved, 
every  consequent  in  his  theory  is  therewith  annihilated.  The 
recognition  of  the  absolute  as  a constitutive  principle  of  intelli- 
gence, our  author  regards  as  at  once  the  condition  and  the  end 
of  philosophy ; and  it  is  on  the  discovery  of  this  principle  in  the 
fact  of  consciousness,  that  he  vindicates  to  himself  the  glory  of 
being  the  founder  of  the  new  eclectic , or  the  one  catholic  philos- 
ophy. The  determination  of  this  cardinal  point  will  thus  briefly 
satisfy  us  touching  the  claim  and  character  of  the  system.  To 
explain  the  nature  of  the  problem  itself,  and  the  sufficiency  of 
the  solution  propounded  by  M.  Cousin,  it  is  necessary  to  premise 
a statement  of  the  opinions  which  may  be  entertained  regarding 
the  Unconditioned,  as  an  immediate  object  of  knowledge  and  of 
thought. 

These  opinions  may  be  reduced  to  four. — 1°,  The  Uncondi- 
tioned is  incognizable  and  inconceivable  ; its  notion  being  only 
negative  of  the  conditioned,  which  last  can  alone  be  positively 
known  or  conceived. — 2°,  It  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge ; but 


20 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


its  notion,  as  a regulative  principle  of  the  mind  itself,  is  more 
than  a mere  negation  of  the  conditioned. — 3°,  It  is  cognizable, 
hut  not  conceivable ; it  can  be  known  by  a sinking  back  into 
identity  with  the  absolute,  but  is  incomprehensible  by  conscious- 
ness and  reflection,  which  are  only  of  the  relative  and  the  differ- 
ent.— 4°,  It  is  cognizable  and  conceivable  by  consciousness  and 
reflection,  under  relation,  difference,  and  plurality. 

The  first  of  these  opinions  we  regard  as  true ; the  second  is 
held  by  Kant;  the  third  by  Schelling;1  and  the  last  by  our  author. 

1.  In  our  opinion,  the  mind  can  conceive,  and,  consequently, 
can  know,  only  the  limited , and  the  conditionally  limited.  The 
unconditionally  unlimited,  or  the  Infinite , the  unconditionally 
limited,  or  the  Absolute , can  not  positively  be  construed  to  the 
mind ; they  can  be  conceived,  only  by  a thinking  away  from,  or 
abstraction  of,  those  very  conditions  under  which  thought  itself 
is  realized  ; consequently,  the  notion  of  the  Unconditioned  is  only 
negative — negative  of  the  conceivable  itself.  For  example,  on  the 
one  hand  we  can  positively  conceive,  neither  an  absolute  whole, 
that  is,  a whole  so  great,  that  we  can  not  also  conceive  it  as  a 
relative  part  of  a still  greater  whole  ; nor  an  absolute  part,  that 
is,  a part  so  small,  that  we  can  not  also  conceive  it  as  a relative 
whole,  divisible  into  smaller  parts.  On  the  other  hand,  we  can 
not  positively  represent,  or  realize,  or  construe  to  the  mind  (as 
here  understanding  and  imagination  coincide),2  an  infinite  whole, 
for  this  could  only  be  done  by  the  infinite  synthesis  in  thought 
of  finite  wholes,  which  would  itself  require  an  infinite  time  for 
its  accomplishment ; nor,  for  the  same  reason,  can  we  follow  out 
in  thought  an  infinite  divisibility  of  parts.  The  result  is  the  same, 
whether  we  apply  the  process  to  limitation  in  space,  in  time,  or 
in  degree.  The  unconditional  negation,  and  the  unconditional 

1 [But  not  alone  by  Sclielling.  For  of  previous  philosophers,  several  held  substan- 
tially the  same  doctrine.  Thus  Plotinus  :• — vE<tti  8e  to  bv  ivepyeia'  paWov  8e  ra 
ap.(j) co  ev.  Mia  pev  ovv  (pvtris,  to  t€  bv,  o re  vovs'  Sid  xai  tci  ovra.  Kai  p too 
ovtos  evepyeia  Kai  o vov S'  d toiovto?  ' kci'l  ai  ovt id  vorfacLS,  to  eiSos,  Ka\  tj  popcpp  tov 
ovtos,  Ka\  1 7 evepyeia  ' K.  t.  A.  (Enn.  V.  1.  ix.  c.  8.)] 

2 [The  Understanding,  thought  proper,  notion,  concept,  &c.,  may  coincide  or  not 
with  Imagination,  representation  proper,  image,  &c.  The  two  faculties  do  not  coin- 
cide in  a general  notion  ; for  we  can  not  represent  Man  or  Horse  in  an  actual  image 
without  individualizing  the  universal  ; and  thus  contradiction  emerges.  But  in  the 
individual,  say  Socrates  or  Bucephalus,  they  do  coincide  ; for  I see  no  valid  ground 
why  we  should  not  think,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  or  conceive  the  individuals 
which  we  represent  In  like  manner  there  is  no  mutual  contradiction  between  the 
image  and  the  concept  of  the  Infinite  or  Absolute,  if  these  be  otherwise  possible  ; for 
there  is  not  necessarily  involved  the  incompatibility  of  the  one  act  of  cognition  with 
the  other.] 


REVIEWER’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


21 


affirmation  of  limitation  ; in  other  words,  the  infinite  and  the 
absolute. , properly  so  called / are  thus  equally  inconceivable  to  us. 

As  the  conditionally  limited  (which  we  majT  briefly  call  the 
conditioned)  is  thus  the  only  possible  object  of  knowledge  and  of 
positive  thought — thought  necessarily  supposes  conditions.  To 
think  is  to  condition;  and  conditional  limitation  is  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  possibility  of  thought.  For,  as  the  gray  hound 
can  not  outstrip  his  shadow,  nor  (by  a more  appropriate  simile) 
the  eagle  outsoar  the  atmosphere  in  which  he  floats,  and  by  which 
alone  he  may  be  supported ; so  the  mind  can  not  transcend  that 
sphere  of  limitation,  within  and  through  which  exclusively  the 
possibility  of  thought  is  realized.  Thought  is  only  of  the  con- 
ditioned; because,  as  we  have  said,  to  think  is  simply  to  condi- 
tion. The  absolute  is  conceived  merely  by  a negation  of  conceiv- 
ability ; and  all  that  we  know,  is  only  known  as 

“ won  from  the  void  and  formless  infinite .” 

How,  indeed,  it  could  ever  be  doubted  that  thought  is  only  of  the 
conditioned,  may  well  be  deemed  a matter  of  the  profoundest 
admiration.  Thought  can  not  transcend  consciousness  ; con- 
sciousness is  only  possible  under  the  antithesis  of  a subject  and 
object  of  thought,  known  only  in  correlation,  and  mutually  limit- 
ing each  other  ; while,  independently  of  this,  all  that  we  know 


1 It  is  right  to  observe,  that  though  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  terms.  Infinite  and 
Absolute,  and  Unconditioned , ought  not  to  be  confounded,  and  accurately  distinguish 
them  in  the  statement  of  our  own  view  ; yet,  in  speaking  of  the  doctrines  of  those  by 
whom  they  are  indifferently  employed,  we  have  not  thought  it  necessary,  or  rather 
we  have  found  it  impossible,  to  adhere  to  the  distinction.  The  Unconditioned  in  our 
use  of  language  denotes  the  genus  of  which  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  are  the  species. 

[The  term  Absolute  is  of  a twofold  (if  not  threefold)  ambiguity,  corresponding  to 
the  double  (or  treble)  signification  of  the  word  in  Latin. 

1.  Alsolutum  means  what  is  freed  or  loosed;  in  which  sense  the  Absolute  will  be 
what  is  aloof  from  relation,  comparison,  limitation,  condition,  dependence,  &c.,  and 
thus  is  tantamount  to  to  dnoXvrov  of  the  lower  Greeks.  In  this  meaning  the  Abso- 
lute is  not  opposed  to  the  Infinite. 

Absolutum  means  finished , ■perfected,  completed;  in  which  sense  the  Absolute  will 
be  what  is  out  of  relation,  &c.,  as  finished,  perfect,  complete,  total,  and  thus  corre- 
sponds to  to  oXov  and  to  reXeiov  of  Aristotle  In  this  acceptation — and  it  is  that  in 
which  for  myself  I exclusively  use  it — the  Absolute  is  diametrically  opposed  to,  is 
contradictory  of,  the  Infinite. 

Besides  these  two  meanings,  there  is  to  be  noticed  the  use  of  the  word,  for  the 
most  part  in  its  adverbial  form ; — absolutely  ( absolute ) in  the  sense  of  simply,  simpli- 
citer,  (arrXcos),  that  is,  considered  in  and  for  itself — considered  not  in  relation.  This 
holds  a similar  analogy  to  the  two  former  meanings  of  Absolute,  which  the  Indefinite 
(to  aopicrTov)  does  to  the  Infinite  (to  aneipov).  It  is  subjective  as  they  are  objective  : 
it  is  in  our  thought  as  they  are  in  their  own  existence.  This  application  is  to  be  dis- 
counted, as  here  irrelevant.] 


22 


COUSIN’S  PHILOSOPHY. 


either  of  subject  or  object,  either  of  mind  or  matter,  is  only  a 
knowledge  in  each  of  the  particular,  of  the  plural,  of  the  differ- 
ent, of  the  modified,  of  the  phenomenal.  We  admit  that  the 
consequence  of  this  doctrine  is — that  philosophy,  if  viewed  as 
more  than  a science  of  the  conditioned,  is  impossible.  Departing 
from  the  particular,  we  admit,  that  we  can  never,  in  our  highest 
generalizations,  rise  above  the  finite;  that  our  knowledge,  whether 
of  mind  or  matter,  can  be  nothing  more  than  a knowledge  of  the 
relative  manifestations  of  an  existence,  which  in  itself  it  is  our 
highest  wisdom  to  recognize  as  beyond  the  reach  of  philosophy — 
in  the  language  of  St.  Austin — “ cognoscendo  ignorari , et  igno- 
rando  cognosci .” 

The  conditioned  is  the  mean  between  two  extremes — two  in- 
conditionates,  exclusive  of  each  other,  neither  of  which  can  be 
conceived  as  possible , but  of  which,  on  the  principles  of  contra- 
diction and  excluded  middle,  one  must  be  admitted  as  necessary. 
On  this  opinion,  therefore,  reason  is  shown  to  be  weak,  but  not 
deceitful.  The  mind  is  not  represented  as  conceiving  two  propo- 
sitions subversive  of  each  other,  as  equally  possible  ; but  only,  as 
unable  to  understand  as  possible,  either  of  two  extremes  ; one  of 
which,  however,  on  the  ground  of  their  mutual  repugnance,  it  is 
compelled  to  recognize  as  true.  We  are  thus  taught  the  salutary 
lesson,  that  the  capacity  of  thought  is  not  to  be  constituted  into 
the  measure  of  existence ; and  are  warned  from  recognizing  the  do- 
main of  our  knowledge  as  necessarily  co-extensive  with  the  horizon 
of  our  faith.  And  by  a wonderful  revelation,  we  are  thus,  in  the 
very  consciousness  of  our  inability  to  conceive  aught  above  the  rela- 
tive and  finite,  inspired  with  a belief  in  the  existence  of  something 
unconditioned  beyond  the  sphere  of  all  comprehensible  reality.1 

2.  The  second  opinion,  that  of  Kant,  is  fundamentally  the  same 
as  the  preceding.  Metaphysic,  strictly  so  denominated,  the  phi- 
losophy of  Existence,  is  virtually  the  doctrine  of  the  unconditioned. 
From  Xenophanes  to  Leibnitz,  the  infinite,  the  absolute,  the  un- 
conditioned, formed  the  highest  principle  of  speculation;  but  from 

1 [True,  therefore,  are  the  declarations  of  a pious  philosophy  : “A  God  understood 
would  be  no  God  at  all  — “To  think  that  God  is,  as  we  can  think  him  to  be,  is 
blasphemy.” — The  Divinity,  in  a certain  sense,  is  revealed  ; in  a certain  sense  is 
concealed  : He  is  at  once  known  and  unknown.  But  the  last  and  highest  consecra- 
tion of  all  true  religion,  must  be  an  altar — 'Ayvaarco  ©ew — “ To  the  unknovm  and 
unknowable  God.”  In  this  consummation,  nature  and  revelation,  paganism  and  Chris- 
tianity, are  at  one  : and  from  either  source  the  testimonies  are  so  numerous  that  I 
must  refrain  from  quoting  any. — Am  I wrong  in  thinking,  that  M.  Cousin  would  not 
repudiate  this  doctrine  1] 


KANT’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


23 


the  dawn  of  philosophy  in  the  school  of  Elea  until  the  rise  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy,  no  serious  attempt  was  made  to  investigate 
the  nature  and  origin  of  this  notion  (or  notions)  as  a psychological 
phenomenon.  Before  Kant,  philosophy  was  rather  a deduction 
from  principles,  than  an  inquiry  concerning  principles  themselves. 
At  the  head  of  every  system  a cognition  figured,  which  the  phi- 
losopher assumed  in  conformity  to  his  views  ; but  it  was  rarely 
considered  necessary,  and  more  rarely  attempted,  to  ascertain  the 
genesis,  and  determine  the  domain,  of  this  notion  or  judgment, 
previous  to  application.  In  his  first  Critique , Kant  undertakes 
a regular  survey  of  consciousness.  He  professes  to  analyze  the 
conditions  of  human  knowledge — to  mete  out  its  limits — to  in- 
dicate its  point  of  departure — and  to  determine  its  possibility. 
That  Kant  accomplished  much,  it  would  be  prejudice  to  deny ; 
nor  is  his  service  to  philosophy  the  less,  that  his  success  has  been 
more  decided  in  the  subversion  of  error  than  in  the  establishment 
of  truth.  The  result  of  his  examination  was  the  abolition  of  the 
metaphysical  sciences — of  rational  psyphology,  ontology,  specula- 
tive theology,  &c.,  as  founded  on  mere  petitiones  principiorum. 
Existence  is  revealed  to  us  only  under  specific  modifications,  and 
these  are  known  only  under  the  conditions  of  our  faculties  of 
knowledge.  “ Things  in  themselves,”  Matter,  Mind,  God — all, 
in  short,  that  is  not  finite,  relative,  and  phenomenal,  as  bearing 
no  analogy  to  our  faculties,  is  beyond  the  verge  of  our  knowledge. 
Philosophy  was  thus  restricted  to  the  observation  and  analysis 
of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  ; and  what  is  not  explicitly 
or  implicitly  given  in  a fact  of  consciousness,  is  condemned,  as 
transcending  the  sphere  of  a legitimate  speculation.  A knowl- 
edge of  the  unconditioned  is  declared  impossible  ; either  immedi- 
ately, as  a notion,  or  mediately,  as  an  inference.  A demonstra- 
tion of  the  absolute  from  the  relative  is  logically  absurd ; as  in 
such  a syllogism  we  must  collect  in  the  conclusion  what  is  not 
distributed  in  the  premises  : And  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
unconditioned  is  equally  impossible. — But  here  we  think  his 
reasoning  complicated,  and  his  reduction  incomplete.  We  must 
explain  ourselves. 

While  we  regard  as  conclusive,  Kant’s  analysis  of  Time  and 
Space  into  conditions  of  thought,  we  can  not  help  viewing  his 
deduction  of  the  “ Categories  of  Understanding,”  and  the  “ Ideas 
of  speculative  Reason,”  as  the  work  of  a great  but  perverse  inge- 
nuity. The  categories  of  understanding  are  merely  subordinate 


■u  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 

forms  of  the  conditioned.  Why  not,  therefore,  generalize  the 
Conditioned — Existence  conditioned,  as  the  supreme  category,  or 
categories,  of  thought  ? — and  if  it  were  necessary  to  analyze  this 
form  into  its  subaltern  applications,  why  not  develop  these  im- 
mediately out  of  the  generic  principle,  instead  of  preposterously, 
and  by  a forced  and  partial  analogy,  deducing  the  laws  of  the 
understanding  from  a questionable  division  of  logical  proposi- 
tions? Why  distinguish  Reason  ( Vernunft ) from  Understanding 
(Verst and),  simply  on  the  ground  that  the  former  is  conversant 
about,  or  rather  tends  toward,  the  unconditioned ; when  it  is  suf- 
ficiently apparent,  that  the  unconditioned  is  conceived  only  as 
the  negation  of  the  conditioned,  and  also  that  the  conception  of 
contrad  ictories  is  one  ? In  the  Kantian  philosophy  both  faculties 
perform  the  same  function,  both  seek  the  one  in  the  many  ; — the 
Idea  (Idee)  is  only  the  Concept  ( Begriff ) sublimated  into  the  in- 
conceivable ; Reason  only  the  Understanding  which  has  “over- 
leaped itself.”  Kant  has  clearly  shown,  that  the  idea  of  the 
unconditioned  can  have  no  objective  reality — that  it  conveys  no 
knowledge — and  that  it  involves  the  most  insoluble  contradic- 
tions. But  he  ought  to  have  shown  that  the  unconditioned  had 
no  objective  application,  because  it  had,  in  fact,  no  subjective 
affirmation — that  it  afforded  no  real  knowledge,  because  it  con- 
tained nothing  even  conceivable — and  that  it  is  self-contradictory, 
because  it  is  not  a notion,  either  simple  or  positive,  but  only  a 
fasciculus  of  negations — negations  of  the  conditioned  in  its  oppo- 
site extremes,  and  bound  together  merely  by  the  aid  of  language 
and  their  common  character  of  incomprehensibility.  And  while 
he  appropriated  Reason  as  a specific  faculty  to  take  cognizance 
of  these  negations,  hypostatized  as  positive,  under  the  Platonic 
name  of  Ideas ; so  also,  as  a pendant  to  his  deduction  of  the 
categories  of  Understanding  from  a logical  division  of  proposi- 
tions, he  deduced  the  classification  and  number  of  these  ideas  of 
Reason  from  a logical  division  of  syllogisms. — Kant  thus  stands 
intermediate  between  those  who  view  the  notion  of  the  absolute 
as  the  instinctive  affirmation  of  an  encentric  intuition,  and  those 
who  regard  it  as  the  factitious  negative  of  an  eccentric  general- 
ization. 

Were  we  to  adopt  from  the  Critical  Philosophy  the  idea  of  an- 
alyzing thought  into  its  fundamental  conditions,  and  were  we  to 
carry  the  reduction  of  Kant  to  what  we  think  its  ultimate  sim- 
plicity, we  would  discriminate  thought  into  positive  and  nega- 


KANT’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


25 


live,  according  as  it  is  conversant  about  the  conditioned  or  un- 
conditioned. This,  however,  would  constitute  a logical,  not  a 
psychological  distinction ; as  positive  and  negative  in  thought 
are  known  at  once,  and  by  the  same  intellectual  act.  . The  twelve 
Categories  of  the  Understanding  would  be  thus  included  under 
the  former ; the  three  Ideas  of  Reason  under  the  latter ; and  to 
this  intent  the  contrast  between  understanding  and  reason  would 
disappear.  Finally,  rejecting  the  arbitrary  limitation  of  time 
and  space  to  the  sphere  of  sense,  we  would  express  under  the 
formula  of — The  Conditioned  in  Time  and  Space — a definition 
of  the  conceivable,  and  an  enumeration  of  the  three  categories 
of  thought.1 

The  imperfection  and  partiality  of  Kant’s  analysis  are  betrayed 
in  its  consequences.  His  doctrine  leads  to  absolute  skepticism. 
Speculative  reason,  on  Kant’s  own  admission,  is  an  organ  of  mere 
delusion.  The  idea  of  the  unconditioned,  about  which  it  is  con- 
versant, is  shown  to  involve  insoluble  contradictions,  and  yet  to 
be  the  legitimate  product  of  intelligence.  Hume  has  well  ob- 
served, “ that  it  matters  not  whether  we  possess  a false  reason, 
or  no  reason  at  all.”  If  “ the  light  that  leads  astray,  be  light 
from  heaven,”  what  are  we  to  believe  ? If  our  intellectual  na- 
ture be  perfidious  in  one  revelation,  it  must  be  presumed  deceit- 
ful in  all ; nor  is  it  possible  for  Kant  to  establish  the  existence 
of  God,  Freewill,  and  Immortality,  on  the  presumed  veracity  of 
reason,  in  a practical  relation,  after  having  himself  demonstrated 
its  mendacity  in  a speculative. 

Kant  had  annihilated  the  older  metaphysic,  but  the  germ  of  a 
more  visionary  doctrine  of  the  absolute,  than  any  of  those  re- 
futed, was  contained  in  the  bosom  of  his  own  philosophy.  He 
had  slain  the  body,  but  had  not  exorcised  the  spectre  of  the  ab- 
solute ; and  this  spectre  has  continued  to  haunt  the  schools  of 
Germany  even  to  the  present  day.  The  philosophers  were  not 
content  to  abandon  their  metaphysic ; to  limit  philosophy  to  an 
observation  of  phenomena,  and  to  the  generalization  of  these  phe- 
nomena into  laws.  The  theories  of  Boutenveck  (in  his  earlier 
works),  of  Bardili,  of  Reinhold,  of  Fichte,  of  Schelling,  of  Hegel, 
and  of  sundry  others,  are  just  so  many  endeavors,  of  greater  or 
of  less  ability,  to  fix  the  absolute  as  a positive  in  knowledge  ; 
but  the  absolute,  like  the  water  in  the  sieves  of  the  Danaides, 

1 [See  Appendix  I.,  for  a more  matured  view  of  these  categories  or  conditions  of 
thought.] 


26 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


lias  always  hitherto  run  through  as  a negative  into  the  abyss  of 
nothing. 

3.  Of  these  theories,  that  of  Schelling  is  the  only  one  in  re- 
gard to  which  it  is  now  necessary  to  say  any  thing.  His  opinion 
constitutes  the  third  of  those  enumerated  touching  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  absolute ; and  the  following  is  a brief  statement  of 
its  principal  positions  : 

While  the  lower  sciences  are  of  the  relative  and  conditioned, 
Philosophy , as  the  science  of  sciences,  must  be  of  the  absolute 
— the  unconditioned.  Philosophy,  therefore,  supposes  a science 
of  the  absolute.  Is  the  absolute  beyond  our  knowledge  ? — then 
is  philosophy  itself  impossible. 

But  how,  it  is  objected,  can  the  absolute  be  known  ? The  ab- 
solute, as  unconditioned,  identical,  and  one,  can  not  be  cognized 
under  conditions,  by  difference  and  plurality.  It  can  not,  there- 
fore, be  known,  if  the  subject  of  knowledge  be  distinguished 
from  the  object  of  knowledge  ; in  a knowledge  of  the  absolute, 
existence  and  knowledge  must  be  identical ; the  absolute  can 
only  be  known,  if  adequately  known,  and  it  can  only  be  ade- 
quately known,  by  the  absolute  itself.  But  is  this  possible? 
We  are  wholly  ignorant  of  existence  in  itself : — the  mind  knows 
nothing,  except  in  parts,  by  quality,  and  difference,  and  relation ; 
consciousness  supposes  the  subject  contradistinguished  from  the 
object  of  thought ; the  abstraction  of  this  contrast  is  a negation 
of  consciousness  ; and  the  negation  of  consciousness  is  the  anni- 
hilation of  thought  itself.  The  alternative  is  therefore  unavoid- 
able : either  finding  the  absolute,  we  lose  ourselves  ; or  retaining 
self  and  individual  consciousness,  we  do  not  reach  the  absolute. 

All  this  Schelling  frankly  admits.  He  admits  that  a knowl- 
edge of  the  absolute  is  impossible,  in  personality  and  conscious- 
ness : he  admits  that,  as  the  understanding  knows,  and  can  know, 
only  by  consciousness,  and  consciousness  only  by  difference,  we, 
as  conscious  and  understanding,  can  apprehend,  can  conceive 
only  the  conditioned ; and  he  admits  that,  only  if  man  be  him- 
self the  infinite,  can  the  infinite  be  known  by  him : 

“ Nec  sentire  Deum,  nisi  qui  pars  ipse  Deorum  est ; ” 1 
(“None  can  feel  God,  who  shares  not  in  the  Godhead.”) 

But  Schelling  contends  that  there  is  a capacity  of  knowledge 


[This  line  is  from  Manilius.  But  as  a statement  of  Schelling’s  doctrine  it  is  in- 
adequate ; for  on  his  doctrine  the  deity  can  be  known  only  if  fully  known,  and  a full 
knowledge  of  deity  is  possible  only  to  the  absolute  deity— that  is,  not  to  a sharer  in 


SCHELLING’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


27 


above  consciousness,  and  higher  than  the  understanding,  and  that 
this  knowledge  is  competent  to  human  reason,  as  identical  with 
the  Absolute  itself.  In  this  act  of  knowledge,  which,  after  Fichte, 
he  calls  the  Intellectual  Intuition , there  exists  no  distinction  of 
subject  and  object — no  contrast  of  knowledge  and  existence  ; all 
difference  is  lost  in  absolute  indifference — all  plurality  in  abso- 
lute unity.  The  Intuition  itself — Reason — and  the  Absolute  are 
identified.  The  absolute  exists  only  as  known  by  reason,  and 
reason  knows  only  as  being  itself  the  absolute. 

This  act  (act !)  is  necessarily  ineffable  : 

“ The  vision  and  the  faculty  divine,” 

to  be  known,  must  be  experienced.  It  -can  not  be  conceived  by 
the  understanding,  because  beyond  its  sphere ; it  can  not  be  de- 
scribed, because  its  essence  is  identity,  and  all  description  sup- 
poses discrimination.  To  those  who  are  unable  to  rise  beyond  a 
philosophy  of  reflection,  Schelling  candidly  allows  that  the  doc- 
trine of  the  absolute  can  appear  only  a series  of  contradictions ; 
and  he  has  at  least  the  negative  merit  of  having  clearly  exposed 
the  impossibility  of  a philosophy  of  the  unconditioned,  as  found- 
ed on  a knowledge  by  difference,  if  he  utterly  fails  in  positively 
proving  the  possibility  of  such  a philosophy,  as  founded  on  a 

the  Godhead.  Manilius  has  likewise  another  (poetically)  laudable  line,  of  a similar, 
though  less  exceptionable,  purport : 

“ Exemplumque  Dei  quisque  est  in  imagine  parva 
(“  Each  is  himself  a miniature  of  God  ”) 

For  we  should  not  recoil  to  the  opposite  extreme  ; and,  though  man  be  not  identical 
with  the  Deity,  still  is  he  “ created  in  the  image  of  God.”  It  is,  indeed,  only  through 
an  analogy  of  the  human  with  the  Divine  nature,  that  we  are  percipient  and  recipient 
of  Divinity.  As  St.  Prosper  has  it : — “ Nemo  possidet  Deum,  nisi  qui  possidetur  a 
Deo.” — So  Seneca: — “ In  unoquoque  virorum  bonorum  habitat  Deus.” — So  Plotinus : 
— “ Virtue  tending  to  consummation,  and  irradicated  in  the  soul  by  moral  wisdom, 
reveals  a God;  but  a God  destitute  of  true  virtue  is  an  empty  name.” — So  Jacobi: — 
“ From  the  enjoyment  of  virtue  springs  the  idea  of  a virtuous  ; from  the  enjoyment 
of  freedom,  the  idea  of  a free  ; from  the  enjoyment  of  life,  the  idea  of  a living  ; from 
the  enjoyment  of  the  divine,  the  idea  of  a godlike — and  of  a God.” — So  Goethe: — 

“ War  niclit  das  Auge  sonnenhaft, 

Wie  konnten  wir  das  Licht  erblicken  ? 

Lebt’  nicht  in  uns  des  Gottes  eig’ne  Kraft, 

Wie  konnte  uns  das  Gottliches  entzucken?” 

So  Kant  and  many  others.  (Thus  morality  and  religion,  necessity  and  atheism, 
rationally  go  together.) — The  Platonists  and  Fathers  have  indeed  finely  said,  that 
“ God  is  the  soul  of  the  soul,  as  the  soul  is  the  soul  of  the  body.” 

“Vita  Animat  Deus  est ; litec  Corporis.  Iiac  fugiente, 

Solvitur  hoc  ; perit  htec,  destituente  Deo.” 

These  verses  are  preserved  to  us  from  an  ancient  poet  by  John  of  Salisbury,  and  they 
denote  the  comparison  of  which  Buchanan  has  made  so  admirable  a use  in  his  Calvini 
Epiccdium .] 


28 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


knowledge  in  identity,  through  an  absorption  into,  and  vision  of, 
the  absolute. 

Out  of  Laputa  or  the  Empire  it  would  be  idle  to  enter  into  an 
articulate  refutation  of  a theory,  which  founds  philosophy  on  the 
annihilation  of  consciousness,  and  on  the  identification  of  the  un- 
conscious philosopher  with  God.  The  intuition  of  the  absolute  is 
manifestly  the  work  of  an  arbitrary  abstraction,  and  of  a self- 
delusive  imagination.  To  reach  the  point  of  indifference — by 
abstraction  we  annihilate  the  object,  and  by  abstraction  we 
annihilate  the  subject,  of  consciousness.  But  what  remains  ? — 
Nothing.  11  Nil  conscimus  nobis.”  We  then  hypostatize  the 
zero  ; we  baptize  it  with  the  name  of  Absolute  ; and  conceit  our- 
selves that  we  contemplate  absolute  existence,  when  we  only  spe- 
culate absolute  privation.1  This  truth  has  been  indeed  virtually 
confessed  by  the  two  most  distinguished  followers  of  Schelling. 
Hegel  at  last  abandons  the  intuition,  and  regards  '■'•pure  or  unde- 
termined existence ” as  convertible  with  “ pure  nothing;'1'1  while 
Oken,  if  he  adhere  to  the  intuition,  intrepidly  identifies  the  Deity 
or  Absolute  with  zero.  God,  he  makes  the  Nothing,  the  Nothing, 
he  makes  God ; 

And  Naught, 

Is  ev’rything,  and  ev’rything  is  Naught.”2 


1 [The  Infinite  and  Absolute  are  only  the  names  of  two  counter  imbecilities  of  the 
human  mind,  transmuted  into  properties  of  the  nature  of  things — of  two  subjective 
negations,  converted  into  objective  affirmations.  We  tire  ourselves,  either  in  adding 
to,  or  in  taking  from.  Some,  more  reasonably,  call  the  thing  unfinishable — infinite  ; 
others,  less  rationally,  call  it  finished— -absolute.  But  in  both  cases,  the  metastasis  is 
in  itself  irrational.  Not,  however,  in  the  highest  degree  : for  the  subjective  contra- 
dictories were  not  at  first  objectified  by  the  same  philosophers  ; and  it  is  the  crowning 
irrationality  of  the  Infinito-absolutists,  that  they  have  not  merely  accepted  as  objective 
what  is  only  subjective,  but  quietly  assumed  as  the  same,  what  are  not  only  different 
but  conffictive,  not  only  conflictive,  but  repugnant.  Seneca  (Ep.  118)  has  given  the 
true  genealogy  of  the  original  fictions  ; but  at  his  time  the  consummative  union  of  the 
two  had  not  been  attempted.  “Ubi  animus  aliquid  diu  protulit,  et  magnitudinem  ejus 
sequendo  lassatus  est,  infinitum  ccopit  vocari.  Eodem  modo,  aliquid  difficulteitsecari 
cogitavimus,  novissime,  crescente  difficultate,  insecabile  inventum  est.”] 

J [From  the  Rejected  Addresses.  Their  ingenious  authors  have  embodied  a jest  in 
the  very  words  by  which  Oken,  in  sober  seriousness,  propounds  the  first  and  greatest 
of  philosophical  truths.  Jacobi  (or  Neebl)  might  well  say,  that,  in  reading  this  last 
consummation  of  German  speculation,  he  did  not  know  whether  he  were  standing  on 
his  head  or  his  feet.  The  book  in  which  Oken  so  ingeniously  deduces  the  All  from 
the  Nothing,  has,  I see,  been  lately  translated  into  English,  and  published  by  the  Ray 
Society  (I  think).  The  statement  of  the  paradox  is,  indeed,  somewhat  softened  in 
the  second  edition,  from  which,  I presume,  the  version  is  made,  Not  that  Oken  and 
Hegel  are  original  even  in  the  absurdity.  For  as  Varro  right  truly  said  : — “ Nihil  tarn 
absurdc  dici  potest,  quod  non  dicatur  ah  abliquo  philosophorum so  the  Intuition  of 
God  = the  Absolute  = the  Nothing,  we  find  asserted  by  the  lower  Platonists,  by  the 
Buddhists,  and  by  Jacob  Boehme.] 


SCHELLING’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


29 


Nor  does  the  negative  chimera  prove  less  fruitful  than  the  posi- 
tive ; for  Schelling  has  found  it  as  difficult  to  evolve  the  one  into 
the  many,  as  his  disciples  to  deduce  the  universe  and  its  contents 
from  the  first  self-affirmation  of  the  “primordial  Nothing/’ 

“Miri  homines  ! Nihil  esse  aliquid  statuantve  negentve ; 

Quodque  negant  statuunt,  quod  statuuntque  negant.’' 

To  Schelling,  indeed,  it  has  been  impossible,  without  gratuit- 
ous and  even  contradictory  assumptions,  to  explain  the  deduction 
of  the  finite  from  the  infinite.  By  no  salto  mortale  has  he  been 
able  to  clear  the  magic  circle  in  which  he  had  enclosed  himself. 
Unable  to  connect  the  unconditioned  and  the  conditioned  by  any 
natural  correlation,  he  has  variously  attempted  to  account  for  the 
phenomenon  of  the  universe,  either  by  imposing  a necessity  of 
self-manifestation  on  the  absolute,  i.  e.  by  conditioning  the  un- 
conditioned ; or  by  postulating  a fall  of  the  finite  from  the  infinite, 
i.  e.  by  begging  the  very  fact  which  his  hypothesis  professed  its 
exclusive  ability  to  explain. — The  veil  of  Isis  is  thus  still  un- 
withdrawn j1  and  the  question  proposed  by  Orpheus  at  the  dawn 
of  speculation  will  probably  remain  unanswered  at  its  setting : 

“ nits'  §e  fxoL  ev  ri  ra  navr  i'crai  Ka\  ^copty  eKCurrov” 

(“  How  can  I think  each,  separate,  and  all,  one  1”) 

In  like  manner,  annihilating  consciousness  in  order  to  recon- 
struct it,  Schelling  has  never  yet  been  able  to  connect  the  facul- 
ties conversant  about  the  conditioned,  with  the  faculty  of  absolute 
knowledge.  One  simple  objection  strikes  us  as  decisive,  although 
we  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  it  alleged.  “We  awaken,” 
says  Schelling,  “from  the  Intellectual  Intuition  as  from  a state 
of  death ; we  awaken  by  Reflection,  that  is,  through  a compul- 
sory return  to  ourselves.”2  AVe  can  not,  at  the  same  moment,  be 
in  the  intellectual  intuition  and  in  common  consciousness ; we 
must  therefore  be  able  to  connect  them  by  an  act  of  memory — 
of  recollection.  But  how  can  there  be  a remembrance  of  the  ab- 
solute and  its  intuition  ? As  out  of  time,  and  space,  and  relation, 
and  difference,  it  is  admitted  that  the  absolute  can  not  be  con- 
strued to  the  understanding  ? But  as  remembrance  is  only  pos- 

1 [Isis  appears  as  the  HCgypto-Grecian  symbol  of  the  Unconditioned,  (hens' — ’icna 
— O veria  : "icreioii — yvaxrLS  rov  ovtos.  Plat.  I.  et  0.)  In  the  temple  of  Athene-Isis, 
at  Sais,  on  the  fane  there  stood  this  sublime  inscription  : 

I AM  ALL  THAT  WAS,  AND  IS,  AND  SHALL  BE  ; 

NOR  MY  VEIL,  HAS  IT  BEEN  WITHDRAWN  BY  MORTAL. 

(“  Eyol)  elfXL  rrav  to  yeyovus,  kcu  ov,  ku\  eVope vov,  Kai  rbv  i^ibv  rriiikov  ovSels 
6vt)tos  a7T€Ka\v^l/€.”)] 

2 In  Fichte’s  u.  Nicthhammer’s  Phil.  Journ.  vol.  iii.  p.  214. 


30 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


sible  under  the  conditions  of  the  understanding,  it  is  consequently 
impossible  to  remember  any  thing  anterior  to  the  moment  when 
wo  awaken  into  consciousness  ; and  the  clairvoyance  of  the  ab- 
solute, even  granting  its  reality,  is  thus,  after  the  crisis,  as  if  it 
had  never  been.  We  defy  all  solution  of  this  objection. 

4.  What  has  now  been  stated  may  in  some  degree  enable  the 
reader  to  apprehend  the  relations  in  which  our  author  stands, 
both  to  those  who  deny  and  to  those  who  admit  a knowledge  of 
the  absolute.  If  we  compare  the  philosophy  of  Cousin  with  the 
philosophy  of  Schelling,  we  at  once  perceive  that  the  former  is  a 
disciple,  though  by  no  means  a servile  disciple  of  the  latter.  The 
scholar,  though  enamored  with  his  master’s  system  as  a whole, 
is  sufficiently  aware  of  the  two  insuperable  difficulties  of  that 
theory.  He  saw,  that  if  he  pitched  the  absolute  so  high,  it  was 
impossible  to  deduce  from  it  the  relative ; and  he  felt,  probably, 
that  the  Intellectual  Intuition — a stumbling-block  to  himself 
— would  be  arrant  foolishness  in  the  eyes  of  his  countrymen. 
Cousin  and  Schelling  agree,  that  as  philosophy  is  the  science  of 
the  unconditioned,  the  unconditioned  must  be  within  the  com- 
pass of  science.  They  agree  that  the  unconditioned  is  known, 
and  immediately  known : and  they  agree  that  intelligence,  as 
competent  to  the  unconditioned,  is  impersonal,  infinite,  divine. 
But  while  they  coincide  in  the  fact  of  the  absolute,  as  known, 
they  are  diametrically  opposed  as  to  the  mode  in  which  they  at- 
tempt to  realize  this  knowledge;  each  regarding,  as  the  climax  of 
contradiction,  the  manner  in  which  the  other  endeavors  to  bring 
human  reason  and  the  absolute  into  proportion.  According  to 
Schelling,  Cousin’s  absolute  is  only  a relative ; according  to  Cou- 
sin, Schelling’s  knowledge  of  the  absolute  is  a negation  of  thought 
itself.  Cousin  declares  the  condition  of  all  knowledge  to  be 
plurality  and  difference;  and  Schelling,  that  the  condition,  under 
which  alone  a knowledge  of  the  absolute  becomes  possible,  is  in- 
difference and  unity.  The  one  thus  denies  a notion  of  the  abso- 
lute to  consciousness  ; while  the  other  affirms  that  consciousness 
is  implied  in  every  act  of  intelligence.  Truly,  we  must  view  each 
as  triumphant  over  the  other ; and  the  result  of  this  mutual  neu- 
tralization is — that  the  absolute,  of  which  both  assert  a knowl- 
edge, is  for  us  incognizable.1 

1 [“  Quod  genus  hoc  pugnaq  qua  victor  victus  uterque  !” 
is  still  further  exhibited  in  the  mutual  refutation  of  the  two  great  apostles  of  the  Ab 
solute,  in  Germany — Schelling  and  Hegel.  They  were  early  friends — contempora- 


COUSIN’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


31 


In  these  circumstances,  we  might  expect  our  author  to  have 
stated  the  difficulties  to  which  his  theory  was  exposed  on  the 
one  side  and  on  the  other ; and  to  have  endeavored  to  obviate  the 
objections,  both  of  his  brother-absolutists,  and  of  those  who  alto- 
gether deny  a philosophy  of  the  unconditioned.  This  he  has  not 
done.  The  possibility  of  reducing  the  notion  of  the  absolute  to  a 
negative  conception  is  never  once  contemplated ; and  if  one  or 
two  allusions  (not  always,  perhaps,  correct)  are  made  to  his  doc- 
trine, the  name  of  Schelling  does  not  occur,  as  we  recollect,  in  the 
whole  compass  of  these  lectures.  Difficulties,  by  which  either  the 
doctrine  of  the  absolute  in  general,  or  his  own  particular  modifica- 
tion of  that  doctrine,  may  he  assailed,  are  either  avoided,  or  solved 
only  by  still  greater.  Assertion  is  substituted  for  proof;  facts  of 
consciousness  are  alleged,  which  consciousness  never  knew ; and 
paradoxes,  that  baffle  argument,  are  promulgated  as  intuitive 
truths,  above  the  necessity  of  confirmation.  With  every  feeling 
of  respect  for  M.  Cousin  as  a man  of  learning  and  genius,  we 
must  regard  the  grounds  on  which  he  endeavors  to  establish  his 
doctrine  as  assumptive,  inconsequent,  and  erroneous.  In  vindi- 
cating the  truth  of  this  statement,  we  shall  attempt  to  show : in 
th & first  place,  that  M.  Cousin  is  at  fault  in  all  the  authorities  he 
quotes  in  favor  of  the  opinion,  that  the  absolute,  infinite,  uncon- 
ditioned, is  a primitive  notion,  cognizable  by  our  intellect;  in  the 
second , that  his  argument,  to  prove  the  correality  of  his  three 

ries  at  the  same  university — occupiers  of  the  same  bursal  room  (college  chums) — 
Hegel,  somewhat  the  elder  man,  was  somewhat  the  younger  philosopher — and  they 
were  joint-editors  of  the  journal  in  which  their  then  common  doctrine  was  at  first 
promulgated.  So  far  all  was  in  unison  ; but  now  they  separated,  locally  and  in  opin- 
ion. Both,  indeed,  stuck  to  the  Absolute,  but  each  regarded  the  way  in  which  the 
other  professed  to  reach  it,  as  absurd.  Hegel  derided  the  Intellectual  Intuition  of 
Schelling,  as  a poetical  play  of  fancy  ; Schelling  derided  the  Dialectic  of  Hegel,  as  a 
logical  play  with  words.  Both,  I conceive,  were  right ; but  neither  fully  right.  If 
Schelling’s  Intellectual  Intuition  were  poetical,  it  was  a poetry  transcending,  in  fact 
abolishing,  human  imagination.  If  Hegel's  Dialectic  were  logical,  it  was  a logic  out- 
raging that  science  and  the  conditions  of  thought  itself.  Hegel’s  whole  philosophy 
is,  indeed,  founded  on  two  errors  ; — on  a mistake  in  logic,  and  on  a violation  of  logic. 
In  his  dream  of  disproving  the  law  of  Excluded  Middle  (between  two  Contradictories), 
he  inconceivably  mistakes  Contraries  for  Contradictories  ; and  in  positing  pure  or  ab- 
solute existence  as  a mental  datum,  immediate,  intuitive,  and  above  proof  (though,  in 
truth,  this  be  palpably  a mere  relative  gained  by  a process  of  abstraction),  he  not  only 
mistakes  the  fact,  but  violates  the  logical  law  which  prohibits  us  to  assume  the  prin- 
ciple which  it  behoves  us  to  prove.  On  these  two  fundamental  errors  rests  Hegel's 
dialectic ; and  Hegel’s  dialectic  is  the  ladder  by  which  he  attempts  to  scale  the  Abso- 
lute. The  peculiar  doctrine  of  these  two  illustrious  thinkers  is  thus  to  me  only  an- 
other manifestation  of  an  occurrence  of  the  commonest  in  human  speculation  ; if.  is 
only  a sophism  of  relative  self-love,  victorious  over  the  absolute  love  of  truth  : “Quod 
volunt  sapiunt,  et  nolunt  sapere  qua:  vera  sunt.”] 


32 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


ideas,  proves  directly  the  reverse;  in  the  third,  that  the  condi- 
tions under  which  alone  he  allows  intelligence  to  he  possible, 
necessarily  exclude  the  possibility  of  a knowledge,  not  to  say  a 
conception,  of  the  absolute;  and  in  the  fourth , that  the  absolute, 
as  defined  by  him,  is  only  a relative  and  a conditioned. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  M.  Cousin  supposes  that  Aristotle  and 
Kant,  in  their  several  categories,  equally  proposed  an  analysis 
of  the  constituent  elements  of  intelligence ; and  he  also  supposes 
that  each,  like  himself,  recognized  among  these  elements  the  no- 
tion of  the  infinite,  absolute,  unconditioned.  In  both  these  sup- 
positions we  think  him  wrong. 

It  is  a serious  error  in  a historian  of  philosophy  to  imagine 
that,  in  his  scheme  of  categories,  Aristotle  proposed,  like  Kant, 
“an  analysis  of  the  elements  of  human  reason.”  It  is  just,  how- 
ever, to  mention,  that  in  this  mistake  M.  Cousin  has  been  pre- 
ceded by  Kant  himself.  But  the  ends  proposed  by  the  two  phi- 
losophers were  different,  even  opposed.  In  their  several  tables  : 
Aristotle  attempted  a synthesis  of  things  in  their  multiplicity — 
a classification  of  objects  real,  but  in  relation  to  thought; — Kant, 
an  analysis  of  mind  in  its  unity — a dissection  of  thought,  pure, 
but  in  relation  to  its  objects.  The  predicaments  of  Aristotle  are 
thus  objective,  of  things  as  understood ; those  of  Kant  subjective, 
of  the  mind  as  understanding.  The  former  are  results  a 'poste- 
riori— the  creations  of  abstraction  and  generalization ; the  latter, 
anticipations  a priori — the  conditions  of  those  acts  themselves. 
It  is  true,  that  as  the  one  scheme  exhibits  the  unity  of  thought 
diverging  into  plurality,  in  appliance  to  its  objects,  and  the  other, 
exhibits  the  multiplicity  of  these  objects  converging  toward  unity 
by  a collective  determination  of  the  mind  ; while,  at  the  same 
time,  language  usually  confounds  the  subjective  and  objective  un- 
der a common  term ; — it  is  certainly  true,  that  some  elements  in 
the  one  table  coincide  in  name  with  some  elements  in  the  other. 
This  coincidence  is,  however,  only  equivocal.  In  reality,  the 
whole  Kantian  categories  must  be  excluded  frrom  the  Aristotelic 
list,  as  entia  rationis , as  notiones  secundce — in  short,  as  determ- 
inations of  thought,  and  not  genera  of  real  things;  while  the  sev 
oral  elements  would  be  specially  excluded,  as  partial , privative , 
transcendent,  &c.  But  if  it  would  be  unjust  to  criticise  the 
categories  of  Kant  in  whole,  or  in  part,  by  the  Aristotelic  canon, 
what  must  we  think  of  Kant,  who,  after  magnifying  the  idea 
of  investigating  the  forms  of  pure  intellect  as  worthy  of  the 


COUSIN  ON  THE  CATEGORIES  OF  ARISTOTLE  AND  KANT.  33 


mighty  genius  of  the  Stagirite,  proceeds,  on  this  false  hypothesis, 
to  blame  the  execution,  as  a kind  of  patch-work,  as  incomplete, 
as  confounding  derivative  with  simple  notions ; nay,  even,  on  the 
narrow  principles  of  his  own  Critique , as  mixing  the  forms  of 
pure  sense  with  the  forms  of  pure  understanding?1  If  M.  Cousin 
also  were  correct  in  his  supposition  that  Aristotle  and  his  follow- 
ers had  viewed  his  categories  as  an  analysis  of  the  fundamental 
forms  of  thought,  he  would  find  his  own  reduction  of  the  ele- 
ments of  reason  to  a double  principle  anticipated  in  the  scholas- 
tic division  of  existence’  into  ens  per  se  and  ens  per  accidens. 

Nor  is  our  author  correct  in  thinking  that  the  categories  of 
Aristotle  and  Kant  are  complete,  inasmuch  as  they  are  co-ex- 
tensive  with  his  own.  As  to  the  former,  if  the  Infinite  were  not 
excluded,  on  what  would  rest  the  scholastic  distinction  of  ens  cate- 
goricum  and  ens  transcendens  ? The  logicians  require  that  pre- 
dicamental  matter  shall  be  of  a limited  and  finite  nature  ;2  Grod, 
as  infinite,  is  thus  excluded : and  while  it  is  evident  from  the 
whole  context  of  his  book  of  categories,  that  Aristotle  there  only 
contemplated  a distribution  of  the  finite,  so,  in  other  of  his  works, 
he  more  than  once  emphatically  denies  the  infinite  as  an  object 
not  only  of  knowledge,  hut  of  thought; — to  diretpov  dyvcoarov  y 
u7retpov — to  dir&ipov  ovre  votjtov,  ovre  aiaQryrovd  But  if  Aristotle 
thus  regards  the  Infinite  as  beyond  the  compass  of  thought,  Kant 
views  it  as,  at  least,  beyond  the  sphere  of  knowledge.  If  M.  Cousin 
indeed  employed  the  term  category  in  relation  to  the  Kantian 
philosophy  in  the  Kantian  acceptation,  he  would  he  as  erroneous 
in  regard  to  Kant  as  he  is  in  regard  to  Aristotle ; hut  we  presume 
that  he  wishes,  under  that  term,  to  include  not  only  the  “ Cate- 
gories of  Understanding,”  hut  the  “Ideas  of  Reason.”4  But  Kant 

1 See  the  Critik  d.  r.  V.  and  the  Prolegomena. 

2 [M.  Peisse,  in  a note  here,  quotes  the  common  logical  law  of  categorical  entities, 
well  and  briefly  expressed  in  the  following  verse  : 

“ Entia  per  ses e,finita,  realia,  tota.” 

He  likewise  justly  notices,  that  nothing  is  included  in  the  Aristotelic  categories  but 
what  is  susceptible  of  definition,  consequently  of  analysis.] 

3 Phys.  L.  iii.  c.  10,  text.  66,  c.  7,  text.  40.  See  also  Metaph.  L.  ii.  c.  2,  text.  11. 
Analyt.  Post.  L.  i.  c.  20,  text.  39 — et  alibi. — [Aristotle’s  definition  of  the  Infinite  (of 
the  dwetpov  in  contrast  to  the  dopiarov)—11  that  of  which  there  is  always  something 
beyond,’'  may  be  said  to  be  a definition  only  of  the  Indefinite.  This  I shall  not  gain- 
say. But  it  was  the  only  Infinite  which  he  contemplated  ; as  it  is  the  only  Infinite 
of  which  we  can  form  a notion.] 

1 [“  The  Categories  of  Kant  are  simple  forms  or  frames  (schemata)  of  the  Under- 
standing (Vcrstand)  under  which,  an  object  to  be  known,  must  be  necessarily  thought 
Kant’s  Ideas,  a word  which  he  expressly  borrowed  from  Plato,  are  concepts  of  the 

c 


34 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


limits  knowledge  to  experience,  and  experience  to  the  categories 
of  the  understanding,  which,  in  reality,  are  only  so  many  forms 
of  the  conditioned ; and  allows  to  the  notion  of  the  unconditioned 
(corresponding  to  the  ideas  of  reason)  no  objective  reality,  regard- 
ing it  merely  as  a regulative  principle  in  the  arrangement  of 
our  thoughts.  As  M.  Cousin,  however,  holds  that  the  uncondi- 
tioned is  not  only  subjectively  conceived , but  objectively  known ; 
he  is  thus  totally  wrong  in  regard  to  the  one  philosopher,  and 
wrong  in  part  in  relation  to  the  other. 

In  the  second  place,  our  author  maintains  that  the  idea  of  the 
infinite,  or  absolute,  and  the  idea  of  the  finite,  or  relative,  are 
equally  real,  because  the  notion  of  the  one  necessarily  suggests 
the  notion  of  the  other. 

Correlatives  certainly  suggest  each  other,  but  correlatives  may, 
or  may  not,  be  equally  real  and  positive.  In  thought  contradic- 
tories necessarily  imply  each  other,  for  the  knowledge  of  contra- 
dictories is  one.  But  the  reality  of  one  contradictory,  so  far  from 
guaranteeing  the  reality  of  the  other,  is  nothing  else  than  its 
negation.  Thus  every  positive  notion  (the  concept  of  a thing  by 
what  it  is)  suggests  a negative  notion  (the  concept  of  a thing  by 
what  it  is  not;)  and  the  highest  positive  notion,  the  notion  of  the 
conceivable,  is  not  without  its  corresponding  negative  in  the 
notion  of  the  inconceivable.  But  though  these  mutually  suggest 
each  other,  the  positive  alone  is  real ; the  negative  is  only  an  ab- 
straction of  the  other,  and  in  the  highest  generality,  even  an  ab- 
straction of  thought  itself.  It  therefore  behoved  M.  Cousin,  in- 
stead of  assuming  the  objective  correality  of  his  two  elements  on 
the  fact  of  their  subjective  correlation,  to  have  suspected,  on  this 
very  ground,  that  the  reality  of  the  one  was  inconsistent  with  the 
reality  of  the  other.  In  truth,  upon  examination,  it  will  be  found 
that  his  two  primitive  ideas  are  nothing  more  than  contradictory 
relatives.  These,  consequently,  of  their  very  nature,  imply  each 
other  in  thought ; but  they  imply  each  other  only  as  affirmation 
and  negation  of  the  same. 

We  have  already  shown,  that  though  the  Conditioned  (condi- 
tionally limited)  be  one,  what  is  opposed  to  it  as  the  Uncondi- 
tioned, is  plural : that  the  unconditional  negation  of  limitation 

Reason  ( Vcrnunft ;)  whose  objects  transcending  the  sphere  of  all  experience  actual  or 
possible,  consequently  do  not  fall  under  the  categories,  in  other  words,  are  positively 
unknowable.  These  ideas  are  God,  Matter,  Soul,  objects  which,  considered  out  of 
relation,  or  in  their  transcendent  reality,  are  so  many  phases  of  the  Absolute." — M. 
Peisse.] 


COUSIN’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


35 


gives  one  unconditioned,  the  Infinite ; as  the  unconditional  affirm- 
ation of  limitation  affords  another,  the  Absolute.  This,  while  it 
coincides  with  the  opinion,  that  the  Unconditioned  in  either  phasis 
is  inconceivable,  is  repugnant  to  the  doctrine,  that  the  uncondi- 
tioned (ahsoluto-infinite)  can  he  positively  construed  to  the  mind. 
For  those  who,  with  M.  Cousin,  regard  the  notion  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned as  a positive  and  real  knowledge  of  existence  in  its  all- 
comprehensive  unity,  and  who  consequently  employ  the  terms 
Absolute , Infinite , Unconditioned , as  only  various  expressions  for 
the  same  identity,  are  imperatively  hound  to  prove  that  their  idea 
of  the  One  corresponds — either  with  that  Unconditioned  ive  have 
distinguished  as  the  Absolute — or  ivith  that  Unconditioned  we 
have  distinguished  as  the  Infinite — or  that  it  includes  both — or 
that  it  excludes  both.  This  they  have  not  done,  and,  we  suspect, 
have  never  attempted  to  do. 

Our  author  maintains,  that  the  unconditioned  is  known  under 
the  laws  of  consciousness  ; and  does  not,  like  Schelling,  pretend 
to  an  intuition  of  existence  beyond  the  hounds  of  space  and  time. 
Indeed,  he  himself  expressly  predicates  the  absolute  and  infinite 
of  these  forms. 

Time  is  only  the  image  or  the  concept  of  a certain  correlation 
of  existences — of  existence,  therefore,  pro  tanto,  as  conditioned. 
It  is  thus  itself  only  a form  of  the  conditioned.  But  let  that  pass. 
Is,  then,  the  Absolute  conceivable  of  time  ? Can  we  conceive 
time  as  unconditionally  limited  ? We  can  easily  represent  to 
ourselves  time  under  any  relative  limitation  of  commencement 
and  termination ; hut  we  are  conscious  to  ourselves  of  nothing 
more  clearly,  than  that  it  would  he  equally  possible  to  think 
without  thought,  as  to  construe  to  the  mind  an  absolute  com- 
mencement, or  an  absolute  termination,  of  time  ; that  is,  a begin- 
ning and  an  end,  beyond  which,  time  is  conceived  as  non-existent. 
G-oad  imagination  to  the  utmost,  it  still  sinks  paralyzed  within 
the  hounds  of  time ; and  time  survives  as  the  condition  of  the 
thought  itself  in  which  we  annihilate  the  universe  : 

“ Sur  les  mondes  detruits  le  Temps  dort  immobile.” 

But  if  the  Absolute  be  inconceivable  of  this  form,  is  the  Infinite 
more  comprehensible  ? Can  we  imagine  time  as  unconditionally 
unlimited  ? We  can  not  conceive  the  infinite  regress  of  time  ; for 
such  a notion  could  only  be  realized  by  the  infinite  addition  in 
thought  of  finite  times,  and  such  an  addition  would,  itself,  require 


36 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


an  eternity  for  its  accomplishment.  If  we  dream  of  effecting  this, 
we  only  deceive  ourselves  by  substituting  the  indefinite  for  the 
infinite,  than  which  no  two  notions  can  be  more  opposed.  The 
negation  of  the  commencement  of  time  involves  likewise  the  affir- 
mation, that  an  infinite  time  has  at  every  moment  already  run; 
that  is,  it  implies  the  contradiction,  that  an  infinite  has  been  com- 
pleted— For  the  same  reasons  we  are  unable  to  conceive  an  infi- 
nite progress  of  time  ; while  the  infinite  regress  and  the  infinite 
progress,  taken  together,  involve  the  triple  contradiction  of  an 
infinite  concluded,  of  an  infinite  commencing,  and  of  two  infi- 
nites, not  exclusive  of  each  other. 

Space,  like  time,  is  only  the  intuition  or  the  concept  of  a cer- 
tain correlation  of  existence — of  existence,  therefore,  pro  tanto,  as 
conditioned.  It  is  thus  itself  only  a form  of  the  conditioned. 
But  apart  from  this,  thought  is  equally  powerless  in  realizing  a 
notion  either  of  the  absolute  totality , or  of  the  infinite  immensity , 
of  space. — And  while  time  and  space,  as  wholes,  can  thus  neither 
be  conceived  as  absolutely  limited,  nor  as  infinitely  unlimited  ; so 
their  parts  can  be  represented  to  the  mind  neither  as  absolutely 
individual , nor  as  divisible  to  infinity.  The  universe  can  not  be 
imagined  as  a whole,  which  may  not  also  be  imagined  as  a part ; 
nor  an  atom  be  imagined  as  a part,  which  may  not  also  be  imag- 
ined as  a whole. 

The  same  analysis  with  a similar  result,  can  be  applied  to 
cause  and  effect,  and  to  substance  and  phenomenon.  These,  how- 
ever, may  both  be  reduced  to  the  law  itself  of  the  conditioned.1 

The  Conditioned  is,  therefore,  that  only  which  can  be  positively 
conceived ; the  Absolute  and  Infinite  are  conceived  only  as  nega- 
tions of  the  conditioned  in  its  opposite  poles. 

Now,  as  we  observed,  M.  Cousin,  and  those  who  confounded  the 
absolute  and  infinite,  and  regard  the  Unconditioned  as  a positive 
and  indivisible  notion,  must  show  that  this  notion  coincides  either, 
1°,  with  the  notion  of  the  Absolute,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  infi- 
nite ; or  2°,  with  the  notion  of  the  Infinite,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  absolute ; or  3°,  that  it  includes  both  as  true,  carrying  them 
up  to  indifference ; or  4°,  that  it  excludes  both  as  false.  The  last 
two  alternatives  are  impossible,  as  either  would  be  subversive  of 
the  highest  principle  of  intelligence,  which  asserts,  that  of  two 
contradictories,  both  can  not,  but  one  must,  be  true.  It  only, 


1 See  Appendix  I.  for  the  applications  of  that  doctrine. 


COUSIN’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED.  37 

therefore,  remains  to  identify  the  unity  of  the  Unconditioned  with 
the  Infinite,  or  with  the  Absolute — with  either,  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  other.  But  while  every  one  must  be  intimately  conscious 
of  the  impossibility  of  this,  the  very  fact  that  our  author  and 
other  philosophers  a priori  have  constantly  found  it  necessary  to 
confound  these  contradictions,  sufficiently  proves  that  neither 
term  has  a right  to  represent  the  unity  of  the  unconditioned,  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  other.1 

The  Unconditioned  is,  therefore,  not  a positive  concept ; nor 
has  it  even  a real  or  intrinsic  unity  ; for  it  only  combines  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite,  in  themselves  contradictory  of  each 
other,  into  a unity  relative  to  us  by  the  negative  bond  of  their  in- 
conceivability. It  is  on  this  mistake  of  the  relative  for  the  irre- 
spective, of  the  negative  for  the  positive,  that  M.  Cousin’s  theory 
is  founded:  And  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  how  the  mistake 
originated. 

This  reduction  of  M.  Cousin’s  two  ideas  of  the  Infinite  and 
Finite  to  one  positive  conception  and  its  negative,  implicitly  anni- 
hilates also  the  third  idea,  devised  by  him  as  a connection  be- 
tween his  two  substantive  ideas ; and  which  he  marvelously 
identifies  with  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

Yet  before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject,  we  may  observe, 
that  the  very  simplicity  of  our  analysis  is  a strong  presumption 
in  favor  of  its  truth.  A plurality  of  causes  is  not  to  be  postu- 
lated, where  one  is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  phenomena  [Entia 
non  sunt  multiplicanda  prceter  necessitatem) : and  M.  Cousin,  in 
supposing  three  positive  ideas,  where  only  one  is  necessary,  brings 
the  rule  of  parsimony  against  his  hypothesis,  even  before  its  un- 
soundness may  be  definitely  brought  to  light. 

In  the  third  place,  the  restrictions  to  which  our  author  subjects 
intelligence,  divine  and  human,  implicitly  deny  a knowledge — 
even  a concept — of  the  absolute,  both  to  God  and  man. — “ The 
condition  of  intelligence,”  says  M.  Cousin,  “ is  difference ; and  an 
act  of  knowledge  is  only  possible  where  there  exists  a plurality 
of  terms.  Unity  does  not  suffice  for  conception  ; variety  is  neces- 
sary ; nay  more,  not  only  is  variety  necessary,  there  must  like- 
wise subsist  an  intimate  relation  between  the  principles  of  unity 


1 [The  first  three  cases  had,  indeed,  been  realized  in  the  Eleatic  school  alone.  The 
first  by  Parmenides,  the  second  by  Melissus,  the  third  by  Xenophanes.  The  fourth 
has  not,  I presume,  been  explicitly  held  by  any  philosopher ; but  the  silent  confusion 
of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite  has  been  always  common  enough.] 


38 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


and  variety ; without  which,  the  variety  not  being  perceived  by 
the  unity,  the  one  is  as  if  it  could  not  perceive,  and  the  other  as 
if  it  could  not  be  perceived.  Look  back  for  a moment  into  your- 
selves, and  you  will  find,  that  what  constitutes  intelligence  in  our 
feeble  consciousness,  is,  that  there  are  there  several  terms,  of  which 
the  one  perceives  the  other,  of  which  the  other  is  perceived  by  the 
first : in  this  consists  self-knowledge — in  this  consists  self-compre- 
hension— in  this  consists  intelligence : intelligence  without  con- 
sciousness is  the  abstract  possibility  of  intelligence,  not  intelli- 
gence in  the  act ; and  consciousness  implies  diversity  and  differ- 
ence. Transfer  all  this  from  human  to  absolute  intelligence ; that 
is  to  say,  refer  the  ideas  to  the  only  intelligence  to  which  they 
can  belong.  You  have  thus,  if  I may  so  express  myself,  the  life 
of  absolute  intelligence  ; you  have  this  intelligence  with  the  com- 
plete development  of  the  elements  which  are  necessary  for  it  to 
be  a true  intelligence ; you  have  all  the  momenta  whose  relation 
and  motion  constitute  the  reality  of  knowledge.” — In  all  this,  so 
far  as  human  intelligence  is  concerned,  we  cordially  agree ; for  a 
more  complete  admission  could  not  be  imagined,  not  only  that  a 
knowledge,  and  even  a notion,  of  the  absolute  is  impossible  for 
man,  but  that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  such  a 
knowledge,  even  in  the  Deity,  without  contradicting  our  human 
conceptions  of  the  possibility  of  intelligence  itself.  Our  author, 
however,  recognizes  no  contradiction ; and,  without  argument  or 
explanation,  accords  a knowledge  of  that  which  can  only  be  known 
under  the  negation  of  all  difference  and  plurality,  to  that  which 
can  only  know  under  the  affirmation  of  both. 

If  a knowledge  of  the  absolute  were  possible  under  these  con- 
ditions, it  may  excite  our  wonder  that  other  philosophers  should 
have  viewed  this  supposition  as  utterly  impossible;  and  that 
Schelling,  whose  acuteness  was  never  questioned,  should  have 
exposed  himself  gratuitously  to  the  reproach  of  mysticism,  by  his 
postulating  for  a few,  and  through  a faculty  above  the  reach  of 
consciousness,  a knowledge  already  given  to  all  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  Monstrous  as  is  the  postulate  of  the  Intellectual 
Intuition,  we  freely  confess  that  it  is  only  through  such  a faculty 
that  we  can  imagine  the  possibility  of  a science  of  the  absolute ; 
and  have  no  hesitation  in  acknowledging,  that  if  Schelling’s  hypo- 
thesis appear  to  us  incogitable,  that  of  Cousin  is  seen  to  be  self- 
contradictory. 

Our  author  admits,  and  must  admit,  that  the  Absolute,  as  ab- 


COUSIN’S  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


39 


solutely  universal,  is  absolutely  one;  absolute  unity  is  convert- 
ible with  the  absolute  negation  of  plurality  and  difference;  the 
absolute , and  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute , are  therefore  iden- 
tical. But  knowledge,  or  intelligence,  it  is  asserted  by  M.  Cousin, 
supposes  a plurality  of  terms — the  plurality  of  subject  and  object. 
Intelligence,  whose  essence  is  plurality,  can  not  therefore  be 
identified  with  the  absolute,  whose  essence  is  unity;  and  if 
known,  the  absolute,  as  known,  must  be  different  from  the  abso- 
lute, as  existing ; that  is,  there  must  be  two  absolutes — an  abso- 
lute in  knowledge,  and  an  absolute  in  existence,  which  is  con- 
tradictory. 

But  waiving  this  contradiction,  and  allowing  the  non-identity 
of  knowledge  and  existence,  the  absolute  as  known  must  be 
known  under  the  conditions  of  the  absolute  as  existing,  that  is, 
as  absolute  unity.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  asserted,  that 
the  condition  of  intelligence,  as  knowing,  is  plurality  and  differ- 
ence ; consequently  the  condition  of  the  absolute,  as  existing,  and 
under  which  it  must  be  known,  and  the  condition  of  intelligence, 
as  capable  of  knowing,  are  incompatible.  Bor,  if  we  suppose  the 
absolute  cognizable:  it  must  be  identified  either — 1°,  with  the 
subject  knowing;  or,  2°,  with  the  object  known;  or,  3°,  with  the 
indifference  of  both.  The  first  hypothesis,  and  the  second , are 
contradictory  of  the  absolute.  For  in  these  the  absolute  is  sup- 
posed to  be  known,  either  as  contradistinguished  from  the  know- 
ing subject,  or  as  contradistinguished  from  the  object  known;  in 
other  words,  the  absolute  is  asserted  to  be  known  as  absolute 
unity,  i.  e.  as  the  negation  of  all  plurality,  while  the  very  act  by 
which  it  is  known,  affirms  plurality  as  the  condition  of  its  own 
possibility.  The  third  hypothesis,  on  the  other  hand,  is  contra- 
dictory of  the  plurality  of  intelligence ; for  if  the  subject  and 
the  object  of  consciousness  be  known  as  one,  a plurality  of  terms 
is  not  the  necessary  condition  of  intelligence.  The  alternative  is 
therefore  necessary : Either  the  absolute  can  not  be  known  or 
conceived  at  all ; or  our  author  is  wrong  in  subjecting  thought  to 
the  conditions  of  plurality  and  difference.  It  was  the  iron  neces- 
sity of  the  alternative  that  constrained  Schelling  to  resort  to  the 
hypothesis  of  a knowledge  in  identity  through  the  intellectual 
intuition;  and  it  could  only  be  from  an  oversight  of  the  main 
difficulties  of  the  problem  that  M.  Cousin,  in  abandoning  the  in- 
tellectual intuition,  did  not  abandon  the  absolute  itself.  For  how 
that,  whose  essence  is  all-comprehensive  unity,  can  be  known  by 


40 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


the  negation  of  that  unity  under  the  condition  of  plurality — how 
that,  which  exists  only  as  the  identity  of  all  difference,  can  be 
known  under  the  negation  of  that  identity,  in  the  antithesis  of 
subject  and  object,  of  knowledge  and  existence : — these  are  con- 
tradictions which  M.  Cousin  has  not  attempted  to  solve — contra- 
dictions which  he  does  not  seem  to  have  contemplated. 

In  the  fourth  place. — The  objection  of  the  inconceivable  nature 
of  Schelling’s  intellectual  intuition,  and  of  a knowledge  of  the 
absolute  in  identity,  apparently  determined  our  author  to  adopt 
the  opposite,  but  suicidal  alternative — of  a knowledge  of  the  ab- 
solute in  consciousness,  and  by  difference.  The  equally  insuper- 
able objection- — that  from  the  absolute  defined  as  absolute,  Schel- 
ling  had.  not  been  able,  without  inconsequence,  to  deduce  the 
conditioned,  seems,  in  like  manner,  to  have  influenced  M.  Cousin 
to  define  the  absolute  by  a relative;  not  observant,  it  would 
appear,  that  though  he  thus  facilitated  the  derivation  of  the  con- 
ditioned, he  annihilated  in  reality  the  absolute  itself.  By  the 
former  proceeding,  our  author  virtually  denies  the  possibility  of 
the  absolute  in  thought;  by  the  latter,  the  possibility  of  the  ab- 
solute in  existence. 

The  absolute  is  defined  by  our  author,  “an  absolute  cause — a 
cause  which  can  not  but  pass  into  act.'"  Now,  it  is  sufficiently 
manifest  that  a thing  existing  absolutely  if  . e.  not  under  relation), 
and  a thing  existing  absolutely  as  a cause , are  contradictory. 
The  former  is  the  absolute  negation  of  all  relation,  the  latter  is 
the  absolute  affirmation  of  a particular  relation.  A cause  is  a 
relative,  and  what  exists  absolutely  as  a cause,  exists  absolutely 
under  relation.  Schelling  has  justly  observed,  that  “he  would 
deviate  wide  as  the  poles  from  the  idea  of  the  absolute,  who  would 
think  of  defining  its  nature  by  the  notion  of  activity .” 1 But  he 
who  would  define  the  absolute  by  the  notion  of  a cause , would 
deviate  still  more  widely  from  its  nature ; inasmuch  as  the  notion 
of  a cause  involves  not  only  the  notion  of  a determination  to 
activity,  but  of  a determination  to  a particular,  nay  a dependent, 
kind  of  activity — an  activity  not  immanent,  but  transeunt.  What 
exists  merely  as  a cause,  exists  merely  for  the  sake  of  something 
else — is  not  final  in  itself,  but  simply  a mean  toward  an  end; 
and  in  the  accomplishment  of  that  end,  it  consummates  its  own 
perfection.  Abstractly  considered,  the  effect  is  therefore  superior 
to  the  cause.  A cause,  as  cause,  may  indeed  be  better  than  one 


1 Bruno,  p.  171. 


COUSIN’S  SPECULATIVE  THEOLOGY. 


41 


or  two,  or  any  given  number  of  its  effects.  But  the  total  com- 
plement of  the  effects  of  what  exists  only  as  a cause,  is  better 
than  that  which,  ex  hypothesis  exists  merely  for  the  sake  of  their 
production.  Further,  not  only  is  an  absolute  cause  dependent  on 
the  effect  for  its  perfection — it  is  dependent  on  it  even  for  its 
reality.  For  to  what  extent  a thing  exists  necessarily  as  a 
cause,  to  that  extent  it  is  not  all-sufficient  to  itself ; since  to  that 
extent  it  is  dependent  on  the  effect,  as  on  the  condition  through 
which  alone  it  realizes  its  existence ; and  what  exists  absolutely 
as  a cause,  exists  therefore  in  absolute  dependence  on  the  effect 
for  the  reality  of  its  existence.  An  absolute  cause,  in  truth,  only 
exists  in  its  effects:  it  never  is,  it  always  becomes;  for  it  is  an 
existence  in  potentia , and  not  an  existence  in  actu , except  through 
and  in  its  effects.  The  absolute  is  thus,  at  best,  a being  merely 
inchoative  and  imperfect. 

The  definition  of  the  absolute  by  absolute  cause  is,  therefore, 
tantamount  to  a negation  of  itself;  for  it  defines  by  relation  and 
conditions,  that  which  is  conceived  only  as  exclusive  of  both. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  definition  of  the  absolute  by  substance. 
But  of  this  we  do  not  now  speak. 

The  vice  of  M.  Cousin’s  definition  of  the  absolute  by  absolute 
cause,  is  manifested  likewise  in  its  applications.  He  maintains 
that  his  theory  can  alone  explain  the  nature  and  relations  of  the 
Deity;  and  on  its  absolute  incompetency  to  fulfill  the  conditions 
of  a rational  theism,  we  are  willing  to  rest  our  demonstration  of 
its  radical  unsoundness. 

“G-od,”  says  our  author,  “creates;  he  creates  in  virtue  of  his 
creative  power,  and  he  draws  the  universe,  not  from  nonentity, 
but  from  himself,  who  is  absolute  existence.  His  distinguishing 
characteristic  being  an  absolute  creative  force,  which  can  not  but 
pass  into  activity,  it  follows,  not  that  the  creation  is  possible,  but 
that  it  is  necessary .” 

We  must  be  very  brief.  The  subjection  of  the  Deity  to  a ne- 
cessity— a necessity  of  self-manifestation  identical  with  the  crea- 
tion of  the  universe,  is  contradictory  of  the  fundamental  postulates 
of  a divine  nature.  On  this  theory,  (rod  is  not  distinct  from  the 
world ; the  creature  is  a modification  of  the  creator.  Now,  with- 
out objecting  that  the  simple  subordination  of  the  Deity  to  ne- 
cessity, is  in  itself  tantamount  to  his  dethronement,  let  us  see 
to  what  consequences  this  necessity,  on  the  hypothesis  of  M. 
Cousin,  inevitably  leads.  On  this  hypothesis,  one  of  two  altern- 


42 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


atives  must  be  admitted.  G-od,  as  necessarily  determined  to  pass 
from  absolute  essence  to  relative  manifestation,  is  determined  to 
pass  either  from  the  better  to  the  ivorse,  or  from  the  ivorse  to  the 
better.  A third  possibility,  that  both  states  are  equal , as  contra- 
dictory in  itself,  and  as  contradicted  by  our  author,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  consider. 

The  first  supposition  must  be  rejected.  The  necessity  in  this 
case  determines  G-od  to  pass  from  the  better  to  the  worse ; that 
is,  operates  to  his  partial  annihilation.  The  power  which  compels 
this  must  be  external  and  hostile,  for  nothing  operates  willingly 
to  its  own  deterioration ; and,  as  superior  to  the  pretended  G-od, 
is  either  itself  the  real  deity,  if  an  intelligent  and  free  cause,  or  a 
negation  of  all  deity,  if  a blind  force  or  fate. 

The  second  is  equally  inadmissible : — that  G-od,  passing  into 
the  universe,  passes  from  a state  of  comparative  imperfection, 
into  a state  of  comparative  perfection.  The  divine  nature  is  iden- 
tical with  the  most  perfect  nature , and  is  also  identical  with  the 
first  cause.  If  the  first  cause  be  not  identical  with  the  most 
perfect  nature,  there  is  no  G-od,  for  the  two  essential  conditions 
of  his  existence  are  not  in  combination.  Now,  on  the  present 
supposition,  the  most  perfect  nature  is  the  derived ; nay  the  uni- 
verse, the  creation,  the  yivopevov,  is,  in  relation  to  its  cause,  the 
real,  the  actual,  the  oWw?  ov.  It  would  also  be  the  divine,  but 
that  divinity  supposes  also  the  notion  of  cause,  while  the  universe, 
ex  hypothesis  is  only  an  effect. 

It  is  no  answer  to  these  difficulties  for  M.  Cousin  to  say,  that 
the  Deity,  though  a cause  which  can  not  choose  but  create,  is  not, 
however,  exhausted  in  the  act ; and  though  passing  with  all  the 
elements  of  his  being  into  the  universe,  that  he  remains  entire  in 
his  essence,  and  with  all  the  superiority  of  the  cause  over  the 
effect.  The  dilemma  is  unavoidable : — Either  the  Deity  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  universe  for  his  being  or  perfection ; on  which 
alternative  our  author  must  abandon  his  theory  of  G-od,  and  the 
necessity  of  creation : Or  the  Deity  is  dependent  on  his  mani- 
festation in  the  universe  for  his  being  or  perfection ; on  which 
alternative,  his  doctrine  is  assailed  by  the  difficulties  previously 
stated . 

The  length  to  which  the  preceding  observations  have  extended, 
prevents  us  from  adverting  to  sundry  other  opinions  of  our  author, 
which  we  conceive  to  be  equally  unfounded. — For  example  (to 
say  nothing  of  his  proof  of  the  impersonality  of  intelligences 


OUR  HIGHEST  WISDOM  IS  A LEARNED  IGNORANCE. 


43 


because,  forsooth,  truth  is  not  subject  to  our  will),  what  can  be 
conceived  more  self-contradictory  than  his  theory  of  moral  liberty  ? 
Divorcing  liberty  from  intelligence,  but  connecting  it  with  per- 
sonality, he  defines  it  to  be  a cause  which  is  determined  to  act  by 
its  proper  energy  alone.  But  (to  say  nothing  of  remoter  difficul- 
ties) how  liberty  can  be  conceived,  supposing  always  a plurality 
of  modes  of  activity,  without  a knowledge  of  that  plurality  ; — how 
a faculty  can  resolve  to  act  by  preference  in  a particular  man- 
ner, and  not  determine  itself  by  final  causes  ; — how  intelligence 
can  influence  a blind  power  without  operating  as  an  efficient 
cause ; — or  how,  in  fine,  morality  can  be  founded  on  a liberty 
which,  at  best,  only  escapes  necessity  by  taking  refuge  with 
chance : — these  are  problems  which  M.  Cousin,  in  none  of  his 
works,  has  stated,  and  which  we  are  confident  he  is  unable  to 
solve. 

After  the  tenor  of  our  previous  observations,  it  is  needless  to 
say  that  we  regard  M.  Cousin’s  attempt  to  establish  a general 
peace  among  philosophers,  by  the  promulgation  of  his  Eclectic 
theory,  as  a failure.  But  though  no  converts  to  his  Uncondi- 
tioned, and  viewing  with  regret  what  we  must  regard  as  the 
misapplication  of  his  distinguished  talents,  we  can  not  disown  a 
strong  feeling  of  interest  and  admiration  for  those  qualities,  even 
in  their  excess,  which  have  betrayed  him,  with  so  many  other 
aspiring  philosophers,  into  a pursuit  which  could  only  end  in  dis- 
appointment ; — we  mean  his  love  of  truth,  and  his  reliance  on 
the  powers  of  man.  Not  to  despair  of  philosophy  is  “ a last  infir- 
mity of  noble  minds.”  The  stronger  the  intellect,  the  stronger 
the  confidence  in  its  force ; the  more  ardent  the  appetite  for 
knowledge,  the  less  are  we  prepared  to  canvass  the  uncertainty 
of  the  fruition.  “ The  wish  is  parent  to  the  thought.”  Loth 
to  admit  that  our  science  is  at  best  the  reflection  of  a reality  we 
can  not  know,  we  strive  to  penetrate  to  existence  in  itself ; and 
what  \Ve  have  labored  intensely  to  attain,  we  at  last  fondly  be- 
lieve we  have  accomplished.  But,  like  Ixion,  we  embrace  a cloud 
for  a divinity.  Conscious  only  of — conscious  only  in  and  through, 
limitation,  we  think  to  comprehend  the  infinite  ; and  dream  even 
of  establishing  the  science — the  nescience  of  man,  on  an  identity 
with  the  omniscience  of  Grod.  It  is  this  powerful  tendency  of  the 
most  vigorous  minds  to  transcend  the  sphere  of  our  faculties, 
which  makes  a “learned  ignorance”  the  most  difficult  acquire- 
ment, perhaps,  indeed,  the  consummation,  of  knowledge.  In  the 


44 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED. 


words  of  a forgotten,  "but  acute  philosopher  : — “ Magna,  immo 
maxima  pars  sapientice  est — qucedam  asquo  animo  nescire  veiled1 


Hie  raundus  est  infinitas 
Infinitas  et  totus  est, 

(Nam  mente  nunquam  absolveris;) 

Infinitas  et  illius 

Pars  quselibet,  partisque  pars. 

Quod  tangis  est  infinitas  ; 

Quod  cernis  est  infinitas  ; 

Quod  non  vides  corpusculum, 

Sed  mente  sola  concipis, 
Corpusculi  et  corpusculum, 
Hujusque  pars  corpusculi, 
Partisque  pars,  hujusque  pars, 

In  hacque  parte  quicquid  est, 
Infinitatem  continct. 


[Infinitas  ! Infinitas  ! 

Secare  mens  at  pergito, 
Nunquam  secare  desine ; 

In  sectione  qualibet 
Infinitates  dissecas. 

Quiesce  mens  heic  denique, 
Arctosque  nosce  limites 
Queis  contineris  undique ; 
Quiesce  mens,  et  limites 
In  orbe  cessa  qusrere. 

Quod  quseris  in  te  repperis  : 
In  mente  sunt,  in  mente  sunt, 
Hi,  quos  requiris,  termini ; 

A rebus  absunt  limites, 

In  hisce  tantum  infinitas, 


Infinitas  ! Infinitas  ! 

Proli,  quantus  heic  acervus  est ! 
Et  quam  nihil  quod  nostra  mens 
Ex  hoc  acervo  intelligit ! 

At  ilia  Mens  vah,  qualis  est, 
Conspecta  cui  stant  omnia  ! 

In  singulis  quie  perspicit 
Quascunque  sunt  in  singulis 
Et  singulorum  singulis  !”] 


[See  Appendix  I.  for  testimonies  in  regard  to  the  limitation  of  our  knowledge.] 


II.— PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION.1 


(October,  1830.) 

CEuvres  Completes  de  Thomas  Reid,  chef  de  Vecole  Ecossaise. 

Publiees  par  M.  Th.  Jouffroy,  avec  des  Fragments  de  M. 

Royer-Collard,  et  une  Introduction  de  VEditeur. — Tomes 

II.-VT.  8vo.  Paris,  1828-9,  (not  completed.) 

We  rejoice  in  the  appearance  of  this  work — and  for  two  rea- 
sons. We  hail  it  as  another  sign  of  the  convalescence  of  philoso- 
phy, in  a great  and  influential  nation ; and  prize  it  as  a season- 
able testimony,  by  intelligent  foreigners,  to  the  merits  of  a philo- 
sopher, whose  reputation  is,  for  the  moment,  under  an  eclipse  at 
home. 

Apart  from  the  practical  corruption,  of  which  (in  the  emphatic 
language  of  Fichte)  “the  dirt-philosophy”  may  have  been  the 
cause,  we  regard  the  doctrine  of  mind,  long  dominant  in  France, 
as  more  pernicious,  through  the  stagnation  of  thought  which  it 
occasioned,  than  for  the  speculative  errors  which  it  set  afloat. 
The  salutary  fermentation,  which  the  skepticism  of  Hume  determ- 
ined in  Scotland  and  in  Grermany,  did  not  extend  to  that  coun- 
try ; and  the  dogmatist  there  slumbered  on,  unsuspicious  of  his 
principles,  nay  even  resigned  to  conclusions,  which  would  make 
philosophy  to  man,  the  solution  of  the  terrific  oracle  to  QEdipus : 
“ Mayst  thou  ne’er  learn  the  truth  of  what  thou  art !” 

“ Since  the  metaphysic  of  Locke,”  says  M.  Cousin,  “ crossed 


1 [In  French  by  M.  Peisse ; in  Italian  by  S.  Lo  Gatto  ; in  Cross’s  Selections. 

Some  deletions,  found  necessary  in  consequence  of  the  unexpected  length  to  which 
the  Article  extended  (especially  from  the  second  paragraph  on  this  page,  to  “ contri- 
buted,” near  the  top  of  page  49),  have  been  restored.  One  note  has  been  omitted, 
which  Mr.  Napier  had  appended  ; not  that  I would  proclaim  a dissent  from  its  state- 
ments, but  simply  because  it  is  not  mine.  I have  added  little  or  nothing  to  this  criti- 
cism beyond  references  to  my  Dissertations  supplementary  of  Reid,  when  the  points 
under  discussion  are  there  more  fully  or  more  accurately  treated.] 


46 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


the  channel,  on  the  light  and  brilliant  wings  of  Voltaire’s  imagin- 
ation ; Sensualism  has  reigned  in  France,  without  contradiction, 
and  with  an  authority  of  which  there  is  no  parallel  in  the  whole 
history  of  philosophy.  It  is  a fact,  marvelous  but  incontestable, 
that  from  the  time  of  Condillac,  there  has  not  appeared  among  us 
any  philosophical  work,  at  variance  with  his  doctrine,  which  has 
produced  the  smallest  impression  on  the  public  mind.  Condillac 
thus  reigned  in  peace ; and  his  domination,  prolonged  even  to  our 
own  days,  through  changes  of  every  kind,  pursued  its  tranquil 
course,  apparently  above  the  reach  of  danger.  Discussion  had 
ceased : his  disciples  had  only  to  develop  the  words  of  their  mas- 
ter : philosophy  seemed  accomplished.” — ( Journal  des  Savans, 
1819.) 

Nor  would  such  a result  have  been  desirable,  had  the  one  ex- 
clusive opinion  been  true,  as  it  was  false — innocent,  as  it  was 
corruptive.  If  the  accomplishment  of  philosophy  imply  a cessa- 
tion of  discussion — if  the  result  of  speculation  be  a paralysis  of 
itself ; the  consummation  of  knowledge  is  the  condition  of  intel- 
lectual barbarism.  Plato  has  profoundly  defined  man,  “ the 
hunter  of  truth  for  in  this  chase,  as  in  others,  the  pursuit  is  all 
in  all,  the  success  comparatively  nothing.  “ Did  the  Almighty,” 
says  Lessing,  “holding  in  his  right  hand  Truth , and  in  his  left 
Search  after  Truth,  deign  to  proffer  me  the  one  I might  prefer ; 
— in  all  humility  but  without  hesitation,  I should  request — 
Search  after  Truth.”  We  exist  only  as  we  energize;  pleasure 
is  the  reflex  of  unimpeded  energy ; energy  is  the  mean  by  which 
our  faculties  are  developed ; and  a higher  energy  the  end  which 
their  development  proposes.  In  action  is  thus  contained  the 
existence,  happiness,  improvement,  and  perfection  of  our  being ; 
and  knowledge  is  only  precious,  as  it  may  afford  a stimulus  to 
the  exercise  of  our  powers,  and  the  condition  of  their  more  com- 
plete activity.  Speculative  truth  is,  therefore,  subordinate  to 
speculation  itself ; and  its  value  is  directly  measured  by  the  quan- 
tity of  energy  which  it  occasions — immediately  in  its  discovery 
— mediately  through  its  consequences.  Life  to  Endymion  was 
not  preferable  to  death ; aloof  from  practice,  a waking  error  is 
better  than  a sleeping  truth.  Neither,  in  point  of  fact,  is  there 
found  any  proportion  between  the  possession  of  truths,  and  the 
development  of  the  mind  in  which  they  are  deposited.  Every 
learner  in  science,  is  now  familiar  with  more  truths  than  Aris- 
totle or  Plato  ever  dreamt  of  knowing ; yet,  compared  with  the 


SPECULATION  HIGHER  THAN  SPECULATIVE  TRUTH.  47 

Stagirite  or  the  Athenian,  how  few,  among  our  masters  of  modern 
science,  rank  higher  than  intellectual  barbarians  ! Ancient  Greece 
and  modern  Europe  prove,  indeed,  that  “the  march  of  intellect” 
is  no  inseparable  concomitant  of  “ the  march  of  science  — that 
the  cultivation  of  the  individual  is  not  to  be  rashly  confounded 
with  the  progress  of  the  species. 

But  if  the  possession  of  theoretical  facts  be  not  convertible 
with  mental  improvement ; and  if  the  former  be  important  only 
as  subservient  to  the  latter  ; it  follows,  that  the  comparative 
utility  of  a study  is  not  to  be  principally  estimated  by  the  com- 
plement of  truths  which  it  may  communicate ; but  by  the  de- 
gree in  which  it  determines  our  higher  capacities  to  action.  But 
though  this  be  the  standard  by  which  the  different  methods, 
the  different  branches,  and  the  different  masters,  of  philosophy, 
ought  to  be  principally  (and  it  is  the  only  criterion  by  which 
they  can  all  be  satisfactorily)  tried ; it  is  neverthless  a standard 
by  which,  neither  methods,  nor  sciences,  nor  philosophers,  have 
ever  yet  been  even  inadequately  appreciated.  The  critical  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  in  this  spirit,  has  still  to  be  written  ; and 
when  written,  how  opposite  will  be  the  rank,  which,  on  the 
higher  and  more  certain  standard,  it  will  frequently  adjudge — to 
the  various  branches  of  knowledge,  and  the  various  modes  of 
their  cultivation — to  different  ages,  and  countries,  and  individu- 
als, from  that  which  has  been  hitherto  partially  awarded,  on  the 
vacillating  authority  of  the  lower  ! 

On  this  ground  (which  we  have  not  been  able  fully  to  state, 
far  less  adequately  to  illustrate),  we  rest  the  pre-eminent  utility 
of  metaphysical  speculations.  That  they  comprehend  all  the 
sublimest  objects  of  our  theoretical  and  moral  interest; — that 
every  (natural)  conclusion  concerning  God,  the  soul,  the  present 
worth,  and  the  future  destiny  of  man,  is  exclusively  metaphysi- 
cal, will  be  at  once  admitted.  But  we  do  not  found  the  import- 
ance, on  the  paramount  dignity,  of  the  pursuit.  It  is  as  the  best 
gymnastic  of  the  mind — as  a mean,  principally,  and  almost 
exclusively  conducive  to  the  highest  education  of  our  noblest 
powers,  that  we  would  vindicate  to  these  speculations  the  neces- 
sity, which  has  too  frequently  been  denied  them.  By  no  other 
intellectual  application  (and  least  of  all  by  physical  pursuits)  is 
the  soul  thus  reflected  on  itself,  and  its  faculties  concentered  in 
such  independent,  vigorous,  unwonted  and  continued  energy ; — 
by  none,  therefore,  are  its  best  capacities  so  variously  and  in- 


48 


PHILOSOPHY  OP  PERCEPTION. 


tensely  evolved.  “Where  there  is  most  life,  there  is  the  vic- 
tory.” 

Let  it  not  be  believed,  that  the  mighty  minds  who  have  culti- 
vated these  studies,  have  toiled  in  vain.  If  they  have  not  always 
realized  truth,  they  have  always  determined  exertion  ; and  in 
the  congenial  eloquence  of  the  elder  Scaliger: — “ Ese  subtilitates, 
quanquam  sint  animis  otiosis  otiosse  atque  inutiles ; vegetis 
tamen  ingeniis  summam  cognoscendi  afferunt  voluptatem — sitae, 
scilicet  in  fastigio  ejus  sapientiae,  quae  rerum  omnium  principia 
contemplatur.  Et  quamvis  harum  indagatio  non  sit  utilis  ad 
machinas  farinarias  conficiendas ; exuit  tamen  animum  inscitiae 
rubigine,  acuitque  ad  alia.  Eo  denique  splendore  afficit,  ut  prse- 
luceat  sibi  ad  nanciscendum  primi  opificis  similitudinem.  Q,ui, 
ut  omnia  plene  ac  perfecte  est,  at  praeter  et  supra  omnia ; ita 
eos,  qui  scientiarum  studiosi  sunt,  suos  esse  voluit,  ipsormnque 
intellectum  rerum  dominum  constituit.” 1 

The  practical  danger  which  has  sometimes  been  apprehended 
from  metaphysical  pursuits,  has  in  reality  only  been  found  to 
follow  from  their  stunted  and  partial  cultivation.  The  poison 
has  grown  up  ; the  antidote  has  been  repressed.  In  Britain  and 
in  Germany,  where  speculation  has  remained  comparatively  free, 
the  dominant  result  has  been  highly  favorable  to  religion  and 
morals  ; while  the  evils  which  arose  in  France,  arose  from  the 
benumbing  influence  of  a one  effete  philosophy ; and  have,  in 
point  of  fact,  mainly  been  corrected  by  the  awakened  spirit  of 
metaphysical  inquiry  itself. 

With  these  views,  we  rejoice,  as  we  said,  in  the  appearance 
of  this  translation  of  the  works  of  Reid — in  Paris — and  under 
the  auspices  of  so  distinguished  an  editor  as  M.  Jouffroy,  less, 
certainly,  as  indicating  the  triumph  of  any  particular  system  or 
school,  than  as  a pledge,  among  many  others,  of  the  zealous  yet 
liberal  and  unexclusive  spirit,  with  which  the  science  of  mind 
has  of  late  been  cultivated  in  France.  In  the  history  of  French 
philosophy,  indeed  the  last  ten  years  stand  in  the  most  remark- 
able contrast  to  the  hundred  immediately  preceding.  The  state 
of  thralldom  in  that  country  during  the  century  to  one  chronic 
despotism — perpetuating  itself  by  paralyzing  speculation,  in  ren- 

1 Bacon  himself,  the  great  champion  of  physical  pursuits  : — “Non  inutiles  sciential 
existimandre  sunt,  quarum  in  se  nullus  est  usus,  si  ingenia  acuant  et  ordinent.” — 
Hume,  Burke,  Kant,  Stewart,  &c.,  &c.,  might  be  quoted  to  the  same  effect. — Com- 
pare Aristotle,  Metaph.  i.  2;  Eth.  Nic.  x.  7. 


UTILITY  OF  METAPHYSICAL  STUDIES. 


49 


dering  its  objects,  objects  of  disgust — we  have  already  presented, 
in  a striking  passage,  written  by  M.  Cousin,  towa*rd  its  conclu- 
sion ; but  a very  different  picture  would  await  his  pencil,  were 
he  now  to  delineate  the  subsequent  progress  of  that  spirit  of  phi- 
losophy, to  whose  emancipation,  recovery,  and  exaltation,  during 
the  decade , he  has  himself  so  powerfully  contributed.  The  pres- 
ent contrast,  indeed,  which  the  philosophical  enthusiasm  of  France 
exhibits  to  the  speculative  apathy  of  Britain,  is  any  thing  but 
flattering  to  ourselves.  The  new  spirit  of  metaphysical  inquiry, 
which  the  French  imbibed  from  Germany  and  Scotland,  arose 
with  them  precisely  at  the  time  when  the  popularity  of  psycho- 
logical researches  began  to  decline  with  us  ; and  now,  when  all 
interest  in  these  speculations  seems  here  to  be  extinct,  they  are 
there  seen  flourishing,  in  public  favor,  with  a universality  and 
vigor  corresponding  to  their  encouragement. 

The  only  example,  indeed,  that  can  be  adduced  of  any  interest 
in  such  subjects,  recently  exhibited  in  this  country,  is  the  favor- 
able reception  of  Dr.  Brown’s  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Mind.  This  work,  however,  we  regard  as  a concurrent  cause  of 
the  very  indifference  we  lament,  and  as  a striking  proof  of  its 
reality. 

As  a cause  : — These  lectures  have  certainly  done  much  to  jus- 
tify the  general  neglect  of  psychological  pursuits.  Dr.  Brown’s 
high  reputation  for  metaphysical  acuteness,  gave  a presumptive 
authority  to  any  doctrine  he  might  promulgate  ; and  the  personal 
relations  in  which  he  stood  to  Mr.  Stewart  afforded  every  assur- 
ance, that  he  would  not  revolt  against  that  philosopher’s  opin- 
ions, rashly,  or  except  on  grounds  that  would  fully  vindicate  his 
dissent.  In  these  circumstances,  what  was  the  impression  on 
the  public  mind ; when  all  that  was  deemed  best  established — 
all  that  was  claimed  as  original  and  most  important  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  Reid  and  Stewart,  was  proclaimed  by  their  disciple 
and  successor  to  be  naught  hut  a series  of  misconceptions , only 
less  wonderful  in  their  commission  than  in  the  general  ac- 
quiescence in  their  truth  ! Confidence  was  at  once  withdrawn 
from  a pursuit,  in  which  the  most  sagacious  inquirers  were 
thus  at  fault ; and  the  few  who  did  not  relinquish  the  study  in 
despair,  clung  with  implicit  faith  to  the  revelation  of  the  new 
apostle. 

As  a proof: — These  lectures  afford  evidence  of  how  greatly 
talent  has,  of  late,  been  withdrawn  from  the  field  of  metaphysical 

D 


50 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


discussion.  This  work  has  now  been  before  the  world  for  ten 
years.  In  itself  it  combines  many  of  the  qualities  calculated  to 
attract  public,  and  even  popular,  attention  ; while  its  admirers 
have  exhausted  hyperbole  in  its  praise,  and  disparaged  every 
philosophic  name  to  exalt  the  reputation  of  its  author.  Yet, 
though  attention  has  been  thus  concentered  on  these  lectures  for 
so  long  a period,  and  though  the  high  ability  and  higher  au- 
thority of  Dr.  Brown,  deserved  and  would  have  recompensed  the 
labor  ; we  are  not  aware  that  any  adequate  attempt  has  yet  been 
made  to  subject  them,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  an  enlightened  and 
impartial  criticism.  The  radical  inconsistencies  which  they  in- 
volve, in  every  branch  of  their  subject,  remain  undeveloped  ; 
their  unacknowledged  appropriations  are  still  lauded  as  original ; 
their  endless  mistakes , in  the  history  of  philosophy,  stand  yet 
uiworrected  ; and  their  frequent  misrepresentations  of  other  philo- 
sophers continue  to  mislead.1  In  particular,  nothing  has  more 
convinced  us  of  the  general  neglect,  in  this  country,  of  psycholo- 
gical science,  than  that  Dr.  Brown’s  ignorant  attack  on  Reid , 
and,  through  Reid,  confessedly  on  Stewart , has  not  long  since 
been  repelled ; — except,  indeed,  the  general  belief  that  it  was  tri- 
umphant. 

In  these  circumstances,  we  felt  gratified,  as  we  said,  with  the 
present  honorable  testimony  to  the  value  of  Dr.  Reid’s  specula- 
tions in  a foreign  country ; and  have  deemed  this  a seasonable 
opportunity  of  expressing  our  own  opinion  on  the  subject,  and  of 
again  vindicating,  we  trust,  to  that  philosopher,  the  well-earned 
reputation  of  which  he  has  been  too  long  defrauded  in  his  own. 
If  we  are  not  mistaken  in  our  view,  we  shall,  in  fact,  reverse  the 
marvel,  and  retort  the  accusation ; in  proving  that  Dr.  Brown 

1 We  shall,  in  the  sequel,  afford  samples  of  these  “inconsistencies,”  “mistakes,” 
“misrepresentations,” — but  not  of  Brown’s  “appropriations.”  To  complete  the 
cycle,  and  vindicate  our  assertion,  we  may  here  adduce  one  specimen  of  the  way  in 
which  discoveries  have  been  lavished  on  him,  in  consequence  of  his  omission  (excus- 
able, perhaps,  in  the  circumstances)  to  advertise  his  pupils  when  he  was  not  original. 
Brown’s  doctrine  of  Generalization , is  identical  with  that  commonly  taught  by  philo- 
sophers— not  Scottish  ; and,  among  these,  by  authors,  with  whose  works  his  lectures 
prove  him  to  have  been  well  acquainted.  But  if  a writer,  one  of  the  best  informed  of 
those  who,  in  this  country,  have  of  late  cultivated  this  branch  of  philosophy,  could, 
among  other  expressions  equally  encomiastic,  speak  of  Brown’s  return  to  the  vulgar 
opinion,  on  such  a point,  as  of  “a  discovery,  <$-c.,  which  will  in  all  future  ages,  he  re- 
garded as  one  of  the  most  important  steps  ever  made  in  metaphysical  science how  in- 
competent must  ordinary  readers  be  to  place  Brown  on  his  proper  level — how  de- 
sirable would  have  been  a critical  examination  of  his  Lectures  to  distribute  to  him  his 
own,  and  to  estimate  his  property  at  its  true  value  : [See  Diss.  on  Reid,  pp.  868, 
869,  alibi.] 


BROWN’S  ATTACK  ON  REID. 


51 


himself  is  guilty  of  that  “ series  of  wonderful  misconceptions,” 
of  which  he  so  confidently  arraigns  his  predecessors. 

“Turpe  est  doctori,  cum  culpa  redarguit  ipsum.” 

This,  however,  let  it  he  recollected,  is  no  point  of  merely  per- 
sonal concernment.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  either  Reid  accom- 
plished nothing,  or  the  science  has  retrograded  under  Brown. 
But  the  question  itself  regards  the  cardinal  point  of  metaphysical 
philosophy ; and  its  determination  involves  the  proof  or  the  refu- 
tation of  skepticism. 

The  subject  we  have  undertaken  can  with  difficulty  he  com- 
pressed within  the  limits  of  a single  article.  This  must  stand  our 
excuse  for  not,  at  present,  noticing  the  valuable  accompaniment 
to  Reid’s  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  in  the  Fragments  of 
M.  Royer-Collard’s  Lectures,  which  are  appended  to  the  third 
and  fourth  volumes  of  the  translation.  A more  appropriate  occa- 
sion for  considering  these  may,  however,  occur,  when  the  first 
volume,  containing  M.  Jouffroy’s  Introduction,  appears ; of  which, 
from  other  specimens  of  his  ability,  we  entertain  no  humble 
expectations. 

“ Reid,”  says  Dr.  Brown,  “ considers  his  confutation  of  the 
ideal  system  as  involving  almost  every  thing  which  is  truly  his. 
Yet  there  are  few  circumstances  connected  with  the  fortune  of 
modern  philosophy,  that  appear  to  me  more  wonderful,  than  that 
a mind  like  Dr.  Reid’s,  so  learned  in  the  history  of  metaphysical 
science,  should  have  conceived,  that  on  this  point,  any  great 
merit,  at  least  any  merit  of  originality,  was  justly  referable  to 
him  particularly.  Indeed,  the  only  circumstance  which  appears 
to  me  wonderful,  is,  that  the  claim  thus  made  by  him  should 
have  been  so  readily  and  generally  admitted.”  (Led.  xxv.  p.  155.) 

Dr.  Brown  then  proceeds,  at  great  length,  to  show:  1°,  That 
Reid,  in  his  attempt  to  overthrow  what  he  conceived  “the  com- 
mon theory  of  ideas,”  wholly  misunderstood  the  catholic  opinion, 
which  was,  in  fact,  identical  with  his  own ; and  actually  attri- 
buted to  all  philosophers  “ a theory  which  had  been  universally, 
or,  at  least,  almost  universally,  abandoned  at  the  time  he  wrote 
and,  2°,  That  the  doctrine  of  perception,  which  Reid  so  absurdly 
fancies  he  had  first  established,  affords,  in  truth,  no  better  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  than  even  the  long 
abandoned  hypothesis  which  he  had  taken  such  idle  labor  to  re- 
fute. 


PHILOSOPHY  OP'  PERCEPTION. 


In  every  particular  of  this  statement,  Dr.  Brown  is  completely, 
and  even  curiously,  wrong.  He  is  out  in  his  prelusive  flourish — 
out  in  his  serious  assault.  Reid  is  neither  “ so  learned  in  the 
history  of  metaphysical  science”  as  he  verbally  proclaims,  nor  so 
sheer  an  ignorant  as  he  would  really  demonstrate.  Estimated 
by  aught  above  a very  vulgar  standard,  Reid’s  knowledge  of  phi- 
losophical opinions  was  neither  extensive  nor  exact;  and  Mr. 
Stewart  was  himself  too  competent  and  candid  a judge,  not  fully 
to  acknowledge  the  deficiency.1  But  Reid’s  merits  as  a thinker 
are  too  high,  and  too  securely  established,  to  make  it  necessary 
to  claim  for  his  reputation  an  erudition  to  which  he  himself  ad- 
vances no  pretension.  And,  be  his  learning  what  it  may,  his 
critic,  at  least,  has  not  been  able  to  convict  him  of  a single  error  ; 
while  Dr.  Brown  himself  rarely  opens  his  mouth  upon  the  older 
authors,  without  betraying  his  absolute  unacquaintance  with  the 
matters  on  which  he  so  intrepidly  discourses. — Nor,  as  a specu- 
lator, does  Reid’s  superiority  admit,  we  conceive,  of  doubt.  With 
all  admiration  of  Brown’s  general  talent,  we  do  not  hesitate  to 
assert,  that,  in  the  points  at  issue  between  the  two  philosophers, 
to  say  nothing  of  others,  he  has  completely  misapprehended  Reid's 
philosophy , even  in  its  fundamental  position — the  import  of  the 
skeptical  reasoning — and  the  significance  of  the  only  argument 
by  which  that  reasoning  is  resisted.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
Reid  can  only  be  defended  on  the.  ground  of  misconception,  the 
very  fact,  that  his  great  doctrine  of  perception  could  actually  be 
reversed  by  so  acute  an  intellect  as  Brown’s,  would  prove  that 
there  must  exist  some  confusion  and  obscurity  in  his  own  de- 
velopment of  that  doctrine,  to  render  such  a misinterpretation 
possible.  Nor  is  this  presumption  wrong.  In  truth,  Reid  did 
not  generalize  to  himself  an  adequate  notion  of  the  various  possi- 
ble theories  of  perception , some  of  which  he  has  accordingly  con- 
founded : while  his  error  of  commission  in  discriminating  con- 
sciousness as  a special  faculty,  and  his  error  of  omission  in  not 
discriminating  intuitive  from  representative  knowledge — a dis- 
tinction without  which  his  peculiar  philosophy  is  naught — have 
contributed  to  render  his  doctrine  of  the  intellectual  faculties 
prolix,  vacillating,  perplexed,  and  sometimes  even  contradictory. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  doctrine  of  perception  in  re- 
lation to  the  points  at  issue  between  Reid  and  his  antagonist,  it 

1 (Dissertation,  &c.  Part  ii  p.  197.)  [In  my  foot  notes  to  Reid  will  be  found 
abundant  evidence  of  this  deficiency.] 


CHARACTER  OE  BROWN’S  ATTACK. 


53 


is  therefore  necessary  to  disintricate  the  question,  by  relieving  it 
of  these  two  errors,  bad  in  themselves,  hut  worse  in  the  confu- 
sion which  they  occasion  ; for,  as  Bacon  truly  observes — “ citius 
emergit  veritas  ex  errore  quam  ex  confusione.”  And,  first,  of 
Consciousness. 

mdstotle,  Descartes,  Locke,  and  philosophers  in  general,  have 
regarded.  Consciousness,  not  as  a particular  faculty,  but  as  the 
universal  condition  of  intelligence.  Reid,  on  the  contrary,  fol- 
lowing, probably,  Hutcheson,  and  followed  by  Stewart,  Royer- 
Collard,  and  others,  has  classed  consciousness  as  a co-ordinate 
faculty  with  the  other  intellectual  powers  ; distinguished  from 
them,  not  as  the  species  from  the  individual,  but  as  the  individual 
from  the  individual.  And  as  the  particular  faculties  have  each 
their  peculiar  object,  so  the  peculiar  object  of  consciousness  is, 
the  operations  of  the  other  faculties  themselves , to  the  exclusion 
of  the  objects  about  which  these  operations  are  conversant. 

This  analysis  we  regard  as  false.  For  it  is  impossible  : in  the 
first  place,  to  discriminate  consciousness  from  all  the  other  cog- 
nitive faculties,  or  to  discriminate  any  one  of  these  from  con- 
sciousness ; and,  in  the  second , to  conceive  a faculty  cognisant 
of  the  various  mental  operations,  without  being  also  cognisant  of 
their  several  objects. 

We  know  ; and  We  know  that  ice  know  : — these  propositions, 
logically  distinct,  are  really  identical ; each  implies  the  other. 
We  know  (i.  e.  feel,  perceive,  imagine,  remember,  &c.)  only  as  we 
know  that  ice  thus  know ; and  we  know  that  ice  knoic,  only  as  we 
know  in  some  particular  manner  (i.  e.  feel , perceive , &c.).  So 
true  is  the  scholastic  brocard  : — “ Non  sentimus  nisi  sentiamus 
nos  sentire  ; non  sentimus  nos  sentire  nisi  sentiamus.'1' — The  at- 
tempt to  analyze  the  cognition  I know,  and  the  cognition  I knoic 
that  I know , into  the  separate  energies  of  distinct  faculties,  is 
therefore  vain.  But  this  is  the  analysis  of  Reid.  Consciousness, 
which  the  formula  I knoic  that  I know  adequately  expresses,  he 
views  as  a power  specifically  distinct  from  the  various  cognitive 
faculties  comprehended  under  the  formula  I know , precisely  as 
these  faculties  are  severally  contradistinguished  from  each  other. 
But  here  the  parallel  does  not  hold.  I can  feel  without  perceiv- 
ing, I can  perceive  without  imagining,  I can  imagine  without 
remembering,  I can  remember  without  judging  (in  the  emphatic 
signification),  I can  judge  without  willing.  One  of  these  acts 
does  not  immediately  suppose  the  other.  Though  modes  merely 


54 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


of  the  same  indivisible  subject,  they  are  modes  in  relation  to  each 
other , really  distinct,  and  admit,  therefore,  of  psychological  dis- 
crimination. But  can  I feel,  without  being  conscious  that  I feel? 
— can  I remember,  without  being  conscious  that  I remember? 
or,  can  I be  conscious,  without  being  conscious  that  I perceive, 
or  imagine,  or  reason — that  I energize,  in  short,  in  some  determ- 
inate mode,  which  Reid  would  view  as  the  act  of  a faculty  spe- 
cifically different  from  consciousness  ? That  this  is  impossible, 
Reid  himself  admits.  “ Unde,”  says  Tertullian — “ unde  ista 
tormenta  cruciandse  simplicitatis  et  suspendendse  veritatis  ? Q,uis 
mihi  exhibebit  sensum  non  intelligentem  se  sentire  ?” — But  if, 
on  the  one  hand,  consciousness  be  only  realized  under  specific 
modes,  and  can  not  therefore  exist  apart  from  the  several  facul- 
ties in  cumulo ; and  if,  on  the  other,  these  faculties  can  all  and 
each  only  be  exerted  under  the  condition  of  consciousness  ; con- 
sciousness, consequently,  is  not  one  of  the  special  modes  into 
which  our  mental  activity  may  be  resolved,  but  the  fundamental 
form — the  generic  condition  of  them  all.  Every  intelligent  act 
is  thus  a modified  consciousness  ; and  consciousness  a compre- 
hensive term  for  the  complement  of  our  cognitive  energies. 

But  the  vice  of  Ur.  Reid’s  analysis  is  further  manifested  in  his 
arbitrary  limitation  of  the  sphere  of  consciousness ; proposing  to 
it  the  various  intellectual  operations,  but  excluding  their  objects. 
“I  am  conscious,”  he  says,  “of  perception,  but  not  of  the  object 
I perceive;  I am  conscious  of  memory,  but  not  of  the  object  I 
remember.” 

The  reduction  of  consciousness  to  a particular  faculty  entailed 
this  limitation.  For,  once  admitting  consciousness  to  be  cogni- 
sant of  objects  as  of  operations , Reid  could  not,  without  absurdity, 
degrade  it  to  the  level  of  a special  power.  For  thus,  in  the  first 
place,  consciousness  co-extensive  with  all  our  cognitive  faculties, 
would  yet  be  made  co-ordinate  with  each : and,  in  the  second , two 
faculties  would  be  supposed  to  be  simultaneously  exercised  about 
the  same  object,  to  the  same  intent. 

But  the  alternative  which  Reid  has  chosen  is,  at  least,  equally 
untenable.  The  assertion,  that  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  act  of 
knowledge,  without  being  conscious  of  its  object,  is  virtually 
suicidal.  A mental  operation  is  only  what  it  is,  by  relation  to 
its  object;  the  object  at  once  determining  its  existence,  and  spe- 
cifying the  character  of  its  existence.  But  if  a relation  can  not 
be  comprehended  in  one  of  its  terms,  so  we  can  not  be  conscious 


CONSCIOUSNESS  NOT  A SPECIAL  FACULTY. 


55 


of  an  operation,  without  being  conscious  of  the  object  to  which 
it  exists  only  as  correlative.  For  example,  we  are  conscious  of  a 
perception,  says  Reid,  hut  are  not  conscious  of  its  object.  Yet 
how  can  we  be  conscious  of  a perception , that  is,  how  can  we 
know  that  a perception  exists — that  it  is  a perception,  and  not 
another  mental  state — and  that  it  is  the  perception  of  a rose,  and 
of  nothing  but  a rose ; unless  this  consciousness  involve  a knowl- 
edge (or  consciousness)  of  the  object,  which  at  once  determines 
the  existence  of  the  act — specifies  its  kind — and  distinguishes  its 
individuality?  Annihilate  the  object,  you  annihilate  the  opera- 
tion; annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  you  annihilate 
the  consciousness  of  the  operation.  In  the  greater  number  indeed 
of  our  cognitive  energies,  the  two  terms  of  the  relation  of  knowl- 
edge exist  only  as  identical;  the  object  admitting  only  of  a logical 
discrimination  from  the  subject.  I imagine  a Hippogryph.  The 
Hippogryph  is  at  once  the  object  of  the  act  and  the  act  itself. 
Abstract  the  one,  the  other  has  no  existence : deny  me  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  Hippogryph,  you  deny  me  the  consciousness  of 
the  imagination ; I am  conscious  of  zero ; I am  not  conscious  at 
all. 

A difficulty  may  here  be  started  in  regard  to  two  faculties — 
Memory  and  Perception. 

Memory  is  defined  by  Reid  “an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
past and  is  thus  distinguished  from  consciousness,  which,  with 
all  philosophers,  he  views  as  “an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
present .”  We  may  therefore  be  conscious  of  the  act  of  memory 
as  present,  but  of  its  object  as  past,  consciousness  is  impossible. 
And  certainly,  if  Reid’s  definition  of  memory  be  admitted,  this 
inference  can  not  be  disallowed.  But  memory  is  not  an  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  the  past ; an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past 
is  a contradiction  in  terms.  This  is  manifest,  whether  we  look 
from  the  act  to  the  object,  or  from  the  object  to  the  act.  To  be 
known  immediately , an  object  must  be  known  in  itself ; to  be 
known  in  itself,  it  must  be  known  as  actual,  now  existent,  present. 
But  the  object  of  memory  is  past — not  present,  not  now  existent, 
not  actual ; it  can  not  therefore  be  known  in  itself.  If  known  at 
all,  it  must  be  known  in  something  different  from  itself;  i.  e. 
mediately;  and  memory  as  an  “ immediate  knowledge  of  the 
past,”  is  thus  impossible.  Again:  memory  is  an  act  of  knowl- 
edge; an  act  exists  only  as  present;  and  a present  knowledge 
can  be  immediately  cognisant  only  of  a present  object.  But  the 


56 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


object  known  in  memory  is  past ; consequently,  either  memory  is 
not  an  act  of  knowledge  at  all,  or  the  object  immediately  known 
is  present;  and  the  past,  if  known,  is  known  only  through  the 
medium  of  the  present ; on  either  alternative  memory  is  not  “an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  past?''  Thus,  memory,  like  our  other 
faculties,  affords  only  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  present; 
and,  like  them,  is  nothing  more  than  consciousness  variously 
modified.1 

In  regard  to  Perception : Reid  allows  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  the  affections  of  the  subject  of  thought,  mind,  or  self,  and  an 
immediate  knoivledge  of  the  qualities  of  an  object  really  different 
from  self — matter.  To  the  former,  he  gives  the  name  of  con- 
sciousness, to  the  latter,  that  of  perception.  Is  consciousness,  as 
an  immediate  knowledge,  'purely  subjective , not  to  be  discrimin- 
ated from  perception,  as  an  immediate  knowledge,  really  objective  ? 
A logical  difference  we  admit ; a psychological  we  deny. 

Relatives  are  known  only  together : the  science  of  opposites  is 
one.  Subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  are  known  only  in 
correlation  and  contrast — and  by  the  same  common  act:  while 
knowledge,  as  at  once  a synthesis  and  an  antithesis  of  both,  may 
be  indifferently  defined  an  antithetic  synthesis,  or  a synthetic 
antithesis  of  its  terms.  Every  conception  of  self,  necessarily  in- 
volves a conception  of  not-self:  every  perception  of  what  is  dif- 
ferent from  me,  implies  a recognition  of  the  percipient  subject 
in  contradistinction  from  the  object  perceived.  In  one  act  of 
knowledge,  indeed,  the  object  is  the  prominent  element,  in  an- 
other the  subject;  but  there  is  none  in  which  either  is  known 
out  of  relation  to  the  other.  The  immediate  knowledge  which 
Reid  allows  of  things  different  from  the  mind,  and  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  mind  itself,  can  not  therefore  be  split  into  two 
distinct  acts.  In  perception,  as  in  the  other  faculties,  the  same 
indivisible  consciousness  is  conversant  about  both  terms  of  the 


1 The  only  parallel  we  know  to  this  misconception  of  Reid’s  is  the  opinion  on  which 
Fromondus  animadverts.  “In  primis  displicet  nobis  plurimorum  recentiorum  philoso- 
phia,  qui  sensuum  interiorum  operationes,  ut  phantasiationem.  memorationem,  et  re- 
miniscentiarn,  circa  imagines,  recenter  aut  olim  spiritibus  vel  cerebro  impressas,  versari 
negant ; scd  proximo  circa  objecta  qua  foris  sunt.  Ut  cum  quis  meminit  se  vidissc 
leporem  currentem  ; memoria,  mquiunt,  non  intuetur  et  attingit  imaginem  leporis  in 
cerebro  asservatam,  sed  socum  leporem  ipsum  qui  cursu  trajiciebat  campum,  &c.  &c.” 
( Philosophia  Christiana  de  Anima  Lovanii,  1649.  L.  iii.  c.  8.  art.  8.)  Who  the 
advocates  of  this  opinion  were,  we  are  ignorant ; but  more  than  suspect  that,  as  stated, 
it  is  only  a misrepresentation  of  the  Cartesian  doctrine,  then  on  the  ascendant.  [Lord 
Monboddo  has,  however,  a doctrine  of  the  sort.] 


CONSCIOUSNESS. 


57 


relation  of  knowledge.  Distinguish  the  cognition  of  the  subject 
from  the  cognition  of  the  object  of  perception,  and  you  either 
annihilate  the  relation  of  knowledge  itself,  which  exists  only  in 
its  terms  being  comprehended  together  in  the  unity  of  conscious- 
ness ; or  you  must  postulate  a higher  faculty,  which  shall  again 
reduce  to  one  the  two  cognitions  you  have  distinguished — that  is, 
you  are  at  last  compelled  to  admit,  in  an  unphilosophical  com- 
plexity, that  common  consciousness  of  subject  and  object,  which 
you  set  out  with  denying  in  its  philosophical  simplicity.  Con- 
sciousness and  immediate  knowledge  are  thus  terms  universally 
convertible ; and  if  there  be  an  immediate  knowledge  of  things 
external,  there  is  consequently  the  consciousness  of  an  outer  world? 

Reid’s  erroneous  analysis  of  consciousness  is  not  perhaps  of  so 
much  importance  in  itself,  as  from  causing  confusion  in  its  con- 
sequences. Had  he  employed  this  term  as  tantamount  to  imme- 
diate knowledge  in  general,  whether  of  self  or  not,  and  thus  dis- 
tinctly expressed  what  he  certainly  [?]  taught , that  mind  and 
matter  are  both  equally  known  to  us  as  existent  and  in  themselves  ; 
Dr.  Brown  could  hardly  have  so  far  misconceived  his  doctrine,  as 
actually  to  lend  him  the  very  opinion  which  his  whole  philosophy 
was  intended  to  refute,  viz.  that  an  immediate , and  consequently 
a real , knowledge  of  external  things  is  impossible.  But  this  by 
anticipation. 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  error — the  non-distinction  of  repre- 


1 How  correctly  Aristotle,  reasoned  on  this  subject,  may  be  seen  from  the  following 
passage:  “When  we  perceive  ( aladavopeBa ”■ — the  Greeks,  perhaps  fortunately,  had 

no  special  term  for  consciousness) — .“when  we  perceive  that  we  see,  hear,  &c.,  it  is 
necessary,  that  by  sight  itself  we  perceive  that  we  see,  or  by  another  sense.  If  by 
another  sense,  then  this  also  must  be  a sense  of  sight,  conversant  equally  about  the 
object  of  sight,  color.  Consequently,  there  must  either  be  two  senses  of  the  same 
object,  or  every  sense  must  be  percipient  of  itself.  Moreover,  if  the  sense  percipient 
of  sight  be  different  from  sight  itself,  it  follows,  either  that  there  is  a regress  to  infinity, 
or  we  must  admit,  at  last,  some  sense  percipient  of  itself ; but  if  so,  it  is  more  reason- 
able to  admit  this  in  the  original  sense  at  once.”  ( Dc  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  2,  text.  136.) 
Here  Aristotle  ought  not  to  be  supposed  to  mean  that  every  sense  is  an  independent 
faculty  of  perception,  and,  as  such,  conscious  of  itself.  Compare  Be  Som.  et  Vig.  c. 
2,  and  Probl.  (if  indeed  his)  sect.  xi.  ()  33.  His  older  commentators — Alexander, 
Themistius,  Simplicius — follow  their  master.  Philoponus  and  Michael  Ephesius  de- 
sert his  doctrine,  and  attribute  this  self-consciousness  to  a peculiar  faculty  which  they 
call  Attention  (to  TcpoaeKTiKov.)  This  is  the  earliest  example  we  know  of  this  false 
analysis,  which,  when  carried  to  the  last  absurdity,  has  given  us  co?isciousness,  and 
attention,  and  reflection,  as  distinct  powers.  Of  the  schoolmen,  satius  est  silere,  quam 
parum  dicere.  Nemesius,  and  Plutarchus  of  Athens  preserved  by  Philoponus,  accord 
this  reflex  consciousness  to  intellect  as  opposed  to  sense.  Plato  varies  in  his  Thestetus 
and  Charmides.  [Some,  however,  of  the  Greek  commentators  on  Aristotle,  as  I have 
elsewhere  observed,  introduced  the  term  2vvclcrSrio-is,  employing  it,  by  extension,  for 
consciousness  in  general.] 


58 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


sentative  from  presentative  or  intuitive  knowledge.1  The  reduc- 
tion of  consciousness  to  a special  faculty  involved  this  confusion. 
For  had  Reid  perceived  that  all  our  faculties  are  only  conscious- 
ness, and  that  consciousness  as  an  immediate  knowledge  is  only 
of  the  present  and  actual,  he  would  also  have  discovered  that  the 
past  and  possible  either  could  not  be  known  to  us  at  all,  or  could 
be  known  only  in  and  through  the  present  and  actual — i.  e.  me- 
diately. But  a mediate  knowledge  is  necessarily  a representative 
knowledge.  For  if  the  present,  or  actual  in  itself,  makes  known 
to  us  the  past  and  possible  through  itself,  this  can  only  be  done 
by  a vicarious  substitution  or  representation.  And  as  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  past  is  given  in  memory  (using  that  term  in  its  vulgar 
universality),  and  that  of  the  possible  in  imagination , these  two 
faculties  are  powers  of  representative  knowledge.  Memory  is  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  a present  thought,  involving  an  absolute 
belief  that  this  thought  represents  another  act  of  knowledge  that 
has  been.  Imagination  (which  we  use  in  its  widest  signification, 
to  include  conception  or  simple  apprehension)  is  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  an  actual  thought,  which,  as  not  subjectively  self- 
contradictory (i.  e.  logically  possible),  involves  the  hypothetical 
belief  that  it  objectively  may  be  (i.  e.  is  really  possible). 

Nor  is  philosophy  here  at  variance  with  nature.  The  learned 
and  unlearned  agree,  that  in  memory  and  imagination,  naught  of 
which  we  are  conscious  lies  beyond  the  sphere  of  self,  and  that 
in  these  acts  the  object  known  is  only  relative  to  a reality  sup- 
posed to  be.  Nothing  but  Reid’s  superstitious  horror  of  the  ideal 
theory  could  have  blinded  him  so  far  as  not  to  see  that  these 
faculties  are,  of  necessity,  mediate  and  representative.  In  this, 
however,  he  not  only  over-shot  the  truth,  but  almost  frustrated 
his  whole  philosophy.  For  he  thus  affords  a ground  (and  the  only 
ground,  though  not  perceived  by  Brown),  on  which  it  could  be  ar- 
gued that  his  doctrine  of  perception  was  not  intuitive — was  not  pre- 
sentative. For  if  he  reject  the  doctrine  of  ideas  not  less  in  mem- 
ory and  imagination,  which  must  be  representative  faculties,  than 
in  perception,  which  may  be  intuitive,  and  if  he  predicate  imme- 
diate knowledge  equally  of  all ; — it  can  plausibly  be  contended, 
in  favor  of  Brown’s  conclusion,  that  Reid  did  not  really  intend  to 
allow  a proper  intuitive  or  presentative  perception,  and  that  he 
only  abusively  gave  the  name  of  immediate  knowledge  to  the 


[See  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  804-815.] 


REPRESENTATIVE  AND  PRESENTATIVE  KNOWLEDGE. 


59 


simplest  form  of  the  representative  theory,  in  contradistinction 
to  the  more  complex.  But  this  also  hy  anticipation. 

There  exists,  therefore,  a distinction  of  knowledge — as  imme- 
diate, intuitive , or  presentative , and  as  mediate  or  representative. 
The  former  is  logically  simple , as  only  contemplative : the  latter 
logically  complex,  as  both  representative,  and  contemplative  of 
the  representation.  In  the  one,  the  object  is  single , and  the  word 
univoeal : in  the  other  it  is  double,  and  the  term  equivocal ; the 
object  known  and  representing,  being  different  from  the  object 
unknown  and  represented.  The  knowledge  in  an  intuitive  act, 
as  convertible  with  existence,  is  assertory ; and  the  reality  of  its 
only  object  is  given  unconditionally,  as  a fact:  the  knowledge  in 
a representative  act,  as  not  convertible  with  existence,  is  problem- 
atical; and  the  reality  of  its  principal  object  is  given  hypothet- 
ically, as  an  inference.  Representative  knowledge  is  purely  sub- 
jective, for  its  object  known  is  always  ideal;  presentative  may 
be  either  subjective  or  objective,  for  its  one  object  may  be  either 
ideal  or  material.  Considered  in  themselves  : an  intuitive  cogni- 
tion is  complete,  as  absolute  and  irrespective  of  aught  beyond 
the  compass  of  knowledge ; a representative  incomplete,  as  rela- 
tive to  a transcendent  something,  beyond  the  sphere  of  conscious- 
ness. Considered  in  relation  to  their  objects:  the  former  is  com- 
plete, its  object  being  known  and  real ; the  latter  incomplete,  its 
object  known,  being  unreal,  and  its  real  object  unknown.  Con- 
sidered in  relation  to  each  other:  immediate  knowledge  is  com- 
plete, as  all-sufficient  in  itself ; mediate  incomplete,  as  realized 
only  through  the  other.1 

So  far  there  is  no  difficulty,  or  ought  to  have  been  none.  The 
past  and  possible  can  only  be  known  mediately  by  representa- 
tion. But  a more  arduous,  at  least  a more  perplexed,  question 

1 This  distinction  of  intuitive  or  presentative  and  of  representative  knowledge,  over- 
looked, or  rather  abolished,  in  the  theories  of  modern  philosophy,  is  correspondent  to 
the  division  of  knowledge  by  certain  of  the  schoolmen,  into  intuitive  and  abstractive. 
By  the  latter  term,  they  also  expressed  abstract  knowledge  in  its  present  signification. 
“ Cognitio  intuitiva ,”  says  the  Doctor  Resolutissimus,  “ est  ilia  qute  immediate  tendit 
ad  rem  sibi  prcescntem  objective,  secundum  ejus  actualem  existentiam ; sicut  cum  video 
colorem  existentem  in  pariete,  vel  rosam,  quam  in  manu  teneo.  Abslractiva,  dicitur 
omnis  cognitio,  quaa  habetur  de  re  non  sic  realiter  proesmte  in  ratione,  objecti  imme- 
diate cogniti.”  Now,  when  with  a knowledge  of  this  distinction  of  which  Reid  was 
ignorant,  and  rejecting  equally  with  him  not  only  species,  but  a representative  per- 
ception, we  say  that  many  of  the  schoolmen  have,  in  this  respect,  left  behind  them  all 
modern  philosophers  ; we  assert  a paradox,  but  one  which  we  are  easily  able  to  prove. 
Leibnitz  spoke  truly,  when  he  said  : “ Aurum  latere  in  stercore  illo  scholastico  bar- 
bariei [See  Diss.  on  Reid,  pp.  804-815.] 


60 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


arises,  when  we  ask  : Is  all  knowledge  of  the  present  or  actual 
intuitive  ? Is  the  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter  equally  im- 
mediate ? 

In  regard  to  the  immediate  knowledge  of  mind , there  is  now  at 
least  no  difficulty  ; it  is  admitted  not  to  he  representative.  The 
problem,  therefore,  exclusively  regards  the  intuitive  perception 
of  the  qualities  of  matter. 

(To  obviate  misapprehension,  we  may  here  parenthetically  ob- 
serve, that  all  we  do  intuitively  know  of  self — all  that  we  may 
intuitively  know  of  not-self,  is  only  relative.  Existence  absolute- 
ly and  in  itself , is  to  us  as  zero ; and  while  nothing  is,  so  nothing 
is  known  to  us,  except  those  phases  of  being  which  stand  in 
analogy  to  our  faculties  of  knowledge.  These  we  call  qualities , 
phenomena, properties,  &c.  When  we  say,  therefore,  that  a thing 
is  known  in  itself,  we  mean  only,  that  it  stands  face  to  face,  in 
direct  and  immediate  relation  to  the  conscious  mind ; in  other 
words,  that,  as  existing,  its  phenomena  form  part  of  the  circle 
of  our  knowledge — exist,  since  they  are  known,  and  are  known, 
because  they  exist.) 

If  we  interrogate  consciousness  concerning  the  point  in  ques- 
tion, the  response  is  categorical  and  clear.  When  I concentrate 
my  attention  in  the  simplest  act  of  perception,  I return  from  my 
observation  with  the  most  irresistible  conviction  of  two  facts,  or 
rather,  two  branches  of  the  same  fact ; — that  I am — and  that 
something  different  from  me  exists.  In  this  act,  I am  conscious 
of  myself  as  the  perceiving  subject,  and  of  an  external  reality  as 
the  object  perceived ; and  I am  conscious  of  both  existences  in 
the  same  indivisible  moment  of  intuition.  The  knowledge  of  the 
subject  does  not  precede  nor  follow  the  knowledge  of  the  object ; 
— neither  determines,  neither  is  determined  by,  the  other.  The 
two  terms  of  correlation  stand  in  mutual  counterpoise  and  equal 
independence  ; they  are  given  as  connected  in  the  synthesis  of 
knowledge,  but  as  contrasted  in  the  antithesis  of  existence. 

Such  is  the  fact  of  perception  revealed  in  consciousness,  and 
as  it  determines  mankind  in  general  in  their  equal  assurance  of 
the  reality  of  an  external  world,  and  of  the  existence  of  their  own 
minds.  Consciousness  declares  our  knowledge  of  material  quali- 
ties to  be  intuitive.  Nor  is  the  fact,  as  given,  denied  even  by 
those  who  disallow  its  truth.  So  clear  is  the  deliverance,  that 
even  the  philosophers  (as  we  shall  hereafter  see)  who  reject  an 
intuitive  perception,  find  it  impossible  not  to  admit,  that  their 


SIX  SCHEMES  OF  PERCEPTION  AND  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  01 

doctrine  stands  decidedly  opposed  to  the  voice  of  consciousness 
and  the  natural  conviction  of  mankind.  [This  doctrine  is,  how- 
ever, to  he  asserted,  only  in  subordination  to  the  distinction  of 
the  Primary , Secundo-primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  Mat- 
ter. See  Diss.  on  Reid,  p.  845-874.] 

According  as  the  truth  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  percep- 
tion is  entirely  accepted,  accepted  in  part , or  'wholly  rejected,  six 
possible  and  actual  systems  of  philosophy  result.  We  say  ex- 
plicitly— the  truth  of  the  fact.  For  the  fact,  as  a phenomenon 
of  consciousness,  can  not  be  doubted;  since  to  doubt  that  we  are 
conscious  of  this  or  that,  is  impossible.  The  doubt,  as  itself  a 
phenomenon  of  consciousness,  would  annihilate  itself.  [See  Diss. 
on  Reid,  p.  816-819.] 

1.  If  the  veracity  of  consciousness  be  unconditionally  admit- 
ted— if  the  intuitive  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter,  and  the 
consequent  reality  of  their  antithesis  be  taken  as  truths,  to  be 
explained  if  possible,  but  in  themselves  are  held  as  paramount 
to  all  doubt,  the  doctrine  is  established  which  we  would  call  the 
scheme  of  Natural  Realism  or  Natural  Dualism. — 2.  If  the  ve- 
racity of  consciousness  be  allowed  to  the  equipoise  of  the  object 
and  subject  in  the  act,  but  rejected  as  to  the  reality  of  their  an- 
tithesis, the  system  of  Absolute  Identity  emerges,  which  reduces 
both  mind  and  matter  to  phenomenal  modifications  of  the  same 
common  substance. — 3 and  4.  If  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
be  refused  to  the  co-originality  and  reciprocal  independence  of 
the  subject  and  object,  two  schemes  are  determined,  according 
as  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  terms  is  placed  as  the  original  and 
genetic.  Is  the  object  educed  from  the  subject,  Idealism ; is  the 
subject  educed  from  the  object,  Materialism , is  the  result. — 5. 
Again,  is  the  consciousness  itself  recognized  only  as  a phenom- 
enon, and  the  substantial  reality  of  both  subject  and  object  de- 
nied, the  issue  is  Nihilism. 

6.  These  systems  are  all  conclusions  from  an  original  inter- 
pretation of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  perception,  carried  in- 
trepidly forth  to  its  legitimate  issue.  But  there  is  one  scheme, 
which,  violating  the  integrity  of  this  fact,  and,  with  the  complete 
idealist,  regarding  the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception  as 
only  a modification  of  the  percipient  subject,  or,  at  least,  a phe- 
nomenon numerically  different  from  the  object  it  represents — 
endeavors,  however,  to  stop  short  of  the  negation  of  an  external 
world,  the  reality  of  which,  and  the  knowledge  of  whose  reality, 


62 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


it  seeks  by  various  hypotheses,  to  establish  and  explain.  This 
scheme,  which  we  would  term  Cosmothetic  Idealism , Hypothet- 
ical Realism,  or  Hypothetical  Dualism — although  the  most  in- 
consequent of  all  systems,  has  been  embraced,  under  various 
forms,  by  the  immense  majority  of  philosophers. 

Of  these  systems,  Dr.  Brown  adheres  to  the  last.  He  holds 
that  the  mind  is  conscious  or  immediately  cognizant  of  nothing 
beyond  its  subjective  states ; but  he  assumes  the  existence  of  an 
external  world  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  exclusively  on 
the  ground  of  our  irresistible  belief  in  its  unknown  reality.  In- 
dependent of  this  belief,  there  is  no  reasoning  on  which  the  exist- 
ence of  matter  can  be  vindicated  ; the  logic  of  the  idealist  he  ad- 
mits to  be  unassailable. 

But  Brown  not  only  embraces  the  scheme  of  hypothetical  real- 
ism himself,  he  never  suspects  that  Reid  entertained  any  other 
doctrine.  Brown’s  transmutation  of  Reid  from  a natural  to  a 
hypothetical  realist,  as  a misconception  of  the  grand  and  dis- 
tinctive tenet  of  a school,  by  one  even  of  its  disciples,  is  without 
a parallel  in  the  whole  history  of  philosophy  : and  this  portentous 
error  is  prolific ; chimcera  chimceram  parit.  Were  the  evidence 
of  the  mistake  less  unambiguous,  we  should  be  disposed  rather  to 
question  our  own  perspicacity,  than  to  tax  so  subtle  an  intellect 
with  so  gross  a blunder. 

Before  establishing  against  his  antagonist  the  true  opinion  of 
Reid,  it  will  be  proper  first  to  generalize  the  possible  forms,  under 
which  the  hypothesis  of  a representative  perception  can  be  realized, 
as  a confusion  of  some  of  these  as  actually  held,  on  the  part  both 
of  Reid  and  Brown,  has  tended  to  introduce  no  small  confusion 
into  the  discussion. 

The  hypothetical  realist  contends,  that  he  is  wholly  ignorant 
of  things  in  themselves,  and  that  these  are  known  to  him,  only 
through  a vicarious  phenomenon,  of  which  he  is  conscious  in  per- 
ception ; 

“ Rerumqae  ignarus,  Imagine  gaudet.” 

In  other  words,  that  the  object  immediately  known  and  represent- 
ing is  numerically  different  from  the  object  really  existing  and 
represented.  Now  this  vicarious  phenomenon,  or  immediate  ob- 
ject, must  either  be  numerically  different  from  the  percipient 
intellect,  or  a modification  of  that  intellect  itself.  If  the  latter, 
it  must,  again,  either  be  a modification  of  the  thinking  substance, 


REID’S  DOCTRINE  OF  PERCEPTION. 


63 


with  a transcendent  existence  "beyond  the  act  of  thought,  or  a 
modification  identical  with  the  act  of  perception  itself. 

All  possible  forms  of  the  representative  hypothesis  are  thus 
reduced  to  three,  and  these  have  all  been  actually  maintained. 

1.  The  representative  object  not  a modification  of  mind. 

2.  The  representative  object  a modification  of  mind , dependent 

for  its  apprehension , but  not  for  its  existence , on  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness. - — 

3.  The  representative  object  a modification  of  mind , non-exist- 

ent out  of  consciousness  ; — the  idea  and  its  perception  only  dif- 
ferent relations  of  an  act  [state)  really  identical.  — 

In  the  first , the  various  opinions  touching  the  nature  and  origin 
of  the  representative  object ; whether  material,  immaterial,  or  be- 
tween both ; whether  physical  or  hyperphysical ; whether  propa- 
gated from  the  external  object  or  generated  in  the  medium ; wheth- 
er fabricated  by  the  intelligent  soul,  or  in  the  animal  life : whether 
infused  by  God,  or  angels,  or  identical  with  the  divine  substance : 
— these  afford  in  the  history  of  philosophy  so  many  subordinate 
modifications  of  this  form  of  the  hypothesis. — In  the  tivo  latter , the 
subaltern  theories  have  been  determined  by  the  difficulty  to  con- 
nect the  representation  with  the  reality,  in  a relation  of  causal 
dependence;  and  while  some  philosophers  have  left  it  altogether 
unexplained,  the  others  have  been  compelled  to  resort  to  the  hy- 
perphysical theories  of  divine  assistance  and  a pre-established  har- 
mony.— Under  the  second , opinions  have  varied,  whether  the  repre- 
sentative object  be  innate  or  factitious.  [See  Diss.  p.  817-819.] 

The  third  of  these  forms  of  representation  Reid  does  not  seem 
to  have  understood.  The  illusion  which  made  him  view,  in  his 
doctrine,  memory  and  imagination  as  powers  of  immediate  knowl- 
edge, though  only  representative  faculties,  under  the  third  form, 
has,  in  the  history  of  opinions  regarding  perception,  puzzled  him, 
as  we  shall  see,  in  his  exposition  of  the  doctrine  of  Arnauld.  He 
was  not  aware  that  there  was  a theory,  neither  identical  with  an 
intuitive  perception,  nor  with  the  first  or  second  form  of  the  repre- 
sentative hypothesis  ; with  both  of  which  he  was  sufficiently  ac- 
quainted.— Dr.  Brown,  on  the  contrary,  who  adopts  the  third  and 
simplest  modification  of  that  hypothesis,  appears  ignorant  of  its 
discrimination  from  the  second ; and  accordingly  views  the  phi- 
losophers who  held  this  latter  form,  as  not  distinguished  in  opin- 
ion from  himself.  Of  the  doctrine  of  intuition  he  does  not  seem 
almost  to  have  conceived  the  possibility. 


64 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


These  being  premised,  we  proceed  to  consider  the  greatest  of 
all  Brown’s  errors,  in  itself  and  in  its  consequences — his  miscon- 
ception of  the  cardinal  position  of  Reid’s  philosophy,  in  supposing 
that  philosopher  as  a hypothetical  realist,  to  hold  with  himself  the 
third  form  of  the  representative  hypothesis,  and  not,  as  a natural 
realist,  the  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  perception.  "We  are  compelled 
to  he  brief ; and  to  complete  the  evidence  of  the  following  proof 
(if  more  indeed  he  required),  we  must  beg  our  readers,  interested 
in  the  question,  to  look  up  the  passages,  to  which  we  are  able 
only  to  refer.  [See  Diss.  on  Reid,  p.  819-824.  The  pages  of  the 
original  editions  here  referred  to  are  there  marked.] 

In  the  first  place,  knowledge  and  existence  are  then  only  con- 
vertible when  the  reality  is  known  in  itself ; for  then  only  can 
we  say,  that  it  is  known  because  it  exists,  and  exists  since  it  is 
known.  And  this  constitutes  an  immediate , presentalive , or  in- 
tuitive cognition,  rigorously  so  called. — Nor  did  Reid  contemplate 
any  other.  “ It  seems  admitted,”  he  says,  “ as  a first  principle, 
by  the  learned  and  the  unlearned,  that  what  is  really  perceived 
must  exist,  and  that  to  perceive  what  does  not  exist  is  impossible. 
So  far  the  unlearned  man  and  the  philosopher  agree.” — ( Essays 
on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  142.) 

In  the  second  place,  philosophers  agree,  that  the  idea  or  repre- 
sentative object  in  their  theory,  is  in  the  strictest  sense  immedi- 
ately perceived. — And  so  Reid  understands  them.  “I  perceive 
not,”  says  the  Cartesian,  “the  external  object  itself;”  (so  far  he 
agrees  with  the  Peripatetic,  and  differs  from  the  unlearned  man;) 
“ but  I perceive  an  image,  or  form,  or  idea,  in  my  own  mind,  or 
in  my  brain.  I am  certain  of  the  existence  of  the  idea;  because 
I immediately  perceive  it .”  (L.  c.) 

In  the  third  p>lace,  philosophers  concur  in  acknowledging,  that 
mankind  at  large  believe,  that  the  external  reality  itself  consti- 
tutes the  immediate  and  only  object  of  perception. — So  also  Reid. 
“ On  the  same  principle,  the  unlearned  man  says,  I perceive  the 
external  object,  and  I perceive  it  to  exist. 'n  (L.  c.) — “ The  vul- 
gar undoubtedly  believe,  that  it  is  the  external  object  which  we 
immediately  perceive , and  not  a representative  image  of  it  only 
It  is  for  this  reason,  that  they  look  upon  it  as  perfect  lunacy  to 
call  in  question  the  existence  of  external  objects .”  (L.  c.) — “ The 
vulgar  are  firmly  persuaded,  that  the  very  identical  objects  which 
they  perceive  continue  to  exist  when  they  do  not  perceive  them  ; 
and  are  no  less  firmly  persuaded,  that  when  ten  men  look  at  the 


BROWN’S  ARGUMENT  FOR  REID’S  REPRESENTATION. 


65 


sun  or  the  moon  they  all  see  the  same  individual  object .”  (P. 

166.) — Speaking  of  Berkeley:  “The  vulgar  opinion  he  reduces 
to  this,  that  the  very  things  which  ive  perceive  by  our  senses  do 
really  exist.  This  he  grants.  (P.  165) — “ It  is,  therefore,  ac- 
knowledged by  this  philosopher  (Hume)  to  be  a natural  instinct 
or  prepossession,  an  universal  and  primary  opinion  of  all  men, 
that  the  objects  which  we  immediately  perceive,  by  our  senses, 
are  not  images  in  our  minds , hut  external  objects , and  that  their 
existence  is  independent  of  us  and  our  perception.”  (P.  201. 
See  also  pp.  143,  198,  199,  200,  206.) 

In  these  circumstances,  if  Reid : either  1°, — maintains,  that 
his  immediate  perception  of  external  things  is  convertible  with 
their  reality ; or  2°, — asserts  that,  in  his  doctrine  of  perception, 
the  external  reality  stands,  to  the  percipient  mind,  face  to  face, 
in  the  same  immediacy  of  relation  which  the  idea  holds  in  the 
representative  theory  of  the  philosophers ; or  3°, — declares  the 
identity  of  his  own  opinion  with  the  vulgar  belief,  as  thus  ex- 
pounded by  himself  and  the  philosophers  : — he  could  not  more 
emphatically  proclaim  himself  a natural  realist , and  his  doctrine 
of  perception,  as  intended,  at  least,  a doctrine  of  intuition.  And 
he  does  all  three. 

The  first  and  second. — “ We  have  before  examined  the  reasons 
given  by  philosophers  to  prove  that  ideas,  and  not  external  ob- 
jects, are  the  immediate  objects  of  perception.  We  shall  only 
here  observe,  that  if  external  objects  be  perceived  immediate- 
ly,” [and  he  had  just  before  asserted  for  the  hundredth  time  that 
they  were  so  perceived]  “ we  have  the  same  reason  to  believe 

THEIR  EXISTENCE,  AS  PHILOSOPHERS  HAVE  TO  BELIEVE  THE  EXISTENCE 
OF  IDEAS,  WHILE  THEY  HOLD  THEM  TO  BE  THE  IMMEDIATE  OBJECTS  OF 

perception.”  (P.  589.  See  also  pp.  118,  138.) 

The  third. — Speaking  of  the  perception  of  the  external  world — 
“ AVe  have  here  a remarkable  conflict  between  two  contradictory 
opinions,  wherein  all  mankind  are  engaged.  On  the  one  side 
stand  all  the  vulgar , who  are  unpracticed  in  philosophical  re- 
searches, and  guided  by  the  uncorrupted  primary  instincts  of 
nature.  On  the  other  side,  stand  all  the  philosophers , ancient 
and  modern  ; every  man , ivithout  exception , ivho  reflects.  In  this 

DIVISION,  TO  MY  GREAT  HUMILIATION,  I FIND  MYSELF  CLASSED  AVITH 
THE  VULGAR.”  (P.  207.) 

Various  other  proofs  of  the  same  conclusion,  could  be  adduced; 
these  for  brevity  we  omit. — Brown’s  interpretation  of  the  funda- 

E 


66 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


mental  tenet  of  Reid’s  philosophy  is,  therefore,  not  a simple  mis- 
conception, but  an  absolute  reversal  of  its  real  and  even  unambi- 
guous import.  [This  is  too  strong.  See  Diss.  p.  820.] 

But  the  ground,  on  which  Brown  vindicates  his  interpretation, 
is  not  unworthy  of  the  interpretation  itself.  The  possibility  of 
an  intuition  beyond  the  sphere  of  self,  he  can  hardly  be  said  to 
have  contemplated  ; but  on  one  occasion,  Reid’s  language  seems, 
for  a moment,  to  have  actually  suggested  to  him  the  question: 
— Might  that  philosopher  not  possibly  regard  the  material  object, 
as  identical  with  the  object  of  consciousness  in  perception? — On 
what  ground  does  he  reject  the  affirmative  as  absurd  ? His  rea- 
soning is  to  this  effect : — To  assert  an  intuitive  perception  of 
matter , is  to  assert  an  identity  of  matter  and  mind  ( for  an  im- 
mediacy of  knowledge  is  convertible  with  a unity  of  existence ) ; 
But  Reid  was  a sturdy  dualist ; Therefore , he  could  not  main- 
tain cm  immediate  perception  of  the  qualities  of  matter.  (Led. 
xxv.  pp.  159,  160.)  In  this  syllogism,  the  major  is  a mere  peti- 
tio  principii , which  Brown  has  not  attempted  to  prove;  and 
which,  as  tried  by  the  standard  of  all  philosophical  truth,  is  not 
only  false,  but  even  the  converse  of  the  truth ; while,  admitting 
its  accuracy,  it  can  not  be  so  connected  with  the  minor,  as  to 
legitimate  the  conclusion. 

If  we  appeal  to  consciousness,  consciousness  gives,  even  in  the 
last  analysis — in  the  unity  of  knowledge,  a duality  of  existence  ; 
and  peremptorily  falsifies  Brown’s  assumption,  that  not-self,  as 
knozun,  is  identical  with  self  as  knowing.  Reid  therefore,  as  a 
dualist,  and  on  the  supreme  authority  of  consciousness,  might 
safely  maintain  the  immediacy  of  perception ; — nay,  as  a dualist 
Reid  could  not , consistently,  have  adopted  the  opinion  which 
Brown  argues,  that,  as  a dualist,  he  must  be  regarded  to  have 
held.  Mind  and  matter  exist  to  us  only  in  their  qualities ; and 
these  qualities  exist  to  us  only  as  they  are  known  by  us,  i.  e.  as 
phenomena.  It  is  thus  merely  from  knowledge  that  we  can  infer 
existence , and  only  from  the  supposed  repugnance  or  compatibility 
of  phenomena , within  our  experience,  are  we  able  to  ascend  to  the 
transcendent  difference  or  identity  of  substances.  Now,  on  the 
hypothesis  that  all  we  immediately  know,  is  only  a state  or  mo- 
dification or  quality  or  phenomenon  of  the  cognitive  subject  itself 
— how  can  we  contend,  that  the  phenomena  of  mind  and  matter, 
known  only  as  modifications  of  the  same , must  be  the  modifica- 
tions of  different  substances  ; — nay,  that  only  on  this  hypothesis 


BROWN’S  ARGUMENT  DISPROVED. 


67 


of  their  substantial  unity  in  knowledge,  can  their  substantial 
duality  in  existence  be  maintained  ? But  of  this  again. 

Brown’s  assumption  has  no  better  foundation  than  the  exagge- 
ration of  a crotchet  of  philosophers  ; which,  though  contrary  to 
the  evidence  of  consciousness,  and  consequently  not  only  without 
but  against  all  evidence,  has  yet  exerted  a more  extensive  and 
important  influence,  than  any  principle  in  the  whole  history  of 
philosophy.  This  subject  deserves  a volume  ; we  can  only  afford 
it  a few  sentences.  Some  philosophers  (as  Anaxagoras,  Heracli- 
tus, Alcmaeon)  maintained  that  knowledge  implied  even  a con- 
trariety of  subject  and  object.  But  since  the  time  of  Empedocles, 
no  opinion  has  been  more  universally  admitted,  than  that  the 
relation  of  knowledge  inferred  the  analogy  of  existence.  This 
analogy  may  be  supposed  in  two  potences.  What  knows  and 
what  is  known,  are  either,  1°,  similar , or,  2°,  the  same  ; and  if 
the  general  principle  be  true,  the  latter  is  the  more  philosophical. 
This  principle  it  was,  which  immediately  determined  the  whole 
doctrine  of  a representative  perception.  Its  lower  potence  is  seen 
in  the  intentional  species  of  the  schools,  and  in  the  ideas  of 
Mallebranche  and  Berkeley ; its  higher  in  the  gnostic  reasons  of 
the  Platonists,  in  the  pre-existing  species  of  Avicenna  and  the 
Arabians,  in  the  ideas  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz,  in  the  pheno- 
mena of  Kant,  and  in  the  external  states  of  Dr.  Brown.  It  me- 
diately determined  the  hierarchical  gradation  of  faculties  or 
souls  of  the  Aristotelians — the  vehicular  medico  of  the  Platonists 
— the  theories  of  a common  intellect  of  Alexander,  Themistius, 
Averroes,  Cajetanus,  and  Zabarella — the  vision  in  the  deity  of 
Mallebranche — and  the  Cartesian  and  Leibnitian  doctrines  of 
assistance , and  predetermined  harmony.  To  no  other  origin  is 
to  be  ascribed  the  refusal  of  the  fact  of  consciousness  in  its  prim- 
itive duality  ; and  the  Unitarian  systems  of  identity , material- 
ism, idealism , are  the  result. 

But  however  universal  and  omnipotent  this  principle  may  have 
been,  Reid  was  at  once  too  ignorant  of  opinions,  to  be  much  in 
danger  from  authority,  and  too  independent  a thinker,  to  accept 
so  baseless  a fancy  as  a fact.  “ Mr.  Norris,”  says  he,  “ is  the 
only  author  I have  met  with  who  professedly  puts  the  question, 
Whether  material  things  can  be  perceived  by  us  immediately  ? 
He  has  offered  four  arguments  to  show  that  they  can  not.  First, 
Material  objects  are  without  the  mind,  and  therefore  there  can 
be  no  union  between  the  object  and  the  percipient.  Answer — 


68 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


This  argument  is  lame,  until  it  is  shown  to  he  necessary,  that  in 
perception  there  should  he  an  union  between  the  object  and  the 
percipient.  Second,  material  objects  are  disproportioned  to  the 
mind , and  removed  from  it  by  the  whole  diameter  of  Being. — 
This  argument  I can  not  answer,  because  I do  not  understand  it.'" 
( Essays , I.  P.  p.  202.) 

The  principle,  that  the  relation  of  knowledge  implies  an  anal- 
ogy of  existence,  admitted  without  examination  in  almost  every 
school,  but  which  Reid,  with  an  ignorance  wiser  than  knowl- 
edge, confesses  he  does  not  understand  ; is  nothing  more  than 
an  irrational  attempt  to  explain,  what  is,  in  itself,  inexplicable. 
How  the  similar  or  the  same  is  conscious  of  itself,  is  not  a whit 
less  inconceivable,  than  how  one  contrary  is  immediately  perci- 
pient of  another.  It  at  best  only  removes  our  admitted  ignorance 
by  one  step  back  ; and  then,  in  place  of  our  knowledge  simply 
originating  from  the  incomprehensible , it  ostentatiously  departs 
from  the  absurd. 

The  slightest  criticism  is  sufficient  to  manifest  the  futility  of 
that  hypothesis  of  representation,  which  Brown  would  substitute 
for  Reid’s  presentative  perception  ; — although  this  hypothesis, 
under  various  modifications,  be  almost  coextensive  with  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy.  In  fact,  it  fulfills  none  of  the  conditions  of  a 
legitimate  hypothesis. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  unnecessary. — It  can  not  show,  that  the 
fact  of  an  intuitive  perception,  as  given  in  consciousness,  ought 
not  to  be  accepted ; it  is  unable  therefore  to  vindicate  its  own 
necessity,  in  order  to  explain  the  possibility  of  our  knowledge  of 
external  things.  That  we  can  not  show  forth,  hov)  the  mind  is 
capable  of  knowing  something  different  from  self,  is  no  reason  to 
doubt  that  it  is  so  capable.  Every  how  (Scon)  rests  ultimately 
on  a that  (on) ; every  demonstration  is  deduced  from  something 
given  and  indemonstrable ; all  that  is  comprehensible,  hangs 
from  some  revealed  fact , which  we  must  believe  as  actual , but, 
can  not  construe  to  the  reflective  intellect  in  its  possibility . In 
consciousness — in  the  original  spontaneity  of  intelligence  ( vov> 
locus  principiorum),  are  revealed  the  primordial  facts  of  our  in- 
telligent nature.  Consciousness  is  the  fountain  of  all  compre- 
hensibility and  illustration  ; but  as  such , can  not  be  itself  illus- 
trated or  comprehended.  To  ask  how  any  fact  of  consciousness 
is  possible,  is  to  ask  how  consciousness  its'elf  is  possible  ; and  to 
ask  how  consciousness  is  possible,  is  to  ask  how  a being  intelli- 


RE  PEE  SENT  ATIONISM  NOT  A LEGITIMATE  HYPOTHESIS. 


69 


gent  like  man  is  possible.  Could  we  answer  this,  the  Serpent 
had  not  tempted  Eve  by  an  hyperbole  : — “"VVe  should  be  as 
Gods.”  But  as  we  did  not  create  ourselves,  and  are  not  even  in 
the  secret  of  our  creation,  we  must  take  our  existence,  our 
knowledge  upon  trust : and  that  philosophy  is  the  only  true,  be- 
cause in  it  alone  can  truth  be  realized,  which  does  not  revolt 
against  the  authority  of  our  natural  beliefs. 

“ The  voice  of  Nature  is  the  voice  of  God.” 

To  ask,  therefore,  a reason  for  the  possibility  of  our  intuition  of 
external  things,  above  the  fact  of  its  reality,  as  given  in  our  per- 
ceptive consciousness,  betrays,  as  Aristotle  has  truly  said,  an 
imbecility  of  the  reasoning  principle  itself: — uTovtov  typrelv 
\6yov,  cKpevras  ryv  alcrdyaiv,  appoxTTta  ti?  eem  biavoias.'''  The 
natural  realist  who  accepts  this  intuition,  can  not,  certainly, 
explain  it,  because,  as  ultimate,  it  is  a fact  inexplicable.  Yet, 
with  Hudibras : 

“ He  knows  what's  what ; and  that's  as  high 
As  metaphysic  wit  can  fly.” 

But  the  hypothetical  realist — the  cosmothetic  idealist,  who  rejects 
a consciousness  of  aught  beyond  the  mind,  can  not  require  of  the 
natural  realist  an  explanation  of  how  such  a consciousness  is 
possible,  until  he  himself  shall  have  explained,  what  is  even  less 
conceivable,  the  possibility  of  representing  (i.  e.  of  knoioing)  the 
unknown.  Till  then,  each  founds  on  the  incomprehensible  ; but 
the  former  admits  the  veracity,  the  latter  postulates  the  falsehood 
of  that  principle,  which  can  alone  confer  on  this  incomprehensi- 
ble foundation  the  character  of  truth.  The  natural  realist,  whose 
watchword  is — The  facts  of  consciousness,  the  ivhole  facts,  and 
nothing  but  the  facts,  has  therefore  naught  to  fear  from  his  anta- 
gonist, so  long  as  consciousness  can  not  be  explained  nor  redar- 
gued from  without.  If  his  system  be  to  fall,  it  falls  only  with 
philosophy  ; for  it  can  only  be  disproved,  by  proving  the  menda- 
city of  consciousness — of  that  faculty, 

“ Queb  nisi  sit  veri,  ratio  quoque  falsa  fit  omnis  ;” 

(“  Which  unless  true,  all  reason  turns  a lie.”) 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  violation  of  the  laws  of  a legitimate 
hypothesis ; — the  doctrine  of  a representative  perception  annihi- 
lates itself,  in  subverting  the  universal  edifice  of  knowledge. — 
Belying  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  our  immediate  percep- 
tion of  an  outer  world,  it  belies  the  veracity  of  consciousness 


70 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


altogether.  But  the  truth  of  consciousness,  is  the  condition  of 
the  possibility  of  all  knowledge.  The  first  act  of  hypothetical 
realism,  is  thus  an  act  of  suicide ; philosophy,  thereafter,  is  at 
best  but  an  enchanted  corpse,  awaiting  only  the  exorcism  of  the 
skeptic,  to  relapse  into  its  proper  nothingness. — But  of  this  we 
shall  have  occasion  to  treat  at  large,  in  exposing  Brown’s  mis- 
prision of  the  argument  from  common  sense. 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  the  condition  of  a legitimate  hypothe- 
sis, that  the  fact  or  facts  for  which  it  is  excogitated  to  account, 
be  not  themselves  hypothetical. — But  so  far  is  the  principal  fact, 
which  the  hypothesis  of  a representative  perception  is  proposed 
to  explain,  from  being  certain  ; its  reality  is  even  rendered  prob- 
lematical by  the  proposed  explanation  itself.  The  facts,  about 
which  this  hypothesis  is  conversant,  are  two  ; — the  fact  of  the 
mental  modification , and  the  fact  of  the  material  reality.  The 
problem  to  be  solved  is  their  connection  ; and  the  hypothesis  of 
representation  is  advanced,  as  the  ratio  of  their  correlation,  in 
supposing  that  the  former  as  known  is  vicarious  of  the  latter  as 
existing.  There  is,  however,  here  a see-saw  between  the  hypothe- 
sis and  the  fact : the  fact  is  assumed  as  an  hypothesis  ; and  the 
hypothesis  explained  as  a fact ; each  is  established,  each  is 
expounded,  by  the  other.  To  account  for  the  possibility  of  an 
unknown  external  world,  the  hypothesis  of  representation  is  de- 
vised ; and  to  account  for  the  possibility  of  representation,  we 
imagine  the  hypothesis  of  an  external  world.  Nothing  could  be 
more  easy  than  to  demonstrate,  that  on  this  supposition,  the  fact 
of  the  external  reality  is  not  only  petitory  but  improbable.  This, 
however,  we  are  relieved  from  doing,  by  Dr.  Brown’s  own  admis- 
sion, that  “ the  skeptical  argument  for  the  non-existence  of  an 
external  world , as  a mere  play  of  reasoning , admits  of  no  reply 
and  we  shall  afterward  prove,  that  the  only  ground  on  which  he 
attempts  to  vindicate  this  existence  (the  ground  of  our  natural 
belief  in  its  reality),  is  one,  not  competent  to  the  hypothetical 
realist.  We  shall  see,  that  if  this  belief  be  true,  the  hypothesis 
itself  is  superseded ; if  false,  that  there  is  no  fact  for  the  hypo- 
thesis to  explain. 

In  the,  fourth  place,  a legitimate  hypothesis  must  account  for 
the  phenomenon,  about  which  it  is  conversant,  adequately  and 
without  violence,  in  all  its  dependencies,  relations,  and  peculiari- 
ties.— But  the  hypothesis  in  question,  only  accomplishes  its  end 
— nay  only  vindicates  its  utility,  by  a mutilation,  or,  more  prop- 


REPRESENT  ATIONISH  NOT  A LEGITIMATE  HYPOTHESIS.  71 

erly,  by  the  destruction  and  re-creation , of  the  very  phenome- 
non for  the  nature  of  which  it  would  account.  The  entire  phe- 
nomenon to  be  explained  by  the  supposition  of  a representative 
perception,  is  the  fact,  given  in  consciousness,  of  the  immediate 
knoiuledge  or  intuition  of  an  existence  different  from  self.  This 
simple  phenomenon  it  hews  down  into  two  fragments ; into  the 
existence  and  the  intuition.  The  existence  of  external  things, 
which  is  given  only  through  their  intuition,  it  admits ; the  intu- 
ition itself,  though  the  ratio  cognoscendi,  and  to  us  therefore  the 
ratio  essendi  of  their  reality,  it  rejects.  But  to  annihilate  what  is 
prior  and  constitutive  in  the  phenomenon,  is,  in  truth,  to  annihi- 
late the  phenomenon  altogether.  The  existence  of  an  external 
world,  which  the  hypothesis  proposes  to  explain,  is  no  longer  even 
a truncated  fact  of  consciousness  ; for  the  existence  given  in  con- 
sciousness, necessarily  fell  with  the  intuition  on  which  it  reposed. 
A representative  perception,  is  therefore,  an  hypothetical  ex- 
planation of  a supposititious  fact:  it  creates  the  nature  it  inter- 
prets. And  in  this  respect,  of  all  the  varieties  of  the  representa- 
tive hypothesis,  the  third , or  that  which  views  in  the  object 
known  a modification  of  thought  itself,  most  violently  outrages 
the  phenomenon  of  consciousness  it  would  explain.  And  this  is 
Brown’s.  The  first , saves  the  phenomenon  of  consciousness  in  so 
far  as  it  preserves  always  the  numerical,  if  not  always  the  sub- 
stantial, difference  between  the  object  perceived  and  the  percipi- 
ent mind.  The  second , does  not  violate  at  least  the  antithesis  of 
the  object  perceived  and  the  percipient  act.  But  in  the  third  or 
simplest  form  of  representation,  not  only  is  the  object  known, 
denied  to  be  itself  the  reality  existing,  as  consciousness  attests  ; 
this  object  revealed  as  not-self,  is  identified  with  the  mental  ego ; 
nay,  even,  though  given  as  permanent,  with  the  transient  energy 
of  thought  itself. 

In  the  fifth  place,  the  fact,  which  a legitimate  hypothesis  is 
devised  to  explain,  must  be  within  the  sphere  of  experience. — The 
fact,  however,  for  which  that  of  a representative  perception  ac- 
counts (the  existence  of  external  things),  transcends,  ex  hypothesi , 
all  experience ; it  is  the  object  of  no  real  knowledge,  but  a bare 
ens  rationis — a mere  hyperphysical  chimera. 

In  the  sixth  and  last  place,  an  hypothesis  itself  is  probable  in 
proportion  as  it  works  simply  and  naturally  ; that  is  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  dependent  on  no  subsidiary  hypothesis,  and  as  it  in- 
volves nothing,  petitory,  occult,  supernatural,  as  an  element  of  its 


72 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


explanation.  In  this  respect,  the  doctrine  of  a representative  per- 
ception is  not  less  vicious  than  in  others.  To  explain  at  all,  it 
must  not  only  postulate  subsidiary  hypotheses , but  subsidiary 
miracles. — The  doctrine  in  question  attempts  to  explain  the  knoivl- 
cdge  of  an  unknown  world , by  the  ratio  of  a representative  per- 
ception : but  it  is  impossible  by  any  conceivable  relation,  to  apply 
the  ratio  to  the  facts.  The  mental  modification,  of  which,  on  the 
doctrine  of  representation,  we  are  exclusively  conscious  in  percep- 
tion, either  represents  (i.  e.  affords  a mediate  knowledge  of)  a real 
external  world,  or  it  does  not.  (We  say  only  the  reality ; to  in- 
clude all  systems  from  Kant’s,  who  does  not  predicate  even  an 
existence  in  space  and  time  of  things  in  themselves , to  Locke’s, 
who  supposes  the  trancendent  reality  to  resemble  its  idea,  at  least 
in  the  primary  qualities .)  Now,  the  latter  alternative  is  an 
affirmation  of  absolute  Idealism ; we  have,  therefore,  at  present 
only  to  consider  the  former.  And  here,  the  mind  either  knows 
the  reality  of  what  it  represents,  or  it  does  not. — On  the  prior  al- 
ternative, the  hypothesis  under  discussion  would  annihilate  itself, 
in  annihilating  the  ground  of  its  utility.  For  as  the  end  of  repre- 
sentation is  knowledge  ; and  as  the  hypothesis  of  a representative 
perception  is  only  required  on  the  supposed  impossibility  of  that 
presentative  knowledge  of  external  things,  which  consciousness 
affirms : — if  the  mind  is  admitted  to  be  cognizant  of  the  outer 
reality  in  itself,  previous  to  representation,  the  end  toward  which 
the  hypothesis  was  devised  as  a mean , has  been  already  accom- 
plished ; and  the  possibility  of  an  intuitive  perception,  as  given 
in  consciousness,  is  allowed.  Nor  is  the  hypothesis  only  absurd, 
as  superfluous.  It  is  worse.  For  the  mind  would,  in  this  case, 
he  supposed  to  know  before  it  knew  ; or,  like  the  crazy  Pentheus, 
to  see  its  objects  double — 

(“  Et  solem  geminum  et  duplices  se  ostendere  Thebas  :”) 

and,  if  these  absurdities  he  eschewed,  then  is  the  identity  of  mind 
and  self — of  consciousness  and  knowledge , abolished  ; and  my 
intellect  knows,  what  I am  not  conscious  of  it  knowing ! — The 
oth,er  alternative  remains  : — that  the  mind  is  blindly  determined 
to  represent , and  truly  to  represent,  the  reality  which  it  does  not 
know.  And  here  the  mind  either  blindly  determines  itself,  or  is 
blindly  determined  by  an  extrinsic  and  intelligent  cause. — The 
former  lemma  is  the  more  philosophical,  in  so  far  as  it  assumes 
nothing  hyperphysical ; hut  it  is  otherwise  utterly  irrational,  in 


REPRESENTATIONS  NOT  A LEGITIMATE  HYPOTHESIS.  73 

as  much  as  it  would  explain  an  effect,  by  a cause  wholly  inade- 
quate to  its  production.  On  this  alternative,  knowledge  is  sup- 
posed to  be  the  effect  of  ignorance — intelligence  of  stupidity — 
life  of  death.  We  are  necessarily  ignorant,  ultimately  at  least,  of 
the  mode  in  which  causation  operates  ; but  we  know  at  least,  that 
no  effect  arises  without  a cause — and  a cause  proportionate  to  its 
existence. — The  absurdity  of  this  supposition  has  accordingly 
constrained  the  profoundest  cosmothetic  idealists,  notwithstanding 
their  rational  abhorrence  of  a supernatural  assumption,  to  em- 
brace the  second  alternative.  To  say  nothing  of  less  illustrious 
schemes,  the  systems  of  Divine  Assistance,  of  a Pre-established 
Harmony,  and  of  the  Vision  of  all  things  in  the  Deity,  are  only 
so  many  subsidiary  hypotheses — so  many  attempts  to  bridge,  by 
supernatural  machinery,  the  chasm  between  the  representation 
and  the  reality , which  all  human  ingenuity  had  found,  by  natural 
means,  to  be  insuperable.  The  hypothesis  of  a representative 
perception,  thus  presupposes  a miracle  to  let  it  work.  Dr.  Brown, 
indeed,  rejects  as  unphilosophical,  those  hyperphysical  subsidies. 
But  he  only  saw  less  clearly  than  their  illustrious  authors,  the 
necessity  which  required  them.  It  is  a poor  philosophy  that 
eschews  the  Deus  ex  mac  kin  a , and  yet  ties  the  knot  which  is  only 
soluble  by  his  interposition.  It  is  not  unphilosophical  to  assume 
a miracle,  if  a miracle  be  necessary ; but  it  is  unphilosophical  tc 
originate  the  necessity  itself.  And  here  the  hypothetical  realist 
can  not  pretend,  that  the  difficulty  is  of  nature’s,  not  of  his  crea- 
tion. In  fact  it  only  arises,  because  he  has  closed  his  eyes  upon 
the  light  of  nature,  and  refused  the  guidance  of  consciousness  : 
but  having  swamped  himself  in  following  the  ignis  fcituus  of  a 
theory,  he  has  no  right  to  refer  its  private  absurdities  to  the  im- 
becility of  human  reason ; or  to  generalize  his  own  factitious  igno- 
rance, by  a Quantum  est  quod  nescimus!  The  difficulty  of  the 
problem  Dr.  Brown  has  not  perceived ; or  perceiving,  has  not 
ventured  to  state — far  less  attempted  to  remove.  He  has  essayed, 
indeed,  to  cut  the  knot,  which  he  was  unable  to  loose;  but  we 
shall  find,  in  the  sequel,  that  his  summary  postulate  of  the  reality 
of  an  external  world,  on  the  ground  of  our  belief  in  its  existence, 
is,  in  his  hands,  of  all  unfortunate  attempts,  perhaps  the  most 
unsuccessful. 

The  scheme  of  Natural  Realism  (which  it  is  Reid’s  honor  to 
have  been  the  first,  among  not  forgotten  philosophers,  virtually 
and  intentionally,  at  least,  to  embrace)  is  thus  the  only  system,  on 


74 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


which  the  truth  of  consciousness  and  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
can  be  vindicated ; while  the  Hypothetical  Realist,  in  his  effort 
to  be  “wise  above  knowledge,”  like  the  dog  in  the  fable,  loses 
the  substance,  in  attempting  to  realize  the  shadow.  “ Les 
homines ” (says  Leibnitz,  with  a truth  of  which  he  was  not  him- 
self aware),  “ les  homines  cherclient  ce  qu'ils  savent,  et  ne  savent 
pas  ce  qu'ils  cherchent." 

That  the  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  perception  is  not  without  its 
difficulties,  we  allow.  But  these  do  not  affect  its  possibility ; and 
may  in  a great  measure  be  removed  by  a more  sedulous  examin- 
ation of  flic  phenomena.  The  distinction  of  perception  proper 
from  sensation  proper,  in  other  words,  of  the  objective  from  the 
subjective  in  this  act,  Reid,  after  other  philosophers,  has  already 
turned  to  good  account ; but  his  analysis  would  have  been  still 
more  successful,  had  he  discovered  the  law  which  universally 
governs  their  manifestation  : That  Perception  and  Sensation,  the 
objective  and  subjective,  though  both  always  co-existent,  are  al- 
ways in  the  inverse  ratio  of  each  other.  But  on  this  matter  we 
can  not  at  present  enter.  [See  Diss.  p.  876-885.] 

Dr.  Brown  is  not  only  wrong  in  regard  to  Reid’s  own  doctrine; 
he  is  wrong,  even  admitting  his  interpretation  of  that  philosopher 
to  be  true,  in  charging  him  with  a “series  of  wonderful  miscon- 
ceptions,” in  regard  to  the  opinions  universally  prevalent  touch- 
ing the  nature  of  ideas.  We  shall  not  argue  the  case  upon  the 
higher  ground,  that  Reid,  as  a natural  realist,  could  not  be  jihi- 
losophically  out,  in  assailing  the  hypothesis  of  a representative 
perception,  even  though  one  of  its  subordinate  modifications 
might  be  mistaken  by  him  for  another ; but  shall  prove  that, 
supposing  Reid  to  have  been  like  Brown,  an  hypothetical  realist, 
under  the  third  form  of  a representative  perception,  he  was  not 
historically  wrong  in  attributing  to  philosophers  in  general  (at 
least,  after  the  decline  of  the  Scholastic  philosophy),  the  first  or 
second  variety  of  the  hypothesis.  Even  on  this  lower  ground , 
Brown  is  fated  to  be  unsuccessful ; and  if  Reid  be  not  always 
correct,  his  antagonist  has  failed  in  convicting  him  even  of  a sin- 
gle inaccuracy.  We  shall  consider  Brown’s  charge  of  misrepre- 
sentation in  detail. 

It  is  always  unlucky  to  stumble  on  the  threshold.  The  para- 
graph (Lect.  xxvii.)  in  which  Dr.  Brown  opens  his  attack  on  Reid, 
contains  more  mistakes  than  sentences  ; and  the  etymological  dis- 
cussion if  involves,  supposes  as  true,  what  is  not  simply  false,  but 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG. 


75 


diametrically  opposite  to  the  truth. — Among  other  errors  : — In  the 
first  place,  the  term  “ idea ” was  never  employed  in  any  system, 
previous  to  the  age  of  Descartes,  to  denote  “ little  images  derived 
from  objects  without.”  In  the  second , it  was  never  used  in  any 
philosophy,  prior  to  the  same  period,  to  signify  the  immediate  ob- 
ject of  perception.  In  the  third , it  was  not  applied  by  the  “ Peri- 
patetics or  Schoolmen,”  to  express  an  object  of  human  thought  at 
all.1  In  the  fourth , ideas  (taking  this  term  for  species)  were  not 
“ in  all  the  dark  ages  of  the  scholastic  followers  of  Aristotle,”  re- 
garded as  “ little  images  derived  from  without for  a numerous 

1 The  history  of  the  word  idea  seems  completely  unknown.  Previous  to  the  age  of 
Descartes,  as  a philosophical  term,  it  was  employed  exclusively  by  the  Platonists — at 
least  exclusively  in  a Platonic  meaning  ; and  this  meaning  was  precisely  the  reverse  of 
that  attributed  to  the  word  by  Dr.  Brown  ; — the  idea  was  not  an  object  of  perception — 
the  idea  ivas  not  derived  from  without. — In  the  schools,  so  far  from  being  a current 
psychological  expression,  as  he  imagines,  it  had  no  other  application  than  a theological. 
Neither,  after  the  revival  of  letters,  was  the  term  extended  by  the  Aristotelians  even 
to  the  objects  of  intellect.  Melancthon,  indeed  (who  was  a kind  of  semi-Platonist)  uses 
it  on  one  occasion  as  a synonyme  for  notion,  or  intelligible  species  {Be  Anima,  p.  187, 
ed.  1555) ; but  it  was  even  to  this  solitary  instance,  we  presume,  that  Julius  Scaliger 
alludes  {Be  Subtilitate,  vi.  4),  when  he  castigates  such  an  application  of  the  word  as 
neoteric  and  abusive.  “ Melanch."  is  on  the  margin.  Goclenius  also  probably  founded 
his  usage  on  Melanchthon. — We  should  have  distinctly  said,  that  previous  to  its  employ- 
ment by  Bescartes  himself,  the  expression  had  never  been  used  as  a comprehensive  term 
for  the  immediate  objects  of  thought,  had  we  not  in  remembrance  the  Historia  Anim.cz 
Humana  of  our  countryman  David  Buchanan.  This  work,  originally  written  in  French, 
had  for  some  years  been  privately  circulated  previous  to  its  publication  at  Paris  in  1636. 
Here  we  find  the  word  idea  familiarly  employed,  in  its  most  extensive  signification,  to 
express  the  objects,  not  only  of  intellect  proper,  but  of  memory,  imagination,  sense  ; 
and  this  is  the  earliest  example  of  such  an  employment.  For  the  Biscourse  on  Method 
in  which  the  term  is  usurped  by  Descartes  in  an  equal  latitude,  was  at  least  a year 
later  in  its  publication — viz.  in  June,  1637.  Adopted  soon  after  also  by  Gassendi,  the 
word  under  such  imposing  patronage  gradually  won  its  way  into  general  use.  In  En- 
gland, however,  Locke  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  first  who  naturalized  the  term  in 
its  Cartesian  universality.  Hobbes  employs  it,  and  that  historically,  only  once  or 
twice ; Henry  More  and  Cudworth  are  very  chary  of  it,  even  when  treating  of  the 
Cartesian  philosophy ; Willis  rarely  uses  it ; while  Lord  Herbert,  Reynolds,  and  the 
English  philosophers  in  general,  between  Descartes  and  Locke,  do  not  apply  it  psy- 
chologically at  all.  When  in  common  language  employed  by  Milton  and  Dryden,  after 
Descartes,  as  before  him,  by  Sidney,  Spenser,  Shakspeare,  Hooker,  &c.,  the  meaning 
is  Platonic.  Our  lexicographers  are  ignorant  of  the  difference. 

The  fortune  of  this  word  is  curious.  Employed  by  Plato  to  express  the  real  forms 
of  the  intelligible  world,  in  lofty  contrast  to  the  unreal  images  of  the  sensible  ; it  was 
lowered  by  Descartes,  who  extended  it  to  the  objects  of  our  consciousness  in  general. 
When,  after  Gassendi,  the  school  of  Condillac  had  analyzed  our  highest  faculties  into 
our  lowest,  the  idea  was  still  more  deeply  degraded  from  its  high  original.  Like  a 
fallen  angel,  it  was  relegated  from  the  sphere  of  divine  intelligence,  to  the  atmosphere 
of  human  sense  ; till  at  last  Ideologic  (more  correctly  Idealogie),  a word  which  could 
only  properly  suggest  an  a priori  scheme,  deducing  our  knowledge  from  the  intellect, 
has  in  France  become  the  name  peculiarly  distinctive  of  that  philosophy  of  mind 
which  exclusively  derives  our  knowledge  from  the  senses. — Word  and  thing,  ideas 
have  been  the  crux  philosophomm,  since  Aristotle  sent  them  packing  (^aipe'rcocraj/ 
ideal)  to  the  present  day. 


76 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


party  of  the  most  illustrious  schoolmen  rejected  species , not  only 
in  the  intellect , hut  in  the  sense.  In  the  fifth , “ phantasm ” in 
“the  old  philosophy,”  was  not  the  “ external  cause  of  perception ,” 
but  the  internal  object  of  imagination.  In  the  sixth , the  term 
“ shadowy  film ” which  here  and  elsewhere  he  constantly  uses, 
shows  that  Dr.  Brown  confounds  the  matterless  species  of  the 
Peripatetics  with  the  corporeal  effluxions  of  Democritus  and  Ep- 
icurus : 

“ Quae,  quasi  membrancB,  summo  de  cortice  rerum 
Dereptse,  volitant  ultro  citroque  per  auras.” 

Dr.  Brown,  in  short,  only  fails  in  victoriously  establishing 
against  Reid  the  various  meanings  in  which  “ the  old  writers'' 
employed  the  term  idea , by  the  petty  fact — that  the  old  writers 
did  not  employ  the  term  idea  at  all. 

Nor  does  the  progress  of  the  attack  belie  the  omen  of  its  outset. 
We  shall  consider  the  philosophers  quoted  by  Brown  in  chronol- 
ogical order.  Of  three  of  these  only  (Descartes,  Arnauld,  Locke), 
were  the  opinions  particularly  noticed  by  Reid ; the  others  (Hobbes, 
Le  Clerc,  Crousaz),  Brown  adduces  as  examples  of  Reid’s  general 
misrepresentation.  Of  the  greater  number  of  the  philosophers 
specially  criticised  by  Reid,  Brown  prudently  says  nothing. 

Of  these,  the  first  is  Descartes;  and  in  regard  to  him,  Dr. 
Brown,  not  content  with  accusing  Reid  of  simple  ignorance, 
contends,  “ that  the  opinions  of  Descartes  are  precisely  opposite 
to  the  representations  which  he  has  given  of  them.”  (Lect.  xxvii. 
p.  172.) — Now  Reid  states,  in  regard  to  Descartes,  that  this  phi- 
losopher appears  to  place  the  idea  or  representative  object  in  per- 
ception, sometimes  in  the  mind , and  sometimes  in  the  brain;  and 
he  acknowledges  that  while  these  opinions  seem  to  him  contra- 
dictory, he  is  not  prepared  to  pronounce  which  of  them  their 
author  held,  if  he  did  not  indeed  hold  both  together.  “ Descartes,” 
he  says,  “ seems  to  have  hesitated  between  the  two  opinions,  or 
to  have  passed  from  one  to  the  other.”  On  any  alternative,  how- 
ever, Reid  attributes  to  Descartes,  either  the  first  or  the  second 
form  of  representation.  Now  here  we  must  recollect,  that  the 
question  is  not  whether  Reid  be  rigorously  right , but  whether 
he  be  inexcusably  wrong.  Dr.  Brown  accuses  him  of  the  most 
ignorant  misrepresentation — of  interpreting  an  author,  whose  per- 
spicuity he  himself  admits,  in  a sense  “ exactly  the  reverse ” of 
truth.  To  determine  what  Descartes’  doctrine  of  perception  act- 
ually is,  would  be  difficult,  perhaps  even  impossible;  but  in  refer- 


HISTORICALLY,  E.EID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG 


77 


ence  to  the  question  at  issue,  certainly  superfluous.  It  here  suf- 
fices to  show,  that  his  opinion  on  this  point  is  one  mooted  among 
his  disciples ; and  that  Brown,  wholly  unacquainted  with  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  question,  dogmatizes  on  the  basis  of  a.  single  pas- 
sage— nay,  of  a passage  in  itself  irrelevant. 

Reid  is  justified  against  Brown,  if  the  Cartesian  Idea  he  proved, 
either  a material  image  in  the  brain,  or  an  immaterial  representa- 
tion in  the  mind,  distinct  from  the  percipient  act.  By  those  not 
possessed  of  the  key  to  the  Cartesian  theory,  there  are  many  pas- 
sages1 in  the  writings  of  its  author,  which,  taken  by  themselves, 
might  naturally  be  construed  to  import,  that  Descartes  supposed 
the  mind  to  be  conscious  of  certain  motions  in  the  brain , to  which, 
as  well  as  to  the  modifications  of  the  intellect  itself,  he  applies  the 
terms  image  and  idea.  Reid,  who  did  not  understand  the  Carte- 
sian philosophy  as  a system,  was  puzzled  by  these  superficial  ambi- 
guities. Not  aware  that  the  cardinal  point  of  that  system  is — 
that  mind  and  body,  as  essentially  opposed,  are  naturally  to  each 
other  as  zero,  and  that  their  mutual  intercourse  can  only  be  super- 
naturally  maintained  by  the  concourse  of  the  Deity  ;2  Reid  attrib- 
uted to  Descartes  the  possible  opinion  that  the  soul  is  immediately 
cognizant  of  material  images  in  the  brain.  But  in  the  Cartesian 
theory,  mind  is  only  conscious  of  itself;  the  affections  of  body  may, 
by  the  law  of  union,  be  the  proximate  occasions,  but  can  never 
constitute  the  immediate  objects,  of  knowledge.  Reid,  however, 
supposing  that  nothing  could  obtain  the  name  of  image , which  did 
not  represent  a prototype,  or  the  name  of  idea  which  was  not  an 
object  of  thought,  thus  misinterpreted  Descartes  ; who  applies, 
abusively  indeed,  these  terms  to  the  occasion  of  perception  (i.  e., 
the  motion  in  the  sensorium,  unknown  in  itself  and  resembling 

1 Ex.  gr.  De  Pass,  (j  35, — a passage  stronger  than  any  of  those  noticed  by  De  la 
Forge. 

2 That  the  theory  of  Occasional  Causes  is  necessarily  involved  in  Descartes’  doc- 
trine of  Assistance , and  that  his  explanation  of  the  connection  of  mind  and  body 
reposes  on  that  theory,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt.  For  while  he  rejects  all  physical 
influence  in  the  communication  and  conservation  of  motion  between  bodies,  which  he 
refers  exclusively  to  the  ordinary  concourse  of  God  (Princ.  P.  II.  Art.  36,  etc.) ; con- 
sequently he  deprives  conflicting  bodies  of  all  proper  efficiency,  and  reduces  them  to 
the  mere  occasional  causes  of  this  phenomenon.  But  a fortiori , he  must  postulate  the 
hypothesis,  which  he  found  necessary  in  explaining  the  intercourse  of  things  substan 
tially  the  same,  to  account  for  the  reciprocal  action  of  two  substances,  to  him,  of  so 
incompatible  a nature,  as  mind  and  body.  De  la  Forge,  Geulinx,  Mallebranche,  Corde- 
moi,  and  other  disciples  of  Descartes,  only  explicitly  evolve  what  the  writings  of  their 
master  implicitly  contain.  We  may  observe,  though  we  can  not  stop  to  prove,  that 
Tennemann  is  wrong  in  denying  De  la  Forge  to  be  even  an  advocate,  far  less  the  first 
articulate  expositor,  of  the  doctrine  of  Occasional  Causes. 


78 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


nothing;),  as  well  as  to  the  object  of  thought  ( i . e.  the  representa- 
tion of  which  we  are  conscious  in  the  mind  itself).  In  the  Leib- 
nitio-Wolfian  system,  two  elements,  both  also  denominated  ideas , 
arc  in  like  manner  accurately  to  be  contra-distinguished  in  the 
process  of  perception.  The  idea  in  the  brain , and  the  idea  in  the 
mind,  are,  to  Descartes,  precisely  what  the  “ material  idea,'1'1  and 
the  “ sensual  idea,”  are  to  the  Wolfians.  In  both  philosophies,  the 
two  ideas  are  harmonic  modifications,  correlative  and  co-existent; 
hut  in  neither,  is  the  organic  affection  or  material  idea  an  object  of 
consciousness.  It  is  merely  the  unknown  and  arbitrary  condition 
of  the  mental  representation  ; and  in  the  hypotheses  both  of  Assist- 
ance and  of  Pre-established  Harmony,  the  presence  of  the  one  idea 
implies  the  concomitance  of  the  other,  only  by  virtue  of  the  hyper- 
physical determination.  Had  Reid,  in  fact,  not  limited  his  study 
of  the  Cartesian  system  to  the  writings  of  its  founder,  the  twofold 
application  of  the  term  idea , by  Descartes,  could  never  have  seduced 
him  into  the  belief,  that  so  monstrous  a solecism  had  been  commit- 
ted by  that  illustrious  thinker.  By  De  la  Forge,  the  personal  friend 
of  Descartes,  the  verbal  ambiguity  is,  indeed,  not  only  noticed, 
but  removed ; and  that  admirable  expositor  applies  the  term  “ cor- 
poreal species’’’  to  the  affection  in  the  brain,  and  the  terms  “idea,” 
“ intellectual  notion,”  to  the  spiritual  representation  in  the  con- 
scious mind. — ( De  I’Esprit,  c.  10.) 

But  if  Reid  be  wrong  in  his  supposition,  that  Descartes  admit- 
ted a consciousness  of  ideas  in  the  brain;’  is  he  on  the  other  al- 
ternative wrong,  and  inexcusably  wrong,  in  holding  that  Descar- 
tes supposed  ideas  in  the  mind , not  identical  with  their  percep- 
tions? Mallebranche,  the  most  illustrious  name  in  the  school 
after  its  founder,  (and  who,  not  certainly  with  less  ability,  may 
be  supposed  to  have  studied  the  writings  of  his  master,  with  far 
greater  attention  than  either  Reid  or  Brown,)  ridicules,  as  “ con- 
trary to  common  sense  and  justice,”  the  supposition  that  Descartes 
had  rejected  ideas  in  “ the  ordinary  acceptation ,”  and  adopted  the 
hypothesis  of  their  being  representations,  not  really  distinct  from 
their  perception.  And  while  “he  is  as  certain  as  he  possibly  can 
be  in  such  matters,”  that  Descartes  had  not  dissented  from  the 
general  opinion,  he  taunts  Arnauld  with  resting  his  paradoxical 
interpretation  of  that  philosopher’s  doctrine  “not  on  any  passages 


1 Reid’s  error  on  this  point  is  however  surpassed  by  that  of  M.  Royer-Collard,  who 
represents  the  idea  in  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  perception  as  exclusively  situate  in  the 
brain. — ( CEuvres  de  Reid,  III.  p.  334). 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG. 


79 


of  his  Metaphysic  contrary  to  the  common  opinion ,”  hut  on  his 
own  arbitrary  limitation  of  iltlie  ambiguous  term  perception ” 
(Rep.  au  Livre  des  Idees,  passim ; Arnauld,  CEuv.  xxxviii.  pp, 
388,  389.)  That  ideas  are  “ found  in  the  mind , not  formed  by  itfi 
and  consequently,  that  in  the  act  of  knowledge  the  representation 
is  really  distinct  from  the  cognition  proper,  is  strenuously  asserted 
as  the  doctrine  of  his  master  by  the  Cartesian  Roell,  in  the  con- 
troversy he  maintained  with  the  Anti-Cartesian  De  Vries.  (Ro- 
elli  Dispp.;  De  Vries  De  Ideis  innatis.)  But  it  is  idle  to  mul- 
tiply proofs.  Brown’s  charge  of  ignorance  falls  back  upon  himself ; 
and  Reid  may  lightly  bear  the  reproach  of  “ exactly  reversing'1’’ 
the  notorious  doctrine  of  Descartes,  when  thus  borne,  along  with 
him,  by  the  profoundest  of  that  philosopher’s  disciples. 

Had  Brown  been  aware,  that  the  point  at  issue  between  him 
and  Reid,  was  one  agitated  among  the  followers  of  Descartes 
themselves,  he  could  hardly  have  dreamt  of  summarily  determin- 
ing the  question  by  the  production  of  one  vulgar  passage  from  the 
writings  of  that  philosopher.  But  we  are  sorely  puzzled  to  ac- 
count for  his  hallucination,  in  considering  this  passage  pertinent. 
Its  substance  is  fully  given  by  Reid  in  his  exposition  of  the  Car- 
tesian doctrine.  Every  iota  it  contains,  of  any  relevancy,  is 
adopted  by  Mallebranche  ; — constitutes,  less  precisely  indeed,  his 
famous  distinction  of  perception  (idee)  from  sensation  ( sentiment ) : 
and  Mallebranche  is  one  of  the  two  modern  philosophers  admitted 
by  Brown  to  have  held  the  hypothesis  of  representation  in  its  first , 
and,  as  he  says,  its  most  “ erroneous ” form.  But  principles  that 
coalesce,  even  with  the  hypothesis  of  ideas  distinct  from  mind , 
are  not,  a fortiori , incompatible  with  the  hypothesis,  of  ideas  dis- 
tinct only  from  the  perceptive  act.  We  can  not,  however,  enter 
on  an  articulate  exposition  of  its  irrelevancy. 

To  adduce  Hobbes,  as  an  instance  of  Reid’s  misrepresentation 
of  the  “common  doctrine  of  ideas,”  betrays,  on  the  part  of  Brown, 
a total  misapprehension  of  the  conditions  of  the  question ; or  he 
forgets  that  Hobbes  was  a materialist.  The  doctrine  of  repre- 
sentation, under  all  its  modifications,  is  properly  subordinate  to 
the  doctrine  of  a spiritual  principle  of  thought;  and  on  the  sup- 
position, all  but  universally  admitted  among  philosophers,  that 
the  relation  of  knowledge  implied  the  analogy  of  existence,  it  was 
mainly  devised  to  explain  the  possibility  of  a knowledge  by  an 
immaterial  subject,  of  an  existence  so  disproportioned  to  its  na- 
ture, as  the  qualities  of  a material  object.  Contending,  that  an 


80 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PEECEPTION. 


immediate  cognition  of  the  accidents  of  matter,  infers  an  essential 
identity  of  matter  and  mind,  Brown  himself  admits,  that  the  hy- 
pothesis of  representation  belongs  exclusively  to  the  doctrine  of 
dualism  (Lect.  xxv.  pp.  159,  160)  ; while  Reid,  assailing  the 
hypothesis  of  ideas,  only  as  subverting  the  reality  of  matter,  could 
hardly  regard  it  as  parcel  of  that  scheme,  which  acknowledges  the 
reality  of  nothing  else.  But  though  Hobbes  can  not  be  adduced 
as  a competent  witness  against  Reid,  he  is  however  valid  evi- 
dence against  Brown.  Hobbes,  though  a materialist , admitted 
no  knowledge  of  an  external  world.  Like  his  friend  Sorbiere,  he 
was  a kind  of  material  idealist.  According  to  him,  we  know 
nothing  of  the  qualities  or  existence  of  any  outward  reality.  All 
that  we  know  is  the  “ seeming ,”  the  “ apparition ,”  the  “ aspect ,” 
the  “ phenomenon ,”  the  “ phantasm ,”  within  ourselves  ; and  this 
subjective  object , of  which  we  are  conscious,  and  which  is  con- 
sciousness itself,  is  nothing  more  than  the  11  agitation”  of  our 
internal  organism,  determined  by  the  unknown  “ motions,”  which 
are  supposed,  in  like  manner,  to  constitute  the  world  without. 
Perception  he  reduces  to  sensation.  Memory  and  imagination 
are  faculties  specifically  identical  with  sense,  differing  from  it 
simply  in  the  degree  of  their  vivacity;  and  this  difference  of  in- 
tensity, with  Hobbes,  as  with  Hume,  is  the  only  discrimination 
between  our  dreaming  and  our  waking  thoughts. — A doctrine  of 
perception  identical  with  Reid’s  ! 

In  regard  to  Arnauld,  the  question  is  not,  as  in  relation  to  the 
others,  whether  Reid  conceives  him  to  maintain  a form  of  the 
ideal  theory  which  he  rejects,  but  whether  Reid  admits  Arnauld' s 
opinion  on  perception  and  his  own  to  be  identical.  “ To  these 
authors,”  says  Hr.  Brown,  “whose  opinions,  on  the  subject  of 
perception,  Dr.  Reid  has  misconceived,  I may  add  one,  whom  even 
lie  himself  allows  to  have  shaken  off  the  ideal  system , and  to  have 
considered  the  idea  and  the  perception,  as  not  distinct,  but  the 
same,  a modification  of  the  mind  and  nothing  more.  I allude  to 
the  celebrated  Jansenist  writer,  Arnauld,  who  maintains  this  doc- 
trine as  expressly  as  Dr.  Reid  himself,  and  makes  it  the  founda- 
tion of  his  argument  in  his  controversy  with  Mallebranche.” 
(Lecture  xxvii.  p.  173.)  If  this  statement  be  not  untrue,  then  is 
Dr.  Brown’s  interpretation  of  Reid  himself  correct.  A represent- 
ative perception,  under  its  third  and  simplest  modification,  is  held 
by  Arnauld  as  by  Brown;  and  his  exposition  is  so  clear  and  artic- 
ulate, that  all  essential  misconception  of  his  doctrine  is  precluded. 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG.  81 

In  these  circumstances,  if  Reid  avow  the  identity  of  Arnauld’s 
opinion  and  his  own,  this  avowal  is  tantamount  to  a declaration 
that  his  peculiar  doctrine  of  perception  is  a scheme  of  representa- 
tion; whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  he  signalize  the  contrast  of 
their  two  opinions,  he  clearly  evinces  the  radical  antithesis — and 
his  sense  of  the  radical  antithesis — of  the  doctrine  of  intuition , 
to  every,  even  the  simplest  form  of  the  hypothesis  of  representa- 
tion. And  this  last  he  does. 

It  can  not  be  maintained,  that  Reid  admits  a philosopher  to 
hold  an  opinion  convertible  with  his,  whom  he  states : — “ to  profess 
the  doctrine,  universally  received,  that  ive  perceive  not  material 
things  immediately — that  it  is  their  ideas,  which  are  the  immediate 
objects  of  our  thoughts — and  that  it  is  in  the  idea  of  every  thing, 
that  we  perceive  its  properties."  This  fundamental  contrast  being 
established,  we  may  safely  allow,  that  the  radical  misconception, 
which  caused  Reid  to  overlook  the  difference  of  our  presentative 
and  representative  faculties,  caused  him  likewise  to  believe,  that 
Arnauld  had  attempted  to  unite  two  contradictory  theories  of 
perception.  Not  aware,  that  it  was  possible  to  maintain  a doc- 
trine of  perception,  in  which  the  idea  was  not  really  distinguished 
from  its  cognition,  and  yet  to  hold  that  the  mind  had  no  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  external  things  : Reid  supposes,  in  the  first 
place,  that  Arnauld,  in  rejecting  the  hypothesis  of  ideas,  as  repre- 
sentative entities,  really  distinct  from  the  contemplative  act  of 
perception,  coincided  with  himself  in  viewing  the  material  reality, 
as  the  immediate  object  of  that  act ; and,  in  the  second,  that 
Arnauld  again  deserted  this  opinion,  when,  with  the  philosophers, 
he  maintained,  that  the  idea,  or  act  of  the  mind  representing  the 
external  reality,  and  not  the  external  reality  itself,  was  the  im- 
mediate object  of  perception.  But  Arnauld’s  theory  is  one  and 
indivisible ; and,  as  such,  no  part  of  it  is  identical  with  Reid’s. 
Reid’s  confusion,  here  as  elsewhere,  is  explained  by  the  circum- 
stance, that  he  had  never  speculatively  conceived  the  possibility 
of  the  simplest  modification  of  the  representative  hypothesis.  He 
saw  no  medium  between  rejecting  ideas  as  something  different 
from  thought,  and  the  doctrine  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the 
material  object.  Neither  does  Arnauld,  as  Reid  supposes,  ever 
assert  against  Mallebranche,  “ that  we  perceive  external  things 
immediately,”  that  is,  in  themselves. 1 Maintaining  i?hat  all  our 


1 This  is  perfectly  clear  from  Arnauld’s  own  uniform  statements ; and  it  is  justly 
observed  by  Mallebranche,  in  his  Reply  to  the  Treatise  On  True  and  False  Ideas , (p. 

F 


82 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


perceptions  are,  modifications  essentially  representative , Arnauld 
everywhere  avows,  that  he  denies  ideas,  only  as  existences  distinct 
from  the  act  itself  of  perception.* 1 

Reid  was  therefore  wrong,  and  did  Arnauld  less  than  justice, 
in  viewing  his  theory  “as  a weak  attempt  to  reconcile  two  incon- 
sistent doctrines  he  was  wrong,  and  did  Arnauld  more  than 
justice,  in  supposing,  that  one  of  these  doctrines  is  not  incom- 
patible with  his  own.  The  detection,  however,  of  this  error  only 
tends  to  manifest  more  clearly,  how  just,  even  when  under  its 
influence,  was  Reid’s  appreciation  of  the  contrast,  subsisting  be- 
tween his  own  and  Arnauld’s  opinion,  considered  as  a whole;  and 
exposes  more  glaringly  Brown’s  general  misconception  of  Reid’s 
philosophy,  and  his  present  gross  misrepresentation,  in  affirming 
that  the  doctrines  of  the  two  philosophers  were  identical,  and  by 
Reid  admitted  to  he  the  same. 

Nor  is  Dr.  Brown  more  successful  in  his  defense  of  Locke. 

Supposing  always,  that  ideas  were  held  to  be  something  dis- 
tinct from  their  cognition,  Reid  states  it,  as  that  philosopher’s 
opinion,  “that  images  of  external  objects  were  conveyed  to  the 
brain ; but  whether  he  thought  with  Descartes  [erratum  for  Dr. 
Clarke  ?]  and  Newton,  that  the  images  in  the  brain  are  perceived 
by  the  mind,  there  present,  or  that  they  are  imprinted  on  the 
mind  itself,  is  not  so  evident.”  This,  Dr.  Brown,  nor  is  he  orig- 
inal in  the  assertion,  pronounces  a flagrant  misrepresentation. 
Not  only  does  he  maintain,  that  Locke  never  conceived  the  idea 
to  be  substantially  different  from  the  mind,  as  a material  image 
in  the  brain;  but,  that  he  never  supposed  it  to  have  an  existence 
apart  from  the  mental  energy  of  which  it  is  the  object.  Locke, 
he  asserts,  like  Arnauld,  considered  the  idea  perceived  and  the 
percipient  act,  to  constitute  the  same  indivisible  modification  of 
the  conscious  mind.  We  shall  see. 

In  his  language,  Locke  is,  of  all  philosophers,  the  most  figura- 
tive, ambiguous,  vacillating,  various,  and  even  contradictory; — 
as  has  been  noticed  by  Reid,  and  Stewart,  and  Brown  himself — 

123,  orig.  edit.) — that,  “ in  reality,  according  to  M.  Arnauld,  we  do  not  perceive  bodies, 
we  perceive  only  ourselves." 

1 CEuvres  t.  xxxviii.  pp.  187,  198,  199,  389,  ct  passim.  It  is  to  be  recollected  that 
Descartes,  Mallebranche,  Arnauld,  Locke,  and  philosophers  in  general  before  Reid, 
employed  the  term  Perception  as  co-extensive  with  Consciousness. — By  Leibnitz, 
Wolf,  and  their  followers,  it  was  used  in  a peculiar  sense — as  equivalent  to  Repre- 
sentation or  Idea  proper,  and  as  contradistinguished  from  Apperception,  or  conscious- 
ness. Reid’s  limitation  of  the  term,  though  the  grounds  on  which  it  is  defended  are 
not  of  the  strongest,  is  convenient,  and  has  been  very  generally  admitted. 


HISTORICALLY,  HMD  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG.  83 

indeed,  we  "believe,  by  every  author  who  has  had  occasion  to 
comment  on  this  philosopher.  The  opinions  of  such  a writer  are 
not,  therefore,  to  be  assumed  from  isolated  and  casual  express- 
ions, which  themselves  require  to  be  interpreted  on  the  general 
analogy  of  his  system ; and  yet  this  is  the  only  ground  on  which 
Dr.  Brown  attempts  to  establish  his  conclusions.  Thus,  on  the 
matter  under  discussion,  though  really  distinguishing,  Locke 
verbally  confounds,  the  objects  of  sense  and  of  intellect — the 
operation  and  its  object — the  objects  immediate  and  mediate — 
the  object  and  its  relations — the  images  of  fancy  and  the  notions 
of  the  understanding.  Consciousness  is  converted  with  Percep- 
tion— Perception  with  Idea — Idea  with  Ideatum,  and  with  No- 
tion, Conception,  Phantasm,  Representation,  Sense,  Meaning,  &c. 
Now,  his  language  identifying  ideas  and  perceptions,  appears 
conformable  to  a disciple  of  Arnauld ; and  now  it  proclaims  him 
a follower  of  Digby — explaining  ideas  by  mechanical  impulse, 
and  the  propagation  of  material  particles  from  the  external  real- 
ity to  the  brain.  The  idea  would  seem,  in  one  passage,  an  or- 
ganic affection — the  mere  occasion  of  a spiritual  representation ; 
in  another,  a representative  image,  in  the  brain  itself.  In  em- 
ploying thus  indifferently  the  language  of  every  hypothesis,  may 
we  not  suspect,  that  he  was  anxious  to  be  made  responsible  for 
none  ? One,  however,  he  has  formally  rejected  : and  that  is  the 
very  opinion  attributed  to  him  by  Dr.  Brown — that  the  idea , or 
object  of  consciousness  in  perception,  is  only  a modification  of 
the  mind  itself. 

We  do  not  deny,  that  Locke  occasionally  employs  expressions, 
which,  in  a writer  of  more  considerate  language,  would  imply 
the  identity  of  ideas  with  the  act  of  knowledge  ; and,  under  the 
circumstances,  we  should  have  considered  suspense  more  rational 
than  a dogmatic  confidence  in  any  conclusion,  did  not  the  follow- 
ing passage,  which  has  never,  we  believe,  been  noticed,  appear  a 
positive  and  explicit  contradiction  of  Dr.  Brown’s  interpretation. 
It  is  from  Locke’s  Examination  of  Mallebranche' s Opinion , 
which,  as  subsequent  to  the  publication  of  the  Essay,  must  be 
held  authentic,  in  relation  to  the  doctrines  of  that  work.  At  the 
same  time,  the  statement  is  articulate  and  precise,  and  possesses 
all  the  authority  of  one  cautiously  made  in  the  course  of  a pole- 
mical discussion.  Mallebranche  coincided  with  Arnauld,  and 
consequently  with  Locke,  as  interpreted  by  Brown,  to  the  extent 
of  supposing,  that  sensation  proper  is  nothing  but  a state  or 


84 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


modification  of  the  mind  itself ; and  Locke  had  thus  the  oppor- 
tunity of  expressing,  in  regard  to  this  opinion,  his  agreement  or 
dissent.  An  acquiescence  in  the  doctrine,  that  the  secondary 
qualities,  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  sensation,  are  merely 
mental  states,  by  no  means  involves  an  admission  that  the  pri- 
mary qualities  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  perception,  are 
nothing  more.  Mallebranche,  for  example,  affirms  the  one  and 
denies  the  other.  But  if  Locke  be  found  to  ridicule,  as  he  does, 
even  the  opinion  which  merely  reduces  the  secondary  qualities 
to  mental  states,  a fortiori,  and  this  on  the  principle  of  his  own 
philosophy,  he  must  be  held  to  reject  the  doctrine,  which  would 
reduce  not  only  the  non-resembling  sensations  of  the  secondary, 
but  even  the  resembling,  and  consequently  extended,  ideas  of  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter,  to  modifications  of  the  immaterial 
unextended  mind.  In  these  circumstances,  the  following  passage 
is  superfluously  conclusive  against  Brown,  and  equally  so,  whe- 
ther we  coincide  or  not  in  all  the  principles  it  involves.  “ But 
to  examine  their  doctrine  of  modification  a little  farther.  Differ- 
ent sentiments  (sensations)  are  different  modifications  of  the 
mind.  The  mind,  or  soul,  that  perceives,  is  one  immaterial  in- 
divisible substance.  Now  I see  the  white  and  black  on  this  paper, 
I hear  one  singing  in  the  next  room,  I feel  the  warmth  of  the  fire 
I sit  by,  and  I taste  an  apple  I am  eating,  and  all  this  at  the 
same  time.  Now,  I ask,  take  modification  for  what  you  please, 
can  the  same  unextended,  indivisible  substance  have  different, 
nay , inconsistent  and  opposite  (as  these  of  white  and  black  must 
be)  modifications  at  the  same  time  ? Or  must  ive  suppose  dis- 
tinct parts  in  an  indivisible  substance,  one  for  black,  another  for 
white,  and  another  for  red  ideas,  and  so  of  the  rest  of  those  in- 
finite sensations , ivhicli  ive  have  in  sorts  and  degrees ; all  which 
ive  can  distinctly  perceive,  and  so  are  distinct  ideas , some  where- 
of are  opposite,  as  heat  and  cold , which  yet  a man  may  feel  at 
the  same  time  ? I was  ignorant  before,  how  sensation  was  per- 
formed in  us : this  they  call  an  explanation  of  it ! Must  I say 
now  I understand  it  better  ? If  this  be  to  cure  one’s  ignorance, 
it  is  a very  slight  disease,  and  the  charm  of  two  or  three  insig- 
nificant words  will  at  any  time  remove  it ; probatum  est .”  (Sec. 
39.)  This  passage,  as  we  shall  see,  is  correspondent  to  the  doc- 
trine held  on  this  point  by  Locke’s  personal  friend  and  philosoph- 
ical follower,  Le  Clerc.  (But,  what  is  curious,  the  suppositions 
which  Locke  here  rejects,  as  incompatible  with  the  spirituality 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG. 


85 


of  mind,  are  the  very  facts,  on  which  Ammonius  Hermiee,  Phi- 
loponus,  and  Condillac,  among  many  others,  found  their  proof  of 
the  immateriality  of  the  thinking  subject.) 

But  if  it  be  thus  evident,  that  Locke  held  neither  the  third 
form  of  representation,  that  lent  to  him  by  Brown,  nor  even  the 
second;  it  follows,  that  Reid  did  him  any  thing  hut  injustice,  in 
supposing  him  to  maintain,  that  ideas  are  objects,  either  in  the 
brain , or  in  the  mind  itself.  Even  the  more  material  of  these 
alternatives  has  been  the  one  generally  attributed  to  him  by  his 
critics,1  and  the  one  adopted  from  him  by  his  disciples.2  Nor  is 
this  to  be  deemed  an  opinion  too  monstrous  to  be  entertained  by 
so  enlightened  a philosopher.  It  was,  as  we  shall  see,  the  com- 
mon opinion  of  the  age ; the  opinion,  in  particular,  held  by  the 
most  illustrious  of  his  countrymen  and  contemporaries — by  New- 
ton, Clarke,  Willis,  Hook,  &c.3  The  English  psychologists  have 
indeed  been  generally  very  mechanical. 

Dr.  Brown  at  length  proceeds  to  consummate  his  imagined  vic- 
tory, by  11  that  most  decisive  evidence , found  not  in  treatises  read 
only  by  a few,  but  in  the  popular  elementary  works  of  science  of 
the  time,  the  general  text  books  of  schools  and  colleges.”  He 
quotes,  however,  only  two  : — the  Pneumatology  of  Le  Clerc,  and 
the  Logic  of  Crousaz. 

“ Le  Clerc,”  says  Dr.  Brown,  “ in  his  chapter  on  the  nature 
of  ideas,  gives  the  history  of  the  opinions  of  philosophers  on  this 
subject,  and  states  among  them  the  very  doctrine  which  is  most 

1 To  refer  only  to  the  first  and  last  of  his  regular  critics  : see  Solid  Philosophy 
asserted  against  the  Fajicics  of  the  Ideists,  by  J.  S.  [John  Sergeant.]  Lond.  1697. 
p.  161 — a very  curious  book,  absolutely,  we  may  say,  unknown  ; and  Cousin,  Cours  de 
Philosophic,  t.  ii.  1829  ; pp.  330,  357,  325,  365 — the  most  important  work  on  Locke 
since  the  Nouvcaux  Essais  of  Leibnitz. 

2 Tucker’s  Light  of  Nature,  i.  pp.  15,  18,  ed.  2. 

3 On  the  opinion  of  Newton  and  Clarke,  see  Des  Maizeaux’s  Recueil,  i.  pp.  7,  8. 
9,  15,  22,  75,  127,  169,  &c.  Genovesi  notices  the  crudity  of  Newton’s  doctrine, 
“Mentem  in  cercbro  prassidere  atque  in  eo,  suo  scilicet  sensorio,  rerum  hnagincs  ccrnere:' 
On  Willis,  see  his  work,  Be  Anima  Brutorum,  p.  64,  alibi,  ed.  1672.  On  Hook,  see  his 
Lcct.  on  Light,  ()  7.  We  know  not  whether  it  has  been  remarked  that  Locke’s  doctrine  of 
particles  and  impulse,  is  precisely  that  of  Sir  Kenelm  Digby ; and  if  Locke  adopts  one 
part  of  so  gross  an  hypothesis,  what  is  there  improbable  in  his  adoption  of  the  other  1 
— that  the  object  of  perception  is,  “a  material  participation  of  the  bodies  that,  work 
on  the  outward  organs  of  the  senses.”  (Digby,  Treatise  of  Bodies,  c.  32.)  As  a spe- 
cimen of  the  mechanical  explanations  of  mental  phenomena  then  considered  satisfac- 
tory, we  quote  Sir  Kenelm’s  theory  of  memory  : “ Out  of  which  it  followeth,  that  the 
little  similitudes  which  are  in  the  caves  of  the  brain,  wheeling  and  swimming  about, 
almost  in  such  sort  as  you  see  in  the  washing  of  currants  or  rice  by  the  winding  about 
and  circular  turning  of  the  cook’s  hand,  divers  sorts  of  bodies  do  go  their  course  for 
a pretty  while  ; so  that  the  most  ordinary  objects  can  not  but  present  themselves 
quickly,”  &c.,  &c.  (ibidem.) 


86 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


forcibly  and  accurately  opposed  to  the  ideal  system  of  perception. 

< Alii  putant  ideas  et  perceptiones  idearum  easdem  esse,  licet  rela~ 
tionibus  differant.  Idea,  uti  censent,  proprie  ad  objectum  refer- 
tur,  quod  mens  considerat ; — perceptio,  vere  ad  mentem  ipsam 
quae  percipit : sed  duplex  ilia  relatio  ad  unam  modificationem 
mentis  pertinet.  Itaque,  secundum  hosce  philosophos,  nullas 
sunt,  proprie,  loquendo,  ideee  a mente  nostra  distinctae.’  What  is 
it,  I may  ask,  ivhich  Dr.  Reid  considers  himself  as  having  added 
to  this  very  philosophical  view  of  perception  ? and  if  he  added 
nothing,  it  is  surely  too  much  to  ascribe  to  him  the  merit  of  de- 
tecting errors,  the  counter  statement  of  ivhich  had  long  formed 
a part  of  the  elementary  works  of  the  school .” 

In  the  first  place,  Dr.  Reid  certainly  “ added ” nothing  “to  this 
very  philosophical  view  of  perception,”  but  he  exploded  it  altogether. 

In  the  second,  it  is  false,  either  that  this  doctrine  of  perception 
11  had  long  formed  part  of  the  elementary  works  of  the  schools ,” 
or  that  Le  Clerc  affords  any  countenance  to  this  assertion.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  virtually  stated  by  him  to  be  the  novel  paradox 
of  a single  philosopher ; nay  to  carry  the  blunder  to  hyperbole, 
it  is  already,  as  such  a singular  opinion,  discussed  and  referred 
to  its  author  by  Reid  himself.  Had  Dr.  Brown  proceeded  from 
the  tenth  paragraph,  which  he  quotes,  to  the  fourteenth,  which 
he  could  not  have  read,  he  would  have  found,  that  the  passage 
extracted,  so  far  from  containing  the  statement  of  an  old  and 
familiar  dogma  in  tne  schools,  was,  neither  more  nor  less,  than  a 
statement  of  the  contemporary  hypothesis  of — Antony  Arnauld  ! 
and  of  Antony  Arnauld  alone  ! ! 

In  the  third  place,  from  the  mode  in  which  he  cites  Le  Clerc, 
his  silence  to  the  contrary,  and  the  general  tenor  of  his  statement, 
Dr.  Brown  would  lead  us  to  believe,  that  Le  Clerc  himself  coin- 
cides in  “this  very  philosophical  view  of  perception.”  So  far, 
however,  from  coinciding  with  Arnauld,  he  pronounces  his  opin- 
ion to  be  false ; controverts  it  upon  very  solid  grounds  ; and  in 
delivering  his  own  doctrine  touching  ideas,  though  sufficiently 
cautious  in  telling  us  what  they  are,  he  has  no  hesitation  in  as- 
suring us,  among  other  things  which  they  can  not  be,  that  they 
are  not  modifications  or  essential  states  of  mind.  “ Non  est  (idea 
sc.)  modificatio  aut  essentia  mentis  : nam  prseterquam  quod  sen- 
timus  ingens  esse  discrimen  inter  idaea  perceptionem  et  sensatio- 
nem  ; quid  habet  mens  nostra  simile  monti,  aut  innumeris  ejus- 
modi  ideis?” — ( Pneumat . sect.  i.  c.  5.  § 10.) 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG. 


87 


On  all  this  no  observation  of  ours  can  he  either  so  apposite  or 
authoritative,  as  the  edifying  reflections  with  which  Dr.  Brown 
himself  concludes  his  vindication  of  the  philosophers  against  Reid. 
Brown’s  precept  is  sound,  hut  his  example  is  instructive.  One 
word  we  leave  blank,  which  the  reader  may  himself  supply. — 

“ That  a mind  so  vigorous  as  that  of  Dr. should  have  been 

capable  of  the  series  of  misconceptions  which  we  have  traced , may 
seem  wonderful , and  truly  is  so  ; and  equally , or  rather  still  more 
wonderful , is  the  general  admission  of  his  merit  in  this  respect. 
I trust  it  will  impress  you  with  one  important  lesson — to  consult 
the  opinions  of  authors  in  their  own  ivories,  and  not  in  the  ivorks 
of  those  who  profess  to  give  a faithful  account  of  them.  From 
my  own  experience  I can  most  truly  assure  you,  that  there  is 
scarcely  an  instance  in  which  I have  found  the  view  I had  re- 
ceived of  them  to  be  faithful.  There  is  usually  something  more, 
or  something  less,  which  modifies  the  general  result ; and  by  the 
various  additions  and  subtractions  thus  made,  so  much  of  the 
spirit  of  the  original  doctrine  is  lost,  that  it  may,  in  some  cases, 
he  considered,  as  having  made  a fortunate  escape,  if  it  be  not  at 
last  represented  as  directly  opposite  to  ivhat  it  is?''  (Lect.  xxvii. 
p.  175.) 

The  cause  must,  therefore,  he  unconditionally  decided  in  favor 
of  Reid,  even  on  that  testimony,  which  Brown  triumphantly  pro- 
duces in  court,  as  “ the  most  decisive  evidence'1'1  against  him: — 
here  then  we  might  close  our  case.  To  signalize,  however,  more 
completely  the  whole  character  of  the  accusation,  we  shall  call  a 
few  witnesses  ; to  prove,  in  fact,  nothing  more  than  that  Brown’s 
own  “most  decisive  evidence”  is  not  less  favorable  to  himself, 
than  any  other  that  might  he  cited  from  the  great  majority  of  the 
learned. 

Mallebranche,  in  his  controversy  with  Arnauld,  every  where 
assumes  the  doctrine  of  ideas,  really  distinct  from  their  percep- 
tion, to  he  the  one  ‘ 1 commonly  received  nor  does  his  adversary 
venture  to  dispute  the  assumption.  {Rep.  au  Livre  des  Idees. — 
Arnauld,  CEuv.  t.  xxxviii.  p.  388.) 

Leibnitz,  on  the  other  hand,  in  answer  to  Clarke,  admits , that 
the  crude  theory  of  ideas  held  by  this  philosopher,  teas  the  com- 
mon. “ Je  ne  demeure  point  d’accord  des  notions  vulgaires, 
comme  si  les  Images  des  choses  etaient  transportees,  par  les  or- 
ganes,  jusqu'd  Vame.  Cette  notion  de  la  Philosophic  Vulgaire 
n’est  point  intelligible,  comme  les  nouveaux  Cartesiens  l’ont  assez 


88 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


montre.  L’on  ne  saurait  expliquer  comment  la  substance  imma- 
terielle  est  affectee  par  la  matiere:  et  soutenir  une  chose  non 
intelligible  la-dessus,  c’est  recourir  a la  notion  scholastique  chi- 
merique  de  je  ne  sais  quelles  especes  intentionelles  inexpliquable, 
qui  passentdes  organes  dans  Fame.”  {Opera,  II.  p.  161.)  Nor 
does  Clarke,  in  reply,  disown  this  doctrine  for  himself  and  others. 
—{Ibid.  p.  182.) 

Brucicer,  in  his  Historia  Philosophica  Doctrines  de  Icleis 
(1723),  speaks  of  Arnauld’s  hypothesis  as  a “ peculiar  opinion ,” 
rejected  by  “ philosophers  in  general  (plerisque  eruditis),”  and 
as  not  less  untenable  than  the  paradox  of  Mallebranche. — (P. 
248.) 

Dr.  Brown  is  fond  of  text-books.  Did  we  condescend  to  those 
of  ordinary  authors,  we  could  adduce  a cloud  of  witnesses  against 
him.  As  a sample,  we  shall  quote  only  three,  but  these  of  the 
very  highest  authority. 

Christian  Thomasius,  though  a reformer  of  the  Peripatetic  and 
Cartesian  systems,  adopted  a grosser  theory  of  ideas  than  either. 
In  his  Introductio  ad  Pliilosophiam  aulicam  (1702),  he  defines 
thought  in  general,  a mental  discourse  “ about  images,  by  the 
motion  of  external  bodies , and  through  the  organs  of  sense , 
stamped  in  the  substance  of  the  brain.”  (c.  3.  § 29.  See  also 
his  Inst.  Jurispr.  Div.  L.  i.  c.  1.,  and  Introd.  in  Phil,  ration. 
c.  3.) 

S’G-ravesande,  in  his  Introductio  ad  Pliilosophiam  (1736), 
though  professing  to  leave  undetermined,  the  positive  question 
concerning  the  origin  of  ideas,  and  admitting  that  sensations  are 
“nothing  more  than  modifications  of  the  mind  itself;”  makes  no 
scruple,  in  determining  the  negative , to  dismiss,  as  absurd,  the 
hypothesis,  which  would  reduce  sensible  ideas  to  an  equal  sub- 
jectivity. “ Mentem  ipsam  has  Ideas  efficere,  et  sibi  ipsi  repre- 
sentare  res,  quarum  his  solis  Ideis  cognitionem  acquirit,  nullo 
modo  concipi  potest.  Nulla  inter  causam  et  effectum  relatio 
daretur.”  (H  279,  282.) 

G-enovesi,  in  his  Elementa  Metaphysical  (1748),  lays  it  down 
as  a fundamental  position  of  philosophy,  that  ideas  and  the  act 
cognitive  of  ideas  are  distinct  (“  Prop.  xxx.  Idece  et  Percep- 
tiones  non  videntur  esse  posse  una  eademque  res”) ; and  he  ably 
refutes  the  hypothesis  of  Arnauld,  which  he  reprobates  as 
a paradox,  unworthy  of  that  illustrious  reasoner.  {Pars.  II.  p. 
140.) 


HISTORICALLY,  REID  RIGHT,  BROWN  WRONG. 


89 


Voltaire’s  Dictionnaire  Pliilosophique  may  be  adduced  as  re- 
presenting the  intelligence  of  the  age  of  Reid  himself.  11  Qqi’est- 
ce  qu’une  Idee  ? — C’est  une  Image  qui  se  peint  dans  mon  cer- 
veau. — Toutes  vos  pensees  sont  done  des  images  ? — Assurement 
&c.  (voce  Idee.) 

What,  in  fine,  is  the  doctrine  of  the  two  most  numerous  schools 
of  modern  philosophy — the  Leibnitian  and  Kantian  ? 1 Both 
maintain  that  the  mind  involves  representations  of  which  it  is 
not,  and  never  may  be,  conscious  ; that  is,  both  maintain  the 
second  form  of  the  hypothesis,  and  one  of  the  two  that  Reid 
understood  and  professedly  assailed.  [This  statement  requires 
qualification.] 

In  Crousaz,  Dr.  Brown  has  actually  succeeded  in  finding  one 
example  (he  might  have  found  twenty),  of  a philosopher,  before 
Reid,  holding  the  same  theory  of  ideas  with  Arnauld  and  himself.1 2 

The  reader  is  nowin  a condition  to  judge  of  the  correctness  of 
Brown’s  statement,  “ that  with  the  exception  of  Mallebranche 
and  Berkeley,  who  had  peculiar  and  very  erroneous  notions  on  the 
subject,  all  the  philosophers  whom  Dr.  Reid  considered  himself 
as  opposing,”  (what ! Newton,  Clarke,  Hook,  Norris,  Porterfield, 


1 Leibnitz  ; — Opera,  Dutcnsii,  tom.  ii.  pp.  21,  23,  33,  214,  pars  ii.  pp.  137,  145, 
146.  CEuvres  Philos,  par  Raspe,  pp.  66.  67,  74,  96,  ets.  Wolf  ; — Psychol.  Rat.  (j 
10,  ets.  Psychol.  Emp.  (j  48.  Kant — -Critik  d.  r.  V.  p.  376.  ed.  2.  Anthropologic, 
tj  5.  With  one  restriction,  Leibnitz’s  doctrine  is  that  of  the  lower  Platonists,  who 
maintained  that  the  soul  actually  contains  representations  of  every  possible  substance 
and  event  in  the  world  during  the  revolution  of  the  great  year ; although  these  cogni- 
tive reasons  are  not  elicited  in  consciousness,  unless  the  reality,  thus  represented,  be 
itself  brought  within  the  sphere  of  the  sensual  organs.  ( Plotinus , Enn.  V.  lib.  vii.  cc. 
1,  2,  3.) 

2 In  speaking  of  this  author,  Dr.  Brown,  who  never  loses  an  opportunity  to  depre- 
ciate Reid,  goes  out  of  his  way  to  remark,  “ that  precisely  the  same  distinction  of 
sensations  and  perceptions,  on  which  Dr.  Reid  founds  so  much,  is  stated  and  enforced 
in  the  different  works  of  this  ingenious  writer,”  and  expatiates  on  this  conformity  of 
the  two  philosophers,  as  if  he  deemed  its  detection  to  be  something  new  and  curious. 
Mr.  Stewart  had  already  noticed  it  in  his  Essays.  But  neither  he  nor  Brown  seem 
to  recollect,  that  Crousaz  only  copies  Mallebranche,  re  et  verbis,  and  that  Reid  had 
himself  expressly  assigned  to  that  philosopher  the  merit  of  first  recognizing  the  dis- 
tinction. This  is  incorrect.  But  M.  Royer  Collard  (Reid,  CEuvres,  t.  iii.  p.  329)  is 
still  more  inaccurate  in  thinking  that  Mallebranche  and  Leibnitz  (Leibnitz!)  were  per- 
haps the  only  philosophers  before  Reid,  who  had  discriminated  perception  from  sensa- 
tion. The  distinction  was  established  by  Des  Cartes  ; and  after  Mallebranche,  but 
long  before  Reid,  it  had  become  even  common  ; and  so  far  is  Leibnitz  from  having 
any  merit  in  the  matter,  his  criticism  of  Mallebranche  shows,  that  with  all  his  learn- 
ing he  was  strangely  ignorant  of  a discrimination  then  familiar  to  philosophers  in 
general,  which  may  indeed  be  traced  under  various  appellations  to  the  most  ancient 
times.  [A  contribution  toward  this  history,  and  a reduction  of  the  qualities  of  matter 
to  three  classes,  under  the  names  of  Primary,  Secundo-primary,  and  Secondary,  is 
given  in  the  Supplementary  Dissertations  appended  to  Reid's  Works  (p.  825-875.)) 


90 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


&c.  ? — these,  he  it  remembered,  all  severally  attacked  by  Reid, 
Brown  has  neither  ventured  to  defend,  nor  to  acknowledge  that 
he  could  not),  “would,  if  they  had  been  questioned  by  him,  have 
admitted,  before  they  heard  a single  argument  on  his  part,  that 
their  opinions  with  respect  to  ideas  were  precisely  the  same  as  his 
own .”  (Lect.  xxvii.  p.  174.) 

We  have  thus  vindicated  our  original  assertion : — Brown  has 

NOT  SUCCEEDED  IN  CONVICTING  ReID,  EVEN  OF  A SINGLE  ERROR. 

Brown’s  mistakes  regarding  the  opinions  on  perception,  enter- 
tained by  Reid  and  the  philosophers,  are  perhaps,  however,  even 
less  astonishing,  than  his  total  misconception  of  the  purport  of 
Hume’s  reasoning  against  the  existence  of  matter,  and  of  the 
argument  by  which  Reid  invalidates  Hume’s  skeptical  conclusion. 
We  shall  endeavor  to  reduce  the  problem  to  its  simplicity. 

Our  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  certain  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, which  as  primitive,  and  consequently  incomprehensible,  are 
given  less  in  the  form  of  cognitions  than  of  beliefs.  But  if  con- 
sciousness in  its  last  analysis — in  other  words,  if  our  primary 
experience , be  a faith  ; the  reality  of  our  knowledge  turns  on  the 
veracity  of  our  constitutive  beliefs.  As  ultimate,  the  quality  of 
these  beliefs  can  not  be  inferred ; their  truth,  however,  is  in  the 
first  instance  to  be  presumed.  As  given  and  possessed,  they 
must  stand  good  until  refuted  ; “ neganti  incumbit  probation 
It  is  not  to  be  presumed,  that  Intelligence  gratuitously  annihilates 
itself'; — that  Nature  operates  in  vain  ; — that  the  Author  of  nature 
creates  only  to  deceive. 

“ S’oWore  TrapTrav  anoKkvTai , fjvTiva  iravres 

Aaol  (friyii^ovcrL-  Qeov  vv  rt  eWl  /cat  avrlj.” 

But  though  the  truth  of  our  instinctive  faiths  must  in  the  first 
instance  be  admitted,  their  falsehood  may  subsequently  be  estab- 
lished : this  however  only  through  themselves — only  on  the 
ground  of  their  reciprocal  contradiction.  Is  this  contradiction 
proved,  the  edifice  of  our  knowledge  is  undermined ; for  “ no  lie 
is  of  the  truth”  Consciousness  is  to  the  philosopher,  what  the 
Bible  is  to  the  theologian.  Both  are  professedly  revelations  of 
divine  truth ; both  exclusively  supply  the  constitutive  principles 
of  knowledge,  and  the  regulative  principles  of  its  construction. 
To  both  we  must  resort  for  elements  and  for  laws.  Each  may  be 
disproved,  but  disproved  only  by  itself.  If  one  or  other  reveal 
facts,  which,  as  mutually  repugnant,  can  not  but  be  false,  the 
authenticity  of  that  revelation  is  invalidated  ; and  the  criticism 


BROWN’S  MISCONCEPTION  OE  SKEPTICISM. 


91 


which  signalizes  this  self-refutation,  has,  in  either  case,  been  able 
to  convert  assurance  into  skepticism — “to  turn  the  truth  of  Grod 
into  a lie,” 

“ Et  violare  fidem  primam,  et  convellere  tota 
Fundamenta  quibus  nixatur  vita,  salusque — Lucr. 

As  psychology  is  only  a developed  consciousness,  that  is,  a 
scientific  evolution  of  the  facts  of  which  consciousness  is  the 
guarantee  and  revelation  : the  positive  philosopher  has  thus  a 
primary  presumption  in  favor  of  the  elements  out  of  which  his 
system  is  constructed;  while  the  skeptic,  or  negative  philoso- 
pher, must  he  content  to  argue  back  to  the  falsehood  of  these 
elements,  from  the  impossibility  which  the  dogmatist  may  expe- 
rience, in  combining  them  into  the  harmony  of  truth.  For  truth 
is  one  ; and  the  end  of  philosophy  is  the  intuition  of  unity.  Skep- 
ticism is  not  an  original  or  independent  method ; it  is  the  correl- 
ative and  consequent  of  dogmatism  ; and  so  far  from  being  an 
enemy  to  truth,  it  arises  only  from  a false  philosophy,  as  its  indi- 
cation and  its  cure.  “ Alte  dubitat,  qui  altius  credit .”  The 
skeptic  must  not  himself  establish,  but  from  the  dogmatist  accept, 
his  principles ; and  his  conclusion  is  only  a reduction  of  philoso- 
phy to  zero,  on  the  hypothesis  of  the  doctrine  from  which  his 
premises  are  borrowed. — Are  the  principles  which  a particular 
system  involves,  convicted  of  contradiction ; or,  are  these  princi- 
ples proved  repugnant  to  others,  which,  as  facts  of  consciousness, 
every  positive  philosophy  must  admit ; there  is  established  a rel- 
ative skepticism,  or  the  conclusion,  that  philosophy  in  so  far  as 
realized  in  this  system,  is  groundless. — Again,  are  the  principles, 
which,  as  facts  of  consciousness,  philosophy  in  general  must  com- 
prehend, found  exclusive  of  each  other  ; there  is  established  an 
absolute  skepticism ; — the  impossibility  of  all  philosophy  is  in- 
volved in  the  negation  of  the  one  criterion  of  truth.  Our  state- 
ment may  be  reduced  to  a dilemma.  Either  the  facts  of  con-i 
sciousness  can  be  reconciled,  or  they  can  not.  If  they  can  not, 
knowledge  absolutely  is  impossible,  and  every  system  of  philo-' 
sophy  therefore  false.  If  they  can,  no  system  which  supposes? 
their  inconsistency  can  pretend  to  truth. 

As  a legitimate  skeptic,  Hume  could  not  assail  the  foundations 
of  knowledge  in  themselves.  His  reasoning  is  from  their  subse- 
quent contradiction  to  their  original  falsehood;  and  his  premises, 
not  established  by  himself,  are  accepted  only  as  principles  uni- 
versally conceded  in  the  previous  schools  of  philosophy.  On  the 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


03 

assumption,  that  what  was  thus  unanimously  admitted  by  philo- 
sophers, must  be  admitted  of  philosophy  itself,  his  argument 
against  the  certainty  of  knowledge  was  triumphant. — Philoso- 
phers agreed  in  rejecting  certain  primitive  beliefs  of  conscious- 
ness as  false,  and  in  usurping  others  as  true.  If  consciousness, 
however,  were  confessed  to  yield  a lying  evidence  in  one  particu- 
lar, it  could  not  be  adduced  as  a credible  witness  at  all : — “ Fal- 
sus  in  uno , falsus  in  omnibus .”  But  as  the  reality  of  our  knowl- 
edge necessarily  rests  on  the  assumed  veracity  of  consciousness, 
it  thus  rests  on  an  assumption  implicitly  admitted  by  all  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  to  be  illegitimate. 

“ Faciunt,  nee,  intelligendo,  ut  nihil  intelligant  /” 

Reid  (like  Kant)  did  not  dispute  Hume’s  inference,  as  deduced 
from  its  antecedents.  He  allowed  his  skepticism,  as  relative,  to 
be  irrefragable  ; and  that  philosophy  could  not  be  saved  from  ab- 
solute skepticism,  unless  his  conceded  premises  could  be  disal- 
lowed, by  refuting  the  principles  universally  acknowledged  by 
modern  philosophers.  This  he  applied  himself  to  do.  He  sub- 
jected these  principles  to  a new  and  rigorous  criticism.  If  his 
analysis  be  correct  (and  it  was  so,  at  least,  in  spirit  and  inten- 
tion), it  proved  them  to  be  hypotheses,  on  which  the  credulous 
sequacity  of  philosophers — “ philosophorum  credula  natio” — had 
bestowed  the  prescriptive  authority  of  self-evident  truths  ; and 
showed,  that  where  a genuine  fact  of  consciousness  had  been 
surrendered,  it  had  been  surrendered  in  deference  to  some  ground- 
less assumption,  which,  in  reason,  it  ought  to  have  exploded. 
Philosophy  was  thus  again  reconciled  with  Nature  ; consciousness 
was  not  a bundle  of  antilogies;  certainty  and  knowledge  were 
not  evicted  from  man. 

All  this  Dr.  Brown  completely  misunderstands.  He  compre- 
hends neither  the  reasoning  of  skepticism,  in  the  hands  of  Hume, 
nor  the  argument  from  common  sense,  in  those  of  Reid.  Retro- 
grading himself  to  the  tenets  of  that  philosophy,  whose  contra- 
dictions Hume  had  fairly  developed  into  skepticism,  he  appeals 
against  this  conclusion  to  the  argument  of  common  sense  ; albeit 
that  argument,  if  true,  belies  his  hypothesis,  and  if  his  hypothesis 
be  true,  is  belied  by  it.  Hume  and  Reid  he  actually  represents 
as  maintaining  precisely  the  same  doctrine,  on  precisely  the  same 
grounds  ; and  finds  both  concurring  with  himself,  in  advocating 
that  very  opinion,  which  the  one  had  resolved  into  a negation  of 
all  knowledge,  and  the  other  exploded  as  a baseless  hypothesis. 


ARGUMENT  FROM  COMMON  SENSE. 


93 


Our  discussion,  at  present,  is  limited  to  a single  question — to 
the  truth  or  falsehood  of  consciousness  in  assuring  us  of  the  re- 
ality of  a material  world.  In  perception,  consciousness  gives,  as 
an  ultimate  fact,  a belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
something  different  from  self.  As  ultimate,  this  belief  can  not 
be  reduced  to  a higher  principle  ; neither  can  it  be  truly  analyzed 
into  a double  element.  We  only  believe  that  this  something 
exists , because  we  believe  that  we  know  (are  conscious  of)  this 
something  as  existing ; the  belief  of  the  existence  is  necessarily 
involved  in  the  belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence.  Both 
are  original,  or  neither.  Does  consciousness  deceive  us  in  the 
latter,  it  necessarily  deludes  us  in  the  former ; and  if  the  former, 
though  a fact  of  consciousness,  be  false ; the  latter,  because  a 
fact  of  consciousness,  is  not  true.  The  beliefs  contained  in  the 
two  propositions : 

1°,  I believe  that  a material  world  exists  ; 

2°,  I believe  that  I immediately  knoiv  a material  world  exist- 
ing (in  other  words,  I believe  that  the  external  reality  itself 
is  the  object  of  ivhicli  I am  conscious  in  perception) ; 
though  distinguished  by  philosophers,  are  thus  virtually  identical. 

The  belief  of  an  external  rvorld,  was  too  powerful,  not  to  com- 
pel an  acquiescence  in  its  truth.  But  the  philosophers  yielded  to 
nature,  only  in  so  far  as  to  coincide  in  the  dominant  result.  They 
falsely  discriminated  the  belief  in  the  existence , from  the  belief  in 
the  knowledge.  With  a few  exceptions,  they  held  fast  by  the 
truth  of  the  first ; but,  on  grounds  to  which  it  is  not  here  neces- 
sary to  advert,  they  concurred,  with  singular  unanimity,  in  abjur- 
ing the  second.  The  object  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  per- 
ception, could  only,  they  explicitly  avowed,  be  a representative 
image  present  to  the  mind  ; — an  image  which,  they  implicitly 
confessed,  we  are  necessitated  to  regard  as  identical  with  the 
unknown  reality  itself.  Man,  in  short,  upon  the  common  doc- 
trine of  philosophy,  was  doomed  by  a perfidious  nature  to  realize 
the  fable  of  Narcissus  ; he  mistakes  self  for  not-self, 

“ corpus  putat  esse  quod  umbra  est.” 

To  carry  these  principles  to  their  issue  was  easy  ; and  skepti- 
cism in  the  hands  of  Hume  was  the  result.  The  absolute  veraci- 
ty of  consciousness  was  invalidated  by  the  falsehood  of  one  of  its 
facts ; and  the  belief  of  the  knowledge , assumed  to  be  delusive, 
was  even  supposed  in  the  belief  of  the  existence , admitted  to  be 
true.  The  uncertainty  of  knowledge  in  general,  and  in  particu- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


lar,  the  problematical  existence  of  a material  world,  were  thus 
legitimately  established.  To  confute  this  reduction  on  the  con- 
ventional ground  of  the  philosophers,  Reid  saw  to  be  impossi- 
ble ; and  the  argument  which  he  opposed,  was,  in  fact,  imme- 
diately subversive  of  the  dogmatic  principle,  and  only  mediately 
of  the  skeptical  conclusion.  This  reasoning  was  of  very  ancient 
application,  and  had  been  even  long  familiarly  known  by  the 
name  of  the  argument  from  Common  Sense.  [See  Diss.,  742- 
803.] 

To  argue  from  common  sense  is  nothing  more  than  to  render 
available  the  presumption  in  favor  of  the  original  facts  of  con- 
sciousness— that  what  is  by  nature  necessarily  believed  to  be , 
truly  is.  Aristotle,  in  whose  philosophy  this  presumption  obtained 
the  authority  of  a principle,  thus  enounces  the  argument : — 
“ What  appears  to  all , that  we  affirm  to  be  ; and  he  who  rejects 
this  belief , will,  assuredly,  advance  nothing  better  worthy  of 
credit.”  (Eth.  Nic.  L.  x.  c.  2.)  As  this  argument  rests  entire- 
ly on  a presumption ; the  fundamental  condition  of  its  validity 
is,  that  this  presumption  be  not  disproved.  The  presumption 
in  favor  of  the  veracity  of  consciousness,  as  we  have  already 
shown,  is  redargued  by  the  repugnance  of  the  facts  themselves, 
of  which  consciousness  is  the  complement ; as  the  truth  of  all 
can  only  be  vindicated  on  the  truth  of  each.  The  argument 
from  common  sense,  therefore  postulates,  and  founds  on  the  as- 
sumption  THAT  OUR  ORIGINAL  BELIEFS  BE  NOT  PROVED  SELF-CON- 

TRADICTORY. 

The  harmony  of  our  primary  convictions  being  supposed,  and 
not  redargued,  the  argument  from  common  sense  is  decisive 
against  every  deductive  inference  not  in  unison  with  them.  For 
as  every  conclusion  is  involved  in  its  premises,  and  as  these  again 
must  ultimately  be  resolved  into  some  original  belief ; the  conclu- 
sion, if  inconsistent  with  the  primary  phenomena  of  consciousness, 
must,  ex  hypothesis  be  inconsistent  with  its  premises,  i.  e.  be 
logically  false.  On  this  ground,  our  convictions  at  first  hand , 
peremptorily  derogate  from  our  convictions  at  second.  “ If  we 
know  and  believe,”  says  Aristotle,  “through  certain  original  prin- 
ciples, we  must  know  and  believe  these  with  paramount  certainty , 
for  the  very  reason  that  we  know  and  believe  all  else  through 
them  ;”  and  he  elsewhere  observes,  that  our  approbation  is  often 
rather  to  be  accorded  to  what  is  revealed  by  nature  as  actual 
than  to  what  can  be  demonstrated  by  philosophy  as  possible : — 


BROWN  IMPOTENT  AGAINST  THE  SKEPTIC. 


95 


“ IIpoaiXeiv  ov  Sei  7 ravra  roc?  oia  tcov  \6ycov,  dXXa  7 roWd/ct?  fj.aXX.ov 

TO £9  $aLVOfJ.e.VOLs”  1 

“ Novimus  certissima  scientia,  et  clamcinte  conscientia ,”  (to  ap- 
ply the  language  of  Augustine,  in  our  acceptation),,  is  thus  a pro- 
position, either  absolutely  true  or  absolutely  false.  The  argu- 
ment from  common  sense,  if  not  omnipotent,  is  powerless  : and 
in  the  hands  of  a philosopher  by  whom  its  postulate  can  not  be 
allowed,  its  employment,  if  not  suicidal,  is  absurd.  This  condi- 
tion of  non-contradiction  is  unexpressed  by  Reid.  It  might  seem 
to  him  too  evidently  included  in  the  very  conception  of  the  argu- 
ment to  require  enouncement.  Dr.  Brown  has  proved  that  he 
was  wrong.  Yet  Reid  could  hardly  have  anticipated,  that  his 
whole  philosophy,  in  relation  to  the  argument  of  common  sense, 
and  that  argument  itself,  were  so  to  be  mistaken,  as  to  be  ac- 
tually interpreted  by  contraries.  These  principles  established, 
we  proceed  to  their  application. 

Dr.  Brown’s  error,  in  regard  to  Reid’s  doctrine  of  perception, 
involves  the  other,  touching  the  relation  of  that  doctrine  to  Hume’s 
skeptical  idealism.  On  the  supposition,  that  Reid  views  in  the 
immediate  object  of  perception  a mental  modification,  and  not 
a material  quality,  Dr.  Brown  is  fully  warranted  in  asserting, 
that  he  left  the  foundations  of  idealism,  precisely  as  he  found 
them.  Let  it  once  be  granted,  that  the  object  known  in  percep- 
tion, is  not  convertible  with  the  reality  existing;  idealism  re- 
poses in  equal  security  on  the  hypothesis  of  a representative  per- 
ception— whether  the  representative  image  be  a modification  of 
consciousness  itself — or  whether  it  have  an  existence  independ- 
ent either  of  mind  or  of  the  act  of  thought.  The  former  indeed 
as  the  simpler  basis,  would  be  the  more  secure;  and,  in  point  of 
fact,  the  egotistical  idealism  of  Fichte,  resting  on  the  third  form 
of  representation,  is  less  exposed  to  criticism  than  the  theologi- 
cal idealism  of  Berkeley,  which  reposes  on  the  first.  Did  Brown 
not  mistake  Reid’s  doctrine,  Reid  was  certainly  absurd  in  think- 
ing, a refutation  of  idealism  to  be  involved  in  his  refutation  of 
the  common  theory  of  perception.  So  far  from  blaming  Brown, 
on  this  supposition,  for  denying  to  Reid  the  single  merit  which 
that  philosopher  thought  peculiarly  his  own ; we  only  reproach 


1 Jacobi  ( Werhe , II.  Vorr.  p.  11,  ets.)  following  Fries,  places  Aristotle  at  the  head 
of  that  absurd  majority  of  philosophers,  who  attempt  to  demonstrate  every  thing.  This 
would  not  have  been  more  sublimely  false,  had  it  been  said  of  the  German  Plato  him- 
self. 


9G 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


him  for  leaving,  to  Reid  and  to  himself,  any  possible  mode  of 
resisting  the  idealist  at  all.  It  was  a monstrous  error  to  reverse 
Reid’s  doctrine  of  perception  ; but  a greater  still,  not  to  see  that 
this  reversal  stultifies  the  argument  from  common  sense  ; and 
that  so  far  from  “ proceeding  on  safe  ground ” in  an  appeal  to 
our  original  beliefs,  Reid  would  have  employed,  as  Brown  has 
actually  done,  a weapon,  harmless  to  the  skeptic , but  mortal  to 
himself. 

The  belief,  says  Dr.  Brown,  in  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  is  irresistible , therefore  it  is  true.  On  his  doctrine  of  per- 
ception, which  he  attributes  also  to  Reid,  this  inference  is,  how- 
ever, incompetent,  because  on  that  doctrine  he  can  not  fulfill  the 
condition  which  the  argument  implies.  I can  not  but  believe 
that  material  things  exist : — I can  not  but  believe  that  the 
material  reality  is  the  object  immediately  known  in  perception. 
The  former  of  these  beliefs,  explicitly  argues  Dr.  Brown,  in  de- 
fending his  system  against  the  skeptic,  because  irresistible,  is 
true.  The  latter  of  these  beliefs,  implicitly  argues  Dr.  Brown, 
in  establishing  his  system  itself,  though  irresistible  is  false.  And 
here  not  only  are  two  primitive  beliefs,  supposed  to  be  repugnant, 
and  consciousness  therefore  delusive ; the  very  belief  which  is  as- 
sumed as  true,  exists  in  fact  only  through  the  other,  which,  ex 
hypolhcsi,  is  false.  Both  in  reality  are  one.1  Kant,  in  whose 


1 This  reasoning  can  only  be  invalidated  either,  1°,  By  disproving  the  belief  itself 
of  the  knowledge,  as  a fact ; or — 2°,  By  disproving  its  attribute  of  originality.  The 
latter  is  impossible  ; and  if  possible  would  also  annihilate  the  originality  of  the  belief 
of  the  existence,  which  is  supposed.  The  former  alternative  is  ridiculous.  That  we 
are  naturally  determined  to  believe  the  object  known  in  perception,  to  be  the  external 
existence  itself,  and  that  it  is  only  in  consequence  of  a supposed  philosophical  necessity , 
we  subsequently  endeavor  by  an  artificial  abstraction  to  discriminate  these,  is  admitted 
even  by  those  psychologists,  whose  doctrine  is  thereby  placed  in  overt  contradiction  to 
our  original  beliefs.  Though  perhaps  superfluous  to  allege  authorities  in  support  of 
such  a point,  wc  refer,  however,  to  the  following,  which  happen  to  occur  to  our  recol- 
lection.— Descartes,  Dc.  Pass.  art.  26. — Mallebranche,  Rech.  1.  iii.  c.  1. — Berkeley, 
Works , i.  p.  216,  and  quoted  by  Reid,  Es.  I.  P.  p.  165. — Hume,  Treat.  H.  N.  i.  pp. 
330.  338.  353.  358  361.  369.  orig.  cd. — Essays,  ii.  pp.  154.  157.  ed.  1788. — As  not 
generally  accessible,  we  translate  the  following  extracts  — Schelling  ( Llcen  zu  cincr 
Philosophic  der  Natur.  Einl.  p.  xix.  lit  cd.) — “When  (in  perception)  I represent  an 
object,  object  and  representation  are  one  and  thi  same.  And  simply  in  this  our  inabil- 
ity to  discriminate  the  object  from  the  representation  during  the  act,  lies  the  conviction 
which  the  common  sense  of  mankind  (gemeine  Verstand)  has  of  the  reality  of  extern- 
al things,  although  these  become  known  to  it,  only  through  representations.”  (See 
also  p.  xxvi.) — We  can  not  recover,  at  the  moment,  a passage,  to  the  same  effect,  in 
Kant ; but  the  ensuing  is  the  testimony  of  an  eminent  disciple. — Tennemann,  ( Gescli . 
d.  Phil.  II.  p.  294.)  speaking  of  Plato  : “ The  illusion  that  things  in  themselves  are  cog- 
nizable, is  so  natural,  that  we  need  not  marvel  if  even  philosophers  have  not  been 
able  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the  prejudice.  The  common  sense  of  mankind 


BROWN  IMPOTENT  AGAINST  THE  SKEPTIC.  97 

doctrine  as  in  Brown’s  the  immediate  object  of  perception  consti- 
tutes only  a subjective  phenomenon,  was  too  acute,  not  to  dis- 
cern that,  on  this  hypothesis,  philosophy  could  not,  without  con- 
tradiction, appeal  to  the  evidence  of  our  elementary  faiths. — “Al- 
lowing idealism,”  he  says,  “ to  he  as  dangerous  as  it  truly  is,  it 
would  still  remain  a scandal  to  philosophy  and  human  reason  in 
general,  to  he  compelled  to  accept  the  existence  of  external  things 
on  the  testimony  of  mere  belief.  ” 1 

But  Reid  is  not  like  Brown,  felo  de  se  in  his  reasoning  from  our 
natural  beliefs  ; and  on  his  genuine  doctrine  of  perception,  the 
argument  has  a very  different  tendency.  Reid  asserts  that  his 
doctrine  of  perception  is  itself  a confutation  of  the  ideal  system  ; 
and  so,  when  its  imperfections  are  supplied,  it  truly  is.  For  it 
at  once  denies  to  the  skeptic  and  idealist  the  premises  of  their  con- 
clusion ; and  restores  to  the  realist,  in  its  omnipotence,  the  argu- 
ment of  common  sense.  The  skeptic  and  idealist  can  only  found 
on  the  admission,  that  the  object  known  is  not  convertible  with  the 
reality  existing ; and,  at  the  same  time,  this  admission,  by  placing 
the  facts  of  consciousness  in  mutual  contradiction,  denies  its  postu- 
late to  the  argument  from  our  beliefs.  Reid’s  analysis  therefore 
in  its  result — that  we  have,  as  we  believe  we  have,  an  immedi- 
ate knowledge  of  the  material  reality — accomplished  every 
thing  at  once.2 


(gemeine  Menschenverstand)  which  remains  steadfast  withn  the  sphere  of  experience , 
recognizes  no  distinction  between  things  in  themselves  [unknown  reality  existing]  and 
phenomena  [representation,  object  known]  ; and  the  philosophizing  reason,  commen- 
ces therewith  its  attempt  to  investigate  the  foundations  of  this  knowledge,  and  to  re- 
call itself  into  system.” — See  also  Jacobi’s  David  Hume , passim,  { Werke , ii.)  and  his 
Allioills  Briefsammlung,  {Werke,  i.  p.  119.  ets.)  Reid  has  been  already  quoted  — [Diss. 
p.  747,  748  give  other  testimonies  of  a similar  purport.] 

1 Cr.  d.  r.  V. — Vorr.  p.  xxxix.  Kant’s  marvelous  acuteness  did  not,  however,  enable 
him  to  bestow  on  his  “ Only  possible  demonstration  of  the  reality  of  an  external  world, ” 
{ibid  p.  275,  ets.)  even  a logical  necessity  ; nor  prevent  his  transcendental,  from  being 
apodeictically  resolved  (by  Jacobi  and  Fichte)  into  absolute  idealism.  In  this  argument, 
indeed,  he  collects  more  in  the  conclusion,  than  was  contained  in  the  antecedent ; and 
reaches  it  by  a double  saltus,  overleaping  the  foundations  both  of  the  egotistical  and  mys- 
tical idealists.  — Though  Kant,  in  the  passage  quoted  above  and  in  other  places,  appar- 
ently derides  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  and  altogether  rejects  it  as  a metaphysical 
principle  of  truth  ; he  at  last,  however,  found  it  necessary  (in  order  to  save  philosophy 
from  the  annihilating  energy  of  his  Speculative  Reason ) to  rest  on  that  very  principle 
of  an  ultimate  belief,  (which  he  had  originally  spurned  as  a basis  even  of  a material 
reality.)  the  reality  of  all  the  sublimest  objects  of  our  interest — God,  Free  Will,  Im- 
mortality, &c.  His  Practical  Reason,  as  far  as  it  extends,  is,  in  truth,  only  another 
(and  not  even  a better)  term  for  Common  Sense.- — Fichte,  too,  escaped  the  admitted 
nihilism  of  his  speculative  philosophy,  only  by  a similar  inconsequence  in  his  practical. 
— (See  his  Bestimmung  des  Menschen.)  “ Naturam  expellas  furca cj-c. 

3 [This  is  spoken  too  absolutely.  Reid  I think  was  correct  in  the  aim  of  his  phi- 

Gr 


98 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION 


Dr.  Brown  is  not,  however,  more  erroneous  in  thinking  that  the 
argument  from  common  sense  could  he  employed  by  him,  than  in 
supposing  that  its  legitimacy,  as  so  employed,  was  admitted  by 
Hume.  So  little  did  he  suspect  the  futility,  in  his  own  hands,  of 
this  proof,  he  only  regards  it  as  superfluous,  if  opposed  to  that  phi- 
losopher, who,  he  thinks,  in  allowing  the  belief  in  the  existence  of 
matter  to  be  irresistible,  allows  it  to  be  true.  (Lect.  xxviii.  p.  176.) 
Dr.  Brown  has  committed,  perhaps,  more  important  mistakes  than 
this,  in  regard  to  skepticism  and  to  Hume ; — none  certainly  more 
fundamental.  Hume  is  converted  into  a dogmatist ; the  essence 
of  skepticism  is  misconceived. 

On  the  hypothesis  that  our  natural  beliefs  are  fallacious,  it  is 
not  for  the  Pyrrhonist  to  reject,  but  to  establish  their  authenti- 
city ; and  so  far  from  the  admission  of  their  strength  being  a sur- 
render of  his  doubt,  the  very  triumph  of  skepticism  consists  in 
proving  them  to  be  irresistible.  By  what  demonstration  is  the 
foundation  of  all  certainty  and  knowledge  so  effectually  subverted, 
as  by  showing  that  the  principles,  which  reason  constrains  us 
speculatively  to  admit,  are  contradictory  of  the  facts,  which  our 
instincts  compel  us  practically  to  believe  ? Our  intellectual 
nature  is  thus  seen  to  be  divided  against  itself;  consciousness 
stands  self-convicted  of  delusion.  “ Surely  we  have  eaten  the 
fruit  of  lies !” 

This  is  the  scope  of  the  “ Essay  on  the  Acaclemicod  or  Skeptical 
Philosophy ,”  from  which  Dr.  Brown  quotes.  In  that  essay,  pre- 
vious to  the  quotation,  Hume  shows,  on  the  admission  of  philoso- 
phers, that  our  belief  in  the  knoivledge  of  material  things,  as  im- 
possible is  false  ; and  on  this  admission,  he  had  irresistibly  estab- 
lished the  speculative  absurdity  of  our  belief  in  the  existence  of 
an  external  world.  In  the  passage,  on  the  contrary,  which  Dr. 
Brown  partially  extracts,  he  is  showing  that  this  idealism,  which 
in  theory  must  be  admitted,  is  in  application  impossible.  Specu- 
lation and  practice,  nature  and  philosophy,  sense  and  reason,  be- 
lief and  knowledge,  thus  placed  in  mutual  antithesis,  give,  as 
their  result,  the  uncertainty  of  every  principle  ; and  the  assertion 
of  this  uncertainty  is — Skepticism.  This  result  is  declared  even 
in  the  sentence,  with  the  preliminary  clause  of  which,  Dr.  Brown 
abruptly  terminates  his  quotation. 

losophy  ; but  in  the  execution  of  his  purpose  he  is  often  at  fault,  often  confused,  and 
sometimes  even  contradictory.  I have  endeavored  to  point  out  and  to  correct  these 
imperfections  in  the  edition  which  I have  not  yet  finished  of  his  works.] 


BROWN  IMPOTENT  AGAINST  THE  SKEPTIC. 


99 


But  allowing  Dr.  Brown  to  be  correct  in  transmuting  the  skep- 
tical nihilist  into  a dogmatic  realist ; he  would  still  be  wrong  (on 
the  supposition  that  Hume  admitted  the  truth  of  a belief  to  be 
convertible  with  its  invincibility ) in  conceiving,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  Hume  could  ever  acquiesce  in  the  same  inconsequent  con- 
clusion with  himself;  or,  on  the  other,  that  he  himself  could, 
without  an  abandonment  of  his  system,  acquiesce  in  the  legitimate 
conclusion.  On  this  supposition,  Hume  could  only  have  arrived 
at  a similar  result  with  Reid : there  is  no  tenable  medium  be- 
tween the  natural  realism  of  the  one  and  the  skeptical  nihilism  of 
the  other. — “Do  you  follow,”  says  Hume  in  the  same  essay,  “the 
instinct  and  propensities  of  nature  in  assenting  to  the  veracity  of 
sense  ?” — I do,  says  Dr.  Brown.  (Lect.  xxviii.  p.  176.  alibi.) — 
“ But  these,”  continues  Hume,  “lead  you  to  believe  that  the  very 
perception  or  sensible  image  is  the  external  object.  Do  you  dis- 
claim this  principle  in  order  to  embrace  a more  rational  opinion, 
that  the  perceptions  are  only  representations  of  something  exter- 
nal ?” — It  is  the  vital  principle  of  my  system,  says  Brown,  that 
the  mind  knows  nothing  beyond  its  own  states  (Lectt.  passim  :) 
philosophical  suicide  is  not  my  choice ; I must  recall  my  admis- 
sion, and  give  the  lie  to  this  natural  belief. — “ You  here,”  pro- 
ceeds Hume,  “ depart  from  your  natural  propensities  and  more 
obvious  sentiments  ; and  yet  are  not  able  to  satisfy  your  reason, 
which  can  never  find  any  convincing  argument  from  experience 
to  prove,  that  the  perceptions  are  connected  with  any  external 
objects.” — I allow,  says  Brown,  that  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  can  not  be  proved  by  reasoning , and  that  the  skeptical  ar- 
gument admits  of  no  logical  reply.  (Lect.  xxviii.  p.  175.) — “ But” 
(we  may  suppose  Hume  to  conclude)  “as  you  truly  maintain  that 
the  confutation  of  skepticism  can  be  attempted  only  in  tioo  ways 
(ibid.) — either  by  showing  that  its  arguments  are  inconclusive,  or 
by  opposing  to  them,  as  paramount,  the  evidence  of  our  natural 
beliefs — and  as  you  now,  voluntarily  or  by  compulsion,  abandon 
both : you  are  confessedly  reduced  to  the  dilemma,  either  of  ac- 
quiescing in  the  conclusion  of  the  skeptic,  or  of  refusing  your 
assent  upon  no  ground  whatever.  Pyrrhonism  or  absurdity  ? — 
choose  your  horn.” 

Were  the  skepticism  into  which  Dr.  Brown’s  philosophy  is  thus 
analyzed,  confined  to  the  negation  of  matter,  the  result  would 
be  comparatively  unimportant.  The  transcendent  reality  of  an 
outer  world,  considered  absolutely,  is  to  us  a matter  of  supreme 


100 


PHILOSOPHY  OP  PERCEPTION. 


indifference.  It  is  not  the  idealism  itself  that  we  must  deplore ; 
but  the  mendacity  of  consciousness  which  it  involves.  Conscious- 
ness, once  convicted  of  falsehood,  an  unconditional  skepticism,  in 
regard  to  the  character  of  our  intellectual  being,  is  the  melan- 
choly, but  only  rational  result.  Any  conclusion  may  now  with 
impunity  be  drawn  against  the  hopes  and  dignity  of  human  na- 
ture. Our  Personality , our  Immateriality , our  Moral  Liberty , 
have  no  longer  an  argument  for  their  defense.  “ Man  is  the  dream 
of  a shadow  God  is  the  dream  of  that  dream. 

Dr.  Brown,  after  the  best  philosophers,  rests  the  proof  of  our 
personal  identity , and  of  our  mental  individuality , on  the  ground 
of  beliefs , which,  as  “ intuitive,  universal,  immediate,  and  irre- 
sistible,” he  not  unjustly  regards  as  “ the  internal  and  never-ceas- 
ing voice  of  our  Creator — revelations  from  on  high,  omnipotent 
[and  veracious]  as  their  author.”  To  him  this  argument  is  how- 
ever incompetent,  as  contradictory. 

What  we  know  of  self  or  person , we  know,  only  as  given  in 
consciousness.  In  our  perceptive  consciousness  there  is  revealed 
as  an  ultimate  fact  a self  and  a not-self ; each  given  as  independ- 
ent— each  known  only  in  antithesis  to  the  other.  No  belief  is 
more  “ intuitive , universal , immediate , or  irresistible,”  than  that 
this  antithesis  is  real  and  known  to  be  real ; no  belief  therefore  is 
more  true.  If  the  antithesis  be  illusive,  self  and  not-self , subject 
and  object , I and  Thou  are  distinctions  without  a difference ; and 
consciousness,  so  far  from  being  “the  internal  voice  of  our  Crea- 
tor,” is  shown  to  be,  like  Satan,  “ a liar  from  the  beginning.” 
The  reality  of  this  antithesis  in  different  parts  of  his  philosophy 
Dr.  Brown  affirms  and  denies. — In  establishing  his  theory  of  per- 
ception, he  articulately  denies,  that  mind  is  conscious  of  aught 
beyond  itself ; virtually  asserts,  that  what  is  there  given  in  con- 
sciousness as  not-self , is  only  a phenomenal  illusion — a modifica- 
tion of  self,  which  our  consciousness  determines  us  to  believe  the 
quality  of  something  numerically  and  substantially  different. 
Like  Narcissus  again,  he  must  lament — 

“ Ille  ego  sum  sensi,  sed  me  mea  fallit  imago.’' 

After  this  implication  in  one  part  of  his  system  that  our  belief 
in  the  distinction  of  self  and  not-self  is  nothing  more  than  the 
deception  of  a lying  consciousness  ; it  is  startling  to  find  him,  in 
others,  appealing  to  the  beliefs  of  this  same  consciousness  as  to 
“revelations  from  on  high;” — nay,  in  an  especial  manner  alleg- 
ing “ as  the  voice  of  our  Creator,”  this  very  faith  in  the  distinc- 


BROWN  IMPOTENT  AGAINST  THE  SKEPTIC. 


101 


tion  of  self  and  not-self,  through  the  fallacy  of  which,  and  of 
which  alone,  he  had  elsewhere  argued  consciousness  of  falsehood. 

On  the  veracity  of  this  mendacious  belief,  Dr.  Brown  establishes 
his  proof  of  our  personal  identity.  (Lect.  xii. — xv.)  Touching 
the  object  of  perception,  when  its  evidence  is  inconvenient , this 
belief  is  quietly  passed  over  as  incompetent  to  distinguish  not- 
self  from  self ; in  the  question  regarding  our  personal  identity, 
where  its  testimony  is  convenient , it  is  clamorously  cited  as  an 
inspired  witness,  exclusively  competent  to  distinguish  self  from 
not-self.  Yet,  why,  if,  in  the  one  case,  it  mistook  sel f for  not-self 
it  may  not,  in  the  other,  mistake  not-self  for  self , would  appear  a 
problem  not  of  the  easiest  solution. 

The  same  belief,  with  the  same  inconsistency,  is  again  called 
in  to  prove  the  individuality  of  mind.  (Lect.  xciv.)  But  if  we 
are  fallaciously  determined,  in  perception,  to  believe  what  is  sup- 
posed idivisible,  identical , and  one,  to  he  plural  and  different 
and  incompatible  (self  = self  + not-self) ; how,  on  the  authority 
of  the  same  treacherous  conviction,  dare  we  maintain,  that  the 
phenomenal  unity  of  consciousness  affords  a guarantee  of  the  reed 
simplicity  of  the  thinking  principle  ? The  materialist  may  now 
contend,  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  self  is  only  an  illusive 
phenomenon  ; that  our  consecutive  identity  is  that  of  the  Delphic 
ship,  and  our  present  unity  merely  that  of  a system  of  co-ordinate 
activities.  To  explain  the  phenomenon,  he  has  only  to  suppose, 
as  certain  theorists  have  lately  done,  an  organ  to  tell  the  lie  of 
our  personality ; and  to  quote  as  authority  for  the  lie  itself,  the 
perfidy  of  consciousness,  on  which  the  theory  of  a representative 
perfection  is  founded. 

On  the  hypothesis  of  a representative  perception,  there  is,  in 
fact,  no  salvation  from  materialism,  on  the  one  side,  short  of 
idealism — skepticism — nihilism,  on  the  other.  Our  knowledge 
of  mind,  and  matter , as  substances,  is  merely  relative  ; they  are 
known  to  us  only  in  their  qualities  ; and  we  can  justify  the  postu- 
lation of  two  different  substances , exclusively  on  the  supposition  of 
the  incompatibility  of  the  double  series  of  phenomena  to  coinhere 
in  one.  Is  this  supposition  disproved  ? — the  presumption  against 
dualism  is  again  decisive.  “ Entities  are  not  to  be  multiplied  with- 
out necessity  — “ A plurality  of  principles  is  not  to  be  assumed 
where  the  phenomena  can  be  explained  by  one.'1'1  In  Brown’s 
theory  of  perception,  he  abolishes  the  incompatibility  of  the  two 
series ; and  yet  his  argument,  as  a dualist,  for  an  immaterial  prin- 


102 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  PERCEPTION. 


ciple  of  thought,  proceeds  on  the  ground,  that  this  incompatibility 
subsists.  (Lect.  xcvi.  pp.  646,  647.)  This  philosopher  denies  us 
an  immediate  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  the  accidents  of  mind. 
The  accidents  which  we  refer  to  body,  as  known  to  us,  are  only 
states  or  modifications  of  the  percipient  subject  itself ; in  other 
words,  the  qualities  we  call  material,  are  known  by  us  to  exist, 
only  as  they  are  known  by  us  to  inhere  in  the  same  substance  as 
the  qualities  we  denominate  mental.  There  is  an  apparent  anti- 
thesis, but  a real  identity.  On  this  doctrine,  the  hypothesis  of  a 
double  principle  losing  its  necessity,  becomes  philosophically  ab- 
surd ; and  on  the  law  of  parsimony,  a psychological  unitarianism, 
at  best,  is  established.  To  the  argument,  that  the  qualities  of  the 
object  are  so  repugnant  to  the  qualities  of  the  subject  of  percep- 
tion, that  they  can  not  be  supposed  the  accidents  of  the  same  sub- 
stance ; the  Unitarian — whether  materialist,  idealist,  or  absolutist 
— has  only  to  reply  : that  so  far  from  the  attributes  of  the  object, 
being  exclusive  of  the  attributes  of  the  subject,  in  this  act ; the 
hypothetical  dualist  himself  establishes,  as  the  fundamental  axiom 
of  his  philosophy  of  mind,  that  the  object  known  is  universally 
identical  with  the  subject  knowing.  The  materialist  may  now 
derive  the  subject  from  the  object,  the  idealist  derive  the  object 
from  the  subject,  the  absolutist  sublimate  both  into  indifference, 
nay,  the  nihilist  subvert  the  substantial  reality  of  either ; — the 
hypothetical  realist  so  far  from  being  able  to  resist  the  conclusion 
of  any,  in  fact  accords  their  assumptive  premises  to  all. 

The  same  contradiction  would,  in  like  manner,  invalidate  every 
presumption  in  favor  of  our  Liberty  of  Will.  But  as  Dr.  Brown 
throughout  his  scheme  of  Ethics  advances  no  argument  in  sup- 
port of  this  condition  of  our  moral  being,  which  his  philosophy 
otherwise  tends  to  render  impossible,  we  shall  say  nothing  of  this 
consequence  of  hypothetical  realism. 

So  much  for  the  system,  which  its  author  fondly  imagines, 
“ allows  to  the  skeptic  no  resting-place  for  his  foot — no  fulcrum 
for  the  instrument  he  uses so  much  for  the  doctrine  which 
Brown  would  substitute  for  Reid’s ; — nay,  which  he  even  sup- 
poses Reid  himself  to  have  maintained. 

“ Scilicet,  hoc  totum  falsa  ratione  receptum  est  !”* 

' [In  this  criticism  I have  spoken  only  of  Dr.  Brown’s  mistakes,  and  of  these,  only 
with  reference  to  his  attack  on  Reid.  On  his  appropriating  to  himself  the  observa- 
tions of  others,  and  in  particular  those  of  Destutt  Tracy,  I have  said  nothing,  though 
an  enumeration  of  these  would  be  necessary  to  place  Brown  upon  his  proper  level. 
That,  however,  would  require  a separate  discussion.] 


III.— JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 
MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


(October,  1832.) 

A Manual  of  the  History  of  Philosophy ; translated  from  the 
German  of  Tennemann.  By  the  Rev.  Arthur  Johnson,  M.A., 
late  Fellow  of  ’VYadham  College.  8vo.  Oxford:  1832. 

We  took  up  this  translation  with  a certain  favorable  prepos- 
session, and  felt  inclined  to  have  said  all  we  conscientiously  could 
in  its  behalf ; but  alas  ! never  were  expectations  more  completely 
disappointed,  and  we  find  ourselves  constrained  exclusively  to 
condemn,  where  we  should  gladly  have  been  permitted  only  to 
applaud. 

We  were  disposed  to  regard  an  English  version  of  Tenne- 
mann’s  minor  History  of  Philosophy — his  “ Grundrissf  as  a 
work  of  no  inconsiderable  utility — if  competently  executed  : hut 
in  the  present  state  of  philosophical  learning  in  this  country  we 
were  well  aware,  that  few  were  adequate  to  the  task,  and  of  those 
few  we  hardly  expected  that  any  one  would  he  found  so  disinter- 
ested, as  to  devote  himself  to  a labor,  of  which  the  credit  stood 
almost  in  an  inverse  proportion  to  the  trouble.  Few  works,  in- 
deed, would  prove  more  difficult  to  a translator.  A complete 
mastery  of  the  two  languages,  in  a philological  sense,  was  not 
enough.  There  was  required  a comprehensive  acquaintance  with 
philosophy  in  general,  and,  in  particular,  an  intimate  knowledge 
of  the  philosophy  of  Kant.  Tennemann  was  a Kantian  ; he  esti- 
mates all  opinions  by  a Kantian  standard ; and  the  language 
which  he  employs  is  significant  only  as  understood  precisely  in  a 
Kantian  application.  In  stating  this,  we  have  no  intention  of 
disparaging  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  work,  which,  in  truth,  with 


104  JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 

all  its  defects,  we  highly  esteem  as  the  production  of  a sober, 
accurate,  and  learned  mind.  Every  historian  of  philosophy  must 
have  his  system,  by  reference  to  which  he  criticises  the  opinions 
of  other  thinkers.  Eclecticism,  as  opposed  to  systematic  philos- 
ophy, is  without  a meaning.  For  either  the  choice  of  doctrines 
must  be  determined  by  some  principle,  and  that  principle  then 
constitutes  a system  ; or  the  doctrines  must  be  arbitrarily  as- 
sumed, which  would  be  the  negation  of  philosophy  altogether. 
(We  think  therefore,  that  M.  Cousin,  in  denominating  his  scheme 
distinctively  the  eclectic , has  committed  an  act  of  injustice  on 
himself.)  But  as  it  was  necessary  that  Tennemann  should  be 
of  some  school — should  have  certain  opinions — we  think  it  any 
thing  but  a disadvantage  that  he  was  of  the  Kantian.  The 
Critical  Philosophy  is  a comprehensive  and  liberal  doctrine  ; and 
whatever  difference  may  subsist  with  regard  to  its  positive  con- 
clusions, it  is  admitted,  on  all  hands,  to  constitute,  by  its  nega- 
tive, a great  epoch  in  the  history  of  thought.  An  acquaintance 
with  a system  so  remarkable  in  itself,  and  in  its  influence  so  de- 
cisive of  the  character  of  subsequent  speculation,  is  now  a matter 
of  necessity  to  all  who  would  be  supposed  to  have  crossed  the 
threshold  of  philosophy.  The  translation  of  a work  of  merit  like 
the  present,  ought  not  therefore  to  be  less  acceptable  to  the  En- 
glish reader,  because  written  in  the  spirit  and  language  of  the 
Kantian  system ; — provided,  he  be  enabled  by  the  translator  to 
understand  it.  But  what  does  this  imply  ? Not  merely  that 
certain  terms  in  the  German  should  be  rendered  by  certain  terms 
in  the  English ; for  few  philosophical  words  are  to  ibe  found  in 
the  latter,  which  suggests  the  same  analyses  and  combinations 
of  thought  as  those  embodied  in  the  technical  vocabulary  of  the 
former.  The  language  of  German  philosophy  has  sometimes 
three  or  four  expressions,  precisely  distinguishing  certain  gene- 
ralizations or  abstractions ; where  we  possess  only  a single  word, 
comprehensive  of  the  whole,  or,  perhaps,  several,  each  vaguely 
applicable  to  all  or  any.  In  these  circumstances  a direct  trans- 
lation was  impossible.  The  translator  could  only  succeed  by 
coming  to  a specific  understanding  with  his  reader.  He  behoved, 
in  the  first  place,  clearly  to  determine  the  value  of  the  principal 
terms  to  be  rendered  ; which  could  only  be  accomplished  through 
a sufficient  exposition  of  that  philosophy  whose  peculiar  analyses 
these  terms  adequately  expressed.  In  the  second  place,  it  was 
incumbent  on  him  to  show  in  what  respects  the  approximating 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  105 

English  term  was  not  exactly  equivalent  to  the  original;  and 
precisely  to  define  the  amplified  or  restricted  sense,  in  which,  hy 
accommodation  to  the  latter,  the  former  was  in  his  translation 
specially  to  he  understood. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  be  remembered,  that  the  Grundriss 
of  Tennemann  was  not  intended  by  its  author  for  an  independent 
treatise.  It  is  merely  a manual  or  text-book ; that  is,  an  outline 
of  statements  to  be  filled  up,  and  fully  illustrated  in  lectures  ; — 
a text-book  also  for  the  use  of  students,  who,  from  their  country 
and  course  of  education,  were  already  more  or  less  familiar  with 
the  philosophy  of  the  German  schools.  In  translating  this  work 
as  a system  intended  to  be  complete  per  se,  and  in  favor  of  a 
public  unlearned  in  philosophical  discussion,  and  utterly  ignorant 
of  German  metaphysics,  a competent  translator  would  thus  have 
found  it  necessary,  in  almost  every  paragraph,  to  supply,  to  am- 
plify, and  to  explain.  M.  Cousin,  indeed,  when  he  condescended 
to  translate  this  work  (we  speak  only  from  recollection  and  a 
rapid  glance),  limited  himself  to  a mere  translation.  But  by  him 
the  treatise  was  intended  to  be  only  subordinate  to  the  history 
of  speculation  delivered  in  his  lectures ; and  was  addressed, 
among  his  countrymen,  to  a numerous  class  of  readers,  whose 
study  of  philosophy,  and  of  German  philosophy,  he  had  himself 
powerfully  contributed  to  excite.  The  fact,  indeed,  of  a French 
translation,  by  so  able  an  interpreter,  was  of  itself  sufficient  to 
render  a simple  version  of  the  work  into  another  European  tongue 
nearly  superfluous  ; and  we  were  prepared  to  expect,  that,  if 
translated  into  English,  something  more  would  be  attempted, 
than  what  had  been  already  so  well  executed  in  a language  with 
which  every  student  of  philosophy  is  familiar. 

It  was,  therefore,  with  considerable  interest,  that  we  read  the 
announcement  of  an  English  translation,  by  a gentleman  distin- 
guished for  learning  among  the  Tutors  of  Oxford ; whose  compa- 
rative merit,  indeed,  had  raised  him  to  several  of  the  most 
honorable  and  important  offices  in  the  nomination  of  the  two 
“Venerable  Houses.”  Independently  of  its  utility,  we  hailed  the 
publication  as  a symptom  of  the  revival,  in  England,  of  a taste 
for  philosophical  speculation  ; and  this  more  especially,  as  it  ema- 
nated from  that  University  in  which  (since  its  legal  constitution 
had  been  subverted,  and  all  the  subjects  taught  reduced  to  the 
capacity  of  one  self-elected  teacher),  Psychology  and  Metaphysics, 
as  beyond  the  average  comprehension  of  the  College  Fellows,  had 


i 06 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TF.NNEMANN’S 


remained  not  only  untaught,  hut  their  study  discouraged,  if  not 
formally  proscribed.  A glance  at  Mr.  Johnson’s  preface  confirmed 
us  in  our  prepossessions.  We  were  there,  indirectly,  indeed,  hut 
confidently,  assured  of  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  philosophy 
in  general,  and  German  philosophy  in  particular;  nor  were  we 
allowed  to  remain  ignorant  of  the  translator’s  consciousness  that 
he  might  easily  have  become  the  rival  of  his  author.  “As  far,” 
he  says,  “as  it  appeared  possible,  I have  preserved  the  technical 
expressions  of  my  author,  subjoining  for  the  most  part  an  expla- 
nation of  their  meaning,  for  the  benefit  of  those  English  readers 
who  may  not  have  plunged  into  the  profound  abyss  of  Grerman 
metaphysics  — the  expositor  himself  having  of  course  so  plunged. 
“Whenever,”  he  adds,  “it  has  appeared  to  me  that  an  observa- 
tion of  my  author  was  of  a nature  impossible  to  be  apprehended 
by  any  but  a scholar  long  familiar  with  the  disputes  of  the  Grer- 
man lecture-rooms,  I have  endeavored  to  express  the  sense  of  it 
in  other  words;” — necessarily  implying  that  the  interpreter  him- 
self was  thus  familiar.  And  again: — “ There  are  parts  of  Tenne- 
mann,  which  on  this  account  I had  much  rather  have  composed 
anew  than  translated,  particularly  the  Introduction.” 

The  examination  of  a few  paragraphs  of  the  work,  however, 
proved  the  folly  of  our  expectations.  We  found  it  to  be  a bare 
translation ; and  one  concentrating  every  possible  defect.  We 
discovered,  in  th e,  first  place,  that  the  translator  was  but  superfi- 
cially versed  in  the  German  language  ; — in  the  second , that  he 
was  wholly  ignorant  even  of  the  first  letter  in  the  alphabet  of  Ger- 
man philosophy  ; — in  the  third , that  he  was  almost  equally  unac- 
quainted with  every  other  philosophy,  ancient  and  modern ; — in 
the  fourth,  that  he  covertly  changes  every  statement  of  his  author 
which  he  may  not  like ; in  the  fifth,  that  he  silently  suppresses 
every  section,  sentence,  clause,  word  he  is  suspicious  of  not  under- 
standing ; — and  in  the  sixth,  that  he  reviles,  without  charity,  the 
philosophy  and  philosophers  he  is  wholly  incapable  of  appreciat- 
ing.— Instead  of  being  of  the  smallest  assistance  to  the  student 
of  philosophy,  the  work  is  only  calculated  to  impede  his  progress, 
if  not  at  once  to  turn  him  from  the  pursuit.  From  beginning  to 
end,  all  is  vague  or  confused,  unintelligible  or  erroneous.  We  do 
not  mean  to  insinuate  that  it  was  so  intended  (albeit  the  thought 
certainly  did  strike  us),  but,  in  point  of  fact,  this  translation  is 
admirably  calculated  to  turn  all  metaphysical  speculation  into 
contempt.  From  the  character  of  the  work,  from  the  celebrity 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


of  its  author  and  of  its  French  translator,  and  even  from  the 
academical  eminence  of  Mr.  Johnson  himself,  his  version  would 
he  probably  one  of  the  first  books  resorted  to  by  the  English  stu- 
dent, for  information  concerning  the  nature  and  progress  of  phi- 
losophical opinions.  But  in  proportion  as  the  inquirer  were  capa- 
ble of  thinking,  would  philosophy,  as  here  delineated,  appear  to 
him  incomprehensible ; and  in  proportion  as  he  respected  his  source 
of  information,  would  he  either  despair  of  his  own  capacity  for 
the  study,  or  be  disgusted  with  the  study  itself.  It  is,  indeed,  by 
reason  of  the  serious  injury  which  this  translation  might  occasion 
to  the  cause  of  philosophy  in  this  country,  that  we  find  it  impera- 
tive on  us,  by  annihilating  its  authority,  to  deprive  it  of  the 
power  to  hurt. 

But  let  us  be  equitable  to  the  author  while  executing  justice 
on  his  work.  This  translation  is  by  no  means  to  be  taken  as  a 
test  of  the  general  talent  or  accomplishment  of  the  translator. 
He  has  certainly  been  imprudent,  in  venturing  on  an  undertak- 
ing, for  which  he  was  qualified,  neither  by  his  studies,  nor  by  the 
character  of  his  mind.  That  he  should  ever  conceive  himself  so 
qualified,  furnishes  only  another  proof  of  the  present  abject  state 
of  philosophical  erudition  in  this  country ; for  it  is  less  to  be 
ascribed  to  any  overweening  presumption  in  his  powers,  than  to 
the  lamentable  lowness  of  the  standard  by  which  he  rated  their 
sufficiency.  What  Mr.  Johnson  has  executed  ill,  there  are  prob- 
ably not  six  individuals  in  the  British  empire  who  could  perform 
well. — But  to  the  proof  of  our  assertions. 

That  Mr.  Johnson,  though  a quondam  Professor  of  ancient 
Saxon,  is  still  an  under-graduate  in  modern  German , will,  with- 
out special  proof,  be  sufficiently  apparent  in  the  course  of  our 
criticism. 

Of  his  ignorance  of  the  Kantian  philosophy , in  the  language 
of  which  the  work  of  Tennemann  is  written,  every  page  of  the 
translation  bears  ample  witness.  The  peculiarities  of  this  lan- 
guage are  not  explained ; nay,  the  most  important  sections  of  the 
original,  from  which,  by  a sagacious  reader,  these  might  have 
been  partially  divined,  are  silently  omitted,  or  professedly  sup- 
pressed as  unintelligible.  ( E . g.  § 41.)  Terms  in  the  original, 
correlative  and  opposed,  are,  not  only  not  translated  by  terms 
also  correlative  and  opposed,  but  confounded  under  the  same  ex- 
pression, and,  if  not  rendered  at  random,  translated  by  the  rule 
of  contraries.  To  take,  for  example,  the  mental  operations  and 


108 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S. 


their  objects : In  a few  pages  we  have  examined,  we  find  among 
other  errors,  Vernunft  (Reason),  though  strictly  used  in  its  pro- 
per signification  as  opposed  to  Ver stand,  rendered  sometimes  by 
“ Reason,”  hut  more  frequently  by  “ Understanding”  or  “ Intel- 
lect ;”  and  Verstand  (Understanding),  in  like  manner,  specially 
used  in  opposition  to  Vernunft  (Reason),  translated  indifferently 
by  “Understanding”  or  “Reason,”1  Vorstellung  (Representa- 
tion), the  genus  of  which  Idee,  Begriff,  Anschauung  are  species, 
is  translated  “Perception,”  “Idea,”  “Apprehension,”  “Impres- 
sion,” “ Thought,”  “ Effort,”  &c. — Begriff  (Notion,  Concept),2 
the  object  of  the  Understanding,  as  opposed  to  Idee  (Idea),  the 
object  of  the  Reason,  is  commonly  translated  “ Idea,”  (and  this 
also  in  treating  of  the  Aristotelian  and  Kantian  philosophies,  in 
which  this  term  has  a peculiar  meaning  very  different  from  its 
Cartesian  universality),  sometimes  “ Opinion,”  “ Character ;”  Idee 
der  Vernunft  (Idea  of  Reason)  is  rendered  by  “object  of  Under- 
standing,” and  Ziveck  der  Vernunft  (scope  or  end  of  Reason),  by 
“mental  object;”  while  Anschauung  (immediate  object  of  Per- 
ception or  Imagination)  is  expressed  by  “ mental  Conception,'1'1 
“ Perce ptionf  & c. — Yet  Mr.  Johnson  professes,  “ as  far  as  it  ap- 
peared possible,  to  have  preserved  the  technical  expressions  of  his 
author  !”  But  of  this  more  in  the  sequel. 

Of  our  translator’s  knowledge  of  philosophy  in  general,  a speci- 
men may  be  taken  from  the  few  short  notes  of  explanation  he 
has  appended.  These  for  the  most  part  say,  in  fact,  nothing,  or 
are  merely  an  echo  of  the  text ; where  they  attempt  more,  they 
are  uniformly  wrong.  Take,  for  example,  the  two  first.  At  p.  55, 
on  the  words  Syncretism  and  Mysticism,  we  have  this  luminous 
annotation:  “The  force  of  these  terms,  as  used  by  the  author, 
will  be  sufficiently  explained  in  the  course  of  the  work.  TranslP 
At  p.  70  (and  on  a false  translation),  there  is  the  following  note, 
which,  though  not  marked  as  the  translator’s,  at  once  indicates 
its  source  : “Idealism  is  used  to  denote  the  theory  which  asserts 
the  reality  of  our  ideas,3  and  from  these  argues  the  reality  of  ex- 


1 By  the  time  he  is  half  through  the  work,  our  translator  seems  to  have  become  aware 
that  the  Kantians  “make  a broad  distinction  between  the  Understanding  and  Rea 
son.”  The  discovery,  however,  had  no  beneficial  effect  on  his  translation. 

2 It  will  be  seen  that  wc  do  not  employ  Conception  in  the  meaning  attached  to  it 
by  Mr.  Stewart. 

3 The  stoutest  skeptic  never  doubted  that  we  are  really  conscious  of  what  we  are 
conscious — he  never  doubted  the  subjective  reality  of  our  ideas  : the  doubt  would  an- 
nihilate itself. 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


ternal  objects.1  Pantheism  is  the  opinion  that  all  nature  partakes 
of  the  divine  essence.” 2 — To  this  head  we  may  refer  the  author’s 
continual  translation  of  Philosophic  by  “ Moral  Philosophy,” 
which  he  tells  us  is  convertible  with  Metaphysics  in  general ; his 
use  of  the  word  “ Experimentalism”  for  Empirism,  Philosophy 
of  Experience  or  of  Observation ; to  say  nothing  of  the  incorrect- 
ness and  vacillation  of  his  whole  technical  language  criticised  by 
any  standard. — Under  this  category  may  be  also  mentioned  the 
numerous  and  flagrant  errors  in  philosophical  history.  For  ex- 
ample, Joseph  Priestley  ( cils  Physiker  beruehnite ) is  called  “the 
celebrated  Physician ;”  and  Ancillon  (pere ),  thus  distinguished 
from  his  son,  the  present  Prussian  prime  minister,  himself  a dis- 
tinguished philosopher,  is  converted  from  a Calvinist  pastor  to  a 
Catholic  priest — “ Father  Ancillon.” 

But  lest  we  should  be  supposed  to  have  selected  these  defects, 
we  shall  vindicate  the  rigid  accuracy  of  our  strictures  by  a few 
extracts.  AYe  annex  to  each  paragraph  a literal  translation,  not 
such,  assuredly,  as  we  should  offer,  were  we  to  attempt  a com- 
plete version  of  the  original,  but  such  as  may  best  enable  the 
English  reader  to  compare  Mr.  Johnson  and  Tennemann  together. 
AYe  find  it  convenient  to  make  our  observations  in  the  form  of 
notes : in  these  we  pass  over  much  that  is  imperfect,  and  can 
notice  only  a few  of  the  principal  mistakes.  AYe  can  not,  of 
course,  hope  to  be  fully  understood  except  by  those  who  have 
some  acquaintance  with  German  philosophy. — AYe  shall  first  quote 
paragraphs  from  the  Introduction. 

Johnson's  Version,  \ 1. — “ A history  of  philosophy,  to  be  complete,  de- 
mands a preliminary  inquiry  respecting  the  character  of  this  science,  as  well 
as  respecting  its  subject-matter,4  its  form  and  object  ;5  and  also  its  extent 

1 We  had  always  imagined  the  proving  the  reality  of  external  objects  to  be  the  ne- 
gation of  Idealism — Realism. 

2 Pantheism,  however,  is  the  very  denial  of  such  participation  ; it  asserts  that  “all 

nature”  and  the  “ divine  essence”  are  not  two,  one  partaking  of  the  other,  but  one  and 
the  same.  3 “ Complete,”  inaccurate  ; original,  Zweckmacssige. 

4 “Subject  matter;”  original,  Inhalt,  i.  e.  contents,  the  complement  of  objects. 
Subject  or  Subject-matter  is  the  materia  subjecta  or  in  qua  ; and  if  employed  for  the 
object,  materia  objecta  or  circa  quam,  is  always  an  abuse  of  philosophical  language, 
though  with  us,  unfortunately  a very  common  one.  But  to  commute  these  terms  in  the 
translation  of  a Kantian  Treatise,  where  subject  and  object  subjective  and  objective,  are 
accurately  contradistinguished,  and  where  the  distinction  forms,  in  fact,  the  very  cardi- 
nal point  on  which  the  whole  philosophy  turns,  is  to  convert  light  into  darkness,  or- 
der into  chaos. 

5 “ Object original,  Zweck,  end,  aim,  scope.  The  unphilosophical  abuse  of  the 
term  object  for  end  is  a comparatively  recent  innovation  in  the  English  and  French  lan- 
guages. Culpable  at  all  times,  on  the  present  occasion  it  is  equally  inexcusable  as  the 
preceding. 


110 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 


or  comprehensiveness,  its  method,  its  importance,  and  the  different  ways  in 
which  it  may  he  treated.  All  these  particulars,  with  the  bibliography 
belonging  to  it  will  form,  together  with  some  previous  observations  on  the 
progress  of  philosophical  research,1  the  subject  of  a general  introduc- 
tion.”   

Literal  Translation , $ 1. — “The  history  of  philosophy,  if  handled  in 
conformity  to  the  end  in  view,  presupposes  an  inquiry  touching  the  con- 
ception of  the  science  conjoining  a view  of  its  contents,  form,  and  end,  as 
also  of  its  compass,  method,  importance,  and  the  various  modes  in  which 
it  may  be  treated.  These  objects,  along  with  the  history  and  literature  of 
the  history  of  philosophy,  combined  with  some  preparatory  observaions  on 
the  progress  of  the  philosophizing  reason,  affords  the  contents  of  a general 

introduction  to  the  history  of  philosophy.” 

Johnson's  Version,  4 2. — “ The  human  mind  has  a tendency  to  attempt 
to  enlarge  the  bounds  of  its  knowledge,  and  gradually  to  aspire  to  a clear 
development  of  the  laws  and  relations  of  nature,  and  of  its  own  operations.2 
At  first  it  does  nothing  more  than  obey  a blind  desire,  without  accounting 
to  itself  sufficiently  for  this  instinctive  impulse  of  the  understanding,3  and 
without  knowing  the  appropriate  means  to  be  employed,  or  the  distance 
by  which  it  is  removed  from  its  object.  Insensibly  this  impulse  becomes 
more  deliberate,  and  regulates  itself  in  proportion  to  the  progress  of  the 
understanding,4  which  gradually  becomes  better  acquainted  with  itself. 
Such  a deliberate  impulse  is  what  we  call  philosophy.5” 

Literal  Translation,  § 2. — “Man,  through  the  tendency  of  his  Reason 
(Vernunft),  strives  after  a systematic  completion  (Yollendung)  of  his  know'l- 
ecige  considered  in  Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  and  Modality,  and  conse- 
quently endeavors  to  raise  himself  to  a science  of  the  ultimate  principles 
and  laws  of  Nature  and  Liberty,  and  of  their  mutual  relations.  To  this 
he  is  at  first  impelled  by  the  blind  feeling  of  a want ; he  forms  no  adequate 
appreciation  of  the  problem  thus  proposed  by  reason  ; and  knows  not  by 
what  way,  through  what  means,  or  to  what  extent,  the  end  is  to  be  at- 
tained. By  degrees  his  efforts  become  more  reflective,  and  this  in  propor- 

1 “ Philosophic  research.”  The  translation  is  a vague  and  unmeaning  version  of  a 
precise  and  significant  original — philosophiren.de  Vernunft.  (See  $ 2.) 

2 This  sentence  is  mangled  and  wholly  misunderstood.  “ The  end  of  philosophy,” 
says  Trismegistus,  “is  the  intuition  of  unity  and  to  this  tendency  of  speculation 
toward  the  absolute — to  the  intensive  completion  in  unity,  and  not  to  the  extensive  en- 
largement to  infinity,  of  our  knowledge,  does  Tennemann  refer.  The  latter  is  not 
philosophy  in  his  view  at  all.  In  the  translation,  Vernunft  (Reason),  the  faculty  of 
the  absolute  in  Kant’s  system,  and  here  used  strictly  in  that  sense,  is  diluted  into 
“Mind  and  the  four  grand  Categories  are  omitted,  according  to  which  reason  en- 
deavors to  carry  up  the  knowledge  furnished  through  the  senses  and  understanding, 
into  the  unconditioned. 

3 “Understanding  just  the  reverse — “Reason;”  original,  Vernunft.  The  author 
and  his  translator  arc  in  these  terms,  always  at  cross  purposes.  “ Instinctive  impulse 
of  the  understanding”  is  also  wrong  in  itself,  and  wrong  as  a translation.  The  whole 
sentence,  indeed,  as  will  he  seen  from  our  version,  is  one  tissue  of  error. 

4 “Understanding;”  the  same  error;  “Reason.”  The  whole  sentence  is  ill  ren- 
dered. 

5 “ Philosophy  ;”  das  Pliilosophircn,  not  philosophy  vaguely,  but  precisely,  philo- 
sophic act — philosophizing.  Streben  here,  and  before,  is  also  absurdly  translated 
“ impulse  a “ deliberate  impulse  1”  a round  square  1 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


Ill 


tion  to  the  gradual  development  of  the  self-consciousness  of  reason.  This 
reflective  effort  we  denominate  the  act  of  philosophizing.” 

Johnson’s  Version,  § 3. — “ Thereupon  arise  various  attempts  to  approxi- 
mate this  mental  object  of  the  understanding,1  attempts  more  or  less  differ- 
ing in  respect  of  their  principles,  their  methods,  their  consequences,2  their 
extent,  and,  in  general,  their  peculiar  objects.  In  all  these  attempts, 
(which  take  the  name  of  Philosophic  Systems,  when  they  present  them- 
selves in  a scientific  form,  and  the  value  of  which  is  proportionate  to  the 
degree  of  intelligence  manifested  by  each  particular  philosopher),  we  trace 
the  gradual  development  of  the  human  understanding,3  according  to  its 
peculiar  laws.’' 

Literal  Translation,  § 3. — “ Out  of  this  effort  arise  the  various  attempts 
of  thinkers  to  approximate  to  this  Idea  of  reason,  or  to  realize  it  in  thought ; 
attempts  more  or  less  differing  from  each  other  in  principle,  in  method, 
in  logical  consequence,  in  result,  and  in  the  comprehension  and  general 
character  of  their  objects.  In  these  attempts  (which,  when  they  present 
themselves  in  a form  scientifically  complete,  are  denominated  philosophic 
systems,  and  possess  a value,  varying  in  proportion  to  the  pitch  of  intellect- 
ual cultivation,  and  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  several  speculators)  the 
thinking  reason  developes  itself  in  conformity  to  its  peculiar  laws.” 

Johnson’s  Version,  k 4. — “ But  the  development  of  human  reason  is 
itself  subject  to  external  conditions,  and  is  sometimes  seconded,  sometimes 
retarded,  or  suspended,  according  to  the  different  impressions  it  receives 
from  without.”  4 

Literal  Translation 4. — “But  the  development  of  human  reason 
does  not  take  place  without  external  excitement  : it  is  consequently 
dependent  upon  external  causes,  in  as  much  as  its  activity  through  the 
different  direction  given  it  from  without,  is  now  promoted  in  its  efforts, 
now  checked  and  held  hack.” 

Johnson  s Version,  § 5. — “To  give  an  account  of  the  different  works 
produced  by  the  understanding,  thus  in  the  progress  of  improvement,  and 
favored  or  impeded  by  external  circumstances,  is,  in  fact,  to  compose  a 
history  of  philosophy.”5 

Literal  Translation,  § 5. — “An  account  of  the  manifold  efforts  made 
to  realize  that  Idea  of  reason  ( k 2)  in  Matter  and  Form,  (in  other  words, 
to  bring  philosophy  as  a science  to  bear),  efforts  arising  from  the  develop- 
ment of  reason,  and  promoted  or  held  in  check  by  external  causes — con- 
stitutes, in  fact,  the  History  of  Philosophy.” 

Johnson's  Version,  § 6. — “ The  subject  matter6  of  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy, is  both  external  and  internal.  The  internal  or  immediate  embraces, 
1.  The  efforts  continually  made  by  the  understanding  to  attain  to  a per- 
ception of  the  first  principles  of  the  great  objects  of  its  pursuit  ($2),  with 
many  incidental  details  relating  to  the  subject  of  investigation,  the  degree 
of  ardor  or  remissness  which  from  time  to  time  have  prevailed ; with  the 


1 “ Object  of  the  Understanding  the  opposite  again  ; original,  Idee  dcr  Vernunft. 

2 “ Consequences  wrong  ; Conscquenz. 

3 “ Understanding,”  usual  blunder  for  Reason,  and  twice  in  this  tj.  It  is  so  frequent 
in  the  sequel,  that  we  can  not  afford  to  notice  it  again.  The  whole  paragraph  is  in 
other  respects  mutilated,  and  inaccurately  rendered. 

4 Mangled  and  incorrect.  s jbi(j 

6 “ Subject-matter;”  Stoff,  matter,  or  object-matter:  see  note  on  6 1. 


112 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OP  TENNEMANN’S 


influence  of  external  causes  to  interest  men  in  sucli  pursuits,  or  the  absence 
of  them.1  2.  The  effects  of  philosophy,  or  the  views,  methods,  and  systems 
it  has  originated  ; effects  varying  with  the  energies  out  of  which  they 
sprang.  In  these  we  see  the  understanding  avail  itself  of  materials  per- 
petually accumulating  toward  constituting  philosophy  a science,  or  rules 
and  principles  for  collecting  materials  to  form  a scientific  whole  : or  finally, 
maxims  relating  to  the  method  to  be  pursued  in  such  researches.2  3.  And 
lastly  : We  observe  the  development  of  the  understanding  as  an  instrument 
of  philosophy,  that  is  to  say,  the  progress  of  the  understanding  toward 
researches  in  which  it  depends  solely  on  itself;  in  other  words,  its 
gradual  progress  toward  the  highest  degree  of  independence ; a progress 
which  may  he  observed  in  individuals,  in  nations,  and  in  the  whole  race 
of  man.”3 

Literal  Translation , § 6.  “ The  matter  about  which  the  history  of 

philosophy  is  conversant,  is  consequently  both  internal  and  external.  The 
internal  or  proximate  matter,  comprehends,  in  the  first  place,  the  contin- 
ued application  of  reason  to  the  investigation  of  the  ultimate  principles 
and  laws  of  Nature  and  Liberty  ; for  therein  consists  the  act  of  philosophiz- 
ing (<:  2).  And  here  are  to  be  observed  great  differences  in  regard  to 
subject  and  object — to  the  extensive  application  and  intensive  force  of  the 
philosophizing  energy — to  internal  aims  and  motives  (whether  generous  or 
interested) — as  likewise  to  external  causes  and  occasions.  It  comprehends, 
secondly,  the  products  of  the  philosophizing  act , in  other  words,  pliilo- 
sopliic  views,  methods,  and  systems  ($  3),  which  are  as  manifold  as  the 
efforts  out  of  which  they  spring.  Through  these  reason  partly  obtains 
materials  becoming  gradually  purer,  for  philosophy  as  science,  partly  rules 
and  principles  by  which  to  bind  up  these  materials  into  a scientific  whole, 
partly,  in  fine,  maxims  for  our  procedure  in  the  search  after  philosophy. 
Thirdly,  it  comprehends  the  development  of  reason,  as  the  instrument  of 
philosophy,  i.  e.  the  excitation  of  reason  to  spontaneous  inquiry,  in  conform- 
ity to  determined  laws  through  internal  inclination,  and  external  occa- 
sion, and  herein  the  gradual  progress  manifested  by  individuals,  nations, 
and  the  thinking  portion  of  mankind.  This  therefore  constitutes  an  im- 
portant anthropological  phasis  of  the  history  of  philosophy.” 

Johnson's  Version,  §7.  “ The  external  matter  consists  in  the  causes, 

events,  and  circumstances  which  have  influenced  the  development  of 
philosophic  reason,  and  the  nature  of  its  productions.  To  this  order  of  facts 
belong  : 1.  The  individual  history  of  philosophers,  that  is  to  say,  the  de- 
gree, the  proportion,  and  the  direction  of  their  intellectual  powers  : the 
sphere  of  their  studies  and  their  lives,  the  interests  which  swayed  them, 
and  even  their  moral  characters.4 5  2.  The  influence  of  external  causes, 
that  is  to  say,  the  character,  and  the  degree  of  mental  cultivation  preva- 
lent in  the  countries  to  which  they  belonged  ; the  prevailing  spirit  of  the 
times ; and,  to  descend  still  farther,  the  climate  and  properties  of  the 
country ; its  institutions,  religion,  and  language.6  3.  The  influence  of 

1 The  whole  sentence  execrable  in  all  respects  ; we  can  not  criticise  it  in  detail. 

2 In  this  sentence  there  are  nine  errors,  besides  imperfections. 

3 In  this  sentence,  what  is  suffered  to  remain  is  worse  treated  than  what  is  thrown 
out. 

4 In  this  sentence  there  are  four  inaccuracies. 

5 In  this  sentence  there  are  two  omissions,  one  essential  to  the  meaning,  and  one 

inaccuracy. 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


individuals  in  consequence  of  the  admiration  and  imitation  they  have  ex- 
cited, by  their  doctrines  or  example  ; an  influence  which  betrays  itself  in 
the  matter  as  well  as  in  the  manner  of  their  schools.”1  (Bacon,  Locke, 
Leibnitz.) 

Literal  Translation , §7.  “ The  external  matter  consists  in  those 

causes,  events,  and  circumstances,  which  have  exerted  an  influence  on  the 
development  of  the  philosophizing  reason,  and  the  complexion  of  its  pro- 
ductions. To  this  head  belong,  in  the  first  place,  the  individual  genius  of 
the  philosopher,  i.  e.  the  degree,  the  mutual  relation,  and  the  direction  of 
his  intellectual  faculties,  dependent  thereon  his  sphere  of  view  and  opera- 
tion, and  the  interest  with  which  it  inspires  him,  and  withal  even  his 
moral  character.  In  the  second  place,  the  influence  of  external  causes 
on  individual  genius,  such  as  the  character  and  state  of  cultivation  of 
the  nation,  the  dominant  spirit  of  the  age,  and  less  proximately  the  cli- 
mate and  natural  qualities  of  the  country,  education,  political  constitution, 
religion,  and  language.  In  the  third  place,  the  effect  of  individual  genius 
itself  (through  admiration  and  imitation,  precept  and  example)  on  the  in- 
terest, the  direction,  the  particular  objects,  the  kind  and  method  of  the 
subsequent  speculation — an  influence  variously  modified  in  conformity  to 
intellectual  character,  to  the  consideration  and  celebrity  of  schools  estab- 
lished, to  writings,  their  form  and  their  contents.”  (Bacon,  Locke, 
Leibnitz). 

Jolmson’s  Version,  § 9.  “History  in  general  is  distinguished,  when 
properly  so  called,  from  Annals,  Memoirs,  &c.,  by  its  form  : i.  e.  by  the 
combination  of  its  incidents,  and  their  circumstantial  development.”3 

Literal  Translation,  § 9.  “History,  in  the  stricter  signification,  is 
distinguished  by  reference  to  its  form,  from  mere  annals,  memoirs,  &c., 
through  the  concatenation  of  events,  and  their  scientific  exposition,”  \i.  e. 
under  the  relation  of  causes  and  effects.] 

P-assing  now  to  the  body  of  the  book : — we  shall  first  take  a 
paragraph  from  the  account  of  Aristotle's  philosophy,  in  which  an 
Oxford  Tutor  and  Examining  Master  may  he  supposed  at  home. 
With  the  exception,  however,  of  four  popular  treatises,  we  sus- 
pect that  the  Stagirite  is  as  little  read  or  understood  in  Oxford, 
as  in  Edinburgh. 

Johnson! s Version,  § 140. — “Aristotle  possessed  in  a high  degree  the 
talents  of  discrimination  and  analysis,  added  to  the  most  astonishing  knowl- 


1 Compare  the  literal  version  ! 

3 “ Circumstantial  development ; pragmatische  Darstellung.  No  word  occurs  more 
frequently  in  the  historical  and  philosophical  literature  of  Germany  and  Holland,  than 
pragmatisch,  or  pragmaticus,  and  Pragmatismus.  So  far  from  pragmatisch  being  tan- 
tamount to  “ circumstantial,”  and  opposed  (see  (>  12  of  translation)  to  “ scientific,”  the 
word  is  peculiarly  employed  to  denote  that  form  of  history,  which,  neglecting  circum- 
stantial details,  is  occupied  in  the  scientific  evolution  of  causes  and  effects.  It  is,  in 
fact,  a more  definite  term  than  the  histoire  ra.ison.ee  of  the  French.  The  word  in  this 
signification  was  originally  taken  from  Polybius  ; but  founded,  as  is  now  acknowledged, 
on  an  erroneous  interpretation.  (See  Schweigh.  ad  Polyb.  L.  i.  c.  2 — C.  D.  Beckii 
Diss.  Pragmatical  Historic  apud  veteres  ratio  et  judicium — and  Borgeri  Oratio  de  His- 
toria  Pragmatica). 


H 


114 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 


edge  of  books,1  and  the  works  of  Nature.  To  the  latter,  more  especially, 
he  had  devoted  himself.  He  rejected  the  doctrine  of  ideas  ; maintaining 
that  all  our  impressions  and  thoughts,  and  even  the  highest  efforts2  of  the 
understanding,  are  the  fruit  of  experience  ; that  the  world  is  eternal,  even 
in  its  form,  and  not  the  work  of  a creative  providence.  In  the  theory  of 
composition  he  drew  a distinction  between  the  matter,  which  he  referred 
to  philosophy,  and  the  form,  which  he  derived  from  poetry.3  Instead  of 
following  his  master  in  his  way  of  reasoning  from  the  universal  to  the  par- 
ticular, he  always  takes  the  opposite  course,  and  infers  the  first  from  the 
latter.  His  writings  contain  valuable  remarks  on  the  system  of  his  pre- 
decessors ; his  own  being  that  of  Empiricism,  modified  in  a slight  degree 
by  the  nationalism  of  Plato.” 

Literal  Translation,  $ 140. — “Aristotle  possessed  in  a high  degree  the 
talent  of  discrimination,  and  an  extensive  complement  of  knowledge  derived 
from  books,  and  from  his  own  observation  of  nature.  The  investigation  of 
nature  was,  indeed,  his  peculiar  aim.  He  consequently  rejected  Ideas,  and 
admitted  that  all  mental  representations  (Vorstellungen),  even  the  highest 
of  the  understanding,  are,  as  to  their  matter  given,  being  elaborated  out 
of  experience  ; and  that  the  universe  is  eternal  even  in  its  form,  and  not 
fashioned  by  a plastic  intelligence.  He  had  not  a genius  (Sinn)  like  Plato 
for  the  Ideal  [the  object  of  reason  proper]  but  was  more  the  philosopher  of 
the  understanding  (Verstand) ; one,  who  in  his  intellectual  system  (Ver- 
standessystem) — an  Empirism  modified  by  Plato’s  Rationalism — did  not, 
like  that  philosopher,  proceed  from  the  universal  to  the  particular,  but 
from  the  particular  to  the  universal.” 

Johnson’s  Version,  § 145. — “ Physiology  (sic)  is  indebted  to  Aristotle 
for  its  first  cultivation  ; for  an  essay,  imperfect  indeed,  but  built  upon  ex- 
periment associated  with  theory.  The  soul  he  pronounced  to  be  exclu- 
sively the  active  principle  of  life  ; the  primitive  form  of  every  body  capa- 
ble of  life,  i.  e.  organized His  remarks  on  the  characteristics 

of  our  means  of  knowledge,  that  is,  the  senses,4 *  are  deserving  of  particular 
attention;  as  well  as  his  observations  on  the  Common  Sense;  and  on  Con- 
sciousness6 (the  existence  of  which  he  was  the  first  distinctly  to  recognize) ; 


1 Tennemann  does  not  make  Aristotle  a bibliographer. 

2 The  question  of  origin  refers  not  to  the  subjective  efforts  of  our  faculties,  but  to 
the  objective  knowledge  about  which  these  efforts  are  conversant.  The  sentence  is 
otherwise  mutilated,  and  its  sense  destroyed. 

3 What  this  may  possibly  mean  we  confess  ourselves  at  a loss  to  guess.  Is  it  an 
attempt  at  translating  some  interpolation  of  Wendt  in  the  last  edition  of  the  Grund- 
riss  1 — ours  is  the  fourth.  It  can  not  surely  be  intended  for  a version  of  what  is  other- 
wise omitted  by  Mr.  Johnson. 

4 “ On  the  characteristics  of  our  means  of  knowledge,  that  is,  the  senses,  are,”  &c. 
The  original  is — ucher  die  Aeusserungen  der  Erkcnntnissthaetigkcit  d.  i.  ueber  die 

Smne,  den  Gemcinsinn,  &c.  See  Literal  Translation. 

6 Neither  by  xAristotle  nor  by  any  other  Greek  philosopher,  was  Consciousness  falsely 
analyzed  into  a separate  faculty,  and  the  Greek  language  contains  no  equivalent  ex- 
pression ; a want  which,  considering  the  confusion  and  error  which  the  word  (however 
convenient)  has  occasioned  among  modern  philosophers,  we  regard  as  any  thing  but 
a defect.  That  we  can  not  know  without  knowing  that  we  know,  and  that  these  arc 
not  two  functions  of  distinct  faculties,  but  one  indivisible  energy  of  the  same  power, 
this  is  well  stated  by  Aristotle  in  explaining  the  function  of  the  Common  Sense  ; and 
to  this  Tennemann  correctly  refers.  It  is  the  error  of  his  translator  to  make  Aristotle 
treat  explicitly  of  consciousness  by  name. 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


115 


on  Imagination,  Memory,  and  Recollection.  Perception  is  the  faculty 
which  conveys  to  us  the  forms  of  objects.  Thought  is  the  perception  of 
forms  or  ideas  by  means  of  ideas,1 2  which  presupposes  the  exercise  of  Sensa- 
tion and  Imagination.  Hence  a passive  and  an  active  Intelligence.  The 
last  is  imperishable  (Immortality  independent  of  Conscience3  or  Memory.) 
The  thinking  faculty  is  an  energy  distinct  from  the  body,  derived  from 
without,  resembling  the  elementary  matter3  of  the  stars Enjoy- 

ment is  the  result  of  the  complete  development  of  an  energy,  which  at  the 
same  time  perfects  that  energy.4  The  most  noble  of  all  enjoyments  is  the 
result  of  Reason.” 

Literal  Translation , § 145. — “ Psychology  is  indebted  to  Aristotle  for 
its  first,  though  still  imperfect,  scientific  treatment  upon  the  principles  of 
experience,  although  with  these  he  has  likewise  combined  sundry  specula- 
tive views.  The  soul  is  the  efficient  principle  of  life  (life  taken  in  its  most 
extensive  signification) — the  primitive  form  of  every  physical  body  suscepti- 
ble of  animation,  i.  e.  of  one  organically  constituted His 

remarks  are  especially  interesting  on  the  manifestation  of  our  cognitive 
energies,  i.  e.  on  the  Senses — on  the  Common  Sense,  the  first  approach  to  a 
clear  indication  of  Consciousness  (die  erste  deutlichere  Andeutung  des  Be- 
wusstseyns) — on  Imagination,  Reminiscence,  and  Memory.  The  Percep- 
tive and  Imaginative  act  (Anschauen)  is  an  apprehension  of  the  forms  of 
objects  ; and  Thought,  again,  an  apprehension  of  the  forms  of  those  forms 
which  Sense  and  Imagination  presuppose.  Hence  a passive  and  an  act - 
ive  Intellect  or  Understanding.  To  the  latter  belongs  indestructibility 
(immortality  without  consciousness  and  recollection.)  Thought  is,  indeed, 
a faculty  distinct  from  the  corporeal  powers,  infused  into  man  from  with- 
out, and  analogous  to  the  element  of  the  stars Pleasure  is 

the  result  of  the  perfect  exertion  of  a power; — an  exertion  by  which  again 
the  power  itself  is  perfected.  The  noblest  pleasures  originate  in  Reason. 
Practical  Reason,  Will,  is,  according  to  Aristotle,  and  on  empirical  princi- 
ples, determined  by  notions  [of  the  Understanding],  without  a higher  ideal 
principle  [of  Reason  properly  so  called.”] 

We  conclude  our  extracts  by  a quotation  from  the  chapter  on 
Kant. 

Johnson's  Version , § 373. — “His  (Kant’s)  attention  being  awakened  by 
the  Skepticism  of  Hume,  he  was  led  to  remark  the  very  different  degree  of 


1 No  meaning,  or  a wrong  meaning.  The  term  Idea  also,  in  the  common  modern 
signification,  should  have  been  carefully  avoided,  under  the  head  of  Aristotle. 

2 Conscience  is  not  used  in  English  for  Consciousness.  Was  Mr.  Johnson  copying 
from  the  F rench  1 

3 The  word  “ matter”  is  here  wrong. 

4 “ Development  of  an  energy"  and  “ perfecting  an  energy ,”  in  relation  to  Aristotle’s 
doctrine  of  the  Pleasurable,  is  incorrect.  The  word  in  the  original  is,  as  it  ought  to 
be,  Kraft,  power,  or  faculty.  The  term  “ complete”  also  does  not  render  the  original 
so  well  as  “ perfect.”  “ The  perfect  exertion  of  a power”  is  here  intended  to  denote, 
both  subjectively  the  full  and  free  play  of  the  faculty  in  opposition  to  its  languid  ex- 
ercise or  its  too  intense  excitement,  and  objectively,  the  presence  of  all  conditions, 
with  the  absence  of  all  impediments,  to  its  highest  spontaneous  energy.  Aristotle’s 
doctrine  of  Pleasure,  though  never  yet  duly  appreciated,  is  one  of  the  most  important 
generalizations  in  his  whole  philosophy.  The  end  of  the  section  is  otherwise  much 
mutilated. 


lie 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 


certainty  belonging  to  the  deductions  of  Moral  Philosophy,1  and  the  con- 
clusions of  Mathematics  ; and  to  speculate  upon  the  causes  of  this  differ- 
ence. Metaphysics,  of  course,  claimed  his  regard ; but  he  was  led  to  be- 
lieve, that  as  yet  the  very  threshold  of  the  science  had  not  been  passed. 
An  examination  of  the  different  philosophical  systems,  and  particularly 
of  the  jejune  Dogmatism  of  Wolf,  led  him  to  question  whether,  antece- 
dently to  any  attempt  at  Dogmatic  philosophy,  it  might  not  be  necessary 
to  investigate  the  possibility  of  philosophical  knowledge,  and  he  concluded 
that  to  this  end  an  inquiry  into  the  different  sources  of  information,2  and 
a critical  examination  of  their  origin  and  employment,  were  necessary  ; in 
which  respect  he  proposed  to  complete  the  task  undertaken  by  Locke.  He 
laid  down,  in  the  first  place,  that  Moral  Philosophy  and  Mathematics  are, 
in  their  origin,  intellectual  sciences.3  Intellectual  knowledge  is  distin- 
guished from  experimental  by  its  qualities  of  necessity  and  universality. 
On  the  possibility  of  intellectual  knowledge  depends  that  of  the  philoso- 
phical sciences.4  These  are  either  synthetic  or  analytic ; the  latter  of  which 
methods  is  dependent  on  the  first.5  What  then  is  the  principle  of  synthet- 
ical a 'priori  knowledge  in  contradistinction  to  experimental ; which  is 
founded  on  observation  ? The  existence  of  a priori  knowledge  is  deduci- 
ble  from  the  mathematics,  as  well  as  from  the  testimony  of  common  sense  ;6 
and  it  is  with  such  knowledge  that  metaphysics  are  chiefly  conversant.  A 
science,  therefore,  which  may  investigate  with  strictness  the  possibility  of 
such  knowledge,  and  the  principles  of  its  employment  and  application,  is 
necessary  for  the  direction  of  the  human  mind,  and  of  the  highest  practical 
utility.  Kant  pursued  this  course  of  inquiry,  tracing  a broad  line  of  dis- 
tinction between  the  provinces  of  Moral  Philosophy  and  the  Mathematics, 
and  investigating  more  completely  than  had  yet  been  done,  the  faculty  of 


1 “ Moral  Philosophy  Philosophic.  Thrice  in  this  (j. 

2 “ Information  Erkcnntnisse.  The  version  is  incorrect ; even  Knowledge  does 
not  adequately  express  the  original,  both  because  it  is  not  also  plural,  and  because  it 
is  of  a less  emphatically  subjective  signification.  Cognitions  would  be  the  best  trans- 
lation, could  we  venture  also  on  the  verb  cognize  as  a version  of  Erkennen. 

3 “Intellectual  sciences;”  rationale  oder  Vernunft-Wissenchaften.  Intelleclus  or 
Intellekt  is,  in  the  language  of  German  philosophers,  synonymous  with  Verstand,  Un- 
derstanding. The  translator,  therefore,  here  renders,  as  he  usually  does,  one  term  of 
the  antithesis  by  the  other.  The  same  capital  error  is  repeated  in  the  two  following 
sentences. 

4 “Philosophical  sciences;” — philosophische  Erkennlnisse,  philosophic  knowledges 
or  cognitions.  This  and  the  following  errors  would  have  been  avoided  by  an  acquaint- 
ance with  the  first  elements  of  the  critical  philosophy. 

5 “ The  latter  of  which  methods  is  dependent  on  the  first.”  These  few  words  con- 
tain two  great  mistakes.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  reference  in  the  original  to  any 
synthetic  and  analytic  methods,  but  to  Kant’s  thrice  celebrated  distinction  of  synthetic 
and  analytic  cognitions  or  judgments,  a distinction  from  which  the  critical  philosophy 
departs.  In  the  second,  there  is  nothing  to  excuse  the  error  that  analytic  cognitions 
are  founded  on  synthetic.  Analytic  cognitions  are  said  by  Tennemann  to  rest  on  the 
primary  law  of  thought,  i.  e.  on  the  principle  of  contradiction.  (See  Critik  d.  r.  V. 
p.  189,  ets.) — The  present  is  an  example  of  the  absurdity  of  translating  this  work  with- 
out an  explanatory  amplification.  The  distinction  of  analytic  and  synthetic  judgments 
is  to  the  common  reader  wholly  unintelligible  from  the  context. 

6 “ Common  sense.”  Kant  was  not  the  philosopher  to  appeal  to  common  sense. 
Die  gemeine  Erkennlniss  is  common  knowledge,  in  opposition  to  mathematical.  (See 
Grit.  d.  r.  V.  Einl.  6 5.) 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


knowledge.1  He  remarked  that  synthetical  a priori  knowledge  imparts  a 
formal  character  to  knowledge  in  general,  and  can  only  he  grounded  in 
laws  affecting  the  Individual,  and  in  the  consciousness  which  he  has  of  the 
harmony  and  unison  of  his  faculties.2  He  then  proceeds  to  analyze  the 
particulars  of  our  knowledge,  and  discriminates  between  its  elementary 
parts  so  often  confounded  in  practice,  with  a view  to  ascertain  the  true 
nature  of  each  species  : the  characteristics  of  necessity  and  universality 
which  belong  to  a priori  knowledge  being  his  leading  principles.”3 

Literal  Translation,  k 381. — “ Awakened  by  the  skepticism  of  Hume, 
Kant  directed  his  attention  on  the  striking  difference  in  the  result  of  medi- 
tation in  Mathematics  and  in  Philosophy,  and  upon  the  causes  of  this  dif- 
ference. Metaphysic  justly  attracted  his  consideration,  but  he  was  con- 
vinced that  its  threshold  had  yet  been  hardly  touched.  Reflection,  and  a 
scrutiny  of  the  various  philosophical  systems,  especially  of  the  shallow 
dogmatism  of  the  "Wollian  school,  suggested  to  him  the  thought,  that,  pre- 
vious to  all  dogmatical  procedure  in  philosophy,  it  was  necessary,  first 
to  investigate  the  possibility  of  a philosophical  Jcnmcledge  ; and  that  to 
this  end,  an  inquiry  into  the  different  sources  of  our  knowledge — into  its 
origin — and  its  employment  (in  other  words,  Criticism),  was  necessary. 
Thus  did  he  propose  to  accomplish  the  'work  which  had  been  commenced 
by  Locke.  Philosophy  and  mathematics,  he  presupposed  to  be,  in  respect 
of  their  origin,  rational  sciences,  or  sciences  of  reason.  Rational  knowl- 
edge is  distinguished  from  emptirical  by  its  character  of  necessity  and  uni- 
versality. "With  its  possibility  stands  or  falls  the  possibility  of  philosophi- 
cal knowledge,  which  is  of  two  kinds — synthetic  and  analytic.  The  lat- 
ter rests  on  the  fundamental  law  of  thought ; but  what  is  the  principle 
of  synthetic  laiowleclge  a priori,  as  contrasted  with  empirical,  of  which 
perception  is  the  source  ? That  such  knowledge  exists,  is  guaranteed  by 
the  truth  of  mathematical,  and  even  of  common  knowledge,  and  the  effort 
of  reason  in  metaphysic  is  mainly  directed  to  its  realization.  There  is 
therefore  a science  of  the  highest  necessity  and  importance,  which  investi- 
gates, on  principles,  the  possibility,  the  foundation,  and  the  employment 
of  such  knowledge.  Kant  opened  to  himself  the  way  to  this  inquiry,  by 
taking  a strict  line  of  demarkation  between  philosophy  and  mathematics, 
and  by  a more  profound  research  into  the  cognitive  faculties  than  had 
hitherto  been  brought  to  bear  ; while  his  sagacity  enabled  him  to  divine, 
that  synthetic  knowledge  a priori  coincides  with  the  form  of  our  knowl- 
edge, and  can  only  be  grounded  in  the  laws  of  the  several  faculties  which 
co-operate  in  the  cognitive  act.  Then,  in  order  fully  to  discover  these  forms 
of  knowledge,  according  to  the  guiding  principles  of  universality  and  neces- 
sity, he  undertook  a dissection  of  knowledge,  and  distinguished  [in  reflec- 
tion] what  in  reality  is  only  presented  combined,  for  the  behoof  of  scien- 
tific knoAvledge.” 

Johnson’s  Version,  \ 375. — . . . “ The  laws  of  ethics  are  superior  to  the 
empirical  and  determinable  free-will  which  we  enjoy  in  matters  of  practice, 
and  assume  an  imperative  character,  occupying  the  chief  place  in  practi- 


1 This  sentence  is  inaccurately  rendered,  and  not  duly  connected  with  the  next. 

2 This  sentence  is  incomprehensible  to  all ; but  its  absurdity  can  be  duly  apprecia- 
ted only  by  those  who  know  something  of  the  Kantian  philosophy. 

3 The  same  observation  is  true  of  this  sentence  and  of  the  following  section,  which 
ve  leave  without  note  or  comment. 


118 


JOHNSON’S  TRANSLATION  OF  TENNEMANN’S 


cal  philosophy.  This  categorical  principle  becomes  an  absolute  law  of 
universal  obligation,  giving  to  our  conduct  an  ultimate  end  and  spring  of 
action ; which  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a passion  or  affection,  but  as  a 
moral  sense  of  respect  for  law.” 

Literal  Translation,  k 383. — . . . “The  Moral  Law,  as  opposed  to  an 
empirically  determined  volition,  appears  under  the  character  of  a Categori- 
cal Imperative,  (absolute  Ought  [unconditional  duty],)  and  takes  its  place 
at  the  very  summit  of  practical  philosophy.  This  imperative,  as  the  uni- 
versal rule  of  every  rational  will,  prescribes  with  rigorous  necessity  an 
universal  conformity  to  the  laiv  [of  duty ] ; and  thereby  establishes  the 
supreme  absolute  end  and  motive  of  coxrduct,  which  is  not  a pathological 
feeling  [blind  and  mechanical],  but  a reverence  for  the  law  [of  duty,  ra- 
tional and  free].” 

That  Mr.  Johnson  makes  no  scruple  of  violating  the  good  faith 
of  a translator,  is  a serious  accusation — hut  one  unfortunately 
true.  This,  indeed,  is  principally  shown,  in  the  history  of  those 
philosophers  whose  speculations  are  unfavorable  to  revealed  relig- 
ion.— Speaking  of  Hume , Tennemann  says: — “On  the  empirical 
principles  of  Locke,  he  investigated  with  a profoundly  penetrating 
genius  the  nature  of  man  as  a thinking,  and  as  an  active  being. 
This  led  him  through  a train  of  consequent  reasoning  to  the 

skeptical  result  that,  &c And  in  these  investigations  of 

Hume,  philosophical  skepticism  appeared  with  a terrific  force, 
profundity  (Gfrundlichkeit),  and  logical  consequence,  such  as  had 
never  previously  been  witnessed,  and  at  the  same 'time  in  a form 
of  greater  precision,  perspicuity,  and  elegance.”  Thus  rendered 
by  Mr.  Johnson  : — “ Taking  the  experimental  principles  of  Locke 
as  the  foundation  of  his  system,  he  deduced  from  them  many 
acute  but  specious  conclusions  respecting  the  nature  and  condi- 
tion of  man,  as  a reasonable  agent.  He  was  led  on  by  arguments, 
the  fallacy  of  which  is  lost  in  their  ingenuity,  to  the  inference 

that,  &c The  investigations  of  Hume  were  recommended, 

not  only  by  a great  appearance  of  logical  argumentation,  but  by 
an  elegance  and  propriety  of  diction,  and  by  all  those  graces  of 
style  which  he  possessed  in  so  eminent  a degree,  and  which  made 
his  skepticism  more  dangerous  than  it  deserved  to  be.” — The  same 
tampering  with  the  text  we  noticed  in  the  articles  on  Hobbes  and 
Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury. — We  hardly  attribute  to  intention 
what  Mr.  Johnson  says  of  Krug,  that  “he  appears  to  add  little 
to  Kant,  except  a superior  degree  of  obscurity.”  Krug  is  known 
to  those  versed  in  German  philosophy,  not  only  as  a very  acute, 
but  as  a very  lucid  writer.  In  his  autobiography,  we  recollect, 
he  enumerates  perspicuity  as  the  first  of  his  three  great  errors  as 


MANUAL  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


an  author ; reverence  for  common  sense,  and  contempt  of  cant, 
being  the  other  two.  Tennemann  attributes  to  him  “uncommon 
clearness.” 

As  a specimen  of  our  translator’s  contemptuous  vituperation 
of  some  illustrious  thinkers,  we  shall  quote  his  notes  on  Fichte 
and  Schelling,  of  whose  systems,  it  is  almost  needless  to  say,  his 
translation  proves  him  to  have  understood  nothing. 

After  reversing  in  the  text  what  Tennemann  asserts  of  Fichte’s 
unmerited  persecution,  we  have  the  following  note : — “ It  is  pain- 
ful to  be  the  instrument  of  putting  on  record  so  much  of  nonsense 
and  so  much  of  blasphemy  as  is  contained  in  the  pretended  phi- 
losophy of  Fichte;  the  statement,  however,  will  not  be  without 
its  good,  if  the  reader  be  led  to  reflect  on  the  monstrous  absurdi- 
ties which  men  will  believe  at  the  suggestion  of  their  own  fancies, 
who  have  rejected  the  plain  evidences  of  Christianity.”  [Fichte 
was,  for  his  country  and  generation,  an  almost  singularly  pious 
Christian.  He  was  even  attacked  by  the  theologians — for  his 
orthodoxy.] — On  Schelling’s  merits  we  have  the  following  digni- 
fied decision  : — “ The  grave  remarks  of  the  author  on  this  absurd 
theory,  might  perhaps  have  been  worthily  replaced  by  the  pithy 
criticism  of  Mr.  Burcliell,  apud  the  Yicar  of  Wakefield,  as  applied 
to  other  absurdities,  videlicet — Fudge — Fudge — Fudge.” 

But  enough! — We  now  take  our  leave  of  Mr.  Johnson,  recom- 
mending to  him  a meditation  on  the  excellent  motto  he  has  pre- 
fixed to  his  translation: — “ Difficile  est  in  philosophia  pane  a esse 
ei  not  a,  cui  non  sint  aut  pleraque  aut  omnia.” 


IV.— LOGIC. 


IN  REFERENCE  TO  THE  RECENT  ENGLISH 
TREATISES  ON  THAT  SCIENCE.1 


(April,  1833.) 

1.  Artis  Logicce  Rudimenta , with  Illustrative  Observations  on 
each  Section.  Fourth  edition,  with  Additions.  12mo.  Ox- 
ford : 1828. 

2.  Elements  of  Logic.  By  Richard  Whately,  D.D.,  Principal 
of  St.  Alban’s  Hall,  and  late  Fellow  of  Oriel  College,  Oxford. 
Third  edition.  8vo.  London : 1829. 

3.  Introduction  to  Logic,  from  Dr.  Whately' s Elements  of  Logic. 
By  the  Rev.  Samuel  Hinds,  M.A.,  of  Q,ueen’s  College,  and 
Vice-Principal  of  St.  Alban’s  Hall,  Oxford.  12mo.  Oxford  : 
1827. 

4.  Outline  of  a New  System  of  Logic , with  a Critical  Exam- 
ination of  Dr.  Whately' s “ Elements  of  Logic,"  by  George 
Bentham,  Esq.  8vo.  London : 1827. 

5.  An  Examination  of  some  Passages  in  Dr.  Whately's  Ele- 
ments of  Logic.  By  George  Cornewall  Lewis,  Esq.,  Stu- 
dent of  Christ  Church.  8vo.  Oxford  : 1829. 

6.  A Treatise  on  Logic  on  the  Basis  of  Aldrich,  with  Illustra- 
tive Notes  by  the  Rev.  John  Huyshe,  M.A.,  Brazen-nose 
College,  Oxford.  12mo.  Second  edition.  Oxford : 1833. 

7.  Questions  on  Aldrich's  Logic,  tvith  References  to  the  most 
Popular  Treatises.  12mo.  Oxford : 1829. 

8.  Key  to  Questions  on  Aldrich's  Logic.  12mo.  Oxford:  1829. 

9.  Introduction  to  Logic.  12mo.  Oxford : 1830. 

10.  Aristotle's  Philosophy . (An  article  in  Vol.  iii.  of  the  Seventh 
Edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica , now  publishing.) 
By  the  Rev.  Renn  Dickson  Hampden,  M.A.,  late  Fellow  of 
Oriel  College,  Oxford.  4to.  Edinburgh  : 1832. 


1 [In  French  by  M.  Peisse ; in  Italian  bv  S.  Lo  Gatto  ; in  Cross’s  Selections.] 


FORTUNE  OF  LOGICAL  STUDY  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


121 


Nothing,  we  think,  affords  a more  decisive  proof  of  the  oblique 
and  partial  spirit  in  which  philosophy  has  been  cultivated  in 
Britain,  for  the  last  century  and  a half,  than  the  combined  per- 
version and  neglect,  which  Logic — the  science  of  the  formal  laws 
of  thought — has  experienced  during  that  period.  Since  the  time, 
and  principally,  we  suspect,  through  the  influence  of  Locke  (who, 
as  Leibnitz  observed,  ‘ ‘ sprevit  logfcam  non  intellexit”),  no  coun- 
try has  been  so  poor  in  this  department  of  philosophy,  whether 
we  estimate  our  dialectical  literature  by  its  mass  or  by  its  quality. 
Loth  to  surrender  the  subject  altogether,  yet  unable,  from  their 
own  misconception  of  its  nature,  to  vindicate  to  logic,  on  the 
proper  ground,  its  paramount  importance,  as  a science  a priori, 
distinct  and  independent:  the  few  logical  authors  who  appeared, 
endeavored,  on  the  one  hand,  by  throwing  out  what  belonged  to 
itself,  of  an  unpopular  and  repulsive  character,  to  obviate  disgust ; 
and,  on  the  other,  by  interpolating  what  pertained  to  other 
branches  of  philosophy — here  a chapter  of  psychology,  there  a 
chapter  of  metaphysic,  &c. — to  conciliate  to  the  declining  study 
a broader  interest  than  its  own.  The  attempt  was  too  irrational 
to  succeed ; and  served  only  to  justify  the  disregard  it  was  meant 
to  remedy.  This  was  to  convert  the  interest  of  science  with  the 
interest  of  amusement : this  was  not  to  amplify  logic,  but  to  de- 
form philosophy ; by  breaking  down  their  boundaries,  and  running 
its  several  departments  into  each  other. 

In  the  Universities,  where  Dialectic  (to  use  that  term  in  its 
universality)  once  reigned  “ The  Queen  of  Arts,”  the  failure  of 
the  study  is  more  conspicuously  remarkable. 

In  those  of  Scotland  the  Chairs  of  Logic  have  for  generations 
taught  any  thing  rather  than  the  science  which  they  nominally 
profess — a science,  by  the  way,  in  which  the  Scots  have  not  lat- 
terly maintained  the  reputation  once  established  by  them  in  all,1 


1 “ Les  Escossois  sont  bons  Philosophes”— pronounced  the  Dictator  of  Letters. — 
( Scaligerana  Sccunda). — Servetus  had  previously  testified  to  their  character  for  logical 
subtility:  “ Dialecticis  argutiis  sibi  blandiuntur.”  (Prof,  in  Ptolcm.  Geogr.  1533.) 
[My  learned  friend,  Mr.  James  Broun  of  the  Temple,  shows  me  that  the  unhappy 
heretic  had  here  only  copied  the  words  of  Erasmus — a far  higher  authority.  ( Enc . 
Moritz.)'] — For  a considerable  period,  indeed,  there  was  hardly  to  be  found  a continental 
University  of  any  note,  without  the  appendage  of  a Scottish  Professor  of  Philosophy 
[In  the  Key  to  Barclay's  Satyricon,  it  is  said  of  Cardinal  Du  Perron,  under  Henry  IV 
“Ejus  solicitudine,  in  Gallia  plures  Scoti  celebri  nomine  bonas  artes  professi  sunt, 
quam  in  ipsa  Scotia  foventur  et  aluntur  a Rege.”  Sir  Thomas  Urquhart  is  less  eu- 
phuistic  than  usual,  in  his  diction  of  the  following  passage : “ There  was  a professor 
of  the  Scottish  nation,  within  these  sixteen  years,  in  Somure,  who  spoke  Greek  with 
as  great  ease  as  ever  Cicero  did  Latin,  and  could  have  expressed  himself  in  it  as  well 


122 


LOGIC. 


and  still  retained  in  other  departments  of  philosophy.  To  the 
philosophers,  indeed,  of  our  country,  we  must  confess,  that,  in 
great  part  is  to  he  attributed  the  prevalence  of  the  erroneous 
notions  on  this  subject  promulgated  by  Locke. 

No  system  of  logic  deserving  of  notice,  in  fact,  ever  appear- 
ed in  Scotland;  and  for  Scottish  logical  writers  of  any  merit, 
we  must  travel  hack  for  more  than  two  centuries  to  three 
contemporary  authors,  whose  abilities,  like  those,  indeed,  of 
almost  all  the  more  illustrious  scholars  of  their  nation,  were 
developed  under  foreign  influence — to  Robert  Balfour,* 1  Mark 

and  as  promptly  as  in  any  other  language,  [Urquhart  refers  to  Johannes  Camero,  the 
celebrated  theologian — and  as  he  himself  calls  him,  the  “bibliotheca  movens”] ; yet 
the  most  of  the  Scottish  nation  never  having  astricted  themselves  so  much  to  the  pro- 
priety of  words  as  to  the  knowledge  of  things,  [1]  where  there  was  one  preceptor  of 
languages  among  them,  there  were  above  forty  professors  of  philosophy.  Nay,  to  so 
high  a pitch  did  the  glory  of  the  Scottish  nation  attaine  over  all  the  parts  of  France, 
and  for  so  long  a time  together  continued  in  that  attained  height,  by  vertue  of  an  as- 
cendant, the  French  considered  the  Scots  to  have,  above  all  nations,  in  matter  of  their 
subtlety  in  philosophical  disceptations,  that  there  have  not  been,  till  of  late,  for  these 
several  ages  together,  any  lord,  gentleman,  or  other  in  all  that  country,  who  being 
desirous  to  have  his  son  instructed  in  the  principles  of  philosophy,  would  intrust  him 
to  the  discipline  of  any  other  than  a Scottish  master;  of  whom  they  were  no  less 
proud  than  Philip  was  of  Aristotle,  or  Tullius  of  Cratippus.  And  if  it  occurred,  as 
very  often  it  did,  that  a pretender  to  a place  in  any  French  university,  having  in  his 
tender  years  been  subferulary  to  some  other  kind  of  schooling,  should  enter  into  com- 
petition with  another  aiming  at  the  same  charge  and  dignity,  whose  learning  flowed 
from  a Caledonian  source,  commonly  the  first  was  rejected,  and  the  other  preferred ; 
education  of  youth  in  all  grounds  of  literature  under  teachers  of  the  Scottish  nation 
being  then  held  by  all  the  inhabitants  of  France  to  have  been  attended,  cateris  paribus, 
with  greater  proficiency  than  any  other  manner  of  breeding  subordinate  to  the  docu- 
ments of  those  of  another  country.  Nor  are  the  French  the  only  men  who  have  har- 
boured this  good  opinion  of  the  Scots  in  behalf  of  their  inward  abilities,  but  many 
times  the  Spaniards,  Italians,  Flemins,  Dutch,  Hungarians,  Sweds,  and  Polonians, 
have  testified  their  being  of  the  same  mind,  by  the  promotions  whereunto,  for  their 
learning,  they,  in  all  those  nations  at  several  times,  have  attained.”  {Jewel,  1652, 
Works,  p.  258).  As  in  literature  and  philosophy,  so  in  war.  Scots  officers,  in  great 
numbers,  and  of  distinguished  merit,  figured  in  the  opposite  armies  of  Gustavus  and 
Ferdinand — especially  of  the  former  ; yet  the  commandant  of  the  Fort  of  Egra, 
and  all  the  executioners  or  murderers  of  Wallenstein,  were  Scots — with  a sprinkling  of 
Irish — gentlemen.  The  Scots,  too,  were  long  the  merchants  of  Poland,  and  the  “ trav- 
eling merchants,”  Anglice,  peddlers,  of  Europe.  On  this,  see  “ Hercules  tuani  jidem ,” 
(1608,  p.  125) — one  of  the  squibs  against  Scioppius  in  the  Scaligeran  controversy.] 

1 [“  We  find  in  La  Logique,  ou  art  de  discourir  et  raisonner  of  Scipio  Dupleix,  Royal 
Counselor,  &c.,  a handsome  eulogy  of  Balfour.  The  author  declares  that  he  draws 
his  doctrine  from  Aristotle,  and  his  most  celebrated  interpreters.  ‘ Sur  tous  lesquels 
je  prise  M.  Robert  Balfor,  gentilhomme  Escossois,  tant  pour  sa  rare  et  profonde  doc- 
trine aux  sciences  et  aux  langues,  que  pour  l’integrite  de  ses  mosurs.  Aussi  luy  doys- 
je  lc  peu  de  sijauoir  que  j’ay  acquis,  ayant  eu  l’honneur  de  jouir  familierement  de  sa 
douce  et  vrayement  philosophique  conversation.’  ( Preface , f.  5.)  Farther  on,  and  in 
the  body  of  the  work  (f.  25.),  he  calls  ‘ M . Robert  Balfor,  le  premier  Philosophe  de 
nostro  memoire,’  &c.  This  Logic  of  Dupleix  is,  with  L'Organe  of  Philip  Canaye, 
and  the  Ditdectique  of  Ramus,  one  of  the  oldest  treatises  on  this  science  written  in 
French.  It  is  a very  competent  analysis  of  the  Organon.  The  third  edition  is  of  1607 ; 
the  first  probably  published  at  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century.” — M.  Peisse. — My 


FORTUNE  OF  LOGICAL  STUDY  IN  CAMBRIDGE. 


123 


Duncan,1  and  William  Chalmers,2  Professors  in  the  Universities 
of  Bordeaux,  Saumur,  and  Anjou.  In  Cambridge  the  fortune  of 

copy  of  Scipio  Dupleix’s  Logic  is  of  the  second  edition,  “ enlarged  by  the  author,”  and 
in  1604.  From  the  “Privilege,”  at  the  end,  it  appears  that  the  first  edition  was  of 
1600.  As  M.  Peisse  remarks,  it  is  an  excellent  work.  Balfour’s  learned  countryman 
and  contemporary,  Thomas  Dempster,  in  his  Historia  Ecclesiastica  (§  209)  speaks  of 
him,  as  “ sui  seculi  phoenix,  Greece  et  Latine  doctissimus,  philosophus  et  mathematicus 
priscis  conferendus,”  &c.  &c.  ; and  writing  in  Italy,  he  notices  that  Balfour  was  then 
(1627)  living,  having  been  for  thirty  years  Principal  of  the  College  of  Bourdeaux. 
Balfour's  Cleomedes,  edition  and  commentary  are  eulogized  to  the  highest  by  Barthius 
and  Bake;  while  his  Council  of  Nice,  and  the  notes,  have  gained  him  a distinguished 
reputation  among  theologians.  His  series  of  Commentaries  on  the  Logic,  Physics, 
and  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  were  published  at  Bourdeaux,  in  4°,  and  are  all  of  the  highest 
value.  The  second  edition  of  that  on  the  Organon  appeared  in  1620,  and  extends  to 
1055  pages.  It  is,  however,  a comparatively  rare  book,  which  may  excuse  subsequent 
editors  and  logicians  for  their  ignorance  of  its  existence.] 

1 [It  is  impossible  to  speak  too  highly  of  the  five  books  of  the  Institutio  Logica  by 
Mark  Duncan,  “ Doctor  of  Philosophy  and  Medicine.”  The  work,  which  extends 
only  to  about  280  octavo  pages,  was  at  least  five  times  printed ; the  first  edition  ap- 
pearing in  1612,  at  Saumur,  for  the  use  of  that  University,  was  republished  at  Paris, 
in  the  following  year.  It  forms  the  basis  of  Burgersdyk’s  Institutiones  Logica.  (Ley- 
den, 1626),  who  had  been  Duncan’s  colleague  in  Saumur ; and  that  celebrated  logician 
declares  that  from  it  (speaking  only  of  the  first  or  unimproved  edition),  he  had  received 
more  assistance  than  from  all  other  systems  of  the  science  put  together.  In  fact, 
Duncan’s  Institutions  are,  in  many  respects,  better  even  than  his  own  ; and  were  there 
now  any  intelligent  enthusiasm  for  such  studies,  that  rare  and  little  book  would  incon- 
tinently be  republished.  I have  not  seen  the  author’s  Synopsis  Etliica.  Duncan,  as 
physician,  figures  in  the  celebrated  process  of  Urban  Grandier  and  the  Nuns  of  Laudun 
(1634).  Medical  practice  seems  indeed  to  have  withdrawn  him  from  philosophical 
speculation.  James  VI.  nominated  Duncan  Physician  Royal,  and  he  would  have 
transferred  himself  to  London,  but  his  wife  and  her  family  were  averse  from  migrating 
“ to  a ferocious  nation  and  an  inclement  sky.”  His  elder  brother,  William,  as  Dempster 
assures  us,  “bonis  artibus  supra  hoc  seculum,  et  maxime  Grsecis  literis  ad  miraculum 
imbutus,”  was  distinguished  also  as  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Physic  in  the  schools 
of  Tholouse  and  Montauban.  His  son,  Mark  also,  but  better  known  under  the  name 
of  M.  des  Cerisantes,  was  a kind  of  Admirable  Crichton ; his  life  is  more  romantic 
than  a romance.  He  obtained  high  celebrity  as  a Latin  poet ; for,  though  his  pieces 
be  few,  they  comprise  what  are  not  unjustly  lauded,  as  the  best  imitations  extant 
of  Catullus.  By  him  there  is  an  elegiac  address  to  his  father,  on  the  republication 
of  the  Logical  Institution,  in  1627.  It  is  found  also  in  the  third,  but  not  in  the 
fourth,  edition  of  that  work ; and  it  establishes,  once  and  again,  that  the  logician, 
then  alive,  was  a native  of  Scotland.,  and  not  merely  bom  of  a Scottish  grandfather 
in  England : 

“Ecce  Caleioniis  Duncanus  natus  in  oris 
and  addressing  the  book, 

“ Scotia  cumprimis  pemice  adeunda  volatu, 

Namque  patrem  tellus  edidit  ilia  tuum." 

Joseph  Scaliger  also  testifies  to  the  nativity  of  his  friend  Duncan,  in  Scotland,  and 
apparently  in  the  west  of  Scotland.  Speaking  of  the  Gaelic,  he  says  : “qua  in  Scotije 

occidentalibus  (unde  Duncanus  et  Buchananus  sunt  oriundi) utuntur.”  (Prima 

Scaligerana,  voce  Britones).  Scaliger,  I may  notice,  had  resided  for  some  time  in 
Scotland.  Dr.  Kippis  (Biogr.  Brit.  V.  494.)  states,  on  very  respectable  authority,  that 
William  and  Mark  were  born  in  London,  their  father,  Alexander,  in  Beverley.  He  is, 
however,  wrong.] 

2 [The  Disputationes  Philosophica  Gulielmi  Camerarii  Scoti,  Congregationis  Ora- 
torii  Domini  Jesu  Preshyteri  (in  folio,  Paris,  1630,  pp.  620),  is  a work  of  much  learning, 
and  of  considerable  acuteness.  The  first  part  is  logical ; but  among  other  treatises 


124 


LOGIC. 


the  study  is  indicated  by  the  fact,  that  while  its  statutory  teach- 
ing has  been  actually  defunct  for  ages,  the  “ Elements  of 
Logic'* 1'1  of  William  Duncan  of  Aberdeen,  have  long  collegially 
dispensed  a muddy  scantling  of  metaphysic  psychology,  and  dia- 
lectic, in  the  University  where  Downam  taught;1  while  Murray’s 
Compendium  Logiccc,  the  Trinity  College  text-book,  may  show 
that  matters  are,  if  possible,  at  a lower  pass  in  Dublin. 

In  Oxford,  the  fate  of  the  science  has  been  somewhat  different, 
but,  till  lately,  scarcely  more  favorable.  And  here  it  is  neces- 
sary to  be  more  particular,  as  this  is  the  only  British  seminary 
where  the  study  of  logic  proper  can  be  said  to  have  survived  ; and 
as,  with  one  exception,  the  works  under  review  all  emanate  from 
that  University — represent  its  character — and  are  determined 
and  modified  by  its  circumstances.  Indeed,  with  one  or  two  in- 
significant exclusions,  these  works  comprise  the  whole  recent 
logical  literature  of  the  kingdom. 

During  the  scholastic  ages,  Oxford  was  held  inferior  to  no 
University  throughout  Europe  ; and  it  was  celebrated,  more  espe- 
cially, for  its  philosophers  and  dialecticians.  But  it  was  neither 
the  recollection  of  old  academical  renown,  nor  any  enlightened 
persuasion  of  its  importance,  that  preserved  to  logic  a place  among 
the  subjects  of  academical  tuition,  when  the  kindred  branches  of 
philosophy,  with  other  statutory  studies,  were  dropt  from  the 
course  of  instruction  actually  given.  These  were  abandoned  from 
no  conviction  of  their  inutility,  nor  even  in  favor  of  others  of 
superior  value : they  were  abandoned  when  the  system  under 
which  they  could  be  taught,  was,  for  a private  interest,  illegally 
superseded  by  another  under  which  they  could  not.  When  the 
College  Fellows  supplanted  the  University  Professors,  the  course 
of  statutory  instruction  necessarily  fell  with  the  statutory  instru- 
ments by  which  it  had  been  carried  through.  The  same  exten- 

of  this  author,  I have  not  seen  his  Introductio  ad  Logicam  (in  octavo,  Anjou,  and  of 
the  same  year).  It  is  a curious  illustration  of  the  “ Scoti  extra  Scotiam  agentes that 
there  were  five  Camerarii,  five  Chalmerses;  all  flourishing  in  1630  ; all  Scotsmen  by 
birth;  all  living  on  the  Continent;  and  there,  all  Latin  authors;  viz.,  two  Williams, 
two  Davids,  and  one  George.  The  preceding  age  shows  several  others.] 

1 [I  understand  that  William  Duncan’s  Elements,  and  every  other  logical  spectre, 
are  now  in  Cambridge,  even  collegially,  laid,  and  that  mathematics  are  there  at  length 
left  to  supply  the  discipline  which  logic  was  of  old  supposed  exclusively  to  afford. 
If,  however,  the  “ Philosophical  Society  of  Cambridge  ” may  represent  the  University, 
its  Transactions  are  enough  to  show  the  wisdom  of  the  old  and  statutory  in  contrast 
to  the  new  and  illegal,  and  that  Coleridge  (himself  a Cantabrigian,  and  more  than 
nominally  a philosopher),  was  right  in  declaring  “ Mathematics  to  he  no  substitute  for 
Logic." — (Sec  Alhenamm,  24th  August  1850,  and  Appendix  II.)] 


FORTUNE  OF  LOGICAL  STUDY  IN  OXFORD. 


125 


sive,  the  same  intensive,  education  which  had  once  been  possible 
when  the  work  was  distributed  among  a body  of  Professors,  each 
chosen  for  his  ability,  and  each  concentrating  his  attention  on  a 
single  study,  could  no  longer  he  attempted,  when  the  collegial 
corporations,  a fortuitous  assemblage  of  individuals,  in  so  far  as 
literary  qualification  is  concerned,  had  usurped  the  exclusive  pri- 
vilege of  instruction ; and  when  each  of  these  individuals  was 
authorized  to  become  sole  teacher  of  the  whole  academical  cyclo- 
paedia. But  while  the  one  unqualified  Fellow-tutor  could  not 
perform  the  work  of  a large  body  of  qualified  Professors  ; it  is 
evident  that,  as  he  could  not  rise  and  expand  himself  to  the  former 
system,  that  the  present,  existing  only  for  his  behoof,  must  he 
contracted  and  brought  down  to  him.  This  was  accordingly  done. 
The  mode  of  teaching,  and  the  subjects  taught,  were  reduced  to 
the  required  level  and  extent.  The  capacity  of  lecturing,  that 
is,  of  delivering  an  original  course  of  instruction,  was  not  now  to 
be  expected  in  the  tutor.  The  pupil,  therefore,  read  to  his  tutor 
a lesson  out  of  book  ; on  this  lesson,  the  tutor  might,  at  his  dis- 
cretion, interpose  an  observation,  or  preserve  silence ; and  he  was 
thus  effectually  guaranteed  from  all  demands,  beyond  his  ability 
or  inclination  to  meet.  This  reversed  process  was  still  denomi- 
nated a i lecture.  In  like  manner,  all  subjects  which  required  in 
the  tutor  more  than  the  Fellows’  average  of  learning  or  acute- 
ness, were  eschewed.  Many  of  the  most  important  branches  of 
education  in  the  legal  system  were  thus  discarded ; and  those 
which  it  was  found  necessary  or  convenient  to  retain  in  the  in- 
trusive, were  studied  in  easier  and  more  superficial  treatises. 
This,  in  particular,  was  the  case  with  logic. 

By  statute,  the  Professor  of  Dialectic  was  bound  to  read  and 
expound  the  Organon  of  Aristotle  twice  a week ; and,  by  statute, 
regular  attendance  on  his  lectures  was  required  from  all  under- 
graduates for  their  three  last  years.  Until  the  statutory  system 
was  superseded,  an  energetic  and  improving  exercise  of  mind 
from  the  intelligent  study  of  the  most  remarkable  monument  of 
philosophical  genius,  imposed  on  all,  was  more  especially  secured 
in  those  who  would  engage  in  the  subsidiary  business  of  tuition. 
This,  and  the  other  conditions  of  that  system,  thus  determined  a 
far  higher  standard  of  qualification  in  the  tutor,  when  the  tutor 
was  still  only  a subordinate  instructor,  than  remained  when  he 
had  become  the  exclusive  organ  of  academical  education.  When, 
at  last,  the  voice  of  the  Professors  was  silenced  in  the  University, 


126 


LOGIC. 


and  in  the  Colleges  the  Fellows  had  been  able  to  exclude  all  other 
graduates  from  the  now  principal  office  of  Tutor,  the  study  of 
logic  declined  with  the  ability  of  those  by  whom  the  science  was 
taught.  The  original  treatises  of  Aristotle  were  now  found  to 
transcend  the  College  complement  of  erudition  and  intellect. 
They  were  accordingly  abandoned  ; and  with  these  the  various 
logical  works  previously  in  academical  use,  which  supposed  any 
reach  of  thought,  or  an  original  acquaintance  with  the  Organon. 
The  Compendium  of  Sanderson  stood  its  ground  for  a season, 
when  the  more  elaborate  treatises  (erst  in  academical  use)  of 
Brerewood,  Crackanthorpe,  and  Smiglecius,  were  forgotten.  But 
this  little  treatise,  the  excellent  work  of  an  accomplished  logician, 
was  too  closely  relative  to  the  books  of  the  Organon,  and 
demanded  too  frequently  an  inconvenient  explanation,  to  retain 
its  place,  so  soon  as  another  text-book  could  be  introduced,  more 
accommodated  to  the  fallen  and  falling  standard  of  tutorial  com- 
petency. Such  a text-book  was  soon  found  in  the  Compendium 
of  Aldrich.  The  dignity  of  its  author,  as  Dean  of  Christ  Church, 
and  his  reputation  as  an  ingenious,  even  a learned,  writer  in 
other  branches  of  knowledge,  insured  it  a favorable  recommen- 
dation: it  was  yet  shorter  than  Sanderson’s;  written  in  a less 
scholastic  Latin ; adopted  an  order  wholly  independent  of  the 
Organon ; and  made  no  awkward  demands  upon  the  tutor,  as 
comprising  only  what  was  either  plain  in  itself,  or  could  without 
difficulty  be  expounded.  The  book — which,  in  justice  to  the 
Dean,  we  ought  to  mention  was  not  originally  written  for  the 
public — is  undoubtedly  a work  of  no  inconsiderable  talent;  but 
the  talent  is,  perhaps,  principally  shown,  in  the  author  having- 
performed  so  cleverly  a task  for  which  he  was  so  indifferently 
prepared.  Absolutely  considered,  it  has  little  or  no  value.  It  is 
but  a slight  eclectic  epitome  of  one  or  two  logical  treatises  in 
common  use  (that  it  is  exclusively  abridged  from  Wallis  is  incor- 
rect) ; and  when  the  compiler  wanders  from,  or  mistakes,  his 
authorities,  he  displays  a want  of  information  to  be  expected, 
perhaps,  in  our  generation,  but  altogether  marvelous  in  his.  It 
is  clear,  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  ancient,  and  very  little  of  the 
modern,  logicians.  The  treatise  likewise  omits  a large  proportion 
of  the  most  important  matters ; and  those  it  does  not  exclude  are 
treated  with  a truly  unedifying  brevity.  As  a slender  introduc- 
tion to  the  after-study  of  logic  (were  there  not  a hundred  better) 
it  is  not  to  be  despised;  as  a full  course  of  instruction — as  an 


FORTUNE  OF  LOGICAL  STUDY  IN  OXFORD. 


127 


independent  system  of  the  science,  it  is  utterly  contemptible 
Yet,  strange  to  say,  the  Compend  of  Aldrich,  having  gradually 
supplanted  the  Compend  of  Sanderson,  has  furnished,  for  above 
a century,  the  little  all  of  logic  doled  out  in  these  latter  days  by 
the  University  of  Bradvvardin  and  Scotus.1 

Even  the  meliorations  of  the  academical  system  have  not  proved 
beneficial  to  this  study : perhaps,  indeed,  the  reverse.  Since  the 
institution  of  honors — since  the  re-introduction,  however  limit- 
ed, of  a real  examination  for  the  first  degree  in  arts,  a powerful 
stimulus  has  been  applied  to  other  studies— to  that  of  logic  none. 
Did  a candidate  make  himself  master  of  tile  Organon? — he  would 
find  as  little  favor  from  the  dispensers  of  academical  distinction, 
as  he  had  previously  obtained  assistance  from  his  tutor.  For  the 
public  examiners  could  not  be  expected,  either  to  put  questions 
on  what  they  did  not  understand,  or  to  encourage  the  repetition 
of  such  overt  manifestations  of  their  own  ignorance.  The  mini- 
mum of  Aldrich,  therefore,  remained  the  maximum  of  the 
“schools;”  and  was  “got  up,”  not  to  obtain  honor,  but  to  avoid 
disgrace. — Yet  even  this  minimum  was  to  be  made  less  ; there 
was  “a  lower  deep  beneath  the  lowest  deep.”  The  Compen- 
dium, a meagre  duodecimo  of  a hundred  and  eighty  pages,  to  be 
read  in  a day,  and  easily  mastered  in  a week,  was  found  too 
ponderous  a volume  for  pupil,  and  tutor,  and  examiner.  It  was 
accordingly  subjected  to  a process  of  extenuation,  out  of  which 
it  emerged,  reduced  to  little  more  than  a third  of  its  original  gra- 
cility — a skeleton  without  marrow  or  substance.  “ Those  who 
go  deep  in  dialectic,”  says  Aristo  Chius,  “may  be  resembled  to 
crab-eaters  ; for  a mouthful  of  meat,  they  spend  their  time  over 
a heap  of  shells.”  But  your  superficial  student  of  logic,  he  loses 
his  time  without  even  a savor  of  this  mouthful ; and  Oxford,  in 
her  senility,  has  proved  no  Alma  Mater,  in  thus  so  unpiteously 
cramming  her  alumni  with  the  shells  alone.  As  Dr.  Whately 
observes  : — “ A very  small  proportion  even  of  distinguished  stu- 


1 Some  thirty  years  ago,  indeed,  there  was  printed,  in  usurn  academical  juventutis, 
certain  Excerpta  ex  Aristotelis  Organo.  The  execution  of  that  work  shows  how  in- 
adequate its  author  was  to  the  task  he  had  undertaken.  Nothing  could  be  more  con- 
ducive to  the  rational  study  of  logic  than  a systematic  condensation  of  the  more  essen- 
tial parts  of  the  different  treatises  of  the  Organon,  with  original  illustrations,  and 
selections  from  the  best  commentators,  ancient  and  modern.  As  it  is,  this  petty  pub- 
lication has  exerted  no  influence  on  the  logical  studies  of  the  University ; we  should 
like  to  know  how  many  tutors  have  expounded  it  in  their  lectures,  how  many  candi- 
dates have  been  examined  on  it  in  the  schools.  On  the  logical  authors,  at  least,  of  the 
University,  it  has  exerted  none. 


128 


LOGIC. 


dents  ever  become  proficients  in  logic ; and  by  far  the  greater 
proportion  pass  through  the  University  without  knowing  any 
thing  at  all  of  the  subject.  I do  not  mean  that  they  have  not 
learned  by  rote  a string  of  technical  terms,  but  that  they  under- 
stand absolutely  nothing  whatever  of  the  principles  of  the  science.” 
The  miracle  would  be,  if  they  ever  did.  Logic  thus  degraded  to 
an  irksome,  but  wholly  unprofitable,  penance,  the  absurdity  of 
its  longer  enforcement  was  felt  by  some  intelligent  leaders  of  the 
University.  “It  was  proposed,”  says  Dr.  Whately,  “to  leave 
the  study  of  logic  altogether  to  the  option  of  the  candidates a 
proposal  hailed  with  joy  by  the  under-graduates,  who  had  long 
prayed  fervently  with  St.  Ambrose — UA  Dialectica  Aristotelis 
libera  nos , DomineA 1 

In  these  circumstances,  when  even  the  Heads  could  not  much 
longer  have  continued  obstinate,  and  Logic  seemed  in  Oxford  on 
the  eve  of  following  the  sister  sciences  of  philosophy  to  an  aca- 
demic grave,  a new  life  was  suddenly  communicated  to  the  expir- 
ing study,  and  hope,  at  least,  allowed  for  its  ultimate  convales- 
cence under  a reformed  system. 

This  was  mainly  effected  by  the  publication  of  the  Elements 
of  Dr.  Whately,  then  Principal  of  St.  Alban’s  Hall,  and  recently 
(we  rejoice)  elevated  to  the  Archiepiscopal  See  of  Dublin.  (INo.  2, 
of  the  works  at  the  head  of  this  article.)  Somewhat  previously, 
the  Rudimenta  (abbreviated  Compendium ) of  Aldrich  had  been 
illustrated  with  English  notes  by  an  anonymous  author,  whom 
we  find  quoted  in  some  of  the  subsequent  treatises  under  the 
name  of  Hill.  (No.  1.)  The  success  and  ability  of  the  Elements 
prompted  imitation  and  determined  controversy.  Mr.  Bentham 
(nephew  of  Mr.  Jeremy  Bentham)  published  his  Outline  and  Ex- 
amination., in  which  Dr.  Whately  is  alternately  the  object  of  cen- 
sure and  encomium.  (No.  4.)  The  pamphlet  of  Mr.  Lewis  (on 
two  points  only)  is  likewise  controversial.  (No.  5.)  The  Princi- 
pal, as  becoming,  was  abridged  and  lauded  by  his  Vice  (No.  3 ;) 
and  the  treatises  of  Mr.  Huyshe  and  others  (Nos.  6,  7,  8,  9),  are 
all  more  or  less  relative  to  Dr.  Whately’s,  and  all  so  many  mani- 
festations of  the  awakened  spirit  of  logical  pursuit.  The  last 
decade,  indeed,  has  done  more  in  Oxford  for  the  cause  of  this  sci- 
ence than  the  whole  hundred  and  thirty  years  preceding  ;2  for 

1 [This  addition  of  St.  Ambrose  to  the  Litany,  I took  as  recorded  by  Cardinal  Cusa.] 

2 [Since  that  time,  with  a rise  of  the  academical  spirit,  the  study  of  logic  has  been 
still  more  zealously  pursued  in  Oxford,  and  several  resident  members  of  the  Univer- 


WORKS  REVIEWED. 


129 


since  the  time  of  Wallis  and  Aldrich,  until  the  works  under  re- 
view, we  recollect  nothing  on  the  subject  which  the  University 
could  claim,  except  one  or  two  ephemeral  tracts; — the  shallow 
Reflections  of  Edward  Bentham,  about  the  middle  of  the  last 
century ; and  after  the  commencement  of  the  present,  a couple 
of  clever  pamphlets  in  vindication  of  logic,  and  in  extinction  of 
the  logic  of  Kett — which  last  also  was  a moon-calf  of  Alma  Mater. 

It  remains  now  to  inquire  : — At  what  value  are  we  to  rate 
these  new  logical  publications?  — Before  looking  at  their  con- 
tents, and  on  a knowledge  only  of  the  general  circumstances 
under  which  they  were  produced,  we  had  formed  a presumptive 
estimate  of  what  they  were  likely  to  perform ; and  found  our 
anticipation  fully  confirmed,  since  we  recently  examined  what 
they  had  actually  accomplished.  None  of  the  works  are  the  pro- 
ductions of  inferior  ability ; and  though  some  of  them  propose 
only  a humble  end,  they  are  all  respectably  executed.  A few  of 
them  display  talent  rising  far  above  mediocrity  ; and  one  is  the 
effort  of  an  intellect  of  great  natural  power.  But  when  we  look 


sity  have  published  treatises  on  the  science,  of  no  ordinary  merit.  I may  chronologi- 
cally notice  those  of  Mr.  Wooley,  Mr.  Thomson,  Mr.  Chretien,  and  Mr.  Mansel. — To 
two  of  those  gentleman  I am,  indeed,  under  personal  obligations. — Mr.  Thomson,  in 
the  second  edition  of  his  Laws  of  Thought,  among  other  flattering  testimonies  of  his 
favorable  opinion,  has  done  me  the  honor  of  publishing  the  specimen  which  I had  com- 
municated to  him,  of  a scheme  of  Syllogistic  Notation ; and  I regret  to  find,  that  this 
circumstance  has  been  the  occasion  of  some  injustice,  both  to  him  and  to  me.  To  him  : 
— inasmuch,  as  he  has  been  unfairly  regarded  as  a mere  expositor  of  my  system  ; to 
me  : — inasmuch,  as  his  objections  to  that  system  have  been  unfairly  regarded  as  de- 
cisive. In  point  of  fact,  though  we  coincide,  touching  the  thoroughgoing  quantifica- 
tion of  the  predicate  in  affirmative  propositions,  we  are  diametrically  opposed,  touch- 
ing the  same  quantification  in  negatives.  But,  while  I am  happy,  in  the  one  case,  to 
receive  even  a partial  confirmation  of  the  doctrine,  from  Mr.  Thomson’s  able  and  in- 
dependent speculation  ; I should  be  sorry,  in  the  other,  to  subject,  what  I deem,  the 
truth  to  the  uncanvassed  opinion  of  any  human  intellect. — To  Mr.  Mansel , besides  sundry 
gratifying  expressions  of  approval,  in  his  acute  and  learned  Notes  on  the  Rudiments  of 
Aldrich ; I am  indebted  for  valuable  aid  in  the  determination  of  a curious  point  in  the 
history  of  logic.  Instead  of  Petrus  Hispanus  being  a plagiarist,  and  his  Summulce  a 
translation  from  the  Greek,  as  supposed  by  Ehinger,  Keckermann,  Placcius,  J.  A. 
Fabricius,  Brucker — by  all,  in  short,  who  for  the  last  two  centuries  and  a half,  have 
treated  of  the  matter  ; it  is  now  certain,  that  the  “ Synopsis  Organi,"  published  under 
the  name  of  Michael  Psellus  (the  younger)  is  itself  a mere  garbled  version  of  the  great 
logical  text-book  of  the  west,  and  without  any  authority,  capriciously  fathered,  by 
Ehinger,  as  an  original  work,  on  the  illustrious  Byzantine.  I am  now,  in  fact,  able  to 
prove  : that  in  the  Augsburg  Library,  the  codex  from  which  Ehinger  printed,  contained 
neither  the  title  nor  the  author’s  name  under  which  his  publication  appeared  ; and 
that  in  several  of  the  European  libraries  there  are  extant  Greek  manuscripts,  iden- 
tical with  the  text  of  that  publication,  and  professing  to  be  merely  copies  of  a transla- 
lation  from  the  Latin  original  of  Hispanus. — This  detection  enables  us  also  to  trace 
the  Tpdpfj.ara,J'Eypa\lre,  k.  t.  A.  of  Blemmides  and  the  Greeks  to  the  Barbara,  Celar- 
ent,  &c.  of  Hispanus  and  the  Latins.] 


I 


130 


LOGIC. 


from  the  capacity  of  the  author  to  his  acquirements,  our  judg- 
ment is  less  favorable.  If  the  writers  are  sometimes  original, 
their  matter  is  never  new.  They  none  of  them  possess — not  to 
say  a superfluous  erudition  on  their  subject — even  the  necessary 
complement  of  information.  Not  one  seems  to  have  studied  the 
logical  treatises  of  Aristotle  ; all  are  ignorant  of  the  Greek  Com- 
mentators on  the  Organon,  of  the  Scholastic,  Ramist,  Cartesian, 
Wolfian,  and  Kantian  Dialectic.  In  none  is  there  any  attempt 
at  the  higher  logical  philosophy : we  have  no  preliminary  determ- 
ination of  the  fundamental  laws  of  thought;  no  consequent 
evolution,  from  these  laws,  of  the  system  itself.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  find  principle  buried  in  detail ; inadequate  views  of  the 
science  ; a mere  agglutination  of  its  parts  ; of  these  some  wholly 
neglected,  and  others,  neither  the  most  interesting  nor  important, 
elaborated  out  of  bounds  ; and  always,  though  in  very  different 
proportions,  too  much  of  the  “ shell,”  too  little  of  the  “ meat.” 
They  are  rarely,  indeed,  wise  above  Aldrich.  His  partial  views 
of  the  order  and  comprehension  of  the  science  have  determined 
theirs  ; his  most  egregious  blunders  are  repeated ; and  sometimes 
when  an  attempt  is  made  at  a correction,  either  Aldrich  is  right, 
or  a new  error  is  substituted  for  the  old.  Even  Dr.  Whately, 
who,  in  the  teeth  of  every  logician  from  Alexander  to  Kant,  speaks 
of  “the  boundless  field  within  the  legitimate  limits  of  the  sci- 
ence,” “ walks  in  trodden  ways,”  and  is  guiltless  of  “ removing 
the  ancient  landmark.”  His  work,  indeed  never  transcends,  and 
generally  does  not  rise  to  the  actual  level  of  the  science ; nor, 
with  all  its  ability,  can  it  justly  pretend  to  more  than  a relative 
and  local  importance.  Its  most  original  and  valuable  portion  is 
but  the  insufficient  correction  of  mistakes  touching  the  nature  of 
logic,  long  exploded,  if  ever  harbored,  among  the  countrymen  of 
Leibnitz,  and  only  lingering  among  the  disciples  of  Locke. 

An  articulate  proof  of  the  accuracy  of  these  conclusions,  on  all 
the  works  under  consideration,  would  far  exceed  our  limits.  Nor 
is  this  requisite.  It  will  he  sufficient  to  review  that  work,  in 
chief,  to  which  most  of  the  others  are  correlative,  and  which 
stands  among  them  all  the  highest  in  point  of  originality  and 
learning ; and  the  rest  occasionally,  in  subordination  to  that  one. 
Nor  in  criticizing  Dr.  Whately’s  elements  can  we  attempt  to  vin- 
dicate all  or  even  the  principal  points  of  our  judgment.  To  show 
the  deficiencies  in  that  work,  either  of  principle  or  of  detail,  would, 
in  the  universal  ignorance  in  this  country  of  logical  philosophy 


WORKS  REVIEWED. 


131 


and  of  a high  logical  standard,  require  a preliminary  exposition 
of  what  a system  of  this  science  ought  to  comprehend,  far  beyond 
our  space,  were  we  even  to  discuss  these  points  to  the  exclusion 
of  every  other.  We  must,  therefore,  omitting  imperfections , con- 
fine ourselves  to  an  indication  of  some  of  Dr.  Whatley’s  positive 
errors.  This  we  shall  attempt,  “though  the  work,”  as  its  author 
assures  us,  “has  undergone,  not  only  the  close  examination  of 
himself  and  several  friends,  but  the  severer  scrutiny  of  determ- 
ined opponents,  without  any  material  errors  having  been  detected, 
or  any  considerable  alteration  found  necessary.”  In  doing  this, 
nothing  could  be  farther  from  our  intention  than  any  derogation 
from  the  merit  of  that  eminent  individual,  whom,  even  when  we 
differ  most  from  his  opinions,  we  respect,  both  as  a very  shrewd, 
and  (what  is  a rarer  phenomenon  in  Oxford)  a very  independent, 
thinker.  The  interest  of  truth  is  above  all  personal  considera- 
tions ; and  as  Dr.  Whately,  in  vindication  of  his  own  practice, 
has  well  observed : — “ Errors  are  the  more  carefully  to  he  pointed 
out  in  proportion  to  the  authority  by  which  they  are  sanctioned.” 
“ No  mercy,”  says  Lessing,  “ to  a distinguished  author.”  This, 
however,  is  not  our  motto;  and  if  our  “scrutiny”  he  “severe,” 
we  are  conscious  than  it  can  not  justly  he  attributed  to  “determ- 
ined opposition.” 

We  find  matter  of  controversy  even  in  the  first  page  of  the 
Elements,  and  in  regard  even  to  the  first  question  of  the  doctrine : 
— What  is  logic  ? — Dr.  Whately  very  properly  opens  by  a state- 
ment, if  not  a definition,  of  the  nature  and  domain  of  logic  ; and 
in  no  other  part  of  his  work  have  the  originality  and  correctness 
of  his  views  been  more  applauded,  than  in  the  determination  of 
this  fundamental  problem.  He  says  : 

‘ ‘ Logic,  in  the  most  extensive  sense  which  the  name  can  with  propriety 
be  made  to  hear,  may  he  considered  as  the  Science,  and  also  as  the  Art 
of  Reasoning.  It  investigates  the  principles  on  which  argumentation  is 
conducted,  and  furnishes  rules  to  secure  the  mind  from  error  in  its  deduc- 
tions. Its  most  appropriate  office,  however,  is  that  of  instituting  an  anal- 
ysis of  the  process  of  the  mind  in  reasoning ; and  in  this  point  of  view  it 
is,  as  has  been  stated,  strictly  a science  ; while,  considered  in  reference  to 
the  practical  rules  above  mentioned,  it  may  he  called  the  art  of  reasoning. 
This  distinction,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  has  been  overlooked,  or  not 
clearly  pointed  out  by  most  writers  on  the  subject ; logic  having  been  in 
general  regarded  as  merely  an  art,  and  its  claim  to  held  a place  among 
the  sciences  having  been  expressly  denied.”  ( Elements , p.  1.) 

Here  the  inquiry  naturally  separates  into  two  branches  ; — the 
one  concerns  the  genus , the  other  the  object-matter , of  logic. 


132 


LOGIC. 


In  regard  to  the  former : — Dr.  Whately’s  reduction  of  logic  to 
the  twofold  category  of  Art  and  Science , has  earned  the  praises 
of  his  Critical  Examiner,  but  Mr.  Bentham,  it  must  he  acknowl- 
edged, is  as  often  out  in  his  encomium  as  in  his  censure.  He 
observes : 

“ Dr.  Whately  has  in  particular  brought  to  view  one  very  important 
fact,  overlooked  by  all  his  predecessors,  though  so  obvious,  when  once  ex- 
hibited, as  to  make  us  wonder  that  it  should  not  have  been  remarked : viz. 
that  logic  is  a science  as  well  as  an  art.  The  universally  prevailing  error, 
that  human  knowledge  is  divided  into  a number  of  parts,  some  of  which 
are  arts  without  science,  and  others  sciences  without  art,  has  been  fully  ex- 
posed by  Mr.  [Jeremy]  Bentham  in  his  Chrestomthaia.  There  also  it  has 
been  shown,  that  there  can  not  exist  a single  art  that  has  not  its  corres- 
ponding science,  nor  a single  science  which  is  not  accompanied  by  some 
portion  of  art.  The  Schoolmen,  on  the  contrary,  have,  with  extraordinary 
effort,  endeavored  to  prove  that  logic  is  an  art  only,  not  a science  ; and  in 
that  particular  instance,  Dr.  Whately  is,  I believe,  one  of  the  first  who  has 
ventured  to  contradict  this  ill-founded  assertion.” — ( Outline , p.  12.) 

In  all  this  there  is  but  one  statement  with  which  we  can  agree. 
We  should  certainly  “wonder”  with  Mr.  Bentham,  had  any  “so 
obvious  and  important  fact”  been  overlooked  by  all  Dr.  Whately’s 
predecessors  ; and  knowing  something  of  both,  should  assuredly 
be  less  disposed  to  presume  a want  of  acuteness  in  the  old  logi- 
cians, than  any  ignorance  of  their  speculations  in  the  new.  In 
the  latter  alternative,  indeed,  will  he  found  a solution  of  the 
“wonder.”  Author  and  critic  are  equally  in  error. 

In  the  first  place,  looking  merely  to  the  nomenclature,  both 
are  historically  wrong.  “ Logic,”  says  Dr.  Whately,  “ has  been 
in  general  regarded  merely  as  an  art , and  its  claim  to  hold  a 
place  among  the  sciences  has  been  expressly  denied.”  The  re- 
verse is  true.  The  great  majority  of  logicians  have  regarded  logic 
as  a science,  and  expressly  denied  it  to  be  an  art.  This  is  the 
oldest  as  well  as  the  most  general  opinion. — “ The  Schoolmen,” 
says  Mr.  Bentham,  “ have  with  extraordinary  effort  endeavored 
to  prove  that  logic  is  an  art  only  A On  the  contrary,  the  School- 
men have  not  only  “ with  extraordinary  effort,”  hut  with  unex- 
ampled unanimity  labored  in  proving  logic  to  be  exclusively  a 
science  ; and  so  far  from  “ Dr.  Whately  being”  (with  Mr.  Jeremy 
Bentham)  “ the  first  to  contradict  this  ill-founded  assertion,”  the 
paradox  of  these  gentlemen  is  only  the  truism  of  the  world  beside. 
This  error  is  the  more  surprising,  as  the  genus  of  logic  is  one  of 
those  vexed  questions  on  which,  as  Ausonius  has  it, 

“ Omnis  certat  dialectica  turbo,  sophorum 


LOGIC— WHAT  ? 


133 


indeed,  until  latterly,  no  other  perhaps  stands  so  obtrusively  for- 
ward during  the  whole  progress  of  the  study. — Plato  and  the 
Platonists  considered  dialectic  as  a science  ; hut  with  them  dia- 
lectic was  a real  not  a formal  discipline,  and  corresponded  rather 
to  the  metaphysic  than  to  the  logic  of  the  Peripatetics. — Logic  is 
not  defined  by  Aristotle. — His  Greek  followers  (and  a consider- 
able body  of  the  most  eminent  dialecticians  since  the  revival  of 
letters),  deny  it  to  be  either  science  or  art. — The  Stoics  in  general 
viewed  it  as  a science. — The  Arabian  and  Latin  Schoolmen  did 
the  same.  In  this  opinion  Thomist  and  Scotist,  Realist  and 
Nominalist,  concurred ; an  opinion  adopted,  almost  to  a man,  by 
the  Jesuit,  Dominican,  and  Franciscan  Cursualists. — From  the 
restoration  of  letters,  however,  and  especially  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  sixteenth  century,  so  many  Aristotelians,  with  the 
whole  body  of  Ramists  (to  whom  were  afterward  to  be  added  a 
majority  of  the  Cartesians,  and  a large  proportion  of  the  Eclec- 
tics), maintained  that  it  was  an  art ; that  the  error  of  Sander- 
son may  be  perhaps  excused  in  attributing  this  opinion  to  “al- 
most all  the  more  recent  authors”  at  his  time.  Along  with  these, 
however  (so  far  is  Dr.  Whately  from  having  “ brought  to  view 
this  important  fact,  overlooked  by  all  his  predecessors,”)  there  was 
a very  considerable  party  who  anticipated  the  supposed  novelty 
of  this  author  in  defining  logic  by  the  double  genus  of  art  and 
science / — In  the  schools  of  Wolf  and  Kant,  logic  again  obtained 
the  name  of  science. 

But — to  look  beneath  the  name — as  Dr.  Whately  and  his  critic 
are  wrong  in  imagining  that  there  is  any  novelty  in  the  observa- 
tion, they  are  equally  mistaken  in  attributing  to  it  the  smallest 
importance.  The  question  never  concerned  logic  itself,  but  merely 
the  meaning  of  the  terms  by  which  it  should  be  defined.  The 
old  logicians  (however  keenly  they  disputed  whether  logic  were 


1 To  make  reference  to  these  would  be  de  trap ; we  count  above  a dozen  logicians 
of  this  class  in  our  own  collection.  But  independently  of  the  older  and  less  familiar 
authors,  Mr.  Jeremy  Bentham  and  Dr.  Whately  have  no  claim  (the  latter  makes  none) 
to  originality  in  this  observation.  Even  the  last  respectable  writer  on  logic  in  the 
British  Empire,  previous  to  these  gentlemen,  Dr.  Richard  Kirwan,  w'hose  popular  and 
able  volumes  were  published  in  1807,  defines  logic  as  art  and  science ; and  this  in 
terms  so  similar  to  those  of  Dr.  Whately,  that  we  can  not  hesitate  in  believing  that 
this  author  had  his  predecessor's  definition  (which  we  shall  quote)  immediately  in 
view.  “ Logic  is  both  a science  and  an  art ; it  is  a science  inasmuch  as,  by  analyzing 
the  elements,  principles,  and  structure  of  arguments,  it  teaches  us  how  to  discover 
their  truth  or  detect  their  fallacies,  and  point  out  the  sources  of  such  errors.  It  is  an 
art,  inasmuch  as  it  teaches  now  to  arrange  arguments  in  such  manner  that  their  truth 
may  be  most  readily  perceived,  or  their  falsehood  detected.”  (Vol.  i.  p.  1.) 


134 


LOGIC. 


a science  or  an  art — or  neither — or  both — a science  speculative, 
or  a science  practical — or  at  once  speculative  and  practical) — 
never  dreamt  that  the  controversy  possessed,  in  so  far  as  logic 
was  concerned,  more  than  a verbal  interest.1  In  regard  to  the 
essential  nature  of  logic  they  were  at  one ; and  contested  only, 
what  was  the  comprehension  of  these  terms  in  philosophical  pro- 
priety, or  rather  what  was  the  true  interpretation  of  their  Aris- 
totelic  definitions.  Many  intelligent  thinkers  denounced,  with 
Yives,  the  whole  problem  as  frivolous.  ‘ ‘ Q,U8estioni  locum  dedit 
misera  homonymia,”  says  Mark  Duncan,  among  a hundred  others. 
The  most  strenuous  advocates  of  the  several  opinions  regularly 
admit,  that  unless  the  terms  are  taken  in  the  peculiar  significa- 
tion for  which  they  themselves  contend,  that  all  and  each  of  their 
adversaries  may  he  correct ; while,  at  the  same  time  it  was  rec- 
ognized on  all  hands,  that  these  terms  were  vulgarly  employed 
in  a vague  or  general  acceptation,  under  which  every  opinion 
might  be  considered  right,  or  rather  no  opinion  could  be  deemed 
wrong.  The  preparatory  step  of  the  discussion  was,  therefore,  an 
elimination  of  these  less  precise  and  appropriate  significations, 
which,  as  they  could  at  best  only  afford  a remote  genus  and  dif- 
ference, were  wholly  incompetent  for  the  purpose  of  a definition. 
But  what  the  older  logicians  rejected  as  a useless  truism,  the  re- 
cent embrace  as  a new  and  important  observation. — In  regard  to 
its  novelty : — Do  Dr.  Whately  and  Mr.  Bentham  imagine  that 
any  previous  logician  could  ever  have  dreamt  of  denying  that 
logic,  in  their  acceptation  of  the  terms,  was  at  once  an  art  and  a 
science  ? Let  them  look  into  almost  any  of  the  older  treatises, 
and  they  will  find  this  explicitly  admitted,  even  when  the  terms 
Art  and  Science  are  employed  in  senses  far  less  vague  and  uni- 
versal than  is  done  by  them. — As  to  its  importance : — Do  they 
suppose  that  a more  precise  and  accurate  conception  of  logic  is 
thus  obtained  ? The  contrary  is  true.  The  term  Science  Dr. 
Whately  employs  in  its  widest  possible  extension,  for  any  knowl- 
edge considered  absolutely,  and  not  in  relation  to  practice  ; and 
in  this  acceptation  every  art  in  its  doctrinal  portion  must  be  a 

1 Father  Buffier  is  unjust  to  the  old  logicians,  but  he  places  the  matter  on  its  proper 
footing  in  reference  to  the  new. — “ Si  la  Iogique  est  une  science.  Oui  et  non  ; selon 

l'idee  qu’il  vous  plait  d’attacher  au  nom  de  science,  &c. Si  la  Iogique  est  un  art. 

Encore  un  fois,  oui  et  non  ; — II  plait  aux  logiciens  de  disputer  si  la  Iogique  est,  ou 
n'est  pas  un  art. ; et  il  ne  leur  plait  pas  toujours  d’avouer  ni  d’enseigner  a leurs  dis- 
ciples, que  e’est  une  pure  ou  puerile  question  de  nom.”  ( Cours  dcs  Sciences  (Logi- 
que),  p.  887.) 


LOGIC— WHAT  ? 


135 


science.  Art  he  defines  the  application  of  knowledge  to  practice ; 
in  which  signification,  ethics , politics , religion , and  all  other 
■practical  sciences , must  he  arts.  Art  and  Science  are  thus  dis- 
tended till  they  run  together.  As  philosophical  terms,  they  are 
now  altogether  worthless;  too  universal  to  define;  too  vacillating 
between  identity  and  difference,  to  distinguish.  In  fact,  their 
application  to  logic,  or  any  other  subject,  is  hereafter  only  to  un- 
define, and  to  confuse ; expressing,  as  they  do,  not  any  essential 
opposition  between  the  things  themselves,  but  only  the  different 
points  of  view  under  which  the  same  thing  may  be  contemplated 
by  us ; — every  art  being  thus  in  itself  also  a science , every  science 
in  itself  also  an  art. — This  Mr.  Bentham  thinks  the  correction 
of  a universal  error — the  discovery  of  an  important  fact.  If  the 
question  in  the  hands  of  the  old  logicians  be  frivolous,  what  is  it 
in  those  of  the  new  ! 1 

So  much  for  the  genus,  now  for  the  object-matter. 

Of  Dr.  Whately ’s  Elements , Mr.  Hind  says,  and  that  emphati- 
cally : — “ This  treatise  displays — and  it  is  the  only  one  that  has 
clearly  done  so — the  true  nature  and  use  of  logic ; so  that  it 
may  be  approached,  no  longer  as  a dark,  curious,  and  merely 


1 Such  is  the  most  favorable  interpretation  we  can  give  of  Dr.  Whately’s  meaning. 
But  the  language  in  which  this  meaning  is  conveyed  is  most  ambiguous  and  inaccu- 
rate. E.  g.  he  says  : “A  science  is  conversant  about  knowledge  only."  (P.  56.)  He 
can  not  mean  what  the  words  express,  that  science  has  knowledge  for  its  object-mat- 
ter, for  this  is  nonsense  ; and  the  words  do  not  express,  what,  from  the  context,  we 
must  presume  he  means,  that  science  has  no  end  ulterior  to  the  contemplative  act  of 
knowledge  itself.  Dr.  Whately  thus  means  by  science  what  Aristotle  meant  by  spec- 
ulative science,  but  how  different  in  the  precision  of  their  definitions  ! 0ec oprjTiKrjs 
fj.ev  (ini (TTqpqs)  reXoy  aXrjdeia-  npaKriKrjs  6 epyov ; — or,  as  Averroes  has  it,  Per 
speculativam  scimus  ut  sciamus ; per  practicani  scimus  ut  operemur. — In  like  manner, 
Dr.  Whately  gives,  without  being  aware  of  it,  two  very  different  definitions  of  the  term 
Art.  In  one  place  (p.  1)  it  is  said,  “that  logic  may  be  called  the  art  of  reasoning, 
while,  considered  in  reference  to  the  practical  rules,  it  furnishes  to  secure  the  mind 
from  error  in  its  deductions.”  This  is  evidently  the  AiaXeKTiKrj  npaypariov  of 

the  Greek  interpreters,  the  logica  docens  {quae  tradit  pracepta ) of  the  Arabian  and 
Latin  schools.  Again,  in  another  (p.  56)  it  is  said,  that  “ an  art  is  the  application  of 
knowledge  to  practice."  If  words  have  any  meaning,  this  definition  (not  to  wander 
from  logic)  suits  only  the  A ioKcktikt)  iv  xpijaei  Ka'i  yvpvaaia  npaypariov  of  the  Greek, 
the  logica  utens  {qua.  utitur  praceptis)  of  the  Latin  Aristotelians.  The  L.  docens,  and 
the  L.  utens,  are,  however,  so  far  from  being  convertible,  that  by  the  great  majority 
of  philosophers,  they  have  been  placed  in  different  genera.  The  Greek  logicians  denied 
the  L.  docens  to  be  either  science  or  art,  regarding  it  as  an  instrument,  not  a part  of 
philosophy  ; the  L.  utens,  on  the  contrary,  they  admitted  to  be  a science,  and  a part 
of  philosophy,  but  not  separable  and  distinct.  The  Latins,  on  the  contrary,  held  in  gen- 
eral the  L.  docens  to  be  a science,  and  part  of  philosophy ; the  L.  utens  as  neither, 
but  only  an  instrument.  Some,  however,  made  the  docens  a science,  the  utens  an  art ; 
while  by  others  this  opinion  was  reversed,  &c.  These  distinctions  are  not  to  be  con- 
founds 1 with  the  pure  and  applied  logics  of  a more  modern  philosophy. 


136 


LOGIC. 


speculative  study ; such  as  one  is  apt,  in  fancy,  to  class  with 
astrology  and  alchemy.”  (Pref.  p.  viii.)  These  are  strong 
words. 

We  are  disposed  to  admit  that  Dr.  Whately,  though  not  right, 
is  perhaps  not  far  wrong  with  regard  to  the  “ true  nature  and 
use  of  logic  — that  he  “ clearly  displays”  that  nature  and  use, 
is  palpably  incorrect ; and  that  his  is  “ the  only  treatise  which 
has  clearly  done  so,”  is  hut  another  proof,  that  assertion  is  often 
in  the  inverse  ratio  of  knowledge. 

W e shall  not  dwell  on  what  we  conceive  a very  partial  concep- 
tion of  the  science — that  Dr.  Whately  makes  the  process  of 
reasoning  not  merely  its  principal,  but  even  its  adequate  object; 
those  of  simple  apprehension  and  judgment  being  considered  not 
in  themselves  as  constituent  elements  of  thought,  but  simply  as 
subordinate  to  argumentation.  In  this  view  logic  is  made  con- 
vertible with  syllogistic.  This  view,  which  may  be  allowed,  in 
so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  logic  contained  in  the  Aristotelic  treatises 
now  extant,  was  held  by  several  of  the  Arabian  and  Latin  school- 
men ; borrowed  from  them  by  the  Oxford  Crackanthorpe,  it  was 
adopted  by  Wallis;  and  from  Wallis  it  passed  to  Dr.  Whately. 
But,  as  applied  to  logic,  in  its  own  nature,  this  opinion  has  been 
long  rejected,  on  grounds  superfluously  conclusive,  by  the  im- 
mense majority  even  of  the  Peripatetic  dialecticians  ; and  not  a 
single  reason  has  been  alleged  by  Dr.  Whately  to  induce  us  to 
waver  in  our  belief,  that  the  laws  of  thought , and  not  the  laws  of 
reasoning , constitute  the  adequate  object  of  the  science.  This 
error,  which  we  can  not  now  refute,  would,  however,  be  of  com- 
paratively little  consequence,  did  it  not — as  is  notoriously  the 
case  in  Dr.  Whately’s  Elements — induce  a perfunctory  considera- 
tion of  the  laws  of  those  faculties  of  thought ; these  being  viewed 
as  only  subsidiary  to  the  process  of  reasoning. 

In  regard  to  the  “ clearness ” with  which  Dr.  Whately  “dis- 
plays the  true  nature  and  use  of  logic,”  we  can  only  say,  that, 
after  all  our  consideration,  we  do  not  yet  clearly  apprehend 
what  his  notions  on  this  point  actually  are.  In  the  very  pas- 
sages where  he  formally  defines  the  science,  we  find  him  in- 
distinct, ambiguous,  and  even  contradictory ; and  it  is  only  by 
applying  the  most  favorable  interpretation  to  his  words  that  we 
are  able  to  allow  him  credit  for  any  thing  like  a correct  opinion. 

He  says,  that  “ the  most  appropriate  office  of  logic  (as  science) 
is  that  of  instituting  an  analysis  of  the  process  of  the  mind  in 


LOGIC— WHAT  ? 


137 


reasoning ,”  (p.  1) ; ana  again,  that  “ the  process  ( operation ) of 
reasoning  is  alone  the  appropriate  province  of  logic.”  (Pp.  13, 
140.) — The  process  or  operation  of  reasoning  is  thus  the  object- 
matter  about  which  the  science  of  logic  is  conversant.  Now,  a 
definition  which  merely  affirms  that  logic  is  the  science  which  has 
the  process  of  reasoning  for  its  object,  is  not  a definition  of  this 
science  at  all ; it  does  not  contain  the  differential  quality  by  which 
logic  is  discriminated  from  other  sciences ; and  it  does  not  prevent 
the  most  erroneous  opinions  (it  even  suggests  them)  from  being 
taken  up  in  regard  to  its  nature.  Other  sciences,  as  psychology 
and  metaphysic,  propose  for  their  object  (among  the  other  facul- 
ties) the  operation  of  reasoning,  but  this  considered  in  its  real 
nature  : logic,  on  the  contrary,  has  the  same  for  its  object,  but 
only  in  its  formal  capacity  ; in  fact,  it  has,  in  propriety  of  speech, 
nothing  to  do  with  the  process  or  operation , but  is  conversant  only 
with  its  laics.  Dr.  Whately’s  definition,  is  therefore,  not  only 
incompetent,  but  delusive.  It  would  confound  logic  and  psycho- 
logy and  metaphysic,  and  occasion  those  very  misconceptions  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  logic  which  other  passages  of  the  Elements , 
indeed  the  general  analogy  of  his  work,  show  that  it  was  not  his  / 
intention  to  sanction. 

But  Dr.  Whately  is  not  only  ambiguous;  he  is  contradictory. 
We  have  seen,  that,  in  some  places,  he  makes  the  process  of  rea- 
soning the  adequate  object  of  logic ; what  shall  we  think  when 
we  find,  that,  in  others,  he  states  that  the  total  or  adequate  object 
of  logic  is  language  ? But,  as  there  can  not  be  two  adequate 
objects,  and  as  language  and  the  operation  of  reasoning  are  not 
the  same,  there  is  therefore  a contradiction.  “ In  introducing,” 
he  says,  “ the  mention  of  language , previously  to  the  definition 
of  logic,  I have  departed  from  established  practice,  in  order  that 
it  may  be  clearly  understood,  that  logic  is  entirely  conversant 
about  language  ; a truth  which  most  writers  on  the  subject,  if 
indeed  they  were  fully  aware  of  it  themselves,  have  cerieiinly  not 
taken  due  care  to  impress  on  their  readers.”1  (P.  56.)  And 
again: — “Logic  is  wholly  concerned  in  the  use  of  language.” 
(P.  74.) 

The  term  logic  (as  also  dialectic ) is  of  ambiguous  deriva- 
tion. It  may  either  be  derived  from  Aoyos  (ivSladeros),  reason, 


' v>  i 

l nr 


1 Almost  all  logicians,  however,  impress  upon  their  readers,  that  logic  is  (not, 
indeed,  entirely,  but)  partially  and  secondarily  occupied  with  language  as  the  vehicle 
of  thought,  about  which  last  it  is  adequately  and  primarily  conversant. 


138 


LOGIC. 


or  our  intellectual  faculties  in  general ; or  from  J.6709  yrpo- 
(popi/cbs),  speech  or  language,  by  which  these  are  expressed.  The 
science  of  logic  may,  in  like  manner,  be  viewed  either : — 1°,  as 
adequately  and  essentially  conversant  about  the  former  (the  in- 
ternal X0709,  verbum  mentale ),  and  partially  and  accidentally 
about  the  latter,  (the  external  X0709,  verbum  oris) ; or,  2°,  as  ade- 
quately and  essentially  conversant  about  the  latter,  partially  and 
accidentally  about  the  former. 

The  first  opinion  has  been  held  by  the  great  majority  of  logi- 
cians, ancient  and  modern.  The  second,  of  which  some  traces 
may  be  found  in  the  Greek  commentators  of  Aristotle,  and  in  the 
more  ancient  Nominalists  during  the  middle  ages  (for  the  later 
scholastic  Nominalists,  to  whom  this  doctrine  is  generally,  but 
falsely,  attributed,  held  in  reality  the  former  opinion),  was  only 
fully  developed  in  modern  times  by  philosophers,  of  whom  Hobbes 
may  be  regarded  as  the  principal.  In  making  the  analysis  of  the 
operation  of  reasoning  the  appropriate  office  of  logic,  Dr.  Whately 
adopts  the  first  of  these  opinions ; in  making  logic  entirely  con- 
versant about  language,  he  adopts  the  second.  We  can  hardly, 
however,  believe  that  he  seriously  entertained  this  last.  It  is 
expressly  contradicted  by  Aristotle  ( Analyt . Post.  i.  10,  § 7) ; it 
involves  a psychological  hypothesis  in  regard  to  the  absolute 
dependence  of  the  mental  faculties  on  language,  once  and  again 
refuted,  which  we  are  confident  that  Dr.  Whately  never  could 
sanction.;  and,  finally,  it  is  at  variance  with  sundry  passages  of 
the  Elements , where  a doctrine  apparently  very  different  is 
advanced.  But,  be  his  doctrine  what  it  may,  precision  and 
perspicuity  are  not  the  qualities  we  should  think  of  applying 
to  it. 

But  if  the  Yice-principal  be  an  incompetent  judge  of  what  the 
Principal  has  achieved,  he  is  a still  more  incompetent  reporter 
of  what  all  other  logicians  have  not.  If  he  had  read  even  a hun- 
dredth plrt  of  the  works  it  behoved  him  to  have  studied,  before 
being  entitled  to  assert  that  Dr.  Whately’s  “treatise  is  the  only 
one  that  has  clearly  displayed  the  true  use  and  nature  of  logic,” 
he  has  accomplished  what  not  one  of  his  brother  dialecticians  of 
Oxford  has  attempted.  But  the  assertion  betrays  itself : TravToXyos 
dydOeia.  To  any  one  on  a level  with  the  literature  of  this  science, 
the  statement  must  appear  supremely  ridiculous — that  the  no- 
tions held  of  the  nature  and  use  of  logic  in  the  Kantian,  not  to 
say  the  AVolfian  school,  are  less  clear,  adequate,  and  correct,  than 


LOGIC— WHAT  ? 


139 


those  promulgated  by  Dr.  Whatley. — A general  survey,  indeed, 
of  the  history  of  opinions  on  this  subject  would  prove,  that  views 
essentially  sound  were  always  as  frequent,  as  the  carrying  of 
these  views  into  effect  was  rare.  Many,  speculatively,  recognized 
principles  of  the  science,  which  almost  none  practically  applied  to 
regulate  its  constitution. — Even  the  Scholastic  logicians  display, 
in  general,  more  enlightened  and  profound  conceptions  of  the 
nature  of  their  science  than  any  recent  logician  of  this  country. 
In  their  multifarious  controversies  on  this  matter,  the  diversity  of 
their  opinions  on  subordinate  points  is  not  more  remarkable,  than 
their  unanimity  on  principal.  All  their  doctrines  admit  of  a 
favorable  interpretation ; some,  indeed,  for  truth  and  precision, 
have  seldom  been  equaled,  and  never  surpassed.  Logic  they  all 
discriminated  from  psychology,  metaphysic,  &c.  as  a rational , not 
a real — as  a formal , not  a material  science. — The  few  who  held 
the  adequate  object  of  logic  to  be  things  in  general , held  this, 
however,  under  the  qualification,  that  things  in  general  were  con- 
sidered by  logic  only  as  they  stood  under  the  general  forms  of 
thought  imposed  on  them  by  the  intellect — quatenus  secundis  in- 
tentionihus  sub  stab  ant. — Those  who  maintained  this  object  to  be 
the  higher  processes  of  thought  (three,  two,  or  one),  carefully 
explained,  that  the  intellectual  operations  were  not,  in  their  own 
nature,  proposed  to  the  logician — that  belonged  to  the  psycholo- 
gist— but  only  in  so  far  as  they  were  dirigible , or  the  subject  of 
laws.  The  proximate  end  of  logic  was  thus  to  analyze  f^e  canons 
of  thought ; its  remote , to  apply  these  to  the  intellectual  acts. — 
Those,  again  (and  they  formed  the  great  majority),  who  saw 
this  object  in  second  notions did  not  allow  that  logic  was  con- 

1 The  distinction  (which  we  owe  to  the  Arabians)  of  first  and  second  notions, 

( notiones , conceptus,  intentiones,  intellecta  prima  et  secunda),  is  necessary  to  be  known, 
not  only  on  its  own  account,  as  a highly  philosophical  determination,  but  as  the  con- 
dition of  any  understanding  of  the  scholastic  philosophy,  old  and  new,  of  which, 
especially  the  logic,  it  is  almost  the  Alpha  and  Omega.  Yet,  strange  to  say,  the 
knowledge  of  this  famous  distinction  has  been  long  lost  in  “ the  (once)  second  school 
of  the  church.” — Aldrich’s  definition  is  altogether  inadequate,  if  not  positively  errone- 
ous. Mr.  Hill  and  Dr.  Whately,  followed  by  Mr.  Huyshe  and  the  author  of  Questions 
on  Logic,  &c.,  misconceive  Aldrich,  who  is  their  only  authority,  if  Aldrich  understood 
himself,  and  flounder  on  from  one  error  to  another,  without  even  a glimpse  of  the 
light.  {Hill,  pp.  30-33  ; Whately,  pp.  173-175  ; Huyshe,  pp.  18,  19  ; Questions,  pp. 
10,  11,  71.)  (Of  a surety,  no  calumny  could  be  more  unfounded,  as  now  applied  to 
Oxford,  than  the  “ clamor ,”  of  which  Dr.  Whately  is  apprehensive — “ the  clamor  against 
confining  the  human  mind  in  the  trammels  of  the  schoolmen  !”) — The  matter  is  worth 
some  little  illustration ; we  can  spare  it  none,  and  must  content  ourselves  with  a defi- 
nition of  the  terms. — A first  notion  is  the  concept  of  a thing  as  it  exists  of  itself,  and 
independent  of  any  operation  of  thought ; as,  John,  Man,  Animal,  &c.  A second 


140 


LOGIC. 


cerneil  with  these  second  notions  abstractly  and  in  themselves, 
(that  was  the  province  of  metaphysic),  but  only  in  concrete  as 
applied  to  first ; that  is,  only  as  they  were  the  instruments  and 
regulators  of  thought. — It  would  require  a longer  exposition  than 
we  can  afford,  to  do  justice  to  these  opinions — especially  to  the 
last.  When  properly  understood,  they  will  be  found  to  contain, 
in  principle,  all  that  has  been  subsequently  advanced  of  any  value 
in  regard  to  the  object-matter  and  scope  of  logic. 

Nothing  can  be  more  meagre  and  incorrect  than  Dr.  Whately’s 
sketch  of  the  History  of  Logic.  The  part  of  his  work,  indeed, 
is  almost  wholly  borrowed  from  the  poverty  of  Aldrich.  As 
specimens : 

Archytas ,‘  by  Whately  as  by  Aldrich,  is  set  down  as  inventor 
of  the  Categories ; and  this  now  exploded  opinion  is  advanced 
without  a suspicion  of  its  truth.  The  same  unacquaintance  with 
philosophical  literature  and  Aristotelic  criticism  is  manifested  by 
every  recent  Oxford  writer  who  has  alluded  to  the  subject.  We 
may  refer  to  the  Excerpta  ex  Organo,  in  usum  Acadeviicce  Ju- 
ventutis — to  the  Oxonia  Purgata  of  Dr.  Tatham — to  Mr.  Hill’s 
Notes  on  Aldrich — to  Mr.  Huyshe’s  Logic — and  to  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Aristotle  by  Mr.  Hampden.  The  last,  even  makes  the 
Stagirite  derive  his  moral  system  from  the  Pythagoreans  ; al- 
though the  forgery  of  the  fragments  preserved  by  Stobseus,  under 
the  name  of  Theages,  and  other  ethical  writers  of  that  school, 
has  nowabeen  for  half  a century  fully  established.  They  stand 
likewise  without  an  obelus  in  Dr.  Gaisford’s  respectable  edition 
of  the  Florilegium.  [The  physical  treatises,  also,  as  those  under 

notion  is  the  concept,  not  of  an  object  as  it  is  in  reality,  but  of  the  mode  under  which  it 
is  thought  by  the  mind;  as,  Individual,  Species,  Genus,  &c.  The  former  is  the  concept 
of  a thing — real — immediate — direct:  the  latter  the  concept  of  a concept — formal — me- 
diate— reflex.  For  elucidation  of  this  distinction,  and  its  applications,  it  is  needless  to 
make  references.  The  subject  is  copiously  treated  by  several  authors  in  distinct 
treatises,  but  will  be  found  competently  explained  in  almost  all  the  older  systems  of 
logic  and  philosophy. 

1 [On  Archytas,  I may  refer  the  reader  to  three  excellent  monographs : by  Navarrus 
(Copenhagen,  1820) ; by  Hartenstein  (Lcipsic.  1833) ; and  by  Gruppe  (Berlin,  1840.) 
The  Metaphysical,  Physical,  and  Ethical  fragments,  written  in  the  Doric  dialect,  and 
bearing  the  name  of  Pythagorean  philosophers,  are  all,  to  a critical  reader,  obtrusively 
spurious,  and  on  all,  this  note  has  been  superfluously  branded  by  the  German  critics 
and  historians  of  philosophy,  for  above  half  a century.  Meiners  began,  and  nearly  ac- 
complished, the  exposition.  Instead  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  stealing  their  philosophies 
from  the  Pythagoreans,  and  their  thefts  remaining,  by  a miracle,  for  centuries,  un- 
known, and  even  unsuspected  ; the  forgers  of  these  more  modern  treatises  have  only 
impudently  translated  the  doctrines  of  the  two  philosophers  into  their  supposititious 
Doric.  Their  non-exposure,  at  the  time,  is  the  strongest  proof  of  the  languid  litera- 
ture of  the  decline.] 


LOGIC— WHAT  ? 


141 


the  names  of  Ocellus  Lucanus  and  Timseus  Locrius,  are  of  the 
same  character ; they  are  comparatively  recent  fabrications.] — 
Aristotle  would  be,  indeed,  the  sorriest  plagiary  on  record,  were 
the  thefts  believed  of  him  by  his  Oxford  votaries  not  false  only, 
but  ridiculous.  By  Aldrich  it  is  stated,  as  on  indisputable  evi- 
dence, that,  while  in  Asia,  he  received  a great  part  of  his  philos- 
ophy from  a learned  Jew  and  this  silly  and  long  derided  fable 
even  stands  uncontradicted  in  the  Compendium  to  the  present 
day  : while,  by  the  Oxford  writers  at  large,  he  is  still  supposed 
to  have  stolen  his  Categories  and  Ethics  (to  say  nothing  of  his 
physical  doctrines)  from  the  Pythagoreans.  What  would  Schlei- 
ermaoher  or  Creuzer  think  of  this  ! 

In  discriminating  Aristotle’s  merits  in  regard  to  logic,  Dr. 
Whately,  we  are  sorry  to  say,  is  vague  and  incorrect. 

“No  science  can  be  expected  to  make  any  considerable  progress,  which 
is  not  cultivated  on  right  principles. The  greatest  mistakes  have  al- 

ways prevailed  respecting  the  nature  of  logic  ; and  its  province  has,  in 
consequence,  been  extended  by  many  writers  to  subjects  with  which  it  has 
no  proper  connection.  Indeed  with  the  exception  of  Aristotle  (who  is 
himself  not  entirely  exempt  from  the  errors  in  question),  hardly  a writer 
on  logic  can  be  mentioned  who  has  clearly  perceived,  and  steadily  kept  in 
view  throughout,  its  real  nature  and  object.”  (P.  2.) 

On  the  contrary,  so  far  is  Aristotle — so  far  at  least  are  his 
logical  treatises  which  still  remain  (and  these  are,  perhaps,  few 
to  the  many  that  are  lost),  from  meriting  this  comparative  eulo- 
gium,  than  nine-tenths — in  fact,  more  than  nineteen-twentieths, 
— of  these  treat  of  matters,  which,  if  logical  at  all,  can  be  viewed 
as  the  objects,  not  of  pure,  but  only  of  an  applied  logic ; and  we 
have  no  hesitation  in  affirming,  that  the  incorrect  notions  which 
have  prevailed,  and  still  continue  to  prevail,  in  regard  to  the 
“nature  and  province  of  logic,”  are,  without  detraction  from  his 
merits,  mainly  to  be  attributed  to  the  example  and  authority  of 
the  Philosopher  himself. — The  book  of  Categories,  as  containing 
an  objective  classification  of  real  things,  is  metaphysical,  not  log- 
ical. The  two  books  of  Posterior  Analytics,  as  sorely  conversant 
about  demonstrative  or  necessary  matter,  transcend  the  limits  of 
the  formal  science  ; and  the  same  is  true  of  the  eight  books  of 
Topics,  as  wholly  occupied  with  probable  matter,  its  accidents 
and  applications.  Even  the  two  books  of  the  Prior  Analytics,  in 


1 [The  Jews  have  even  made  Aristotle  a native  Israelite— born  at  Jerusalem — of 
the  tribe  of  Benjamin — and  a Rabbi  deep  in  the  sacred  books  of  his  nation.  (See 
Bartoloccii  Bibliotheca  Rabbinica,  t.  i.  p.  471,  sq.)  ] 


142 


LOGIC. 


which  the  pure  syllogism  is  considered,  are  swelled  with  extra- 
logical  discussions.  Such,  for  example,  is  the  whole  doctrine  of 
the  modality  of  syllogisms  as  founded  on  the  distinction  of  pure, 
necessary,  and  contingent  matter  ; — the  consideration  of  the  real 
truth  or  falsehood  of  propositions,  and  the  power  so  irrelevantly 
attributed  to  the  syllogism  of  inferring  a true  conclusion  from 
false  premises  ; — the  distinction  of  the  enthymeme,  through  the 
extrafonnal  character  of  its  premises,  as  a reasoning  from  signs 
and  probabilities  ; — the  physiognomic  syllogism,  &c.  &c.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  book  On  denouncement ; and  matters  are  even 
worse  with  that  on  Fallacies , which  is,  in  truth,  only  a sequel 
of  the  Topics.  If  Aristotle,  therefore,  did  more  than  any  other 
philosopher  for  the  progress  of  the  science ; he  also  did  more  than 
any  other  to  overlay  it  with  extraneous  lumber,  and  to  impede 
its  development  under  a precise  and  elegant  form.  Many  of  his 
successors  had  the  correctest  views  of  the  object  and  scope  of 
logic  ; and  even  among  the  schoolmen  there  were  minds  who 
could  have  purified  the  science  from  its  adventitious  sediment, 
had  they  not  been  prevented  from  applying  their  principles  to 
details,  by  the  implicit  deference  then  exacted  to  the  precept  and 
practice  of  Aristotle.1 

“ It  has  been  remarked,”  says  Dr.  Whately,  after  Aldrich, 
“ that  the  logical  system  is  one  of  those  few  theories  which  have 
been  begun  and  perfected  by  the  same  individual.  The  history 
of  its  discovery,  as  far  as  the  main  principles  of  the  science  are 
concerned,  properly  commences  and  ends  with  Aristotle.”  (P.  6.) 
— In  so  far  as  “ the  main  principles  of  the  science  are  concerned,” 
this  can  not  be  denied.  It  ought,  however,  to  have  been  stated 
with  greater  qualification.  Aristotle  left  to  his  successors,  much 
to  reject — a good  deal  to  supply — and  the  whole  to  simplify, 
digest,  and  arrange. — In  regard  alone  to  the  deficiencies : — If  Dr. 
Whately  and  the  other  Oxford  logicians  are  right  (we  think  de- 
cidedly otherwise),  in  adding  the  fourth  syllogistic  figure  (which, 
by  the  way,  none  of  them,  from  Aldrich  downward,  ever  hint  to 
the  under-graduates  not  to  be  of  Aristotelic  origin),  the  Stagirite 

1 [M.  Barthelemy  Saint-Hilaire,  to  whom,  among  many  other  valuable  Aristotelic 
labors  of  high  talent,  wc  owe  an  excellent  French  translation  of  the  Organon,  with 
copious  notes  and  introductions,  has  combated  this  opinion.  (See  the  Preface  to  his 
first  volume,  especially  pp.  xvi-xx,  cxlii.)  I still,  however,  remain  unconvinced  ; 
though  I can  not  now  detail  my  reasons. — Assuredly,  I do  not  plead  guilty  to  the 
charge  of  disparaging  the  genius  of  Aristotle  ; reverencing  him  as  the  Prince  of 
Philosophers.] 


HISTORY  OF  LOGIC. 


143 


is  wrong  in  recognizing  the  exclusive  possibility  of  the  other  three 
(Analyt.  Pr.  i.  23,  $ 1) ; and  so  far  his  system  can  hardly  be 
affirmed  by  them  to  have  been  perfected  by  himself.  To  say  no- 
thing of  the  five  moods  subsequently  added  by  Theophrastus  and 
Eudemus,  the  extensive  and  important  doctrine  of  hypothetical, 
a doctrine,  in  a great  measure,  peculiar  and  independent,  was, 
probably,  an  original  supplement  by  these  philosophers  ; previous 
to  which,  the  logical  system  remained  altogether  defective.  [This 
requires  some  addition,  and  some  modification.] 

The  following  is  Dr.  Whately’s  sketch  of  the  fortune  of  Logic, 
from  Aristotle  down  to  the  Schoolmen : 

“ The  writings  of  Aristotle  were  not  only  absolutely  lost  to  the  world  for 
about  two  centuries  [many,  if  not  most,  were  always  extant],  but  seem 
to  have  been  but  little  studied  for  a long  time  after  their  recovery.  An 
art,  however,  of  logic,  derived  from  the  principles  traditionally  preserved 
by  his  disciples,  seems  to  have  been  generally  known,  and  to  have  been 
employed  by  Cicero  in  his  philosophical  works ; but  the  pursuit  of  the 
science  seems  to  have  been  abandoned  for  a long  time.  Early  in  the 
Christian  era  the  Peripatetic  doctrines  experienced  a considerable  revival; 
and  we  meet  with  the  names  of  Galen  and  Porphyry  as  logicians  ; but  it 
is  not  till  the  fifth  [sixth]  century  that  Aristotle’s  logical  works  were  trans- 
lated into  Latin  by  the  celebrated  Boethius.  Not  one  of  these  seems  to 
have  made  any  considerable  advances  in  developing  the  theory  of  reason- 
ing. Of  Galen’s  labors  little  is  known  ; and  Porphyry’s  principal  work  is 
merely  on  the  Predicables.  We  have  little  of  the  science  till  the  revival 
of  learning  among  the  Arabians,  by  whom  Aristotle’s  treatises  on  this  as 
well  as  on  other  subjects  were  eagerly  studied.”  (P.  7.) 

In  this  sketch,  Dr.  Whately  closely  follows  Aldrich ; and  how 
utterly  incompetent  was  Aldrich  for  a guide,  is  significantly  shown 
by  his  incomparable  (but  still  uncorrected)  blunder  of  confound- 
ing Galen  with  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  ! ‘ ‘ Circa  annum  Chr isti 
140,  interpretum  princeps  Galenus  floruit,  sive  Ex- 

positor, tear  e^oyfiv,  dictus.”  Galen,  who  thus  flourished  at  nine 
years  old,  never  deserved,  never  received  the  title  of  The  Com- 
mentator. This  designation,  as  every  tyro  ought  to  know,  was 
exclusively  given  to  Alexander,  the  oldest  and  ablest  of  the  Greek 
interpreters  of  Aristotle,  until  it  was  afterward  divided  with  him 
by  Averroes. — The  names  of  Theophrastus  and  Eudemus , the 
great  founders  of  logic  after  Aristotle,  do  not  appear. — We  say 
nothing  of  inferior  logicians,  hut  the  Aphrodisian  and  Ammonius 
Hermice  were  certainly  not  less  worthy  of  notice  than  Porphyry. 
— Of  Galen's  logical  labors,  some  are  preserved,  and  of  others  we 
know  not  a little  from  his  own  information  and  that  of  others. 
Why  is  it  not  stated,  here  or  elsewhere,  that  the  fourth  figure 


144 


LOGIC. 


has  been  attributed  to  Galen,  and  on  what  (incompetent)  author- 
ity ? — Nothing  is  said  of  the  original  logical  treatises  of  Boethius , 
though  his  work  on  Hypothetical  is  the  most  copious  we  possess. 
— Had  Dr.  Whately  studied  the  subject  for  himself,  he  would 
hardly  have  failed  to  do  greater  justice  to  the  Greek  logicians. 
What  does  he  mean  by  saying,  “we  have  little  of  the  science  till 
the  revival  of  learning  among  the  Arabians  ?”  Are  Averroes  and 
Avicenna  so  greatly  superior  to  Alexander  and  Ammonius  ? 

Dr.  Whately,  speaking  of  the  Schoolmen , says  : 

“ It  may  be  sufficient  to  observe,  that  their  fault  did  not  lie  in  their  dili- 
gent study  of  logic,  and  the  high  value  they  set  upon  it,  but  in  their  ut- 
terly mistaking  the  true  nature  and  object  of  the  science  ; and  by  the  at- 
tempt to  employ  it  for  the  purpose  of  physical  discoveries  involving  every 
subject  in  a mist  of  words,  to  the  exclusion  of  sound  philosophical  investi- 
gation. Their  errors  may  serve  to  account  for  the  strong  terms  in  which 
Bacon  sometimes  appears  to  censure  logical  pursuits ; but  that  this  cen- 
sure was  intended  to  bear  against  the  extravagant  perversions,  not  the 
legitimate  cultivation  of  the  science,  may  be  proved  from  his  own  obser- 
vations on  the  subject,  in  his  Advancement  of  Learning .”  (P.  8.) 

It  has  been  long  the  fashion  to  attribute  every  absurdity  to  the 
Schoolmen ; it  is  only  when  a man  of  talent,  like  Dr.  Whately, 
follows  the  example,  that  a contradiction  is  worth  while.  The 
Schoolmen  (we  except  always  such  eccentric  individuals  as  Ray- 
mond Lully),  had  correcter  notions  of  the  domain  of  logic  than 
those  who  now  contemn  them,  without  a knowledge  of  their 
works.  They  certainly  did  not  “attempt  to  employ  it  for  the 
purpose  of  physical  discoveries.”  We  pledge  ourselves  to  refute 
the  accusation,  whenever  any  effort  is  made  to  prove  it ; till 
then,  we  must  be  allowed  to  treat  it  as  a groundless,  though  a 
common  calumny. — As  to  Bacon,  we  recollect  no  such  reproach 
directed  by  him  either  against  logic  or  against  the  scholastic  logi- 
cians. On  the  contrary,  “Logic,”  he  says,  “does  not  pretend  to 
invent  sciences,  or  the  axioms  of  sciences,  but  passes  it  over  with 
a cuique  in  sua  arte  crcdendumf  1 And  so  say  the  Schoolmen  ; 
and  so  says  Aristotle. 

We  are  not  satisfied  with  Dr.  Whately’s  strictures  on  Locke , 


1 Advancement  of  Learning : — and  similar  statements,  frequently  occur  in  the  Be 
Argumentis  and  Novum  Organum.  The  censure  of  Bacon,  most  pertinent  to  the  point, 
is  in  the  Organum , Aph.  63.  It  is,  however,  directed,  not  against  the  Schoolmen,  but 
exclusively  against  Aristotle  ; it  does  not  reprobate  any  false  theory  of  the  nature  and 
object  of  logic,  but  certain  practical  misapplications  of  it ; and,  at  any  rate,  it  only 
shows  that  Bacon  gave  the  name  of  Dialectic  to  Ontology.  Aristotle  did  not  corrupt 
physics  by  logic,  but  by  metaphysic.  The  Schoolmen  have  sins  of  their  own  to  an- 
swer for,  but  this,  imputed  to  them,  they  did  not  commit. 


MODALITY  OF  PROPOSITIONS  AND  SYLLOGISMS.  145 

Waits,  &rc.,  but  can  not  afford  the  space  necessary  to  explain  our 
views.  One  mistake  in  relation  to  the  former  we  shall  correct, 
as  it  can  be  done  in  a few  words.  After  speaking  of  Locke’s  ani- 
madversion on  the  syllogism,  Dr.  Whately  says  : “ He  (Locke) 
presently  after  inserts  an  encomium  upon  Aristotle,  in  which  he 
is  equally  unfortunate  ; he  praises  him  for  the  £ invention  of  syl- 
logisms,’ to  which  he  certainly  had  no  more  claim  than  Linnaeus 
to  the  creation  of  plants  and  animals,  or  Harvey,”  &c.  (P.  19.) 

In  the  first  place,  Locke’s  words  are,  “ invention  of  forms  of  argu- 
mentation,”  which  is  by  no  means  convertible  with  “ invention 
of  syllogisms ,”  the  phrase  attributed  to  him.  But  if  syllogism 
had  been  the  word,  in  one  sense  it  is  right,  in  another  wrong. 
“Aristotle,”  says  Dr.  Gullies,  11  invented  the  syllogism,”  &c. ; and 
in  that  author’s  (not  in  Dr.  Whately’s)  meaning,  this  may  be  cor- 
rectly affirmed. — But,  in  the  second  place,  Dr.  Whately  is  wrong 
in  thinking,  that  the  word  “ invention”  is  used  by  Locke,  in  the 
restricted  sense  in  which  it  is  now  almost  exclusively  employed, 
as  opposed  to  discovery.  In  Locke  and  his  contemporaries,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  older  writers,  to  invent  is  currently  used  for  to  dis- 
cover. An  example  occurs  in  the  sentence  of  Bacon  just  quoted ; 
and  in  this  signification  we  may  presume  that  “invention”  is 
here  employed  by  Locke,  as  it  was  also  thus  employed  in  French 
by  Leibnitz,  in  relation  to  this  very  passage  of  Locke. 

But  from  the  History,  to  proceed  to  the  Science  itself. 

Turning  over  a few  pages,  we  come  to  an  error  not  peculiar  to 
Dr.  Whately,  but  shared  with  him  by  all  logicians — we  mean  the 
Modality  of  propositions  and  syllogisms ; in  other  words,  the 
necessity,  possibility , &c.,  of  their  matter,  as  an  object  of  logical 
consideration. 

It  has  always  been  our  wonder,  how  the  integrity  of  logic  has 
not  long  ago  been  purified  from  this  metaphysical  admixture. 
Kant,  whose  views  of  the  nature  and  province  of  the  science  were 
peculiarly  correct,  and  from  whose  acuteness,  after  that  of  Aris- 
totle, every  thing  might  have  been  expected,  so  far  from  ejecting 
the  Modality  of  propositions  and  syllogisms,  again  sanctioned  its 
right  of  occupancy,  by  deducing  from  it,  as  an  essential  element 
of  logical  science,  the  last  of  his  four  generic  categories,  or  fun- 
damental forms  of  thought.  Nothing,  however,  can  be  clearer, 
than  that  this  modality  is  no  object  of  logical  concernment.  Logic 
is  a formal  science ; it  takes  no  consideration  of  real  existence, 
or  of  its  relations,  but  is  occupied  solely  about  that  existence  and 

K 


146 


LOGIC. 


those  relations  which  arise  through,  and  are  regulated  by,  the 
conditions  of  thought  itself.  Of  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  propo- 
sitions, in  themselves,  it  knows  nothing,  and  takes  no  account : 
all  in  logic  may  he  held  true  that  is  not  conceived  as  contradic- 
tory. In  reasoning,  logic  guarantees  neither  the  premises  nor  the 
conclusion,  hut  merely  the  consequence,  of  the  latter  from  the 
former ; for  a syllogism  is  nothing  more  than  the  explicit  asser- 
tion of  the  truth  of  one  proposition,  on  the  hypothesis  of  other  pro- 
positions being  true  in  which  that  one  is  implicitly  contained.  A 
conclusion  may  thus  be  true  in  reality  (as  an  assertion),  and  yet 
logically  false  (as  an  inference).1 

But  if  truth  or  falsehood,  as  a material  quality  of  propositions 
and  syllogisms  be  extralogical,  so  also  is  their  modality.  Neces- 
sity, Possibility,  &c.,  are  circumstances  which  do  not  affect  the 
logical  copula  or  the  logical  inference.  They  do  not  relate  to  the 
connection  of  the  subject  and  predicate  of  the  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent as  terms  in  thought,  but  as  realities  in  existence ; they 
are  metaphysical,  not  logical  conditions.  The  syllogistic  inference 
is  always  necessary ; is  modified  by  no  extraformal  condition ; 
and  is  equally  apodictic  in  contingent  as  in  necessary  matter. 

If  such  introduction  of  metaphysical  notions  into  logic  be  once 
admitted,  there  is  no  limit  to  the  intrusion.  This  is  indeed  shown 
in  the  vacillation  of  Aristotle  himself  in  regard  to  the  number  of 
the  modes.  In  one  passage  ( De  Interp.  c.  12,  § 1)  he  enumerates 
four — the  necessary , the  impossible , the  contingent , the  possible  ; 
a determination  generally  received  among  logicians.  In  another 
[Ibid,  i 9),  he  adds  to  these  four  modes  hvo  others , viz.  the  true , 
and,  consequently,  the  false.  Some  logicians  have  accordingly 
admitted,  but  exclusively,  these  six  modes ; his  Greek  interpreters, 
however,  very  properly  observe  (though  they  made  no  use  of  the 
observation),  that  Aristotle  did  not  mean  by  these  enumerations 

1 [In  a certain  sense,  therefore,  all  logical  inference  is  hypothetical — hypothetically 
necessary  ; and  the  hypothetical  necessity  of  logic  stands  opposed  to  absolute  or  sim- 
ple necessity.  The  more  recent  scholastic  philosophers  have  well  denominated  these 
two  species — the  necessitas  consequential,  and  the  necessitas  consequcntis.  The  former 
is  an  ideal  or  formal  necessity ; the  inevitable  dependence  of  one  thought  upon  another, 
by  reason  of  our  intelligent  nature.  The  latter  is  a real  or  material  necessity  ; the  in- 
evitable dependence  of  one  thing  upon  another  because  of  its  own  nature.  The  former 
is  a logical  necessity,  common  to  all  legitimate  consequence,  whatever  be  the  material 
modality  of  its  objects.  The  latter  is  an  extralogical  necessity,  over  and  above  the 
syllogistic  inference,  and  wholly  dependent  on  the  modality  of  the  matter  consequent. 
— This  ancient  distinction,  modern  philosophers  have  not  only  overlooked  but  con- 
founded. (See  contrasted  the  doctrines  of  the  Aphrodisian  and  of  Mr.  Dugald  Stew- 
art, in  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  701  a,  note  *).] 


MODALITY  OF  PROPOSITIONS  AND  SYLLOGISMS. 


147 


to  limit  the  number  of  modes  to  four  or  six,  but  thought  only  of 
signalizing  the  more  important.  [In  general,  indeed,  astl  previ- 
ously stated,  he  speaks  only  of  the  necessary  and  contingent. 
[Anal,  passim.)]  Modes  maybe  conceived  without  end; — as  the 
certain , the  probable , the  useful , the  good , the  just — and  what 
not  ? All,  however,  must  be  admitted  into  logic  if  any  are  : the 
line  of  distinction  attempted  to  he  drawn  is  futile.  Such  was  the 
confusion  and  intricacy  occasioned  by  the  four  or  two  modes  alone, 
that  the  doctrine  of  modals  long  formed,  not  only  the  most  useless, 
hut  the  most  difficult  and  disgusting  branch  of  logic.  It  was,  at 
once,  the  criterium  et  crux  ingeniorum.  “ De  rnodali  non  gus- 
tabit  asinusf  said  the  schoolmen ; “ De  moduli  non  gustabit 
logicusf  say  we.  This  subject  was  only  perplexed  because  dif- 
ferent sciences  were  confounded  in  it ; and  modals  ought  to  he 
entirely,  on  principle  (as  they  have  been  almost  entirely  in  prac- 
tice), relegated  from  the  domain  of  logic,  and  consigned  to  the 
grammarian  and  metaphysician.  This  was,  indeed,  long  ago, 
obscurely  perceived  by  a profound  hut  now  forgotten  thinker. 
“ Pronunciata  ilia,”  says  Yives,  “ quibus  additur  modus,  non 
dialecticam  sed  grammaticam  qusestionem  habent.”  Ramus  also 
felt  the  propriety  of  their  exclusion,  though  equally  unable  to 
explicate  its  reasons.1 * * * * * 

Dr.  Whately  has  very  correctly  stated — 

“ It  belongs  exclusively  to  a syllogism,  properly  so  called  (i.  e.  a valid 
argument,  so  stated  that  its  conclusiveness  is  evident  from  the  mere  form  of 
the  expression),  that  if  letters,  or  any  other  unmeaning  symbols,  he  sub- 
stituted for  the  several  terms,  the  validity  of  the  argument  shall  still  he 
evident.’'  (P.  37.) 

Here  logic  appears  in  Dr.  Whately’s  exposition,  as  it  is  in 

1 [M.  Barthelemy  Saint-Hilaire  ( Logique  d'Aristote,  T.  I.  Pref.  p.  Ixv.)  says  : — 

“ Theophraste  et  Eudeme,  dont  on  invoque  l’autorite,  avaient  combattu  sur  plusieurs 
points  la  theorie  de  la  modalite ; ils  en  avaient  change  quelques  regies  ; rnais  ils 
l’avaient  admise  comme  partie  integrante  de  la  theorie  generale.  Depuis  eux,  nul 
logicien  n'a  pretendu  la  supprimer.  M.  Hamilton  est  jusqu’a  present  le  seul,  si  Ton 
excepte  Laurentius  Valla,  au  xve  siecle,  qui  ait  propose  ce  retranchement.7’ — Valla, 
whose  Dialectica  I take  shame  for  overlooking,  certainly  does  reject  modals,  as  a spe- 
cies of  logical  proposition ; but  on  erroneous  grounds.  He  confounds  formal  with 
material  necessity  ; and  alleges  no  valid  reason  for  the  retrenchment.  The  reduction 
of  the  Necessary  and  Contingent  to  the  Apodictic  and  Problematic  is  modem,  and.  I 
think,  erroneous.  For  all  the  necessary  is  not  apodictic  or  demonstrable  ; and  the  con- 

tingent is  by  no  means  convertible  with  the  doubtful  or  problematic.  There  is  here 

also  a mixing  of  the  subjective  with  the  objective.  In  my  view,  modes  are  only  ma- 

terial affections  of  the  predicate,  or,  it  may  be,  of  the  subject ; and  those  which,  from 
their  generality,  have  been  contemplated  in  logic,  may,  I think,  be  reduced  to  the  re- 

lation of  genus  and  species,  and  their  consecution,  thereby,  recalled  to  the  utmost 

simplicity. — I agree  with  Mr.  Mansel  (Pref.  p.  ii.),  if  I do  not  misapprehend  him.] 


148 


LOGIC. 


truth,  a distinct  and  self-sufficient  science.  What,  then,  are  we 
to  think  of  the  following  passages  ? 

“ Should  there  he  no  sign  at  all  to  the  common  term,  the  quantity  of 
the  proposition  (which  is  called  an  Indefinite  proposition),  is  ascertained 
by  the  matter ; i.  e.  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the  extremes, 
which  is  either  Necessary,  Impossible,  or  Contingent,  See.,  &c.  (P.  64.) — 

“As  it  is  evident,  that  the  truth  or  falsity  of  any  proposition  (its  quantity 
and  quality  being  known)  must  depend  on  the  matter  of  it,  we  must  bear 
in  mind,  that,  in  necessary  matter  all  affirmatives  are  true , and  nega- 
tives false;  in  impossible  matter , vice  versa  ; in  contingent  matter,  all 
universals  false,  and  particulars  true : e.g.  ‘all  islands  (or,  some  islands) 
are  surrounded  by  water,’  must  be  true,  because  the  matter  is  necessary : 
to  say  ‘no  islands,  or  some — not ,'  See.,  would  have  been  false:  again, 
‘ some  islands  are  fertile,’  1 some  are  not  fertile,’  are  both  true,  because  it 
is  Contingent  Matter  : put  ‘all'  or  ‘no,'  instead  of  1 some,'  and  the  propo- 
sitions will  be  false,”  Sec.,  Sec.  (P.  67.) 

In  these  passages  (which,  it  is  almost  needless  to  say,  are  only 
specimens  of  the  common  doctrine),  logic  is  reduced  from  an  inde- 
pendent science  to  a scientific  accident.  Possible , impossible , ne- 
cessary',  and  contingent  matter,  are  terms  expressive  of  certain  lofty 
generalizations  from  an  extensive  observation  of  real  existence ; 
and  logic,  inasmuch  as  it  postulates  a knowledge  of  these  general- 
izations, postulates  its  own  degradation  to  a precarious  appendage 
— to  a fortuitous  sequel,  of  all  the  sciences  from  which  that  knowl- 
edge must  be  borrowed.  If  in  syllogisms,  “unless  unmeaning 
symbols  can  he  substituted  for  the  several  terms,  the  argument 
is  either  unsound  or  sophistical — why  does  not  the  same  hold 
good  in  propositions,  of  which  syllogisms  are  hut  the  complement? 
But  A,  and  B,  and  C,  know  nothing  of  the  necessary,  impossible, 
contingent.  Is  logic  a formal  science  in  one  chapter,  a real 
science  in  another  ? Is  it  independent,  as  a constituted  whole ; 
and  yet  dependent,  in  its  constituent  parts  ? 

We  can  not  pass  without  notice  Dr.  Whately’s  employment  of 
the  term  Argument.  This  word  he  defines,  and  professes  to  use 
in  a “ strict  logical  sense  and  gives  us,  moreover,  under  a dis- 
tinct head,  a formal  enumeration  of  its  other  various  significations 
in  ordinary  discourse.  The  true  logical  acceptation  of  the  term, 
he,  however,  not  only  does  not  employ,  but  even  absolutely  over- 
looks; while,  otherwise,  his  list  of  meanings  is  neither  well  dis- 
criminated, nor  at  all  complete.  We  shall  speak  only  of  the 
logical  omission  and  mistake. 

“ Reasoning  (or  discourse)  expressed  in  words  is  argument ; and  an  ar- 
gument stated  at  full  length,  and  in  its  regular  form,  is  called  a syllo- 


ARGUMENT— MIDDLE  TEEM. 


149 


gism  ; the  third  part  of  logic,  therefore,  treats  of  the  syllogism.  Every 
argument  consists  of  two  parts  ; that  which  is 'proved;  and  that  by  means 
of  which  it  is  proved,”  &c.  And  in  a note  on  this  : — “ I mean,  in  the 
strict  technical  sense ; for,  in  popular  use,  the  word  Argument  is  often 
employed  to  denote  the  latter  of  these  two  parts  alone : e.  g.  this  is  an 
argument  to  prove  so  and  so,”  &c.  (P.  72.) 

Now,  the  signification,  here  (not  quite  correctly)  given  as  the 
“popular  use”  of  the  term,  is  nearer  to  the  “strict  technical 
sense”  than  that  which  Dr.  Whately  supposes  to  he  such.  In 
technical  propriety  argument  can  not  he  used  for  argumentation , 
as  he  thinks — but  exclusively  for  its  middle  term.  In  this  mean- 
ing the  word  (though  not  with  uniform  consistency)  was  employed 
by  Cicero,  Quintilian,  Boethius,  &c. ; it  was  thus  subsequently 
used  by  the  Latin  Aristotelians,  from  whom  it  passed  even  to  the 
Ramists  ;l  and  this  is  the  meaning  which  the  expression  always, 
first  and  most  naturally,  suggests  to  a logician.  Of  the  older  dia- 
lecticians, Crackantliorpe  is  the  only  one  we  recollect,  who  uses, 
and  professes  to  use,  the  word  not  in  its  strict  logical  signification, 
but  with  the  vulgar  as  convertible  with  Reasoning.  In  vindicat- 
ing his  innovation,  he,  however,  misrepresents  his  authorities. 
Sanderson  is,  if  we  remember,  rigidly  correct.  The  example  of 
Crackantliorpe,  and  of  some  French  Cartesians,  may  have  seduced 
Wallis  ; and  Wallis’s  authority,  with  his  own  ignorance  of  logi- 
cal propriety,  determined  the  usage  of  Aldrich — and  of  Oxford. — 
We  say  again  Aldrich’s  ignorance  ; and  the  point  in  question 
supplies  a significant  example.  “ Terminus  tertius  [says  he]  cui 
qusestionis  extrema  comparantur,  Aristoteli  Argumentum,  vulgo 
Medium .”  The  reverse  would  be  correct : — “ Aristoteli  Medium , 
vulgo  Argumentum  P This  elementary  blunder  of  the  Dean, 

corrected  by  none,  is  repeated  by  nearly  all  his  epitomators, 
expositors,  and  imitators.  It  stands  in  Hill  (p.  118) — in  Huyshe 
(p.  84) — in  the  Questions  on  Logic  (p.  41) — and  in  the  Key  to 
the  Questions  (p.  101) ; and  proves  emphatically,  that,  for  a cen- 
tury and  a half,  at  least,  the  Organon  (to  say  nothing  of  other 
logical  works)  could  have  been  as  little  read  in  Oxford  as  the 
Tar  gum  or  Zendavesta. 

A parallel  to  this  error  is  Dr.  Whately’s  statement,  that  “the 


1 Ramus,  in  his  definitions,  indeed,  abusively  extends  the  word  to  both  the  other 
terms  ; the  middle  he  calls  the  te.rtiv.rn  argumentum.  Throughout  his  writings,  how- 
ever— and  the  same  is  true  of  those  of  his  friend  Talreus — argumentum,  without  an 
adjective,  is  uniformly  the  word  used  for  the  middle  term  of  a syllogism  ; and  in  this 
he  is  followed  by  the  Ramists  and  Semi-Ramists  in  general. 


150 


LOGIC. 


Major  Premiss  is  often  called  Principle (P.  25.)  The  major 
premise  is  often  called  the  Proposition ; never  the  Principle.  A 
principle  may,  indeed,  he  a major  premise ; but  we  make  hold 
to  say,  that  no  logician  ever  employed  the  term  Principle  as  a 
svnonyme  for  major  premise. 

Speaking  of  the  Dilemma , Dr.  Whately  says  : — “Most,  if  not 
all,  writers  on  this  point,  either  omit  to  tell,  whether  the  Dilemma 
is  a kind  of  conditional  or  of  disjunctive  argument,  or  else  refer 
it  to  the  latter  class,  on  account  of  its  having  one  disjunctive  pre- 
miss ; though  it  clearly  belongs  to  the  class  of  conditionals.”  (P. 
100.)  Most,  if  not  all,  logical  writers,  do,  not  omit  to:  tell  this, 
hut  Dr.  Whately,  we  fear,  has  omitted  to  consult  them ; and  the 
opinion  he  himself  adopts,  so  far  from  being  held  by  few  or  none, 
has  been,  in  fact,  long  the  catholic  doctrine.  For  every  one  logi- 
cian, during  the  last  century,  who  does  not  hold  the  dilemma  to 
he  a conditional  syllogism,  we  could  produce  ten  who  do. 

Dr.  Whately — indeed  all  the  Oxford  logicians — adopts  the 
inelegant  division  of  the  Hypothetical  proposition  and  syllogism 
into  the  Conditional  and  Disjunctive.  This  is  wrong  in  itself. 
The  name  of  the  genus  should  not,  without  necessity,  be  con- 
founded with  that  of  a species.  But  the  terms  Hypothetical 
and  Conditional  are  in  sense  identical,  differing  only  in  the  lan- 
guage from  which  they  are  taken.  It  is  likewise  wrong  on  the 
score  of  authority  ; for  the  words  have  been  used  as  synonymous 
by  those  logicians  who,  independently  of  the  natural  identity 
of  the  terms,  were  best  entitled  to  regulate  their  conventional 
use. — Boethius,  the  first  among  the  Latins  who  elaborated  this 
part  of  logic,  employs  indifferently  the  terms  hypotheticus , condi- 
tionalis,  non  simplex , for  the  genus,  and  as  opposed  to  categori- 
cus  or  simplex  ; and  this  genus  he  divides  into  the  Propositio  et 
Syllogismus  conjunctivi  (called  also  conjuncti , connexi , per  con- 
nexionem),  equivalent  to  Dr.  Whately’s  Conditionals ; and  into 
the  Propositio  et  Syllogismus  disjunctivi  (also  disjuncti , per  dis- 
junctionem ).  Other  logicians  have  employed  other,  none  better, 
terms  of  distinction  ; hut,  in  general,  all  who  had  freed  themselves 
of  the  scholastic  slime,  avoided  the  needless  confusion  to  which 
we  object. 

But,  to  speak  now  of  Hypothetical  in  their  Aristotelic  mean- 
ing, Dr.  Whately  says  : 

“ Aldrich  has  stated,  through  a mistake,  that  Aristotle  utterly  despised 
hypothetical  syllogisms,  and  thence  made  no  mention  of  them  ; but  he  did 


HYPOTHETICAL  PROPOSITIONS  AND  SYLLOGISMS. 


151 


indicate  his  intention  to  treat  of  them  in  some  part  of  this  work,  which 
either  was  not  completed  by  him  according  to  his  design,  or  else  (in  com- 
mon with  many  of  his  writings)  has  not  come  down  to  us.”  (P.  104.) 

Any  ignorance  of  Aristotle  on  the  part  of  Aldrich  is  conceiva- 
ble, but  in  his  censure  Dr.  Whately  is  not  himself  correct.  With 
the  other  Oxford  logicians,  he  never  suspects  the  HvWoyicrpol  ig 
inrodeaea^  of  Aristotle  and  our  hypothetical  syllogisms,  not  to  be 
the  same.  In  this  error,  which  is  natural  enough,  he  is  not 
without  associates  even  of  distinguished  name.  Those  versed  in 
Aristotelic  and  logical  literature  are,  however,  aware,  that  this 
opinion  has  been  long,  if  not  exploded,  at  least  rendered  ex- 
tremely improbable.  We  can  not  at  present  enter  on  the  subject, 
and  must  content  ourselves  with  stating,  that  hypothetical  syllo- 
gisms, in  the  present  acceptation,  were  first  expounded,  and  the 
name  first  applied  to  them  by  Theophrastus  and  Eudemus. 
The  latter,  indeed,  clearly  discriminated  such  hypothetical  syllo- 
gisms from  those  of  Aristotle ; and,  what  has  not,  we  believe, 
been  observed,  even  Boethius  expressly  declares  the  JfiAAoyioyto? 
e£  d/xoAoyta?  of  the  philosopher  to  be  really  categorical,  while  in 
regard  to  the  SvWoyio-fios  et?  to  aSvvarov,  there  is  no  ground  of 
doubt.  The  only  reason  for  hesitation  arises  from  the  passage 
(Analyt.  Pr.  i.  44,  $ 4),  in  which  it  is  said,  that  there  are  many 
other  syllogisms  concluding  by  hypothesis,  and  these  the  philoso- 
pher promises  to  discuss.  Of  what  nature  these  were,  we  have 
now  no  means  even  of  conjecture.  If  we  judge  from  Aristotle’s 
notion  of  hypothesis,  and  from  the  syllogisms  he  calls  by  that 
name,  we  should  infer  that  they  had  no  analogy  to  the  hypothe- 
ticals  of  Theophrastus  and  it  will  immediately  be  seen,  that  a 
complete  revolution  in  the  nomenclature  of  this  branch  of  logic 
was  effected  subsequently  to  Aristotle.  We  may  add,  that  no 
reliance  is  to  be  placed  in  the  account  given  by  Pacius  of  the 
Aristotelic  doctrine  on  this  point : he  is  at  variance  with  his  own 
authorities,  and  has  not  attentively  studied  the  Greek  logicians. 

1 [M.  Barthelemy  Saint-Hilaire  ( Logique  D'Aristote , T.  I.  Pref.  p.  lx.  sq.  and  T. 
IV.  Top.  i.  8,  9,  notes)  has  done  me  the  honor  to  controvert  this  opinion,  and  contends 
that  the  Hypothetical  syllogisms  of  Aristotle,  are  the  same  with  those  which  from 
Theophrastus  have  descended  to  us  under  that  name.  But  however  ingenious  his 
arguments,  to  me  they  are  not  convincing ; and  to  say  nothing  of  older  authorities, 
he  has  also  against  him  Dr.  Waitz,  the  recent  and  very  able  editor  of  the  Organon  in 
Germany. — I am  now,  indeed,  more  even  than  formerly,  persuaded,  that  our  hypothe- 
ticals  are  not  the  reasonings  from  hypothesis  of  the  father  of  logic ; for  I think  it  can 
be  shown,  that  our  hypothetical  and  disjunctive  syllogisms  are  only  immediate  infer- 
ences, and  not  therefore  entitled,  in  Aristotelic  language,  to  the  style  of  syllogisms  at  all.  ] 


152 


LOGIC. 


So  far  we  state  only  the  conclusions  also  of  others.  The  fol- 
lowing observation,  as  farther  illustrating  this  point,  will  proba- 
bly surprise  those  best  qualified  to  judge,  by  its  novelty  and 
paradox.  It  must  appear,  indeed,  at  first  sight,  ridiculous  to 
talk,  at  the  present  day,  of  discoveries  in  the  Organon.  The 
certainty  of  the  fact  is,  however,  equal  to  its  improbability.  The 
term  Categorical  [tcaTpyopucof),  applied  to  proposition  or  syllo- 
gism, in  contrast  to  Hypothetical  (vTrodeTucos),  we  find  employed 
in  all  the  writings  extant  of  the  Peripatetic  School,  subsequent 
to  those  of  its  founder.  In  this  acceptation  it  is  universally  ap- 
plied by  the  interpreters  of  Aristotle,  up  to  the  Aphrodisian ; and 
previously  to  him,  we  certainly  know  that  it  was  so  used  by 
Theophrastus  and  Eudemus.  Now,  no  logician,  we  believe,  an- 
cient or  modern,  has  ever  remarked,  that  it  was  not  understood 
in  this  signification  by  the  philosopher  himself.1  The  Greek  com- 
mentators on  the  Organon,  indeed,  once  and  again  observe,  in  par- 
ticular places,  that  the  term  categorical  is  there  to  be  interpreted 
affirmative ; but  none  has  made  the  general  observation,  that  it 
was  never  applied  by  Aristotle  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  exclu- 
sively usurped  by  themselves.  But  so  it  is.  Throughout  the  Orga- 
non there  is  not  to  be  found  a single  passage,  in  which  categori- 
cal stands  opposed  to  hypothetical  (e£  viroOeaeaffi ; there  is  not  a 
single  passage  in  which  it  is  not  manifestly  in  the  meaning  of 
affirmative,  as  convertible  with  /caracjoaTiKb'i,  and  opposed  to  airo- 
(part/cbs  and  crrepyTucbs.  Nor  is  the  induction  scanty.  In  the 
Prior  Analytics  alone,  the  word  occurs  at  least  eighty-five  times. 
— Nay,  farther  ; as  this  never  was,  so  there  is  another  term  al- 
ways employed  by  Aristotle  in  contrast  to  his  syllogisms  by  hypo- 
thesis. The  syllogisms  of  this  class  (whether  they  conclude  by 
agreement , or  through  a reductio  ad  absurdum ),  he  uniformly 


1 [M.  Peisse,  in  his  extensive  logical  reading,  has  found  the  following  unexclusive, 
though  merely  incidental,  observation  by  the  thrice  learned  Gerard,  John  Vossius : — 
“ Nusquam  in  Aristotele  syllogismus  categoricus  opponitur  hypothetico.”  ( De  Natura 
Artium,  L.  iv.  c.  8,  <)  8.) — I have  also  met  with  an  earlier  authority,  in  Cardanus ; 
but  he  states  only  that  Aristotle  very  frequently  uses  categoric  for  affirmative,  not  that 
he  always  does  so.  ( Conlr . Log.  Ixxiv.)  With  these  individual  and  partial  excep- 
tions, the  general  statement  in  the  text  stands  good. 

Boethius,  I think,  has  greatly  contributed  to  this  confusion  of  the  terms.  In  his 
versions  from  the  Organon,  he  uniformly  translates  Aristotle’s  KarriyopiKos  (affirma- 
tive), by  prcedicatibus  ; and  Aristotle’s  KaratparLKos  (a  mere  synonome),  affiirmativus : 
whereas,  in  his  original  writings,  he  uses  the  term  prcedicativus  for  Karr/yopiKos,  in  the 
post-Aristotelic  signification. — Apuleius,  on  the  contrary  (followed  by  Cassiodorus  and 
Isidore  of  Seville),  always  employs  dedicativus  in  opposition  to  abdicativus ; uni  prce- 
dicativus in  opposition  to  conditionalis . And  rightly.  (De  Dogm.  Plat.  1.  iii. )] 


HYPOTHETICAL  PROPOSITIONS  AND  SYLLOGISMS. 


153 


opposes  to  those  which  conclude  Set/m/ctw?,  ostensively  ; and  the 
number  of  passages  in  which  this  opposition  occurs  are  not  a few. 
— Categorical , in  our  signification,  is  thus  not  of  Aristotelic 
origin.  The  change  in  the  meaning  of  the  term  was  undoubtedly, 
we  think,  introduced  by  Theophrastus.  The  marvel  is,  that  no 
logician  or  commentator  has  hitherto  signalized  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  Aristotelic  signification  of  the  word,  and  that  which 
has  subsequently  prevailed.1 

We  may  allude  (we  can  do  no  more)  to  another  instance,  in 
which  Aristotle’s  meaning  has  been  almost  universally  mistaken ; 
and  to  the  authority  of  this  mistake  we  owe  the  introduction  of 
an  illogical  absurdity  into  all  the  systems  of  logic.  We  refer  to 
the  Enthymeme. — On  the  vulgar  doctrine  this  is  a species  of  rea- 
soning, distinguished  from  the  syllogism  proper,  by  having  one 
or  other  of  its  premises,  not  expressed,  but  understood  ; and  this 
distinction,  without  a suspicion  either  of  its  legitimacy  or  origin, 
is  fathered  on  the  Stagirite. — The  division  of  syllogism  and 
enthymeme,  in  this  sense,  would  involve  nothing  less  than  a dis- 
crimination of  species  between  the  reasoning  of  logic  and  the 
reasoning  of  ordinary  discourse ; syllogism  being  the  form  pecu- 
liar to  the  one,  enthymeme  that  appropriate  to  the  other. — Nay, 
even  this  distinction,  if  admitted,  would  not  avail;  syllogism  and 
enthymeme  being  distinguished  as  two  intralogical  forms  of  argu- 
mentation. Those  who  defend  the  distinction  are  thus  driven 
back  on  the  even  greater  absurdity — of  establishing  an  essential 
difference  of  form,  on  an  accidental  variety  of  expression — of 
maintaining  that  logic  regards  the  accident  of  the  external  lan- 
guage, and  not  the  necessity  of  the  internal  thought.  This,  at 
least,  is  not  the  opinion  of  Aristotle,  who  declares  : — “ Syllogism 
and  Demonstration  belong  not  to  the  outward  discourse , but  to 
the  discourse  zuhich  passes  in  the  mind : — Ov  irpos  tov  ef :a>  \6yov 
rj  aTrbSei^i'i,  akXa  TTpos  tov  iv  ~fj  ’^rvyrp  irrel  oiibe  cruWoy ur pbos C 

(Analyt.  Post.  i.  10,  k 7.) — But  if  the  distinction,  in  its  general 
nature,  be  unphilosophical,  it  is  still  more  irrational  at  the  hands 
of  its  reputed  author.  For  Aristotle  distinguishes  the  enthymeme 
from  the  mere  syllogism,  as  a reasoning  of  a peculiar  matter — 
from  signs  and  likelihoods  ; so  that,  if  he  over-and-above  discrim- 
inated these  by  an  accident  of  form,  he  would  divide  the  genus 
by  tvjo  differences,  and  differences  of  a merely  contingent  asso- 
ciation. Yet,  strange  to  say,  this  improbability  has  been  be- 
1 [See  note  (')  to  p.  152.] 


154 


LOGIC. 


lieved; — believed  without  any  cogent  evidence; — believed  from 
the  most  ancient  times ; and  even  when  the  opinion  was  at  last 
competently  refuted,  the  refutation  was  itself  so  immediately  for- 
gotten, that  there  seems  not  to  be  at  present  a logical  author  (not 
to  say  in  England,  but)  in  Europe,  who  is  even  aware  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  controversy.1 

A discussion  of  the  question  would  exceed  our  limits.  For 
those  who  may  wish  to  study  the  point,  we  may  briefly  indicate 
the  sources  of  information;  and  these,  though  few,  will  be  found, 
we  think,  to  be  exhaustive. 

Toward  the  conclusion  of  the  fifteenth  century,  the  celebrated 
Rodolplius  Agricola  (t  1485),  in  his  posthumous  book,  De  In- 
vention Dialeclica,  recognizes  it  as  doubtful,  whether  Aristotle 
meant  to  discriminate  the  Enthymeme  from  the  Syllogism,  by 
any  peculiarity  of  form  ; and  Phrissemius  in  his  Scholia  on  that 
book  (1523),  shows  articulately,  that  the  common  opinion  was  at 
variance  with  the  statements  of  the  Philosopher.  Without,  it  is 
probable,  any  knowledge  of  Phrissemius,  the  matter  was  discuss- 
ed by  Major  agius , in  his  Reprehensions  contra  Nizolium,  and 
his  Explanations  in  Aristotelis  Rhetoricam — the  latter  in  1572. 
Twenty-five  years  thereafter,  Julius  Pachis  (who  was  not  appa- 
rently aware  of  either)  argued  the  whole  question  on  far  broader 
grounds ; and,  in  particular,  on  the  authority  of  four  Greek 
MSS.,  ejected  as  a gloss  the  term  dreX?)?  (imperfectus),  ( Analyt . 
Pr.  ii.  27,  k 3),  on  which  the  argument  for  the  common  doctrine 
mainly  rests;  which  has  been  also  silently  done  by  the  Berlin 
Academicians,  in  their  late  splendid  edition  of  Aristotle’s  works, 
on  two  of  the  three  MSS.  of  the  Organon,  on  which  they  found. 
We  may  notice,  that  the  Masters  of  Louvain , in  their  comment- 
ary on  the  logical  treatises  of  Aristotle  (1535),  observe,  that  “the 
word  imperfectus  is  not  to  be  found  in  some  codices,  but  that 
it  ought  to  be  supplied  is  shown,  both  by  the  Greek  [printed] 
copies  and  by  the  version  of  Boethius.”  Scaynus,  in  his  Para- 
phrasis in  Organum  (1599),  adopts  the  opinion  without  arguing 
the  question  ; and  he  does  not  seem  to  have  been  aware  even  of 
the  Commentary  of  Pacius,  published  three  years  before.  About 
1620,  Corydaleus , bishop  of  Mitylene,  who  had  studied  in  Italy, 
maintained  in  his  Logic  the  opinion  of  Pacius,  but  without  addi- 

1 In  this  country,  some  years  ago,  the  question  was  stated  in  a popular  miscellany, 
with  his  usual  ability,  by  a learned  friend  to  whom  we  pointed  out  the  evidence ; but 
none  of  the  subsequent  writers  have  profited  by  the  information. 


ENTHYMEME. 


155 


tional  corroboration ; though  in  his  Rhetoric  (reprinted  by  Fabri- 
cius,  in  the  Bibliotheca  Grceca),  he  adheres  to  the  vulgar  doc- 
trine. [Becmanus  ( Orig . 1608  and  Manuel.  1626),  and  Heuman- 
nus  ( Poec . 1729),  have  nothing  new  or  determinate,  though  they 
moot  the  question.]  In  1724,  Facciolati  expanded  the  argument 
of  Pacius — (for  he,  as  the  others,  was  ignorant  of  Scaynus,  Ma- 
joragius,  Phrissemius,  Agricola,  &c.,  and  adds  nothing  of  his  own 
except  an  error  or  two) — into  a special  Acroama:  but  his  elo- 
quence was  not  more  effective  than  the  reasoning  of  his  predeces- 
sors ; and  the  question  again  fell  into  complete  oblivion.  Any  one 
who  competently  reargues  the  point,  will  have  both  to  supply 
and  to  correct.1 


1 For  example. — Pacius  (whom  Facciolati,  by  rhetorical  hyperbole,  pronounces — 
“ Aristotelis  Intcrpres,  quot  sunt,  quot  fuerunt,  quotque  futuri  sunt,  longe  prsestan- 
tissimus”),  establishes  it  as  one  of  the  main  pillars  of  his  argument,  that  the  Greek 
interpreters  did  not  acknowledge  the  term  dreXrjs  : — “ quoniam  Johannes  Grammaticus 
hie  nullam  ejus  mentionem  facit ; et  tarn  ipse,  quam  Alexander,  superiori  libro,  expli- 
cates definitionem  syllogismi  ab  Aristotele  traditam,  ac  distinguentes  syllogismum  ab 
argumentatione  constante  ex  una  propositione,  non  vocant  hanc  argumentationem 
enthymema,  sed  syllogismum  povo Xrjpparov."  {Comm,  in  Analyt.  Pr.  ii.  27,  $ 3.) — 
Pacius  is  completely  wrong.- — Philoponus,  or  rather  Ammonius  Hermise,  on  the  place 
in  question  {Anal.  Pr.  ii.  c.  27,  (j  3),  states,  indeed  (as  far  as  we  recollect,  for  our 
copy  of  his  Commentary  is  not  at  hand),  nothing  to  the  point.  [On  since  referring  to 
the  passage,  we  find  that  too  much  had  been  conceded.  M.  Peisse,  too,  notices  its 
irrelevancy.]  The  fallacy  of  such  negative  evidence  is  however  shown  in  his  exposi- 
tion of  the  Posterior  Analytics,  where  he  says  ; — “ ’E vdvpypa  fie  e’lpyrai,  ano  rov 
KaraXipndveiv  red  vr2  ivdv peicrdai  ryv  piav  npordenv.’''  (f.  4.  a.  Edit.  Aid.  1534.) 
Ammonius  also,  On  the  Jive  words  of  Porphyry  (f.  5 a,  ed.  Aid.  1546)  expressly  defines 
the  Enthymeme — UA  syllogism  with  one  proposition  unexpressed ; hence  called  an  im- 
perfect syllogism.'1'’  How  inaccurate,  moreover,  Pacius  is  in  regard  to  the  still  higher 
authority  of  Alexander  (whose  interpretation  of  the  second  book  of  the  Prior  Analytics , 
which  contains  the  passage  in  question,  is  still  in  MS.,  and  probably  spurious),  maj 
be  seen  by  his  Commentary  on  the  first  book  of  the  Prior  Analytics  (f.  7.  a.  b.  Edit 
Aid.  1534),  compared  with  his  Commentary  on  the  Topics  (pp.  6,  7,  Edit.  Aid.  1513) 
This  last  we  shall  quote.  He  is  speaking  of  Aristotle’s  definition  of  the  Syllogism  : — 
“ Te  Bevrco  v”  fie  einev  «AA’  ov  “ r e 8 evr  o s,”  &s  roves  a^ovcriv,  alnapevoL  rbv 
A oyov — ort  pybev  avXhoyicrTiKcos  St’  ivos  redevros  beiKvvrai,  aAA’  ck  8vo  to  eXa^icr- 
rov.  Ovs  yap  oi  nepl  Avrinarpov  (Tarsensem  Tyriumve!)  pov  oXrj  p parov  s 
avKkoyiapovs  Xeyovcnv,  ovk  elcri  crvXXoyurpo'i,  aAA  eVS eS>s  epwrcovrai.  — — Totou- 
rot  fie  curt  Kal  oi  prjropiKol  crvXXoyicrpol,  obs  i v Bv  pr]  par  a A eyopev-  /cat  yap  iv 
CKeivoLS  fi ok.Il  yiyverjBai  Sta  pids  npordaeais  avXXoyKrpoS,  r<3  rrjv  trepan  yviopipov 
overav  vno  hiKaarav,  rj  rcov  aKpoararv  npoarlBeaBai  oiov,  K.  r.  A.  - — A to  ov  fie  oi 
tolovto t Kvplws  avXXoyurpol,  aXXd  to  oXov,  prjropiKo'i  o~u\Xoyicrpo\.  ’E<jf>  cov  ovv 
pi]  yviopipov  icrrL  ro  napaXemopevov,  ovk  ear  iv  in  t rovriov  oiov  re  rov  fit’  ivBvprf- 
paros  yiyvecrdai  crvXXoyicrpow  teat  yap  /cat  an  avrov  rov  ovoparos  crvXXoyicrpos 
crvvBeo-iv  riva  Xoyiov  eoise  arjpalveiw  ioanep  Kal  6 avp'lryfiicrpbs,  yjsr/tfiaiv.— From 
these  passages  (which  are  confirmed  by  the  anonymous  Greek  author  of  the  book 
“Touching  Syllogisms”),  it  is  manifest  against  Pacius: — 1°,  That  the  ’Ei /Bvpripa 
was  used  by  the  oldest  commentators  on  Aristotle  in  the  modern  signification,  as  a 
syllogism  of  one  expressed  premise ; and,  2°,  That  the  crvXXoyicrpbs  povoXypparos 
was  not  a term  of  the  Aristotelian,  but  of  the  Stoical  School.  This  appears  clearly 
from  Sextus  Empiricus  (Inst.  ii.  § 167 ; Contra  Math.  viii.  § 443  ; ed.  Fabr.).  Boe- 


15C 


LOGIC. 


Wo  proceed  to  consider  a still  more  important  subject — the 
nature  of  the  Inductive  inference ; and  regret  that  we  can  not 
echo  the  praises  that  have  been  bestowed  on  Dr.  Whately’s 
analysis  of  this  process.  We  do  not,  indeed,  know  the  logician 


tliius,  and  all  the  later  Greek  logicians  (with  the  partial  variation  of  Magentinus  and 
Pachymeres),  also  favor  the  common  opinion.  Their  authority  is,  however,  of  little 
weight,  and  the  general  result  of  the  argument  stands  unaffected. — In  these  errors,  it 
is  needless  to  say,  that  Pacius  is  followed  by  Corydaleus  and  Facciolati. 

[I  may  here  annex  a general  statement  of  the  various  meanings  in  which  the  term 
Enthymemc  has  been  employed ; and  though  I can  not  tarry  to  give  articulate  refer- 
ences to  the  books  in  which  the  several  opinions  are  to  be  found,  this  I think  will 
exhibit  a far  completer  view  of  the  multiform  significations  of  the  word  than  is  else- 
where to  be  found. 

These  meanings  may  be  first  distributed  into  four  categories,  according  as  the  word 
is  employed  to  denote  : — I.  A thought  or  proposition  in  general; — II.  A proposition, 
part  of  a syllogism; — III.  A syllogism  of  some  peculiar  matter ; — IV.  A syllogism  of 
an  unexpressed  part. 

I.  — Enthymeme  denotes  a thought  or  proposition: 

1.  Of  any  kind. — See  Cicero,  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus,  Demetrius,  Quintilian, 
Sopater,  and  one  of  the  anonymous  Scholiasts  on  Hermogenes. 

2.  Of  any  kind,  with  its  reason  annexed. — See  Aristotle,  Quintilian. 

3.  Of  imagination  or  feeling,  as  opposed  to  intellection. — Isocrates,  Author  of  the  Rhe- 
toric to  Alexander,  the  Halicarnassian. 

4.  Inventive. — Xenophon. 

5.  Facetious,  witty,  antithetic. — Quintilian,  Juvenal,  Agellius. 

II.  — Enthymeme  denotes  a proposition,  part  of  a syllogism: 

1.  Any  one  proposition. — Held  by  Neocles  (1);  See  Quintilian,  Scholiast  on  Hermo- 
genes, Greek  author  of  the  Prolegomena  Statuum,  Matthreus  Camariota. 

2.  Conclusion  of  an  Epichirema.- — Hermogenes,  Scholiast  on  Hermogenes,  Rufus, 
Greek  author  of  the  Rhetorical  Synopticon,  Maximus  Planudes,  Georgius  Pletho, 
M.  Camariota. 

This  category  it  is  impossible  always  rigorously  to  distinguish  from  IV. 

III.  — Enthymeme  denotes  a syllogism  of  a certain  matter : 

1.  Rhetorical  of  any  kind. — Aristotle,  Curius  Fortunatianus,  Harpocratian,  Scholiast 
on  Hermogenes,  M.  Camariota. 

2.  From  consequents,  or  from  opposites — repugnants,  contraries,  dissimilars,  <Sj-c. — 
Cicero,  Quintilian,  Hermogenes,  Apsines,  Julius  Rufinianus. 

3.  (Leaving  that  from  consequents  to  be  called  Epichirema),  from  opposites  alone. 
— Cornificius,  Author  of  the  Rhetoric  to  Herennius,  Quintilian,  Flennogenes, 
Apsines. 

4.  From  signs  and  likelihoods. — Aristotle’s  special  doctrine. 

IV.  Enthymeme  denotes  a syllogism  which  there  is  unexpressed : 

1.  a)  One  or  two  propositions. — So  Victorious  in  Cassiodorus.  See  also  Cicero,  Quin 
tilian  and  Boethius. 

b)  One  proposition ; and  here  : — 

2.  Any  proposition. — Held  by  Neocles  (?)  Quintilian,  and  the  Greek  author  of  the 
Prolegomena  Rhetorica ; see  also  Scholiast  on  Hermogenes  and  G.  Pletho.  Aris- 
totle and  Demetrius  allow  this,  as  a frequent  accident  of  rhetorical  syllogisms. 

3.  Either  premise. — This  is  the  common  doctrine  of  the  Greek  logicians,  following 
Alexander  and  Ammonius,  and  followed  by  the  Arabians,  and  of  the  Schoolmen 
following  Boethius,  Cassiodorus,  Isidore  of  Seville,  and  the  Arabians.  It  is  also 
the  doctrine  of  the  moderns.  All  these  parties  agree  in  fathering  it  on  the  Stagi- 
rite. 

4.  The  major  premise;  (the  non-expression  of  the  minor  being  allowed  to  the  common 
syllogism.) — This  is  held  by  two  Greek  logicians — Leo  Magentinus  and  Georgius 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


157 


who  has  clearly  defined  the  proper  character  of  dialectical  induc- 
tion, and  there  are  few  who  have  not  in  the  attempt  been  guilty 
of  the  grossest  blunders.  Aristotle’s  doctrine  on  this  point, 
though  meagre,  is  substantially  correct ; hut  succeeding  logicians, 
in  attempting  to  improve  upon  their  master,  have  only  corrupted 
what  they  endeavored  to  complete.  As  confusion  is  here  a prin- 
cipal cause  of  error,  we  must  simplify  the  question  by  some  pre- 
liminary distinctions  and  exclusions. 

The  term  Induction  (eVaymy?))  has  been  employed  to  denote 
three  very  different  things  : — 1°,  The  objective  process  of  inves- 
tigating individual  facts,  as  preparatory  to  illation ; — 2°,  A mate- 
rial illation  of  the  universal  from  the  singular,  warranted  either 
by  the  general  analogies  of  nature,  or  by  special  presumptions 
afforded  by  the  object-matter  of  any  real  science ; — 3°,  A formal 
illation  of  the  universal  from  the  individual,  as  legitimated  solely 
by  the  laws  of  thought,  and  abstract  from  the  conditions  of  this 
or  that  particular  matter. 

That  the  first  of  these,  an  inventive  process  or  process  of  dis- 
covery, is  beyond  the  sphere  of  a critical  science,  is  manifest ; nor 
has  Induction,  in  this  abusive  application  of  the  term,  been  ever 
arrogated  to  Logic.  By  logicians,  however,  the  second  and  third 
have  been  confounded  into  one,  and,  under  every  phasis  of  mis- 
conception, treated  as  a simple  and  purely  logical  operation.  Yet 
nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  these  constitute  two  separate 
operations,  and  that  the  second  is  not  properly  a logical  process 
at  all.  In  logic,  all  inference  is  determined  ratione  formas,  the 
conclusion  being  necessarily  implied  in  the  very  conception  of  the 
premises.  In  this  second  Induction,  on  the  contrary,  the  illation 
is  effected  vi  materice,  on  grounds  not  involved  in  the  notion  of  its 
antecedent.  To  take,  for  example,  Dr.  Whately’s  instance  : The 
naturalist  who,  from  the  proposition — “ Ox,  sheep,  deer,  goat, 

Pachymeres.  (By  the  way  I may  notice  that  Saxius  is  wrong  in  carrying  up  the 
former  to  the  seventh  century  ; for  Leo  could  not  be  older  than  the  ninth,  seeing 
that  he  quotes  Psellus.)  The  same  opinion  I find  maintained  by  Cardanus ; but  on 
a misinterpretation  of  Averroes. 

5.  The  conclusion. — The  doctrine  of  Ulpian  the  commentator  of  Demosthenes,  of 
Minucianus,  and  of  a Scholiast  on  Hermogenes.  Though  this,  as  an  exclusive 
opinion,  be  not  right,  modern  logicians  are  still  farther  wrong,  in  their  otherwise 
erroneous  doctrine  of  Enthymeme,  for  not  recognizing  as  a third  order,  the  non- 
expression of  the  conclusion ; since  this  is  an  ellipsis  of  the  very  commonest  in  our 
practice  of  reasoning.  Keckermannus,  indeed  (ignorant  of  the  ancient  doctrine), 
while  admitting  the  practice,  expressly  refuses  to  it  the  name  of  Enthymeme. 

6.  Two  propositions . — This  opinion  might  seem  to  be  held  by  some  of  the  authorities 
under  category  II.] 


158 


LOGIC. 


(i.  e.  some  horned  animals),  ruminate,”  infers  the  conclusion — - 
“ All  horned  animals  ruminate,”  may  he  warranted  in  this  pro- 
cedure hy  the  material  probabilities  of  his  science;  but  his  illation 
is  formally,  is  logically  vicious.  Here,  the  inference  is  not  neces- 
sitated by  the  laws  of  thought.  The  some  of  the  antecedent,  as 
it  is  not  thought , either  to  contain  or  to  constitute,  so  it  does  not 
mentally  determine,  the  coll  of  the  consequent ; and  the  reasoner 
must  transcend  the  sphere  of  logic,  if  he  would  attempt  to  vindi- 
cate the  truth  of  his  conclusion.  Yet,  this,  by  the  almost  unani- 
mous consent  of  logicians,  has  been  admitted  into  their  science. 
Induction  they  have  distinguished  into  perfect  and  imperfect ; 
according  as  the  ivliole  concluded  was  inferred  from  all , or  from 
some  only,  of  its  constituent  parts.  They  thus  involved  them- 
selves in  a twofold  absurdity.  For,  on  the  one  hand , they  recog- 
nized the  consequence  of  the  Imperfect  Induction  to  be  legitimate, 
though,  admitting  it  to  be  not  necessarily  cogent ; as  if  logic 
could  infer  with  a degree  of  certainty  inferior  to  the  highest : 
and,  on  the  other , they  attempted  to  corroborate  this  imbecility, 
by  calling  in  real  probabilities — physical,  psychological,  meta- 
physical ; which  logic  could  neither,  as  a formal  science,  know, 
nor,  as  an  apodictic  science,  take  into  account.  This  was  a corol- 
lary of  the  fundamental  error  to  which  we  have  already  alluded 
— the  non-exclusion  of  all  material  modality  from  the  domain  of 
logic.  Thus,  it  was  maintained,  that,  in  necessary  matter , the 
Imperfect  Induction  was  necessarily  conclusive ; as  if  logic  could 
be  aware  of  what  was  necessary  matter — as  if,  indeed,  this  itself 
were  not  the  frequent  point  of  controversy  in  the  objective 
sciences,  and  did  not,  in  fact,  usually  vary  in  them,  as  these 
same  sciences  advanced.1 

The  two  first  processes  to  which  the  name  of  Induction  has 
been  given,  being  thus  excluded,  it  remains  only  to  say  a few 


1 [Thus,  Sir  Thomas  Browne,  expressing  the  doctrine  of  naturalists  in  the  seven- 
teenth century,  declared  it  to  be  “ impossible,  that  a quadruped,  should  lay  an  egg,  or 
have  the  bill  of  a bird."  To  the  older  logicians,  therefore,  this  proposition  was  of  im- 
possible matter.  The  subsequent  discovery  of  the  Ornithorynchus  Paradoxus  has 
shown  to  the  naturalist  that  his  twofold  impossibility  was  possible,  and  the  proposi- 
tion is,  consequently,  to  our  recent  logicians  one  of  possible  matter. — “ Dogs  bark:" 
this  was  erst  of  necessary  matter; — “ dogs”  were  then  “ all  dogs,”  and  the  inductive 
conclusion  compulsory  and  universal.  (Wolfii  Logica,  § 479.)  Since  an  observation 
of  the  dogs  of  Labrador  (I  think),  the  proposition,  as  in  our  zoologies  so  in  our  logics, 
has  fallen  to  contingent  matter;  “dogs”  are  now  “some  dogs,”  and  the  inductive 
conclusion,  petitory,  particular,  or  false.  And  so  on.  But  in  logic,  as  in  theology — 
Variasse  erroris  est. 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


isy 

words  in  explanation  of  the  third — of  that  Induction,  with  which 
alone  logic  is  concerned,  hut  the  nature  of  which  has  by  almost 
all  logicians,  been  wholly  misrepresented.1 

Logic  does  not  consider  things  as  they  exist  really  and  in 
themselves,  but  only  the  general  forms  of  thought  under  which 
the  mind  conceives  them  ; in  the  language  of  the  schools,  logic  is 
conversant,  not  about  first , hut  about  second  notions .2  Thus  a 
logical  inference  is  not  determined  by  any  objective  relation  of 
Causality  subsisting  between  the  terms  of  the  premises  and  con- 
clusion, hut  solely  by  the  subjective  relation  of  Reason  and  Con- 
sequent, under  which  they  are  construed  to  the  mind  in  thought.3 
The  notion  conceived  as  determining,  is  the  Reason  ; the  notion 
conceived  as  determined,  is  the  Consequent ; and  the  relation 
between  the  two  is  the  Consequence.  Now,  the  mind  can  think 
two  notions  under  the  formal  relation  of  consequence,  only  in  one 
or  other  of  two  modes.  Either  the  determining  notion  must  he 
conceived  as  a ivhole , containing  (under  it),  and  therefore  neces- 
sitating, the  determined  notion,  conceived  as  its  contained  part 
or  parts ; — or  the  determining  notion  must  he  conceived  as  the 
parts  constituting , and,  therefore,  necessitating  the  determined 
notion,  conceived  as  their  constituted  whole.  Considered,  indeed, 
absolutely  and  in  themselves,  the  ivhole  and  all  the  parts  are 
identical.  Relatively , however , to  us,  they  are  not ; for  in  the 
order  of  thought  (and  logic  is  only  conversant  with  the  laws  of 
thought),  the  whole  may  he  conceived  first,  and  then  by  mental 
analysis  separated  into  its  parts ; or  the  parts  may  he  conceived 
first,  and  then  by  mental  synthesis  collected  into  a whole.  Log- 
ical inference  is  thus  of  two  and  only  of  two,  kinds : — it  must 
proceed,  either  from  the  ivhole  to  the  parts,  or  from  the  parts  to 
the  whole  ; and  it  is  only  under  the  character  of  a constituted  or 
containing  whole,  or  of  a constituting  or  contained  part,  that  any 
thing  can  become  the  term  of  a logical  argumentation. 

Before  proceeding,  we  must,  however,  allude  to  the  nature  of 
the  ivhole  and  part,  about  which  logic  is  conversant.  These  are 


1 [What  follows,  on  the  logical  doctrine  of  Induction,  is,  as  it  has  generally  been 
admitted  to  be,  I am  convinced,  true.  I would,  however,  now  evolve  it  in  somewhat 
different  language.  Compare  among  others  : — Woolley's  Logic  (p.  120,  sq.) ; Hansel's 
Aldrich  (App.  p.  50,  sg.)] 

2 See  p.  139,  note  (*). 

3 [The  logical  relation  of  Reason  and  Consequent,  as  more  than  a mere  corollary  of 
the  law  of  Non-contradiction,  in  its  three  phases,  is,  I am  confident  of  proving,  errone- 
ous.] 


160 


LOGIC. 


not  real  or  essential  existences,  but  creations  of  the  mind  itself, 
in  secondary  operation  on  the  primary  objects  of  its  knowledge. 
Things  may  be  conceived  the  same,  inasmuch  as  they  are  con- 
ceived the  subjects  of  the  same  attribute , or  collection  of  attri- 
butes (i.  e.  of  the  same  nature) : — inasmuch  as  they  are  conceived 
the  same,  they  must  be  conceived  as  the  parts  constituent  of,  and 
contained  under  a whole : — and  as  they  are  conceived  the  same, 
only  as  they  are  conceived  to  be  the  subjects  of  the  same  nature, 
this  common  nature  must  be  convertible  with  that  ivhole.  A logi- 
cal or  universal  whole  is  called  a genus  when  its  parts  are  thought 
as  also  containing  wholes  or  species  ; a species  when  its  parts  are 
thought  as  only  contained  parts  or  individuals.  Genus  and  species 
are  each  called  a class.  Except  the  highest  and  the  lowest,  the 
same  class  may  thus  be  thought,  either  as  a genus,  or  as  a species. 

Such  being  the  nature  and  relations  of  a logical  whole  and 
parts,  it  is  manifest  what  must  be  the  conditions  under  which  the 
two  kinds  of  logical  inference  are  possible.  The  one  of  these,  the 
process  from  the  whole  to  the  parts,  is  Deductive  reasoning  (or 
Syllogism  proper) ; the  other,  the  process  from  the  parts  to  the 
whole,  is  Inductive  reasoning.  The  former  is  governed  by  the 
rule  : What  belongs  (or  does  not  belong)  to  the  containing  whole, 
belongs  (or  does  not  belong)  to  each  and  all  of  the  contained 
parts.  The  latter  by  the  rule : — What  belongs  (or  does  not  belong) 
to  all  the  constituent  parts  (belongs  or  does  not  belong)  to  the 
constituted  ivhole.  These  rules  exclusively  determine  all  formal 
inference ; whatever  transcends  or  violates  them,  transcends  or 
violates  logic.  Both  are  equally  absolute.  It  would  be  not  less 
illegal,  to  infer  by  the  Deductive  syllogism  an  attribute,  belong- 
ing to  the  whole,  of  something  it  was  not  conceived  to  contain  as 
a part ; than  by  the  Inductive,  to  conclude  of  the  whole,  what  is 
not  conceived  as  a predicate  of  all  its  constituent  parts.  In  either 
case,  the  consequent  is  not  thought,  as  determined  by  the  antece- 
dent ; — the  premises  do  not  involve  the  conclusion. 

The  Deductive  and  Inductive  processes  are  elements  of  logic 
equally  essential.  Each  requires  the  other.  The  former  is  only 
possible  through  the  latter ; and  the  latter  is  only  valuable  as 
realizing  the  possibility  of  the  former.  As  our  knowledge  com- 
mences with  the  apprehension  of  singulars,  every  class  or  uni- 
versal whole  is  consequently  only  a knowledge  at  second-hand. 
Deductive  reasoning  is  thus  not  an  original  and  independent  pro- 
cess. The  universal  major  proposition,  out  of  which  it  develops 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


161 


the  conclusion,  is  itself  necessarily  the  conclusion  of  a foregone 
Induction,  and,  mediately  or  immediately,  an  inference — a col- 
lection, from  individual  objects  of  perception,  or  self-conscious- 
ness. Logic,  therefore,  as  a definite  and  self-sufficient  science, 
must  equally  vindicate  the  formal  purity  of  the  synthetic  illation, 
by  which  it  ascends  to  its  wholes,  as  of  the  analytic  illation,  by 
which  it  re-descends  to  their  parts.  (See  Note  (:)  p.  171). 

Not  only  is  the  Deductive,  thus,  in  a general  way,  dependent 
for  its  possibility  on  the  Inductive,  syllogism ; the  former  is,  what 
has  not  been  observed — in  principle  and  detail — in  whole  and  in 
part — in  end  and  in  means — in  perfection  and  imperfection,  pre- 
cisely a counterpart  or  inversion  of  the  latter.  The  attempts  that 
have  been  made  by  almost  every  logician,  except  {perhaps  ?)  Aris- 
totle,1 to  assimilate  and  even  identify  the  two  processes,  by  reduc- 
ing the  Inductive  syllogism  to  the  schematic  proprieties  of  the 
Deductive — proceeding  as  they  do  on  a total  misconception  of 
their  analogy  and  differences,  have  contributed  to  involve  the 
doctrine  of  Logical  Induction  in  a cloud  of  error  and  confusion. 
The  Inductive  inference  is  equally  independent,  and,  though  far 
less  complex,  equally  worthy  of  analysis  as  the  Deductive ; it  is 
governed  by  its  own  laws  ; and,  if  judged  aright,  must  be  esti- 
mated by  its  own  standard.  The  correlation  of  the  two  processes 
is  best  exemplified  by  employing  the  same  symbols  in  our  ascent 
through  an  Inductive,  and  our  re-descent  through  a Deductive 
syllogism. 


1 [I  said  perhaps,  for  Aristotle  in  his  doctrine  of  Induction,  in  fact,  implicitly  con- 
tradicts himself.  In  his  development  of  the  inductive  process,  he  is  compelled  to  re- 
cognize, though  he  was  not  prepared  to  signalize,  the  universal  quantification  of  the 
predicate  in  affirmative  propositions ; a quantification  which  he  elsewhere,  once  and 
again,  explicitly  condemns,  as,  in  all  cases,  absurd.  It  was  the  detection  of  this  his 
inconsistency,  which  first  led  me  to  the  conviction,  that  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative 
proposition  may,  formally,  or  by  the  laws  of  thought,  be  universal;  and  from  thence, 
again,  to  the  conviction  (after  this  article  was  written),  that  the  predicate  in  proposi- 
tions, both  affirmative  and  negative,  should  be  unexclusively  quantified  in  logical  lan- 
guage, as  it  is  in  logical  thought. 

Here  M.  Peisse  has  the  following  note  : “This  ‘ perhaps'  is  very  right,  for  it  is  by 
no  means  certain  that  Aristotle  gave  to  the  Inductive  syllogism  a form  absolutely  in- 
dependent. It  is  even  more  probable  that  he  assimilated  it  to  the  Deductive,  since  he 
appears  to  prescribe  a conversion  of  the  minor  premise,  in  order  to  legitimate  the  uni- 
versal conclusion  (An.  Pr.  II.  23,  § 4.);  this  in  effect  is  to  transform  it  into  a syllo- 
gism of  the  first  figure  (in  Barbara).  It  is  even  this  passage  which  may  have  seduced 
subsequent  logicians,  admitting  as  it  does,  however,  of  a different  interpretation.” 
Aristotle,  in  expressing  the  extremes  vaguely,  as  “ the  one ” and  “ the  other,"  is  more 
accurate  than  the  logicians,  who  astrict  the  reciprocating  proposition  to  the  minor  pre- 
mise. For  his  example  is  only  of  a single  case.  On  the  doctrine,  indeed,  of  a quan- 
tified predicate,  the  reciprocation  may  be,  in  either  premise,  or  in  both.) 

L 


1 62 


LOGIC 


Inductive. 
x,  y,  z are  A ; 
x,  y,  z are  (whole)  B : 


Deductive. 

B is  A ; 

x,  y,  z are  (under)  B ; 


Therefore,  B is  A. 


Therefore,  A contains  B. 


A contains  x,  y,  z ; 
x,  y,  z constitute  B ; 


or 


Therefore,  x,  y,  z are  A. 

or 

A contains  B ; 

B contains  x,  y,  z ; 
Therefore,  A contains  x,  y,  z. 


These  two  syllogisms  exhibit,  each  in  its  kind,  the  one  natural 
and  perfect  figure.  This  will  be  at  once  admitted  of  the  Deduc- 
tive, which  is  in  the  first.  But  the  Inductive,  estimated,  as  it  has 
always  been,  by  the  standard  of  the  Deductive,  will  appear  a 
monster.  It  appears,  on  that  standard,  only  in  the  third  figure 
and  then,  contrary  to  the  rule  of  that  figure  it  has  an  universal 
conclusion.1 2  ( Analyt . Pr.  i.  22,  $ 8).  But  when  we  look  less  par- 
tially and  more  profoundly  into  the  matter,  our  conclusion  will  be 
very  different. 

1 We  say — Induction  appears  a syllogism  of  the  third  figure,  because,  though  so 
held  by  logicians,  it  is  not.  [?  ] The  mistake  arose  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  copula  or 
substantive  verb,  which  in  different  relations  expresses  either  “ are  contained  under," 
or  “ constitute."  Thus,  taking  Aristotle’s  example  : 

Man,  horse,  mule,  are  long-lived  ; 

Man,  horse,  mule,  are  the  whole  class  of  animals  wanting  bile ; 

Therefore,  the  whole  class  of  animals  wanting  bile  are  long-lived. 

Now  here  it  is  evident  that  the  subject  stands  in  a very  different  relation  to  its  predi- 
cate in  the  major  and  minor  premise  ; though  in  both  cases  the  connection  is  expressed 
by  the  same  copula.  In  the  former,  the  “are”  expresses  that  the  predicate  determines 
the  subject  as  a contained  part ; in  the  latter,  that  the  subject  determines  the  predicate  by 
constituting  it  a whole.  Explicitly  thus  : 

Long-lived — contains — Man,  horse,  mule  ; 

Man,  horse,  mule — constitute — Animal  wanting  bile  ; 

Therefore,  Long-lived — contains — Animal  wanting  bile. 

That  the  logicians  have  neglected  to  analyze  the  Inductive  inference  as  an  independ- 
ent process,  and  attempted  to  reduce  it  to  the  conditions  of  the  Deductive  ; is  the  cause 
or  the  effect  of  a primary  deficiency  in  their  technical  language.  They  have  no  word 
to  express  the  synthesis  of  a logical  whole.  The  word  constitute,  &c.,  which  we  have, 
from  necessity,  employed  in  this  sense,  belongs  properly  to  the  relations  of  an  Essen- 
tial (Physical  or  Metaphysical)  whole,  and  parts.  [I  would  now  express  this  somewhat 
differently  ; though  not  varying  in  the  doctrine  itself.] 

2 [It  will  be  seen  from  the  tenor  of  the  text,  that  by  the  year  1833,  I had  become 
aware  of  the  error  in  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  and  the  logicians,  which  maintains  that 
the  predicate  in  affirmative  propositions  could  only  be  formally  quantified  as  particular ; 
nay,  that  Aristotle,  by  his  practice  in  the  inductive  syllogism,  virtually  contradicts  the 
speculative  precept  which  he,  over  and  over,  expressly  enounces  for  syllogism  in  gen- 
eral. It  was  not,  however,  for  several  years  thereafter,  that  I made  the  second  step  ; 
by  admitting  in  negative  propositions  a particular  predicate.  The  doctrine  of  a thorough- 
going quantification  of  the  predicate,  with  its  results,  I have,  however,  publicly  taught 
since  the  year  1840,  at  the  latest.  How  this  doctrine,  when  applied,  at  once  simplifies 
and  amplifies  the  logic  of  propositions  and  of  syllogisms,  it  is  not  here  requisite  to  state. 
(But  see  Appendix  II.)  I would  only  remark,  in  reference  to  certain  recent  misappre- 
hensions, that  my  doctrine  has,  and  could  have,  no  novelty  from  a mere  recognition, 
as  possible,  of  the  eight  propositional  forms — four  affirmative  and  four  negative ; — forms, 
which  I thus  name  and  number  : 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


163 


In  the  first  place,  we  find  that  the  two  syllogisms  present  so 
systematic  a relation  of  contrast  and  similarity,  that,  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  one  being  admitted,  we  are  analogically  led  to  presume 
the  perfection  of  the  other.  In  the  propositions,  the  order  of  the 


i.  Toto-total  . 

ii.  Toto-partial  . 

iii.  Parti-total  . 

iv.  Parti-partial  . 


Affirmative. 
All— is  all  — . 
All — is  some  — 
Some — is  all  — 
Some — is  some  ■ 


Negative. 

Any — is  not  any — 
Any — is  not  some — . 
Some — is  not  any — . 
Some — is  not  some — 


Every  system  of  logic  necessarily  contemplated  all  these  ; for  of  these  every  system 
of  the  science  expressly  allowed  some,  and  expressly  disallowed  the  others.  By  Aris- 
totle and  logicians  in  general,  of  the  Affirmative  the  even,  of  the  Negative  the  odd , 
numbers  are  declared  admissible,  while  the  others  are  overtly  rejected  : — formally,  at 
least,  and  of  necessity  ; for  though  a universal  quantification  of  the  predicate  in  affirm- 
atives has  been  frequently  recognized,  this  was  by  logicians  recognized  (if  not  ignor- 
antly), as  vi  materia,  contingently,  and  therefore  extralogically ; nor  am  I aware  of  any 
previous  attempt  to  prove,  that,  formally  or  by  the  laws  of  thought,  even  this  proposi- 
tion had  a right  to  claim  its  place  in  logic.  It  is  not,  therefore,  on  a mere  enumeration 
of  the  eight  propositional  forms — far  less  is  it  on  an  ignorance  of  the  ordinary  objection 
by  logicians — on  a mistake  of  the  meaning  of  the  forms  themselves — and  on  a blindness 
to  the  results  of  a thoroughgoing  quantification  of  the  predicate,  that  I would  found 
any  claim  of  novelty  to  my  New  Analytic.  Yet  on  this  ground  it  has  been  actually 
contested  ! — In  general,  I may  say,  that  aware  of  many  partial  manifestations  of  dis- 
content with  the  common  doctrine,  I know  of  no  attempt  to  evince  that  the  doctrine 
itself  is  radically  wrong.  Various  of  these  manifestations  are  recorded  by  Mr.  Baynes 
in  his  excellent  “ Essay  on  the  new  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms.” 

The  thoroughgoing  quantification  of  the  predicate,  in  its  appliances  to  negative  pro- 
positions, has  been  demurred  to  by  logicians  well  entitled  to  respect,  who  do  not  gain- 
say it  in  the  case  of  affirmatives.  But  not  only  is  this  application  allowable,  not  only 
is  it  systematic,  not  only  is  it  useful — it  is  even  necessary. — For,  to  speak  even  of 
its  very  weakest  form,  that  of  parti-partial  negation,  “ Some — is  not  some — ” ; this  (to 
say  nothing  of  its  other  uses)  is  the  form,  and  the  only  form,  which  we  naturally  em- 
ploy in  dividing  a whole  of  any  kind  into  parts : — “ Some  A is  not  some  A.”  And  is 
this  form  (that  too  inconsistently)  to  be  excluded  from  logic — exempted  from  demand  1 
— But,  again,  to  prove  both  the  obnoxious  propositions  summarily,  and  at  once  what 
objection,  apart  from  the  arbitrary  laws  of  our  present  logics,  can  be  taken  to  the  fol- 
lowing syllogism  1 — 

“ All  man  is  some  animal ; 

Any  man  is  not  (no  man  is)  some  animal ; 

Therefore,  some  animal  is  not  some  animal.'’’ 


Vary  this  syllogism  of  the  third,  to  any  other  figure  ; it  will  always  be  legitimate  by 
nature,  if  illegitimate  to  unnatural  art.  Taking  it,  however,  as  it  is  : — The  negative 
minor,  with  its  particular  predicate,  offends  logical  prejudice.  But  it  is  a propositional 
form,  irrecusable,  both  as  true  in  itself,  and  as  necessary  in  practice. — Its  converse, 
again,  is  even  technically  allowed;  and  no  proposition  can  possibly  be  right,  if  its 
converse  is  possibly  wrong.  For,  to  say,  (as  has  been  said,  indeed,  from  Aristotle 
downward),  that  a parti-total  negative  proposition  is  inconvertible  ; this  is  merely  to 
confess,  that  the  rules  of  the  logicians  are  inadequate  to  the  truth  of  logic  and  the 
realities  of  nature.  In  fact,  it  is  to  supply  this  very  inadequacy,  that  the  doctrine  of 
a thoroughgoing  quantification  of  the  predicate  is,  perhaps,  mainly  required.  A toto- 
partial  negative  can  not,  therefore,  be  scientifically  refused.' — But  if  the  premises  of 
a syllogism  be  correct,  its  conclusion  must  be  obligatory.  This  conclusion,  however, 
is  a parti-partial  negative  : 

“ Some  animal  (say,  rational)  is  not  some  animal  (say.  irrational).” 


164 


LOGIC. 


terms  remains  unchanged : but  the  order  of  the  propositions 
themselves  is  reversed  ; the  conclusion  of  the  one  syllogism  form- 
ing the  major  premise  of  the  other.  Of  the  terms  the  major  is 
common  to  both  ; but  (as  noticed  by  Aristotle)  the  middle  term 
of  the  one  is  the  minor  of  the  other.  In  the  common  minor  pre- 
mise, the  terms,  though  identical,  have,  with  the  different  nature 
of  the  process,  changed  their  relation  in  thought.  In  the  Induct- 
ive, the  parts  being  conceived  as  constituting  the  whole,  are  the 
determining  notion ; whereas,  in  the  Deductive,  the  parts  being 
conceived  as  contained  under  the  whole,  are  the  determined. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  however  apparently  dissimilar  in 
figure  and  proportion  may  be  the  two  syllogisms  on  this  partial 
standard,  it  will  be  found,  if  we  ascend  to  a higher,  that  a com- 
mon general  principle  regulates  a similar,  nay,  a one  exclusive 
perfection  in  each.  The  perfection  of  figure  in  all  syllogisms  is 
this : — That  the  middle  term  should  be  the  determined  notion  in 
the  proposition , the  determining  notion  in  the  assumption. — This 
condition  is  realized  in  the  first  figure  of  the  Deductive  syllogism. 
There  the  middle  term  is  the  subject  (contained,  determined  no- 
tion) in  the  proposition  or  major  premise  ; and  the  predicate  (con- 
taining, determining  notion)  in  the  minor  premise  or  assumption. 
— In  like  manner,  in  our  Inductive  syllogism,  the  middle  term 
is  the  subject  (contained,  determined  notion)  of  the  proposition, 
and  the  constituent  (determining  notion)  of  the  assumption. 
Thus,  not  only  are  the  Inductive  and  Deductive  syllogisms,  in  a 
general  sense,  reversed  processes  ; the  perfect  figure  of  the  one  is 
the  exact  evolution  or  involution  of  the  perfect  figure  of  the  other. 
— The  same  analogy  holds  with  their  imperfections.  Taking,  for 
example,  what  logicians  have  in  general  given  as  the  perfected 
figure,  but  which  is,  in  fact,  an  unnatural  perversion  of  the  In- 
ductive syllogism  (i.  e.  its  reduction  to  the  first  figure,  by  con- 
verting the  terms  of  the  minor  premise),  we  shall  find,  that  its 
reversal  into  a Deductive  syllogism  affords,  as  we  should  have 
anticipated,  only  a kindred  imperfection  (in  the  third  figure). 


A parti-partial  negative  is  thus  a proposition,  not  only  logically  valid,  but  logically 
indispensable. 

Nothing,  it  may  be  observed,  is  more  easy  than  to  misapply  a form  ; nothing  is  more 
easy  than  to  employ  a weaker,  when  we  are  entitled  to  employ  a stronger  proposition. 
But  from  the  special  and  factitious  absurdity,  thus  emerging,  to  infer  the  general  and 
natural  absurdity  of  a propositional  form — -this,  certainly,  is  not  a logical  procedure. 
— (In  part,  coincident  with  what  I have  elsewhere,  and  that  this  very  day,  been  obliged 
•o  state. — See  p.  626.)] 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


165 


Inductive. 
x,  y,  z are  A ; 
B is  x,  y,  z ; 


Deductive. 

B is  A ; 

B is  x,  y,  z ; 


Therefore,  B is  A. 


Therefore,  x,  y,  z are  A. 
or 

A contains  B ; 
x,  y,  z contain  B ; 
Therefore,  A contains  x,  y,  z. 


or 

A contains  x,  y,  z ; 
x,  y,  z contain  B ; 


Therefore,  A contains  B. 


We  call  this  reduction  of  the  Inductive  syllogism  an  unnatural 
perversion  ; because,  in  the  converted  minor  premise,  the  consti- 
tuent parts  are  perverted  into  a containing  whole,  and  the  con- 
taining whole  into  a subject,  contained  under  its  constituent 
parts. 

After  these  hints  of  what  we  deem  the  true  nature  of  logical 
Induction,  we  return  to  Dr.  Whately ; whose  account  of  this  pro- 
cess is  given  principally  in  the  two  following  passages. 

The  first : — “Logic  takes  no  cognizance  of  Induction , for  instance,  or 
of  a priori  reasoning,  &c.,  as  distinct  forms  of  argument ; for  when  thrown 
into  the  syllogistic  form,  and  when  letters  of  the  alphabet  are  substituted 
for  the  terms  (and  it  is  thus  that  an  argument  is  properly  to  be  brought 
under  the  cognizance  of  logic),  there  is  no  distinction  between  them : — 
e.  g.  a 1 Property  which  belongs  to  the  ox,  sheep,  deer,  goat,  and  antelope, 
belongs  to  all  horned  animals ; rumination  belongs  to  these  ; therefore  to 
all.’  This  which  is  an  inductive  argument,  is  evidently  a syllogism  in 
Barbara.  The  essence  of  an  inductive  argument  (and  so  of  the  other 
kinds  which  are  distinguished  from  it)  consists  not  in  the  form  of  the  ar- 
gument, but  in  the  relation  which  the  subject-matter  of  the  premises  hears 
to  that  of  the  conclusion.”  (P.  110.) — The  second : — “ In  the  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  we  deduce,  from  our  observation  of  certain  known 
cases,  an  inference  with  respect  to  unknown  ones,  we  are  employing  a 
syllogism  in  Barbara  with  the  major  premise  suppressed  ; that  being  al- 
ways substantially  the  same,  as  it  asserts,  that,  ‘ what  belongs  to  the  indi- 
vidual or  individuals  we  have  examined,  belongs  to  the  whole  class  under 
which  they  come.’  ” (P.  216.) 

This  agrees,  neither  with  the  Aristotelic  doctrine,  nor  with 
truth. 

We  must  presume,  from  his  silence,  that  our  author,  in  his 
analysis  of  the  inductive  process,  was  not  aware  of  any  essential 
deviation  from  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle.  This  he  does  not  seem 
to  have  studied,  either  in  the  Organon,  or  in  any  of  its  authentic 
expositors  ; and  nothing  can  he  conceived  more  contradictory, 
than  the  statements  of  the  philosopher  on  this  subject  and  those 
of  Dr.  Whately. — Aristotle  views  the  Inductive  and  the  Deduct- 
ive syllogisms  as,  in  certain  respects,  similar  in  form ; in  others, 
as  diametrically  opposed.  Dr.  Whately  regards  them  as  formally 
identical , and  only  discriminated  by  a materal  difference,  i.  e. 


166 


LOGIC. 


logically  considered,  by  no  difference  at  all. — Aristotle  regards  the 
Deductive  syllogism  as  the  analysis  of  a logical  whole  into  its 
parts — as  a descent  from  the  (more)  general  to  the  (more)  parti- 
cular ; the  Inductive  as  a synthesis  of  logical  parts  into  a logi- 
cal whole — as  an  ascent  from  the  (more)  particular  to  the 
(more)  general.  Dr.  Whately,  on  the  other  hand,  virtually  anni- 
hilates the  latter  process,  and  identifies  the  Inductive  with  the 
Deductive  inference. — Aristotle  makes  Deduction  necessarily  de- 
pendent on  Induction ; he  maintains  that  the  highest  or  most 
universal  axioms  which  constitute  the  primary  and  immediate 
propositions  of  the  former,  are  all  conclusions  previously  furnished 
by  the  latter.  Whately,  on  the  contrary,  implicitly  asserts  the 
independence  of  the  syllogism  proper,  as  he  considers  the  conclu- 
sions of  Induction  to  be  only  inferences  evolved  from  a more  uni- 
versal major. — Aristotle  recognizes  only  a perfect  Induction,  i.  e. 
an  enumeration  (actual  or  presumed)  of  all  the  parts ; Whately 
only  an  imperfect,  i.  e.  an  enumeration  professedly  only  of  some. 
— To  Aristotle,  Induction  is  a syllogism,  apparently , of  the  third 
figure;  to  Whately  a syllogism  of  the  first. — If  Whately  be 
right,  Aristotle  is  fundamentally  wrong;  wrong  in  admitting 
Inductive  reasoning  within  the  sphere  of  logic  at  all;  wrong  in 
discriminating  Induction  from  Syllogism  proper ; wrong  in  all  the 
particulars  of  the  contrast. 

But  that  the  Philosopher  is  not  in  error  is  evident  at  once ; 
whereas  the  Archbishop’s  doctrine  is  palpably  suicidal.  On  that 
doctrine,  the  Inductive  reasoning  is  “a  syllogism  in  Barbara, 
the  major  premiss  being  always  substantially  the  same: — What 
belongs  to  the  individucd  or  individuals  we  have  examined,  be- 
longs to  the  ivhole  class  under  which  they  come.” 

Now,  we  ask  : — In  what  manner  do  we  obtain  this  major,  in 
the  evolution  of  which  all  Induction  consists?  Here  there  are 
only  four  possible  answers. — 1°,  This  proposition  (like  the  dictum 
de  omni  et  de  nullo,  and  the  axiom  of  the  convertibility  of  the 
whole  and  its  parts),  it  may  be  said  is  (analytically)  self-evident, 
its  negation  implying  a contradiction.  This  answer  is  manifestly 
false.  For  so  far  from  being  necessitated  by  the  laws  of  thought, 
it  is  in  opposition  to  them  ; the  ivhole  of  the  consequent  not  being 
determined  in  thought  by  the  some  of  the  antecedent. — 2°,  It  may 
be  said,  to  be  acquired  by  Induction.  This,  however,  would  be 
absurd  ; inasmuch  as  Induction  itself  is,  ex  hypothesi,  only  pos- 
sible, through  and  after  the  principle  it  is  thus  adduced  to  con- 


INDUCTIVE  SYLLOGISM. 


167 


struct.  This  of  the  proposition  as  a whole.  The  same  is  also 
true  of  its  parts.  “ Class ” is  a notion,  itself  the  result  of  an  In- 
duction ; it  can  not,  therefore,  be  postulated  as  a pre-requisite  or 
element  of  that  process  itself.  A similar  remark  applies  to  u pro- 
perty C — 3°,  It  may  he  said  to  he  deduced  from  a higher  axiom. 
What  then  is  such  axiom  ? That  has  not  been  declared.  And 
if  such  existed,  the  same  questions  would  remain  to  be  answered 
regarding  the  higher  proposition  which  are  now  required  in  rela- 
tion to  the  lower. — 4°,  It  may  he  asserted  to  be  (as  Kant  would 
say,  synthetically)  given  as  an  ultimate  principle  of  our  intellec- 
tual constitution.  This  will  not  do.  In  the  first  place,  if  such 
principle  exist,  it  only  inclines,  it  does  not  necessitate.  In  the 
second , by  appealing  to  it,  we  should  transcend  our  science,  con- 
found the  logical  and  formal  with  the  metaphysical  and  material. 
In  the  third,  we  should  thus  attempt  to  prove  a logical  law  from 
a psychological  observation ; i.  e.  establish  an  a priori , a neces- 
sary science  on  a precarious  experience — an  experience  admitted 
perhaps  by  the  disciples  of  Reid  and  Royer- Collard,  but  scouted 
by  those  of  Gassendi  and  Locke.1 

Logicians,  we  already  observed,  have  been  guilty  of  a funda- 
mental error  in  bringing  the  distinction  of  perfect  and  of  imper- 
fect Induction  within  the  sphere  of  their  science,  as  this  distinc- 
tion proceeds  on  a material,  consequently  on  an  extralogical,  dif- 
ference. In  this  error,  however,  Dr.  Whately  exceeds  all  other 
logicians,  recognizing,  as  he  does,  exclusively,  that  Induction, 
which  is  only  precariously  valid,  and  valid  only  through  an  ex- 
tralogical presumption.  This  common  major  premise,  if  stated 
as  necessary,  is  (formally  and  materially)  false  ; if  stated  as  prob- 
able, it  is  (formally)  illegitimate,  even  if  not  (materially)  untrue, 
both  because  an  inferior  degree  of  certainty  is  incompatible  with 
an  apodictic  science,  and  because  the  amount  of  certainty  itself 
must,  if  not  capriciously  assumed,  be  borrowed  from  evidence  de- 
pendent on  material  conditions  beyond  the  purview  of  a formal 
science. 

Dr.  Whately  is  not  less  unfortunate  in  refuting  the  opinions 
of  other  logicians  touching  Induction,  than  in  establishing  his  own. 


1 “ It  is  by  induction  that  all  axioms  are  known,  such  as  : — ‘ Things  that  are  equal 
to  the  same  are  equal  to  one  another ‘ A whole  is  greater  than  its  parts and  all  other 
mathematical  axioms.”  Huyshe,  p.  132.  The  same  doctrine  is  held  by  Hill,  p.  176. 
— Is  such  the  Oxford  Metaphysic  1 [This  doctrine,  the  ingenious  author  of  “The 
Regeneration  of  Metaphysics”  (pp.  81,  104),  charges  also  on  Dr.  Whately.] 


168 


LOGIC. 


“ In  this  process,”  he  says,  “ we  are  employing  a syllogism  in  Barbara 
with  the  major  premiss  suppressed  ; not  the  minor,  as  Aldrich  represents 
it.  The  instance  he  gives  will  sufficiently  prove  this  : — 1 This  and  that, 
and  the  other  magnet,  attract  iron  ; therefore  so  do  all.’  If  this  were,  as 
he  asserts,  an  enthymeme  whose  minor  is  suppressed,  the  only  premise 
which  we  could  supply  to  fill  it  up  would  be,  ‘ all  magnets  are  this,  that, 
and  the  other  which  is  manifestly  false.”  (P.  217.) 

Aldrich  has  faults  sufficient  of  his  own,  without  taking  burden 
of  the  sins  of  others.  He  is  here  singly  reprehended  for  saying- 
only  what,  his  critic  seems  not  aware,  had  been  said  by  all  logi- 
cians before  him.  The  suppressed  minor  premise  even  obtained 
in  the  schools  the  name  of  the  Constantia ; and  it  was  not  until 
the  time  of  Wolf1  that  a new-fangled  doctrine,  in  this  respect  the 
same  as  Whately’s,  in  some  degree  superseded  the  older  and  cor- 
rector theory.  “ In  the  example  of  Aldrich,”  says  our  author, 
“the  supressed  minor  premiss,  ‘all  magnets  are  this,  that,  and 
the  other,’  is  manifestly  false.”  Why? — Is  it  because  the  propo- 
sition affirms  that  a certain  three  magnets  (“this,  that,  and  the 
other”)  are  all  magnets  ? Even  admitting  this,  the  objection  is 
null.  The  logician  has  a perfect  right  to  suppose  this  or  any 
other  material  falsity  for  an  example  ; all  that  is  required  of  him 
is,  that  his  syllogism  should  be  formally  correct.  Logic  only 
proves  on  the  hypothetical  truth  of  its  antecedents.  As  Magen- 
tinus  notices,  Aristotle’s  example  of  Induction  is  physiologically 
false ; but  it  is  not  on  that  account  a whit  the  worse  as  a dialec- 
tical illustration.  The  objection  is  wholly  extralogical. — But  this 
is  not,  in  fact,  the  meaning  of  the  proposition.  The  words  (in  the 
original  “hie,  et  ille,  et  iste  magnes”)  are  intended  to  denote 
every  several  magnet.  Aldrich  borrows  the  instance  from  San- 
derson, by  whom  it  is  also  more  fully  expressed  : — “ Iste  magnes 
trahit  ferrum,  et  ille,  et  hie,  et  pariter  se  hahet  in  reliquis ,”  &c. 
— Perhaps,  however,  and  this  is  the  only  other  alternative,  Dr. 
Whately  thinks  the  assumption  “ manifestly  false,”  on  the  ground 
that  no  extent  of  observation  could  possibly  be  commensurate 
with  “all  magnets.”  This  objection  likewise  lies  beyond  the 
domain  of  science.  The  logician,  qua  logician,  knows  nothing 
of  material  possibility  and  impossibility.  To  him  all  is  possible 


[*  I said  generally  “ the  time  of  Wolf;"  for  I recollected  that  some  German  logicians 
prior  to  him,  had  held  the  same  doctrine.  It  was  however  Wolf’s  authority  which 
rendered  the  innovation  general. — M.  Peisse  has  here  the  following  note  : “ The 
germ  of  this  doctrine  is  to  be  found  in  Gassendi.  (Inst.  Log.  Pars  iii.  canon  11. 
Opera,  i.  113.”)] 


INDUCTIVE  PROCESS. 


169 


that  does  not  involve  a contradiction  in  terms.  At  the  same  time, 
the  present  is  merely  the  logical  manner  of  wording  the  proposi- 
tion. The  physical  observer  asserts  on  the  analogy  of  his  science 
“This,  that,  the  other  magnet,  &c.,  represent,  all  magnets;” 
which  the  logician  accepting,  brings  under  the  conditions,  and 
translates  into  the  language  of  his — “ This,  that,  the  other  mag- 
net, &c.,  are  all  magnets,”  i.e.  are  conceived  as  constituting  the 
whole — Magnet. 

Dr.  Whately’s  errors  relative  to  Induction  are,  however,  sur- 
passed by  those  of  another  able  writer,  Mr.  Hampden,  in  regard 
both  to  that  process  itself,  and  to  the  Aristotelic  exposition  of  its 
nature  ; — errors  the  more  inconceivable,  as  he  professes  to  have 
devoted  peculiar  attention  to  the  subject,  which,  he  says,  “ de- 
serves a more  peculiar  notice,  as  throwing  light  on  Aristotle’s 
whole  method  of  philosophizing,  while  it  shows  how  far  he  ap- 
proximated to  the  induction  of  modern  philosophy.”  His  words 
are : 

“ To  obtain  an  accurate  notion  of  the  being  of  any  thing,  we  require  a 
definition  of  it.  A definition  of  the  thing  corresponds,  in  dialectic,  with  the 
essential  notion  of  it  in  metaphysics.  This  abstract  notion,  then,  accord- 
ing to  Aristotle,  constituting  the  true  scientific  view  of  a thing — and  all 
the  real  knowledge  consequently  of  the  properties  of  the  thing  depending 
on  the  right  limitation  of  this  notion — some  exact  method  of  arriving  at 
definitions  which  would  express  these  limitations,  and  serve  as  the  princi- 
ples of  sciences,  became  indispensable  in  such  a system  of  philosophy.  But 
in  order  to  attain  such  definitions,  a process  of  induction  was  required — not 
merely  an  induction  of  that  kind,  which  is  only  a peculiar  form  of  syllo- 
gism, enumerating  all  the  individuals  implied  in  a class  instead  of  the 
whole  class  collectively,  but  an  induction  of  a philosophical  character,  and 
only  differing  from  the  induction  of  modern  philosophy  so  far  as  it  is  em- 
ployed about  language.  We  shall  endeavor  to  show  this  more  fully.  There 
are,  then,  two  kinds  of  induction  treated  of  by  Aristotle.  The  first,  that 
of  simple  enumeration.” — (After  explaining  with  ordinary  accuracy  the 
first,  in  fact  the  only,  species  of  induction  he  proceeds  :) — “ But  there  is 
also  a higher  kind  of  induction  employed  by  Aristotle,  and  pointed  out  by 
him  expressly  in  its  subserviency  to  the  exact  notions  of  things,  by  its 
leading  to  the  right  definitions  of  them  in  words.  As  it  appears  that 
words,  in  a dialectical  point  of  view,  are  classes  more  or  less  comprehen- 
sive of  observations  on  things,  it  is  evident  that  rve  must  gradually  ap- 
proximate toward  a definition  of  any  individual  notion,  by  assigning  class 
within  class,  until  we  have  narrowed  the  extent  of  the  expression  as  far  as 
language  will  admit.  ( Analyt . Post.  ii.  c.  13,  § 21.)  The  first  definitions 
of  any  object  are  vague,  founded  on  some  obvious  resemblance  which  it 
exhibits  compared  with  other  objects.  This  point  of  resemblance  we  ab- 
stract in  thought,  and  it  becomes,  when  expressed  in  language,  a genus  or 
class,  under  which  we  regard  the  object  as  included.  A more  attentive 
examination  suggests  to  us  less  obvious  points  of  resemblance  between 


170 


LOGIC. 


this  object  and  some  of  those  with  which  he  had  classed  it  before.  Thus 
carrying  on  the  analysis — and  by  the  power  of  abstraction  giving  an  in- 
dependent existence  to  those  successive  points  of  resemblance — we  obtain 
subaltern  genera  or  species,  or  subordinate  classes  included  in  that  original 
class  with  which  the  process  of  abstraction  commenced.  As  these  several 
classifications  are  relative  to  each  other,  and  dependent  on  the  class  with 
which  we  first  commenced,  the  definition  of  any  notion  requires  a successive 
enumeration  of  the  several  classes  in  the  line  of  abstraction,  and  hence  is 
said  technically  to  consist  of  genus  and  differentia ; the  genus  being  the 
subordinate  classes  in  the  same  line  of  abstraction.  Now,  the  process  by 
which  we  discover  these  successive  genera,  is  strictly  one  of  philosophical 
induction.  As  in  the  philosophy  of  nature  in  general,  we  take  certain 
facts  as  the  basis  of  inquiry,  and  proceed  by  rejection  and  exclusion  of 
principles  involved  in  the  inquiry,  until  at  last — there  appearing  no  ground 
for  further  rejection — we  conclude  that  we  are  in  possession  of  the  true 
principle  of  the  object  examined  ; so,  in  the  philosophy  of  language,  we 
must  proceed  by  a like  rejection  and  exclusion  of  notions  implied  in  the 
general  term  with  which  we  set  out,  until  we  reach  the  very  confines  of 
that  notion  of  it  with  which  our  inquiry  is  concerned.  This  exclusion  is 
effected  in  language,  by  annexing  to  the  general  term  denoting  the  class 
to  which  the  object  is  primarily  referred,  other  terms  not  including  under 
them  those  other  objects  or  notions  to  which  the  general  term  applies. 
For  thus,  while  each  successive  term  in  the  definition,  in  itself,  extends  to 
more  than  the  object  so  defined — yet  all  viewed  together  do  not ; and 
this  their  relative  bearing  on  the  one  point  constitutes  the  being  of  the 
things.  This  I thus  illustrated  by  Aristotle  ; — ‘ If  we  are  inquiring,’  he 
says,  ‘ what  magnanimity  is,  we  must  consider  the  instances  of  certain 
magnanimous  persons  whom  we  know,  what  one  thing  they  all  have  so  far 
forth  as  they  are  such  ; as,  if  Alcibiades  was  magnanimous,  or  Achilles, 
or  Ajax; — what  one  thing  they  all  have  ; say,  impatience  under  insult ; 
for  one  made  war,  another  raged,  the  other  slew  himself.  Again,  in  the 
instances'of  others,  as  of  Lysander  or  Socrates — if  here  it  is,  to  be  unaltered 
by  prosperity  or  adversity ; — taking  these  two  cases,  I consider,  what  this 
apathy  in  regard  to  events , and  impatience  under  insult,  have  the  same 
in  them.  If,  now.  they  have  nothing  the  same,  there  must  be  two  species 
of  magnanimity.’  ” (P.  513.) 

Mr.  Hampden  afterward  states,  inter  alia , that  the  induction 
of  Aristotle,  “having  for  its  object  to  determine  accurately  in 
words  the  notion  of  the  being  of  things  proceeds,  according  to 
the  nature  of  language,  from  the  general,  and  ends  in  the  parti- 
cular ; whereas  the  investigation  of  a law  of  nature  proceeds  from 
the  particular,  and  ends  in  the  general.  Dialectical  induction  is 
synthetical,  while  philosophical  induction  is  analytical  in  the 
result.”  On  this  ground,  he  explains  the  meaning  of  the  term 
(eVaywyb),  and  defends  the  induction  of  Aristotle  against  its  dis- 
paragement by  Lord  Bacon. 

We  had  imagined,  that  every  compend  of  Logic  explained  the 
two  grand  methods  of  Investigating  the  Definition ; but  upon 


INDUCTIVE  PROCESS. 


171 


looking  into  the  Oxford  treatises  on  this  science,  we  were  surprised 
to  find,  that  this,  among  other  important  matters,  had  in  all  of 
them  been  overlooked.  This  may,  in  part,  enable  us  to  surmise 
how  Mr.  Hampden  could  have  so  misconceived  so  elementary  a 
point,  as  to  have  actually  reversed  the  doctrine,  not  only  of  Aris- 
totle, but  of  all  other  philosophers.  A few  words  will  be  sufficient 
to  illustrate  the  nature  of  the  error. 

In  the  thirteenth  chapter  (Pacian  division)  of  the  second  hook 
of  the  Posterior  Analytics , Aristotle  treats  of  the  manner  of  hunt- 
ing out,  as  he  terms  it,  the  essential  nature  (to  t l ecrn,  quidditas) 
of  a thing,  the  enunciation  of  which  nature  constitutes  its  defini- 
tion. This  may  be  attempted  in  tivo  contrary  ways. — By  the 
one,  we  may  descend  from  the  category,  or  higher  genus  of  the 
thing  to  he  defined,  dividing  and  subdividing,  through  the  oppo- 
site differences,  till  we  reach  the  genus  under  which  it  is  proxi- 
mately  contained ; and  this  last  genus,  along  with  the  specific 
difference  by  which  the  genus  is  divided,  will  he  the  definition 
required. — By  the  other,  we  may  ascend  from  the  singulars,  con- 
tained under  the  thing  to  he  defined  (which  is  necessarily  an 
universal),  hy  an  exclusion  of  their  differences,  until  we  attain 
an  attribution  common  to  them  all,  which  attribution  will  supply 
the  definition  sought. — The  former  of  these  is,  after  Plato,  called 
by  Aristotle,  and  logicians  in  general,  the  method  of  Division; 
the  higher  genus  being  regarded  as  the  (universal)  whole,  the 
subaltern  genera  and  species  as  the  (subject)  parts  into  which  it 
is  divided.  The  extension  here  determines  the  totality. — The 
latter,  which  is  described  but  not  named  by  Aristotle,  is  variously 
denominated  by  his  followers.  Some,  as  his  Greek  commentators, 
taking  the  totality  as  determined  by  the  comprehension,  view  the 
singulars  as  so  many  (essential)  wholes,  of  which  the  common 
attribute  or  definition  is  a part,  and  accordingly  call  this  mode 
of  hunting  up  the  essence  the  Analytic  ; others  again,  regarding 
the  genus  as  the  whole,  the  species  and  individuals  as  the  parts, 
style  it  the  Compositive,  or  Synthetic,  or  Collective  f while 


1 “ In  one  respect,”  says  Aristotle,  “ the  Genus  is  called,  a part  of  the  Species ; in  an- 
other, the  Species  apart  of  the  Genus.”  ( Metaph . L.  v.  c.  25,  t.  30.  Compare  Phys. 
L.  iv.  c.  5 (3)  t.  23  ; and  Porph.  Intr.  c.  3,  § 39.)  In  like  manner,  the  same  method, 
viewed  in  different  relations,  may  be  styled  either  Analysis  or  Synthesis.  This,  how- 
ever, has  not  been  acknowledged ; nor  has  it  even  attracted  notice,  that  different  logi- 
cians and  philosophers,  though  severally  applying  the  terms  only  in  a single  sense, 
are  still  at  cross  purposes  with  each  other.  One  calls  Synthesis  what  another  calls 
Analysis — one  calls  Progression  what  another  calls  Regression ; and  this  both  in  an- 


172 


LOGIC. 


others,  in  fine,  looking  simply  to  the  order  of'the  process  itself, 
from  the  individual  to  the  general,  name  it  the  Inductive.  These 
last  we  shall  imitate. 

Now,  in  the  chapter  referred  to,  Aristotle  considers  and  con- 
trasts these  two  methods. — In  regard  to  Division  (§  8-20)  he 
shows  on  the  one  hand  (against  Plato,  who  is  not  named),  that 
this  process  is  not  to  he  viewed  as  having  any  power  of  demon- 
stration or  argument  ;*  and  on  the  other  (against  Speusippus,  as 
we  learn  from  Eudemus,  through  the  G reek  expositors),  that  it  is 
not  wholly  to  he  rejected  as  worthless,  being  useful,  in  subservi- 
ence always  to  the  other  method  of  induction,  to  insure — that 
none  of  the  essential  qualities  are  omitted — that  these  qualities 
alone  are  taken — and  that  they  are  properly  subordinated  and 
arranged. — In  reference  to  the  Inductive  method,  which  is  to  be 
considered  as  the  principal,  he  explains  its  nature,  and  delivers 
various  precepts  for  its  due  application.  ( k 7,  21,  etc.) 

This  summary  will  enable  the  reader  to  understand  Mr.  Hamp- 
den’s perversion  of  Aristotle’s  doctrine. — In  the  first  place:  that 
gentleman  is  mistaken,  in  supposing  that  the  philosopher  applies 
the  term  Induction  to  any  method  of  investigating  the  definition 
discussed  by  him  in  the  chapter  in  question.  The  word  does  not 
once  occur. — In  the  second  place : he  is  still  farther  deceived,  in 
thinking  that  Aristotle  there  bestows  that  name  on  a descent  from 
the  universal  to  the  particular ; whereas  in  his  philosophy — indeed 
in  all  philosophies — it  exclusively  pertains  to  an  ascent  from  the 
particular  to  the  universal. — In  the  third  place  : he  is  wrong,  in 
imagining  that  Aristotle  there  treats  only  of  a single  method,  for 
he  considers  and  contrasts  two  methods,  not  only  different,  but 
opposed.* 1 2 — In  the  fourth  place  : he  is  mistaken,  in  understanding, 


cient  and  modem  times.  We  ourselves  think  it  best  to  regulate  the  use  of  these  terms 
by  reference  to  the  notion  of  a whole  and  parts,  of  any  kind.  This  we  do,  and  do 
professedly.  Mr.  Hampden,  but  probably  without  intending  it,  does  the  same  : in  one 
part  of  the  passage  we  have  quoted,  speaking  of  Division  (his  logical  induction),  as 
an  “analysis;”  in  another,  describing  it  as  “synthetical.”  [The  total  omission  of 
ihe  distinction  of  Comprehension  and  Extension  (though  this  be  the  very  turning 
point  of  logic),  by  former  Oxford  logicians,  is  remarkable  in  itself,  and  has  been  the 
cause,  as  is  here  exemplified,  of  much  error  and  confusion  Dr.  Whately,  indeed,  not 
only  overlooks  the  distinction,  but  he  often  reverses  the  language  in  which  it  is  logi- 
cally expressed.] 

1 This  he  had  elsewhere  done;  Pr.  Analyt.  1.  i.  c.  31.  Post.  Analyt.  1.  ii.  c.  5,  et 
alibi. 

2 Mr.  Hampden’s  error,  we  suspect,  originates  in  the  circumstance  that  Pacius 
(whom  Duval  follows  in  the  Organon)  speaks,  in  his  analytic  argument  of  the  chapter, 
of  a methodus  divisiva  and  a methodus  inductiva ; and  that  Mr.  Hampden,  using  Duval’s 


INDUCTION:  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  DEFINITION. 


173 


as  applied  to  one  contrary,  the  observations  which  Aristotle  ap- 
plies, and  which  are  only  applicable,  in  expounding  the  reverse. 
For  example : he  quotes  in  the  note,  as  pertinent  to  Division, 
words  of  the  original  relative  to  induction  ; and  the  instance  (from 
the  definition  of  Magnanimity)  adduced  to  illucidate  the  one 
method,  is  in  reality  employed  by  Aristotle  to  explain  the  other. 
— In  the  fifth  place  : his  error  is  enhanced,  by  seeing  in  his  own 
single  method  the  subordinate  of  Aristotle’s  two  ; and  in  lauding 
as  a peculiarly  important  part  of  the  Aristotelic  philosophy,  a 
process  in  the  exposition  of  which  Aristotle  has  no  claim  to  origi- 
nality, and  to  which  he  himself,  here  and  elsewhere,  justly  attri- 
butes only  an  inferior  importance. — In  the  sixth  place  : in  contra- 
diction equally  of  his  whole  philosophy  and  of  the  truth  of  nature, 
the  Stagirite  is  made  to  hold  that  our  highest  abstractions  are 
first  in  the  order  of  time  ; that  our  process  of  classification  is 
encentric,  not  eccentric ; that  a child  generalizes  substance  and 
accident  before  egg  and  white. 

Mr.  Hampden’s  statement  of  the  Inductive  method  being  thus 
the  reverse  of  truth,  it  is  needless  to  say  that  the  etymological 
explanation  he  has  hazarded  of  the  term  (eircuyco^rj)  must  be  erro- 
neous.— But  even  more  erroneous  is  the  pendant  by  which  he 
attempts  to  illustrate  his  interpretation  of  that  term.  “ The 
d'rrayojjfi  Abduction  spoken  of  by  Aristotle  ( Anal . Prior,  ii.  c. 
25),  is  just  the  reverse — a leading  away,  by  the  terms  successive- 
ly brought  from  the  more  accurate  notion  conveyed  by  a former 
one.”  The  Abduction , here  referred  to,  is  no  more  such  a “ lead- 
ing away”  than  it  is  a theft.  It  is  a kind  of  syllogism — of  what 
nature  we  can  not  longer  tresspass  on  the  patience  of  our  readers 
by  explaining.  For  the  same  reason  we  say  nothing  of  some 
other  errors  we  had  remarked  in  Mr.  Hampden’s  account  of  that 
branch  of  the  Aristotelic  philosophy  which  we  have  been  now 
considering. 

edition,  in  his  extemporaneous  study  of  the  subject,  not  previously  aware  that  there 
are  two  opposite  methods  of  investigating  the  definition,  took  up  the  notion  that  these 
were  merely  a twofold  expression  for  the  same  thing.  Mr.  Hampden  is  an  able  man  : 
but  to  understand  Aristotle  in  any  of  his  works,  he  must  be  understood  in  all ; and  to 
be  understood  in  all,  he  must  be  long  and  patiently  studied  by  a mind  disciplined  to 
speculation,  and  familiar  with  the  literature  of  philosophy. 


V.-DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


HISTORY  OF  THEIR  INSTRUCTION,  IN  REFERENCE 
TO  DALGARNO. 


(July,  1835.) 

The  works  of  George  Dalgarno,  of  Aberdeen , 4to.  Reprinted 
at  Edinburgh : 1834. 

In  taking  up  this  work,  we  owe  perhaps  some  apology  for  the 
deviation  from  our  ordinary  rules  ; inasmuch  as  it  is  merely  a 
reprint  of  ancient  matter,  the  publication  also  not  professedly 
reaching  beyond  the  sphere  of  a private  society — the  Maitland 
Club.  We  are  induced,  however,  to  make  a qualified  exception 
in  favor  of  this  edition  of  Dalgarno’s  Works,  in  consideration  of 
the  extreme  rairity  of  the  original  treatises,  added  to  their  high 
importance  ; and  because  the  liberality  of  the  editors  (Mr.  Henry 
Cockburn  and  Mr.  Thomas  Maitland),  has  not  limited  their  con- 
tribution merely  to  members  of  that  society,  but  extended  it  to 
the  principal  libraries  of  the  kingdom,  and,  we  believe,  to  many 
individuals  likely  to  feel  an  interest  in  its  contents.  We  shall, 
however,  relax  our  rule  only  to  the  measure  of  a very  brief 
notice. 

Dalgarno’s  Works  are  composed  of  two  treatises : the  first  en- 
titled— “ Ars  Signorum , Vulgo  Character  Universalis  et  Lingua 
Philosophica.  Londini:  1661 the  second — “ Didascalocophus, 
or  the  Deaf  and  Dumb  Man's  Tutor;  to  which  is  added  a Dis- 
course of  the  Nature  and  Number  of  Double  Consonants : both 
which  Tracts  being  the  first  ( for  what  the  Author  knows)  that 
have  been  published  upon  either  of  the  subjects.  Printed  at  the 
Theatre  in  Oxford,  1680.” 

Of  the  author  himself,  all  that  is  known  is  comprised  in  the 
following  slight  notice  by  Anthony  a Wood.  “ The  reader  may 
be  pleased  to  know,  that  one  George  Dalgarno,  a Scot,  wrote  a 


t 


DALGARNO. 


175 


book  entitled  Ars  Signomrn,  Sfc.,  London,  1661.  This  book, 
before  it  went  to  press,  the  author  communicated  to  Dr.  Wilkins, 
who,  from  thence  taking  a hint  of  greater  matter,  carried  it  on, 
and  brought  it  up  to  that  which  you  see  extant.  This  Dalgarno 
was  born  at  old  Aberdeen,  and  bred  in  the  University  at  New 
Aberdeen ; taught  a private  grammar  school,  with  good  success, 
for  about  thirty  years  together,  in  the  parishes  of  S.  Michael,  and 
S.  Mary  Magdalen,  in  Oxford  ; wrote  also  Didascalocophus,  or  the 
Deaf  and,  Dumb  Man’s  Tutor  ; and  dying  of  a fever,  on  the  28th 
of  August,  1687,  aged  sixty  or  more,  was  buried  in  the  North 
body  of  the  Church  of  S.  Mary  Magdalen.”  (Athene  Oxon.,  Yol. 
II.,  p.  506).  With  the  exception  of  an  accidental  allusion  to  his 
treatise  on  Signs,  by  Leibnitz,  in  a letter  to  Mr.  Burnet  of  Kem- 
ney,  from  whom  he  had  probably  received  that  work  of  a fellow 
Aberdonian,  and  some  slight  traditionary  statements  by  the  Grer- 
man  historians  of  literature,  the  memory  of  Dalgarno  had  wholly 
perished,  when  attention  was  again  awakened  to  the  originality 
and  importance  of  his  speculations  by  the  late  Mr.  Dugald  Stew- 
art, in  various  passages  of  his  writings ; and  these  having  sug- 
gested to  the  editors  the  idea  of  the  present  reprint,  they  are  very 
properly  collected  in  their  preliminary  statement,  as  the  best  of 
testimonies  to  its  importance. 

In  speaking  of  Dalgarno’s  two  treatises,  we  shall  reverse  their 
chronological  as  well  as  natural  order,  and  take  them  in  what 
appears  to  us  the  order  of  their  practical  interest. 

To  appreciate  the  high  and  peculiar  value  of  our  author’s  treat- 
ise on  the  education  of  the  Deaf  and  Dumb,  it  is  necessary  to 
take  a survey  of  what  had  actually  been  accomplished  in  this 
important  department  of  applied  psychology,  previous  to  the  ap- 
pearance of  his  treatise.  A regular  history  of  this  branch  of  edu- 
cation, with  extracts  from  the  writings  of  its  earlier  promoters, 
now  in  general  extremely  rare,  would  form  an  interesting  pres- 
ent, both  to  the  speculative  and  to  the  practical  philosopher.  In 
the  total  absence  of  such  a work,  we  may  be  pardoned  in  throw- 
ing briefly  together  a few  scattered  notices,  which  have  accident- 
ally crossed  us  in  the  course  of  other  inquiries. 

In  deducing  a history  of  the  progress  in  the  art  of  educating 
the  deaf  and  dumb,  there  are  certain  separate  points  of  accom- 
plishment which  it  is  proper  to  distinguish.  These  are : 1°,  The 
teaching  the  pupil  to  understand,  by  the  motions  of  the  lips,  &c. 
the  speech  of  those  around  him;  2°,  To  communicate  his  own 


176 


DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


thoughts  in  the  articulate  sounds  of  a language ; 3°,  To  read 
writing ; 4°,  To  employ  letters  and  words,  denoted  by  certain 
conventional  motions  of  the  hand.  5°,  There  is,  however,  a fifth 
point,  of  still  higher  and  more  difficult  accomplishment,  and  on 
which  the  easy,  certain,  and  complete  success  of  the  whole  at- 
tempt depends  ; — that  is,  a determination  of  the  psychological 
laws,  by  which  the  order  and  objects  of  instruction,  under  the 
condition  of  deafness,  is  regulated. 

As  the  result  of  a philosophical  deduction,  it  was  naturally  to 
be  expected,  that  the  last  of  these  should  only  be  realized,  after 
the  possibility  and  conditions  of  the  method  in  general  had  been 
empirically  proved  in  the  other  four.  In  the  present  instance, 
however,  theory  did  not  merely,  follow  practice — it  long  prevented 
its  application ; and  the  deaf  and  dumb  had  been  actually  taught 
the  use  of  speech,  before  the  philosophers  would  admit  their  capa- 
city of  instruction.  The  dictum  of  Aristotle,  that  of  all  the 
senses,  hearing  contributes  the  most  to  intelligence  and  knowledge 
(et?  (f>povTj(T lv  7 rXeicTTov),  was  taken,  apart  from  the  qualifications 
under  which  that  illustrious  thinker  advanced  the  proposition 
(viz.  that  this  was  only  by  accident,  inasmuch  as  hearing  is  the 
sense  of  sound,  and  sound  contingently  the  vehicle  of  thought) ; 
and  was  alleged  to  prove,  what  was  in  fact  the  very  converse  of 
its  true  import,  that  the  deaf  are  wholly  incapable  of  intellectual 
instruction. 

In  like  manner,  a dogma  of  the  physicians,  which  remounts  we 
believe  to  Galen,  that  dumbness  was  not,  as  Aristotle  had  affirm- 
ed, in  general  a mere  consequent  of  deafness,  but  the  effect  of  a 
common  organic  lesion  of  the  lingual  and  auditory  nerves,  arising 
as  they  do  from  a neighboring  origin  in  the  brain — was  generally 
admitted  as  conclusive  against  the  possibility  of  a deaf  person 
being  taught  to  articulate  sounds.  It  was,  therefore,  with  great 
wonder  and  doubt,  that  the  first  examples  of  the  falsehood  of  these 
assumptions  were  received  by  the  learned.  The  disabilities 
which  the  Roman  law,  and  the  older  codes  of  every  European 
jurisprudence,  imposed  on  the  deaf  and  dumb,  were  all  founded 
in  the  principle — “ Surclus  natus,  mutus  est  el  plane  indisciplina- 
bilis, v as  the  great  French  jurist,  Molinaeus  expresses  it. 

Rodolphus  Agricola,  who  died  in  1485,  is  the  oldest  testimony 
we  recollect  to  a capacity  in  the  deaf  and  dumb  of  an  intelligent 
education  ; and  it  is  remarkable,  that  there  is  none  older.  In  the 
last  chapter  of  his  posthumous  work,  De  Inventione  Dialectica, 


DALGARNO. 


177 


as  an  illustration  of  “the  immense  and  almost  incredible  power 
of  the  human  mind,”  he  instances  “as  little  less  than  miraculous, 
what  he  himself  had  witnessed — a person  deaf  from  infancy,  and 
consequently  dumb,  who  had  learned  to  understand  writing,  and, 
as  if  possessed  of  speech,  was  able  to  write  down  his  whole 
thoughts.” — Ludovicus  Yives,  some  fifty  years  later,  in  his  treat- 
ise De  Anima  (L.  ii.  c.  De  Discendi  ratione ),  after  noticing  that 
Aristotle  had  justly  styled  the  ear  the  organ  of  instruction,  ex- 
presses his  “wonder  that  there  should  have  been  a person  horn 
deaf  and  dumb  who  had  learned  letters : let  the  belief  in  this, 
rest  with  Rodolphus  Agricola,  who  has  recorded  the  fact,  and 
affirmed  that  he  himself  beheld  it.”  The  countrymen  of  the  un- 
believing Yives  were,  however,  destined,  in  the  following  gene- 
ration, to  be  the  inventors  of  the  art  in  question.  For — 

The  oldest  indication  we  have,  of  any  systematic  attempt  at 
educating  the  deaf,  is  by  Franciscus  Yallesius,  the  celebrated 
Spanish  physician,  who,  in  his  Philosophic/,  Sacra , published  in 
1590,  mentions  that  “a  friend  of  his,  Petrus  Pontius,  a Benedic- 
tine monk,  taught  the  deaf  to  speak  by  no  other  art  than  instruct- 
ing them  first  to  write,  then  pointing  out  to  them  the  objects  sig- 
nified by  the  written  characters,  and  finally  guiding  them  to 
those  motions  of  the  tongue,  &c.,  which  correspond  to  the  charac- 
ters.” What  more  is  now  accomplished  ? Petrus  Pontius — who 
was  a Spaniard,  and  not  to  be  confounded  with  the  celebrated 
Scotist,  Joannes  Poncius,  Minorite,  and  native  of  Ireland — did 
not  publish  an  account  of  his  method.  This,  however,  was  done 
by  John  Paul  Bonnet,  of  Arragon,  secretary  to  the  Constable  of 
Castile,  who,  in  1620,  printed  in  Spanish,  at  Madrid,  his  Reduc- 
tion of  Letters , and  Art  of  Instructing  the  Dumb.  That  this 
work  of  Bonnet  contains  only  the  practice  of  Pontius,  is  proved 
by  the  evidence  of  Perez  in  the  book  itself,  and  by  that  of  Anto- 
nius  in  his  Bibliotheca  Hispanica.  Of  the  signal  success  of  the 
art  in  the  hands  of  Pontius  (among  others  on  two  brothers  and  a 
sister  of  the  Constable  of  Castile),  we  have  accounts  by  Antonius, 
by  Morales  ; and  a very  curious  one  by  Sir  Kenelm  Digby,  of 
what  he  himself  saw  in  the  younger  brother  of  the  Constable, 
when  he  accompanied  Charles  I.,  when  Prince  of  Wales,  in  his 
expedition  into  Spain,  and  to  whom  he  appeals  as  a fellow-witness 
Vvdth  himself. 

“There  was  a nobleman  of  great  quality  that  I knew  in  Spain,  the 
younger  brother  of  the  Constable  of  Castile,  who  was  taught  to  heare  the 

M 


178 


DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


sounds  of  words  with  his  eyes  (if  that  expression  may  he  permitted). 
This  Spanish  Lord  was  born  deafe,  so  deafe  that  if  a gun  were  shot  off 
close  by  his  care  he  could  not  heare  it,  and  consequently  he  was  dumbe  ; 
for  not  being  able  to  heare  the  sound  of  words,  lie  could  never  imitate  nor 
understand  them  : The  lovelinesse  of  his  face,  and  especially  the  exceed- 
ing life  and  spiritfulnesse  of  his  eyes,  and  the  comlinesse  of  his  person, 
and  the  whole  composure  of  his  body  throughout,  were  pregnant  signs 
of  a well-tempered  mind  within.  And  therefore  all  that  knew  him  la- 
mented much  the  want  of  rneanes  to  cultivate  it,  and  to  embrue  it  with 
the  notions,  which  it  seemed  to  be  capable  of,  in  regard  of  itself,  had  it 
not  been  crossed  by  this  unhappy  accident,  which  to  remedie  physicians  and 
chyrurgions  had  long  employed  their  skill,  but  all  in  vaine.  At  the  last 
there  was  a priest,  who  undertooke  the  teaching  him  to  understand  others 
when  they  spoke,  and  to  speake  himselfe  that  others  might  understand 
him,  for  which  attempt  at  first  he  was  laughed  at,  yet  after  some  yeares 
he  was  looked  upon  as  if  he  had  wrought  a miracle.  In  a word,  after 
strange  patience,  constancie,  and  pains,  he  brought  the  young  lord  to 
speak  as  distinctly  as  any  man  whatsoever  ; and  to  understand  so  perfect- 
ly what  others  said,  that  he  would  not  lose  a word  in  a whole  dayes  con- 
versation. I have  often  discoursed  with  the  priest  whilst  I waited  upon 
the  Prince  of  Wales  (now  our  gracious  Sovereign)  in  Spain,  and  I doubt 
not  but  his  Majesty  remembreth  all  I have  said  of  him,  and  much  more: 
for  his  Majesty  was  very  curious  to  observe,  and  enquire  into  the  utmost 
of  it.  It  is  true,  one  great  misbecomeingnesse  he  was  apt  to  fall  into, 
whilst  he  spoke  : which  was  an  uncertainty  in  the  tone  of  his  voyce,  for 
not  hearing  the  sound  he  made  when  he  spoke,  he  could  not  steadily  governe 
the  pitch  of  his  voyce,  but  it  would  be  sometimes  higher  and  sometimes  lower, 
though,  for  the  most  part  what  he  delivered  together  he  ended  in  the  same 
key  as  he  began  it.  But  when  he  had  once  suffered  the  passage  of  his  voyce 
to  close,  at  the  opening  it  again,  chance,  or  the  measure  of  his  earnestness 
to  speak  or  reply,  gave  him  his  tone,  which  he  was  not  capable  of  moderat- 
ing by  such  an  artifice,  as  is  recorded  Caius  Gracchus  used,  when  passion 
in  his  orations  to  the  people,  drove  out  his  voice  with  too  great  a vehe- 
mency  or  shrillnesse.  He  could  discerne  in  another  whether  he  spoke 
shrill  or  low,  and  he  would  repeat  after  any  bodie  any  hard  word  what- 
soever, which  the  Prince  tried  often,  not  only  in  English,  but  by  making 
some  Welchmen  that  served  his  Highnesse  speak  words  of  their  language, 
which  he  so  perfectly  ecchoed,  that  I confesse  I wondered  more  at  that 
than  at  all  the  rest,  and  his  master  himselfe  would  acknowledge  that  the 
rules  of  his  art  reached  not  to  produce  that  effect  with  any  certainty. 
And,  therefore,  concluded  this  in  him  must  spring  from  other  rules  he 
had  framed  unto  himselfe  out  of  his  own  attentive  observation ; which  the 
advantages  which  nature  had  justly, given  him  in  the  sharpnesse  of  senses 
to  supply  the  want  of  this,  endowed  him  with  an  ability  and  sagacity  to 
do  beyond  any  other  man  that  had  his  hearing.  He  expressed  it,  surely, 
in  a high  measure  by  his  so  exact  imitation  of  the  Welch  pronunciation  ; 
for  that  tongue  (like  the  Hebrew)  employeth  much  the  guttural  letters, 
and  the  motions  of  that  part  which  frameth  them  cannot  be  seen  or 
judged  by  the  eye,  otherwise  than  by  the  effect  they  may  happily  make 
by  consent  in  the  other  parts  of  the  mouth  exposed  to  view.  For  the 
knowledge  he  had  of  what  they  said  sprung  from  his  observing  the  mo- 
tions they  made,  so  that  he  could  converse  currently  in  the  light,  though 


DALGARNO. 


179 


they  he  talked  with  whispered  never  so  softly.  And  I have  seen  him  at 
the  distance  of  a large  chamber’s  breadth  say  words  after  one,  that  I 
standing  close  by  the  speaker  could  not  hear  a syllable  of.  But  if  he 
were  in  the  darke,  or  if  one  turned  his  face  out  of  his  sight  he  was  capa- 
ble of  nothing  one  said.” — ( Treatise  of  Bodies.) 

The  prejudice  was  now  dispelled,  that  the  deaf  and  dumb  were 
incapable  of  education  ; and  during  the  course  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  many  examples  are  recorded  of  their  successful  instruc- 
tion without  even  the  aid  of  a teacher  experienced  in  the  art. 

Though  nothing  can  be  clearer  than  the  right  of  Spain  to  the 
original  invention  of  this  art  in  all  its  branches,  we,  however, 
find  it  claimed,  at  a much  later  period,  and  in  the  same  year 
(1670),  by  Lana , the  Italian  Jesuit,  in  his  Prodromo ; and  for 
Dr.  John  Wallis , Professor  of  Geometry  in  Oxford,  in  the  Tran- 
sactions of  the  Royal  Society  of  London.  The  precepts  of  the 
former  are  neither  new  nor  important ; and  the  latter  can  only 
vindicate  his  originality  by  an  ignorance  of  what  had  previously 
been  effected.  Wallis  appears  to  have  long  (that  is,  before  the 
appearance  of  Dalgarno’s  work)  applied  himself  mainly  to  the 
comparatively  unimportant  point  of  enabling  the  deaf  to  enun- 
ciate words.  Without  undervaluing  the  merit  of  his  treatise  on 
the  nature  and  pronunciation  of  letters,  in  the  introduction  to  his 
English  grammar,  or  the  success  of  his  principles  in  enabling  the 
deaf  to  speak — all  this  had  been  previously  done  by  others  with 
equal  ability  and  success.  The  nature  of  letters,  the  organic  mo- 
difications for  the  production  of  the  various  vocal  sounds,  had 
been  investigated  by  Fabricius  ab  Aquapendente  in  his  treatise 
De  Locutione ; and  thereafter  with  remarkable  accuracy  and 
minuteness  by  P.  Montanus  in  his  Account  of  a Neio  Art  called 
the  Art  of  Speech,  published  in  Holland  many  years  prior  to  the 
grammar  of  Dr.  Wallis ; — while  Bonnet,  in  the  work  already 
mentioned,  had,  in  the  first  book,  treated  “of  the  nature  of  letters 
and  their  pronunciation  among  different  nations,”  and  in  the  se- 
cond, “ showed  how  the  mute  may  be  taught  the  figure  and  pro- 
nunciation of  letters  by  manual  demonstration,  and  the  motion 
of  the  mouth  and  lips.” — Wallis’s  originality  can  indeed  hardly 
be  maintained  in  relation  even  to  English  writers. 

To  say  nothing  of  Lord  Bacon's  recommendation  of  “the 
motions  of  the  tongue,  lips,  throat,  palate,  &c.,  which  go  to  the 
making  up  of  the  several  letters,  as  a subject  worthy  of  inquiry.” 
John  Buliver  had,  in  the  year  1648,  published  his  curious  treat- 


180 


DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


ise,  entitled — “ Philocophus,  or  the  Deafe  and  Dumbe  Man's 
Friend , exhibiting  the  philosophical  verity  of  that  subtile  art , 
which  may  inable  one  ivitli  an  observant  eie,  to  heare  what  any 
man  speaks  by  the  moving  of  his  lips.  Upon  the  same  ground , 
ivith  the  advantage  of  an  historical  exemplification , apparently 
proving , that  a man  borne  deafe  and  dumbe , may  be  taught  to 
heare  the  sounds  of  words  ivith  his  eie , and  thence  learn  to  speak 
with  his  tongue.  By  J.  B.  sirnamed  the  Chirosopher.  London , 
1648.” 

Bulwer  appears  to  have  been  ignorant  of  Bonnet’s  book,  but 
he  records  many  remarkable  cases,  several  within  bis  own  expe- 
rience, of  wliat  bad  been  accomplished  for  the  education  of  the 
deaf.  He  was  the  first  also  to  recommend  the  institution  of  “an 
academy  of  the  mute,”  and  to  notice  the  capacity  which  deaf 
persons  usually  possess  of  enjoying  music  through  the  medium 
of  the  teeth — a fact  which  has  latterly  been  turned  to  excellent 
account,  especially  in  Germany ; and  there  principally  by  Father 
Robertson , a monk  of  the  Scots  College  of  Ratisbon,  by  whose 
exertions  a new  source  of  instruction  and  enjoyment  has  thus 
been  opened  up  to  those  otherwise  insensible  to  sounds.  It  is 
remarkable  that  Bulwer,  who  had  previously  written  a work  on 
“ Chirologia,  or  the  Natural  Language  of  the  Hand,"  and  who 
had  thence  even  obtained  the  surname  of  the  Chirosopher,  should 
have  suggested  nothing  in  regard  to  a method  of  speaking  on  the 
fingers ; and  it  is  still  more  singular  that  his  attention  was  not 
called  to  this  device,  as  he  himself  has  mentioned  a remarkable 
case,  in  which  it  had  been  actually  applied.  “ A pregnant 
example,”  he  says  “ of  the  officious  nature  of  the  touch,  in  sup- 
plying the  defect  or  temporall  incapacity  of  the  other  senses,  we 
have  in  one  Master  Babington,  of  Burntwood,  in  the  county  of 
Essex,  an  ingenious  gentleman,  who,  through  some  sicknesse, 
becoming  deaf,  doth,  notwithstanding,  feele  words,  and,  as  if  he 
had  an  eye  in  his  finger,  sees  signes  in  the  darke  ; whose  wife 
discourseth  very  perfectly  with  him  by  a strange  way  of  arthro- 
logie,  or  alphabet,  contrived  on  the  joynts  of  his  fingers,  who, 
taking  him  by  the  hand  in  the  night,  can  so  discourse  with  him 
very  exactly  ; for  he  feeling  the  joynts  which  she  touche th  for 
letters,  by  them  collected  into  words,  very  readily  conceives  what 
she  would  suggest  to  him.”  (P.  106.) 

We  pass  over  Holder's  “ Elements  of  Speech.  An  Essay  of 
Inquiry  into  the  Natural  Production  of  Letters,  ivith  an  Appendix 


DALGABNO. 


181 


to  instruct  Persons  Deaf  and  Dumb  f and  Sibscote's  11  Deaf  and. 
Dumb  Man's  Discourse which  were  published  in  the  interval 
between  Wallis’s  practical  application  of  his  method  and  the 
appearance  of  Dalgarno’s  hook.  Dalgarno , we  believe,  may 
claim  the  merit  of  having  first  exhibited,  and  that  in  its  most 
perfect  form,  a finger  alphabet.  He  makes  no  pretensions,  how- 
ever, to  the  original  conception  of  such  a medium  of  communi- 
cation. But  the  great  and  distinctive  merit  of  his  treatise  is 
not  so  much,  that  it  improved  the  mechanism  of  instruction,  as 
that  it  corrected  the  errors  of  his  predecessors,  and  pointed  out 
the  principles  on  which  the  art  is  founded,  and  by  the  observance 
of  which  alone  it  can  be  carried  to  perfection.  As  we  first  attempt 
to  fix  and  communicate  our  notions  by  the  aid  of  speech,  it  was 
a natural  prejudice  to  believe  that  sounds  were  the  necessary 
instrument  of  thought  and  its  expression.  The  earlier  instruct- 
ors of  the  deaf  and  dumb  were  thus  led  to  direct  their  principal 
effort  to  the  teaching  their  pupils  to  distinguish  the  different 
mechanical  movements  by  which  different  sounds  are  produced, 
and  to  imitate  these  sounds  by  imitating  the  organic  modification 
on  which  they  depend.  They  did  not  consider  that  still  there 
existed  no  sound  for  the  deaf ; that  the  signs  to  which  they  thus 
attached  ideas  were  only  perceptions  of  sight  and  feeling  ; that 
these  were,  on  the  one  hand,  minute,  ambiguous,  fugitive,  and, 
on  the  other,  difficult ; and  that  it  would  he  better  to  associate 
thought  with  a system  of  signs  more  easy  to  produce,  and  less 
liable  to  he  mistaken.  The  honor  of  first  educating  the  deaf  and 
dumb  in  the  general  principles  of  grammar,  and  in  primarily 
associating  their  thought  with  written  instead  of  with  spoken 
symbols,  is  generally  claimed  for  the  eighteenth  century,  France, 
and  the  Abbe  de  VEpee.  All  this  was,  however,  fully  demon- 
strated a century  before  in  the  forgotten  treatise  of  our  country- 
man, as  in  a great  measure  also  practiced  by  Pontius,  the  original 
inventor  of  the  art,  a century  before  Dalgarno.  We  are  indebted, 
as  we  formerly  observed,  to  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart  for  rescuing  the 
name  of  Dalgarno  from  the  oblivion  into  which  it  had  fallen  ; and 
the  following  quotation  from  that  distinguished  philosopher  affords 
the  most  competent  illustration  of  his  merits  : — 

“ After  having  thus  paid  the  tribute  of  my  sincere  respect  to  the  enlight- 
ened and  benevolent  exertions  of  a celebrated  foreigner  (Sicard),  I feel 
myself  called  on  to  lay  hold  of  the  only  opportunity  that  may  occur  to  me 
of  rescuing  from  oblivion  the  name  of  a Scottish  writer,  whose  merits  have 


182 


DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


been  strangely  overlooked,  both  by  his  contemporaries  and  by  his  success- 
ors. The  person  I allude  to  is  George  Dalgarno,  who,  more  than  a hundred 
and  thirty  years  ago,  was  led,  by  his  own  sagacity,  to  adopt,  a priori,  the 
same  general  conclusion  concerning  the  education  of  the  dumb,  of  which 
the  experimental  discovery,  and  the  happy  application,  have,  in  our  times, 
reflected  such  merited  lustre  on  the  name  of  Sicard.  I mentioned  Dal- 
garno  formerly,  in  a note  annexed  to  the  first  volume  of  the  1 Philosophy 
of  the  Human  Mind,’  as  the  author  of  a very  ingenious  tract,  entitled 
Ars  Signorum ,’  from  which  it  appears  indisputably  that  he  was  the  pre- 
cursor of  Bishop  Wilkins  in  his  speculations  concerning  a real  character 
and  a philosophical  language  ; and  it  now  appears  to  me  equally  clear, 
upon  a further  acquaintance  with  the  short  fragments  which  he  has  left 
behind  him,  that,  if  he  did  not  lead  the  way  to  the  attempt  made  by  Dr. 
Wallis  to  teach  the  dumb  to  speak,  he  had  conceived  views  with  respect 
to  the  means  of  instructing  them,  far  more  profound  and  comprehensive 
than  any  rve  meet  with  in  the  works  of  that  learned  writer  prior  to  the 
date  of  Dalgarno’s  publications.  On  his  claims  in  these  two  instances,  I 
forbear  to  enlarge  at  present ; but  I can  not  deny  myself  the  satisfaction 
of  transcribing  a few  paragraphs  in  justification  of  what  I have  already 
stated  with  respect  to  the  remarkable  coincidence  between  some  of  his 
theoretical  deductions,  and  the  practical  results  of  the  French  Academician. 

“ ‘I  conceive  there  might  be  successful  addresses  made  to  a dumb  child, 
even  in  its  cradle,  when  he  begins  risu  cognoscere  matrem,  if  the  mother 
or  nurse  had  but  as  nimble  a hand,  as  commonly  they  have  a tongue.  For 
instance,  I doubt  not  but  the  words  hand,  foot,  dog,  cat,  hat,  &c.,  written 
fair,  and  as  often  presented  to  the  deaf  child’s  eye,  pointing  from  the  words 
to  the  things,  and  vice  versa,  as  the  blind  child  hears  them  spoken,  would 
be  known  and  remembered  as  soon  by  the  one  as  the  other ; and  as  I 
think  the  eye  to  be  as  docile  as  the  ear,  so  neither  see  I any  reason  but 
the  hand  might  be  made  as  tractable  an  organ  as  the  tongue,  and  as  soon 
brought  to  form,  if  not  fair,  at  least  legible  characters,  as  the  tongue  to 
imitate  and  echo  back  articulate  sounds.’  1 The  difficulties  of  learning  to 
read  on  the  common  plan,  are  so  great,  that  one  may  justly  wonder  how 
young  ones  come  to  get  over  them.  Now,  the  deaf  child,  under  his  moth- 
er’s tuition,  passes  securely  by  all  these  rocks  and  quicksands.  The  dis- 
tinction of  letters,  their  names,  their  powers,  their  order,  the  dividing 
words  into  syllables,  and  of  them  again  making  words,  to  which  may  be 
added  tone  and  accent — none  of  these  puzzling  niceties  hinder  his  progress. 
It  is  true,  after  he  had  passed  the  discipline  of  the  nursery,  and  comes  to 
learn  grammatically,  then  he  must  begin  to  learn  to  know  letters  written, 
by  their  figures,  number,  and  order.’ 

“ The  same  author  elsewhere  observes,  that  1 the  soul  can  exert  her 
powers  by  the  ministry  of  any  of  the  senses ; and  therefore,  when  she  is 
deprived  of  her  principal  secretaries,  the  eye  and  ear,  then  she  must  be 
contented  with  the  service  of  her  lackeys  and  scullions,  the  other  senses  ; 
which  are  no  less  true  and  faithful  to  their  mistress  than  the  eye  and  the 
ear,  but  not  so  quick  for  dispatch.’ 

“ I shall  only  add  one  other  sentence,  from  which  my  readers  will  be 
enabled,  without  any  comment  of  mine,  to  perceive  with  what  sagacity 
and  success  this  very  original  thinker  had  anticipated  some  of  the  most 
refined  experimental  conclusions  of  a more  enlightened  age. 

“ ‘ My  design  is  not  to  give  a methodical  system  of  grammatical  rules, 


DALGAENO- 


183 


but  only  such  general  directions,  whereby  an  industrious  tutor  may  bring 
his  deaf  pupil  to  the  vulgar  use  and  b~i  of  a language,  that  so  he  may  be 
the  more  capable  of  receiving  instruction  in  the  Sloti,  from  the  rules  of 
grammar,  when  his  judgment  is  ripe  for  that  study ; or,  more  plainly,  I 
intend  to  bring  the  way  of  teaching  a deaf  man  to  read  and  write,  as  near 
as  possible  to  that  of  teaching  young  ones  to  speak  and  understand  theii 
mother-tongue.’ 

“ In  prosecution  of  this  general  idea,  he  has  treated,  in  one  very  short 
chapter,  of  A Deaf  Man's  Dictionary,  and  in  another  of  A Gramma, 
for  Deaf  Persons,  both  of  them  containing  (under  the  disadvantages  of 
a style  uncommonly  pedantic  and  quaint)  a variety  of  precious  hints,  from 
which,  if  I do  not  deceive  myself,  useful  practical  lights  might  he  derived, 
not  only  by  such  as  may  undertake  the  instruction  of  such  pupils,  as 
Mitchell  or  Massieu,  but  by  all  who  have  any  concern  in  the  tuition  of 
children  during  the  first  stage  of  their  education. 

“That  Dalgarno’s  suggestions  with  respect  to  the  education  of  the 
dumb,  were  not  altogether  useless  to  Dr.  "Wallis,  will,  I think,  be  readily 
admitted  by  those  who  take  the  trouble  to  compare  his  letter  to  Mr.  Bev- 
erley (published  eighteen  years  after  Dalgarno’s  treatise)  with  his  Trac- 
tatus  de  Loqucla,  published  in  1653.  In  this  letter,  some  valuable  re- 
marks are  to  be  found  on  the  method  of  leading  the  dumb  to  the  signifi- 
cation of  words ; and  yet  the  name  of  Dalgarno  is  not  once  mentioned  to 
his  correspondent.” 

"We  may  add,  that  Mr.  Stewart  is  far  more  lenient  than  Dr. 
Wallis’  disingenuity  merited,  Wallis,  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Bever- 
ley, has  plundered  Darlgarno,  even  to  his  finger  alphabet.  It  is 
no  excuse,  though  it  may  in  part  account  for  the  omission  of  Dal- 
garno’s name,  that  Darlgarno,  while  he  made  little  account  in 
general  of  the  teaching  of  the  deaf  and  dumb  to  speak,  had,  in 
his  chapter  on  the  subject,  passed  over  in  total  silence  the  very 
remarkable  exploits  in  this  department  of  “ the  learned  and  my 
worthy  friend  Dr.  Wallis,”  as  he  elsewhere  styles  him.  On  this 
subject,  indeed,  it  seems  to  have  been  fated,  that  every  writer 
should  either  be  ignorant  of,  or  should  ignore,  his  predecessors. 
Bulwer,  Lana,  and  Wallis,  each  professed  himself  original  ; Dal- 
garno entitles  his  Didascalocoplius  “ the  first  (for  what  the  author 
knows)  that  had  been  published  on  the  subject and  Amman, 
whose  Surdns  Loquens  appeared  only  in  1692,  makes  solemn 
oath,  “ that  he  had  found  no  vestige  of  a similar  attempt  in  any 
previous  writer.” 

The  length  to  which  these  observations  have  run  on  the  Philo- 
coplius , would  preclude  our  entering  on  the  subject  of  the  other 
treatise — the  Ars  Signorum , were  this  not  otherwise  impossible 
within  the  limits  of  the  present  notice.  But  indeed  the  most 
general  statement  of  the  problem  of  an  universal  character,  and 


184 


DEAF  AND  DUMB. 


of  the  various  attempts  made  for  its  solution,  could  hardly  be 
comprised  within  the  longest  article.  At  the  same  time,  regard- 
ing as  we  do  the  plan  of  a philosophical  language,  as  a curious 
theoretical  idea,  hut  one  which  can  never  he  practically  realized, 
our  interest  in  the  several  essays  is  principally  limited  to  the 
ingenuity  manifested  by  the  authors,  and  to  the  minor  philosophi- 
cal truths  incidentally  developed  in  the  course  of  these  discussions. 
Of  such,  the  treatise  of  Dalgarno  is  not  barren ; but  that  which 
principally  struck  us,  is  his  remarkable  anticipation,  on  specula- 
tive grounds,  a priori , of  what  has  been  now  articulately  proved, 
a posteriori,  by  the  Dutch  philologers  and  Horne  Tooke  (to  say 
nothing  of  the  ancients) — that  the  parts  of  speech  are  all  reduci- 
ble to  the  noun  and  verb,  or  to  the  noun  alone. 


VI.— IDEALISM. 


WITH  REFERENCE  TO  THE  SCHEME  OF  ARTHUR 

COLLIER. 


(April,  1839.) 

1.  Metaphysical  Tracts  by  English  Philosophers  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century.  Prepared  for  the  Press  by  the  late  Rev.  Samuel 
Parr,  D.D.  8vo.  London : 1837. 

2.  Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  the  Rev  Arthur  Collier, 
M.A.,  Piector  of  Langford  Magna , in  the  County  of  Wilts. 
From  A.D.  1704,  to  A.D.  1732.  With  some  Account  of  his 
Family.  By  Robert  Benson,  M.A.  8vo.  London  : 1837. 

We  deem  it  our  duty  to  call  attention  to  these  publications : 
for  in  themselves  they  are  eminently  deserving  of  the  notice  of 
the  few  who  in  this  country  take  an  interest  in  these  higher 
speculations  to  which,  in  other  countries,  the  name  of  Philosophy 
is  exclusively  conceded;  and,  at  the  same  time,  they  have  not 
been  ushered  into  the  world  with  those  adventitious  recommenda- 
tions which  might  secure  their  intrinsic  merit  against  neglect. 

The  fortune  of  the  first  is  curious. — It  is  known  to  those  who 
have  made  an  active  study  of  philosophy  and  its  history,  that 
there  are  many  philosophical  treatises  written  by  English  authors 
— in  whole  or  in  part  of  great  value,  but,  at  the  same  time,  of 
extreme  rarity.  Of  these,  the  rarest  are,  in  fact,  frequently  the 
most  original : for  precisely  in  proportion  as  an  author  is  in  ad- 
vance of  his  age,  is  it  likely  that  his  works  will  be  neglected  ; and 
the  neglect  of  contemporaries  in  general  consigns  a book — espe- 
cially a small  book — if  not  protected  by  accidental  concomitants, 
at  once  to  the  tobacconist  or  tallow-chandler.  This  is  more  par- 
ticularly the  case  with  pamphlets,  philosophical,  and  at  the  same 
time  polemical.  Of  these  we  are  acquainted  with  some,  extant 
perhaps  only  in  one  or  two  copies,  which  display  a metaphysical 


186 


IDEALISM. 


talent  unappreciated  in  a former  age,  but  which  would  command 
the  admiration  of  the  present.  Nay,  even  of  English  philosophers 
of  the  very  highest  note  (strange  to  say!)  there  are  now  actually 
lying  unknown  to  their  editors,  biographers,  and  fellow-metaphy- 
sicians, published  treatises,  of  the  highest  interest  and  import- 
ance ; as  of  Cudworth,  Berkeley,  Collins,  &c.] 

We  have  often,  therefore,  thought  that,  were  there  with  us  a 
public  disposed  to  indemnify  the  cost  of  such  a publication,  a col- 
lection, partly  of  treatises,  partly  of  extracts  from  treatises,  by 
English  metaphysical  writers,  of  rarity  and  merit,  would  be  one 
of  no  inconsiderable  importance.  In  any  other  country  than 
Britain,  such  a publication  would  be  of  no  risk  or  difficulty. 
Almost  every  nation  of  Europe,  except  our  own,  has,  in  fact,  at 
present  similar  collections  in  progress — only  incomparably  more 
ambitious.  Among  others,  there  are  in  Germany  the  Corpus 
Philosophorum,  by  G-froerer ; in  France,  the  Bibliotheque  Philo- 
sophique  dies  Temps  Modernes,  by  Bouillet  and  Gamier ; and 
in  Italy,  the  Collezione  de'  Classici  Metafisici,  &c.  Nay,  in  this 
country  itself,  we  have  publishing  societies  for  every  department 
of  forgotten  literature — except  Philosophy. 

But  in  Britain,  which  does  not  even  possess  an  annotated  edi- 
tion of  Locke — in  England,  where  the  Universities  teach  the 
little  philosophy  they  still  nominally  attempt,  like  the  catechism, 
by  rote,  what  encouragement  could  such  an  enterprise  obtain  ? 
It  did  not,  therefore,  surprise  us,  when  we  learnt  that  the  pub- 
lisher of  the  two  works  under  review — when  he  essayed  what, 
in  the  language  of  “ the  trade ” is  called  “ to  subscribe'1'1  The 
Metaphysical  Tracts,  found  his  brother  booksellers  indisposed  to 
venture  even  on  a single  copy. — Now,  what  was  the  work  which 
our  literary  purveyors  thus  eschewed  as  wormwood  to  British 
taste  ? 

The  late  Dr.  Parr,  whose  erudition  was  as  unexclusive  as  pro- 
found, had,  many  years  previous  to  his  death,  formed  the  plan  of 
reprinting  a series  of  the  rarer  metaphysical  treatises,  of  English 
authorship,  which  his  remarkable  library  contained.  With  this 
view,  he  had  actually  thrown  off  a small  impression  of  five  such 
tracts,  with  an  abridgment  of  a sixth;  but  as  these  probably 
formed  only  a part  of  his  intended  collection,  which,  at  the  same 
time  it  is  known  he  meant  to  have  prefaced  by  an  introduction, 
containing,  among  other  matters,  an  historical  disquisition  on 
Idealism,  with  special  reference  to  the  philosophy  of  Collier,  the 


ENGLISH  INDIFFERENCE  TO  PHILOSOPHY. 


187 


publication  was  from  time  to  time  delayed,  until  its  completion 
was  finally  frustrated  by  his  death.  When  his  library  was  subse- 
quently sold,  the  impression  of  the  six  treatises  was  purchased 
by  Mr.  Lumley,  a respectable  London  bookseller ; and.  by  him 
has  recently  been  published  under  the  title  which  stands  as  Num- 
ber First  at  the  head  of  this  article. 

The  treatises  reprinted  in  this  collection  are  the  following : 

‘ 1 . Claris  Universalis ; or  a new  Inquiry  after  Truth : being  a 
demonstration  of  the  non-existence  or  impossibility  of  an  external  ivorld. 
By  Arthur  Collier,  Hector  of  Langford  Magna,  near  Sarum.  London  : 
1713. 

2.  A Specimen  of  True  Philosophy ; in  a discourse  on  Genesis,  the 
first  chapter  and  the  first  verse.  By  Arthur  Coliier,  Hector  of  Langford 
Magna,  near  Sarum,  Wilts.  Not  improper  to  be  bound  up  with  his 
Claris  Universalis.  Sarum  : 1730. 

3.  (An  abridgement,  by  Dr.  Parr,  of  the  doctrines  maintained  by  Col- 
lier in  his)  Logology , or  Treatise  on  the  Logos,  in  seven  sermons  on  John  1. 
verses  1,  2,  3,  14,  together  with  an  Appendix  on  the  same  subject.  1732. 

4.  Conjecturce  qucedam  de  Sensu,  Motu,  et  Idearum  generatione. 
(This  was  first  published  by  David  Hartley  as  an  appendix  to  his  Epistol- 
ary Dissertation,  De  Lithontriptico  a J.  Stephens  nuper  ixrvento  (Leyden, 
1741,  Bath,  1746);  and  contains  the  principles  of  that  psychological 
theory  which  he  afterward  so  fully  developed  in  his  observations  on  Man.) 

5.  An  Inquiry  into  the  Origin  of  the  Human  Appetites  and  Ajfec- 
tions,  shoiving  how  eoxli  arises  from  Association,  with  an  account  of 
the  entrance  of  Moral  Evil  into  the  world.  To  which  are  added  some 
remarks  on  the  independent  scheme  which  deduces  all  obligation  on  God’s 
part  and  man’s  from  certain  abstract  relations,  truth,  &c.  Written  for 
the  use  of  the  young  gentlemen  at  the  Universities.  Lincoln  : 1747. 
(The  author  is  yet  unknown.) 

6.  Man  in  quest  of  himself ; or  a defense  of  the  Individuality  of  the 
Human  Mind,  or  Self.  Occasioned  by  some  remarks  in  the  Monthly 
Review  for  July,  1763,  on  a note  in  Search’s  Freewill.  By  Cuthbert 
Comment,  Gent.  London  : 1763.  (The  author  of  this  is  Search  himself, 
that  is,  Mr.  Abraham  Tucker.)” 

These  tracts  are  undoubtedly  well  worthy  of  notice  ; but  to 
the  first — the  Claris  Universalis  of  Collier — as  by  far  the  most 
interesting  and  important,  we  shall  at  present  confine  the  few 
observations  which  we  can  afford  space  to  make.1 

This  treatise  is  in  fact  one  not  a little  remarkable  in  the  history 
of  philosophy ; for  to  Collier  along  with  Berkeley  is  due  the  honor 
of  having  first  explicitly  maintained  a theory  of  Absolute  Ideal- 
ism ; and  the  Claris  is  the  work  in  which  that  theory  is  devel- 


1 [It  never  rains  hut  it  pours.  Collier’s  Claris  was  subsequently  reprinted  in  a 
very  handsome  form,  by  a literary  association  in  Edinburgh.  Would  that  the  books 
wanting  reimpression,  were  first  dealt  with  !] 


188 


IDEALISM. 


oped.  The  fortune  of  this  treatise,  especially  in  its  own  country 
has  been  very  different  from  its  deserts.  Though  the  negation 
of  an  external  world  had  been  incidentally  advanced  by  Berkeley 
in  his  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge  some  three  years  prior  to  the 
appearance  of  the  Clavis  Universalis , with  which  the  publication 
of  his  Dialogues  betiveen  Hylas  and  Philonous  was  simultaneous ; 
it  is  certain  that  Collier  was  not  only  wholly  unacquainted  with 
Berkeley’s  speculations,  but  had  delayed  promulgating  his  opinion 
till  after  a ten  years’  meditation.  Both  philosophers  are  thus 
equally  original.  They  are  also  nearly  on  a level  in  scientific  talent ; 
for,  comparing  the  treatise  of  Collier  with  the  writings  of  Berkeley, 
we  find  it  little  inferior  in  metaphysical  acuteness  or  force  of 
reasoning,  however  deficient  it  may  be  in  the  graces  of  composi- 
tion, and  the  variety  of  illustration,  by  which  the  works  of  his 
more  accomplished  rival  are  distinguished.  But  how  dispropor- 
tioned  to  their  relative  merits  has  been  the  reputation  of  the  two 
philosophers ! While  Berkeley’s  became  a name  memorable 
throughout  Europe,  that  of  Collier  was  utterly  forgotten  : — it 
appears  in  no  British  biography ; and  is  not  found  even  on  the 
list  of  local  authors  in  the  elaborate  history  of  the  county  where 
he  was  born,  and  of  the  parish  where  he  was  hereditary  Rector  ! 
Indeed,  but  for  the  notice  of  the  Clavis  by  Dr.  Reid  (who  appears 
to  have  stumbled  on  it  in  the  College  Library  of  Glasgow),  it  is 
probable  that  the  name  of  Collier  would  have  remained  in  his 
own  country  absolutely  unknown — until,  perhaps,  our  attention 
might  have  been  called  to  his  remarkable  writings,  by  the  consid- 
eration they  had  by  accident  obtained  from  the  philosophers  of 
other  countries.  In  England  the  Clavis  Universalis  was  printed, 
but  there  it  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  been  published ; for  it 
there  never  attracted  the  slightest  observation  ; and  of  the  copies 
now  known  to  be  extant  of  the  original  edition, 

“ numerus  vix  est  totidem,  quot 

Thcbarum  porta,  vel  divitis  ostia,  Nili.” 

The  public  libraries  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  as  Mr.  Benson 
observes,  do  not  possess  a single  copy.  There  are,  however,  two 
in  Edinburgh ; and  in  Glasgow,  as  we  have  noticed,  there  is  an- 
other. 

The  only  country  in  which  the  Clavis  can  truly  be  said  to  have 
been  hitherto  published  is  Germany. 

In  the  sixth  supplemental  volume  of  the  Acta  Eruditonm 
(1717)  there  is  a copious  and  able  abstractof  its  contents.  Through 


FATE  OF  THE  CLAVIS  UNIVEESALIS. 


189 


this  abridgement  the  speculations  of  Collier  became  known — par- 
ticularly to  the  German  philosophers ; and  we  recollect  to  have 
seen  them  quoted,  among  others,  by  Wolf  and  Bilfinger. 

In  1756  the  work  was,  however,  translated,  without  retrench- 
ment, into  German,  by  Professor  Eschenbach  of  Rostock,  along 
with  Berkeley’s  Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous.  These 
two  treatises  constitute  his  “ Collection  of  the  most  distinguished 
Writers  who  deny  the  reality  of  their  own  body  and  of  the  whole 
corporeal  world” — treatises  which  he  accompanied  with  “Coun- 
ter observations,  and  an  Appendix,  in  which  the  existence  of 
matter  is  demonstrated These  are  of  considerable  value.  [I 
have  spoken  of  them  in  Stewart’s  Dissertation,  Note  SS.]  Speak- 
ing of  Collier’s  treatise,  the  translator  tells  us  : — “ If  any  book 
ever  cost  me  trouble  to  obtain  it,  the  Clavis  is  that  book.  Every 
exertion  was  fruitless.  At  length,  an  esteemed  friend,  Mr.  J. 
Selk,  candidate  of  theology  in  Dantzic,  sent  me  the  work,  after 

I had  abandoned  all  hope  of  ever  being  able  to  procure  it 

The  preface  is  wanting  in  the  copy  thus  obtained — a proof  that 
it  was  rummaged,  with  difficulty,  out  of  some  old  book  magazine. 
It  has  not,  therefore,  been  in  my  power  to  present  it  to  the  curious 
reader,  but  I trust  the  loss  may  not  be  of  any  great  importance.” 
— In  regard  to  the  preface,  Dr.  Eschenbach  is,  however,  mis- 
taken ; the  original  has  none. 

By  this  translation,  which  has  now  itself  become  rare,  the 
work  was  rendered  fully  accessible  in  Germany ; and  the  philos- 
ophers of  that  country  did  not  fail  to  accord  to  its  author  the 
honor  due  to  his  metaphysical  talent  and  originality.  The  best 
comparative  view  of  the  kindred  doctrines  of  Collier  and  Berkeley 
is  indeed  given  by  Tennemann  (xi.  399,  sq.)\  whose  meritorious 
History  of  Philosophy,  we  may  observe,  does  justice  to  more  than 
one  English  thinker,  whose  works,  and  even  whose  name,  are  in 
his  own  country  as  if  they  had  never  been ! 

Dr.  Reid’s  notice  of  the  Clavis  attracted  the  attention  of  Mr. 
Du  s' aid  Stewart  and  of  Dr.  Parr  to  the  work;  and  to  the 
nominal  celebrity  which,  through  them,  its  author  has  thus 
tardily  attained,  even  in  Britain,  are  we  indebted  for  Mr.  Ben- 
son’s interesting  Memoirs  of  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Arthur 
Collier:  forming  the  second  of  the  two  publications  prefixed  to 
this  article.  What  was  his  inducement  and  what  his  means  for 
the  execution  of  this  task,  the  biographer  thus  informs  us. 


190 


IDEALISM. 


Arthur  Collier  was  born  in  1680.  He  was  the  son  of  Arthur 
Collier,  Rector  of  Langford-Magna,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Salis- 
bury— a living,  the  advowson  of  which  had  for  about  a century 
been  in  possession  of  the  family,  and  of  which  his  great-grand- 
father, grandfather,  father,  and  himself,  were  successively  incum- 
bents. With  his  younger  brother,  William,  who  was  also  des- 
tined for  the  Church,  and  who  obtained  an  adjoining  benefice,  he 
received  his  earlier  education  in  the  grammar-school  of  Salisbury. 
In  1697  he  was  entered  of  Pembroke  College,  Oxford ; but  in 
the  following  year,  when  his  brother  joined  him  at  the  University, 
they  both  became  members  of  Balliol.  His  father  having  died 
in  1697,  the  family  living  was  held  by  a substitute  until  1704, 
when  Arthur,  having  taken  priest’s  orders,  was  inducted  into  the 
Rectory,  on  the  presentation  of  his  mother.  In  1707  he  married 
a niece  of  Sir  Stephen  Fox ; and  died  in  1732,  leaving  his  wife, 
with  two  sons  and  two  daughters,  in  embarrassed  circumstances. 
Of  the  sons : — Arthur  became  a civilian  of  some  note  at  the  Com- 
mons ; and  Charles  rose  in  the  army  to  the  rank  of  Colonel.  Of 
the  daughters  : — Jane  was  the  clever  authoress  of  the  Art  of  In- 
geniously Tormenting ; and  Mary  obtained  some  celebrity  from 
having  accompanied  Fielding,  as  his  wife’s  friend,  in  the  voyage 
which  he  made  in  quest  of  health  to  Lisbon.  Collier’s  family  is 
now  believed  to  be  extinct. 

Besides  the  Clavis  Universalis  (1713),  The  Specimen  of  True 
Philosophy  (1730),  and  the  Logology  (1732),  Collier  was  the 
author  of  two  published  Sermons  on  controversial  points,  which 
have  not  been  recovered.  Of  his  manuscript  works  the  remains 
are  still  considerable,  but  it  is  probable  that  the  greater  propor- 
tion has  perished.  Our  author  was  hardly  less  independent  in 
his  religious,  than  in  his  philosophical  speculations.  In  the  latter 
he  was  an  Idealist ; in  the  former,  an  Arian  (like  Clarke) — an 
Apollinarian — and  a Pligh  Churchman,  on  grounds  which  high 
churchmen  could  not  understand.  Of  Collier  as  a parish  priest 
and  a theologian,  Mr.  Benson  supplies  us  with  much  interesting 
information.  But  it  is  only  as  a metaphysician  that  we  at  present 
consider  him ; and  in  this  respect  the  Memoirs  form  a valuable 
supplement  to  the  Clavis.  Besides  a series  of  letters  in  exposi- 
tion of  his  philosophical  system,  they  afford  us,  what  is  even  more 
important,  an  insight  into  the  course  of  study  by  which  Collier 
was  led  to  his  conclusion.  With  philosophical  literature  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  at  all  extensively  conversant.  His  writ- 


COLLIER’S  BIOGRAPHY. 


191 


ings  betray  no  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  works  of  the  great 
thinkers  of  antiquity;  and  the  compends  of  the  German  Scheib- 
lerus  and  of  the  Scottish  Baronius,  apparently  supplied  him  with 
all  that  he  knew  of  the  Metaphysic  of  the  Schools.  Locke  is 
never  once  alluded  to.  Descartes  and  Mallebranche,  and  his 
neighbor  Mr.  Norris,  were  the  philosophers  whom  he  seems  prin- 
cipally to  have  studied ; and  their  works,  taken  by  themselves, 
were  precisely  those  best  adapted  to  conduct  an  untrammeled 
mind  of  originality  and  boldness  to  the  result  at  which  he  actually 
arrived. 

"Without  entering  on  any  general  consideration  of  the  doctrine 
of  Idealism,  or  attempting  a regular  analysis  of  the  argument  of 
Collier,  we  hazard  a few  remarks  on  that  theory — simply  with 
the  view  of  calling  attention  to  some  of  the  peculiar  merits  of  our 
author. 

Mankind  in  general  believe  that  an  external  world  exists , only 
because  they  believe  that  they  immediately  know  it  as  existent. 
As  they  believe  that  they  themselves  exist  because  conscious  of  a 
self  or  ego  ; so  they  believe  that  something  different  from  them- 
selves exists,  because  they  believe  that  they  are  also  conscious 
of  this  not-self  or  non-ego. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  existence  of 
the  external  world  can  not  be  doubted,  if  we  admit  that  we  do,  as 
we  naturally  believe  we  do — know  it  immediately  as  existent. 
If  the  fact  of  the  knowledge  be  allowed,  the  fact  of  the  existence 
can  not  be  gainsaid.  The  former  involves  the  latter. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  it  is  hardly  less  manifest,  that  if  our 
natural  belief  in  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  an  external 
world  be  disallowed  as  false,  that  our  natural  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a world  can  no  longer  be  founded  on  as  true.  Yet, 
marvelous  to  say,  this  has  been  very  generally  done. 

For  reasons  to  which  we  can  not  at  present  advert,  it  has  been 
almost  universally  denied  by  philosophers,  that  in  sensitive  per- 
ception we  are  conscious  of  any  external  reality.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  have  maintained,  with  singular  unanimity,  that  what 
we  are  immediately  cognitive  of  in  that  act,  is  only  an  ideal  ob- 
ject in  the  mind  itself.  In  so  far  as  they  agree  in  holding  this 
opinion,  philosophers  may  be  called  Idealists  in  contrast  to  man- 
kind in  general,  and  a few  stray  speculators  who  may  be  called 
Realists — Natural  Realists. 

In  regard  to  the  relation  or  import  of  this  ideal  object,  philoso- 


192 


IDEALISM. 


pliers  are  divided ; and  this  division  constitutes  two  great  and 
opposing  opinions  in  philosophy.  On  the  one  hand,  the  majority 
have  maintained  that  the  ideal  object  of  which  the  mind  is  con- 
scious, is  vicarious  or  representative  of  a real  object,  unknown 
immediately,  or  as  existing,  and  known  only  mediately  through 
this  its  ideal  substitute.  These  philosophers,  thus  holding  the 
existence  of  an  external  world — a world,  however,  unknown  in 
itself,  and  therefore  asserted  only  as  an  hypothesis,  may  he  appro- 
priately styled  Cosmothetic  Idealists — Hypothetical  or  Assumptive 
Realists.  On  the  other  hand,  a minority  maintain,  that  the  ideal 
object  has  no  external  prototype ; and  they  accordingly  deny  the 
existence  of  any  external  world.  These  may  be  denominated  the 
Absolute  Idealists. 

Each  of  these  great  genera  of  Idealists  is,  however,  divided 
and  subdivided  into  various  subordinate  species. 

The  Cosmothetic  Idealists  fall  primarily  into  two  classes,  inas- 
much as  some  view  the  ideal  or  representative  object  to  be  a 
tertium  quid  different  from  the  percipient  mind  as  from  the 
represented  object ; while  others  regard  it  as  only  a modification 
of  the  mind  itself — as  only  the  percipient  act  considered  as  repre- 
sentative of,  or  relative  to,  the  supposed  external  reality.  The 
former  of  these  classes  is  again  variously  subdivided,  according 
as  theories  may  differ  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
vicarious  object ; as  whether  it  be  material  or  immaterial — whe- 
ther it  come  from  without  or  rise  from  within — whether  it  ema- 
nate from  the  external  reality  or  from  a higher  source — whether 
it  be  infused  by  God  or  other  hyperphysical  intelligences,  or 
whether  it  be  a representation  in  the  Deity  himself — whether  it 
be  innate,  or  whether  it  be  produced  by  the  mind,  on  occasion 
of  the  presence  of  the  material  object  within  the  sphere  of  sense, 
&c.  &c. 

Of  Absolute  Idealism  only  two  principal  species  are  possible ; 
at  least,  only  two  have  been  actually  manifested  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  ; — the  Theistic  and  the  Egoistic.  The  former  sup- 
poses that  the  Deity  presents  to  the  mind  the  appearances  which 
we  are  determined  to  mistake  for  an  external  world ; the  latter 
supposes  that  these  appearances  are  manifested  to  consciousness, 
in  conformity  to  certain  unknown  laws,  by  the  mind  itself.  The 
Theistic  Idealism  is  again  subdivided  into  three;  according  as 
God  is  supposed  to  exhibit  the  phenomena  in  question  in  his  own 
substance — to  infuse  into  the  percipient  mind  representative  en- 


IDEALISM  IN  GENERAL. 


193 


tities  different  from  its  own  modification — or  to  determine  the  ego 
itself  to  an  illusive  representation  of  the  non-ego.1 

Now  it  is  easily  shown,  that  if  the  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism 
he  abandoned — if  it  be  admitted,  or  proved,  that  we  are  deceived 
in  our  belief  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  the 
mind  ; then  Absolute  Idealism  is  a conclusion  philosophically 
inevitable,  the  assumption  of  an  external  world  being  now  an 
assumption  which  no  necessity  legitimates,  and  which  is  there- 
fore philosophically  inadmissible.  On  the  law  of  parsimony  it 
must  be  presumed  null. 

It  is,  however,  historically  true,  that  Natural  Realism  had  been 
long  abandoned  by  philosophers  for  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  before 
the  grounds  on  which  this  latter  dootrine  rests  were  shown  to  be 
unsound.  These  grounds  are  principally  the  following : 

1.) — In  the  first  place,  the  natural  belief  in  the  existence  of  an 
external  world  was  allowed  to  operate  even  when  the  natural 
belief  of  our  immediate  knowledge  of  such  a world  was  argued 
to  be  false.  It  might  be  thought  that  philosophers,  when  they 
maintained  that  one  original  belief  was  illusive,  would  not  con- 
tend that  another  was  veracious — still  less  that  they  would  as- 
sume, as  true,  a belief  which  existed  only  as  the  result  of  a belief 
which  they  assumed  to  be  false.  But  this  they  did.  The  Cos- 
mothetic Idealists,  all  deny  the  validity  of  our  natural  belief  in 
our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  external  things  ; but  we  find 
the  majority  of  them,  at  the  same  time,  maintaining  that  such 
existence  must  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  our  natural  belief 
of  its  reality.  And  yet,  the  latter  belief  exists  only  in  and  through 
the  former;  and  if  the  former  be  held  false,  it  is,  therefore,  of 
all  absurdities  the  greatest  to  view  the  latter  as  true.  Thus 
Descartes,  after  arguing  that  mankind  are  universally  deluded 
in  their  conviction  that  they  have  any  immediate  knowledge  of 
aught  beyond  the  modifications  of  their  own  minds  ; again  argues 
that  the  existence  of  an  external  world  must  be  admitted — 
because,  if  it  do  not  exist,  God  deceives,  in  impressing  on  us  a 
belief  in  its  reality  ; but  God  is  no  deceiver  ; therefore,  &c.  This 
reasoning  is  either  good  for  nothing,  or  good  for  more  than  Des- 
cartes intended.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  if  God  be  no  deceiver, 
he  did  not  deceive  us  in  our  natural  belief  that  we  knew  some- 

1 [For  a more  detailed  view  of  these  distinctions,  see  Diss.  on  Reid,  pp.  816-819  ; 
Compare  also  above,  pp.  61,  sy.] 


N 


194 


IDEALISM. 


thing  more  than  the  mere  modes  of  self;  hut  then  the  funda- 
mental position  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  is  disproved  : and 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  this  position  he  admitted,  Grod  is  thereby 
confessed  to  be  a deceiver,  who,  having  deluded  us  in  the  belief 
on  which  our  belief  of  an  external  world  is  founded,  can  not  be 
consistently  supposed  not  to  delude  us  in  this  belief  itself.  Such 
melancholy  reasoning  is,  however,  from  Descartes  to  Dr.  Brown, 
the  favorite  logic  by  which  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists  in  general 
attempt  to  resist  the  conclusion  of  the  Absolute  Idealists.  But 
on  this  ground  there  is  no  tenable  medium  between  Natural 
Realism  and  Absolute  Idealism. 

It  is  curious  to  notice  the  different  views,  which  Berkeley  and 
Collier , our  two  Absolute  Idealists,  and  which  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke 
the  acutest  of  the  Hypothetical  Realists  with  whom  they  both 
came  in  contact,  took  of  this  principle. 

Clarke  was,  apparently  too  sagacious  a metaphysician  not  to 
see  that  the  proof  of  the  reality  of  an  external  world  reposed 
mainly  on  our  natural  belief  of  its  reality ; and  at  the  same  time 
that  this  natural  belief  could  not  be  pleaded  in  favor  of  his  hypo- 
thesis by  the  Cosmothetic  Idealist.  He  was  himself  conscious, 
that  his  philosophy  afforded  him  no  arms  against  the  reasoning 
of  the  Absolute  Idealist ; whose  inference  he  was,  however,  in- 
clined neither  to  admit,  nor  able  to  show  why  he  should  not. 
Whiston,  in  his  Memoirs,  speaking  of  Berkeley  and  his  Idealism, 
says  : — “ He  was  pieased  to  send  Dr.  Clarke  and  myself,  each  of 
us,  a book.  After  we  had  both  perused  it,  I went  to  Dr.  Clarke 
and  discoursed  with  him  about  it  to  this  effect: — That  I,  being 
not  a metaphysician,  was  notable  to  answer  Mr.  Berkeley’s  subtle 
premises,  though  I did  not  at  all  believe  his  absurd  conclusion. 
I,  therefore,  desired  that  he,  who  was  deep  in  such  subtilities, 
but  did  not  appear  to  believe  Mr.  Berkeley’s  conclusions,  would 
answer  him ; ivhich  task  he  declined .”  Many  years  after  this, 
as  we  are  told  in  the  Life  of  Bishop  Berkeley,  prefixed  to  his 
works  : — There  was,  at  Mr.  Addison’s  instance,  a meeting  of 
Drs.  Clarke  and  Berkeley  to  discuss  this  speculative  point ; and 
great  hopes  were  entertained  from  the  conference.  The  parties, 
however,  separated  without  being  able  to  come  to  any  agTeement. 
Dr.  Berkeley  declared  himself  not  well  satisfied  with  the  conduct 
of  his  antagonist  on  the  occasion,  tvho,  though  he  could  not  an- 
siver,  had  not  candor  enough  to  own  himself  convinced.” 

Mr.  Benson  affords  us  a curious  anecdote  to  the  same  effect  in 


IDEALISM  IN  GENERAL. 


195 


a letter  of  Collier  to  Clarke.  From  it  we  learn — that  when 
Collier  originally  presented  his  Clavis  to  the  Doctor,  through  a 
friend,  on  reading  the  title,  Clarke  good-humoredly  said  : — “ Poor 
gentleman  ! I pity  him.  He  would  be  a philosopher,  hut  has 
chosen  a strange  task  ; for  he  can  neither  prove  his  point  himself 
nor  can  the  contrary  be  proved  against  him.” 

In  regard  to  the  two  Idealists  themselves,  each  dealt  with  this 
ground  of  argument  in  a very  different  way ; and  it  must  be 
confessed  that  in  this  respect  Collier  is  favorably  contrasted  with 
Berkeley. — Berkeley  attempts  to  enlist  the  natural  belief  of 
mankind  in  his  favor  against  the  Hypothetical  Realism  of  the 
philosophers.  It  is  true,  natural  belief  is  opposed  to  scientific 
opinion.  Mankind  are  not,  however,  as  Berkeley  reports,  Ideal- 
ists. In  this  he  even  contradicts  himself ; for,  if  they  he,  in 
truth  of  his  opinion,  why  does  he  dispute  so  anxiously,  so  learn- 
edly against  tham  ? — Collier , on  the  contrary,  consistently  rejects 
all  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  The  motto  of  his 
work,  from  Mallebranche,  is  the  watchword  of  his  philosophy 
“ Vulgi  assensus  et  approbatio  circa  materiam  difficilem,  est  cer- 
tum  argumentum  falsitatis  istius  opinionis  cui  assentitur .”  And 
in  his  answer  to  the  Cartesian  argument  for  the  reality  of  matter, 
from  “ that  strong  and  natural  inclination  which  all  men  have 
to  believe  in  an  external  world;”  he  shrewdly  remarks  on  the 
inconsistency  of  such  a reasoning  at  such  hands  Strange ! 
That  a person  of  Mr.  Descartes’  sagacity  should  he  found  in  so 
plain  and  palpable  an  oversight ; and  that  the  late  ingenious  Mr. 
Norris  should  he  found  treading  in  the  same  track,  and  that  too 
upon  a solemn  and  particular  disquisition  of  this  matter.  That 
while,  on  the  one  hand,  they  contend  against  the  common  inclina- 
tion or  prejudice  of  mankind,  that  the  visible  world  is  not  ex- 
ternal, they  should  yet  appeal  to  this  same  common  inclination 
for  the  truth  or  being  of  an  external  world,  which  on  their  prin- 
ciples must  he  said  to  be  invisible  ; and  for  which  therefore  (they 
must  needs  have  known  if  they  had  considered  it),  there  neither 
is,  nor  can  be,  any  kind  of  inclination.”  (P.  81.) 

2.) — In  the  second  place,  it  was  very  generally  assumed  in 
antiquity,  and  during  the  middle  ages,  that  an  external  world 
was  a supposition  necessary  to  render  possible  the  fact  of  our 
sensitive  cognition.  The  philosophers  who  held,  that  the  imme- 
diate object  of  perception  was  an  emanation  from  an  outer  reality, 
and  that  the  hypothesis  of  the  latter  was  requisite  to  account  for 


196 


IDEALISM. 


the  phenomenon  of  the  former — their  theory  involved  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world  as  its  condition.  But  from  the  moment 
that  the  necessity  of  this  condition  was  abandoned,  and  this  was 
done  by  many  even  of  the  scholastic  philosophers  ; — from  the 
moment  that  sensible  species  or  the  vicarious  objects  in  percep- 
tion were  admitted  to  be  derivable  from  other  sources  than  the 
external  objects  themselves,  as  from  G-od,  or  from  the  mind  it- 
self : from  that  moment  we  must  look  for  other  reasons  than  the 
preceding,  to  account  for  the  remarkable  fact,  that  it  was  not 
until  after  the  commencement  of  the  eighteenth  century  that  a 
doctrine  of  Absolute  Idealism  was,  without  communication,  con- 
temporaneously promulgated  by  Berkeley  and  Collier. 

3.) — In  explanation  of  this  fact,  we  must  refer  to  a third 
ground,  which  has  been  wholly  overlooked  by  the  historians  of 
philosophy  ; but  which  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  account,  would 
we  explain  how  so  obvious  a conclusion  as  the  negation  of  the 
existence  of  an  outer  world,  on  the  negation  of  our  immediate 
knowledge  of  its  existence,  should  not  have  been  drawn  by  so 
acute  a race  of  speculators  as  the  philosophers  of  the  middle  ages, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  great  philosophers  of  a more  recent  epoch. 
This  ground  is  : — That  the  doctrine  of  Idealism  is  incompatible 
with  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist.  It  is  a very  erro- 
neous statement  of  Reid,  in  which,  however,  he  errs  only  in  com- 
mon with  other  philosophers,  that  11  during  the  reign  of  the  Peri- 
patetic doctrine , we  find  no  appearance  of  skepticism  about  the 
existence  of  matter .”  On  the  contrary,  during  the  dominance  of 
the  scholastic  philosophy,  we  find  that  the  possibility  of  the  non- 
existence of  matter  was  contemplated  ; nay,  that  the  reasons  in 
support  of  this  supposition  were  expounded  in  all  their  cogency. 
We  do  not,  however,  find  the  conclusion  founded  on  these  reasons 
formally  professed.  And  why  ? Because  this  conclusion,  though 
philosophically  proved,  was  theologically  disproved : and  such 
disproof  was  during  the  middle  ages  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
overt  recognition  of  any  speculative  doctrine ; for  with  all  its 
ingenuity  and  boldness,  philosophy  during  these  ages  was  con- 
fessedly in  the  service  of  the  church — it  was  always  Philosphia 
ancillans  Theologice.  And  this  because  the  service  was  volun- 
tary ; a thralldom  indeed  of  love.  Now,  if  the  reality  of  matter 
were  denied,  there  would,  in  general,  be  denied  the  reality  of 
Christ'’ s incarnation;  and  in  particular  the  transubstantiation 
into  his  body  of  the  elements  of  bread  and  ivine.  There  were 


CATHOLICISM  INCONSISTENT  WITH  IDEALISM. 


197 


other  theological  reasons  indeed,  and  these  not  without  their 
weight ; hut  this  was,  perhaps,  the  only  one  insuperable  to  a 
Catholic. 

We  find  the  influence  of  this  reason  at  work  in  very  ancient 
times.  It  was  employed  by  the  earlier  Fathers,  and  more  espe- 
cially in  opposition  to  Marcion’s  doctrine  of  the  merely  phenome- 
nal incarnation  of  our  Saviour. — “ Non  licet”  (says  Tertullian  in 
his  book  De  Anivia,  speaking  of  the  evidence  of  sense — “ non 
licet  nobis  in  dubium  sensus  istus  revocare,  ne  et  in  Christo  de 
fide  eorum  deliberetur  : ne  forte  dicatur,  quod  falso  Satanam  pro- 
spectant de  cselo  preecipitatum ; aut  falso  vocem  Patris  auaierit 
de  ipso  testificatam ; aut  deceptus  sit  cum  Petri  socrum  tetegrit. 
Sic  et  Marcion  phantasma  eum  maluit  credere,  totius  cor- 
poris in  illo  dedignatus  veritatem.”  (Cap.  xvii.)  And  in  his 
book,  Adversus  Marcionem : — “ Ideo  Christus  non  erat  quod  vide- 
batur,  et  quod  erat  mentiebatur ; caro,  nec  caro ; homo,  nec 
homo : proinde  Deus  Christus,  nec  Deus ; cur  enim  non  etiam 
Dei  phantasma  portaverit  ? An  credam  ei  de  interiore  substantia, 
qui  sit  de  exteriore  frustratus?  Q,uomodo  verax  habebitur  in 
occulto,  tam  fallax  repertus  in  aperto  ? . . . Jam  nunc  quum  men- 
dacium  deprehenditur  Christus  caro ; sequitur  ut  omnia  quse  per 
carnem  Christi  gesta  sunt,  mendacio  gesta  sint — congressus,  con- 
tactus,  convictus,  ipsse  quoque  virtutes.  Si  enim  tangendo  ali- 
quern,  liberavit  a vitio,  non  potest  vere  actum  credi,  sine  corporis 
ipsius  veritate.  Nihil  solidum  ab  inani,  nihil  plenum  a vacuo 
perfici  licet.  Putativus  habitus,  putativus  actus ; imaginarius 
operator,  imaginariae  operae.”  (Lib.  iii.  c.  8.) — In  like  manner, 
St.  Augustin,  among  many  other  passages  : — “ Si  phantasma 
fuit  corpus  Christi,  fefellit  Christus  ; et  si  fefellit,  veritas  non 
est.  Est  autem  veritas  Christus ; non  igitur  phantasma  fuit 
corpus  ejus.”  ( Liber  De  Ixxxiii.  Qucestionibus,  qu.  14.) — And 
so  many  others. 

The  repugnancy  of  the  Catholic  dogma  of  transubstantiation 
with  the  surrender  of  a substantial  prototype  of  the  species  pre- 
sented to  our  sensible  perceptions,  was,  however,  more  fully  and 
precisely  signalized  by  the  Schoolmen ; as  may  be  seen  in  the 
polemic  waged  principally  on  the  great  arena  of  scholastic  subtil- 
ity— the  commentaries  on  the  four  books  of  the  Sentences  of 
Peter  Lombard.  In  their  commentaries  on  the  first  book,  especi- 
ally, will  be  found  abundant  speculation  of  an  idealistic  tendency. 


198 


IDEALISM. 


The  question  is  almost  regularly  mooted : — May  not  God  pre- 
serve the  species  (the  ideas  of  a more  modern  philosophy)  before 
the  mind , the  external  reality  represented  being  destroyed? — May 
not  God,  in  fact,  object  to  the  sense  the  species  representing  an 
external  world,  that  world , in  reality,  not  existing  ? To  these 
questions  the  answer  is,  always  in  the  first  instance,  affirmative. 
Why  then,  the  possibility,  the  probability  even,  being  admitted, 
was  the  fact  denied.  Philosophically  orthodox,  it  was  theologic- 
ally heretical ; and  their  principal  argument  for  the  rejection  is, 
that  on  such  hypothesis,  the  doctrine  of  a transubstantiated 
eucharist  becomes  untenable.  A change  is  not — can  not  be — 
(spiritually)  real. 

Such  was  the  special  reason,  why  many  of  the  acuter  School- 
men did  not  follow  out  their  general  argument,  to  the  express 
negation  of  matter ; and  such  also  was  the  only  reason,  to  say 
nothing  of  other  Cartesians,  why  Mallebranche  deformed  the 
simplicity  of  his  peculiar  theory  with  such  an  assumptive  hors 
d? oeuvre,  as  an  unknown  and  otiose  universe  of  matter.  It  is, 
indeed,  but  justice  to  that  great  philosopher  to  say — that  if  the 
incumbrance  with  which,  as  a Catholic,  he  was  obliged  to  burden 
it,  be  thrown  off  his  theory,  that  theory  becomes  one  of  Absolute 
Idealism ; and  that,  in  fact,  all  the  principal  arguments  in  sup- 
port of  such  a scheme  are  found  fully  developed  in  his  immortal 
Inquiry  after  Truth.  This  Mallebranche  well  knew  ; and  know- 
ing it,  we  can  easily  understand,  how  Berkeley’s  interview  with 
him  ended  as  it  did.1 

Mallebranche  thus  left  little  for  his  Protestant  successors  to  do. 
They  had  only  to  omit  the  Catholic  excrescence  ; the  reasons  vin- 
dicating this  omission  they  found  collected  and  marshalled  to  their 
hand.  That  Idealism  was  the  legitimate  issue  of  the  Malle- 


1 [I  can  not,  however,  concur  in  the  praise  of  novelty  and  invention,  which  has 
always  been  conceded  to  the  central  theory  of  Mallebranche.  His  “ Vision  of  all  things 
in  the  Deity,”  is,  as  it  appears  to  me,  simply  a transference  to  man  in  the  flesh,  to  the 
Viator,  of  that  mode  of  cognition,  maintained  by  many  of  the  older  Catholic  divines, 
in  explanation  of  how  the  Saints,  as  disembodied  spirits,  can  be  aware  of  human 
invocations,  and,  in  general,  of  what  passes  upon  earth.  “ They  perceive,”  it  is  said, 
“ all  things  in  God.”  So  that,  in  truth,  the  philosophical  theory  of  Mallebranche,  is 
nothing  but  the  extension  of  a theological  hypothesis,  long  common  in  the  schools  ; 
and  with  scholastic  speculations,  Mallebranche  was  even  intimately  acquainted.  This 
hypothesis  I had  once  occasion  to  express  : 

“ Quidquid,  in  his  tenebris  vitas,  te  came  latcbat , 

Nunc  legis  in  magno  cuncta,  beate,  Deo.”] 


LOCKE’S  IDEALISM. 


199 


branchian  doctrine,  was  at  once  seen  by  those  competent  to  meta- 
physical reasoning.  This  was  signalized,  in  general,  by  Bayle, 
and,  what  has  not  been  hitherto  noticed,  by  Locke.1  It  was, 


1 Compare  Locke’s  Examination  of  P.  Mallebranche’s  Opinion  (<j  20.) 

When  on  this  subject,  we  may  clear  up  a point  connected  therewith,  of  some  inter- 
est, in  relation  to  Locke  and  Newton , and  which  has  engaged  the  attention  of  Dr. 
Reid  and  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart. 

Reid,  who  has  overlooked  the  passage  of  Locke  just  referred  to,  says,  in  deducing 
the  history  of  the  Berkeleian  Idealism,  and  after  speaking  of  Mallebranche’s  opinion  : 
“ It  may  seem  strange  that  Locke,  who  wrote  so  much  about  ideas,  should  not  see 
those  consequences  which  Berkeley  thought  so  obviously  deducible  from  that  doctrine. 

There  is,  indeed,  a single  passage  in  Locke’s  essay,  which  may  lead  one  to 

conjecture  that  he  had  a glimpse  of  that  system  which  Berkeley  afterward  advanced, 
but  thought  proper  to  suppress  it  within  his  own  breast.  The  passage  is  in  Book  IV., 
c.  10,  where,  having  proved  the  existence  of  an  eternal,  intelligent  mind,  he  comes  to 
answer  those  who  conceive  that  matter  also  must  be  eternal,  because  we  can  not  con- 
ceive how  it  could  be  made  out  of  nothing ; and,  having  observed  that  the  creation  of 
mind  requires  no  less  power  than  the  creation  of  matter,  he  adds  what  follows  : ‘ Nay, 
possibly,  if  we  could  emancipate  ourselves  from  vulgar  notions,  and  raise  our  thoughts, 
as  far  as  they  would  reach,  to  a closer  contemplation  of  things,  we  might  be  able  to 
aim  at  some  dim  and  seeming  conception,  how  matter  might  at  first  be  made  and  begin 
to  exist,  by  the  power  of  that  eternal  first  Being ; but  to  give  beginning  and  being  to 
a spirit,  would  be  found  a more  inconceivable  effect  of  omnipotent  power.  But  this 
being  what  would,  perhaps,  lead  us  too  far  from  the  notions  on  which  the  philosophy 
now  in  the  world  is  built,  it  would  not  be  pardonable  to  deviate  so  far  from  them,  or 
to  inquire,  so  far  as  grammar  itself  would  authorize,  if  the  common  settled  opinion 
oppose  it ; especially  in  this  place,  where  the  received  doctrine  serves  well  enough  to 
our  present  purpose.’”  Reid  then  goes  on  at  considerable  length  to  show,  that 
“ every  particular  Mr.  Locke  has  hinted  with  regard  to  that  system  which  he  had  in 
his  mind,  but  thought  it  prudent  to  suppress,  tallies  exactly  with  the  system  of  Ber 
keley.”  ( Intellectual  Poivers,  Ess.  II.  ch.  10.) 

Stewart  does  not  coincide  with  Reid.  In  quoting  the  same  passage  of  Locke,  he 
says  of  it,  that  “ when  considered  in  connection  with  some  others  in  his  writings,  it 
would  almost  tempt  one  to  think,  that  a theory  concerning  matter,  somewhat  analogous 
to  that  of  Boscovich,  had  occasionally  passed  through  his  mind  and  then  adduces 
various  reasons  in  support  of  this  opinion,  and  in  opposition  to  Reid’s.  ( Philosophical 
Essays,  Ess.  II.  ch.  1,  p.  63.) 

The  whole  arcanum  in  the  passage  in  question  is,  however,  revealed  by  M.  Coste, 
the  French  translator  of  the  Essay,  and  of  several  other  of  the  works  of  Locke,  with 
whom  the  philosopher  lived  in  the  same  family,  and  on  the  most  intimate  terms,  for  the 
last  seven  years  of  his  life  ; and  who,  though  he  has  never  been  consulted,  affords  often 
the  most  important  information  in  regard  to  Locke's  opinions.  To  this  passage,  there  is 
in  the  fourth  edition  of  Coste’s  translation,  a very  curious  note  appended,  of  which  the 
following  is  an  abstract.  “ Here  Mr.  Locke  excites  our  curiosity  without  being  inclined 
to  satisfy  it.  Many  persons  having  imagined  that  he  had  communicated  to  me  this 
mode  of  explaining  the  creation  of  matter,  requested,  when  my  translation  first  appeared, 
that  I would  inform  them  what  it  was  ; but  I was  obliged  to  confess,  that  Mr.  Locke 
had  not  made  even  me  a partner  in  the  secret.  At  length,  long  after  his  death,  Sir 
Isaac  Neioton,  to  whom  I was  accidentally  speaking  of  this  part  of  Mr.  Locke’s  book, 
discovered  to  me  the  whole  mystery.  He  told  me,  smiling,  that  it  was  he  himself  who 
had  imagined  this  manner  of  explaining  the  creation  of  matter,  and  that  the  thought 
had  struck  him,  one  day,  when  this  question  chanced  to  turn  up  in  a conversation  be- 
tween himself,  Mr.  Locke,  and  the  late  Earl  of  Pembroke.  The  following  is  the  way 
in  which  he  explained  to  them  his  thought : ‘ We  may  be  enabled ’ (he  said)  1 to  form 


200 


IDEALISM. 


therefore,  but  little  creditable  to  the  acuteness  of  Norris , that  he, 
a Protestant,  should  have  adopted  the  Mallebranchian  hypothesis, 
without  rejecting  its  Catholic  incumbrance.  The  honor  of  first 
promulgating  an  articulate  scheme  of  absolute  idealism  was  thus 
left  to  Berkeley  and  Collier ; and  though  both  are  indebted  to 
Mallebranche  for  the  principal  arguments  they  adduce,  each  is 
also  entitled  to  the  credit  of  having  applied  them  with  an  ingen- 
uity peculiar  to  himself. 

It  is  likewise  to  the  credit  of  Collier’s  sagacity  that  he  has 
noticed  (and  he  is  the  only  modern  philosopher,  we  have  found, 
to  have  anticipated  our  observation),  the  incompatibility  of  the 
Catholic  doctrine  of  the  Eucharist  with  the  non-existence  of  mat- 
ter. In  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  work,  in  which  he  speaks 
“ of  the  use  and  consequences  of  the  foregoing  treatise,”  he  enu- 
merates as  one  “particular  usefulness  with  respect  to  religion,” 
the  refutation  it  affords  of  “ the  real  presence  of  Christ’s  body  in 
the  Eucharist,  in  which  the  Papists  have  grafted  the  doctrine  of 
transubstantiation.”  He  says  : 

“ Now  nothing  can  be  more  evident,  than  that  both  the  sound  and  ex- 
plication of  this  important  doctrine  are  founded  altogether  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  external  matter ; so  that,  if  this  be  removed,  there  is  not  any  thing 
left  whereon  to  build  so  much  as  the  appearance  of  a question. — For  if, 
after  this,  it  be  inquired  whether  the  substance  of  the  bread,  in  this 
sacrament,  be  not  changed  into  the  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ,  the 
accidents  or  sensible  appearances  remaining  as  before  ; or  suppose  this 
should  be  affirmed  to  be  the  fact,  or  at  least  possible,  it  may  indeed  be 
shown  to  be  untrue  or  impossible,  on  the  supposition  of  an  external  world, 
from  certain  consequential  absurdities  which  attend  it ; but  to  remove  an 
external  ivorld,  is  to  prick  it  in  its  punctum  saliens,  or  quench  its  very 
vital  flame.  For  if  there  is  no  external  matter,  the  very  distinction  is  lost 
between  the  substance  and  accidents,  or  sensible  species  of  bodies,  and 
these  last  will  become  the  sole  essence  of  material  objects.  So  that,  if 


some  rude  conception  of  the  creation  of  matter,  if  we  suppose  that  God  by  his  power  had 
prevented  the  entrance  of  any  thing  into  a certain  portion  of  pure  space,  which  is  of  its 
nature  penetrable,  eternal,  necessary,  infinite;  for  henceforward  this  portion  of  space 
would  be  endowed  with  impenetrability,  one  of  the  essential  qualities  of  matter : and  as 
pure  space  is  absolutely  uniform,  wc  have  only  again  to  suppose  that  God  communicated 
the  same  impenetrability  to  another  portion  of  space,  and  we  should  then  obtain  in  a cer- 
tain sort  the  notion  of  the  mobility  of  matter,  another  quality  which  is  also  very  essential 
to  it.'  Thus,  then,  we  are  relieved  of  the  embarrassment  of  endeavoring  to  discover 
what  it  was  that  Mr.  Locke  had  deemed  it  advisable  to  conceal  from  his  readers  : for 
the  above  is  all  that  gave  him  occasion  to  tell  us — ‘ if  we  would  raise  our  thoughts  as 
far  as  they  could  reach,  we  might  be  able  to  aim  at  some  dim  and  seeming  conception 
how  matter  might  at  first  be  made,’  ” &c. — This  suffices  to  show  what  was  the  general 
purport  of  Locke’s  expressions,  and  that  Mr.  Stewart’s  conjecture  is  at  least  nearer  to 
the  truth  than  Dr.  Reid’s. 


COLLIER’S  IDEALISM. 


201 


these  are  supposed  to  remain  as  before,  there  is  no  possible  room  for  the 
supposal  of  any  change,  in  that  the  thing  supposed  to  be  changed,  is  here 
shown  to  be  nothing  at  all.”  (P.  95.) 

But  we  must  conclude. — What  has  now  been  said,  in  reference 
to  a part  of  its  contents,  may  perhaps  contribute  to  attract  the 
attention  of  those  interested  in  the  higher  philosophy,  to  this  very 
curious  volume.  We  need  hardly  add,  that  Mr.  Benson’s  Memoirs 
of  Collier  should  be  bound  up  along  with  it. 


LITEBATTJRE. 


I.— EPISTOLiE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM; 

THE  NATIONAL  SATIRE  OF  GERMANY.1 

(March,  1831.) 

Epistolce  Obscurorum  Virorum,  aliaque  aevi  decimi  sexti  moni- 
menta  rarissima. — Die  Briefe  der  Finsterlinge  an  Magister 
Ortuinus  von  Deventer , nebst  andern  sehr  seltenen  Beytraegen 
zur  Litter atur-  Sitten-  und  Kirchengeschichte  des  Sechszehn- 
ter  Jahrhunderts.  Herausgegeben  und  erlaeutert  durch  Dr. 
Ernst  Muench.  8vo.  Leipzig:  1827. 

With  the  purest  identity  of  origin,  the  Hermans  have  shown 
always  the  weakest  sentiment  of  nationality.  Descended  from 
the  same  ancestors,  speaking  a common  language,  unconquered 
by  a foreign  enemy,  and  once  the  subject  of  a general  govern- 
ment, they  are  the  only  people  in  Europe  who  have  passively 
allowed  their  national  unity  to  be  broken  down,  and  submitted, 
like  cattle,  to  be  parceled  and  reparceled  into  flocks,  as  suited 
the  convenience  of  their  shepherds.  The  same  unpatriotic  apathy 
is  betrayed  in  their  literary  as  in  their  political  existence.  In 
other  countries  taste  is  perhaps  too  exclusively  national ; in  Grer- 
many  it  is  certainly  too  cosmopolite.  Teutonic  admiration  seems, 
indeed,  to  be  essentially  centrifugal;  and  literary  partialities 

1 [Translated  into  German  by  Dr.  Vogler,  in  the  Altes  und  Neues  of  1832 ; after 
being  largely  extracted  in  various  other  literary  journals  of  the  Empire.  I am  aware 
of  no  attempt  to  gainsay  the  proof  of  authorship  here  detailed  ; or,  in  general,  the 
justice  of  the  criticism. — A considerable  number  of  additions  have  been  inserted  in 
this  article ; but  these,  as  they  affect  no  personal  interest,  it  has  not  been  thought 
necessary  often  to  distinguish.] 


RISE  OF  HUMANE  STUDIES  IN  GERMANY. 


203 


have  in  the  Empire  inclined  always  in  favor  of  the  foreign.  The 
Germans  were  long  familiar  with  the  literature  of  every  other 
nation,  before  they  thought  of  cultivating,  or  rather  creating,  a 
literature  of  their  own ; and  when  this  was  at  last  attempted, 
6avfj.a  tcov  airovTwv  was  still  the  principle  that  governed  in  the 
experiment.  It  was  essayed,  by  a process  of  foreign  infusion,  to 
elaborate  the  German  tongue  into  a vehicle  of  pleasing  commu- 
nication ; nor  were  they  contented  to  reverse  the  operation,  until 
the  project  had  been  stultified  by  its  issue,  and  the  purest  and 
only  all-sufficient  of  the  modern  languages  degraded  into  a Baby- 
lonish jargon,  without  a parallel  in  the  whole  history  of  speech. 
A counterpart  to  this  overweening  admiration  of  the  strange  and 
distant,  is  the  discreditable  indifference  manifested  by  the  Ger- 
mans to  the  noblest  monuments  of  native  genius.  To  their  eter- 
nal disgrace,  the  works  of  Leibnitz  were  left  to  be  collected  by 
a Frenchman ; while  the  care  denied  by  his  countrymen  to  the 
great  representative  of  German  universality,  was  lavished,  with 
an  eccentric  affection,  on  the  not  more  important  speculations 
of  Giordano  Bruno,  Spinoza,  and  Cudworth.  But  no  neglect, 
even  by  their  own  confession,  has  weighed  so  long  or  so  heavily 
against  the  Germans,  as  the  want  of  a collective  edition  of  the 
works  of  their  great  national  patriot,  Ulrich  von  Hutten,  and 
of  a critical  and  explanatory  edition  of  their  great  national 
satire,  the  Epistol^e  Obscurorum  Virorum.  This  reproach  has, 
in  part,  been  recently  removed.  Dr.  Muench  has  accomplished 
the  one,  and  attempted  the  other ; we  wish  we  could  say — ac- 
complished well,  or  attempted  successfully.  We  speak  at  present 
only  of  the  latter ; and,  as  an  essay  toward  (what  is  still  want- 
ing) an  explanatory  introduction,  shall  premise  a rapid  outline 
of  the  circumstances  which  occasioned  this  celebrated  satire — a 
satire  which,  though  European  in  its  influence,  has  yet,  as  Herder 
justly  observes,  “ effected  for  Germany  incomparably  more, 
than  Hudibras  for  England,  or  Garagantua  for  France,  or  the 
Knight  of  La  Mancha  for  Spain.”  It  gave  the  victory  to  Reuch- 
lin  over  the  Begging  Friars,  and  to  Luther  over  the  Court  of 
Rome. 

The  Italians  excepted,  no  people  took  so  active  a part  in  the 
revival  of  ancient  literature  as  the  Germans  ; yet  in  no  country 
did  the  champions  of  the  new  intelligence  obtain  less  adventitious 
aid  in  their  exertions,  or  encounter  so  formidable  a resistance 
from  the  defenders  of  the  ancient  barbarism.  Germany  did  not, 


204 


EPISTOL^l  OBSCURORUM  VIRORT7M. 


like  Italy  and  France,  allure  the  learned  fugitives  from  Constan- 
tinople, to  transplant  into  her  seminaries  the  language  and  lite- 
rature of  Greece  ; and  though  learning  was  not  here  deprived 
of  all  liberal  encouragement,  still  the  princes  and  nobles  of  the 
Empire  did  not,  as  the  great  Italian  families,  emulate  each  other, 
in  a munificent  patronage  of  letters.  But  what  in  Germany  prin- 
cipally contributed  to  impede  the  literary  reformation,  was  the 
opposition  which  it  met  with  in  the  great  literary  corporations 
themselves.  In  the  other  countries  of  Europe,  especially  in 
France  and  England,  the  first  sparks  of  the  rekindled  light  had 
been  fostered  in  the  universities  ; 1 these  were  in  fact  the  centres 
from  whence  the  new  illumination  was  diffused.  In  Germany, 
on  the  contrary,  the  academic  walls  contained  the  most  resolute 
enemies  of  reform,  and  in  the  universities  were  found  the  last 
strongholds  of  an  effete,  but  intolerant  scholasticism.  Some, 
indeed,  of  the  restorers  of  polite  letters,  taught  as  salaried  or 
extraordinary  instructors  ( professores  conducti ),  in  the  universi- 
ties f?f  Germany  ; but  their  influence  was  personal,  and  the  tole- 
ration which  they  obtained,  precarious.  Dependent  always  on 
the  capricious  patronage  of  the  Prince,  they  were  viewed  as 
intruders  by  those  bodies  who  constituted  and  governed  these 
institutions.  From  them  they  encountered,  not  only  discourage- 
ment, but  oppression ; and  the  biography  of  the  first  scholars 
who  attempted,  by  public  instruction,  to  disseminate  a taste  for 
classical  literature  in  the  great  schools  of  Germany,  exhibits 
little  else  than  a melancholy  series  of  wanderings  and  persecu- 
tions— abandoning  one  university  only,  in  general,  to  be  ejected 
from  another. 

The  restoration  of  classical  literature  (and  classical  literature 
involved  literature  in  general),  was  in  Germany  almost  wholly 
accomplished  by  individual  zeal,  aided,  principally,  by  one  pri- 
vate institution.  This  institution  was  the  conventual  seminary 
of  St.  Agnes,  near  Zwoll,  in  Westphalia,  founded  by  the  pious 
Thomas  a Kempis  ; from  whence,  immediately  or  mediately, 
issued  nearly  the  whole  band  of  those  illustrious  scholars  who, 
in  defiance  of  every  opposing  circumstance,  succeeded  in  rapidly 
elevating  Germany  to  a higher  European  rank  in  letters,  than 


1 No  thanks,  however,  to  the  universities.  They,  of  course,  resisted  the  inno- 
vation. A king  and  a minister,  Francis  and  Wolsey,  determined  the  difference  ; 
but  for  them,  Budseus  and  Colet  might  have  been  persecuted  like  Buschius  and 
Reuchlin. 


RISE  OF  HUMANE  STUDIES  IN  GERMANY. 


205 


(rebarbarized  by  polemical  theology  and  religious  wars)  she  was 
again  able  to  reach  for  almost  three  centuries  thereafter. 

Six  schoolfellows  and  friends — Count  Maurice  von  Spiegel- 
berg,  Rodolph  von  Lange  (Langius),  Alexander  Hegius,  Lewis 
Dringenberg,  Antonius  Liber,  and  Rodolphus  Agricola — all  train- 
ed in  the  discipline  of  a Kempis,  became,  toward  the  end  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  the  apostles  of  this  reform  in  literature  and 
education ; and  this  mainly  by  their  exertions  with  those  of  their 
disciples,  was,  in  a few  years,  happily  accomplished  throughout 
the  empire.  The  two  first  (we  neglect  chronology),  noblemen 
of  rank  and  dignitaries  in  the  church,  co-operated  to  this  end,  by 
their  liberal  patronage  of  other  scholars,  and  more  especially  by 
the  foundation  of  improved  schools  ; the  four  last , by  their  skill 
and  industry  as  practical  teachers,  and  by  the  influence  of  their 
writings.1 

After  their  return  from  Italy,  where  they  had  studied  under 
Trapezuntius  and  Graza,  and  enjoyed  the  friendship  of  Philelphus, 
Laurentius  Valla,  and  Leonardus  Aretinus,  Von  Lange  was 
nominated  Dean  of  Munster,  and  Count  Spiegelberg , Provost  of 
Emmerich. — Through  the  influence  of  the  former , himself  a Latin 
poet  of  no  inconsiderable  talent,  the  decayed  school  of  Munster 
was  revived  ; supplied  with  able  masters,  among  whom  Camene- 
rius,  Caesarius,  and  Murmellius,  were  distinguished ; and,  in 
spite  of  every  opposition  from  the  predicant  friars  and  university 
of  Cologne,  the  barbarous  school-books  were  superseded,  and  the 
heathen  classics  studied,  as  in  the  schools  of  Italy  and  France. 
From  this  seminary,  soon  after  its  establishment,  proceeded  Pe- 
trus Mehemius,  Josephus  Horlenius  (the  master  of  Mosellanus), 
Ludolphus  Heringius,  Alexander  Moppensis,  Tilemannus  Molle- 


1 An  account  of  the  Fratres  Hieronjmici  would  be  an  interesting  piece  of  literary 
history.  The  scattered  notices  to  be  found  of  this  association  are  meagre  and  incor- 
rect. We  may  observe,  that  the  celebrated  Frieslander,  John  Wesscl  of  Gansfurt,  an 
alumnus  also  of  the  College  of  St.  Agnes,  preceded  the  six  confederates,  enumerated 
in  the  text,  as  a restorer  of  letters  in  Germany.  Before  Reuchlin  (whom  he  initiated 
in  Hebrew),  he  conjoined  a knowledge  of  the  three  learned  languages  ; these,  which 
be  had  cultivated  in  Greece,  Italy,  and  France,  he  taught,  at  least  privately,  on  his 
return  to  Germany,  in  the  universities  of  Cologne,  Heidelberg,  and  Basle.  His  eru- 
dition, his  scholastic  subtlety,  with  his  contempt  for  scholastic  authority,  obtained  for 
him  the  title  of  Lux  Mundi  and  Magistcr  Contradictionum.  In  religious  opinions,  he 
was  the  forerunner  of  Luther.  He  is  not  to  be  confounded  (as  has  been  done)  with 
the  famous  preacher,  Joannes,  variously  called  Wesalius , de  Wessalia,  and  even  Wes- 
selus , accused  by  the  Dominicans  of  suspicious  intercourse  with  the  Jews,  and, 
through  their  influence,  unjustly  condemned  for  heresy  in  1479,  by  the  Archbishop 
of  Mentz. 


206 


EPISTOLiE  OBSCUEOETJM  VIEOETJM. 


rus  (the  master  of  Rivius),  &c.,  who,  as  able  schoolmasters,  pro- 
pagated the  improvement  in  education  and  letters  throughout  the 
north  of  Germany. 

A similar  reform  was  effected  by  Count  Spiegelberg  in  the 
school  of  Emmerich. 

Hegius , a man  of  competent  learning,  hut  of  unrivaled  talents 
as  a practical  instructor,  became  rector  of  the  school  of  Daventer ; 
and  he  can  boast  of  having  turned  out  from  his  tuition  a greater 
number  of  more  illustrious  scholars  than  any  pedagogue  of  modern 
times.  Among  his  pupils  were,  Desiderius  Erasmus,  Hermannus 
Buschius,  Joannes  Csesarius,  Joannes  Murmellius,  Joannes  Glan- 
dorpius,  Conradus  Mutianus,  Hermannus  Torrentinus,  Bartho- 
lomseus  Coloniensis,  Conradus  Goclenius,  the  Aedicollii,  Joannes 
and  Serratius,  Jacobus  Montanus,  Joannes  Peringius,  Timannus 
Camenerius,  Gerardus  Lystrius,  MattliEeus  Frissemius,  Ludolphus 
Geringius,  &c.  Nor  must  Ortuinus  Gratius  be  forgotten. 

D ringenberg  transplanted  the  discipline  of  Zwoll  to  Schlecht- 
stadt  in  Alsace ; and  he  effected  for  the  south  of  Germany  what 
his  colleagues  accomplished  for  the  north.  Among  his  pupils, 
who  almost  rivaled  in  numbers  and  celebrity  those  of  Hegius, 
were  Conradus  Celtcs,  Jacobus  Wimphelingius,  Beatus  Rhenanus 
Joannes  Sapidus,  Bilibald  Pirkheimer,  John  von  Dalherg,  Fran- 
ciscus  Stadianus,  George  Simler  (the  master  of  Melanchthon), 
and  Henricus  Bebelius  (the  master  of  Brassicanus  and  Heinrich- 
mann.) 

Liber  taught  successfully  at  Kempten  and  Amsterdam ; and, 
when  driven  from  these  cities  by  the  partisans  of  the  ancient 
barbarism,  he  finally  established  himself  at  Alcmar.  The  most 
celebrated  of  his  pupils  were  Pope  Hadrian  VI.,  Nicolaus  Cle- 
nardus,  Alardus  of  Amsterdam,  Cornelius  Crocus,  and  Christopho- 
rus  Longolius. 

The  genius  of  Agricola  displayed  the  rarest  union  of  original- 
ity, elegance,  and  erudition.  After  extorting  the  reluctant  admi- 
ration of  the  fastidious  scholars  of  Italy,  he  returned  to  Germany, 
where  his  writings,  exhortation,  and  example,  powerfully  contrib- 
uted to  promote  the  literary  reformation.  It  was  only,  however, 
in  the  latter  years  of  his  short  life,  that  he  was  persuaded  by 
his  friend,  Von  Dalberg,  Bishop  of  Worms,  to  lecture  publicly 
(though  declining  the  status  of  Professor)  on  the  Greek  and  Roman 
authors  ; and  he  delivered,  with  great  applause,  a few  courses, 
alternately  at  Heidelberg  and  Worms.  Celtes  and  Buschius  were 


RISE  OE  HUMANE  STUDIES  IN  GERMANY. 


207 


among  his  auditors.  There  is  no  hyperbole  in  his  epitaph  by  a 
great  Italian : 

“ Scilicet  hoc  uno  meruit  Germania,  laudis 

Quicquid  habet  Latium,  Gracia  quicquid  habet.” 

The  first  restorers  of  ancient  learning  in  Germany  were  thus 
almost  exclusively  pupils  of  a Kempis  or  of  his  disciples.  There 
was,  however,  one  memorable  exception  in  John  Reuclilin  (Joan- 
nes Capnio),  who  was  not,  as  his  biographers  erroneously  assert, 
a scholar  of  Dringenberg  at  Schlechtstadt.1  Of  him  we  are  again 
to  speak. 

We  have  been  thus  particular,  in  order  to  show  that  the  awak- 
ened enthusiasm  for  classical  studies  did  not  in  Germany  origin- 
ate hr  the  Universities  ; and  it  was  only  after  a strenuous  opposi- 
tion from  these  bodies  that  ancient  literature  at  last  conquered 
its  recognition  as  an  element  of  academical  instruction.  At  the 
period  of  which  we  treat,  the  prelections  and  disputations,  the 
examinations  and  honors,  of  the  different  faculties,  required  only 
an  acquaintance  with  the  barbarous  Latinity  of  the  middle  ages. 
The  new  philology  was  thus  not  only  a hors  cVceuvre  in  the 
academical  system,  or,  as  the  Leipsic  Masters  expressed  it,  a 
“ fifth  wheel  in  the  wagon it  was  abominated  as  a novelty, 
that  threw  the  ancient  learning  into  discredit,  diverted  the  studi- 
ous from  the  Universities,  emptied  the  schools  of  the  Magistri, 
and  the  bursae  or  colleges  over  which  they  presided,  and  rendered 
contemptible  the  once  honored  distinction  of  a degree.2 

1 His  connection  with  Zwoll  and  the  Brethren  of  St.  Jerome  may,  however,  be 
established  through  John  Wessel,  from  whom  he  learned  the  elements  of  Hebrew. 

2 “ Attamen  intellexi,”  writes  Magister  Unkenbunck  to  Magister  Gratius,  “ quod 
habetis  paucos  auditores,  et  est  querela  vestra,  quod  Buschius  et  Caasarius  trahunt 
vobis  scholares  et  supposita  abinde,  cum  tamen  ipsi  non  sciunt  ita  exponere  Poetas 
allegorice,  sicut  vos,  et  superaliegare  sacram  scripturam.  Credo  quod  diabolus  est  ir. 
illis  Poetis.  Ipsi  destruunt  omnes  Universitates,  et  audivi  ab  uno  antiquo  Magistro 
Lipsensi,  qui  fuit  Magister  36.  annorum,  et  dixit  mihi,  quando  ipse  fuisset  invenis, 
tunc  ilia  Universitas  bene  stetisset : quia  in  viginti  milliaribus  nullus  Poeta  fuisset. 
Et  dixit  etiam,  quod  tunc  supposita  diligenter  compleverunt  lectiones  suas  formales  et 
materiales,  seu  bursales  ; ct  fuit  magnum  scandalum,  quod  aliquis  studens  iret  in 
platea,  et  non  haberet  Petrum  Hispanuin,  aut  Parva  Logicalia  sub  brachio.  Et  si 
fuerunt  Grammatici,  tunc  portabant  Partes  Alexandri,  vel  Vade  Mecum,  vel  Exerci- 
tium  Puerorum,  aut  Opus  Minus,  aut  Dicta  loan.  Sinthen.  Et  in  scholis  advertebant 
diligenter,  et  habuerunt  in  honore  Magistros  Artium,  et  quando  viderunt  unum  Magis- 
trum,  tunc  fuerunt  perterriti,  quasi  viderent  unum  Diabolum.  Et  dicit  etiam,  quod 
pro  tunc,  quater  in  anno  promovebantur  Bacculaurii,  et  semper  pro  una  vice  sunt 
sexaginta  aut  quinquaginta.  Et  illo  tempore  Universitas  ilia  fuit  multum  in  flore,  et 
quando  unus  stetit  per  annum  cum  dimidio,  fuit  promotus  in  Bacculaurium,  et  per 
tres  annos  aut  duos  cum  dimidio,  in  Magistrum.  Et  sic  parentes  eorum  fuerunt  con- 
tenti,  et  libenter  exposuerunt  pecunias ; quia  videbant,  quod  filii  sui  venerunt  ad 
honores.  Sed  nunc  supposita  volunt  audire  Virgilium  et  Plinium,  et  alios  nnvos 


208 


EPISTOLB3  OBSCUEOEUM  VIEOEUM. 


Ill  possession  of  power,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  patrons 
of  scholasticism  would  tamely  allow  themselves  to  be  stripped  of 
reputation  and  influence  ; and  it  did  not  require  the  ridicule  with 
which  the  “ Humanists ,”  or  “ Poets,”  as  they  were  styled,  now 
assailed  them,  to  exasperate  their  spirit  of  persecution.  G-reek 
in  particular,  and  polite  letters  in  general,  were  branded  as  heret- 
ical;1 and,  while  the  academical  youth  hailed  the  first  lecturers 
on  ancient  literature  in  the  Universities,  as  “ messengers  from 
Heaven,” 2 the  academical  veterans  persecuted  these  intruders  as 

autores,  et  licet  audiunt  per  quinque  annos,  tamen  non  promoventur.  Et  dixit  mihi 
amplius  talis  Magistcr,  quod  tempore  suo  fuerunt  duo  rnillia  studentes  in  Lyptzick,  et 
Erfordue  totidem.  Et  Vienna:  quatuor  millia,  et  Colonise  etiam  tot,  et  sic  de  aliis. 
Nunc  autem  in  omnibus  Universitatibus  non  sunt  tot  supposita,  sicut  tunc  in  una,  aut 
duabus.  Et  Magistri  Lipsenses  nunc  valde  conqueruntur  de  paucitate  suppositorum, 
quia  Poetaj  faciunt  eis  damnum.  Et  quando  parentes  mittunt  filios  suos  in  bursas,  et 
collegia,  non  volunt  ibi  manere,  sed  vadunt  ad  Poetas,  et  student  nequitias.  Et  dixit 
mihi,  quod  ipse  Liptzick  olim  habuit  quadraginta  domicellos,  et  quando  ivit  in  eccle- 
siam,  vel  ad  forum,  vel  spaciatum  in  rubetum,  tunc  iverunt  post  eum.  Et  fuit  tunc 
rnagnus  excessus,  studere  in  Poetria.  Et  quando  unus  confitebatur  in  confessione, 
quod  occulte  audivit  Virgilium  ab  uno  Bacculaurio,  tunc  Sacerdos  imponebat  ei 
magnam  poenitentiam,  videlicet,  jejunare  singulis  sextis  feriis  vel  orare  quotidie  sep- 
tem  Psalmos  poenitentiales.  Et  juravit  mihi  in  conscientia  sua,  quod  vidit,  quod  unus 
magistrandus  fuit  rejectus,  quia  unus  de  examinatoribus  semel  in  die  festo  vidit  ipsum 
legere  in  Terentio.  Utinam  adhuc  staret  ita  in  Universitatibus  !”  ets.  ( Epist . Obs. 
Vir. — Vol.  II.  ep.  46.  See  also  among  others,  Vol.  II.  ep.  58  and  63.  We  quote 
these  epistles  by  number,  though  this  be  marked  in  none  of  the  editions. 

1 “ Hreresis,”  says  Erasmus,  speaking  of  these  worthies — “ hreresis  est  polite  loqui, 
hreresis  Grrece  scire  ; quicquid  ipsi  non  inteiligunt,  quicquid  ipsi  non  faciunt,  haeresis 
est.  In  unum  Capnionem  clamatur,  quia  linguas  callet.”  ( Opera  III.  c.  517.  ed. 
Clerici.)  See  also  Peutinger,  in  Epist.  ad  Rcuchl.  (sig.  A ii.)  Hutten,  Prcsf  Neminis. 

2 “ Omnino  fervebat  opus,”  says  Cruciger,  “ et  deserebantur  tractationes  prioris 
doetrinte  atque  futilis,  et  nitor  elegantiaque  discipline  politioris  expetebantur.  Tunc 
Lipsiam  Ricardus  Crocus,  Britannus,  qui  in  Gallia  auditor  fuerat  Hieronymi  Alex- 
andri  [Aleandri],  venit,  anno  Chr.  MDXV  [MDXIV],  professusque  doctrinam  Greca- 
rum  litterarum,  omnium  amorem  favoremque  statim  est  maximum  consecutus  : quod 
hujus  linguae  non  priinordia,  ut  aliqui  ante  ipsum,  sed  integram  atque  plenam  scien- 
tiam  illius  afferre,  et  posse  hanc  totam  explicare,  docereque  videretur.  Negabat  meus 
pater,  credibile  nunc  esse  id,  quod  ipse  tunc  cognoverit.  Tanquam  ccditus  demissumi 
Crocum  omnes  vaieratos  esse  aiebat,  unumquemque  se  felieem  judicasse,  si  in  fami- 
liaritatem  ipsius  insinuaretur : docenti  vero  et  mercedem,  quae  postularetur,  persol- 
vere  ; et  quocumque  loco  temporeque  presto  esse,  recusavisse  neminem : si  concubia 
nocte  se  conveniri,  si  quamvis  longe  extra  oppidum  jussisset,  omnes  libenter  obsecuti 
fuissent.”  (Loc.  Comm.)  (Among  the  Declamations  of  Melanchthon,  see  Oratio  de 
Initiis,  &c.  and  Oratio  de  Vita  Trocedorfii;  see  also  Camerarius  (the  pupil  of  Croke), 
in  the  Preface  to  his  Herodotus,  and  in  his  Life  of  Melanchthon.)  Dr.  Croke  (after- 
ward an  agent  of  Henry  VIII.  in  the  affair  of  the  divorce,  and  Public  Orator  of  Cam- 
bridge) was  the  first  Professor  of  Greek  in  Leipsie,  and  the  first  author  of  a grammar 
of  that  language,  published  in  Germany.  He  founded  that  school  which,  under  his 
successor,  Sir  Godfrey  Hermann,  is  now  the  chief  fountain  of  Hellenic  literature  in 
Europe.  His  life  ought  to  be  written.  Sir  Alexander  Croke,  in  his  late  splendid 
history  of  the  family,  has  collected  some  circumstances  concerning  this  distinguished 
scholar ; but  a great  deal  of  interesting  information  still  remains  ungathered,  among 
his  own  and  the  writings  of  his  contemporaries.  We  could  fill  a page  with  mere 
references.  » 


PERSECUTION  OE  THE  HUMANISTS. 


20y 


“preachers  of  perversion,”  and  “ winnowers  of  the  devil’s  chaff.” 1 
Conradus  Celtes,  Hermannus  Buschius,  and  Joannes  Rhagius 
Aesticampianus,  were  successively  expelled  from  Leipsic  ; 2 3 other 
universities  emulated  the  example.  The  great  University  of 
Cologne  stood,  however,  “proudly  eminent”  in  its  hostility  to  the 
new  intelligence ; for  improvement  was  there  opposed  hy  the 
united  influence  of  the  Monks  and  Masters.  When  Yon  Lange 
commenced  his  reformation  of  the  school  of  Munster,  a vehement 
remonstrance  was  transmitted  from  the  faculties  of  Cologne  to 
the  bishop  and  chapter  of  that  see,  reprobating  the  projected 
change  in  the  schoolbooks  hitherto  in  use,  and  remonstrating 
against  the  introduction  of  Pagan  authors  into  the  course  of  juve- 
nile instruction.  Foiled  in  this  attempt,  the  obscurants  of  that 
venerable  seminary  resisted  only  the  more  strenuously  every  effort 
at  a reform  within  Cologne  itself.  They  oppressed  and  relegated, 
one  after  another,  Bartholomseus  Coloniensis,  the  two  Aedicollii 
(Joannes  and  Serratius),  Joannes  Murmellius,  Joannes  Csesarius, 
and  Hermannus  Buschius,  as  dangerous  innovators,  who  cor- 
rupted the  minds  of  youth  by  mythological  fancies,  and  the  study 
of  unchristian  authors.  Supported,  however,  by  Count  Nuenar, 
dean  of  the  canonical  chapter,  and  the  influence  of  his  own  rank, 
Buschius,  a nobleman  by  birth,  the  scholar  of  Hegius,  and  friend 
and  schoolfellow  of  Erasmus,  stood  his  ground  even  in  Cologne, 
against  the  scholastic  zealots  ; and,  though  thrice  compelled  to 
abandon  the  field  of  contest,  he  finally  succeeded  in  discomfiting, 
even  in  their  firmest  stronghold,  the  enemies  of  light.  Pliny  and 
Ovid  were  read  along  with  Boethius  and  Sedulius ; the  ancient 
school-books — the  Doctrinale  of  Alexander,  the  Disciplina  Scho- 
laruvi , the  Catholicon,  the  Mammotrectus  (Mammaetractus),  the 
Gemma  Gemmarum , the  Labyrinthus,  the  Dormisecure,  &c.  &c., 


1 Buschii  Uallum  Humanitatis,  ed.  Burckhardi,  p.  15.  In  Leipsic,  humane  letters 
were  styled  by  the  theologians  Dcemonum  cibus,  Dcemonum  opsonium,  Aegyptiae  ollae. 
virulentae  Aegyptiomm  dapes.  (Panegyricum  Lipsiensis  Theologi. — Praef.  Lipsiae, 

1514.) 

3 We  have  before  us  an  oration  of  Aesticampianus,  delivered  in  1511,  on  his  de- 
parture from  Leipsic,  after  the  public  schools  had  been  closed  against  him  by  the 
faculty  of  arts.  We  extract  one  passage — Quem  enirn  poetarum  eloquentium  non 
sunt  persecuti  patres  vestri,  et  quem  vos  ludibrio  non  habuistis,  qui  ad  vos  expoliendos 
quasi  ccelitas  sunt  demissi  ? Nam,  ut  e multis  paucos  referam,  Conradum  Celten 
pene  hostiliter  expulistis  ; Hermannum  Buschium  dm  ac  multum  vexatum  ejecistis  ; 
Joannem  quoque  Aesticampianum  variis  machinis  oppugnatum,  tandem  evertitis. 
Quis  tandem  Poetarum  ad  vos  venieti  Nemo,  hercle,  nemo.  Ineulti  ergo  jejunique 
vivetis,  fcedi  animis  et  inglorii,  qui,  nisi  pcenitentiam  egeritis,  damnati  omnes  immo- 
riemini" 


0 


210 


EPISTOLiE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


were  fit  last  no  longer,  even  in  Cologne,  recognized  as  of  exclu- 
sive authority';  and,  within  a few  years  after  their  disgrace  in 
this  fastness  of  prescriptive  barbarism,  they  were  exploded  from 
all  the  schools  and  universities  throughout  the  empire.  In  this 
difficult  exploit  Buschius  was  aided  by  Erasmus,  Hutten,  Me- 
lanchthon,  Torrentinus,  Bebelius,  Simler,  &c. 

This  was,  however,  but  a skirmish,  compared  with  another 
kindred  and  simultaneous  contest ; and  the  obstinacy  of  Buschius, 
in  defense  of  classical  Latinity,  only  exasperated  the  theologians 
of  Cologne  to  put  forth  all  their  strength  in  opposition  to  Reuch- 
lin,  a still  more  influential  champion  of  illumination,  and  in  sup- 
pression of  the  more  obnoxious  study  of  Hebrew. 

The  character  of  Reuchlin  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  in 
that  remarkable  age  ; for  it  exhibits,  in  the  highest  perfection,  a 
combination  of  qualities  which  are  in  general  found  incompatible. 
At  once  a man  of  the  world  and  of  books,  he  excelled  equally  in 
practice  and  speculation ; was  a statesman  and  a philosopher,  a 
jurist  and  a divine.  Nobles,  and  princes,  and  emperors,  honored 
him  with  their  favor,  and  employed  him  in  their  most  difficult 
affairs  ; while  the  learned  throughout  Europe  looked  up  to  him 
as  the  “trilingue  miraculum,”  the  “ pheenix  litter  arum,”  the 
“ eruditorum  d\<pa.^  In  Italy,  native  Romans  listened  with 
pleasure  to  his  Latin  declamation  ; and  he  compelled  the  jealous 
Greeks  to  acknowledge  that  “ Greece  had  overflown  the  Alps.” 
Of  his  countrymen,  he  was  the  first  to  introduce  the  study  of 
ancient  literature  into  the  German  Universities ; the  first  who 
opened  the  gates  of  the  east,  unsealed  the  word  of  God,  and  un- 
vailed the  sanctuary  of  Hebrew  wisdom.  Agricola  was  the  only 
German  of  the  fifteenth  century  who  approached  him  in  depth  of 
classical  erudition ; and  it  was  not  till  after  the  commencement 
of  the  sixteenth,  that  Erasmus  rose  to  divide  with  him  the  admi- 
ration of  the  learned.  As  an  Oriental  scholar,  Reuchlin  died 
without  a rival.  Cardinal  Fisher,  who  “ almost  adored  his 
name,”  made  a pilgrimage  from  England,  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  visiting  the  object  of  his  worship  ; and  that  great  divine  can- 
didly confesses  to  Erasmus,  that  he  regarded  Reuchlin  as  “ bear- 
ing off  from  all  men  the  palm  of  knowledge,  especially  in  what 
pertained  to  the  hidden  matters  of  religion  and  philosophy.”  At 
the  period  of  which  we  speak,  Reuchlin,  withdrawn  from  academ- 
ical tuition  to  the  conduct  of  political  affairs,  was  not,  however, 
unemployed  in  peaceably  promoting  by  his  writings  the  cause  of 


HISTORY  OF  THE  REUCHLINIAN  PROCESS. 


211 


letters ; when  suddenly  he  found  himself,  in  the  decline  of  life, 
the  victim  of  a formidable  persecution,  which  threatened  ruin  to 
himself,  and  proscription  to  his  favorite  pursuits. 

The  alarming  progress  of  the  new  learning  had  at  last  con- 
vinced the  theologians  and  philosophers  of  the  old  leaven,  that 
their  credit  was  only  to  be  restored  by  a desperate  and  combined 
effort — not  against  the  partisans,  but  against  the  leaders  of  the 
literary  reformation.  “ The  two  eyes  of  Germany”  were  to  be 
extinguished  ; and  the  theologians  of  Cologne  undertook  to  deal 
with  Reuchlin,  while  Erasmus  was  left  to  the  mercies  of  their 
brethren  of  Louvain.  The  assailants  pursued  their  end  with 
obstinacy,  if  not  with  talent ; that  they  did  not  succeed,  showed 
that  the  spirit  of  the  age  had  undergone  a change — a change 
which  the  persecutions  themselves  mainly  contributed  to  accom- 
plish. 

It  was  imagined  that  Hebrew  literature,  and  the  influence  of 
Reuchlin,  could  not  be  more  effectually  suppressed,  than  by  ren- 
dering both  the  objects  of  religious  suspicion.  In  this  attempt, 
the  theologians  of  Cologne  found  an  appropriate  instrument  in 
John  Pfefferkorn,  a Jew,  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Christianity 
from  the  punishment  which  his  crimes  had  merited  at  the  hands 
of  his  countrymen.1  In  the  course  of  the  years  1505  and  1509, 
four2  treatises  (three  in  Latin,  one  in  German)  were  published 
under  the  name  of  the  new  convert ; the  scope  of  which  was  to 
represent  the  Jewish  religion  in  the  most  odious  light.  The  next 
step  was  to  obtain  from  the  Emperor  an  edict,  commanding  that 
all  Hebrew  books,  with  exception  of  the  Bible,  should  be  searched 
for,  and  burned,  throughout  the  empire ; on  the  ground,  that  the 
Jewish  literature  was  nothing  but  a collection  of  libels  on  the 
character  of  Christ  and  Christianity.  The  cultivation  of  Hebrew 
learning  would  thus  be  rendered  impossible,  or  at  least  discour- 
aged; and,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  probably  expected  that  the 
Jews  would  bribe  liberally  to  evade  the  execution  of  the  decree. 

1 Maius,  in  his  Vita  Renchlini,  Jacobus  Thomasius,  in  the  Ohservationcs  Hallenscs , 
Dupin  in  his  Nouvelle  Bibliotheque  des  Auteurs  Ecclesiastiques,  Basnage  in  his  Hisloire 
dcs  Juifs,  and  many  others,  confounded  this  John  Pfefferkorn  with  a relapsed  Jew  of 
the  same  name,  who  was  burned  for  blasphemy  at  Halle  in  1514.  The  Epistolce  Ob- 
scurorum  Virorum,  and  the  Poemata  of  Hutten,  might  have  kept  them  right.  Our 
John  was  living  in  1521. 

2 These  tracts  are  extremely  rare.  Meiners  (to  say  nothing  of  Muench)  was  ac- 
quainted only  with  three.  In  our  collection  there  is  a.  fourth,  entitled  Hostis  Judceorum , 
ets.  with  the  Epigramma  •politum  of  Ortuinus  against  the  Jews,  in  the  title  page,  which 
was  reprinted  in  his  Lamentationes  Obscurormn  Virorum. 


212 


EPISTOLjE  obscurorum  virortjm:. 


Maximilian  was,  in  fact,  weak  or  negligent  enough  to  listen  to 
the  misrepresentation,  and  even  to  bestow  on  Pfefferkorn  the 
powers  necessary  to  carry  the  speculation  into  effect ; hut  some 
informality  having  been  discovered,  in  the  terms  of  the  commis- 
sion, the  Jews  had  interest  to  obtain  a suspension  of  the  order ; 
and  previous  to  its  renewal,  a mandate  was  issued,  requiring, 
among  other  opinions,  that  of  Reuchlin,  as  to  the  nature  and 
contents  of  the  Jewish  writings.  Of  the  referees,  Reuchlin  alone 
complied  with  the  requisition.  He  reported,  that  to  extirpate 
Hebrew  literature  in  the  mass,  was  not  only  unjust,  but  inexpe- 
dient ; that  a large  proportion  of  the  Rabbinic  writings  was  not 
of  a theological  character  at  all,  and  consisted  of  works  not  only 
innocent,  but  highly  useful ; nay,  that  the  religious  books  them- 
selves, while  not,  in  general,  such  as  they  had  been  malevolently 
represented,  were  of  the  greatest  importance  to  Christianity,  as 
furnishing  in  fact,  the  strongest  arguments  in  refutation  of  the 
doctrine  they  defended. 

This  was  precisely  what  the  obscurants  of  Cologne  desired. 
Pfefferkorn,  with  their  assistance,  published  (1511),  under  the 
name  of  Handglass  (Handspiegel),  a tract  in  which  Reuchlin  was 
held  up  to  religious  detestation,  as  the  advocate  of  Jewish  blas- 
phemy, and  as  guilty  of  many  serious  errors  in  the  faith.  Reuch- 
lin condescended  to  reply ; and  his  Eyeglass  (Augenspiegel)  ex- 
posed the  ignorance  and  falsehood  of  his  contemptible  adversary. 
The  principals  now  found  it  necessary  to  come  forward.  Arnold 
Tungern , as  Dean  of  the  Theological  Faculty  of  Cologne,  under- 
took to  sift  the  orthodoxy  of  the  Eyeglass;  forty-three  proposi- 
tions “ de  Judaico  favore  nimis  suspect®,”  were  extracted  and 
published ; and  Reuchlin  summoned  to  an  open  recantation, 
(1512).  In  his  Defensio  contra  calumniator es  suos  Colonienses , 
(1513),  Reuchlin  annihilated  the  accusation,  and  treated  his 
accusers  with  the  unmitigated  severity  which  their  malevolence 
and  hypocrisy  deserved.  These  were  James  Hoogstraten,  a man 
of  no  inconsiderable  ability,  and  of  extensive  influence,  as  mem- 
ber of  the  Theological  Faculty  of  Cologne,  as  Prior  of  the  Domin- 
ican Convent  in  that  city,  and  “ Inquisitor  hmretic®  pravitatis,” 
for  the  dioceses  of  Cologne,  Mentz,  and  Treves — Arnold  of  Tun- 
gern (or  Luyd),  Dean  of  the  Theological  Faculty,  and  head  of 
the  Burse  of  St.  Lawrence — and  Ortuinus  Gratius  ( Ortwin  von 
Graes),  a pupil  of  Hegius,  and  now  a leading  member  of  the 
Faculty  of  Arts,  but  a sycophant  who,  in  hopes  of  preferment, 


HISTORY  OF  THE  REUCHLINIAN  PROCESS. 


213 


prostituted  talents  in  subservience  to  the  enemies  of  that  learning 
in  which  he  was  himself  no  contemptible  proficient. 

Reuchlin  was  not  ignorant  of  the  enemies  with  whom  he  had  to 
grapple.  The  Odium  Theologicum  has  been  always  proverbial ; 
the  Dominicans  were  exasperated  and  leagued  against  him ; no 
opposition  had  hitherto  prevailed  against  that  powerful  order,  who 
had  recently  crushed  Joannes  de  Wesalia,  for  a similar  offense,  by 
a similar  accusation ; while  a contemporary  pope  emphatically  de- 
clared, that  he  would  rather  provoke  the  enmity  of  the  most  formi- 
dable sovereign,  than  offend  even  a single  friar  of  those  mendicant 
fraternities,  who,  under  the  mantle  of  humility,  reigned  omnipo- 
tent over  the  Christian  world.  Reuchlin  wrote  to  his  friends 
throughout  Europe,  entreating  their  protection  and  interest  in  ob- 
taining for  him  new  allies.  He  received  from  all  quarters  the 
warmest  assurances  of  sympathy  and  co-operation.  Not  only  in 
Germany,  but  in  Italy,  France,  and  England,  a confederation  was 
organized  between  the  friends  of  humane  learning.1  The  cause  of 
Reuchlin  became  the  cause  of  letters  ; Europe  was  divided  into 
two  hostile  parties ; the  powers  of  light  stood  marshalled  against 
the  powers  of  darkness.  So  decisive  was  this  struggle  regarded 
for  the  interests  of  literature,  that  the  friends  of  illumination  saw, 
in  its  unexpected  issue,  the  special  providence  of  God  ;2  and  so  im- 
mediate were  its  consequences  in  preparing  the  religious  reforma- 
tion, that  Luther  (Dec.  1518)  acknowledges  to  Reuchlin,  that  “he 
only  followed  in  his  steps — only  consummated  his  victory , with  in- 
ferior strength , indeed , but  not  inferior  courage , in  breaking  the 
teeth  of  the  Behemoth. ”3  It  was  this  contest,  indeed,  which  first 
proved  that  the  nations  were  awake,  and  public  opinion  again  the 
paramount  tribunal.  In  this  tribunal  the  cause  of  Reuchlin  was 
in  reality  decided,  and  his  triumph  had  been  long  complete  before 
it  was  formally  ratified  by  a papal  sentence.  Reuchlin’s  victory, 
in  public  opinion,  was  accomplished  by  a satire ; of  which,  the 
anathema  on  its  publication  by  the  holy  see,  only  gave  intensity 
to  the  effect. — But  to  return. 

1 England,  for  example,  sent  to  the  “ army  of  the  Reuchlinists,”  Mure,  Fisher. 
Lynacre,  Grocyn,  Colet,  Latimer,  Tunstall,  and  Ammonius  of  Lucca  ; “omnes,”  says 
Erasmus  to  Reuchlin,  “ Grace  docti  prater  Coletum  ; (but  as  we  know  from  Erasmus. 
Colet  soon  made  of  that  language  an  assiduous  study).  ( Epist . ill.  Vir.  ad  Reuchl.  L. 
II.  sig.  Ti.)  We  may  notice  that  this  rare  and  interesting  collection  has  jive  letters 
of  Erasmus,  not  to  be  found  in  any  edition  of  his  works. 

2 Jo.  Csesarius  (Ep.  ad  Reuchl.  Lib.  II.  sig.  X.  iii.)  and  Eobanus  Hessus  (ibid.  Z.  i.) 
[See  Reuchlin’s  letter  at  the  end  of  this  article.] 

3 Epist.  ad  Reuchl.  Lib.  II.  sig.  C.  iii.  [and  in  De  Wette’s  Luther's  Bricfe,  I.  196.] 


214 


EPISTOLiE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


Hoogstraten  now  cited  Reuchlin  before  the  court  of  Inquisition 
at  Mentz  (1513).  Reuchlin  declined  Hoogstraten  as  a judge  ; 
lie  was  his  personal  enemy,  and  not  his  provincial ; and  when 
these  objections  were  overruled  he  appealed  to  the  Pope.  This 
appeal,  notwithstanding,  and  in  contempt  of  a sist  on  the  pro- 
ceedings by  the  Elector  of  Mentz,  Hoogstraten  and  his  theological 
brethren  of  Cologne  condemned,  and  publicly  burned  the  writings 
of  Reuchlin,  as  ‘‘offensive,  dangerous  to  religion,  and  savoring 
of  heresy;”  and  to  enhance  the  infamy,  they  obtained  from  the 
Sorbonne  of  Paris,  and  the  Theological  Faculties  of  Mentz,  Er- 
furth,  and  Louvain,  an  approval  of  the  sentence.  Their  triumph 
was  wild  and  clamorous,  but  it  was  brief.  On  Reuchlin’s  appeal, 
the  Pope  had  delegated  the  investigation  to  the  Bishop  of  Spires ; 
and  that  prelate,  without  regard  to  the  determinations  of  the  rev- 
erend faculties,  decided  summarily  in  favor  of  Reuchlin,  and 
condemned  Hoogstraten  in  the  costs  of  process  (1514).  It  was 
now  the  Inquisitor’s  turn  to  appeal ; [but  Reuchlin  likewise  cited 
him  to  Rome.1]  The  cause  was  referred  by  Leo  to  a body  of 
commissioners  in  Rome  ; and  Hoogstraten,  amply  furnished 
with  money,  proceeded  to  that  capital.  The  process  thus  pro- 
tracted, every  mean  was  employed  by  the  Dominicans  to  secure 
a victory.  In  Rome,  they  assailed  the  judges  with  bribes  and 
intimidation.  In  Germany,  they  vented  their  malice,  and  en- 
deavored to  promote  their  cause  by  caricatures  and  libels,  among 
which  last  the  Tocsin  (Sturmglock)  ostensibly  by  Pfefferkorn, 
was  conspicuous ; while  the  pulpits  resounded  with  calumnies 
against  their  victim. 

Amidst  this  impotent  discharge  of  squibs,  there  was  launched, 
from  an  unknown  hand,  a pasquil  against  the  persecutors  of 
Reuchlin.  It  fell  among  them  like  a bomb,  scattering  dismay 
and  ruin  in  its  explosion.  This  tremendous  satire  was  the 
“ E pistol ce  Obscurorum  Virorum  ad  venerabilem  virum  Magis- 
trum  Ortuinum  Gratium .”  Its  purport  is  as  follows  : 

Before  the  commencement  of  his  persecution,  Reuchlin  had 
published  a volume  of  letters  from  his  correspondents  : and 
Pteuchlin’s  enemy,  Ortuinus,  is  now,  in  like  manner,  supposed 
to  print  a volume  of  the  epistles  addressed  to  him  by  friends  of 
his.  But  while  the  correspondents  of  Ortuinus  were,  of  course, 
any  thing  but  less  distinguished  than  those  of  Reuchlin,  the  for- 

1 [See  the  letter  of  Reuchlin  (now  printed  for  the  first  time)  at  the  end  of  the 
article.] 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  SATIRE. 


215 


mer  is  supposed  to  entitle  his  collection — “ Epistolse  Obscurorum 
Virorum  ad  Ortuinum,”  in  modest  ridicule  of  the  arrogance  of  the 
“ Epistolse  Illustrium  Virorum  ad  Reuchlinum,  virum  nostra 
aetate  doctissimum .” 1 The  plan  of  the  satire  is  thus  extremely 
simple  : — to  make  the  enemies  of  Reuchlin  and  of  polite  letters 
represent  themselves ; and  the  representation  is  managed  with  a 
truth  of  nature,  only  equaled  by  the  absurdity  of  the  postures  in 
which  the  actors  are  exhibited.  “ Barbare  ridentur  barbari ,” 
say  Hutten  himself  and  Erasmus  of  the  Epistles:  and  never, 
certainly,  were  unconscious  barbarism,  self-glorious  ignorance, 
intolerant  stupidity,  and  sanctimonious  immorality,  so  ludicrously 
delineated ; never,  certainly,  did  delineation  less  betray  the  arti- 
fice of  ridicule.  The  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Virorum  are  at  once 
the  most  cruel  and  the  most  natural  of  satires ; and  as  such, 
they  were  the  most  effective.  They  converted  the  tragedy  of 
Reuchlin’ s persecution  into  a farce  ; annihilated  in  public  con- 
sideration the  enemies  of  intellectual  improvement;  determined  a 
radical  reform  in  the  German  universities  ; and  even  the  asso- 
ciates of  Luther,  in  Luther’s  lifetime,  acknowledged  that  no 
other  writing  had  contributed  so  powerfully  to  prepare  the  down- 
fall of  the  papal  domination.2  “Veritas  non  est  de  ratione 
faceti;”  but  never  was  argument  more  conducive  to  the  interest 
of  truth. 

Morally  considered,  indeed,  this  satire  is  an  atrocious  libel, 
which  can  only  be  palliated  on  the  plea  of  retaliation,  necessity, 
the  importance  of  the  end,  and  the  consuetude  of  the  times.  Its 
victims  are  treated  like  vermin ; hunted  without  law,  and  exterm- 
inated without  mercy.  What  truth  there  may  be  in  the  wicked 
scandal  it  retails,  we  are  now  unable  to  determine. 

Critically  considered,  its  representations  may,  to  a mere  modern 
reader,  appear  to  sacrifice  verisimilitude  to  effect.  But  by  those 
who  can  place  themselves  on  a level  with  the  age  in  which  the 
Epistolse  appeared,  their  ridicule  (a  few  passages  excepted)  will 
not  be  thought  to  have  overshot  its  aim.  So  truly,  in  fact,  did  it 
hit  the  mark,  that  the  objects  of  the  ridicule  themselves,  with  the 


1 See  E.  0.  V.  Vol.  II.  Ep.  1.  Dr.  Muench  is  wrong  in  supposing  that  “Epistolse 
Obscurorum  Virorum,”  means  “ Briefe  der  Finstcrlinge.'''  The  original  title  does  not 
sufficiently  conceal  the  satire  ; the  translated  openly  declares  it. 

2 “ Nescio,”  says  Justus  Jonas,  “ an  ullum  hujus  seculi  scriptum  sic  papistico  regno 
nocuerit,  sic  omnia  papistica  ridicula  reddiderit,  ut  hse  Obscurorum  Virorum  Epistolse, 
quse  omnia,  minima,  maxima,  clericorum  vitia  verterint  in  risum.” — Ejpist.  Anonymi 
ad  Crotum. 


216 


EPISTOL^l  OBSCURORUM:  YIRORtTM. 


exception  of  those  who  were  necessarily  in  the  secret,  read  the 
letters  as  the  genuine  product  of  their  brethren,  and  even  hailed 
the  publication  as  highly  conducive  to  the  honor  of  scholasticism 
and  monkery. 

In  1516,  immediately  after  the  appearance  of  the  first  volume, 
thus  writes  Sir  Thomas  More : — ‘ ‘ Epistolae  Obscurorum  Virorum 
operas  pretium  est  videre  quantopere  placent  omnibus,  et  doctis 
joco,  et  indoctis  serio,  qui,  dum  ridemus,  putant  rideri  stylum 
tantum,  quem  illi  non  defendunt,  sed  gravitate  sententiarum 
dicunt  compensatum,  et  latere  sub  rudi  vagina  pulcherrimum 
gladium.  Utinam  fuisset  inditus  libello  alius  titulus ! profecto 
intra  centum  annos  homines  studio  stupidi  non  sensissent  nasum 
quanqum  rhinocerotico  longiorem.”  ( Erasmi  Op.  iii.,  p.  1575). 

“ Pessime  consuluit,”  says  Erasmus  in  1518,  “rebus  humanis, 
qui  titulum  indidit  Obscurorum  Virorum:  quod  ni  titulus  prodi- 
disset  lusum,  et  hodie  passim  legerentur  ill®  Epistolae,  tanquam 
in  gratiam  Praedicatorum  script®.  Adest  hie  Lovanii,  Magister 
Nos  ter,  pridem  Prior  apud  Bruxellas,  qui  viginti  libellos  coemerat, 
gratificaturus  amicis,  paulo  antequam  Bulla  ilia  prodiret,  qu® 
effulminat  eum  libellum.  Primum,  optabam  non  editum,  verum 
ubi  fuerat  editus,  optabam  alium  titulum.” — And  again,  in  a letter 
some  ten  years  thereafter : — Ubi  primum  exissent  Epistolcc  Obscu- 
rorum Virorum  miro  Monachorum  applausu  except®  sunt  apud 
Britannos  a Franciscanis  ac  Dominicanis,  qui  sibi  persuadebant  eas 
in  Reuchlini  contumeliam,  et  Monachorum  favorem,  serio  proditas ; 
quumque  quidam  egregie  doctus,  sed  nasutissimus,  fingeret  se 
nonnihil  offendi  stylo,  consolati  sunt  hominem : — ‘ Ne  spectaris,’ 
inquiunt,  ‘ 6 bone,  orationis  cutem,  sed  sententiarum  vim.’  Nec 
hodie  deprehendissent,  ni  quidam,  addita  epistola,  lectorem  admo- 
nuisset  rem  non  esse  seriam.”  (Erasmus  probably  refers  to  the 
penult  letter  of  the  second  volume,  in  which  Ortuinus  is  addressed 
as  “ Omnium  Barbarorum  defensor , qai  clamat  more  asininof  &c.) 
“ Post,  in  Brabantia,  Prior  quidam  Dominicanus  et  Magister 
Noster,  volens  innotescere  patribus,  coemit  acervum  eorum  libel- 
lorum,  ut  dono  mitteret  ordinis  Proceribus,  nihil  dubitans  quin 
in  ordinis  honorem  fuissent  scriptae.  Q,uis  fungus  possit  esse 
stupidior  !”  (Ibid.  pp.  1678,  1110). 

“ Quis  fungus  possit  esse  stupidior!'1'’ — Erasmus  would  have 
wondered  less  at  the  stupidity  of  the  sufferers,  and  more,  perhaps, 
at  the  dexterity  of  the  executioner,  could  he  have  foreseen,  that 
one  of  the  most  learned  scholars  in  England,  and  he  the  most 


CHARACTER  OE  THE  SATIRE. 


217 


learned  of  her  bibliographers,  should  have  actually  republished 
these  letters  as  a serious  work  ; and  that  one  of  our  wittiest  satir- 
ists should  have  reviewed  that  publication,  without  a suspicion 
of  the  lurking  Momus.  And  what  is  almost  equally  astonishing, 
these  absurdities  have  never  been  remarked. 

In  1710,  there  was  printed  in  London  the  most  elegant  edition1 
that  has  yet  appeared  of  the  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Yirorum,  which 
the  editor,  Michael  Maittaire , seriously  represents  as  the  produc- 
tion of  their  ostensible  authors,  and  with  a simplicity  worthy  of 
the  Obscure  themselves,  takes  credit  to  himself  for  rescuing,  as 
he  imagines,  from  oblivion,  so  curious  a specimen  of  conceited 
ignorance,  and  vain-glorious  stupidity. — But  what  ensued  was 
still  more  wonderful.  The  edition,  Maittaire  dedicates  “ Isaaco 
Bicker  staff,  Armigero,  Magnce  Britannice  Censori  and  Steele, 
in  a subsequent  number  of  the  Tatler,  after  acknowledging  the 
compliment,  thus  notices  the  hook  itself: — The  purpose  of  the 
work  is  signified  in  the  dedication,  in  very  elegant  language,  and 
fine  raillery.  (!)  It  seems  this  is  a collection  of  letters,  which 
some  profound  blockheads,  who  lived  before  our  times,  have  writ- 
ten in  honor  of  each  other , and  for  their  mutual  information  in 
each  other’s  absurdities.  (! !)  They  are  mostly  of  the  German  na- 
tion, whence  from  time  to  time,  inundations  have  flowed,  more 
pernicious  to  the  learned  world  than  the  swarms  of  Goths  and 
Yandals  to  the  politic.  (! ! !)  It  is,  methinks,  wonderful,  that 
fellows  could  he  awake,  and  utter  such  incoherent  conceptions , 
and  converse  with  great  gravity  like  learned  men , without  the 
least  taste  of  knowledge  or  good  sense.  It  would  have  been  an 
endless  labor  to  have  taken  any  other  method  of  exposing  such 
impertinencies , than  by  a publication  of  their  oivn  works,  where 
you  see  their  follies,  according  to  the  ambition  of  such  virtuosi, 
in  a most  correct  edition .”  (!!!!)  And  so  forth. — The  monks  are 
no  marvel  after  this. 

These  letters  have  been  always,  however,  a stumbling-block  to 
our  British  divines,  critics,  and  historians. 

Knight,  in  his  Life  of  Erasmus,  knows  nothing  of  the  Epistoke, 
and  less  than  nothing  of  their  authors. 

Jortin  has  made  as,  with  his  talents,  he  could  hardly  fail  to 


1 A re-impression  of  this  edition,  and  with  the  name  of  the  same  bookseller  (Cle- 
ments), appeared  in  1742.  We  know  not  on  what  grounds  Herr  Ebert  (the  highest 
bibliographical  authority  certainly  in  Europe),  asserts  that  this  re-impression  was,  in 
reality,  published  in  Switzerland.  The  paper  and  print  seem  decidedly  English. 


218 


EPISTOUE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


make,  an  amusing  farrago  out  of  the  life  and  writings  of  Eras- 
mus ; though  not  even  superficially  versed  in  the  literary  history 
of  the  sixteenth  century.  Of  the  German  language  he  knows 
nothing ; knows  nothing  of  the  most  necessary  hooks.  He  rarely, 
in  fact,  ventures  beyond  the  text  of  Erasmus  and  Le  Clerc,  with- 
out stumbling.  He  confesses  to  having  seen  only  the  first  of  the 
three  volumes  of  Burckhard’s  Vita  Hutteni ; nay  that  he  obtained 
Burigny’s  Vie  dlErasme,  only  as  he  had  finished  his  own.  Alto- 
gether, Jortin  was  not  in  a position  to  judge  aright  the  character 
of  Erasmus ; nor  is  he  even  on  his  guard  against  the  selfishness, 
meanness,  and  timidity  of  that  illustrious  genius.  Accordingly, 
all  the  unworthy  falsehoods  which  Erasmus  whispers  about  his 
former  friend,  are  unsuspiciously  retailed  as  truths ; for  Jortin 
was  unaware  even  of  the  authors  by  whom  these  are  exposed, 
and  the  reputation  of  Hutten  vindicated.  Of  Hutten,  indeed — 
his  character,  genius,  writings,  and  exploits — he  every  where 
betrays  the  profoundest  ignorance.  Nor  has  he  blundered  less  in 
regard  to  the  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Yirorum,  than  in  regard  to 
their  great  author.  The  Jew,  Pfefferkorn,  he  knows  only  as  a 
writer  against  the  Epistolse,  and  knows  not  that  these  were 
written,  among  others,  against  him.  The  Epistolse  themselves, 
which  he  could  never  have  perused,  but  with  which  especially,  as 
historian  of  Erasmus,  he  ought  to  have  been  familiar,  he  describes 
as  “ a piece  of  harmless  wit.”  Finally,  in  utter  unacquaintance 
with  the  Fasciculus  of  Ortuinus,  though  himself  an  historian  of 
the  Church,  and  that  remarkable  source  of  ecclesiastical  history, 
republished  in  England  by  an  Anglican  divine  ; — he  conceives  it 
to  be  only  a collection  of  “ Epistolce  Clarorum  Virorum  a coun- 
terpart and  precursor,  it  would  appear,  to  the  Epistolse  Obscuro- 
rum Yirorum,  published  twenty  years  before,  confusing  it  proba- 
bly with  the  “ Epistolce  Illustrium  Virorum  ad  Reuchlinum.'1'1 

A late  accomplished  author  ( Lord  Woodhouselee ),  asserts,  that 
the  Epistolse  were  written  in  imitation  of  Arias  Montanus’s  ver- 
sion of  the  Bible.  That  learned  Spaniard  was  born  some  ten 
years  subsequent  to  the  supposed  parody  of  his  Interpretatio 
Liter  atm. 

The  only  other  notice  in  English  literature  of  this  celebrated 
satire  that  occurs  to  us,  is  an  article  on  the  subject,  which  ap- 
peared a few  years  ago  in  the  Retrospective  Revieiv.  We  recol- 
lect it  only  as  a meagre  and  inaccurate  compilation  from  the  most 
superficial  authorities. 


OPINIONS  TOUCHING-  THEIR  AUTHORSHIP. 


219 


No  question  in  the  history  of  letters  has  been  more  variously 
answered  than  that  touching  the  conception  and  authorship  of 
these  celebrated  epistles.  Reuchlin  and  Erasmus  alone,  have 
for  themselves,  expressly  denied  the  authorship  ; which  has  been 
otherwise  attributed  to  an  individual — to  a few — and  to  many. 

An  individual. — Jovius,  Valerius  Andreas,  Koch,  Opmeer,  Maius, 
Naude,  G-ehres,  and  others,  hold  Reuchlin  himself  to  have  been 
sole  author.  Caspar  Barthius,  J.  Thomasius,  Tribbechovius, 
Morhoff,  Loescher,  Weis  linger,  and  Schurzfleisch,  attribute  them 
more  or  less  exclusively  to  Hutten.  Du  Pin  gives  them  to  Reuch- 
lin or  to  Hutten.  Justus  Jonas,  Olearius,  Kapp,  and  Weller,  as- 
sign them  to  Crotus.  Some,  as  Sonleutner,  have  given  them  to 
Eobanus  Hessus  ; — others  to  Erasmus  ; — and  others  to  Euricius 
Cordus  ; — Gioldastus,  again,  refers  them  to  Brussianus  ; — and 
Grisbert  Yoetius  to  the  poet-laureate  Glareanus. 

A few. — Grundling  views  Reuchlin  as  the  exclusive  writer  of 
the  first  part,  assisted  by  Erasmus  and  Hutten  in  the  second. — 
In  both  volumes,  Hutten  has  been  regarded  as  the  principal, 
Crotus  as  the  assistant,  by  the  Unschuldige  Nachrichten  of  1716, 
Veller,  Meiners,  Panzer,  Lobstein,  and  Gfenthe. — But  Duchat, 
C.  Gr.  Mueller  and  Erhard  view  Crotus  as  sole  author  of  the  first 
volume,  and  Hutten,  perhaps  others,  as  his  coadjutors  in  the 
second. — Angst,  as  deviser  of  the  whole,  and  exclusive  writer  of 
the  first  volume,  and,  with  the  aid  of  Hutten , Crotus,  and  others, 
as  principal  author  of  the  second,  has  found  an  advocate  in  Moh- 
nicke. — Finally,  by  some  anonymous  writers,  Hutten  and  Eoba- 
nus have  been  viewed  as  joint  authors  of  both  volumes. 

Many. — Hamelmann,  followed  by  Reimann  and  Placcius.  be- 
stows the  joint  honor,  among  others,  on  Count  Nuenar,  Hutten, 
Reuchlin,  and  Buschius  ; — to  whom  Reichenberg  adds  Erasmus , 
and  Ccesarius  ; — while  Freitag  divides  it  between  Crotus,  Hut- 
ten, Buschius,  Aesticampianus,  Ccesarius,  Reuchlin , Pirkheimer, 
Glandorpius , and  Eobanus. — Burckhard  originally  gave  the  au- 
thorship of  the  whole  to  Hutten,  Nuenar,  Reuchlin,  Buschius, 
and  Ccesarius,  with  Strorner  and  Pirkheimer  as  probable  coadju- 
tors ; but  after  the  publication  of  the  “ Epistola  Anonymi  ad 
Crotum,”  and  herein  he  is  followed  by  Floegel,  to  Hutten  and 
Crotus,  as  inventors  and  principal  writers  of  both  volumes,  assist- 
ed by  Nuenar,  Aesticampianus , Buschius,  Ccesarius,  Reuchlin, 
Pirkheimer , and  possibly  Eobanus. — Burigny  (with  Revius  ?) 
makes  Hutten  the  sole  or  principal  author,  if  not  assisted  by 


220 


EPISTOLR3  obscurorum  virorum. 


Reuchlin,  Fobanus,  Busch  ins,  Ccesarius,  and  Nuenar. — Nicer  on 
attributes  them  to  Hutten , Reuchlin , Nuenar,  Crotus  and  others. 
— Heumannus  and  Stoll  regard  Hutten  as  the  chief  author,  aided 
by  various  friends,  among  whom  the  former  particularizes  James 
Fuchs. — By  Meusel,  Crotus  is  supposed  to  have  conceived  the 
plan,  and,  along  with  Hutten , to  be  the  principal  writer  of  the 
irst  part,  not  unaided,  however,  by  Buschius  and  Aesticampianus  ; 
to  the  composition  of  the  second,  Nuenar,  Pirklieimer,  Fuchs,  and 
perhaps  others,  contributed  their  assistance. — Ruhkopf  assumes 
as  authors,  Reuchlin,  Hutten,  Fobanus,  Cordus,  Crotus,  Bus- 
chius, &c. — By  Scheibe  they  are  held  to  have  been  Crotus, 
Hutten,  Buschius,  Nuenar,  Pirklieimer,  and  others. — Wachler 
holds  Crotus  to  be  the  writer  of  the  first  volume,  Hutten  and 
others  to  be  authors  of  the  second. — Dr.  Muenoh,  in  his  ma- 
tured opinion,  considers  Hutten  and  Crotus  as  principals,  assisted 
more  or  less  by  Fobanus,  Aesticampianus,  Buschius,  Cccsarius, 
Pirklieimer,  Angst,  Franz  von  Sickingen,  and  Fuchs.  Muench’s 
unexclusive  views  have  found  favor  with  MayerhofF  and  Eich- 
stadt. — The  former  regards  Crotus  and  Angst,  exclusively  of 
Hutten,  as  authors  of  the  first  book ; and  of  the  second,  Hutten, 
Buschius,  Crotus,  Pirklieimer,  perhaps  also  Fobanus,  Ccesarius , 
Angst,  Fuchs,  Aesticampianus,  and  Sickingen. — The  latter  as- 
cribes the  authorship  of  the  first  book  to  Crotus,  Buschius,  and 
Pirklieimer  ; and  of  the  second,  along  with  these,  to  Hutten , 
Fobanus,  Angst,  Sickingen,  and  others.  To  these  he  finally 
adds  Melanclithon. 

The  preceding  summary,  which  affords  a far  more  complete 
enumeration  than  has  yet  been  attempted  of  the  various  opinions 
on  this  question,  shows  how  greatly  any  adequate  criticism  of 
the  different  hypotheses  would  exceed  our  limits  : — if  that  indeed 
were  worth  while  ; for  the  fact  of  the  variation  is  itself  proof 
sufficient,  that  all  opinion  is  as  yet  baseless  conjecture.  Our  ob- 
servations (< fxovdvra  avveroiai)  shall  only  be  in  supplement  to 
what  is  already  known.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  as  yet  there  has 
been  adduced  no  evidence  of  any  weight  to  establish  the  co-ope- 
ration of  other  writers  in  these  letters,  besides  Ulrich  von  Hutten 
and  Crotus  Rubianus  ; and,  independent  of  the  general  presump- 
tion against  an  extensive  partnership,  there  is  proof  sufficient  to 
exclude  many  of  the  most  likely  of  those  to  whom  the  work  has 
been  attributed — in  particular,  Reuchlin,  Erasmus,  and  Eobanus. 
We  propose  to  show  that  Hutten,  Crotus,  and  Buschius  are 


HUTTEN,  CROTUS,  BUSCHIUS  THEIR  AUTHORS.— HIJTTEN.  221 


the  joint  authors ; and  this,  in  regard  to  the  first  and  last,  by 
evidence  not  hitherto  discovered. 

Crotus. — The  share  of  Crotus  is,  we  conceive,  sufficiently  es- 
tablished by  the  anonymous  letter  addressed  to  him  by  a friend 
on  his  return  to  the  Catholic  Church  ; and  this  friend,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe,  was  Justus  Jonas.  Crotus  and  Hutten 
were  bosom  friends  from  almost  childhood  to  death ; and,  as  boys, 
they  had  fled  together  from  the  Monastery  of  Fulda  to  the  Uni- 
versity of  Cologne. — The  co-operation  of  Crotus,  we  assume. 

Hutten. — Doubts  have  been  of  late  thrown  on  Hutten' s parti- 
cipation, at  least  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Epistolse,  founded  on 
his  two  letters  to  Diehard  Croke,  discovered  and  published  by 
C.  G-.  Mueller  in  1801.  More  might  be  added  to  what  Dr. 
Muench  has  acutely  alleged  in  disproof  of  the  inference  which 
Mueller  has  deduced  from  these  but  we  shall  not  pause  to  show 
that  Hutten  could  have  been  a writer  of  the  volume  in  question ; 
we  shall  at  once  demonstrate  that  he  must. 

The  middle  term  of  our  proof  is  the  Triumphus  Capnionis. 
This  must,  therefore,  be  vindicated  to  Hutten.  Mohnicke  has, 
with  considerable  ingenuity,  recently  attempted  to  invalidate  the 
grounds  on  which  Hutten  had  been  hitherto  recognized  as  the 
author  of  this  poem.  Added,  however,  to  the  former  evidence, 
the  proof  which  we  shall  now  adduce  appears  to  us  decisive  in 
favor  of  the  old  opinion. — A letter  of  Erasmus  to  Count  Nuenar, 
in  August  1517,  to  say  nothing  of  the  twenty-fifth  letter  of  the 
first  volume  of  the  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Virorum,  proves  that 
the  Triumphus  Capnionis  was  ready  for  publication  tioo  years 
before , and  that  at  his  instance  it  had  been  then  suppressed.  In 
point  of  fact,  it  was  only  printed  in  1519.  This  being  under- 
stood, the  following  coincidence  of  thought  and  expression  between 
letters  of  Hutten,  all  written  one,  two,  or  three  years  before  the 
publication  of  the  Triumphus,  and  the  Triumphus  itself,  can  be 
rationally  explained  only  on  the  hypothesis  that  both  were  the 
productions  of  the  same  mind. 

In  the  Letter  to  Nuenar,  April  1518,  speaking  of  the  Domini- 

1 For  example : — Mueller  (with  Boehmius — indeed,  with  all  others,  as  to  the  former), 
is  wrong  in  regard  to  two  essential  points. — 1°,  Croke  did  not  first  come  to  Leipsic  in 
1515.  “Crocus  regnat  in  Academia  Lipsiensi,  publice  docens  Graecas  literas,”  says 
Erasmus  in  a letter  to  Linacer,  of  June  1514.  (Op.  t.  iii.  p.  136.) — 2°,  The  first  edi- 
tion of  the  Erasmian  Testament  appeared  in  March  1516  ( Wetstein  Proleg.),  and  the 
Letter  of  Erasmus  to  Leo.  X.,  relative  thereto,  is  Aug.  1515,  not  1516,  as  alleged  by 
Mueller. 


222 


EPISTOUE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORIM. 


cans , and  their  persecution  of  true  learning  and  religion,  Hutten 
says  : — “ Q,uodsi  me  audiat  G-ermania,  quanquam  inferre  Turds 
bellum  necesse  est  hoc  tempore,  prius  tamen  huie  intestino  malo 
remedium  opponere  quam  de  Asiatica  expeditione  cogitare  ius- 
sero,”  ets. ; then  immediately  follows  a mention  of  the  famous 
imposture  of  the  Dominicans  of  Berne,  which  he  calls  the  “ Ber- 
nense  Scelus .”  In  the  Preface  of  the  Triumphus,  on  the  other 

hand,  immediately  after  noticing,  in  the  same  words,  the  “ Ber- 
nense  Scelus ,”  the  author  adds,  in  reference  also  to  the  Domini- 
cans and  their  hostility  to  polite  letters  and  rational  theology, 
“ Q,uippe  Turcos  nego,  aut  ardentiori  dignos  odio,  aut  majori 
oppugnandos  opere,”  ets. — Again,  in  the  same  Letter,  Hutten 
writes  : — “In  Italia  certe  nostri  me  puduit,  quoties  de  Capnionis 
affiictione,  orto  cum  Italis  sermone,  illi  percontarentur,  tantum 
licet  in  Germania  fratribus  ?”  In  the  Preface  to  the  Triumphus, 
the  author  says  : — “ Memini  opprobratam  nobis  in  Italia  hominis 
(Hogostrati  so.)  insolentiam.  Tantum.,  inquit  aliquis,  licet  in 
Germania  fratribus .?” — Again,  in  the  same  Letter,  Peter  Mayer 
and  Bartholomew  Zehender,  are  vituperated  in  conjunction : so 
also  in  the  Triumphus. — Again,  in  the  Letter  it  is  said  : — 11  Pe- 
trus Mayer  indoctissimus. . .audax  tamen.”  In  the  Triumphus, 
the  marginal  title  is  “ Petrus  Mayer  indoctissimus ,”  and  in  the 
text  “nemo  est  ex  vulgo  indoctior  ipso,  Audax  nemo  magis,” 
(v.  824). — Again,  in  the  Letter,  it  is  said  of  “ Bartholomceus  qui 
Decimatorf  “ simile  quid  scorpionibus  habet.”  In  the  Trium- 
phus “ Bartholomceus  Zehender  qui  et  Decimatorf  as  he  is  styled 
in  the  running  title,  is  thus  addressed  in  the  text  (v.  772),  “Mitte 
hue  te  ViperaT — Again,  in  his  Letter  to  Gerbellius,  August 
1516,  Hutten  extols  Reuchlin  and  Erasmus,  “ per  eos  enim  bar- 
bar  a esse  desinit  hcec  ncdio  ( Germania  sc.)  So  in  the  Triumphus, 
(v.  964),  Germania  lauds  Reuchlin,  per  te  ne  barbara  dicar  Aut 
rudis  effectum  est.” — Again,  in  the  conclusion  of  Hutten’s  letter 
to  Pirkheimer  (August  1518),  we  find  “ accipe  laqueum , barba- 
ries,”  and  in  the  address  to  the  “ Theologistse,”  closing  the  Tri- 
umphus, we  have  “ proinde  laqueum  sumilef  and  “ obscuris  viris 
laqueum  prsebens  ;”  while  in  both,  this  expression  follows  an 
animated  picture  of  the  rapid  progress  of  polite  literature. — In 
like  manner,  compare  what  is  said  in  Hutten’s  Letter  to  Croke, 
August  1516,  “ Sententia  non  jam  de  Capnione,  sed  de  nostris 
communibus  studiis  lata,”  with  the  text  of  the  Triumphus  (too 
long  to  quote),  of  which  the  marginal  summary  is,  “ Capnion 


PROOF  OF  THEIR  THREE  AUTHORS;  HUTTEN. 


223 


communis  libertatis  assertor,”  (v.  917). — Also  the  same  series  of 
crimes  is  imputed  to  the  Predicant  Friars,  and  raked  up,  in  the 
same  manner,  in  Hutten’s  Intercessio  pro  Capnione,  and  in  two 
places  of  the  Triumphus  (v.  305,  ets.  and  v.  400,  ets.) — Though 
less  remarkable,  we  may  likewise  adduce  the  expression,  “ rum- 
pantur  ut  ilia”  applied  to  the  Friars,  both  in  Hutten’s  Letter  to 
Erasmus  (July  1517),  and  Preface  to  the  Nemo,  and  in  the  Tri- 
umphus (v.  378). — The  “ Jacta  est  alea ,”  in  the  final  address  of 
the  Triumphus,  was  subsequently  Hutten’s  peculiar  motto  in  his 
various  polemical  writings  against  the  court  of  Rome ; as  shortly 
before,  it  had  been  first  adopted  by  him  in  his  invectives  against 
Duke  Ulrich  of  Wirtemberg. — The  occurrence  also  of  the  unusual 
proverbial  allusion,  “ herb  am  porrigens”  in  Hutten’s  Preface  to 
the  Nemo,  and  “ herb  am  sum  emus  ” in  the  conclusion  of  the  Tri- 
umphus, is  not  without  its  weight. — It  may  also  be  observed, 
that  the  author  of  the  Triumphus  and  Hutten  agree  in  always 
using  the  form  Capnion  and  not  Capnio , and  in  the  employment 
(usque  nauseam)  of  the  terms  Tlieologistae,  Sophistae,  Curti- 
sani,  &c. 

[Since  writing  the  above,  I have  met  with  the  very  highest 
testimony  to  Hutten’s  authorship  of  the  Triumphus,  by  his  friend 
Camerarius,  in  the  life  of  his  friend  Melanchthon.  The  words 
are : “A lujus  (Hutteni  sc.)  est  carmen  triumphale  victoriae  Reuch- 
lini , cum  pictura ,”  &c.  (Sub  a.  1514.)  All  doubt  becomes,  in 
these  circumstances,  ridiculous ; and  I suppress  other  internal 
evidence,  evidence  which  I am  able  to  produce.] 

Hutten  thus  proved  the  author  of  the  Triumphus  Capnionis, 
is,  by  a similar  comparison  of  that  work  with  the  Epistolse  Ob- 
scurorum  Virorum,  shown  to  be  a writer  of  the  first,  no  less  than 
of  the  second  volume  of  these  letters. — The  Triumphus,  be  it 
remembered,  was  ready  for  publication  before  the  first  volume  of 
the  Epistolse,  in  the  twenty-fifth  letter  of  which  it  is,  indeed, 
spoken  of  as  already  written.  Thus,  no  allusion  occurs  in  the 
Triumphus  to  the  Epistolse  ; but  the  expression,  obscuri  viri,  in 
the  peculiar  signification  of  the  Epistolse,  which  is  employed  at 
least  five  times  in  the  Triumphus,  argues  strongly  for  the  com- 
mon origin  of  both.  The  following  are,  however,  far  more  signal 
coincidences. — In  the  Triumphus  (v.  309,  ets.)  speaking  of  the 
crimes  of  the  Dominicans,  the  marginal  title  bears  “ Henricus 
Imp.  Sacramento  intoxicatus .”  In  the  Epistolse  (vol.  I.,  ep.  35), 
speaking,  in  like  manner,  of  the  crimes  of  the  same  order,  Magis- 


■224 


EPISTOLjE  obscurorum  virortjm. 


ter  Lyra  reports  that  it  is  written  from  Rome,  that,  as  a punish- 
ment for  their  falsification  of  Reuchlin’s  Eyeglass , these  friars 
are  to  he  condemned  to  wear  a pair  of  white  spectacles  on  their 
black  cowls  (in  allusion  to  the  name  of  that  pamphlet,  and  on 
the  title-page  of  which  a pair  of  large  black  spectacles  appears), 
“sicut  jam  etiam  debent  pati  unum  scandalum  in  celebratione 
missali,  propter  intoxicationem  alicujus  Imperatoris .”  The  allu- 
sion to  the  poisoning  of  Henry  VII.  in  both,  is  remarkable ; but 
the  coincidence  is  carried  to  its  climax,  by  the  employment,  in 
each,  of  so  singular,  and  so  unlikely  a barbarism  (at  least  in  the 
Triumphus)  as  intoxicatus  and  intoxicatio — terms  unknown  even 
in  the  iron  age  of  Latinity. — An  equally  striking  conformity  is 
found  between  a passage  in  the  Triumphus  (v.  269-302),  where 
Hutten  asserts,  firstly , the  superiority  of  Reuchlin’s  theological 
learning,  as  contrasted  with  that  of  his  persecutors,  and  secondly , 
his  equal  participation  with  them  in  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit — 
and  a passage  in  the  fifth  letter  of  the  first  volume  of  the  Epistolse 
in  which  the  same  attributes  are  affirmed  of  the  same  person,  in 
the  same  relation,  and  in  the  same  consecution. — Hutten’s  co- 
operation in  the  first  volume  is  thus  evinced  ; and  his  co-opera- 
tion there,  to  any  extent,  is  proved  by  establishing  his  co-operation 
at  all. 

Hutten’s  participation  in  the  second  volume  has  been  less  dis- 
puted than  his  share  in  the  first.  Besides  the  evidence  already 
stated  by  others,  we  may  refer  to  the  intended  persecution  of 
Erasmus  for  his  edition  of  the  New  Testament,  as  stated  in  the 
letter  of  Hutten  to  Pirkheimer,  from  Bologna,  June  1517,  and  in 
the  forty-ninth  letter  of  the  second  volume  of  the  Epistolse. — Also 
to  the  “ conjuratio ” and  “ conjurati”  (a  remarkable  expression)  in 
favor  of  Reuchlin  against  the  theologians,  in  the  address  appended 
to  the  Triumphus,  and  in  the  ninth  letter  of  the  latter  part  of  the 
Epistoke. 

The  parallelisms  we  have  hitherto  adduced  are  sufficiently  con- 
vincing in  themselves  ; but  they  are  far  more  conclusive  when 
we  consider ; — 1°,  how  narrow  is  the  sphere  within  which  they 
are  found ; and  2°,  that  similar  repetitions  are  frequent  in  the 
undoubted  works  of  Hutten. — As  to  the  former ; the  letters  of 
Hutten,  belonging  to  the  period,  and  the  Triumphus,  extend  only 
to  a few  pages ; and  we  defy  any  one  to  discover  an  equal  number 
of  equally  signal  coincidences  (plagiarism  apart)  from  the  works 
of  any  two  authors,  allowing  him  to  compare  as  many  volumes 


PROOF  OF  THEIR  THREE  AUTHORS;  BUSCHIUS. 


225 


as,  in  the  present  case,  we  have  collated  paragraphs. — As  to  the 
latter ; nothing  hut  a fear  of  trespassing  on  the  patience  of  the 
reader  prevents  us  from  adducing  the  most  ample  evidence  of  the 
fact. 

Buschius. — We  now  proceed  to  state  the  grounds  on  which  we 
contend  that  there  were  three  principal,  or  rather,  perhaps,  three 
exclusive,  authors  of  the  work  in  question ; and  that  the  cele- 
brated Hermann  von  dem  Busche,  or,  as  he  is  more  familiarly- 
known  to  scholars,  Hermannus  Buschius , completes,  with  Hutten 
and  Crotus,  this  memorable  triumvirate. 

Ortuinus  G-ratius,  who  may  be  allowed  to  have  had  a shrewd 
guess  at  his  tormentors,  not  only  in  his  Lamentationes  Virorum 
Obscurorum,1  immediately  after  the  appearance  of  the  Bpistolse, 
but,  what  has  not  been  observed,  twenty  years  thereafter  in  his 
Fasciculus  Rerum  Expetendarum ,2  asserts  that  the  E pis  to  la;  were 
the  work  of  several  authors,  and  states,  even  in  the  former,  that 
their  names  were  known. — Erasmus,  who  enjoyed  the  best  oppor- 
tunities of  information,3  and  in  circumstances  under  which  it  was 
no  longer  a point  of  delicacy  to  dissemble  his  knowledge,  asserts 
that  the  authors  of  the  Epistolse  were  three.  “ Equidem  non 


1 P.  116,  ed.  1649.  It  has  been  doubted  whether  Ortuinus  be  the  real  author  of  the 
Lamentationes,  and  whether  that  silly  rejoinder  be  the  work  of  an  Anti-Reuchlinist  at 
all.  The  affirmative  we  could  fully  establish  by  passages  from  the  works  of  Hutten 
and  Erasmus  which  have  been  wholly  overlooked  ; — but  it  is  not  worth  while. 

2 T.  I.,  p.  479  (Brown’s  edition).  Dr.  Muench  and  others  conceive,  that  this  work  is 
palpably  pseudonymous.  He  could  hardly  have  read  what  Clement  (Bibl.  Cur.  t.  viii.  p. 
244,  ets.)  has  said  upon  this  subject ; and  in  addition  to  the  observations  of  that  acute 
bibliographer  we  may  notice,  that  the  Fasciculus  is  not  hostile  to  Catholicism;  its 
purport  is  only  to  maintain  that  for  which  the  Universities  in  general,  and  Paris  and 
Cologne  in  particular,  had  always  strenuously  contended — that  a Council  was  para- 
mount to  the  Pope,  and  that  a council  was  the  only  mean,  at  that  juncture,  of  recon- 
ciling the  dissensions  in  religion.  Ortuinus’s  zeal  in  the  cause  was  probably  any 
thing  but  allayed  by  the  papal  decision  in  the  case  of  Reuchlin.  N.B.  The  marginal 
notes  in  the  English  edition  are,  for  the  greater  part,  by  the  protestant  editor ; an 
ignorance  of  this  may  have  occasioned  the  misapprehension. 

3 He  was  the  familiar  friend  of  the  whole  circle  of  those  who  either  wrote  the  work, 
or  knew  by  whom  it  was  written — of  Hutten,  Crotus,  Buschius,  Nuenar,  Csesarius, 
Pirkheimer,  Eobanus,  Angst,  Stromer,  &c.  Some  of  the  Epistola;  were  even  commu- 
nicated to  him  before  publication,  and  the  design  and  execution  vehemently  applauded. 
He  himself  expressly  acknowledges  one,  attributed  to  Hutten  ; and  Justus  Jonas,  his 
friend,  asserts  that  they  were  copied  by  him,  and  dispatched  to  his  correspondents, 
committed  to  memory,  and  recited  in  company.  Nay,  they  are  said  to  have  cured  an 
imposthume  on  his  face  by  the  laughter  they  excited.  He  was  thus  manifestly  not 
only  able  to  discover  the  history  of  the  composition,  but  strongly  interested  in  the  dis- 
covery. The  selfishness  and  caution  of  his  own  character  are  slyly  hit  off  in  the 
second  volume — “ Erasmus  est  homo  pro  se and  we  should  be  disposed  to  attribute 
the  clamor  of  his  subsequent  disapprobation  to  personal  pique,  as  much,  at  least,  as 
to  virtuous  indignation,  or  even  timidity. 

P 


226 


EPISTOL.®  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


ignorabam  auc tores.  Nam  tres  fuisse  ferebantur.  In  neminem 
derivavi  suspicionem.” 1 This  testimony  is  at  once  the  most 
cogent  and  most  articulate  that  exists ; so  strong  is  it,  that  we 
at  once  accept  it,  even  against  the  presumption  that  an  effusion 
of  so  singular  a character,  of  such  uniform  excellence,  and  rising 
so  transcendently  above  the  numerous  attempts  at  imitation,  could 
have  emanated  only  from  a single  genius.  To  suppose  the  co- 
operation of  a plurality  of  minds,  each  endowed  with  the  rare 
ability  necessary  for  such  a work,  is  in  itself  improbable,  and  the 
improbability  rises  in  a geometrical  ratio  to  the  number  of  such 
minds  which  the  hypothesis  assumes.  In  the  present  case,  the 
weight  of  special  evidence  in  favor  of  plurality  is  sufficient  to 
counterbalance,  to  a certain  extent,  the  general  presumption  in 
favor  of  unity.  But  gratuitously  to  postulate,  as  has  been  so 
frequently  done,  all  and  sundry  not  disinclined  to  Reuchlin,  to 
have  been  able  to  write,  and  actually  to  have  assisted  in  writing 
this  masterpiece  of  wit,  is  of  all  absurdities  the  greatest.  The 
law  of  parsimony  is  overcome  by  the  irrecusable  testimony  of 
Ortuinus  and  Erasmus,  so  far  as  to  compel  us  to  admit  a plural- 
ity of  authors,  and  that  to  the  amount  of  three  ; but  philosophical 
presumption,  and  historical  evidence,  combine  in  exploding  the 
supposition  of  a greater  number. 

Of  these  three  authors,  tivo  are  already  found. — We  could 
prove,  we  think,  by  exclusion,  that  no  other,  besides  Buschius, 
was  at  all  likely  to  have  been  the  third.  But  as  this  negative 
would  be  tedious,  we  shall  only  attempt  the  positive,  by  showing 
that  every  circumstance  concurs  in  pointing  out  that  distinguished 
scholar  as  the  colleague  of  Hutten  and  Crotus.  The  name  of 
Buschius  has  once  and  again  been  mentioned,  among  the  other 
wellwishers  of  Reuchlin,  as  a possible  author  of  this  satire  ; but 
while  no  evidence  has  yet  been  led,  to  show  that  his  participation 
in  that  work  was  probable,  grounds  have  been  advanced,  and 
still  remain  unanswered,  which  would  prove  this  participation  to 
have  been  impossible. 

We  must  therefore  refute,  as  a preliminary,  this  alleged  im- 
possibility.— “Hamelmann,”  says  Meiners,  whose  authority  on 
this  question  is  deservedly  of  the  highest,  “believes  that  Hermann 
von  dem  Busche  had  a share  in  the  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Viro- 
rum.  This  supposition  is  contradicted  by  the  chronology  of  these 
letters,  which  were  written  and  printed  previously  to  the  return 


1 Spongia  adv.  asp.  Hulteni  (Opera,  t.  x.  c.  1640,  ed.  Clerici). 


PROOF  OF  THEIR  THREE  AUTHORS;  BUSCHIUS.  227 

of  Von  dem  Busche  to  Germany.”'  This  objection,  of  which 
Muench  was  not  aware,  is  established  on  Hamelmann’s  biography 
of  Buschius ; and,  if  true,  it  would  he  decisive.  We  can  prove, 
however,  that  Buschius  was  not  only  in  Germany , but  resident 
at  Cologne  for  a considerable  time  previous  to  the  printing  of 
the  first  volume  of  the  Epistolce,  and  continued  to  reside  there , 
until  about  the  date  of  the  publication  of  the  second .1 2 — Buschius 
was  teaching  in  the  university  of  Cologne,  soon  after  the  publi- 
cation of  the  Prsenotamenta  of  Ortuinus,  in  1514,  as  is  proved  by 
the  letter  of  Magister  Hipp,  the  17th  in  the  first  volume  of  the 
Epistote.  In  the  19th  letter  of  the  second  volume,  Magister 
SchlaurafF,  at  the  commencement  of  his  peregrination,  leaves 
Buschius  in  Rostoch,  hut  at  its  termination  finds  him  teaching  in 
Cologne ; while  the  46th  of  the  same  volume  speaks  of  him  as 
then  (i.  e.  1516)  a rival  of  Ortuinus  in  that  school.  GMareanus 
in  his  Epistle  to  Reuchlin,  dated  from  Cologne,  January  1514, 
speaks  of  Buschius  as  resident  in  that  city.  (111.  Vir.  Ep.  ad 
Reuchl.  X iii.)  The  letter  of  Buschius  himself  to  Reuchlin,  writ- 
ten in  October , “from  his  own  house  in  Cologne,”  is  checked  by 
the  events  to  which  it  alludes  to  the  year  1515  (Ibid.  Y i.) ; and, 
finally,  we  find  him  addressing  to  Erasmus  a poetical  congratu- 
lation on  his  entry  into  that  city  in  1516  (Erasmi  Opera  III.  c. 
198  and  c.  1578,  ed.  Clerici.)  Buschius  could  not  thus  have 
left  Cologne,  before  the  middle  or  end  of  the  year  1516  (his  ab- 
sentation at  that  juncture  becomes  significant) ; and  when  recall- 
ed from  England  to  Cologne  in  1517,  by  Count  Nuenar,  Dean  of 
the  Canonical  Chapter,  that  nobleman,  with  all  his  influence,  was 
unable  to  support  him  against  the  hostility  of  the  Monks  and 
Magistri  Nostri,  Hoogstraten,  Ortuinus  and  Co.,  to  whom,  if  a 
known  or  suspected  contributor  to  the  E pis  tote,  he  would  now 
have  become  more  than  ever  obnoxious.  Erasmus  found  him  at 
Spires  in  1518. — So  far,  therefore,  from  being  placed  beyond  the 
sphere  of  co-operation  during  the  concoction  of  the  Epistote,  he 
was  for  the  whole  period  at  its  very  centre. 

But  his  participation  is  not  simply  possible — it  is  highly  pro- 
bable. 

In  the  first  place,  his  talents  were  not  only  of  the  highest  order, 


1 Lebensbeschr.  her.  Maenner,  II.  p.  380. 

2 Meiners,  it  may  be  observed,  makes  the  appearance  of  the  first  volume  of  the 
Epistolae  a year  too  late.  This  was  in  1515,  or,  at  latest,  in  the  beginning  of  1516  ; 
while  the  second  volume  was  published  toward  the  end  of  1516,  or  early  in  1517. 


22S 


EPISTOLJE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


and  his  command  over  the  Latin  tongue  in  all  its  applications 
almost  unequaled,  hut  his  genius  and  character  in  strict  analogy 
with  the  work  in  question.  The  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Yirorum 
are  always  bitterly  satirical,  and  never  scrupulously  decent.1  The 
writings  of  Buschius — his  (Estrum,  his  Epistola  pro  Reuchlino, 
his  Concio  ad  Clerum  Coloniensem,  his  Vallum  Humanitatis,  to 
say  nothing  of  others — are  just  a series  of  satires,  and  satires  of 
precisely  the  same  tendency  as  that  pasquil.  The  Vallum,  by 
which  he  is  now  best  known  to  scholars,  Erasmus  prevailed  on 
him  to  soften  down ; it  still  remains  sufficiently  caustic.  His 
epigrams  show  that,  in  his  writings,  he  did  not  pique  himself  on 
modesty  ; while  the  exhortation  of  the  worthy  Abbot  Trithemius, 
“ ut  ita  viveret  ne  moribus  destrueret  eruditionem,”  proves  that 
he  was  no  rigorist  in  conduct. 

In  the  second  place,  in  thus  maintaining  the  cause  of  Reuchlin 
he  was  most  effectually  maintaining  his  own. 

In  the  third  place,  Ortuinus  Gfratius,  to  whom  the  Epistolse 
Virorum  Obscurorum  are  addressed,  is  the  principal  victim  of 
this  satire,  though  not  a prominent  enemy  of  Reuchlin — far  less 
of  Hutten  and  Crotus.  But  he  was  the  literary  opponent,  and 
personal  foe  of  Buschius.  Westphalians  by  birth,  Ortuinus  and 
Buschius  were  countrymen  ; they  had  also  been  schoolfellows  at 
Daventer,  under  the  celebrated  Hegius.  But  as  they  were  not 
allies,  their  early  connection  made  them  only  the  more  bitter 
adversaries.  Buschius,  the  champion  of  scholastic  reform,  was 
opposed  by  Ortuinus,  with  no  sincerity  of  conviction,  but  all  the 
vehemence  of  personal  animosity,  in  his  endeavors  to  exterminate 
the  ancient  grammars,  which,  having  for  ages  perpetuated 
barbarism  in  the  schools  and  universities,  were  now  loathed  as 
philological  abominations  by  the  restorers  of  ancient  learning. 
Buschius  had  thus  not  only  general  reasons  to  contemn  Ortuinus, 
as  a renegade  from  the  cause  of  illumination,  but  private  motives 
to  hate  him  as  a hypocritical  and  malevolent  enemy.  The  attack 
of  Ortuinus  is  accordingly  keenly  retorted  by  Buschius  in  the 
preface  to  his  second  edition  of  Donatus,  as  it  is  also  ridiculed  in 

1 This  excludes  Eobanus  Hessus,  of  whom  we  know  from  Erasmus,  Joachim  Came- 
rarius,  and  Melchior  Adamus  (to  say  nothing  of  the  negative  evidence  of  his  own 
writings),  that  he  was  morbidly  averse  from  satire  and  obscenity.  Muench,  who  com- 
prises Eobanus  (he  has  it  uniformly  Erban)  in  his  all-comprehensive  hypothesis  of 
authorship,  makes  him  writer  of  the  tract  De  Fide  Meretricum.  He  was  not ; and  if 
he  were,  the  author  of  that  wretched  twaddle  was  certainly  no  author  of  the  Epistola 
Obscurorum  Virorum. 


PROOF  OF  THEIR  THREE  AUTHORS;  BUSCHIUS. 


229 


the  9th  and  32d  letters  of  the  first  volume  of  the  E pistol*  Ob- 
scurorum  Virorum. 

In  th q fourth  place,  the  scandal  about  the  family  and  parent- 
age of  Ortuinus  (and  he  is  the  only  one  of  the  Obscure  whose 
birth  is  satirized),  seems  to  indicate  the  information  of  a country- 
man ; and  with  every  allowance  for  exaggeration,  still  even  the 
contradictions  of  his  sacerdotal  filiation,  which  Ortuinus  found 
it  necessary  to  publish  in  his  various  works  subsequent  to  the 
Epistolso,  preserve  always  a suspicious  silence  touching  his 
mother. 

In  the  fifth  place,  Buschius  was  the  open  and  strenuous  parti- 
san of  Reuchlin,  in  whose  cause  he  published,  along  with  Nuenar 
and  Hutten,  a truculent  invective  against  the  Apologia  of  Hoog- 
straten.  He  is  always,  indeed,  found  enumerated  among  the 
most  active  and  prominent  of  the  Reuchlinists.  In  evidence  of 
this,  we  regret  that  we  can  not  quote  from  the  Epistolse  illus- 
trium  Virorum  ad  Reuchlinum,  the  letters  of  Nuenar  (T  iii.),  of 
Gdareanus  (X  iii.),  and  of  Eobanus  (Y  iii.),  and  from  the  Epis- 
tolee  Obscurorum  Virorum,  the  50th  letter  of  the  second  volume ; 
in  all  of  which,  the  mention  made  of  Buschius  is  on  various 
accounts  remarkable. 

In  the  sixth  place,  Buschius  was  also  the  intimate  friend  ol 
Crotus  and  Hutten ; and  among  the  letters  to  which  we  last 
referred,  those  of  Nuenar  and  Eobanus  significantly  notice  his 
co-operation  in  aid  of  Reuchlin  with  these  indubitable  authors  of 
the  work  in  question.  His  attachment  to  Hutten  was  so  strong, 
that  it  lost  him,  in  the  end,  the  friendship  of  his  schoolfellow 
Erasmus. 

In  the  seventh  place,  Cologne  and  Leipsic  are  the  universities 
prominently  held  up  to  ridicule  throughout  the  E pistol*.  "We 
see  why,  in  the  cause  of  Reuchlin,  the  Magistri  Nostri  of  Cologne 
should  be  especial  objects  of  attack; — but  why  those  of  Leipsic? 
Leipsic  was  not  even  one  of  the  universities  which  had  concurred 
with  Cologne  in  condemning  the  Augenspiegel  of  Reuchlin. 
With  the  Leipsic  regents,  neither  Hutten  nor  Crotus  had  any 
collision;  nor,  as  far  as  we  are  aware,  any  intercourse.  They 
are  assailed,  however,  with  a perseverance  and  acrimony  betray- 
ing personal  rancor,  and  with  a minuteness  of  information  com- 
petent only  to  one  who  had  been  long  resident  among  them. 
The  problem  is  at  once  solved,  if  we  admit  the  participation  of 
Buschius.  This  scholar  had  grievous  injuries  to  avenge,  not  onlv 


230 


EPISTOUE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


on  the  obscurants  of  Cologne,  but  on  those  of  Leipsic.  The 
influence  of  Hoogstraten,  Tungern,  and  their  adherents,  had 
banished  him  from  Cologne  about  the  year  1500  ; and  on  both 
his  subsequent  returns  to  that  University,  he  remained  at  open 
war  with  its  Theologians  and  “Artists.”1  After  his  first  expul- 
sion from  Cologne,  he  had,  for  six  years,  taught  in  Leipsic  v/ith 
the  greatest  reputation  ; hut  the  jealousy  of  the  barbarians  being 
roused  by  the  preponderance  which  he  had  given  to  the  study  of 
polite  letters,  he  was  constrained  by  their  vexations  to  abandon 
that  university  in  1510,  and  the  extrusion  of  his  friend  Aesticam- 
pianus  was  adjourned  only  until  the  following  year.  The  letter 
of  Magister  Hipp,  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Epistolse  (Ep.  17), 
in  which  the  persecution  of  Aesticampianus  by  the  Leipsic  mas- 
ters is  minutely  described,  and  that  of  Buschius  wholly  over- 
past, betrays  the  hand  of  Buschius  himself.  Throughout  these 
letters,  indeed,  the  notices  of  Yon  dem  Busche,  as  of  Hutten 
and  Crotus,  harmonize  completely  with  the  hypothesis  of  author- 
ship. 

But,  in  the  eighth  place,  we  are  not  altogether  left  to  general 
probabilities.  The  single  letter  of  Buschius  to  Reuchlin,  com- 
pared with  some  of  the  E pistol®  Obscurorum  Virorum,  supplies 
conformities,  that  go  far  of  themselves  to  establish  an  identity  of 
authors.  (Ep.  ad  Reuchl.  L ii.  Y.)  Among  other  parallelisms, 
compare,  in  the  former,  the  threat  of  the  Anti-Reuchlinists,  in 
the  event  of  the  Pope  deciding  against  them,  to  effect  a schism 
in  the  Church,  with  the  same  in  the  57th  Epistle  of  the  second 
volume  of  the  latter  ; — their  menace,  in  the  former,  of  appealing 
to  a Council,  with  the  same  in  the  12th  Epistle  of  the  first  volume 
of  the  latter  ; and  their  disparagement  of  the  Pope,  and  a papal 
sentence,  in  the  former,  with  the  same  in  the  11th  and  12th 
Epistles  of  the  first  volume  of  the  latter. 

We  do  not  pretend  that  the  circumstantial  evidence  now  ad- 
duced amounts  to  absolute  certainty.  It  affords,  however,  the 
highest  probability  ; and  is  at  least  sufficient,  in  the  present  state 
of  the  question,  to  vindicate  against  every  other  competitor,  the 
claim  of  Buschius  to  the  third  place  in  the  triumvirate  to  whom 
the  Epistolae  Obscurorum  Virorum  are  to  be  ascribed. 

It  now  remains  to  say  a few  words  on  Dr.  Muench’s  perform- 
ances as  editor. — A satisfactory  edition  of  the  Epistoke  Obscuro- 

1 How  fond  Buschius  was  of  every  joke  against  Hoogstraten,  may  be  seen  from  ills 
correspondence  with  Erasmus. — (Eras mi:  opera,  t.  iii.  cc  1682,  1083.) 


CHARACTER  OF  MUENCH’S  EDITION. 


231 


rum  Virorum  required  : 1°,  A history  of  the  circumstances  which 
dHtermi  ned  the  appearance  and  character  of  the  satire,  including 
an  inquiry  into  its  authors  ; 2°,  A critical  discussion  of  the  vari- 
ous editions  of  the  work  ; 3°,  A correct  text  founded  on  a colla- 
tion of  all  the  original  editions,  the  omissions,  interpolations,  and 
variations  of  each  being  distinguished ; and,  4°,  A commentary 
on  the  frequent  allusions  to  things  and  persons  requiring  expla- 
nation. 

In  regard  to  th q first  of  these  conditions,  Dr.  Muench  has  added 
nothing — and  not  a little  was  wanting.  To  explain  the  general 
relations  of  the  satire,  it  was  not  sufficient  to  narrate  the  steps 
of  the  Reuchlinian  process  as  an  isolated  event ; nor  in  compiling 
this  narrative  (for  it  shows  no  original  research),  has  he  even 
copied  his  predecessors  without  inaccuracy.  His  disquisition 
touching  the  origin  of  the  work,  from  his  omission  of  all  refer- 
ences, can  only  he  understood  by  those  who  are  already  conver- 
sant with  the  discussion  ; his  statement  of  the  different  opinions 
in  regard  to  the  authorship,  is  at  second  hand,  and  very  incom- 
plete ; and  his  own  hypothesis  on  the  subject  good  for  nothing. 

In  regard  to  the  second  condition,  Dr.  Muench  has  committed 
a momentous  blunder  relative  to  the  appendix  of  seven,  or  more 
properly  six,  letters  which  were  added  to  the  third  edition  of  the 
first  volume — an  edition  which  probably  appeared  within  a year 
after  the  first  edition  of  the  first  volume,  and  almost  certainly 
before  the  publication  of  the  second  volume.  With  Panzer  (whom 
he  makes  of  Leipsic  !)  and  Ebert — nay  even  with  what  he  him- 
self has  transcribed  from  these  bibliographers,  before  his  eyes, 
his  blunder  is  inconceivable.  Prom  a note  to  the  first  of  these 
additional  letters  (p.  146),  compared  with  his  account  of  the 
fourth  edition,  that  of  1556  (p.  70),  he  evidently  imagines  these 
six  letters  to  have  been  first  published  and  appended  in  that 
edition  along  with  the  Epistola  imperterriti  Fratris,  &c.  “ The 

following  letters,”  he  says,  “ are  added  only  in  the  later  edi- 
tions, and  their  author,  as  well  as  the  occasion  of  their  compo- 
sition, unknown.  In  all  probability  they  were  the  work  of  the 
still  living  authors  of  the  first  and  second  volumes.” — -Some  lesser 
errors  under  this  head  we  overpass,  as  Muench  is  here  only  a 
copyist. 

The  third  condition,  though  of  primary  importance,  and  com- 
paratively easy,  our  author  has  not  fulfilled.  He  professes  to 
have  printed  the  first  volume  from  its  second  edition ; he  does 


232 


EPISTOLiE  OBSCURORUM  YIRORUM. 


not  inform  us  from  what  edition  he  printed  the  second  volume, 
or  the  appendix  to  the  first.  He  has  instituted  no  collation  of  the 
original  editions  : and  nothing  can  exceed  the  negligence,  we 
shall  not  say  ignorance,  which  even  this  uncollated  text  displays. 
It  was  the  primary  duty  of  an  editor  to  have  furnished  a text, 
purified  at  least  from  the  monstrous  typographical  errors  with 
which  all  former  editions  abound.  The  present  edition  only  adds 
new  blunders  to  the  old.1  These  errata  we  should  refer  to  a 
culpable  negligence,  were  it  not  that  Dr.  Muench  is  occasionally 
guilty  of  blunders,  which  can  only  he  explained  by  a defective 
scholarship,  and  an  ignorance  of  literary  history.  Thus,  in  his 
introduction  (pp.  55,  56),  he  repeatedly  adduces  a passage  from 
one  of  Hutton’s  letters,  beginning  rumpaniur  utilia,  though  every 
schoolboy  would  at  once  read  rumpantur  ut  ilia. 

To  the  accomplishment  of  the  fourth  condition,  Dr.  Muench 
has  contributed  little  or  nothing.  No  work  more  required,  as 
none  better  deserved,  a commentary,  than  the  Epistolse.  Our 
editor  has,  however,  attempted  no  illustration  of  the  now  obscure 
allusions  with  which  they  every  where  abound — no  difficult  un- 
dertaking to  one  versed  in  the  scholastic  philosophy,  and  the 
general  literature  of  the  period  : but  the  biographical  notices  he 
has  ventured  to  append,  of  a very  few  of  the  persons  mentioned 
in  the  text,  significantly  prove  his  utter  incompetence  to  the  task. 
These  meagre  notices  are  gleaned  from  the  most  vulgar  sources, 
and  one  or  two  examples  will  afford  a sufficient  sample  of  their 
inaccuracy. 

The  celebrated  poet,  Joannes  Baptista  ( Hispaniolus , Spagnoli) 
Mantuanus,  Gfeneral  of  the  Carmelites,  who  died  in  March  1516, 2 3 
he  mistakes,  and  in  the  very  face  of  the  Epistolas,  for  the  obscure 
physician,  Baptista  Fiera  (he  writes  it  Finra)  Mantuanus,  who 
died  at  a much  later  period. 


1 Dipping  here  and  there  at  random,  we  notice  : p.  158,  Wesatio  for  Wesalio,  an 
old  and  important  erratum  ; p.  192,  positionem  for  pitioncm,  old  error  ; p.  132,  Stulteti 
for  Sculteti,  ditto ; p.  133,  succo  taphaniana  drachmas  iii.,  for  succo  raphani  ana  drachmas 
iii.  ; p.  88,  nostrum.  Fctrum  for  nostrum,  P.,  old  error;  p.  98,  quot  libeta  for  quod- 

libcta  ; p.  138,  praeputiati  for  non  praeputiati ; ibid.,  non  praeputiati  for  praeputiati,  old 
error  ; p.  139,  fuit  promotus  for  fui promotus,  old  error  ; p.  203,  cum  contra  semel  ar 
ticulos  habuit  Petrum,  &c.,  for  c.  h.  s.  a.  c.  P. ; p.  204,  parem  for  patrem ; p.  137, 
indoxicationem  for  intoxicationcm ; pp.  162,  163,  solarium  for  solarium , old  error,  &c., 
&c. 

3 The  allusion  to  the  death  of  Mantuanus,  in  the  twelfth  letter  of  the  second  vo- 
lume of  the  Epistolse,  thus  checks,  to  a certain  point,  the  date  of  its  composition,  and 
would  prove  that  it  was  written  in  Italy,  consequently  by  Hutten.  This,  which  has 
not  been  observed,  is  important. 


CHARACTER  OF  MTTENCH’S  EDITION. 


233 


Every  tyro  in  the  literary  history  of  the  middle  ages,  and  of 
the  revival  of  letters,  is  familiar  with  the  name,  at  least,  of  Alex- 
ander de  Villa  Dei  or  Dolensis,  whose  Latin  Grammar,  the  Doc- 
trinale  Puerorum,  reigned  omnipotent  throughout  the  schools  of 
Europe,  from  the  beginning  of  the  13th  to  the  beginning  of  the 
16th  century.  The  struggle  for  its  expulsion  was  one  of  the 
most  prominent  events  in  the  history  of  the  restoration  of  classical 
studies  in  Germany  ; and  the  Epistolse  Obscurorum  Virorum  are 
full  of  allusions  to  the  contest.  Yet  Dr.  Muench  knows  nothing 
of  Alexander.  “ Gallus  Alexander,”  says  he,  uas  it  appears , an 
able  grammarian  of  the  fifteenth  century,  an  experienced  casuist ,” 
&c. — all  utterly  wrong,  even  to  the  name. 

Of  the  notorious  Wigand  Wirt,  Dr.  Muench  states  that  he  was 
one  of  the  Dominicans  executed  at  Berne,  for  the  celebrated  im- 
posture, in  1509.  Though  probably  the  deviser  of  that  fraud,  he 
was  not  among  its  victims ; and  had  Dr.  Muench  read  the  Epis- 
tolse he  edits,  with  the  least  attention,  he  would  have  seen  that 
Wigand  is  in  them  accused  of  being  the  real  author  of  the  Sturm - 
glock  (Alarum),  written  against  Reuchlin,  in  1514,  and  that  he 
is  living  in  1516.  (Vol.  I.  App.  Ep.  6.) 

Our  editor  confounds  Bartholomew  Zehender  or  Decimator  of 
Mentz,  with  Bartholomseus  Coloniensis  of  Minden.  The  former 
was  one  of  the  most  ignorant  and  intolerant  of  the  Anti-Reuch- 
linists ; the  latter,  the  scholar  of  Hegius,  the  friend  of  Erasmus 
(who  styles  him,  vir  eruditione  singulari ),  and  the  ally  of  Bus- 
chius,  Aesticampianus,  and  Csesarius,  had  been  banished  from 
his  native  city,  for  his  exertions  in  the  cause  of  classical  Latinity, 
by  the  persecutors  of  Reuchlin  themselves. 

What  we  have  said  will  suffice  to  show  that  these  letters  still 
await  their  editor.  Let  the  Germans  beware.  The  work  is  of 
European  interest : and,  if  they  are  not  on  the  alert,  the  Epis- 
tolse Obscurorum  Virorum  may,  like  the  poems  of  Lotichius,  find 
a foreign  commentator.1 

1 Another  edition  of  these  Epistles,  by  Rotermund,  we  see  announced  in  the  I .eipsic 
Mass-Catalogue  for  Easter  1830  ; and  have  been  disappointed  in  not  obtaining  it  for 
this  article.  The  editor,  whom  we  know  only  as  author  of  the  Supplement  to 
Joecher's  Biographical  Lexicon,  professes,  in  the  title,  to  give  merely  a reprint  of  the 
London  edition  of  1710  (i.  e.  a text  of  no  authority,  and  swarming  with  typographical 
blunders,)  a preface  explanatory  of  the  origin  of  the  satire,  and  biographical  notices  of 
the  persons  mentioned  in  it.  As  there  seems  no  attempt  at  a commentary,  we  do  not 
surmise  that  Rotermund  has  performed  more  in  Latin  [but  in  German  it  is,]  than 
Muench  in  German ; and  the  small  price  shows  that  there  can  be  little  added  to  the 
text.. — [Having  now  seen  tills  edition,  the  presumptive  opinion  need  not  be  withdrawn. 


234 


EPISTOLJE  OBSCURORUM  VIRORUM. 


— The  only  other  attempt  at  an  illustration  of  this  satire  of  which  I am  aware,  smce 
this  article  was  written,  is  that  of  Professor  Eichstadt,  who,  in  1831  and  the  follow- 
ing years,  on  academical  occasions,  published  at  Jena  his  Commentationcs  De  Poesi 
Culinaria,  of  which  I possess  four.  They  are  explanatory  of  the  persons  alluded  to 
in  one  of  the  Epistol® ; to  wit,  the  Carmen  Rithmicale  Magistri  Philippi  Schlauraff, 
quod  compilavit  ct  comportavit,  quando  fuit  Cursor  in  Thcologia,  et  ambulavit  per  totam 
Almaniam  superiorem. — Twenty  years  have  now  elapsed  since  the  preceding  article 
was  written,  and  the  Germans  have  not  yet  given  to  the  world  even  a critical  text  of 
their  great  national  satire. 

Eobanus  Hcssus,  referred  to  in  note  t,  p.  215,  is  I see  an  error  for  Crotus  Rubianus. 
But  the  one  letter  of  Eobanus  in  the  Illustrium  Virorum  Epistolaj  ad  Reuchlinum, 
(sig.  Y.  ii.  sq.)  is  curious  in  itself ; and  still  more,  as  it  is  in  answer  to  the  following 
letter  of  Reuchlin,  the  autograph  of  which  came  into  my  possession  several  years  after 
the  date  of  the  preceding  article,  and  now  appears  for  the  first  time.  This  autograph 
is  a good  specimen  of  the  calligraphy  for  which  Reuchlin  was  noted ; and  of  which  a 
fac-simile  is  to  be  found,  among  others,  in  Effner’s  “ Doctor  Martin  Luther^”  (ii.  205) 
This  letter  is  of  some  historical  importance. 

“Helio  Eobano  Hesso, 

POLITIORIS  LITERATURE  PRECEPTORI  ERDIFORDIAE,  AMICO  SUO  QUAM  OBSERVANDI3 

SIMO. AD  MANUS. 

S.  D.  P.  Au  tu  non  videas,  Hasse,  mecum  simul,  quam  ist®  crudeles  picse  men 
die®,  ist®  Harpyi®  cyanoleuc®  (non  illi  Fratres  Areales  qui  Romuli  setate  religiosi 
erant,  sed  hi  Fratres  Dominicales  qui  nostro  ®vo  a religione  labascunt,)  indefessa 
bella  gerant,  ut  mihi  vix  concedatur  spirare  ac  aliquando  vires  resumere.  Et  tu 
moleste  quereris,  me  tuis  ad  me  datis  literis  in  hoc  tam  laborioso  tempore  nihil  re- 
spondisse  ! 

Tristius  haud  illis  monstrum,  nec  scevior  ulla 

Pestis.  [Virgo 

Quotidie  calamum  agitant  meum,  et  mentem,  pene  defatigato  mihi,  alio  impellunt,  ut 
melioribus  literis  incumbere  nequeam.  Tu  potes  in  Helicone  choreas  ducere,  Ascrseo- 
que  calamo  imit.ari  Musarum  voluptates.  At  mihi  non  est  integrum  inter  tot  crabrones 
consusurrare,  aut  quippiam,  vel  serium  et  rigidius  Cantone,  meditari.  Ergo  nisi  te 
amen,  invidebo  illi  tu®  prosperitati,  et  mei  miserebor  : quod  tu,  princeps  rei  literari® 
nobilissimus,  careas  aemulis  ; cum  non  modo  tam  illustres  generosi  animi  tui  conatus, 
quos  in  Heroidibus  ostentas,  verum  etiam  nomen  ipsum  tuum,  tantse  majestatis  signa- 
culum,  ad  invidiam  multos  concitare  debuerat  (ut  est  nunc  hominum  multorum  con- 
ditio, senescente  mundo).  Ephesiis  enim  Hessen,  idem  quod  Rex  Latinis,  dicitur, 
Callimacho  poeta  Gyrenso  teste  ; qui  Jovem,  non  sorte  lectum  esse  Regem  Deorum 
asserit,  sed  operibus  manuum,  in  Hymno  ad  Jovem  hoc  utens  carmine : — 

Oil  ae  Qea>v  icrariva  [vulgo,  eVcnjm ] rcahoi  deaav,  epya  be  ^eipoov. 

Ubi  Hessena  summum  regem  designat.  [Chald.  Hasin,  potens.]  Inter  enim  setatis 
tu®  Christianos  poetas,  ipse  Rex  es ; qui  scribendis  versibus,  quodam  potentatu  et 
ingenii  dominio  eminentiore,  plus  c®teris  metro  imperas,  et  syllabas  quasque  ad  regu- 
lam  regis.  Gratulor  itaque  Universitati  Erdifordi®,  quod  te  tali  clarescunt  viro.  Nec 
me  in  odium  ejus,  quominus  de  suo  splendore  ac  laudis  amplitudine  gaudeam,  unquam 
concitabunt  quidam,  male  de  me  homines  meriti,  tecum  habitantes  ; qui  tametsi 
Theologiam  profitentur,  tamen  in  condemnando  mea,  Dei  vocem  non  sunt  sequuti — 
Adam  ubi  es  1 Ipsi  autem  illi  inter  pejores,  non  dico  boni,  sed  minus  mali  fuerunt. 
Quanquam  omnes,  cum  suis  complicibus,  qui  non  vident  trabem  in  oculo  suo,  expecta- 
bunt  Dei  judicium  dicentis  : — In  quo  judicio  judicaveritis,  judicabimini ; Nolite  condcm- 
nare,  et  non  condemnabimini.  Certum  hoc  est : non  mentitur  Deus.  Tu  vero,  quan- 
quam omnium  bcllorum  exitus  incerti  sunt,  tamen  de  mea  causa  spem  tibi  concipe. 
quod  has  volucres  prorsus  superabo.  Sententiam  diffinitivam  cum  execut.ione  obtinui. 
Sed  adversarii,  victoriam  meam  putantes  revera  suam  infamiam,  omni  diligentia  invo- 
caverunt  Francorum  Regem.  Mirum,  quod  non  [jam]  Persarum  summum  item  pon- 


POEMS  OF  EOBANUS. 


235 


tificem  [atque]  alios  principes  exorcisarunt,  ut  Sententiam  Apostolicam  labefactarent. 
Quapropter  ego,  licet  victor,  illos  Romam  citavi.  Ut  ab  hoc  exemolo  discere  potes  ! 
Unde  paulisper  suspende  chelyn,  dum  conclamatum  fuerit.  Interea  tamen,  si  me 
amas,  adapta  citharam  et  Musis  materiam  colliga. — -Eque  foeliciter  vale. 

E Stutgardia,  vii  Kal.  Novembres,  Anno  m.d.xiiii. 

Joannes  Reuchlin  Phorcen.  LL.D. 

In  fervente  ad  Vindietam  Iambo,  non  erts  solus  neque  alter.” 

Reuchlin’s  reference  to  the  language  of  the  Ephesians  is  explained  by  the  Etymolo- 
gicon  Magnum  ( sub  voce.) 

Eobanus,  in  his  answer,  says,  inter  alia,  that  he  had  shown  this  letter  to  sundry 
good  men  in  Erfurt,  admirers  of  Reuchlin,  and  enemies  of  the  hostile  faction,  and  to 
some  even  of  the  Theological  Faculty  (who  had  condemned  the  Eyeglass  without 
interrogating  its  author.)  “Sunt  enim  et  hie  quoque  boni  et  mali ; ipsi  autem  illi, 
quos  tu,  non  lonos  sect  inter  pejores  minus  malos,  appellas,  pmnitere  videntur,  quod 
Coloniensibus  asinis  et  circumforaneis  nugivendis  ipsi  decepti  potius  quam  instructi, 
suffragium  addiderunt.” 

Eobanus  signalises  “ Hutten,  Buschius,  and  Crotus,'’  as  the  three  first  of  the  trum- 
peters of  Reuchlin’s  victory.] 

[ The  following  appears  as  an  Addendum  in  the  English  Edition.  It  is  here  inserted  inits  proper  place. 
— Am.  Pub.] 

The  preceding  letter,  though  I always  prized  it  as  exceedingly  curious,  is,  I find, 
far  more  curious  than  I had  ever  surmised. — Helius  Eobanus  Hcssus  (to  say  nothing 
more  of  Reuchlin)  is  known  to  all  versed  in  the  history  of  the  Restoration  of  Letters, 
and  history  of  the  Reformation  of  the  Church,  as  one  of  the  most  remarkable  characters 
of  that  remarkable  period.  He  was  the  admired  of  Erasmus  and  of  Luther,  the  bosom 
friend  of  Hutten,  Crotus,  Buschius,  Melanchthon,  and  Camerarius,  indeed,  more  or 
less  intimately  connected  with  almost  all  the  many  men  of  note  by  whom  Germany, 
during  the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century,  was  so  conspicuously  illustrated.  In  an 
age — in  a country  where  Latin  so  totally  superseded  the  vernacular,  Eobanus  was  the 
Poet  of  the  Reformation,  and,  with  Melanchthon  and  Camerarius,  its  chief  Litcrator. 
He  is  called  by  Erasmus  the  Ovid,  by  Camerarius  the  Homer,  of  Germany ; and  his 
translation  of  the  Psalter  was  even  more  popular  than  his  Homeric  version,  or  his 
Ovidian  imitations.  Of  his  Psalms,  there  are  known  more  than  forty  editions.  As  a 
poet,  Eobanus  remained  during  his  life  unapproached  in  Germany  ; and  it  was  not  till 
after  his  death,  that  Lotichius,  and  long  after  it,  that  Balde,  came  to  share  with,  if  not 
to  wrest  from,  him  the  Elegiac  and  the  Lyric  laurels. 

But  why  was  he  called  the  King  1 — In  reading  the  Letters  of  Eobanus,  of  which 
we  have  two  collections,  by  his  two  friends,  Camerarius  and  Draco,  in  reading  the 
Letters  of  his  friends  Camerarius  and  Melanchthon — and  in  reading  the  Life  of  Eoba- 
nus by  Camerarius  (to  say  nothing  of  the  many  subsequent  biographers  of  the  poet), 
we  encounter  perpetual  allusions  to  the  title  of  King ; the  title,  in  fact,  which  Eobanus 
assumed  himself  (but,  in  joke,  as  11  Rex  Stultorum ,”)  and  with  which  he  was  almost 
uniformly  decorated  by  his  more  intimate  correspondents.  He  sometimes  dates  his 
epistles,  indeed,  “ ex  Regia  Egestosa and  his  Queen,  he  once  informs  a correspond- 
ent, had  ceased  to  amplify  the  royal  family— non  quia  vetula  sit,  sed  quia  nolit ; dicit 
enim  satis  Regulorum.”  The  royal  pair  had  only  a single  Princess  (Reginula).  Thus 
Luther  (in  1530),  sending  to  the  poetic  translator  of  the  Psalms  his  own  humbler  prose 
German  version  of  the  cxviii.,  writes  : — Nam  poetae  nolo  ullo  modo  comparari,  sicut 
nec  debeo  nec  possum.  Tu  enim  rex  poetarum,  et  poeta  regum,  seu,  rectius  dicam, 
regius  poeta  et  poeticus  rex  es,  qui  regium  ilium  poetam  sic  pulchre  refers  in  peregrina 
sibi  lingua.”  (De  Wette,  iv.  138).  Eobanus,  too,  had  received  the  royal  title  long 
before  he  was  recognized,  in  then  temulent  Germany,  as  the  very  Prince  of  Topers  ; 
his  only  rival  in  this  supremacy  being,  as  we  are  informed  by  Melanchthon,  the  poet’s 
patron  and  territorial  liege-lord,  the  magnanimous  Landgrave  of  Hesse.  So  much  I 
knew. — A few  days,  however,  after  the  preceding  letter  of  Reuchlin  had  been  printed, 
in  looking,  for  another  matter,  through  the  Farragines  Operum  of  Eobanus,  I stumbled 
on  a poem,  previously  overlooked,  articulately  explaining  the  origin  of  the  poet’s  regal 


236 


EPISTOLiE  OBSCURORUM  YIRORTJM. 


style  ; and  found,  that  this  same  letter  constituted  the  very  imperial  patent  of  creation, 
and  was  not,  as  I had  deemed  it,  one  merely  among  the  many  ordinary  recognitions  of 
his  royal  rank.  I have  likewise  subsequently  observed,  that  Camerarius  in  his  Life  of 
Eobanus  (followed  by  Adamus  and  others),  attributes  to  Reuchlin  the  coronation  of 
Eobanus. — Referring  again  to  the  letter  of  Eobanus  in  answer  to  Reuchlin’s,  I find 
the  following  allusion  to  the  matter  in  question  : — “ Ego  autem  quod  reliquum  est,  mi 
Reuchline,  puto  me  tibi  permagnam  debere  gratiam,  et  certe  non  fallor,  quod  genti 
meae  tam  antiquum,  et  quasi  ex  chao,  attuleris  preeconium,  et  regem  me,  alludente 
voce  gentilicia,  salutas.  Rex  igitur  sum  ego,  sed  admodum  parvo  contentus  regno, 
(quanto  tu  asseris,  id  esset  vel  Imperatori  nimium.” — The  verses  (which  here  follow), 
are  from  the  second  book  of  the  Sylva, ; and  though  the  Farragines  were  first  published 
during  the  life  of  the  poet  (1539),  they  are  not  accurately  printed. 

“ Cur  vocetur  REX. 

Non  ego  crediderim  citius,  prodisse  poetarn 
Quern  sterilis  raptum  pradicat  Ascra  senem ; 

Quam  mihi  jamdudum  Phcebceia  signa  ferenti, 

Venit  adoptato  nomine  Regis  honor. 

Hoc  tamen  unde  feram,  qua  manet  origine  nonem, 

Stultum  et  ridiculum  dicere  pene  fuit. 

Scripsimus  exiguo  vulgata  poemata  versu, 

Scripta  notis  populo  Lypsia  clara  dedit.1 
Legerat  hsec  gentis  Reuchlinus  fama  Suev®, 

Et  dixit : — “ Regis  nomen  habere  potes. 

Inter  enim  quoscunque  ferunt  tua  secula  vates, 

Rex  es,  et  est  ratio  nominis  inde  tui : 

Nam  Graii  Regem  dicunt  Hcssena  poet®, 

Esse  ita  te  Regem,  nomine  reque  doces  ; 

Et  velut  exerces  agnatum  in  carmina  regnum, 

Recta  statin  versu  syllaba  quteque  tuo.”2 
Hoc  scriptum3  excipiunt  atque  amplexantur  amici. 

Et  Regem  clamant  omnibus  esse  locis. 

Ipse  ego  quandoquidem  nec  publica  scripta  negare, 

Nec  poteram  charis  obstruere  ora  viris  : 

“ Rex,’  inquam,  “ Rex  vester  ero,  quando  ista  necesse  est 
Tradita  militite  nomina  ferre  meae. 

Verum  alios  titulos,  nec  inepta  insignia  sumam, 

Moria  jamdudum  cognita  tota  mihi  est.4 5 
Vidimus  Utopiae  latissima  regna  superbae.6 

Tecta  Lucernarum  sunt  peragrata  mihi.6 
Fortunata  meo  lustrata  est  Insula  cursu, 

Dulcia  ubi  sEterno  flumine  mella  fluunt, 

Qua  viret  ambrosiae  succus,  qua  rupibus  altis 
Nectara,  ut  e ccelo,  prsecipitata  cadunt.7 
Gentis  Hyperboreae  felieem  vidimus  oram, 

Qua  neque  mors  hominum  nec  mala  fata  premunt, 

Qua  stant  perpetuam  facientia  stagna  juventam, 

Qua  licet  in  ccelum  scandere  quando  libet.8 

1 The  first  edition  of  the  Hcroides  Christiana:  was  published  at  Leipsic,  in  1514,  Eobanus  being  then 
in  his  twenty-fifth  year. — Does  Eobanus  in  the  first  two  verses  refer  to  a recognition  by  him  of  Reuch- 
lin’s poetical  genius  in  1514?  Reuchlin’s  Scenica  Progymnasmata  were  republished,  in  that  year,  at 
Leipsic ; and  probably  the  letter  of  Eobanus  to  Reuchlin,  to  which  the  latter  in  his  epistle  here  printed 
alludes,  contained  an  acknowledgment  to  the  effect,  with  special  reference  to  that  famous  comedy. 
Reuchlin’s  coronation  of  Eobanus  was  thus  only  a reciprocity  for  Eobanus’s  laureation  of  Reuchlin. 

2 This  is  a very  accurate  abstract  of  Reuchlin’s  letter,  here  printed  from  the  autograph,  and  for  the 
first  time. 

0 Thus  in  a writing,  and  not  in  conversation. 

1 Erasmus,  by  his  Encomium  Moria:,  had,  in  a certain  sort,  brought  Folly  into  fashion. 

5 See  the  Utopia  of  Sir  Thomas  More. 

6 Lucian’s  True  History  (i.  29,)  ? 

7 The  Fortunate  Islands,  or  Islands  of  the  Blessed,  need  no  illustration. 

8 He  refers  principally  to  Pindar,  (Pyth.  x.  57,  sq.) 


POEM  OF  EOBANUS. 


237 


Hsec  per  et  h$c  circum  pulcherrima  regna  volentem, 
Moria  me  fida  duxit  arnica  manu  ; 

Cumque  pcragrarim  tot  tantaque  regna,  licebit 
Stultitise  titulos  sumere  jure  mihi. 

Musica  legitimum  sumant  in  carmina  regnum, 

Qui  sunt  Maeonid®,  Virgiliique  super ; 

Quam  mihi  sint  null®  scribenda  in  carmina  vires 
Sentio,  et  ingenium  metior  inde  meum. 

Vos,  quia  me  Regem  facitis,  sinite  esse  tyrannum, 
Stultiti®  haud  aliud  me  diadema  movet.” 

Sic  ego. — Paruerant  illi  tarn  vera  monenti, 
Tradentes  manibus  Regia  sceptra  meis. 

Fecerit  ergo  licet  Reuchlinia  littera  Regem, 

Non  tamen  hoc  tantum  contulit  imperium. 

Plurima  Capnioni  subscribit  turba : — Quid  inde  1 
Si  rem  complebunt  nomina,  Csesar  ero.” 


/ 


» 

II. — ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 

IN  REFERENCE  TO  CULLEN.1 


(July,  1832.) 

An  Account  of  the  Life , Lectures , and  Writings  of  William 
Cullen , M.D.,  Professor  of  the  Practice  of  Physic  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh.  By  John  Thomson,  M.D.,  Professor  of 
Medicine  and  Gfeneral  Pathology  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 
Vol.  I.  8vo.  Edinburgh:  1832. 

We  are  much  gratified  by  the  appearance  of  the  present  work. 
Cullen  is  one  of  those  illustrious  minds  by  whom  Scotland,  during 
the  past  century,  was  raised  from  comparative  insignificance  to 
the  very  highest  rank  in  literature  and  science.  In  no  depart- 
ment of  intellectual  activity  has  Scotland  been  more  prolific  of 
distinguished  talent,  than  in  medicine  ; and  as  a medical  philoso- 
pher the  name  of  Cullen  stands,  in  his  native  country,  pre-emi- 
nent and  alone.  It  would  be  difficult  indeed  to  find  in  any  nation 
an  individual  who  displayed  a rarer  assemblage  of  the  highest 
qualities  of  a physician.  The  characters  of  his  genius  were  prom- 
inent, but  in  just  accordance  with  each  other.  His  erudition 
was  extensive,  yet  it  never  shackled  the  independent  vigor  of  his 
mind  ; while,  on  the  other  hand,  no  love  of  originality  made  him 
overlook  or  disparage  the  labors  of  his  predecessors.  His  capacity 
of  speculation  was  strong,  but  counterbalanced  by  an  equal 
power  of  observation  ; his  imagination,  though  lively,  was  broken 
in  as  a useful  auxiliary  to  a still  more  energetic  reason.  The 
circumstances  under  which  his  mind  was  cultivated,  were  also 
conducive  to  its  full  and  harmonious  evolution.  His  education 
was  left  sufficiently  to  himself  to  determine  his  faculties  to  a 

1 [This  article,  placed  under  the  head  of  Literature,  requires  some  indulgence ; I 
could  not'  give  it  a class  for  itself,  and  it  falls  at  least  more  naturally  under  this,  than 
under  either  of  the  other  heads.] 


CULLEN. 


239 


Iree  and  vigorous  energy;  sufficiently  scholastic  to  prevent  a 
one-sided  and  exclusive  development.  It  was  also  favorable  to 
the  same  result,  that  from  an  early  period  of  life,  his  activity  was 
divided  between  practice,  study,  and  teaching ; and  extended  to 
almost  every  subject  of  medical  science — all  however  viewed  in 
subordination  to  the  great  end  of  professional  knowledge,  the  cure 
of  disease. 

Cullen’s  mind  was  essentially  philosophic.  Without  neglect- 
ing observation,  in  which  he  was  singularly  acute,  he  devoted 
himself  less  to  experiment  than  to  arrangement  and  generaliza- 
tion. We  are  not  aware,  indeed,  that  he  made  the  discovery  of 
a single  sensible  phenomenon.  Nor  do  we  think  less  of  him  that 
he  did  not.  Individual  appearances  are  of  interest  only  as  they 
represent  a general  law.  In  physical  science  the  discovery  of 
new  facts  is  open  to  every  blockhead  with  patience,  manual  dex- 
terity, and  acute  senses  ; it  is  less  effectually  promoted  by  genius 
than  by  co-operation,  and  more  frequently  the  result  of  accident 
than  of  design.  But  what  Cullen  did,  it  required  individual 
ability  to  do.  It  required,  in  its  highest  intensity,  the  highest 
faculty  of  mind — that  of  tracing  the  analogy  of  unconnected 
observations,  of  evolving  from  the  multitude  of  particular  facts 
a common  principle,  the  detection  of  which  might  recall  them 
from  confusion  to  system,  from  incomprehensibility  to  science. 
Of  ten  thousand  physicians  familiar  with  the  same  appearances 
as  Cullen,  is  there  one  could  have  turned  these  appearances  to 
the  same  account  ? But  though  not  an  experimentalist,  Cullen’s 
philosophy  was  strictly  a philosophy  of  experience.  The  only 
speculation  he  recognized  as  legitimate  was  induction.  To  him 
theory  was  only  the  expression  of  an  universal  fact;  and  in 
rising  to  this  fact,  no  one,  with  equal  consciousness  of  power, 
was  ever  more  cautious  in  the  different  steps  of  his  generaliza- 
tion. 

Cullen’s  reputation,  though  high,  has  never  been  equal  to  his 
deserts.  This  is  owing  to  a variety  of  causes.  In  medical 
science,  a higher  talent  obtains  perhaps  a smaller  recompense  of 
popular  applause  than  in  any  other  department  of  knowledge. 
“ Dat  Galenus  opes  “the  solid  pudding,”  but  not  “the  empty 
praise.”  Of  all  subjects  of  scientific  interest,  men  in  general 
seem  to  have  the  weakest  curiosity  in  regard  to  the  functions  of 
their  own  minds,  and  even  bodies.  So  is  it  now,  and,  however 
marvelous,  so  has  it  always  been.  “ Eunt  homines,”  says  St. 


240 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


Austin,  “ mirari  alta  montium,  ingentes  fluctus  maris,  altissimos 
lapsus  fluminum,  oceani  ambitum,  et  gyros  siderum ; — seipsos 
relinquunt  nec  mirantur .”  For  one  amateur  physiologist,  we 
meet  a hundred  dilettanti  chemists,  and  botanists,  and  mineralo- 
gists, and  geologists.  Even  medical  men  themselves  are,  in 
general,  equally  careless  and  incompetent  judges  as  the  public  at 
large,  of  all  high  accomplishment  in  their  profession.  Medicine 
they  cultivate  not  as  a science , but  as  a trade  ; are  indifferent  to 
all  that  transcends  the  sphere  of  vulgar  practice  ; and  affect  to 
despise  what  they  are  unable  to  appreciate.  But  independently 
of  the  genera]  causes  which  have  prevented  Cullen  from  obtaining 
his  due  complement  of  fame,  there  are  particular  causes  which 
conspired  also  to  the  same  result.  His  doctrine  was  not  always 
fully  developed  in  his  works  ; his  opinions  have  been  ignorantly 
misrepresented  ; his  originality  invidiously  impugned  ; and  what 
he  taught  in  his  lectures,  published  without  acknowledgment  by 
his  pupils. 

Cullen’s  honor  thus  calling  for  vindication,  was  long  abandon- 
ed to  neglect.  This  may  be  in  part  explained  by  the  peculiar 
difficulty  of  the  task.  He  who  was  competent  to  appreciate 
Cullen’s  merits,  and  to  assert  for  him  his  proper  place  among 
medical  reasoners,  behoved  to  be  at  home  in  medicine,  both  as 
a practical  art,  and  as  a learned  science — he  required  at  once 
experience,  philosophy,  and  erudition.  But  this  combination  is 
now  unfortunately  rare  : we  could  indeed  with  difficulty  name  a 
second  individual  so  highly  qualified  for  this  duty  as  the  accom- 
plished physician  on  whom  it  has  actually  devolved.  The  expe- 
rience of  a long  and  extensive  practice — habits  of  thought  trained 
in  the  best  schools  of  philosophy — an  excursive  learning  which 
recalls  the  memory  of  a former  age — and  withal  an  admiration 
of  his  subject,  transmuting  an  arduous  undertaking  into  a labor 
of  love — have  enabled  Dr.  Thomson,  in  his  life  of  Cullen,  to  pro- 
duce a work,  which  we  have  no  hesitation  in  pronouncing  the 
most  important  contribution  from  a British  author  to  the  history 
of  medicine,  since  the  commencement  of  our  labors.  Cullen’s 
personal  biography  is  comparatively  meagre.  His  life  is  in  his 
doctrine.  But  to  exhibit  this  doctrine,  as  influenced  by  previous, 
and  as  influencing  subsequent,  speculation,  was  in  a certain  sort 
to  exhibit  the  general  progress  of  medical  science.  In  the  exe- 
cution of  this  part  of  his  labor,  Dr.  Thomson  presents  an  honor- 
able exception  to  the  common  character  of  our  recent  historians 


CULLEN’S  LIFE. 


241 


of  medicine.  He  is  no  retailer  of  second-hand  opinions  ; and  his 
criticism  of  an  author  is  uniformly  the  result  of  an  original  study 
of  his  works.  Though  the  life  of  a physician,  the  interest  of  this 
biography  is  by  no  means  merely  professional.  “ The  Philoso- 
pher,” says  Aristotle,  “ should  end  with  medicine,  the  Physician 
commence  with  philosophy.”  But  philosophy  and  medicine  have 
been  always  too  much  viewed  independently  of  each  other,  and 
their  mutual  influence  has  never  been  fairly  taken  into  account 
in  delineating  the  progress  of  either.  The  history  of  medicine  is, 
in  fact,  a part,  and  a very  important  part,  of  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy. Dr.  Thomson  has  wholly  avoided  this  defect ; and  his 
general  acquaintance  with  philosophical  and  medical  opinions, 
renders  the  Life  of  Cullen  a work  of  almost  equal  interest  to 
liberal  inquirers,  and  to  the  well  educated  practitioner. 

William  Cullen  was  born  at  Hamilton,  in  the  year  1710.  By 
his  father,  a writer  (Anglice,  attorney)  by  profession,  and  factor 
to  the  Duke  of  Hamilton,  he  was  sprung  from  a respectable  line 
of  ancestors,  who  had  for  several  generations  been  proprietors  of 
Saughs,  a small  estate  in  the  parish  of  Bothwell ; through  his 
mother,  he  was  descended  from  one  of  the  most  ancient  families 
in  the  county  of  Lanark,  the  Robertons  of  Ernock.  Having 
completed  his  course  of  general  education  in  the  grammar-school 
of  his  native  town,  and  in  the  University  of  Glasgow,  he  was 
apprenticed  to  Mr.  John  Paisley,  a surgeon  of  extensive  practice 
in  that  city.  At  this  period  (that  of  Edinburgh  recently  except- 
ed), the  Scottish  Universities  did  not  afford  the  means  of  medical 
instruction  ; and  such  an  apprenticeship  was  then  the  usual  and 
almost  the  only  way  in  which  the  student  of  medicine  could,  in 
Scotland,  acquire  a knowledge  of  his  profession.  Having  exhaust- 
ed the  opportunities  of  improvement  which  Glasgow  supplied, 
Cullen,  with  the  view  of  obtaining  a professional  appointment, 
went,  in  his  twentieth  year,  to  London.  Through  the  interest 
of  Commissioner  Cleland  (Will  Honeycomb  of  the  Spectator), 
probably  his  kinsman,  he  was  appointed  surgeon  to  a merchant 
vessel  trading  to  the  Spanish  settlements  in  the  West  Indies, 
commanded  by  Captain  Cleland  of  Auchinlee,  a relation  of  his 
own.  In  this  voyage  he  remained  for  six  months  at  Port  Bello ; 
thus  enjoying  an  opportunity  of  studying  the  effects  of  a tropical 
climate  on  the  constitution,  and  the  endemic  character  of  West 
Indian  diseases.  On  his  return  to  London,  with  the  view  of  per- 
fecting his  knowledge  of  drugs,  he  attended  for  some  time  in  the 

Q. 


242 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


shop  of  Mr.  Murray,  an  eminent  apothecary  in  the  city.  Two 
years  (1732-1734)  he  spent  in  the  family  of  Captain  Cleland,  at 
Auchinlee,  in  the  parish  of  Shotts,  wholly  occupied/  in  the  study, 
and  occasional  practice,  of  his  profession ; and  after  a season  de- 
voted to  the  study  of  general  literature  and  philosophy,  under  a 
dissenting  clergyman  of  Rothbury  in  Northumberland,  he  com- 
pleted his  public  education  by  attending  for  two  sessions  (1734-5, 
1735-6)  the  medical  classes  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 

“The  foundation,”  says  his  biographer,  “of  a new  and  extended  medi- 
cal school  had  been  laid  a few  years  before  this  time  in  Edinburgh,  by  the 
appointment  of  Dr.  Monro  to  the  Chair  of  Anatomy  in  the  University,  and 
by  the  judicious  arrangements  which  that  excellent  anatomist  and  experi- 
enced surgeon  afteward  made  with  Drs.  Rutherford,  Sinclair,  Innes  and 
Plummer,  for  the  regular  and  stated  delivery  of  lectures  on  the  different 
branches  of  medicine.  Previously  to  this  arrangement,  almost  the  only 
regular  lectures  given  upon  any  subjects  connected  with  medicine  in  Edin- 
burgh, were  those  which  had  been  delivered  in  the  Hall  of  the  College  of 
Surgeons,  the  chief  medical  school  in  that  city,  from  the  first  institution 
of  the  College,  in  the  year  1505,  till  the  transference  of  the  anatomical 
class  into  the  University  in  1725. 

“ Though  scarcely  ten  years  had  elapsed  from  the  first  establishment  of 
a regular  school  of  medicine  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh  when  Dr.  Cul- 
len became  a student  there,  the  reputation  of  that  school  was  beginning 
to  be  every  where  acknowledged,  and  had  already  attracted  to  it,  not  only 
a great  portion  of  those  who  were  preparing  themselves  for  the  profession 
of  medicine  in  the  British  dominions,  but  many  students  from  foreign  uni- 
versities.”— P.  8. 

At  the  age  of  twenty-six,  Cullen  commenced  practice  in  Ins 
native  town,  and  with  the  most  flattering  success.  His  dislike 
to  surgery  soon  induced  him  to  devolve  that  department  of  busi- 
ness upon  a partner ; and  for  the  last  four  years  of  his  residence 
at  Hamilton  (having  graduated  at  Glasgow),  he  practiced  only 
as  a physician.  Here  he  married  Anna,  daughter  of  the  Rever- 
end Mr.  Johnstone,  minister  of  Kilbarchan ; who  brought  him  a 
large  family,  and  formed  the  happiness  of  his  domestic  life  for 
forty-six  years.  Here  also  he  became  the  friend  and  medical 
preceptor  of  the  late  celebrated  Dr.  'William  Hunter.  Hunter 
had  been  educated  for  the  church ; but  an  intercourse  with  Cullen 
determined  him  to  a change  of  profession.  After  residing  for  a 
time  in  family  with  his  friend,  it  was  agreed  that  he  should  go 
and  prosecute  his  studies  in  Edinburgh  and  London,  with  the 
intention  of  ultimately  settling  at  Hamilton  as  Cullen’s  partner. 
This  design  was  not,  however,  realized.  Other  prospects  opened 
on  the  young  anatomist  while  in  London,  and  Cullen  cordially 


CULLEN’S  LIEE  AND  MEDICAL  MERITS. 


243 


concurred  in  an  alteration  of  plan,  which,  finally  raised  his  pupil 
to  a professional  celebrity,  different  certainly,  hut  not  inferior  to 
his  own.  Though  thus  cast  at  a distance  from  each  other  in 
after  life,  the  friendship  of  these  distinguished  men  continued  to 
the  last  warm  and  uninterrupted. 

Cullen,  who,  during  his  seven  years’  residence  at  Hamilton, 
had  been  sedulously  qualifying  himself  for  a higher  sphere  of 
activity,  now  removed  to  Glasgow.  In  the  University  of  that 
city,  with  the  exception  of  Anatomy,  no  lectures  seem-  to  have 
been  previously  delivered  in  any  department  of  medicine.  On  his 
establishment  in  Glasgow,  Cullen  immediately  commenced  lec- 
turer ; and,  by  the  concurrence  of  the  medical  professors,  he  was 
soon  permitted  to  deliver,  in  the  University,  courses  of  the  Theory 
and  Practice  of  Physic,  of  Materia  Medica,  of  Botany,  and  of 
Chemistry.  In  his  lectures  on  medicine,  we  find  him  maintain- 
ing in  1746,  the  same  doctrines  with  regard  to  the  theory  of 
Fever,  the  Plumoral  Pathology,  and  the  Nervous  System,  which 
he  published  in  his  writings  thirty  years  thereafter.1 

“ In  entering  upon  the  duties  of  a teacher  of  medicine,  Dr.  Cullen  ven- 
tured to  make  another  change  in  the  established  mode  of  instruction,  by 
laying  aside  the  use  of  the  Latin  language  in  the  composition  and  delivery 
of  his  lectures.  This  was  considered  by  many  as  a rash  innovation  ; and 
some,  desirous  to  detract  from  his  reputation,  or  not  sufficiently  aware  of 
the  advantages  attending  this  deviation  from  established  practice,  have 
insinuated  that  it  was  owing  to  Dr.  Cullen’s  imperfect  knowledge  of  the 
Latin  that  he  was  induced  to  employ  the  English  language.  But  how 
entirely  groundless  such  an  insinuation  is,  must  he  apparent  to  every  one 
at  all  acquainted  with  his  early  education,  course  of  studies,  and  habits  of 
persevering  industry.  When  we  reflect,  too,  that  it  was  through  the  me- 
dium of  the  Latin  tongue  that  he  must  have  acquired  his  extensive  knowl- 
edge of  medical  science,  it  seems  absurd  to  suppose  that  he  was  not  qual- 
ified, like  the  other  teachers  of  Iris  time,  to  deliver,  had  he  chosen  it,  his 
lectures  in  that  language.  We  are  not  left,  however,  to  conjecture  with 
regard  to  this  point;  for  that  Dr.  Cullen  had  been  accustomed,  from  an 
early  period  of  his  life,  to  compose  in  Latin,  appears  not  only  from  letters 
written  by  him  in  that  language  to  some  of  his  familiar  friends,  first 
draughts  of  which  have  been  preserved,  but  also  from  the  fact,  that,  while 
he  taught  medicine  at  Glasgow  in  his  vernacular  tongue,  he  delivered, 
during  the  same  period,  several  courses  of  lectures  on  Botany  in  the  Latin 


1 Cullen,  we  see,  is  represented  by  French  medical  historians  as  “having  taken 
Barthez  for  his  guide.”  (Boisseau,  in  Diet,  des  Sc.  Med. — Biogr.  t.  iii.  p.  363.)  A 
chronological  absurdity.  Barthez  was  twenty-four  years  younger  than  Cullen ; the 
latter  had,  in  his  lectures,  taught  his  peculiar  doctrines  twenty-eight  years  before  “ his 
guide”  was  yet  known  to  the  world  ; and  Cullen’s  Institutions  of  Medicine  preceded 
the  Nova  Doctrina  de  Functionibus  of  Barthez  by  two,  the  Nouveaux  Elcmens  de  la 
Science  de  I Homme  by  six  years. 


244 


ON  THE  E EVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


language.  The  notes  of  these  lectures  still  remain  among  his  papers ; and 
I find  also,  written  with  his  own  hand,  in  the  same  language,  two  copies 
of  an  unfinished  text-book  on  Chemistry.  The  numerous  corrections  of 
expression  which  are  observable  in  the  first  sketches  of  Dr.  Cullen’s  Latin, 
as  well  as  of  his  English  compositions,  show  a constant  attention  on  his 
part  to  the  accuracy  and  purity  of  the  language  in  which  his  ideas  were 
expressed,  and  a mind  always  aiming,  in  whatever  it  engaged,  at  a degree 
of  perfection  higher  than  that  which  it  conceived  it  had  already  attained.” 
— P.  28. 

An  interesting  account  of  these  various  courses,  is  given  by  Dr. 
Thomson.  In  particular,  justice  is  done  to  Cullen’s  extensive 
and  original  views  in  .chemistry ; and  a curious  history  is  afforded 
of  the  progress  of  chemical  lectures,  both  in  this  country  and  on 
the  continent.  In  this  science,  Cullen,  while  lecturer  in  Glasgow, 
had  the  merit  of  training  a pupil  destined  to  advance  it  farther 
than  himself ; though,  as  Dr.  Thomson  has  shown,  the  germs  of 
Black’s  theory  of  latent  heat  are  to  he  found  in  the  lectures  of  his 
preceptor.  Cullen’s  fame  rests,  however,  on  another  basis. 

Cullen  was  thus  the  principal  founder  of  the  medical  school  of 
Glasgow  even  before  he  was  regularly  attached  to  the  University. 
In  1751,  he  was,  however,  admitted  professor  of  the  Theory  and 
Practice  of  Physic,  and  this  a few  days  before  the  translation  of 
Dr.  Adam  Smith  from  the  Chair  of  Logic  to  that  of  Moral  Philos- 
ophy. On  this  occasion,  Hume  and  Burke  were  unsuccessful 
candidates  for  the  professorship  vacated  by  Smith.  "With  Smith 
and  Hume,  whose  minds  in  many  respects  bore  a strong  analogy 
to  his  own,  Cullen  maintained  a familiar  intercourse  during  life  ; 
and  their  letters,  now  for  the  first  time  printed,  form  no  unattract- 
ive portion  of  the  present  volume.  A mutual  interest  in  the  ap- 
plication of  chemistry  to  the  arts,  afforded  also,  about  the  same 
period,  the  first  occasion  of  a correspondence  between  Cullen  and 
Lord  Karnes,  which  soon  ripened  into  an  enduring  friendship. 
The  strength  of  his  attachments  is  one  of  the  most  interesting- 
features  of  Cullen’s  character.  He  seems  never  to  have  relinquish- 
ed, never  to  have  lost  a friend ; and  the  paternal  interest  he 
manifested  in  his  pupils,  secured  to  him  their  warmest  affections 
in  return. 

Cullen  had  for  some  years  contemplated  a removal  to  Edin- 
burgh, before  he  accomplished  his  intention.  At  length,  in  1755, 
on  the  decline  of  Dr.  Plummer’s  health,  he  was  conjoined  with 
that  gentleman  in  the  Chair  of  Chemistry  in  the  University  of 
Edinburgh,  notwithstanding  considerable  opposition  on  the  part 
of  the  other  medical  professors.  During  the  ten  years  he  retained 


CULLEN’S  LIFE  AND  MEDICAL  MERITS. 


245 


this  professorship,  the  number  of  his  auditors  continued  steadily 
to  increase ; from  under  twenty,  they  rose  to  near  a hundred 
and  fifty.  A translation  of  Van  Swieten’s  Commentaries,  which 
Cullen  undertook  at  this  juncture,  was,  like  an  earlier  project  of 
an  edition  of  Sydenham’s  works,  abandoned,  in  consequence  of 
the  extensive  practice  which  he  soon  obtained.  Nothing  contri- 
buted more  to  the  increase  of  his  reputation  than  the  clinical  lec- 
tures which  he  now  regularly  delivered.  In  reference  to  these, 
his  biographer  has  furnished  us  with  an  interesting  sketch  of  the 
rise  and  progress  of  clinical  instruction  in  general.  In  1780, 
during  a vacancy  in  the  Chair  of  Materia  Medica,  he  delivered 
also,  with  great  applause,  a course  of  lectures  on  that  subject ; 
the  notes  of  which,  after  being  rapidly  multiplied  in  manuscript 
for  several  years,  were  at  length  surreptitiously  published  in 
London. 

The  celebrity  which  Cullen  had  acquired  as  a teacher  of  medi- 
cal practice,  by  his  clinical  lectures,  and  his  course  on  the  materia 
medica,  had  gained  him  not  only  great  professional  employment 
in  Edinburgh,  but  numerous  consultations  from  all  parts  of  Scot- 
land. He  was  now  indeed  generally  regarded  as  the  appropriate 
successor  of  Dr.  Rutherford,  in  the  Chair  of  Practical  Medicine. 
Dr.  Rutherford  had,  however,  imbibed  prejudices  against  Cullen, 
which  disposed  him  to  resign  in  favor  of  Dr.  John  Gregory  of 
Aberdeen,  a physician  qualified  in  many  respects  to  do  high 
honor  to  the  University,  though  Cullen’s  pretensions  to  the  chair 
in  question  must  be  viewed  as  paramount  to  those  of  every  other 
candidate.  Cullen  was  unsuccessful ; and  so  disgusted  was  he 
with  his  treatment  on  this  occasion,  that,  on  the  death  of  Dr. 
Whytt,  in  the  following  year  (1766),  he  only  consented  to  accept 
the  Chair  of  the  Theory  of  Physic,  at  the  solicitation  of  his  friends, 
and  in  order  to  leave  a vacancy  in  that  of  Chemistry  for  Dr.  Black. 
So  strong,  however,  was  the  general  conviction  of  Cullen’s  pre- 
eminent qualifications  as  a teacher  of  the  practice  of  medicine, 
that  the  desire  was  ardently  and  publicly  expressed  by  students 
and  professors,  that  he  should  be  permitted  to  lecture  on  that 
subject.  "With  this  desire  Dr.  Gregory  liberally  complied.  Ac- 
cordingly, from  the  year  1768,  the  two  professors  continued  to 
give  alternate  courses  of  the  theory  and  practice  of  physic ; and 
on  the  death  of  Gregory  in  1773,  Cullen  was  appointed  sole  pro- 
fessor of  the  practice.  “ Such  were  the  difficulties  to  be  over- 
come, and  such  the  exertions  required  to  procure,  first  a place  in 


246 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OE  MEDICINE. 


the  University  of  Edinburgh,  and  afterward  the  proper  situation 
in  it,  for  the  man  whose  genius,  talents,  and  industry,  shed  such 
a lustre  over  the  institution,  and  contributed  in  so  remarkable  a 
degree  to  extend  and  to  perpetuate  the  fame  of  its  Medical  School !” 
"With  this  period  of  Cullen’s  life,  the  present  volume  of  his  biogra- 
phy terminates. 

To  form  an  estimate  of  what  Cullen  effected  in  the  improve- 
ment of  Medical  Science,  it  is  necessary  to  premise  a few  remarks 
in  regard  to  what  it  behoved  him  to  accomplish. 

If  we  take  a general  survey  of  medical  opinions,  we  shall  find 
that  they  are  all  either  subordinate  to,  or  coincident  with,  two 
grand  theories.  The  one  of  these  considers  the  solid  constituents 
of  the  animal  economy  as  the  elementary  vehicle  of  life,  and  con- 
sequently places  in  them  the  primary  seat  of  disease.  The  other, 
on  the  contrary,  sees  in  the  humors  the  original  realization  of 
vitality ; and  these,  as  they  determine  the  existence  and  quality 
of  the  secondary  parts,  or  solids,  contain,  therefore,  within  them- 
selves, the  ultimate  principle  of  the  morbid  affection.  By  relation 
to  these  theories,  the  history  of  medicine  is  divided  into  three 
great  periods.  During  the  first , the  two  theories,  still  crude,  are 
not  yet  disentangled  from  each  other ; this  period  extends  from 
the  origin  of  medicine  to  the  time  of  G-alen.  The  second  com- 
prehends the  reign  of  the  Humoral  Pathology — the  interval  be- 
tween Galen  and  Frederic  Hoffmann.  In  the  last,  the  doctrine 
of  the  Living  Solid  is  predominant ; from  Hoffman  it  reaches  to 
the  present  day. 

In  the  medical  doctrines  of  the  first  period,  the  two  theories 
may  be  found  partially  developed.  Sometimes  Humorism,  some- 
times Solidism,  seems  to  be  favored ; neither,  however,  is  ever 
generalized  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other ; and  the  partisans  of 
each  may  with  almost  equal  facility  adduce  authorities  from  the 
schools  of  Cos  and  Gnidos,  of  Athens  and  Alexandria,  in  support 
of  their  favorite  opinion. 

By  Galen,  Humorism  was  first  formally  expounded,  and  re- 
duced to  a regular  code  of  doctrine.  Four  elementary  fluids, 
their  relations  and  changes,  sufficed  to  explain  the  varieties  of 
natural  temperament,  and  the  causes  of  disease  ; while  the  genius, 
eloquence,  and  unbounded  learning  with  which  he  illustrated  this 
theory,  mainly  bestowed  on  it  the  ascendency,  which,  without 
essential  alteration,  it  retained  from  the  conclusion  of  the  sec- 
ond to  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Galenism  and 


GALENISM— HUMORISM 


247 


Hurnorism  are,  in  fact,  convertible  expressions.  Not  that  this 
hypothesis  during  that  long  interval  encountered  no  opposition. 
It  met,  certainly,  with  some  partial  contradiction  among  the 
Greek  and  Arabian  physicians.  After  the  restoration  of  learning 
Fernelius  and  Brissot,  Argenterius  and  Joubert,  attacked  it  in 
different  ways,  and  with  different  degrees  of  animosity ; and 
while  Hurnorism  extended  its  influence  by  an  amalgamation  with 
the  principles  of  the  Chemiatric  school,  Solidism  found  favor  with 
some  of  the  mathematical  physicians,  among  whom  Baglivi  is 
deserving  of  especial  mention."  Until  the  epoch  we  have  stated, 
the  prevalence  of  the  Humoral  Pathology  was,  however,  all  but 
universal. 

Nor  was  this  doctrine  merely  an  erroneous  speculation  ; it 
exerted  the  most  decisive,  the  most  pernicious  influence  on 
practice. — The  various  diseased  affections  were  denominated  in 
accommodation  to  the  theory.  In  place  of  saying  that  a malady 
affected  the  liver,  the  peritoneum,  or  the  organs  of  circulation, 
its  seat  was  assumed  in  the  blood,  the  bile,  or  the  lymph.  The 
morbific  causes  acted  exclusively  on  the  fluids ; the  food  digested 
in  the  stomach,  and  converted  into  chyle,  determined  the  quali- 
ties of  the  blood ; and  poisons  operated  through  the  corruption 
they  thus  effected  in  the  vital  humors.  All  symptons  were 
interpreted  in  blind  subservience  to  the  hypothesis  ; and  those 
only  attracted  attention  which  the  hypothesis  seemed  calculated 
to  explain.  The  color  and  consistence  of  the  blood,  mucus,  feces, 
urine,  and  pus,  were  carefully  studied.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
phenomena  of  the  solids,  if  not  wholly  overlooked,  as  mere  acci- 
dents, were  slumped  together  under  some  collective  name,  and 
attached  to  the  theory  through  a subsidiary  hypothesis.  By 
supposed  changes  in  the  humors,  they  explained  the  association 
and  consecution  of  symptoms.  Under  the  terms,  crudity,  coction, 
and  evacuation , were  designated  the  three  principal  periods  of 
diseases,  as  dependent  on  an  alteration  of  the  morbific  matter. 
In  the  first,  this  matter,  in  all  its  deleterious  energy,  had  not  yet 
undergone  any  change  on  the  part  of  the  organs  ; it  was  still 
crude.  In  the  second,  nature  gradually  resumed  the  ascendant ; 
coction  took  place.  In  the  third,  the  peccant  matter,  now  ren- 
dered mobile,  was  evacuated  by  urine,  perspiration,  dejection, 
&c.,  and  equilibrium  restored.  When  no  critical  discharge  was 
apparent,  the  morbific  matter,  it  was  supposed,  had,  after  a suit- 
able elaboration,  been  assimilated  to  the  humors,  and  its  delete- 


248 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


rious  character  neutralized.  Coction  might  be  perfect  or  imper- 
fect : and  the  transformation  of  one  disease  into  another  was 
lightly  solved  by  the  transport  or  emigration  of  the  noxious 
humor.  It  was  principally  on  the  changes  of  the  evacuated 
fluids  that  they  founded  their  judgments  respecting  the  nature, 
issue,  and  duration  of  diseases.  The  urine,  in  particular,  sup- 
plied them  with  indications,  to  which  they  attached  the  greatest 
importance.  Examinations  of  the  dead  body  confirmed  them  in 
their  notions.  In  the  redness  and  tumefaction  of  inflamed  parts, 
they  beheld  only  a congestion  of  blood  ; and  in  dropsies,  merely 
the  dissolution  of  that  fluid ; tubercles  were  simply  coagula  of 
lymph ; and  other  organic  alterations,  in  general,  naught  but 
obstructions  from  an  increased  viscosity  of  the  humors.  The 
plan  of  cure  was  in  unison  with  the  rest  of  the  hypothesis. 
Venesection  was  copiously  employed  to  renew  the  blood,  to  atten- 
uate its  consistency,  or  to  remove  a part  of  the  morbific  matter 
with  which  it  was  impregnated ; and  cathartics,  sudorifics,  diu- 
retics, were  largely  administered,  with  a similar  intent.  In  a 
word,  as  plethora  or  cacocliymia  were  the  two  great  causes  of 
disease,  their  whole  therapeutic  was  directed  to  change  the  quan- 
tity or  quality  of  the  fluids.  Nor  was  this  murderous  treatment 
limited  to  the  actual  period  of  disease.  Seven  or  eight  annual 
bloodings,  and  as  many  purgations — such  was  the  common  regi- 
men the  theory  prescribed  to  insure  continuance  of  health ; and 
the  twofold  depletion,  still  customary,  at  spring  and  fall,  among 
the  peasantry  of  many  European  countries,  is  a remnant  of  the 
once  universal  practice.  In  Spain,  every  village  has  even  now 
its  Sangrador,  whose  only  cast  of  surgery  is  blood-letting  ; and 
he  is  rarely  idle.  The  medical  treatment  of  Lewis  XIII.  may  be 
quoted  as  a specimen  of  the  humoral  therapeutic.  Within  a sin- 
gle year  this  theory  inflicted  on  that  unfortunate  monarch  above 
a hundred  cathartics,  and  more  than  forty  bloodings. — During 
the  fifteen  centuries  of  Humorism,  how  many  millions  of  lives 
did  medicine  cost  mankind  ? 

The  establishment  of  a system  founded  on  the  correcter  doc- 
trine of  Solidism,  and  purified  from  the  crudities  of  the  Iatro- 
mathematical  and  Iatro-chemical  hypotheses,  was  reserved  for 
three  celebrated  physicians  toward  the  commencement  of  the 
eighteenth  century  — Frederic  Hoffmann  — George  Ernest 
Stahl — and  Hermann  Boerhaave.  The  first  and  second  of  this 
triumvirate  were  born  in  the  same  year,  were  both  pupils  of 


SOLIDISM.— STAHL,  HOFFMANN,  BOERHAAVE. 


249 


Wedelius  of  Jena,  and  both  professors,  and  rival  professors,  in  the 
University  of  Halle  ; the  third  was  eight  years  younger  than  his 
contemporaries,  and  long  an  ornament  of  the  University  of  Ley- 
den. The  doctrines  of  these  masters  were  in  many  respects 
widely  different,  and  contributed  in  very  different  degrees  to  the 
subversion  of  the  obnoxious  hypotheses.  This  was  more  effectu- 
ally accomplished  by  the  two  Hermans,  especially  by  Hoffmann  ; 
whereas  many  prejudices  of  the  humoral  pathology,  of  the  mecha- 
nical and  chemical  theories,  remained  embalmed  in  the  eclecti- 
cism of  Boerhaave. 

In  estimating  Cullen’s  merits  as  a medical  philosopher,  Dr. 
Thomson  was  necessarily  led  to  take  a survey  of  the  state  of 
medical  opinion,  at  the  epoch  when  Cullen  commenced  his  spe- 
culations : 

“ At  the  period  when  Dr  Cullen  first  began  to  deliver  lectures  on  medi- 
cine in  Glasgow,  there  prevailed  in  the  medical  schools  of  Europe  three 
great  systems  of  physic,  those  of  Stahl,  Hoffmann,  and  Boerhaave — teach- 
ers not  less  distinguished  hy  their  peculiar  and  original  powers  of  intellect, 
than  hy  their  attainments  in  literature  and  philosophy,  their  proficiency 
in  the  mathematical  and  experimental  sciences,  and  their  extensive  knowl- 
edge of  theoretical  and  of  practical  medicine.  The  lectures  and  writings 
of  these  eminent  men,  besides  affording  useful  summaries  of  all  that  was 
known  in  medicine  before  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  laid 
open  various  new  and  interesting  views  of  the  animal  economy.  Stahl 
and  Hoffmann,  in  particular,  recognized  more  distinctly,  and  recommended 
more  emphatically,  than  had  been  done  by  any  of  their  predecessors,  the 
study  of  the  living  powers,  and  the  laws  by  which  they  are  governed,  as 
the  proper  and  legitimate  objects  of  medical  investigation. 

“ The  ancient  doctrines  of  the  four  elements  and  their  corresponding 
temperaments — of  the  separate  functions  of  the  vegetative,  sentient,  and 
rational  souls — and  of  the  agency  of  the  natural,  vital,  and  animal  spirits — 
had  continued  to  be  taught  in  the  schools  of  medicine  with  very  little  va- 
riation, from  the  time  of  Galen  till  after  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  It  was,  indeed  hut  a short  time  before  Stahl,  Hoffmann  and 
Boerhaave,  began  to  lecture  on  medicine,  that  a solid  foundation  had  been 
laid  for  the  extension  and  improvement  of  medical  science,  hy  the  intro- 
duction of  the  experimental  and  inductive  method  of  prosecuting  philo- 
sophical inquiries,  so  well  explained  and  strenuously  inculcated  in  the  writ- 
ings of  Lord  Bacon — by  the  clear,  precise,  and  logical  distinction  made 
by  Descartes  between  mind  and  matter,  as  the  respective  subjects  of  pro- 
perties essentially  different  from  each  other — by  the  accurate  analysis 
which  had  been  given  by  Locke  of  mind  and  its  operations,  in  his  Essay 
on  the  Human  Understanding,  and  his  recognition  of  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion as  distinct  sources  of  knowledge — by  the  discovery  by  Newton  of  the 
universal  law  by  which  the  motions  of  masses  of  matter  placed  at  sensi- 
ble distances  from  one  another  are  regulated,  and  his  distinction  of  this 
class  of  motions  from  the  chemical  changes  which  the  different  species  of 
matter  produce  upon  one  another  when  their  minute  particles  are  brought 


250 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


into  immediate  contact — by  the  application  (though  at  first  necessarily 
imperfect,  and  in  many  respects  erroneous)  of  the  principles  of  natural 
philosophy  and  of  chemistry  to  the  investigation  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
animal  economy — by  the  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood  by  Har- 
vey, and  of  the  absorbent  system  by  Asellius  and  Pecquet — by  the  minute 
examination  of  the  structure,  distribution,  and  functions  of  the  nervous 
system  by  Willis,  Vieussens,  Baglivi,  and  others — and  by  the  develop- 
ment by  Glisson  of  the  contractile  or  irritable  power  inherent  in  muscular 
fibres,  by  the  operation  of  which  the  various  motions  of  the  animal  econ- 
omy are  performed ; — advances  in  knowledge  all  tending  to  facilitate  the 
proper  investigation  of  the  vital  susceptibilities  and  energies  inherent  in 
organized  bodies,  and  of  the  operation  of  the  external  agents  by  which 
these  susceptibilities  and  energies  may  be  excited,  modified  or  destroyed.” 
(Pp.  162-3.) 

Stahl — Hoffman — Boerhaave,  are  then  passed  in  review ; their 
doctrines  displayed  in  themselves,  and  in  relation  to  other  sys- 
tems ; and  subjected  to  an  enlightened  criticism.  This  analysis 
exhibits  a rare  command  of  medical  and  philosophical  literature, 
strong  powers  of  original  speculation,  and  the  caution  of  an  expe- 
rienced practitioner. 

In  discussing  the  Animism  of  Stahl , Dr.  Thomson  takes  a view 
of  the  various  divisions  of  the  soul  and  its  faculties,  adopted  by 
the  different  schools  of  philosophy  and  medicine,  from  Hippo- 
crates to  Blumenbach ; and  shows  that  the  Stahlian  theory,  in 
rejecting  the  animal  spirits  of  G-alen  and  Descartes,  with  all 
mechanical  and  chemical  explanations  of  the  vital  functions,  and 
in  attributing  to  the  same  soul  the  collective  phenomena  of  life, 
from  the  purest  energies  of  intelligence  to  the  lowest  movement 
of  the  animal  organism,  has  more  of  apparent  than  of  real  novel- 
ty. It  was  the  universal  opinion  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  that 
body  was  incapable  of  originating  motion,  and  that  self-activity 
was  the  essential  attribute  of  an  incorporeal  principle  or  soul. 
But  while  thus  at  one  in  regard  to  the  general  condition  of  acti- 
vity (Aristotle’s  criticism  of  the  avTOKivrjTov  of  Plato  is  only  ver- 
bal), they  differed  widely  as  to  this — whether  different  kinds  of 
energy,  change,  movement,  were  determined  by  the  same,  or 
by  different  souls.  Plato’s  psychological  trinity  is  clear  ; but 
whether  Aristotle,  by  his  Vegetable,  Animal,  and  Rational  Souls, 
supposes  three  concentric  potences  of  the  same  principle,  or  three 
distinct  principles,  is  not  unambiguously  stated  by  himself,  and 
has  been  always  a point  mooted  among  his  disciples.  Stahl’s 
doctrine  is  thus  virtually  identical  with  the  opinion  of  that  great 
body  of  Aristotelians,  who,  admitting  the  generic  difference  of 


STAHL. 


26i 


function  between  the  three  souls,  still  maintain  their  hypostatic 
unity.  In  this  doctrine,  the  vegetable,  animal,  and  rational 
souls,  express  only  three  of  several  relations  of  the  same  simple 
substance.  We  are  not  convinced,  with  Dr.  Thomson,  that  any 
thing  is  gained  by  limiting  the  term  or  Soul,  to  the  con- 

scious mind.  Many  modern  philosophers  (as  Leibnitz  and,  after 
Leibnitz,  Kant)  do  not,  even  in  the  cognitive  faculties,  restrict 
our  mental  activity  to  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  and  this  too 
for  sufficient  reasons  ; the  phenomena  of  nutrition,  growth,  gene- 
ration, &c.,  are  as  little  explicable  on  merely  chemical  and  me- 
chanical principles,  as  those  of  sense,  or  even  those  of  intelligence, 
and  all  seem  equally  dependent  on  certain  conditions  of  the  nerv- 
ous system  ; the  assumption  of  a double  or  triple  principle  is 
always  hypothetical,  and  Entia  non  stint  multiplicanda  prater 
necessitatem ; while,  at  the  same  time,  on  any  supposition,  a 
generic  expression  is  convenient,  to  denote  the  cause  or  causes 
of  life  in  its  lowest  and  in  its  highest  gradations.  We  are  un- 
able, therefore,  to  coincide  with  Dr.  Thomson  in  his  praise  of 
Gfalen,  for  originating  this  innovation  ; more  especially  as  it  is 
sufficiently  apparent  (however  reserved  his  language  may  occa- 
sionally be),  that  in  Galen’s  own  theory  of  mind,  the  highest 
operations  of  intellect,  and  the  lowest  function  of  his  unconscious 
Nature,  are  viewed  as  equally  the  reflex,  and  nothing  but  the 
reflex  of  organization.  With  this  qualification,  we  fully  coincide 
in  the  following  estimate  of  Stahl : 

“ The  simple  and  sublime  conception,  that  all  the  motions  of  the  human 
body  are  produced  and  governed  by  an  intelligent  principle  inherent  in  it, 
was  well  calculated,  by  its  novelty  and  by  the  easy  and  comprehensive 
generalization  of  vital  phenomena  which  it  seemed  to  afford,  to  excite 
and  promote  the  speculative  inquiries  of  medical  philosophers,  and  to  free 
the  science  of  medicine  from  many  of  those  erroneous  and  absurd  mechani- 
cal and  chemical  doctrines  with  which  in  its  progress  it  had  become  en- 
cumbered. But  the  adoption  of  this  hypothesis  led  Stahl,  in  the  framing 
of  his  system,  to  he  too  easily  satisfied  with  "the  imperfect  and  erroneous 
physiological  view  which  he  had  taken  of  the  human  economy — to  neg- 
lect the  phenomena  of  life,  as  they  present  themselves  in  the  nutrition 
and  generation  of  plants  and  of  irrational  animals — to  content  himself  in 
accounting  for  the  phenomena  of  the  organic  functions,  with  applying  the 
term  Rational  Soul  to  the  principle  which  had  been,  by  almost  all  former 
physiologists,  denominated  the  vegetative  soul  of  nature ; and  almost 
wholly  to  omit  in  his  view  of  the  animal  economy,  the  consideration  of 
the  peculiar  and  distinguishing  susceptibilities  and  energies  of  the  Nerv- 
ous system.  These  errors  and  omissions  prevented  Stahl  from  perceiv- 
ing the  fixed  boundary  which  has  been  established  by  nature  between 
the  operations  of  the  material  and  mental  faculties  of  our  frame,  in  that 
consciousness  of  unity  and  personal  identity,  by  which  all  the  various 


252 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


modifications  of  sense,  memory,  intellect,  and  passion,  appear  to  lie  con- 
stantly and  inseparably  accompanied ; while,  at  the  same  time,  his  am- 
bition to  be  the  founder  of  a new  sect  in  medicine,  disposed  him  to  be 
less  just  to  the  merits  of  his  predecessors  and  contemporaries  than  is  re- 
quired of  one  who  undertakes  to  make  any  addition  to  the  opinions  or  to 
the  experience  of  past  ages. 

“ It  is  but  just  to  Stahl,  however,  to  acknowledge,  that  he  had  the  merit 
of  directing  the  attention  of  medical  practitioners,  in  a more  particular  man- 
ner than  had  been  done  before  his  time,  to  that  resistance  to  putrefaction 
which  exists  in  the  solid  and  fluid  parts  of  the  body  during  life — to  the 
vital  activities  by  which  the  state  of  health  is  preserved,  and  its  functions 
duly  performed — to  the  influence  which  the  mind  indirectly  exercises  over 
the  different  functions  of  the  body — to  the  effects  of  the  different  passions 
in  exciting  diseases — to  the  natural  course  of  diseases — and  especially  to 
those  powers  of  the  animal  economy  by  which  diseases  are  spontaneously 
cured  or  relieved.” — (Pp.  180,  181). 

Medico,  qua  medicus,  ignota  est  anima,  Stahl  may  be  re- 
proached, that  his  medical  theory  was  purely  psychological,  and 
that  he  suffered  it  to  exert  too  dominant  an  influence  on  his  prac- 
tice. Confiding  in  the  inherent  wisdom  of  the  vital  principle,  his 
medicine  was,  as  he  professed  it  to  be,  the  “ Art  of  curing  by 
expectation.'1'  Cullen’s  censure  of  Stahl’s  practice,  as  “propos- 
ing only  inert  and  frivolous  remedies,”  appears,  however,  to  Dr. 
Thomson  too  indiscriminating ; “it  being,”  as  he  well  observes, 
“ a matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  say  at  what  point  a cautious 
and  prudent  abstinence  from  interference  passes  into  ignorant 
and  careless  negligence.”1 


1 [Dr.  Thomson  might,  indeed,  have  stated  this  more  strongly,  and  the  statement 
would  have  been  borne  out,  not  by  Stahl  only,  but  by  Hoffmann.  In  Hoffmann’s  dis- 
sertation, On  the  seven  rules  of  good  health,  the  last  and  most  important  of  these  is  : — 
“ Fly  Doctors  and  doctors’  Drugs,  as  you  wish  to  be  well ; (Fuge  Medicos  et  Medica- 
menta,  si  vis  esse  salvus”) : and  this  precept  of  that  great  physician  is  inculcated  by 
the  most  successful  practitioners  (or  non-practitioners)  of  ancient  and  of  modern 
times.  Celsus  well  expresses  it : — “ Optima  medicina  est  non  uti  medieina  and  I 
have  heard  a most  eminent  physician  candidly  confess,  “ that  the  best  practice  was 
that  which  did  nothing  ; the  next  best,  that  which  did  little.”  In  truth,  medicine  in 
the  hands  by  which  it  is  vulgarly  dispensed,  is  a curse  to  humanity,  rather  than  a 
blessing ; and  the  most  intelligent  authorities  of  the  profession — “ larpatv  ol  xapteV- 
rarot” — from  Hippocrates  downwards,  agree  that,  on  an  average,  their  science,  at 
least  its  practice,  is  a nuisance,  and  “ send  physic  to  the  dogs.”  The  Solidists,  in- 
deed, promptly  admit,  that  the  Humorists  were  homicides  by  wholesale  for  about  fif- 
teen centuries ; while  Homoeopathy  and  the  Water-cure  are  recoils  against  the  mur- 
derous polypharmacy  of  the  Solidists  themselves.  Priesnitz,  I see,  declares,  that  the 
most  and  the  worst  afflictions  which  “ flesh  is”  not  “ heir  to,”  but  which  water  has 
to  remedy,  are  “ the  doctor  and  the  drugs.”  This  is  consolatory  to  the  world  at  large; 
for  if,  as  Charron  says,  “ we  must  all  live  and  die  on  trust,”  so  we  must  all  live  and 
die,  secundum  artem,  on  one  medical  system  or  another.  The  utmost  we  can  do  is, 
like  Ajax,  to  die  with  our  eyes  open  ; for — 

“ Non  nobis  inter  vos  tantas  componere  lites 
“ Who  shall  decide  when  doctors  disagree  1" 

Has  the  practice  of  medicine  made  a single  step  since  Hippocrates  l'| 


HOFFMANN. 


253 


Dr.  Thomson’s  account  of  Hoffmann's  system  is,  however,  still 
more  interesting  ; this  physician  being  the  great  founder  of  the 
now  dominant  pathology  of  the  Living  Solid — Solidism,  a doc- 
trine which  it  was  Cullen’s  glory  to  adopt,  to  vindicate,  and  to 
complete. — However  apparently  opposed  to  that  of  his  rival,  the 
theory  of  Hoffmann  was,  equally  with  that  of  Stahl,  established 
on  the  Aristotelic  psychology ; although  less  dependent  in  prac- 
tice on  any  peculiar  hypothesis  of  mind,  and  more  influenced 
by  the  mathematical  and  chemical  crotchets  of  the  time,  and  the 
Cartesian  and  Leihnitian  theories.  The  Peripatetic  doctrine,  as 
interpreted  by  Philoponus,  Aquinas,  Scotus,  &c.,  of  the  sub- 
stantial difference  of  the  Vegetable,  Sensitive,  and  Rational 
Souls,  corresponds  exactly  to  Hoffmann’s  Nature  or  Organic 
Body — his  Sentient  Soul — and  his  Rational  Soul  ; agents,  ac- 
cording to  him,  differing  in  essence  as  in  operation.  The  merits 
of  this  great  improver  of  medicine,  whose  works  are  now  so  cul- 
pably neglected,  are  canvassed  by  Dr.  Thomson  with  equal  learn- 
ing and  discrimination.  We  can  only  afford  to  quote  the  follow- 
ing observations : 

“ The  great  and  prominent  merits  of  Hoffmann  as  a medical  philoso- 
pher, undoubtedly  consisted  in  his  having  perceived  and  pointed  out  more 
clearly  than  any  of  his  predecessors,  the  extensive  and  powerful  influence 
of  the  Nervous  System,  in  modifying  and  regulating  at  least,  if  not  in  pro- 
ducing, all  the  phenomena  of  the  organic  as  well  as  of  the  animal  func- 
tions in  the  human  economy,  and  more  particularly  in  his  application  of 
this  doctrine  to  the  explanation  of  diseases.  Galen  had  recorded  many 
facts  which  had  been  observed  before  his  time,  by  Erasistratus,  Heroplri 
lus,  and  others,  relative  to  the  nervous  system,  considered  as  the  organ  of 
sense  and  voluntary  motion,  and  to  these  he  had  added  several  new  ob- 
servations and  experiments  of  his  own.  But  it  was  not  till  the  publica- 
tion of  the  elaborate  works  of  Willis  and  Yieussens,  that  the  structure,  dis- 
tribution, and  functions  of  that  system  seem  to  have  become  the  objects 
of  very  general  attention  among  medical  men.  These  authors  pointed 
out  many  examples  of  sympathies  existing  between  different  parts  of  the 
human  body  through  the  medium  of  the  nervous  system,  in  the  states 
both  of  health  and  disease ; and  Mayow,  Baglivi,  and  Pacchioni,  endeavored 
to  account  for  some  of  these  sympathetic  actions,  by  a contractile  power 
which  they  erroneously  supposed  to  be  lodged  in  the  fibres  of  the  dura 
matter.  It  was  reserved  for  Hoffmann,  however,  to  take  a comprehensive 
view  of  the  Nervous  System,  not  only  as  the  organ  of  sense  and  motion, 
but  also  as  the  common  centre  by  which  all  the  different  parts  of  the 
animal  economy  are  connected  together,  and  through  which  they  mu- 
tually influence  each  other.  He  was  accordingly,  led  to  regard  all  those 
alterations  in  the  structure  and  functions  of  this  economy,  which  consti- 
tute the  state  of  disease,  as  having  their  primary  origin  in  affections  of 
the  nervous  system,  and  as  depending,  therefore,  upon  a deranged  state 


254 


ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 


of  the  imperceptible  and  contractile  motions  in  the  solids,  rather  than 
upon  changes  induced  in  the  chemical  composition  of  the  fluid  parts  of 
the  body.”  (Pp.  195,  196). 

Boerhaave’’ s motto — Simplex  Veri  sigillum — stands  in  glaring 
contrast  with  his  system.  In  practice  he  was  a genuine  follower 
of  Hippocrates  and  nature ; in  theory  at  once  Peripatetic,  and 
Cartesian,  and  Leibnitian,  Iatro-chemist  and  Mechanician,  Hu- 
morist and  Solidist,  his  system  presents  only  a plausible  concilia- 
tion of  all  conflicting  hypotheses.  The  eclecticism  of  Boerhaave, 
destitute  of  real  unity,  had  no  principle  of  stability,  and  was 
especially  defective  in  relation  to  the  vital  powers.  It  was 
accordingly  soon  essentially  modified  by  his  disciples,  and  an 
approximation  quietly  effected  to  the  simpler  but  more  compre- 
hensive principles  of  Hoffmann.  De  Gforter,  Winter,  Kaau 
Boerhaave,  and  Grauhius,  all  co-operated  to  this  result ; but  the 
pupil  who  hazarded  the  most  important  changes  on  the  system 
of  his  master,  and  who,  indeed,  contributed  perhaps  more  than 
any  other  individual  to  the  improvement  of  medical  science  in 
general,  was  Haller.  In  the  development  of  his  great  doctrine 
of  Irritability,  Haller  is,  indeed,  not  the  pupil  of  Boerhaave,  but 
a follower  of  Hoffmann  and  Grlisson.  Dr.  Thomson’s  history  of 
this  doctrine  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  portions  of  his  work ; 
and  his  account  of  the  celebrated  controversy  touching  the  prin- 
ciple of  vital  and  involuntary  motion  between  Whytt  and  Haller, 
will  be  found  not  more  attractive  to  professional  physicians,  than 
to  all  who  take  any  interest  in  the  philosophy  of  animated  nature. 

Having  thus  indicated  Cullen’s  point  of  departure,  Dr.  Thom- 
son now  guides  us  along  the  steps  of  his  advance.  Under  the 
heads  of  Physiology,  Pathology,  and  Therapeutics,  a detailed  ac- 
count is  given  of  Cullen’s  system,  in  its  common  and  in  its  pecu- 
liar doctrines.  In  this,  the  principal  portion  of  the  work,  is  exhi- 
bited, for  the  first  time  (and  chiefly  from  manuscript  sources),  a 
comprehensive  view  of  Cullen’s  services  to  medical  science;  much 
original  information  is  supplied  ; new  light  is  thrown  upon  points 
hitherto  obscure  ; many  prevalent  misconceptions  are  rectified ; 
and  some  unworthy,  we  are  sorry  to  add,  hitherto  successful, 
plagiarisms  are  exposed.  Cullen’s  reputation  had  suffered  from 
misrepresentation,  ignorance,  and  neglect ; hut  never  was  the 
honor  of  an  author  more  triumphantly  vindicated  by  his  biogra- 
pher. We  regret  our  inability  to  do  any  justice  to  this  admira- 
ble survey;  which  is,  indeed,  not  more  valuable  as  an  appre- 


CULLEN. 


255 


ciation  of  Cullen’s  merits,  than  as  a supplement  to  the  history 
of  modern  medicine.  An  outline  of  its  contents  would  he  of 
little  interest  or  value;  and  even  an  outline  would  exceed  our 

limits.  — — — 

To  the  history  of  Cullen’s  doctrines  in  relation  to  those  of  pre- 
vious theorists,  Dr.  Thomson  subjoins  an  account — and  the  best 
we  have  ever  seen — of  the  contemporary  progress  of  medicine  in 
the  schools  of  Montpellier  and  Paris.  On  this,  however,  we  can 
not  touch.  Our  limits  also  preclude  us  from  following  him  in  his 
important  discussion  on  medical  education.  We  warmly  recom- 
mend this  part  of  the  volume  to  those  interested  in  the  subject. 
A curious  letter  of  Adam  Smith  (prior  to  the  publication  of  his 
Wealth  of  Nations ) on  Universities  and  Degrees,  will  be  admired 
for  its  ability  by  those  who  dissent  from  his  well-known  doctrine 
upon  these  points.  We  regret  that  we  can  not  make  room  for 
this  very  characteristic  production,  which  is  now  for  the  first  time 
given  to  the  public.  Its  praise  of  the  Scottish  Universities,  and 
its  opinions  as  to  Visitations,  are  particularly  worthy  of  notice. 
The  results  of  the  late  Royal  Commission  of  Yisitation  will  by 
some,  perhaps,  be  viewed  as  affording  a good  commentary  on  Dr. 
Smith’s  text.  “ In  the  present  state  of  the  Scotch  Universities, 
I do  most  sincerely  look  upon  them  as,  in  spite  of  all  their  faults, 
without  exception  the  best  seminaries  of  learning  that  are  to  be 
found  any  where  in  Europe.”  [Smith  would  not  say  this  now  ; 
and  he  said  it  then,  probably,  in  utter  ignorance  of  the  Dutch  and 
German  Universities.]  “ They  are,  perhaps,  upon  the  whole,  as 
unexceptionable  as  any  public  institutions  of  that  kind,  which 
all  contain  in  their  very  nature  the  seeds  and  causes  of  negligence 
and  corruption,  have  ever  been,  or  are  ever  likely  to  be.  That, 
however,  they  are  still  capable  of  amendment,  and  even  of  consider- 
able amendment,  I know  very  well ; and  a Yisitation  is,  I believe 
the  only  proper  means  of  procuring  them  this  amendment.  But 
before  any  wise  man  would  apply  for  the  appointment  of  so  arbi- 
trary a tribunal,  in  order  to  improve  what  is  already,  upon  the 
whole,  very  well , he  ought  certainly  to  know,  with  some  degree 
of  certainty,  first,  who  are  likely  to  be  appointed  visitors  ; and 
secondly,  what  plan  of  reformation  those  visitors  are  likely  to 
follow.”  Besides  the  medical  matters  we  have  been  able  to  notice, 
this  volume  contains  various  other  topics  of  general  interest. 
The  letters  alone  which  it  supplies  of  distinguished  individuals 
form  ati  important  addition  to  the  literary  history  of  Scotland 


256  ON  THE  REVOLUTIONS  OF  MEDICINE. 

during  last  century.  David  Hume,  Adam  Smith,  Lord  Karnes, 
Duhamel,  William  Hunter,  Black,  Senac,  FothergH,  are  among 
Cullen’s  most  frequent  correspondents. 

We  look  forward  to  the  concluding  volume  with  no  little  curi- 
osity. It  will  trace  of  course  the  influence  of  Cullen’s  specu- 
lations on  the  subsequent  progress  of  medicine,  and,  we  hope, 
continue  (what  Dr.  Thomson  has  already  proved  himself  so  well 
qualified  to  execute)  the  history  of  this  science  to  the  present 
day. 


« 


EDUCATION. 


L— ON  THE  STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 

AS  AN  EXERCISE  OF  MIND.1 

(January,  1836.) 

Thoughts  on  the  Study  of  Mathematics  as  a part  of  a Liberal 

Education.  By  the  Rev.  William  Wheavell,  M.A.,  Fellow 

and  Tutor  of  Trinity  College.  8vo.  Cambridge  : 1835. 

We  saw  the  announcement  of  this  phamphlet  with  no  ordinary 
interest — from  the  subject — from  the  place  of  publication — and 
from  the  author. 

The  subject  is  one  of  great  importance  in  the  science  of  educa- 

1 [In  French  by  M.  Peisse  ; in  Italian  by  S.  Lo  Gatto  ; in  German,  as  a separate 
pamphlet,  under  the  title — Ucber  den  Werth  und  Unwerth  der  Mathematik , als  Mittel 
der  hochern  geistigcn  Ausbildung,  Cassel,  1836.  To  this  last  there  is  an  able  preface  ; 
and  the  translator  publishes  the  paper  from  “ an  intimate  and  resistless  conviction 
that  the  plan  of  study  in  some  of  our  new  gymnasia  comprehends  too  great  a variety 
of  objects,  and,  especially,  lavishes  too  much  time  and  application  on  mathematical  in- 
struction ; — an  instruction  without  interest  to  the  majority  of  students,  which,  at  the 
same  time,  pays  no  regard  to  the  differences  of  natural  disposition  and  future  destina- 
tion, overloads  the  memory  and  compromises  the  development  of  the  higher  mental  and 
moral  capacities,  while,  more  especially,  it  stunts  the  evolution  of  that  free  and  inde- 
pendent activity  of  thought  on  which  a utility  for  life  and  a susceptibility  for  its  noblest 
avocations  depend.” 

This  article  was  attacked  in  a pamphlet  published  by  Professor  Chevallier  of  Dur- 
ham, in  the  course  of  the  year  ; but  his  opposition  being  either  mere  assertion  or  mere 
mistake,  I do  not  find  it  necessary  to  say  any  thing  in  reply.  In  fact,  his  defense  of 
“The  Study  of  Mathematics  as  conducive  to  the  development  of  the  Intellectual 
Powers,”  may  suffice  to  show  how  little,  even  by  an  able  advocate,  can  be  alleged  in 
vindication  of  their  utility  in  this  respect  at  all. 

Certain  statements  in  the  criticism  have  also  been  controverted  by  Professor  Boole 
in  his  very  able  “ Mathematical  Analysis  of  Logic,”  in  1847.  I shall  consider  these  in 
a note.  (P.  273). 

On  Dr.  Whewell's  rejoinder,  see  the  end  of  the  article. 

One  unimportant  note  appended  by  the  Editor  is  omitted.] 

R 


258 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


tion.  Whether  and  to  what  extent,  the  study  of  mathematics 
conduces  to  the  development  of  the  higher  faculties,  is  a question 
which,  though  never  adequately  discussed,  has  been  very  confi- 
dently and  very  variously  decided.  The  stream  of  opinions,  and 
the  general  practice  of  the  European  schools  and  universities, 
allow  to  that  study,  at  best,  only  a subordinate  utility  as  a mean 
of  liberal  education; — that  is,  an  education  in  which  the  individual 
is  cultivated,  not  as  an  instrument  toward  some  ulterior  end,  but 
as  an  end  unto  himself  alone ; in  other  words,  an  education,  in 
which  his  absolute  perfection  as  a man,  and  not  merely  his  rela- 
tive dexterity  as  a professional  man,  is  the  scope  immediately  in 
view.  But,  at  the  same  time,  it  can  not  be  denied,  that  signs  of 
a revolutionary  tendency  in  popular  opinion,  touching  the  objects 
and  the  end  of  education,  are,  in  this  nation  at  least,  becoming 
daily  more  and  more  obtrusive ; and  as  the  extended  study  of 
mathematics  is  that  mainly  proposed,  in  lieu  of  the  ancient 
branches  of  discipline  which  our  innovators  would  retrench,  a pro- 
fessed inquiry,  like  the  present,  into  the  influence  of  this  study  on 
the  intellectual  habits,  comes  invested,  independently  of  its  gen- 
eral importance,  with  a certain  local  and  temporary  interest. 

But  the  centre  from  which  it  proceeds,  enhances  also  the  inter- 
est of  the  publication.  In  opposition  to  the  general  opinion  of 
the  learned  world — in  opposition  to  the  practice  of  all  other  uni- 
versities, past  or  present — in  opposition  even  to  its  oaths  and 
statutes,  and  to  the  intention  of  its  founders  and  legislators,  the 
University  of  Cambridge  stands  alone  in  note  making  mathe- 
matical science  the  principal  object  of  the  whole  liberal  education 
it  affords ; and  mathematical  skill  the  sole  condition  of  the  one 
tripos  of  its  honors,  and  the  necessary  passport  to  the  other : — 
thus  restricting  to  the  narrowest  proficiency  all  places  of  distinc- 
tion and  emolument  in  university  and  college,  to  which  such 
honors  constitute  a claim ; — thus  also  leaving  the  immense  ma- 
jority of  its  alumni  without  incitement,  and  the  most  arduous  and 
important  studies  void  of  encouragement  and  reward.  It  is  true, 
indeed  that  the  effect  of  this  contracted  tendency  of  the  'public 
university  is,  in  some  degree,  tempered  by  certain  favorable  acci- 
dents in  the  constitution  of  more  than  one  of  its  private  colleges , 
but  with  every  allowance  for  petty  and  precarious  counteraction, 
and  latterly  for  some  very  inadequate  legislation,  the  University 
of  Cambridge,  unless  it  can  demonstrate  that  mathematical  study 
is  the  one  best,  if  not  the  one  exclusive,  mean  of  a general  evolu- 


WORK  REVIEWED. 


259 


tion  of  our  faculties,  must  be  held  to  have  established  and  main- 
tained a scheme  of  discipline,  more -partial  and  inadequate  than 
any  other  which  the  history  of  education  records.  That  no  Cam- 
bridge mathematician  has  yet  been  found  to  essay  this  demonstra- 
tion, so  necessary  for  his  university,  so  honorable  to  his  science, 
has  always  appeared  to  us  a virtual  admission,  that  the  thesis  was 
incapable  of  defense.  A treatise,  therefore,  apparently  on  the 
very  point,  and  by  a distinguished  member  of  the  university, 
could  not  fail  of  engaging  our  attention ; and  this,  whether  it 
proposed  to  defend  the  actual  practice  of  the  seminary,  or  to  urge 
the  expediency  of  a reform. 

From  the  character  of  its  author , the  pamphlet  before  us  like- 
wise comes  recommended  by  no  mean  claim  to  consideration.  Mr. 
Whewell  has  already,  by  his  writings,  approved  to  the  world,  not 
only  his  extensive  acquirements  in  mathematical  and  physical 
science,  but  his  talent  as  a vigorous  and  independent  thinker.  To 
a narrower  circle,  he  is  known  as  the  principal  public  tutor  of  the 
principal  college  of  his  university ; and  in  this  relation,  his  zeal, 
and  knowledge,  and  ability  have  concurred  in  raising  him  to  an 
enviable  eminence.  Though  more  peculiarly  distinguished  by  his 
publications  in  that  department  of  science  so  exclusively  patron- 
ized by  the  university,  he  has  yet  shown  at  once  his  intelligence 
and  liberality,  by  amplifying  the  former  circle  of  studies  pursued 
in  the  college  under  his  direction ; and,  in  particular,  we  are  in- 
formed, that  he  has  exerted  his  influence  in  awakening  a new 
spirit  for  the  cultivation  of  mental  philosophy  ; in  which  depart- 
ment he  has  already  introduced,  or  is  in  the  course  of  introducing, 
a series  of  more  appropriate  authors  than  those  previously  in  use. 

In  these  circumstances  it  was  with  more  than  usual  expecta- 
tion that  we  received  Mr.  Whewell’s  pamphlet.  Its  perusal — 
must  we  say  it  ? — has  disappointed  us.  The  confession  is  una- 
voidable. Even  the  respect  which  we  entertain  for  the  character 
and  talents  of  the  author,  compels  us  to  be  plain  rather  than  pleas- 
ant with  his  work.  As  a writer,  Mr.  Whewell  has  long  out-grown 
the  need  of  any  critical  dandling : the  question  he  agitates  is  far 
too  serious  to  tolerate  the  bandying  of  compliments  ; his  author- 
ity, in  opposition  to  our  conviction,  is  too  imposing  to  allow  of 
quarter  to  his  reasoning ; while  we  are  confident,  that  he  is  him- 
self too  sincere  a champion  of  truth,  to  accept  of  any  favor  but 
what  the  interest  of  truth  demands. 

We  say,  that  we  are  disappointed  with  the  pamphlet,  and  this 


260 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


on  sundry  accounts.  We  are  disappointed,  certainly,  that  its 
author  did  not  here  advocate  for  the  university  the  liberal  views 
which  he  had  already  extended  to  his  college.  But  taking  it  for 
a vindication  of  mathematical  study,  as  the  principal  mean  in  the 
cultivation  of  the  reasoning  faculty — supposing,  also,  that  the 
reasoning  faculty  is  that  whose  cultivation  is  chiefly  to  be  encour- 
aged in  the  liberal  education  of  a university — considering  it,  in  a 
word,  from  its  own  point  of  view  alone,  we  say  that  we  are  dis- 
appointed with  it,  as  failing  signally  in  the  accomplishment  of 
what  it  proposes.  In  fact,  had  our  opinion  not  previously  been 
decided  on  the  question,  the  perusal  of  this  argument  in  defense 
of  mathematical  study,  as  a useful  gymnastic  of  the  mind,  would 
have  only  tended  to  persuade  us,  that  in  this  relation,  it  was  com- 
paratively useless. 

Before  entering  on  details,  it  is  proper  here,  once  for  all,  to  pre- 
mise : — In  the  first  place,  that  the  question  does  not  regard,  the 
value  of  mathematical  science,  considered  in  itself , or  in  its  ob- 
jective results , but  the  utility  of  mathematical  study,  that  is,  in 
its  subjective  effect , as  an  exercise  of  mind;  and  in  the  second , 
that  the  expediency  is  not  disputed,  of  leaving  mathematics,  as  a 
co-ordinate,  to  find  their  level  among  the  other  branches  of  aca- 
demical instruction.  It  is  only  contended,  that  they  ought  not 
to  be  made  the  principal , far  less  the  exclusive , object  of  academ- 
ical encouragement.  We  speak  not  now  of  professional , but  of 
liberal , education ; not  of  that,  which  considers  the  mind  as  an 
instrument  for  the  improvement  of  science,  but  of  this,  which 
considers  science  as  an  instrument  for  the  improvement  of  mind. 

Of  all  our  intellectual  pursuits,  the  study  of  the  mathematical 
sciences  is  the  one,  whose  utility  as  an  intellectual  exercise,  when 
carried  beyond  a moderate  extent,  has  been  most  peremptorily 
denied  by  the  greatest  number  of  the  most  competent  judges ; 
and  the  arguments,  on  which  this  opinion  is  established,  have 
hitherto  been  evaded  rather  than  opposed.  Some  intelligent  math- 
ematicians, indeed,  admit  all  that  has  been  urged  against  their 
science,  as  a principal  discipline  of  the  mind ; and  only  contend 
that  it  ought  not  to  be  extruded  from  all  place  in  a scheme  of 
liberal  education.  With  these,  therefore,  we  have  no  contro- 
versy. More  strenuous  advocates  of  this  study,  again,  maintain, 
that  mathematics  are  of  primary  importance  as  a logical  exercise 
of  reason  ; but  unable  to  controvert  the  evidence  of  its  contracted 
and  partial  cultivation  of  the  faculties,  they  endeavor  to  vindi- 


QUESTION  STATED— MR.  WHEWELL’S  GROUND. 


261 


cate  the  study  in  general,  by  attributing  its  evil  influence  to 
some  peculiar  modification  of  the  science ; and  thus  hope  to  avoid 
the  loss  of  the  whole,  by  the  vicarious  sacrifice  of  a part.  But 
here,  unfortunately,  they  are  not  at  one.  Some  are  willing  to 
surrender  the  modern  analysis  as  a gymnastic  of  the  mind.  They 
confess,  that  its  very  perfection  as  an  instrument  of  discovery 
unfits  it  for  an  instrument  of  mental  cultivation,  its  formulae 
mechanically  transporting  the  student  with  closed  eyes  to  the 
conclusion  ; whereas  the  ancient  geometrical  construction,  they 
contend,  leads  him  to  the  end,  more  circuitously,  indeed,  but  by 
his  own  exertion,  and  with  a clear  consciousness  of  every  step 
in  the  procedure.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  disgusted  with  the 
tedious  and  complex  operations  of  geometry , recommend  the 
algebraic  process  as  that  most  favorable  to  the  powers  of  gen- 
eralization and  reasoning ; for,  concentrating  into  the  narrowest 
compass  the  greatest  complement  of  meaning,  it  obviates,  they 
maintain,  all  irrelevant  distraction,  and  enables  the  intellect  to 
operate  for  a longer  continuance,  more  energetically,  securely, 
and  effectually. — The  arguments  in  favor  of  the  study,  thus 
neutralize  each  other ; and  the  reasoning  of  those  who  deny  it 
more  than  a subordinate  and  partial  utility,  stands  not  only  un- 
controverted, but  untouched — not  only  untouched,  but  admitted. 

Mr.  Whewell  belongs  to  the  class  of  thorough-going  advocates ; 
he  would  maintain  the  paramount  importance  of  mathematical 
study  in  general ; but  willingly  allows  the  worst  that  has  been 
urged  against  it  to  be  true  of  certain  opinions  and  practices,  to 
which  he  is  opposed . The  obnoxious  modifications  are  not,  how- 
ever,  with  him  coincident  either  with  the  geometric,  or  with  the 
analytic,  method  ; but  though,  we  think,  if  fairly  developed,  his 
principles  would  tend  to  supersede  the  latter — as  he  has  applied 
them,  they  merely  affect  certain  alleged  abuses  in  both  depart- 
ments of  the  science. 

We  were  disappointed  in  finding  so  little  said  on  the  general 
argument ; and  the  special  reasoning  we  must  be  allowed  to  dis- 
regard, as  we  can  not  recognize  a suspected  substance  to  be 
wholesome  food,  merely  because  certain  bits  of  it  are  admitted 
to  be  deadly  poison. 

But  the  general  argument  is  not  only  brief  but  inconclusive. 
The  usual  generalities,  the  common  vague  assertions,  we  have, 
in  praise  of  mathematics,  and  of  the  logical  habits,  which  it  is 
assumed,  that  they  induce ; but  Mr.  Whewell  controverts  none 


262 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


of  the  grounds,  he  refers  to  none  of  the  authorities,  which  go  to 
prove  that  the  tendency  of  a too  exclusive  study  of  these  sciences 
is,  absolutely,  to  disqualify  the  mind  for  observation  and  common 
reasoning.  We  can  not  now  criticise  its  details,  though  to  some 
we  shall  allude  in  the  sequel ; hut  the  very  conception  of  the 
argument  is  vicious.  Mr.  Whewell  contrasts  Mathematics  and 
Logic,  and  endeavors  to  establish  the  high  and  general  import- 
ance of  the  former,  by  showing  their  superiority  to  the  latter  as 
a school  of  practical  reasoning.  Now  admitting,  what  we  are 
far  indeed  from  doing,  that  the  merits  of  the  two  sciences  are 
fully  produced  and  fairly  weighed  against  each  other,  still  the 
comparison  itself  is  invalid.  Logic,  by  a famous  distinction,  is 
divided  : — into  Theoretical  or  General  Logic  Trpccy^drmv, 

docens),  in  so  far  as  it  analyzes  the  mere  laws  of  thought;  and 
into  Practical  or  Special  Logic  (ev  ^pyaei,  utens ),  in  so  far  as  it 
applies  these  laws  to  a certain  matter  or  class  of  objects.  The 
former  is  one , and  stands  in  the  same  common  relation  to  all  the 
sciences  ; the  latter  is  manifold,  and  stands  in  proximate  relation 
to  this  or  that  particular  science,  with  which  it  is  in  fact  identi- 
fied. Now,  as  all  matter  is  either  necessary  or  contingent  (a 
distinction  which  may  be  here  roughly  assumed  to  coincide  with 
mathematical  and  non-mathematical),  we  have  thus,  besides  one 
theoretical  or  general  logic,  also  tivo  practical  or  special  logics  in 
their  highest  universality  and  contrast. 

Theoretical  Logic. 

1)  Practical  Logic,  2)  Practical  Logic, 

As  specially  applied  to  Neces-  As  specially  applied  to  Con - 
sary  Matter  — Mathematical  tingent  Matter  = Philosophy 
reasoning.  and  General  reasoning ? 

Now,  the  question  which  Mr.  Whewell  proposes  to  handle,  is 
— What  is  the  best  instrument  for  educating  men  to  a full  de- 
velopment of  the  reasoning  faculty?  and  his  answer  to  that 
question  is — Mathematics.  But  the  reasoning  faculty  of  men, 
being  in  all  principally , in  most  altogether,  occupied  upon  con- 
tingent matter,  comprising,  what  Mr.  Whewell  himself  calls — 


1 [The  study  of  Language,  if  conducted  upon  rational  principles,  is  one  of  the  best 
exercises  of  an  applied  Logic.  This  study  I can  not  say  that  any  of  our  universities 
encourage.  To  master,  for  example,  the  Minerva  of  Sanctius  with  its  commentators 
is,  I conceive,  a far  more  profitable  exercise  of  mind  than  to  conquer  the  Principia  of 
Newton. — But  I anticipate.] 


MR.  WI-IE WELL’S  GROUND  -UNTENABLE. 


263 


“ the  most  important  employments  of  the  human  mind  he  was 
bound  articulately  to  prove,  what  certainly  can  not  be  presumed, 
that  Mathematics  (the  Practical  Logic  of  necessary  matter)  cul- 
tivate the  reasoning  faculty  for  its  employment  on  contingent 
matter,  better  than  Philosophy,  &e. — the  Practical  Logic  itself 
of  contingent  matter.  But  this  he  does  not  even  attempt.  On 
the  contrary,  after  misstating  the  custom  of  “our  universities,” 
he  actually  overlooks  the  existence  of  the  practical  logic  of  con- 
tingent matter  altogether ; — then,  assuming  mathematics,  the 
logic  of  necessary  matter,  to  he  the  only  practical  logic  in  exist- 
ence, he  lightly  concedes  to  it  the  victory  over  theoretical  logic, 
on  the  ground,  that  “ reasoning,  a practical  process,  must  be 
taught  by  practice  better  than  by  precept .”  The  primary  condi- 
tion and  the  whole  difficulty  of  the  problem  is  thus  eluded  ; for 
it  behoved  him  to  have  proved,  not  to  have  assumed,  the  para- 
dox : — That  the  study  of  necessary  reasoning  alone,  is  a better 
exercise  of  the  habits  of  probable  reasoning,  than  the  practice  of 
probable  reasoning  itself,  and  that,  also,  illustrated  by  the  theory 
of  the  laws  of  thought  and  of  reasoning  in  general.  We  may 
at  once  admit,  that  theoretical  logic  realizes  its  full  value  only 
through  its  practical  applications.  But  does  it  therefore  follow 
— either  that  a useful  practice  is  independent  of  theory,  or  that 
we  shall  come  best  trained  to  the  hunting-field  of  probability,  by 
assiduous  locomotion  on  the  railroad  of  calculus  and  demonstra- 
tion ? But  of  this  hereafter. 

Having  laid  it  down  by  this  very  easy  process,  that  “ Mathe- 
matics are  a means  of  forming  logical  habits  better  than  Logic 
itself fi  Mr.  Whewell  broaches  the  important  question : 

“ How  far  the  study  thus  recommended  is  justly  chargeable  with  evil 

consequences? Does  it  necessarily  make  men  too  little  sensible  to  other 

than  mathematical  reasonings  ? Does  it  teach  them  to  require  a kind  of 
fundamental  principles  and  a mode  of  deduction  which  are  not  in  reality 
attainable  in  questions  of  morals  or  politics,  or  even  of  natural  philosophy  ? 
If  it  does  this,  it  may  well  unfit  men  for  the  most  important  employments 

of  the  human  mind,  &c But  is  this,  in  fact,  usually  the  case  ? And 

if  it  happen  sometimes,  and  sometimes  only,  under  what  circumstances 
does  it  occur  ? This  latter  question  has,  I think,  important  practical  bear- 
ings, and  I shall  try  to  give  some  answer  to  it. 

“I  would  reply,  then,  that  [1°,]  if  mathematics  be  taught  in  such  a 
manner  that  its  foundations  appear  to  be  laid  in  arbitrary  definitions  with- 
out any  corresponding  act  of  the  mind  ; — or  [2°,]  if  its  first  principles  be 
represented  as  borrowed  from  experience,  in  such  a manner  that  the  whole 
science  is  empirical  only ; — or  [3°,]  if  it  be  held  forth  as  the  highest  per- 
fection of  the  science  to  reduce  our  knowledge  to  extremely  general  propo- 


264 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


sitions  anil  processes,  in  which  all  particular  cases  are  included  : — so 
studied,  it  may,  I conceive,  unfit  the  mind  for  dealing  with  other  kinds 
of  truth.”  (P.  8.) 

The  development  and  illustration  of  these  three  propositions 
occupy  the  remainder  of  the  pamphlet. 

Now,  it  will  be  observed  that  Mr.  Whewell  does  not  here  or 
elsewhere,  attempt  any  vindication  of  mathematics  from  those 
charges  to  which  it  is  thus  acknowledged  to  be  obnoxious  ; for  it 
is  no  defense  of  the  study  in  general,  against  which  alone  these 
accusations  have  from  all  ages  been  advanced,  to  admit,  nay,  to 
exaggerate  the  evil  tendency  of  certain  petty  recent  opinions, 
wholly  uncontemplated  by  the  accusers. 

The  principal  value  of  Mr.  Whewell’s  pamphlet  lies  in  the  spe- 
cial illustrations  of  the  first  and  third  heads.  There  the  mathe- 
matician is  within  his  sphere.  On  these  we  should  not  have  been 
indisposed  to  offer  some  remarks  ; but  the  technical  nature  of  the 
subject  could  not  interest  the  general  reader ; and  in  the  words 
of  Rabbinic  apophthegm — “ Dies  brevis , el  opus  multum , et  pater- 
familias urget .” 

The  second  head,  in  which  Mr.  Whewell  trenches  on  philoso- 
phy, we  can  not  altogether  overlook.  He  says : 

“ I will  not  suppose,  that  any  person  who  has  paid  any  attention  to 
mathematics  does  not  see  clearly  the  difference  between  necessary  truths 
and  empirical  facts ; between  the  evidence  of  the  properties  of  a triangle, 
and  that  of  the  general  laws  of  the  structure  of  plants.  The  peculiar 
character  of  mathematical  truth  is,  that  it  is  necessarily  and  inevitably 
true ; and  one  of  the  most  important  lessons  which  we  learn  from  our 
mathematical  studies  is  a knowledge  that  there  are  such  truths,  and  a 
familiarity  with  their  form  and  character. 

“ This  lesson  is  not  only  lost,  but  read  backward,  if  the  student  is  taught 
that  there  is  no  such  difference,  and  that  mathematical  truths  themselves 
are  learnt  by  experience.  I can  hardly  suppose  that  any  mathematician 
would  hold  such  an  opinion  with  regard  to  geometrical  truths,  although 
it  has  been  entertained  by  metaphysicians  of  no  inconsiderable  acuteness, 
as  Hume.  We  might  ask  such  persons  how  Experience  can  show,  not 
only  that  a thing  is,  but  that  it  must  be ; by  what  authority  she,  the 
mere  recorder  of  the  actual  occurrences  of  the  past,  pronounces  upon  all 
possible  cases,  though  as  yet  to  be  tried  hereafter  only,  or  probably  never. 
Or,  descending  to  particulars ; when  it  is  maintained  that  it  is  from  ex- 
perience alone  that  we  know  that  two  straight  lines  can  not  inclose  space, 
we  ask,  who  ever  made  the  trial,  and  how?  and  we  request  to  be  inform- 
ed in  what  way  he  ascertained  that  the  lines  with  which  he  made  his  experi- 
ment were  accurately  straight.  The  fallacy  is  in  this  case,  I conceive,  too 
palpable  to  require  to  be  dwelt  upon.” — (P.  32.) 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  wholly  beyond  the  domain  of  ma- 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  PHILOSOPHY. 


265 


thematics  to  inquire  into  the  origin  and  nature  of  their  principles. 
Mathematics,  as  Plato 1 observes,  and  Proclusf  are  founded  on 
hypotheses , of  which  they  can  render  no  account ; and  for  this 
reason,  the  former  even  denies  them  the  denomination  of  Science. 
“The  geometer,  qua  geometer,”  says  Aristotle , “can  attempt  no 
discussion  of  his  principles.”*  3 As  observed  by  Seneca: — “ The 
Mathematical  is,  so  to  speak,  a superficial  science  ; it  builds  on  a 
borrowed  site,  and  the  principles,  by  aid  of  which  it  proceeds,  are 
not  its  own : Philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  begs  nothing  from  an- 
other; it  rears  its  own  edifice  from  its  own  soil.”4  These  autho- 
rities represent  the  harmonions  opinion  of  philosophers  and  ma- 
thematicians, in  ancient  and  in  modern  times. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  if  a mathematician  know  so  little  of 
his  province,  as  to  make  such  an  inroad  into  that  of  the  philoso- 
pher, we  can  not  for  our  life  imagine,  how  a metaphysical  flourish 
at  the  head  of  a mathematical  system  can  affect  the  treatment 
of  the  science,  and  through  that  affect  the  mind  of  the  student. 
We  doubt,  indeed,  whether  one  mathematician  in  a hundred  has 
ever  possessed  an  opinion,  far  less  the  right  to  an  opinion,  on  the 
matter. 

In  the  third  place,  what  are  we  to  think  of  the  assumption, 
that  the  study  of  mathematics  is  requisite  to  make  us  aware  of 
the  existence  of  Necessary  Cognitions — Necessary  Truths  ? That 
certain  notions , that  certain  judgments,  there  are,  which  we  are 
compelled  to  recognize  as  necessary,  is  a fact  that  was  never  un- 
known to,  was  never  denied  by,  any  rational  being.  Whether 
these  necessary  notions  and  judgments  are  truths , has  been  in- 
deed doubted  by  certain  philosophers  ; but  of  this  doubt  mathe- 
matics can  afford  us  no  solution — no  proper  materials  for  a solu- 
tion. The  very  propositions  on  which  these  sciences  build  then- 
whole  edifice  of  demonstration,  are  as  well  known  by  the  tyro 
when  he  opens  his  Euclid,  as  by  the  veteran  Euler  or  Laplace ; 
nay,  they  are  possessed,  even  in  prior  property,  by  the  philoso- 
pher, to  whom,  indeed,  the  mathematician  must  look  for  their 
vindication  and  establishment. 

But,  in  the  fourth  place,  if  Mr.  Whewell  “ can  hardly  suppose 
that  any  mathematician  would  hold  the  opinion  that  mathemati- 
cal truths  are  learned  from  experience,”  we  can  not  understand 

1 Dc  Repub.  LI.  vi.  vii.  2 In  Euclid. . L.  i.  p.  23. 

3 Post  Analyt.  L.  i.  c.  12,  § 3.  Compare  Phys.  L.  i.  c.  2,  text  8. 

4 Epist.  lxxxviii. 


266 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


why  he  takes  the  trouble  of  writing  this  treatise  against  such 
an  opinion,  as  actually  held,  and  held  by  a whole  “ school  of 
mathematics  ?”  Perhaps,  he  means  by  “ any  mathematician” 
— any  mathematician  worthy  of  the  name.  But  then  if  this 
“ school  of  mathematics”  be  so  contemptible,  why  write,  and  that 
so  seriously,  against  them  ? This,  we  may  observe,  is  not  the 
only  contradiction  in  the  pamphlet  we  have  been  wholly  unable 
to  reconcile. 

But,  in  the  fifth  place,  the  contrast  of  the  mathematician  and 
metaphysician  is  itself  in  error. — In  regard  to  the  exculpation  of 
the  mathematicians , we  need  look  no  farther  than  to  the  late  Sir 
John  Leslie  for  its  disproof.  “ Geometry”  (says  that  original 
thinker,  and  he  surely  was  a mathematician),  “ is  thus  founded 
likewise  on  observation  ; but  of  a kind  so  familiar  and  obvious, 
that  the  primary  notions  which  it  furnishes  might  seem  intui- 
tive.” 1 — As  to  the  inculpation  of  the  metaphysicians — why  was 
Locke  not  mentioned  in  place  of  Hume  ? If  Hume  did  advance 
such  a doctrine,  he  only  skeptically  took  up  what  Locke  dogma- 
tically laid  down.  But  Locke  himself  received  this  opinion  from 
a mathematician  ; for  this  part  of  his  philosophy  he  borrows  from 
Gassendi : and,  what  is  curious,  he  here  deserts  the  schoolman 
from  whom  he  may  appear  to  have  adopted,  as  the  basis  of  his 
philosophy,  the  twofold  origin  of  knowledge — Sense  and  Reflec- 
tion; for  the  unacknowledged  master  maintains  on  this,  as  on 
many  other  questions,  opinions  far  more  profound  than  those  of 
his  disciple. — But  in  regard  to  Hume , Mr.  Whewell  is  wholly 
wrong.  So  far  is  this  philosopher  from  holding  “ that  geometri- 
cal truths  are  learnt  by  experience,”  that,  while  rating  mathemat- 
ical science,  as  a study,  at  a very  low  account,  he  was  all  too 
acute  to  countenance  so  crude  an  opinion  in  regard  to  its  founda- 
tion ; and,  in  fact,  is  celebrated  for  maintaining  one  precisely  the 
reverse.  On  this  point  Hume  -was  neither  sensualist  nor  skeptic, 
but  deserted  Aenesidemus  and  Locke  to  encamp  with  Descartes 
and  Leibnitz. 

In  the  sixth  place,  the  quality  of  necessity  is  correctly  stated 
by  Mr.  Whewell  as  the  criterion  of  a pure  or  a priori  knowledge. 
So  far,  however,  from  this  being  a truism  always  familiar  to  ma- 
thematicians, it  only  shows  that  Mr.  Whewell  has  himself  been 
recently  dipping  into  the  Kantian  philosophy  ; of  which  he  here 

1 Rudiments  of  Plane  Geometry,  p.  18  ; and  more  fully  in  Elements  of  Geometry 
and  of  Geometrical  Analysis,  p.  453. 


MATHEMATICAL  NOT  AN  IMPROVING  STUDY. 


267 


adduces  a famous  principle  and  one  of  the  most  ordinary  illustra- 
tions. The  principle  was  indeed  enounced  by  Leibnitz,  in  whom 
mathematics  may  assert  a share ; but  that  philosopher  failed  to 
carry  it  out  to  its  most  important  applications.  In  his  philoso- 
phy, our  conceptions  of  Space  and  Time  are  derived  from  expe- 
rience. We  can  trace  it  also  obscurely  in  Descartes,  and  several 
of  the  older  metaphysicians  ; but  assuredly  it  was  nothing  “ pal- 
pable,”  nothing  to  ivhicli  the  mathematicians  can  lay  claim.  On 
this  principle,  as  first  evolved — at  least,  first  signalized  by  Kant, 
Space  and  Time  are  merely  modifications  of  mind,  and  mathe- 
matics thus  only  conversant  about  necessary  thoughts — thoughts 
which  can  even  make  no  pretension  to  truth  and  objective  reality. 
Are  the  foundations  of  the  science  thus  better  laid  ? — But  to  more 
important  matters. 

It  is  an  ancient  and  universal  observation,  that  different  studies 
cultivate  the  mind  to  a different  development ; and  as  the  end  of 
a liberal  education  is  the  general  and  harmonious  evolution  of 
its  faculties  and  capacities  in  their  relative  subordination , the 
folly  has  accordingly  been  long  and  generally  denounced,  which 
would  attempt  to  accomplish  this  result,  by  the  partial  applica- 
tion of  certain  partial  studies.  And  not  only  has  the  effect  of  a 
one-sided  discipline  been  remarked  upon  the  mind  in  general,  in 
the  disproportioned  development  of  one  power  at  the  expense  of 
others  ; it  has  been  equally  observed  in  the  exclusive  cultivation 
of  the  same  power  to  some  special  energy,  or  in  relation  to  some 
particular  class  of  objects.  Of  this  no  one  had  a clearer  percep- 
tion than  Aristotle ; and  no  one  has  better  illustrated  the  evil 
effects  of  such  a cultivation  of  the  mind,  on  all  and  each  of  its 
faculties.  He  says : 

“The  capacity  of  receiving  knowledge  is  modified  by  the  habits  of  the 
recipient  mind.  For,  as  we  have  been  habituated  to  learn,  do  we  deem 
that  every  thing  ought  to  be  taught ; and  the  same  object  presented  in  an 
unfamiliar  manner,  strikes  us,  not  only  as  unlike  itself,  but,  from  want 
of  custom,  as  comparatively  strange  and  unknown.  For  the  accustomed 
is  the  better  known.  How  great,  indeed,  is  the  influence  of  custom,  is 
manifested  in  the  laws  ; for  here  the  falbulous  and  puerile  exert  a stronger 
influence  through  habit,  than,  through  knowledge,  do  the  true  and  the 
expedient.  Some,  therefore  (who  have  been  over  much  accustomed  to 
mathematical  studies),  will  only  listen  to  one  who  demonstrates  like  a 
mathematician ; others  (who  have  exclusively  cultivated  analogical  rea- 
soning), require  the  employment  of  examples  ; while  others,  again  (whose 
imagination  has  been  exercised  at  the  expense  of  judgment),  deem  it  suffi- 
cient to  adduce  the  testimony  of  a poet.  Some  are  satisfied  only  with  an 
exact  treatment  of  every  subject ; to  others,  again,  from  a trifling  disposi- 


268 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


tion,  or  an  impotence  of  continued  thought,  the  exact  treatment  of  any 
becomes  irksome.  We  ought,  therefore,  to  he  educated  to  the  different 
modes  and  amount  of  evidence,  which  the  different  objects  of  our  knowl- 
edge admit.”1 

And  again: 

“ It  is  the  part  of  a well-educated  man  to  require  that  measure  of  accu- 
racy in  every  discussion,  which  the  nature  of  its  object-matter  allows  ; for 
.t  would  not  be  more  absurd  to  tolerate  a persuasive  mathematician,  than 
to  astrict  an  orator  to  demonstration.  But  every  one  judges  competently 
in  the  matters  with  which  he  is  conversant.  Of  these,  therefore,  he  is  a 
good  judge — of  each,  he  who  has  been  disciplined  in  each,  absolutely,  he 
who  has  been  disciplined  in  all.”2 * * * 6 

But  the  difference  between  different  studies,  in  their  contract- 
ing influence,  is  great.  Some  exercise,  and  consequently  develope 
perhaps,  one  faculty  on  a single  phasis,  or  to  a low  degree  ; while 
others,  from  the  variety  of  objects  and  of  relations  which  they 
present,  calling  into  strong  and  unexclusive  activity  the  whole 
circle  of  the  higher  powers,  may  almost  pretend  to  accomplish 
alone  the  work  of  Catholic  education. 

If  we  consult  reason,  experience,  and  the  common  testimony  of 
ancient  and  modern  times,  none  of  our  intellectual  studies  tend  to 
cultivate  a smaller  number  of  the  faculties , in  a more  partial  or 
feeble  manner , than  mathematics.  This  is  acknowledged  by  every 
writer  on  education  of  the  least  pretension  to  judgment  and  expe- 
rience ; nor  is  it  denied,  even  by  those  who  are  the  most  decidedly 
opposed  to  their  total  banishment  from  the  sphere  of  a liberal  in- 
struction. Germany  is  the  country  which  has  far  distanced  every 
other  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  education ; and  the  three  fol- 
lowing testimonies  may  represent  the  actual  state  of  opinion 
in  the  three  kingdoms  of  the  Germanic  union  which  stand  the 
highest  in  point  of  intelligence — Prussia,  Bavaria,  and  Wirtem- 
berg. 

The  first  authority  is  that  of : — Bernhardi , one  of  the  most  in- 
telligent and  experienced  authorities  on  education  to  be  found  in 
Prussia. 

“It  is  asked — Do  mathematic 9 awaken  the  judgment,  the  reasoning 
faculty,  and  the  understanding  in  general  to  an  all-sided  activity?  We 

1 Metaph.  1.  ii.  (VA to  eXa-rroj/)  c.  3,  text.  14. 

2 Eth.  Nicom.  1.  i.  c.  3.  The  text  universally  received  (''Exacrroj  fie  Kplve i Ka\S> s 

a yti'cbcTKet  teal  tovtcov  earlv  ayados  Kpirp s-  Kad ’ eKaaTou  apa  6 TrtTvaibevpevos  • 

utt\ws  fie  6 nep'i  rdv  nmaibevplvos  •),  is  at  once  defective  and  tautological.  The 

cause  of  the  corruption  is  manifest ; the  emendation  simple  and,  we  think,  certain. 
'E/cacr-roy  fie  /cpiVei /eaXcoy  a yivaxrKcl,  tovtow  ap  ear \v  ayados  Kpirps  • Kad'  eKaarov, 

6 Kad  eKatrrov  ivenaibevpivos,  (wrX£>y  fie,  6 nepl  irav  mnaib^vplvos. 


MATHEMATICAL  NOT  AN  IMPROVING  STUDY. 


269 


are  compelled  to  answer — No.  For  they  do  this  only  in  relation  to  a 
knowledge  of  quantity , neglecting  altogether  that  of  quality. — Further, 
is  this  mathematical  evidence , is  this  coincidence  of  theory  and  practice 
actually  found  to  hold  in  the  other  branches  of  our  knowledge  ? The 
slightest  survey  of  the  sciences  proves  the  very  reverse ; and  teaches  us 
that  mathematics  tend  necessarily  to  induce  that  numb  rigidity  into  our 
intellectual  life,  which,  pressing  obstinately  straight  onward  to  the  end  in 
view,  takes  no  heed  or  account  of  the  means  by  which,  in  different  sub- 
jects, it  must  be  differently  attained.”1 

The  second  authority  we  quote,  is  that  of  the  distinguished 
philosopher  who  has  long  so  beneficially  presided  over  the  Royal 
Institute  of  Studies  in  Munich — Von  Weiller : — 

“ Mathematics  and  Grammar  differ  essentially  from  each  other,  in  re- 
spect to  their  efficiency,  as  general  means  of  intellectual  cultivation.2 
The  former  have  to  do  only  with  the  intuitions  of  space  and  time,  and  are, 
therefore,  even  in  their  foundation,  limited  to  a special  department  of  our 
being;  whereas  the  latter,  occupied  with  the  primary  notions  of  our  in- 
tellectual life  in  general,  is  co-extensive  with  its  universal  empire.  On 
this  account,  the  grammatical  exercise  of  mind  must,  if  beneficially  applied 
precede  the  mathematical.  And  thus  are  we  to  explain  why  the  efficiency 
of  the  latter  does  not  stretch  so  widely  over  our  intellectual  territory  ; why 
it  never  develops  the  mind  on  so  many  sides ; and  why,  also,  it  never 
penetrates  so  profoundly.  By  mathematics,  the  powers  of  thought  are 
less  stirred  up  in  their  inner  essence,  than  drilled  to  outward  order  and 
severity ; and,  consequently,  manifest  their  education  more  by  a certain 
formal  precision,  than  through  their  fertility  and  depth.  This  truth  is 
even  signally  confirmed  by  the  experience  of  our  own  institution.  The 
best  of  our  former  Real  scholars,  when  brought  into  collation  with  the 
Latin  scholars  could,  in  general,  hardly  compete  with  the  most  middling 
of  these — not  merely  in  matters  of  language,  but  in  every  thing  which 
demanded  a more  developed  faculty  of  thought.”3 

The  third  witness  whom  we  call,  is  one,  be  it  remarked,  with 


1 Ansichten,  SfC.,  i.  e.  Thoughts  on  the  Organization  of  Learned  Schools,  by  A.  F. 
Bernhardi,  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  Director  and  Professor  of  the  Frederician  Gymna- 
sium, in  Berlin,  and  Member  of  the  Consistorial  Council,  1818. 

2 Vide  Morgensterni  Orat.  De  Litteris  Humaniorihus,  p.  11. 

3 From  a Dissertation  accompanying  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Royal  Institute  of 
Studies,  in  Munich,  for  the  year  1822,  by  its  Director,  Cajetan  von  Weiller,  Privy 
Counselor,  Perpetual  Secretary  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Sciences,  &c.  This  testi- 
mony is  worthy  of  attention,  not  merely  on  account  of  the  high  talent,  knowledge,  and 
experience  of  the  witness,  but  because  it  hints  at  the  result  of  a disastrous  experiment 
made  by  authority  of  Government  throughout  the  schools  of  an  extensive  kingdom ; — 
an  experiment  of  which  certain  empirics  would  recommend  a repetition  among  our- 
selves. But  the  experiment,  which  in  schools  organized  and  controlled  like  those  of 
Bavaria,  could  be  at  once  arrested  when  its  evil  tendency  was  sufficiently  apparent, 
would,  in  schools  circumstanced  like  ours,  end  only,  either  in  their  ruin,  or  in  their 
conversion  from  inadequate  instruments  of  a higher  cultivation  to  effective  engines  of 
a disguised  barbarism.  We  may  endeavor,  erelong,  to  prevent  the  experience  of  other 
nations  from  being  altogether  unprofitable  to  ourselves. 

“ Felix  quern  faciunt  aliena  pericula  cautum .” 


270 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


a stronger  bias  to  realism , in  the  higher  instruction,  than  is  of 
late,  after  the  experience  of  the  past,  easily  to  be  found  in  Gfer- 
many.  Professor  Klumpp  observes  : 

“We  shall  first  of  all  admit,  that  mathematics  only  cultivate  the  mind 
on  a single  phasis.  Their  object  is  merely  form  and  quantity.  They 
thus  remain,  as  it  were,  only  on  the  surface  of  things  without  reaching 
their  essential  qualities,  or  their  internal  and  far  more  important  relations 
— to  the  feelings,  namely,  and  the  will — and  consequently  without  determ- 
ining the  higher^. faculties  to  activity.  So,  likewise,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  memory  and  imagination  remain  in  a great  measure  unemployed ; 
so  that,  strictly  speaking,  the  understanding  alone  remains  to  them,  and 
even  this  is  cultivated  and  pointed  only  in  one  special  direction.  To  a 
many-sided  culture — to  an  all-sided  harmonious  excitation  and  develop- 
ment of  the  many  various  powers,  they  can  make  no  pretension.  This, 
too,  is  strongly  confirmed  by  experience,  inasmuch  as  many  mere  mathe- 
maticians, however  learned  and  estimable  they  may  be,  are  still  notorious 
for  a certain  one-sidedness  of  mind,  and  for  a want  of  practical  tact.  If, 
therefore,  mathematical  instruction  is  to  operate  beneficially  as  a mean 
of  mental  cultivation,  the  chasms  which  it  leaves  must  be  filled  up  by 
other  objects  of  study,  and  that  harmonious  evolution  of  the  faculties  pro- 
cured, which  our  learned  schools  are  bound  to  propose  as  their  necessary 
end.”1 

To  the  same  general  fact,  we  shall  add  the  testimony  of  one  of 
the  shrewdest  of  human  observers,  we  mean  Goethe , who  in  a 
letter  to  Zelter  thus  speaks : 

“ This  also  shows  me  more  and  more  distinctly,  what  I have  long  in 
secret  been  aware  of,  that  the  cultivation  afforded  by  the  Mathematics  is, 
in  the  highest  degree,  one-sided  and  contracted.  Nay,  Voltaire  does  not 
hesitate  somewhere  to  affirm,  “j’ai  toujours  remarque  que  la  geometrie 
laisse  V esprit  ou  elle  le  trouve .'  Franklin,  also,  has  clearly  and  explicitly 
enounced  his  particular  aversion  for  mathematicians ; as  he  found  them, 
in  the  intercourse  of  society,  insupportable  from  their  trifling  and  captmis 
spirit''2 

Even  D’Alembert,  the  mathematician,  and  professed  encomiast 
of  the  mathematics,  can  not  deny  the  charge  that  they  freeze  and 
parch  the  mind  : but  he  endeavors  to  evade  it. 

“ Wc  shall  content  ourselves  with  the  remark,  that  if  mathematics  (as 
is  asserted  with  sufficient  reason)  only  make  straight  the  minds  ivhich 


1 Die  Gelchrten  Schulcn,  tfc.,  i.  e.  Learned,  Schools,  according  to  the  principles  of  a 
genuine  humanism,  and  the  demands  of  the  age.  By  F.  W.  Klumpp,  Professor  in  the 
Royal  Gymnasium  of  Stuttgart.  1829,  vol.  ii.  p.  41.  An  interesting  account  of  the 
seminary  established  on  Klumpp’s  principles,  by  the  King  of  Wirtemberg,  at  his 
pleasure  palace  of  Stetten,  in  1831,  is  to  be  found  in  the  Conversations  Lexicon  fur 
neueslen  Zeit,  i.  p.  727. 

■ Briefwechscl  zwischen  Godlie  und  Zelter,  1833,  i.  p.  430. 


MATHEMATICAL  NOT  AN  IMPROVING  STUDY. 


271 


are  without  a bias,  so  they  only  dry  up  and  chill  the  minds  already  pre- 
pared for  this  operation  by  nature.”1 

Yet  what  a confession ! The  Cambridge  catholicon  is  thus  a 
dose  which  never  bestows  health,  hut  tends  always  to  evolve  the 
seeds  of  disease. 

Nay,  Descartes,  the  greatest  mathematician  of  his  age,  and  in 
spite  of  his  mathematics,  also  its  greatest  philosopher,  was  con- 
vinced from  his  own  consciousness,  that  these  sciences,  however 
valuable  as  an  instrument  of  external  science,  are  absolutely  per- 
nicious as  a mean  of  internal  culture.  Baillet,  his  biographer, 
frequently  commemorates  this ; and  first  under  the  year  1623, 
the  28th  of  the  philosopher,  he  records  of  Descartes,  that : 

“ It  was  now  a long  time,  since  he  had  been  convinced  of  the  small 
utility  of  the  Mathematics,  especially  when  studied  on  their  own  ac- 
count, and  not  applied  to  other  things.  There  was  nothing,  in  truth, 
which  appeared  to  him  more  futile  than  to  occupy  ourselves  with  simple 
numbers  and  imaginary  figures,  as  if  it  were  proper  to  confine  ourselves  to 
these  trifles  (bagatelles)  without  carrying  our  view  beyond.  There  even 
seemed  to  him  in  this  something  worse  than  useless.  His  maxim  was, 
that  such  application  insensibly  disaccustomed  zis  to  the  use  of  our  rea- 
son, and  made  us  run  the  danger  of  losing  the  path  which  it  traces.” 
( Cartesii  Regulae  ad  Directionem  Ingenii,  Reg.  iv.  MSS). — [The  words 
themselves  of  Descartes  deserve  quotation:  “ Hevera  nihil  inanius  est, 
quam  circa  nudos  numeros  figurasque  imaginarias  ita  versari,  ut  velle 
videamur  in  talium  nugarum  cognitione  conquiescere,  atque  superficiariis 
istis  demonstrationibus,  quse  casu  saepius  quam  arte  inveniuntur,  et  magis 
ad  oculos  et  imaginationem  pertinent,  quam  ad  intellectum,  sic  incubare, 
ut  quodammodo  ipsa  ratione  uti  desuescamus;  simulque  nihil  intricatius, 
quam  tali  probandi  modo,  novas  difficultates  confusis  numeris  involutas, 
expedire.  Q,uum  vero  postea  cogitarem,  unde  ergo  fieret,  ut  primi  olim 
Philosophiae  inventores,  neminem  Matheseos  imperitum  ad  studium  sapi- 
entiae  vellent  admittere,  [a  fable,  the  oldest  recorder  of  which  flourished 
some  sixteen  centuries  subsequent  to  Plato,]  tanquam  haec  disciplina  om- 
nium facillima  et  maxime  necessaria  videatur,  ad  ingenia  capessendis  aliis 
majoribus  scientiis  erudienda  et  prseparanda;  plane  suspicatus  sum,  quam- 
clam  eos  Matliesim  agnovisse,  valde  diversam  a vulgari  nostrae  actatis.”] 
— Baillet  goes  on  : “ In  a letter  to  Mersenne,  written  in  1630,  M.  Des- 
cartes recalled  to  him  that  he  had  renounced  the  study  of  mathematics 
for  many  years  ; and  that  he  was  anxious  not  to  lose  any  more  of  his 
time  in  the  barren  operations  of  geometry  and  arithmetic,  studies  vvhich 
never  lead  to  any  thing  important .” — Finally,  speaking  of  the  general 
character  of  the  philosopher,  Baillet  adds  : “ In  regard  to  the  rest  of  ma- 
thematics” (he  had  just  spoken  of  astronomy,  which  Descartes  thought, 
“ though  he  dreamt  in  it  himself,  only  a loss  of  time”) — “ in  regard  to 
the  rest  of  mathematics,  those  who  know  the  rank  which  he  held  above 
all  mathematicians,  ancient  and  modern,  will  agree  that  he  was  the  man 
in  the  world  best  qualified  to  judge  them.  We  have  observed  that,  after 


1 Melanges,  t.  iv.  p.  184,  ed.  1763.  [Compare  also  Esprit  de  VEncycl.  II.  p.  349.] 


272 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


having  studied  these  sciences  to  the  bottom,  he  lmd  a renounced  them  as  of 
no  use  for  the  conduct  of  life  and  solace  of  mankind.”  ‘ 

We  shall  refer  to  Descartes  again. 

How  opposite  are  the  habitudes  of  mind  which  the  study  of 
the  Mathematical  and  the  study  of  the  Philosophical  sciences1 2 
require  and  cultivate,  has  attracted  the  attention  of  observers 
from  the  most  ancient  times.  The  principle  of  this  contrast  lies 
in  their  different  objects , in  their  different  ends,  and  in  the  differ- 
ent modes  of  considering'  their  objects  ; — differences  in  the  sciences 
themselves,  which  calling  forth,  in  their  cultivators,  different 
faculties,  or  the  same  faculty  in  different  ways  and  degrees,  de- 
termine developments  of  thought  so  dissimilar,  that  in  the  same 
individual  a capacity  for  the  one  class  of  sciences  has,  not  with- 
out reason,  been  considered  as  detracting  from  his  qualification 
for  the  other. 

As  to  their  objects. — In  the  first  place  : — The  Mathematical 
sciences  are  limited  to  the  relations  of  quantity  alone,  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  to  the  one  relation  of  quantities — equality  and 
inequality;  the  Philosophical  sciences,  on  the  contrary,  are 
astricted  to  none  of  the  categories,  are  coextensive  with  existence 
and  its  modes,  and  circumscribed  only  by  the  capacity  of  the 
human  intellect  itself. — In  the  second  place  : — Mathematics  take 
no  account  of  things,  but  are  conversant  solely  about  certain 
images  ; and  their  whole  science  is  contained  in  the  separation, 
conjunction,  and  comparison  of  these.  Philosophy,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  mainly  occupied  with  realities ; it  is  the  science  of  a 
real  existence,  not  merely  of  an  imagined  existence. 


1 La  Vie  de  Descartes,  P.  i.  pp.  Ill,  112,  225.  P.  ii.  p.  481. — [The  Regulte  of 
Descartes,  extracted  also  in  the  Port  Royal  Logic,  were  published  in  full,  at  Amster- 
dam, in  1701.  They  are  found  in  the  third  volume  of  Garnier’s  edition  of  the 
“ CEuvres  Philosophiqucs  de  Descartes”  (that  is,  his  works  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
Mathematical  and  Physical  writings) ; and  were  translated  into  French  by  M.  Cousin, 
in  his  edition  of  the  whole  works  of  the  philosopher.] 

2 [Reminded  by  the  preceding  note — it  may  be  proper  here  to  remark  upon  the 
vague  universality  which  is  given  to  the  terms  philosophy  and  philosophical  in  common 
English  ; an  indefinitude  limited  specially  to  this  country.  Mathematics  and  Physics 
may  here  be  called  philosophical  sciences ; whereas,  on  the  Continent,  they  are 
excluded  from  philosophy,  philosophical  being  there  applied  emphatically  to  those 
sciences  which  are  immediately  or  mediately  mental.  Hegel,  in  one  of  his  works, 
mentions  that  in  looking  over  what  in  England  are  published  under  the  title  of  “Phi- 
losophical Transactions,”  he  had  been  unable  to  find  any  philosophy  at  all.  This 
abusive  employment  of  the  words  is  favored,  I believe,  principally  at  Cambridge ; for 
if  Mathematics  and  Physics  are  not  philosophical,  then  that  university  must  confess 
that  it  now  encourages  no  philosophy  whatever.  The  history  of  this  insular  peculi- 
arity might  easily  be  traced.] 


REASONS  WHY  MATHEMATICAL  STUDY  UNIMPROVING.  273 


As  to  their  ends , and  their  procedure  to  these  ends. — Truth  or 
knowledge  is,  indeed,  the  scope  of  both ; hut  the  kind  of  knowl- 
edge proposed  by  the  one  is  very  different  from  that  proposed  by 
the  other. — In  Mathematics,  the  whole  principles  are  given  ; in 
Philosophy,  the  greater  number  are  to  be  sought  out  and  estab- 
lished.— In  Mathematics,  the  given  principles  are  both  material 
and  formal , that  is,  they  afford  at  once  the  conditions  of  the  con- 
struction of  the  science,  and  of  our  knowledge  of  that  construction 
(principia  essendi  et  cognoscendi).  In  Philosophy,  the  given 
principles  are  only  formal — only  the  logical  conditions  of  the 
abstract  possibility  of  knowledge. — In  Mathematics,  the  whole 
science  is  virtually  contained  in  its  data;  it  is  only  the  evolution 
of  a potential  knowledge  into  an  actual,  and  its  procedure  is  thus 
merely  explicative.  In  Philosophy,  the  science  is  not  contained 
in  data;  its  principles  are  merely  the  rules  for  our  conduct  in 
the  quest,  in  the  proof,  in  the  arrangement  of  knowledge  : it  is  a 
transition  from  absolute  ignorance  to  science,  and  its  procedure 
is  therefore  ampliative.  In  Mathematics  we  always  depart  from 
the  definition  ; in  Philosophy,  with  the  definition  we  usually  end. 
— Mathematics  know  nothing  of  causes ; the  research  of  causes 
is  Philosophy ; the  former  display  only  the  that  (to  otl)  ; the  lat- 
ter mainly  investigates  the  why  (to  Sioti).1 — The  truth  of  Mathe- 
matics is  the  harmony  of  thought  and  thought;  the  truth  of 
Philosophy  is  the  harmony  of  thought  and  existence. — Hence  the 
absurdity  of  all  applications  of  the  mathematical  method  to  phi- 
losophy. 

1 [By  cause,  &c.,  with  modern  philosophers,  I mean  efficient  cause,  and  should  have 
stated  this  articulately,  had  the  possibility  of  ambiguity  ever  been  suggested.  When 
I therefore  said  that  Philosophy  and  Mathematics  are  distinguished,  in  that  the  former 
is,  and  the  latter  is  not,  a research  of  causes,  I,  of  course,  meant  and  mean  efficient 
causes.  A very  acute  philosophical  mathematician,  Professor  Boole,  in  his  “ Mathe- 
matical Analysis  of  Logic"  (pp.  11,  sq.,  81,  sq.),  makes  me  in  this  contradict  Aristo- 
tle ; and  he  is  literally  correct  in  his  quotation  from  the  Posterior  Analytics,  where 
Aristotle  does  declare,  that  the  geometer  investigates  the  dtdrt.  Mr.  Boole  has  not, 
however,  recollected,  that  Aristotle  had  four  causes  ; and  as  Mathematics  are  confess- 
edly occupied  with  the  formal,  the  philosopher,  not  only  in  the  place  adduced,  but  in 
sundry  others,  therefore  states,  that  the  mathematician  is  conversant  about  the  why. 
But  even  Aristotle  was  fully  aware,  that  the  term  cause  or  principle  properly  and  em- 
phatically pertains  only  to  the  efficient;  and  accordingly  in  his  Eudemian  Ethics  (ii.  6), 
he  states  this,  adding,  as  an  example,  that  what  in  mathematics  are  called,  principles, 
are  so  styled,  not  in  propriety,  but  only  by  analogy  or  resemblance.  He  indeed  express- 
ly denies  to  them  the  efficient,  &c.  (Metaph.  iii.  2,  alibi.) 

Mr.  Boole,  likewise,  has  not  observed,  that  it  is  not  Abstract,  Pure  or  Theoretical 
Logic  which  I oppose  to  Mathematics,  but  that  I oppose  to  each  other  two  Concrete , 
Applied  or  Practical  Logics  ; to  wit,  that  of  necessary  matter  = mathematics,  and  that 
of  contingent  matter  = philosophy  and  common  reasoning.  See  p.  262.] 

S 


274 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


It  is,  however,  proximately  in  the  different  modes  of  consider- 
ing their  objects  that  Mathematics  and  Philosophy  so  differently 
cultivate  the  mind. 

In  the  first  place : — Without  entering  on  the  metaphysical 
nature  of  Space  and  Time,  as  the  basis  of  concrete  and  discrete 
quantities,  of  geometry  and  arithmetic,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
Space  and  Time,  as  the  necessary  conditions  of  thought,  are, 
severally,  to  us  absolutely  one  ; and  each  of  their  modifications, 
though  apprehended  as  singular  in  the  act  of  consciousness,  is,  at 
the  same  time,  recognized  as  virtually,  and  in  effect,  universal. 
Mathematical  science,  therefore,  whose  notions  (as  number,  figure, 
motion)  are  exclusively  modifications  of  these  fundamental  forms, 
separately  or  in  combination,  does  not  establish  their  universality 
on  any  a posteriori  process  of  abstraction  and  generalization  ; but 
at  once  contemplates  the  general  in  the  individual.  The  univer- 
sal notions  of  philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  are,  with  a few  great 
exceptions,  generalizations  from  experience ; and  as  the  universal 
constitutes  the  rule  under  which  the  philosopher  thinks  the 
individual,  philosophy  consequently,  the  reverse  of  mathematics, 
views  the  individual  in  the  general. 

In  the  second  place : — In  Mathematics,  quantity,  when  not 
divorced  from  form,  is  itself  really  presented  to  the  intellect  in  a 
lucid  image  of  phantasy,  or  in  a sensible  diagram ; and  the  quan- 
tities which  can  not  thus  be  distinctly  construed  to  imagination 
and  sense,  are,  as  only  syntheses  of  unity,  repetitions  of  identity, 
adequately,  though  conventionally,  denoted  in  the  vicarious  com- 
bination of  a few  simple  symbols.  Thus  both  in  geometry,  by 
an  ostensive  construction,  and  in  arithmetic  and  algebra,  by  a 
symbolical,  the  intellect  is  relieved  of  all  effort  in  the  support  and 
presentation  of  its  objects  ; and  is  therefore  left  to  operate  upon 
these  in  all  the  ease  and  security  with  which  it  considers  the  con- 
crete realities  of  nature.  Philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  is  princi- 
pally occupied  with  those  general  notions  which  are  thought  by 
the  intellect  but  are  not  to  be  pictured  in  the  imagination  ; and 
yet,  though  thus  destitute  of  the  light  and  definitude  of  mathemat- 
ical representations,  philosophy  is  allowed  no  adequate  language 
of  its  own ; and  the  common  language,  in  its  vagueness  and  in- 
sufficiency, does  not  afford  to  its  unimaginable  abstractions  that 
guarantee  and  support,  which,  though  less  wanted,  is  fully  ob- 
tained by  its  rival  science,  in  the  absolute  equivalence  of  mathe- 
matical thought  and  mathematical  expression. 


REASONS  WHY  MATHEMATICAL  STUDY  UNIMPROVING.  275 

In  the  third  place: — Mathematics,  departing  from  certain 
original  hypotheses,  and  these  hypotheses  exclusively  determin- 
ing every  movement  of  their  procedure,  and  the  images  or  the 
vicarious  symbols  about  which  they  are  conversant  being  clear 
and  simple,  the  deductions  of  the  sciences  are  apodictic  or  demon- 
strative ; that  is,  the  possibility  of  the  contrary  is,  at  every  step, 
seen  to  he  excluded  in  the  very  comprehension  of  the  terms.  On 
the  other  hand,  in  Philosophy  (with  the  exception  of  the  Theory 
of  Logic),  and  in  our  reasonings  in  general,  such  demonstrative 
certainty  is  rarely  to  be  attained ; probable  certainty,  that  is, 
where  we  are  never  conscious  of  the  impossibility  of  the  contrary, 
is  all  that  can  be  compassed ; and  this  also,  not  being  internally 
evolved  from  any  fundamental  data.,  must  be  sought  for,  collected, 
and  applied  from  without. 

From  this  general  contrast  it  will  easily  he  seen,  how  an  ex- 
cessive study  of  the  mathematical  sciences  not  only  does  not 
prepare,  hut  absolutely  incapacitates  the  mind , for  those  intel- 
lectual energies  which  philosophy  and  life  require.  We  are 
thus  disqualified  for  observation , either  internal  or  external — for 
abstraction  and  generalization — and  for  common  reasoning  ; nay 
disposed  to  the  alternative  of  blind  credulity  or  of  irrational 
skepticism. 

That  mathematics,  in  which  the  objects  are  purely  ideal,  in 
which  the  principles  are  given,  in  which,  from  these  principles, 
the  whole  science  is  independently  developed,  and  in  which  de- 
velopment the  student  is,  as  Aristotle  expresses  it,  not  an  actor , 
but  a mere  spectator ; — that  mathematics  can  possibly  in  their 
study  educate  to  any  active  exercise  of  the  powers  of  observation 
either  as  reflected  upon  ourselves,  or  as  directed  on  the  affairs  of 
life  and  the  phenomena  of  nature,  will  not,  we  presume,  be  main- 
tained. But  of  this  again. 

That  they  do  not  cultivate  the  power  of  generalization  is 
equally  apparent.  The  ostensive  figures  of  Geometry  are  no 
abstractions — but  concrete  forms  of  imagination  or  sense ; and 
the  highest  praise,  accorded  by  the  most  philosophical  mathe- 
maticians, to  the  symbolical  notation  of  arithmetic  and  algebra, 
is,  that  it  has  relieved  the  mind  of  all  intellectual  effort,  by 
substituting  a sign  for  a notion,  and  a mechanical  for  a men- 
tal process.  In  mathematics,  genus  and  species  are  hardly 
known. 

Geometry,  indeed,  has  been  justly  considered  as  cultivating 


276 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


rather  the  lowest  degree  of  the  imagination 1 than  any  higher 
power  of  the  understanding. — “ The  geometer,'"1  says  ( Pliiloponus 
or  rather  Ammonius ) “ considers  the  divisible  forms  in  the  imag- 
ination ; for  he  uses  his  imagination  as  his  board.""1  “ Those 
rejoice"  (says  Albertus  Magnus ),  “ in  the  mathematical  sciences 
ichose  organ  of  imagination  for  receiving  figures  is  temperately 
dry  and  warm'" — “Among  philosophers”  (says  Fracastorius,  the 
mathematician,  the  philosopher,  the  poet),  “ some  delight  to  in- 
vestigate the  causes  and  substances  of  things,  and  these  are  the 
Philosophers,  properly  so  called.  Others  again,  inquiring  into  the 
relations  of  certain  accidents,  are  chiefly  occupied  about  these, 
such  as  numbers  and  figures , and,  in  general,  quantities.  These 
latter  are  principally  potent  in  the  faculty  of  imagination , and  in 
that  part  of  the  brain  which  lies  toward  its  centre  ; this,  therefore, 
they  have  hot,  and  capacious,  and  excellently  conservative.  Hence, 
they  imagine  well  how  things  stand  in  their  wholes  and  in  rela- 
tion to  each  other.  But  we  have  said,  that  every  one  finds 
pleasure  in  those  functions  which  he  is  capable  of  performing- 
well.  Wherefore , these  principally  delight  in  that  knoivledge 

which  is  situate  in  the  imagination,  and  they  are  denominated 
Mathematicians."1 5  Though  no  believers  in  Gall,  there  can,  how- 
ever, we  think,  he  no  doubt,  that  in  the  same  individual  there  are 
very  different  degrees  of  imagination  for  different  objects  ; and  of 
these  one  of  the  most  remarkable  is,  the  peculiar  capacity  possess- 
ed by  certain  persons  of  presenting  and  retaining  quantities  and 
numbers — the  condition  of  a mathematical  genius. — “ The  study 
of  mathematics"  (says  Descartes,  and  he  frequently  repeats  the 
observation),  “ principally  exercises  the  imagination  in  the  con- 
sideration of  figures  and  motions.”6  Nay,  on  this  very  ground,  he 
explains  the  incapacity  of  mathematicians  for  philosophy.  “ That 
part  of  the  mind,”  says  he,  in  a letter  to  Father  Mersenne,  “to 

1 In  this  country,  the  term  Imagination  has  latterly  been  used  in  a more  contracted 
signification,  as  expressive  of  what  has  been  called  the  creative  or  productive  imagina- 
tion alone.  Mr.  Stewart  has  even  bestowed  on  the  reproductive  imagination  the  term 
Conception ; — happily,  we  do  not  think ; as  botli  in  grammatical  propriety,  and  by  the 
older  and  correcter  usage  of  philosophers,  this  term  (or  rather  the  product  of  this  opera- 
tion— Concept)  is  convertible  with  general  notion , or  more  correctly  notion,  simply,  and 
in  this  sense  is  admirably  rendered  by  the  Begriff  ( what  is  grasped  up)  of  the  Germans. 

2 In  Aristot.  de  Anima,  Sign.  B.  iv.  ed.  Trincavelli,  1535. — (Aristot.  1.  i.  text.  16). 
So  Themistius,  frequently. 

3 In  Metaph.  Aristot.  L.  1.  tract  i.  c.  5.  So  Averroes,  frequently. 

4 Dc  Intellectione,  L.  ii.  Opera,  f.  148,  ed.  3.  Venet.  1584. 

5 Lettres,  p.  i.  let.  xxx. 


MATHEMATICS  DO  NOT  CONDUCE  TO  GENERALIZATION.  277 

wit,  the  imagination , which  is  principally  conducive  to  a skill  in 
mathematics,  is  of  greater  detriment  than  service  for  metaphysical 
speculations /”  Sir  Kenelm  Digby  acutely  says: — “I  may  ob- 
serve, as  our  countryman  Roger  Bacon  did  long  ago,  that  those 
students,  who  husy  themselves  much  with  such  notions  as  reside 
wholly  in  the  Fantasie,  do  hardly  ever  become  idoneous  for  ab- 
stracted metaphysical  speculations  ; the  one  having  bulkie  foun- 
dation of  matter,  or  of  the  accidents  of  it,  to  settle  upon  (at  least 
with  one  foot);  the  other  flying  continually,  even  to  a lessening 
pitch,  in  the  subtile  air.  And,  accordingly,  it  hath  been  generally 
noted,  that  the  exactest  mathematicians , who  converse  altogether 
with  lines,  figures,  and  other  differences  of  quantity,  have  seldom 
proved  eminent  in  metaphysics  or  speculative  divinity  ; nor  again, 
the  professors  of  these  sciences,  in  the  other  arts.  Much  less  can 
it  be  expected  that  an  excellent  physician , whose  fancy  is  always 
fraught  with  the  material  drugs,  that  he  prescribeth  his  apothe- 
cary to  compound  his  medicines  of,  and  whose  hands  are  inured 
to  the  cutting  up,  and  eyes  to  the  inspection  of  anatomized  bodies, 
should  easily  and  with  success,  flic  his  thoughts  at  so  towering  a 
game , as  a pure  intellect,  a separated  and  unbodied  soul.m — The 
dependence  of  mathematics  on  the  lower  imagination  is  recognized 
in  like  manner,  in  the  Kantian  philosophy  and  its  modifications. 

But  the  study  of  mathematical  demonstration  is  mainly  recom- 
mended as  a practice  of  reasoning  in  general ; and  it  is  precisely, 
as  such  a practice,  that  its  inutility  is  perhaps  the  greatest. — 
General  reasoning  is  almost  exclusively  occupied  on  contingent 
matter ; if  mathematical  demonstration  therefore  supplies,  as  is 
contended,  the  best  exercise  of  practical  logic,  it  must  do  this  by 
best  enabling  us  to  counteract  the  besetting  tendencies  to  error, 
and  to  overcome  the  principal  obstacles  in  the  way  of  our  probable 
reasonings.  Now,  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  such  reasoning 
lie  wholly — 1)  in  its  form — 2)  in  its  vehicle — 3)  in  its  object-mat- 
ter. Of  thsse  severally. 

1.)  As  to  the  form: — The  study  of  mathematics  educates  to  no 
sagacity  in  detecting  and  avoiding  the  fallacies  ivliich  originate 
in  the  thought  itself  of  the  reasoner. — Demonstration  is  only  de- 
monstration, if  the  necessity  of  the  one  contrary  and  the  impos- 
sibility of  the  other  be,  from  the  nature  of  the  object-matter  itself, 


1 Epist.  p.  ii.  ep.  xxxiii. 

2 Observations  on  Sir  Thos.  Brown's  Rcligio  Medici , sub  initio. 


278 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


absolutely  clear  to  consciousness  at  every  step  of  its  deduction. 
Mathematical  reasoning,  therefore,  as  demonstrative,  allows  no 
room  for  any  sophistry  of  thought ; the  necessity  of  its  matter 
necessitates  the  correctness  of  its  form,  and,  consequently,  it  can 
not  forewarn  and  arm  the  student  against  this  formidable  princi- 
ple of  error.  Mr.  Whewell,  indeed,  says,  that — “ In  Mathematics 
the  student  is  rendered  familiar  with  the  most  perfect  examples 
of  strict  inference ; compelled  habitually  to  fix  his  attention  on 
those  conditions  on  which  the  cogency  of  the  demonstration  de- 
pends ; and  in  the  mistaken  and  imperfect  attempts  at  demon- 
stration made  by  himself  or  others,  he  is  presented  with  examples 
of  the  most  natural  fallacies,  which  he  sees  exposed  and  cor- 
rected.” (P.  5.)  We  must  be  pardoned  for  observing  that  we 
should  have  wished  the  connection  of  the  first  clauses  of  this  sen- 
tence and  the  last,  had  been  instructed  by  something  better  than 
an  “ and also  that  the  novel  assertions  in  this  last  itself  had 
been  explained  and  exemplified.  Were  the  truth  of  our  argu- 
ment not  sufficiently  manifest  of  itself,  we  might  appeal  to  the 
fact,  noticed  by  Aristotle  and  confirmed  by  all  subsequent  expe- 
rience, that  of  the  sciences,  mathematics  alone  have  continued  to 
advance  without  “ shadow  of  turning,”  and  even  (as  far  as  their 
proper  objects  are  concerned)  without  dispute.  Mathematics 
have  from  the  first  been  triumphant  over  the  husk ; Philosophy 
is  still  militant  for  the  kernel.  Logie,  therefore,  as  the  doctrine 
of  the  form  of  reasoning,  so  valuable  in  every  other  subject,  is 
practically  valueless  in  mathematics  ; and,  so  far  from  11  forming 
logical  habits  better  than  logic  itself f as  Mr.  Whewell  intrepidly 
asserts,  mathematics  can  not  in  this  relation  conduce  to  “ logical 
habits”  at  all.  The  art  of  reasoning  right  is  assuredly  not  to  be 
taught  by  a process  in  which  there  is  no  reasoning  wrong.  We 
do  not  learn  to  swim  in  water  by  previous  practice  in  a pool  of 
quicksilver.  Yet,  if  mathematics  are  to  be  recommended  as 
counteracting  our  natural  tendency  to  err,  why  not  also  propose 
the  mercury  as  counteracting  our  natural  tendency  to  sink  ? Mr. 
Coleridge  (himself  a Cantabrigian)  is  right,  when  he  says  : — “ It 
is  a great  mistake  to  suppose  geometry  any  substitute  for  logic.” 1 
Since  writing  the  above,  we  have  stumbled  on  the  following 
passage  of  Du  Hamel , not  only  a distinguished  philosopher  but 
a distinguished  mathematician : 


1 Table  Talk,  i,  10. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


279 


“ I do  not  find,  that  geometers  are  mighty  solicitous  whether  their  argu- 
ments he,  in  formula,  compounded  according  to  logical  prescription ; and 
yet  there  are  none  who  demonstrate  either  more  precisely  or  with  greater 
conviction.  For  they  usually  follow  the  guidance  of  nature  ; descending 
step  by  step,  from  the  simpler  and  more  general  to  the  more  complex,  and 
defining  every  term,  they  leave  no  ambiguity  in  their  language.  Hence 
it  is,  that  they  can  not  err  in  the  form  of  their  syllogisms ; for  we  seldom 
deviate  from  logical  rules,  except  when  we  abuse  the  ambiguity  of  words, 
or  attribute  a different  meaning  to  the  middle  term,  in  the  major  and  in 
the  minor  proposition. — It  is  also  the  custom  of  geometers  to  prefix  cer- 
tain self-evident  axioms  or  principles,  from  which  all  that  they  are  subse- 
quently to  demonstrate  flows.— Finally,  their  conclusions  are  deduced, 
either  from  definitions  which  can  not  be  called  in  question,  or  from  those 
principles  and  propositions  known  by  the  light  of  nature,  and  styled  axioms, 
or  from  other  already  established  conclusions,  which  now  obtain  the  co- 
gency of  principles.  They  make  no  troublesome  inquiry  into  the  mood  or 
figure  of  a syllogism,  nor  lavish  attention  on  the  rules  of  logic;  for  such 
attention,  by  averting  their  mind  from  more  necessary  objects,  would  be 
detrimental  rather  than  advantageous.”  1 

[Arnauld  has  likewise  some  observations  to  the  same  effect. — 
Huygens  and  Leibnitz,  indeed,  truly  observe,  that  mathematicians 
can,  and  sometimes  do,  err  in  point  of  form.  But  this  aberration 
is  rare  and  exceptional ; it  requires,  indeed,  a most  ingenious 
stupidity  to  go  wrong,  where  it  is  far  more  easy  to  keep  right. 
A mathematical  reasoning  may  certainly  transgress  in  form,  and 
a railway  locomotive  may  go  off  the  rails.  But  as  a railroad  con- 
ductor need  not  look  ahead  for  ditches  and  quagmires,  so  a ma- 
thematician, in  his  process,  is  not  compelled  to  be  on  guard  against 
the  fallacies  which  beset  the  route  of  the  ordinary  reasoner.] 

But  if  the  study  of  mathematics  do  not,  as  a logical  discipline, 
warn  the  reason  against  the  fallacies  of  thought,  does  it  not,  as 
an  invigorating  exercise  of  reason  itself,  fortify  that  faculty 
against  their  influence  ? To  this  it  is  equally  incompetent.  The 
principles  of  mathematics  are  self-evident ; and  every  transition, 
every  successive  step  in  their  evolution,  is  equally  self-evident. 
But  the  mere  act  of  intellect,  which  an  intuitive  proposition  de- 
termines, is  of  all  mental  energies  the  easiest — the  nearest,  in 
fact,  to  a negation  of  thought  altogether.  But  as  every  step  in 
mathematical  demonstration  is  intuitive,  every  step  in  mathe- 
matical demonstration  calls  forth  an  absolute  minimum  of  thought ; 


1 ( De  Mente  Humana , 1.  iii.  c.  1.  Opera,  t.  ii.  p.  351.)  See  also,  instar  omnium, 
Fonseca  (in.Metaph.  Aristot.  L.  ii.  c.  3,  q.  4,  sect.  3.)  Leibnitz  {Opera,  t.  ii.  p.  17) 
commemorates  the  notable  exploit  of  two  zealous,  but  thick-headed  logicians — Herlinus 
and  Dasypodius  by  name — who  actually  reduced  the  first  six  books  of  Euclid  into  for 
mal  syllogisms. 


280 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


and  as  a faculty,  is  always  evolved  in  proportion  to  its  competent 
degree  of  exercise,  consequently  mathematics,  in  determining 
reason  to  its  feeblest  energy , determines  reason  to  its  most  limited 
development. 

In  the  inertion  of  this  study,  the  mind,  in  fact,  seldom  rises  to 
the  full  consciousness  of  self-activity.  We  are  here  passively 
moved  on,  almost  as  much  as  we  spontaneously  move.  It  has 
been  well  expressed: — “ Mathematics  munus  pistrinarium  est ; 
ad  rnolarn  enim  alligati , vertimur  in  gyrwm  aeque  atque  vertimusP 
The  routine  of  demonstration,  in  the  gymnastic  of  mind,  may, 
indeed,  he  compared  to  the  routine  of  the  treadmill,  in  the  gym- 
nastic of  body.  Each  determines  a single  power  to  a low  hut 
continuous  action ; all,  not  disabled  in  the  ordinary  functions  of 
humanity,  are  qualified  to  take  a part  in  either ; hut  as  few  with- 
out compulsion  are  found  to  expatiate  on  the  one,  so  few  without 
impulsion  are  found  to  make  a progress  in  the  other.  Both  are 
conversant  about  the  necessary  ; both  depart  from  data;  of  both 
the  procedure  is  by  steps  ; and  in  both,  the  first  step  being  con- 
ceded, the  necessity  of  every  other  is  shown  on  evidence  equally 
intuitive.  The  one  is  ever  moving,  never  advancing ; the  other 
ever  varying  to  infinity  only  the  expression  of  the  same  identity. 
Both  are  abstract  occupations ; and  both  are  thought  to  disqualify 
for  the  world ; for  though  both  corrective  disciplines,  a prejudice 
prevails  toward  the  one,  against  the  moral  habits  of  its  votaries, 
toward  the  other,  against  their  moral  reasoning.  Among  many 
other  correspondences,  both,  in  fine,  cultivate  a single  intellectual 
virtue ; for  both  equally  educate  to  a mechanical  continuity  of 
attention ; as  in  each  the  scholar  is  disagreeably  thrown  out,  on 
the  slightest  wandering  of  thought. 

Nor  is  the  extreme  facility  of  mathematics  any  paradox.  “No 
one,  almost,”  says  Cicero , “ seems  to  have  intently  applied  him- 
self to  this  science,  who  did  not  attain  in  it  any  proficiency  he 
pleased  1 “ Mathematics  are  the  study  of  a sluggish  intellect ,” 
says  “the  Helvetian  Pliny 2 and  Warburton  calls  “the  routine 
of  demonstration  the  easiest  exercise  of  reason,  where  much  less 
of  the  vigor  than  of  the  attention  of  mind  is  required  to  excel.”3 
Among  the  Greeks  in  ancient,  as  in  the  school  of  Pestalozzi,  and 
others  in  recent  times,  mathematics  were  drawn  back  to  the  pri- 
mary elements  of  education.  Among  a hundred  others,  Aristotle 

1 Be  Oratore,  L.  i.  c.  3.  3 Zuingerus  in  Ethic.  Nicom.  L.  vi.  c.  9. 

3 Julian,  Pref.  Works,  iv.  p.  345. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


281 


observes  that  not  youths  only,  hut  mere  boys  easily  became 
mathematicians,  while  yet  incapable  of  practical  or  speculative 
philosophy.1 *  And  in  regard  to  boys,  it  is  acknowledged  by  Nie- 
meyer , one  of  the  highest  authorities,  in  education,  of  our  age, 
“to  be  a fact  notorious  in  all  schools,  that  the  minds  which  mani- 
fest a partiality  for  this  class  of  abstract  representations,  possess 
the  feeblest  judgment  in  reference  to  other  matters.”  ^ “The 
mathematical  genius”  (says  the  learned  Bishop  of  Avranches,  an 
admirer  of  mathematics,  and  himself  no  contemptible  geometer) 
“requires  much  phlegm,  moderation,  attention,  and  circumspec- 
tion. All,  therefore,  that  goes  to  the  formation  of  those  brilliant 
minds,  to  whom  has  been  conceded  by  privilege  the  title  of  beaux- 
esprits,  I mean  copiousness,  variety,  freedom,  readiness,  vivacity 
— all  this  is  directly  opposed  to  mathematical  operations,  which 
are  simple,  slow,  dry,  forced,  and  necessary.”3 — [Finally,  this 
extreme  facility  of  the  mathematical  processes,  is  not  only  prompt- 
ly admitted  by  mathematical  authors,  hut  founded  on  by  many 
of  them  as  a strong  recommendation  of  the  study.  Of  these  we 
need  only  mention,  among  many  others,  Descartes,  Wolf,  Daries , 
Golems , Horrebovius,  Weidler,  Lichtcnberg , &c.,  &c. ; hut  to 
these  it  is  unnecessary  to  give  articulate  references.] 

This  leads  us  to  observe,  that  to  minds  of  any  talent,  mathe- 
matics are  only  difficult  because  they  are  too  easy. — Pleasure  is 
the  concomitant  of  the  spontaneous  and  unimpeded  energy  of  a 
faculty  or  habit ; and  Pain  the  reflex,  either  of  the  compulsion  of 
a power  to  operation  beyond  its  due  limits,  whether  in  continu- 
ance or  degree,  or  of  the  compulsory  repression  of  its  spontaneous 
tendency  to  action.  A study,  therefore,  will  be  agreeable,  in  pro- 
portion as  it  affords  the  conditions  of  an  exercise,  spontaneous 
and  unimpeded,  to  a greater  number  of  more  energetic  faculties  ; 
and  irksome,  in  proportion  as  it  constrains  either  to  a too  intense 
or  too  protracted  activity,  or  to  no  activity  at  all.  It  is  by  reason 
of  this  principle  that  mathematics  are  found  more  peculiarly  in- 
tolerable, by  minds  endowed  with  the  most  varied  and  vigorous 
capacities  ; for  such  minds  are  precisely  those  which  the  study 
mulcts  of  the  most  numerous  and  vivid  pleasures,  and  punishes 
with  the  largest  proportion  of  intensest  pains.  It  can  not,  cer- 
tainly, he  said  that  the  cultivation  of  these  sciences  fatigues  a 


1 Eth.  Nic.  L.  vi.  c.  8. 

3 Ueber  Pestalozzi,  1810,  p.  51.  See  also  Klnmpp,  ut  supra,  vol.  ii.  p.  41. 

3 Huetiana,  ch.  123. 


282 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


single  faculty,  by  urging  it  to  an  activity  at  any  moment  too 
intense ; in  fact,  they  are  felt  as  irksome,  in  a great  measure, 
because  they  do  not  allow  even  the  one  power  which  they  partially 
occupy,  its  highest  healthy  exercise.  In  mathematics  we  attain 
our  end — “ non  vi  seel  saepe  cadendoP  But  the  continued  and 
monotonous  attention  they  necessitate  to  a long  concatenated 
deduction,  each  step  in  the  lucid  series  calling  forth,  on  the  same 
eternal  relation,  and  to  the  same  moderate  amount,  the  same 
simple  exertion  of  reason ; — this,  added  to  the  inertion  to  which 
they  condemn  all  the  nobler  and  more  pleasurable  energies  of 
thought,  is  what  renders  mathematics,  in  themselves  the  easiest 
of  all  rational  studies — the  most  arduous  for  those  very  minds  to 
which  studies,  in  themselves  most  arduous,  are  easiest. 

In  mathematics  dullness  is  thus  elevated  into  talent,  and  talent 
degraded  into  incapacity. — “ Those,”  says  the  Chian  Aristo , 
“who  occupy  themselves  with  Mathematics  to  the  neglect  of 
Philosophy,  are  like  the  wooers  of  Penelope,  who,  unable  to  attain 
the  mistress,  contented  themselves  with  the  maids.”  1 — Hippohi- 
cus,  a mathematical  genius,  and  general  blockhead,  of  whom  his 
pupil,  the  philosopher  Arcesilaus,  used  to  say,  “ that  his  science 
must  have  flown  into  his  mouth  when  yawning,”1  2 is  the  repre- 
sentative of  a numerous  class. — “ The  mathematician  is  either  a 
beggar,  a dunce,  or  a visionary,  or  the  three  in  ‘one,”  was  long 
an  adage  in  the  European  schools.3 — “ Lourd  comme  un  geo- 
metre”4 (dull  as  a mathematiqian)  has  also,  by  the  confession  of 
its  objects,  obtained  a proverbial  currency  in  the  most  mathemat- 
ical nation  of  Europe. — “ A dull  and  patient  intellect,”  says  Jo- 
seph Scaliger,  the  most  learned  of  men — “such  should  be  your 
geometers.  A great  genius  can  not  be  a great  mathematician” D 
— “We  see,”  says  Roger  Bacon , a geometer  above  his  age,  “that 
the  very  rudest  scholars  are  competent  to  mathematical  learning, 
although  unable  to  attain  to  any  knowledge  of  the  other  sciences.” 0 
— On  the  other  hand,  to  say  nothing  of  less  illustrious  examples, 
Bayle , the  impersonation  of  all  logical  subtilty,  is  reported  by  Le 
Clerc  “ to  have  confessed  that  he  could  never  understand  the 


1 Stobaei  Floril.,  Tit.  iv.  110. — We  accept,  but  do  not  pledge  ourselves  to  defend, 
the  interpretation  of  the  universal  Gesner. 

2 Laert.  L.  iv.  seg.  32. 

3 Alstcdii  Didactica,  c.  12  ; and  Muelleri  Parcemice  Academics,  p.  38. 

4 Encyclopedic,  t.  iv.  p.  627.  Art.  Geometre,  par  D'Alembert  (in  Esprit  dtc.I 
6 Scaligerana  Sccunda,  p.  270,  Ed.  Des  Maizeaux. 

0 Opus  Majus,  P.  iv.  c.  3. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


283 


demonstration  of  the  first  problem  of  Enclid:1  and  Wolf , “the 
philologer,”  the  mightiest  master  of  the  higher  criticism,  as  we 
are  informed  hy  his  biographer  and  son-in-law,  “ was  absolutely 
destitute  of  all  mathematical  capacity;”  nay,  “remained  firmly 
convinced”  (what,  as  gymnasiarch  and  professor,  he  had  the 
amplest  opportunities  of  verifying)  “that  the  more  capable  a 
mind  was  for  mathematics,  the  more  incapable  was  it  for  the 
other  noblest  sciences.”2 

We  are  far  from  meaning  hereby  to  disparage  the  mathemati- 
cal genius,  which  invents  new  methods  and  formulae,  or  new  and 
felicitous  applications  of  the  old  ; but  this  we  assert — that  the 
most  ordinary  intellect  may,  by  means  of  these  methods  and  for- 
mulae, once  invented,  reproduce  and  apply,  by  an  effort  nearly 
mechanical,  all  that  the  original  genius  discovered.  The  merit 
of  a mathematical  invention  is,  in  fact,  measured  by  the  amount 
of  thought  which  it  supersedes.  It  is  the  highest  compliment  to 
the  ingenuity  of  a Pascal,  a Leibnitz,  and  a Babbage,  in  their 
invention  of  the  arithmetical  machine,  that  there  would  not  be 
required,  in  those  who  use  it,  more  than  the  dexterity  of  a turn- 
spit. The  algebraic  analysis  is  not  an  instrument  so  perfect ; it 
still  requires  a modicum  of  mind  to  work  it. 

Unlike  their  divergent  studies,  the  inventive  talents  of  the 
mathematician  and  philosopher,  in  fact,  approximate.  To  meta- 
physical intellects,  like  those  of  Descartes  and  Leibnitz,  mathe- 
matical discovery  shows  almost  as  an  easy  game.  Both  were 
illustrious  inventors,  almost  as  soon  as  serious  students,  of  the 
science ; and  when  the  former,  at  the  age  of  forty-two,  published 
the  work  which,  embodying  his  boyish  discoveries,  determines 
the  grand  era  in  the  progress  of  the  modern  analytic,  he  had  for 
seventeen  years , as  he  expressly  tells  us,  completely  forgotten  even 
the  elementary  operations  of  arithmetic.  Yet  so  far  was  the 
puerile  play  of  the  philosopher,  in  advance  of  the  veteran  effort 
of  the  mathematician,  that  it  is  only  about  four  years,  since 
Fourier  practically  demonstrated  how  a great  principle  of  Des- 
cartes, previously  unappreciated,  affords  the  best  and  the  most 
rapid  method  for  the  analysis  of  numerical  equations. 

2.)  In  regard  to  the  vehicle  : — Mathematical  language,  precise 
and  adequate,  nay,  absolutely  convertible  ivith  mathematical 
thought,  can  afford  us  no  example  of  those  fallacies  which  so 

1 Bill.  Choisie,  t.  xii.  p.  223. 

2 Kortum,  Lebcn  Wolfs  des  Philologen,  1833.  Vol.  i.  p.  23. 


284 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS 


easily  arise  from  the  ambiguities  of  ordinary  language;  its 
study  can  not,  therefore,  it  is  evident,  supply  us  with  any  means 
of  obviating  those  illusions  from  which  it  is  itself  exempt.  The 
contrast  of  mathematics  and  philosophy,  in  this  respect,  is  an 
interesting  object  of  speculation  ; but,  as  imitation  is  impossible, 
one  of  no  practical  result. 

3.)  In  respect  of  the  matter : — Mathematics  afford  us  no  assist- 
ance, either  in  conquering  the  difficulties , or  in  avoiding  the  dan- 
gers which  ice  encounter  in  the  great  field  of  'probabilities  wherein 
we  live  and  move. 

As  to  the  difficulties : — Mathematical  demonstration  is  solely 
occupied  in  deducing  conclusions ; probable  reasoning,  princi- 
pally concerned  in  looking  out  for  premises. — All  mathematical 
reasoning  flows  from,  and — admitting  no  tributary  streams — can 
be  traced  back  to  its  original  source : principle  and  conclusion 
are  convertible.  The  most  eccentric  deduction  of  the  science  is 
only  the  last  ring  in  a long  chain  of  reasoning,  which  descends, 
with  adamantine  necessity,  link  by  link,  in  one  simple  series, 
from  its  original  dependence. — In  contingent  matter,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  reasoning  is  comparatively  short ; and  as  the  conclu- 
sion can  seldom  be  securely  established  on  a single  antecedent,  it 
is  necessary,  in  order  to  realize  the  adequate  amount  of  evidence, 
to  accumulate  probabilities  by  multiplying  the  media  of  inference ; 
and  thus  to  make  the  same  conclusion,  as  it  were,  the  apex  of 
many  convergent  arguments.  (Compare  Aristot.  Anal.  Post.  I. 
12,  § 13.)  In  general  reasoning,  therefore,  the  capacities  mainly 
requisite,  and  mainly  cultivated,  are  the  prompt  acuteness  which 
discovers  what  materials  are  wanted  for  our  premises,  and  the 
activity,  knowledge,  sagacity,  and  research  able  competently  to 
supply  them. — In  demonstration,  on  the  contrary,  the  one  capa- 
city cultivated  is  that  patient  habit  of  suspending  all  intrusive 
thought,  and  of  continuing  an  attention  to  the  unvaried  evolution 
of  that  perspicuous  evidence  which  it  passively  recognizes,  but 
does  not  actively  discover.  Of  Observation,  Experiment,  Induc- 
tion, Analogy,  the  mathematician  knows  nothing.  What  Mr. 
Whewell,  therefore,  alleges  in  praise  of  demonstration — “ that  the 
mixture  of  various  grounds  of  conviction , which  is  so  common 
in  other  men’s  minds,  is  rigorously  excluded  from  the  mathemat- 
ical student’s,”  is  precisely  what  mainly  contributes  to  render  it 
useless  as  an  exercise  of  reasoning.  In  the  practical  business  of 
life  the  geometer  is  proverbially  but  a child  : and  for  the  theory 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


285 


of  science  ? — the  subtlety  of  mind , the  multiformity  of  matter , 
lie  far  beyond  calculus  and  demonstration  ; mathematics  are  not 
the  net  in  which  Psyche  may  he  caught,  nor  the  chain  by  which 
Proteus  can  he  fettered. 

As  to  the  dangers : — How  important  soever  may  he  the  study 
of  general  logic,  in  providing  us  against  the  fallacies  which  origi- 
nate both  in  the  form  and  in  the  vehicle  of  reasoning,  the  error  of 
our  conclusions  is,  in  practice,  far  less  frequently  occasioned  hy 
any  vice  in  our  logical  inference  from  premises,  then  by  the  sin  of 
a rash  assumption  of  premises  materially  false.  Now  if  mathe- 
matics, as  is  maintained,  do  constitute  the  true  logical  catharticon, 
the  one  practical  propcedeutic  of  all  reasoning,  it  must  of  course 
enable  us  to  correct  this  the  most  dangerous  and  prevalent  of  our 
intellectual  failings.  But,  among  all  our  rational  pursuits,  mathe- 
matics stand  distinguished,  not  merely  as  affording  us  no  aid 
toward  alleviating  the  evil,  but  as  actually  inflaming  the  disease. 
The  mathematician,  as  already  noticed,  is  exclusively  engrossed 
with  the  deduction  of  inevitable  conclusions,  from  data  passively 
received  ; while  the  cultivators  of  the  other  departments  of  knowl- 
edge, mental  and  physical,  are  for  the  most  part,  actively  occupied 
in  the  quest  and  scrutiny,  in  the  collection  and  balancing  of  prob- 
abilities, in  order  to  obtain  and  purify  the  facts  on  which  their 
premises  are  to  be  established.  Their  pursuits,  accordingly,  from 
the  mingled  experience  of  failure  and  success,  have,  to  them, 
proved  a special  logic,  a practical  discipline — on  the  one  hand,  of 
skill  and  confidence,  on  the  other,  of  caution  and  sobriety:  his , 
on  the  contrary,  have  not  only  not  trained  him  to  that  acute  scent, 
to  that  delicate,  almost  instinctive,  tact  which,  in  the  twilight 
of  probability,  the  search  and  discrimination  of  its  finer  facts 
demand;  they  have  gone  to  cloud  his  vision,  to  indurate  his 
touch,  to  all  but  the  blazing  light  and  iron  chain  of  demonstra- 
tion, leaving  him,  out  of  the  narrow  confines  of  his  science,  either 
to  a passive  credulity  in  any  premises,  or  to  an  absolute  incre- 
dulity in  all. 

Before,  however,  proceeding  articulately  to  show  how,  in  differ- 
ent dispositions,  these  opposite  vices  are,  both,  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  the  same  common  cause,  we  may  first  evince  that  our 
doctrine  in  regard  to  the  general  tendency  of  mathematical  study 
is  the  universal  opinion  of  those  who,  from  their  knowledge  and 
their  powers  of  observation,  are  the  best  qualified  to  pronounce 
a judgment.  We  quote  the  authorities  that  chance  to  linger  in 


286 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


our  recollection  ; a slight  research  might  multiply  them  without 
end. 

On  such  a question,  we,  of  course,  prefer  the  testimony  of 
mathematicians  themselves  ; they  shall  constitute  our  first  class, 
and  under  this  head  we  include  those  only  who  have  distinguished 
themselves  by  mathematical  publications. 

Of  these,  the  oldest  we  shall  adduce  is  that  miracle  of  universal 
genius — Pascal : 

“There  is  a great  difference  between  the  spirit  of  Mathematics 1 and 
the  spirit  of  Observation .1 2  In  the  former,  the  principles  are  palpable, 
but  remote  from  common  use  ; so  that  from  want  of  custom  it  is  not  easy 
to  turn  our  head  in  that  direction ; but  if  it  be  thus  turned  ever  so  little, 
the  principles  are  seen  fully  confessed,  and  it  would  argue  a mind  incor- 
rigibly false,  to  reason  inconsequently  on  principles  so  obtrusive,  that  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  overlook  them.  But,  in  the  field  of  observation , the 
principles  are  in  common  use,  and  before  the  eyes  of  all.  We  need  not 
to  turn  our  head,  to  make  any  effort  whatsoever.  Nothing  is  wanted 
beyond  a good  sight : but  good  it  must  be  ; for  the  principles  are  so  minute 
and  numerous,  that  it  is  hardly  possible  but  some  of  them  should  escape. 
The  omission,  however,  of  a single  principle,  leads  to  error ; it  is,  there- 
fore, requisite  to  have  a sight  of  the  clearest,  to  discern  all  the  principles; 
and,  then,  a correct  intellect  to  avoid  false  reasonings  on  known  principles. 
All  mathematicians  would,  thus,  be  observant,  had  they  a good  sight ; for 
they  do  not  reason  falsely  on  the  principles  which  they  know ; and  minds 
of  observation  would  be  mathematical  could  they  turn  their  view  toward 
the  unfamiliar  principles  of  mathematics.  The  cause  why  certain  observ- 
ant minds  are  not  mathematical,  is,  because  they  are  wholly  unable  to 
turn  themselves  toward  the  principles  of  mathematics ; but  the  reason 
why  there  are  mathematicians  void  of  observation , is,  that  they  do  not 
see  what  lies  before  them  ; and  that  accustomed  to  the  clear  and  palpa- 
ble principles  of  mathematics,  and  only  to  reason  after  these  principles 
have  been  icell  seen  and  handled,  they  lose  themselves  in  matters  of  observ- 
ation, ivhere  the  principles  do  not  allow  of  being  thus  treated.  These 
objects  are  seen  with  difficulty  ; nay,  are  felt  rather  than  seen ; and  it  is 
with  infinite  pains  that  others  can  be  made  to  feel  them,  if  they  have  not 
already  felt  them  without  aid.  They  are  so  delicate  and  so  numerous, 
that  to  be  felt  they  require  a very  fine  and  a very  clear  sense.  They  can 
also  seldom  be  demonstrated  in  succession  as  is  done  in  mathematics ; for 
we  are  not  so  in  possession  of  their  principles,  while  the  very  attempt 
would,  of  itself,  be  endless.  The  object  must  be  discovered  at  once,  by  a 
single  glance,  and  not  by  course  of  reasoning — at  least  up  to  a certain 


1 In  the  original — V esprit  de  Geomctrie.  Geomctrie,  as  is  usual  in  French,  is  here 
employed  by  Pascal  for  mathematics  in  general. 

2 In  the  original — V esprit  de  Finesse.  It  is  impossible  to  render  this  quite  adequately 
in  English.  Fin  is  hero  used  for  acute,  subtile,  observant;  and  esprit  de  finesse  is 
nearly  convertible  with  spirit  of  acute  observation,  applied  especially  to  the  affairs  of 
the  world.  But  as  the  expressions  observant  and  spirit  of  observation  with  us  actually 
imply  the  adjective,  the  repetition  of  which  would  be  awkward,  we  have  accordingly 
translated  the  original  by  these  alone. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


287 


point.  Thus  it  is  rare , that  mathematicians  a, re  observant,  or  that  ob- 
servant minds  are  mathematical : because  mathematicians  would  treat 
matters  of  observation  by  rule  of  mathematic ; and  make  themselves 
ridiculous  by  attempting  to  commence  by  definitions  and  by  principles — 
a mode  of  procedure  incompatible  with  this  kind  of  reasoning.  It  is  not, 
that  the  mind  does  not  perform  the  process ; but  performs  it  silently, 
naturally,  and  artlessly  : for  its  expression  surpasses  all  men,  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  it  appertains  to  few.  On  the  other  hand,  minds  of  observa- 
tion, habituated  to  form  their  judgment  at  a single  glance,  are  so  amazed 
when  propositions  are  laid  before  them,  whereof  they  comprehend  nothing, 
and  wherein  to  enter,  it  behoves  them  to  pass  through  definitions  and  bar- 
ren principles,  which  they  are  also  unaccustomed  thus  to  consider  in 
detail — that  they  are  revolted  and  disgusted.  But  false  minds,  they  are 
never  either  observant  or  mathematical.  Mathematicians,  who  are  mere 
mathematicians,  have  thus  their  understanding  correct,  provided  always 
that  every  thing  be  well  explained  to  them  by  definition  and  principle  : 
otherwise  they  are  false  and  insupportable;  for  they  are  correct  only  upon 
notorimis  principles.  And  minds  of  observation,  if  only  observant,  are 
incapable  of  the  patience  to  descend  to  the  first  principles  of  matters  spec- 
ulative and  of  imagination,  of  which  they  have  had  no  experience  in  the 
usage  of  the  world.”1 

Berkeley  is  our  second  mathematician.  He  asks,  and  his 
queries  are  intended  to  he  answered  in  the  negative : 

“ Whether  tedious  calculations  in  algebra  and  fluxions  be  the  likeliest 
method  to  improve  the  mind  ? And  whether  men’s  being  accustomed  to 
reason  altogether  about  mathematical  signs  and  figures,  doth  not  make 
them  at  a loss  how  to  reason  without  them  ? Whether  whatever  readi- 
ness analysts  acquire  in  stating  a problem,  or  finding  apt  expressions  for 
mathematical  quantities,  the  same  doth  necessarily  infer  a proportionable 
ability  in  conceiving  and  expressing  other  matters  ?”2 

S’  Gravesande , our  third  mathematical  testimony,  after  praising 
geometry,  as  an  useful  exercise  of  intelligence,  inasmuch  as  its 
principles  are  simple,  its  conclusions  undoubted,  and  as  it  ascends 
from  the  easiest  and  simplest  to  the  more  difficult  and  more  com- 
plex ; and  the  method  of  analysis,  as  cultivating  the  invention, 
from  the  necessity  it  imposes  of  discovering  the  intermediate  terms 
requisite  for  bringing  given  extremes  into  comparison  (this  ad- 
vantage, be  it  noticed,  can  not  be  allowed  to  the  mere  study  of 
the  method),  proceeds : 

“ But  it  is  not  sufficient  to  have  applied  the  mind  to  one  science ; the 
more  ividely  different  among  themselves  are  the  ideas  which  the  intellect 
acquires,  and  concerning  which  it  reasons,  the  more  expanded  becomes  its 
intelligence.  In  the  mathematical  sciences,  by  a well  ordered  exercise, 
the  above-mentioned  faculties  are  improved.  But  there  is  required,  more- 
over, that  these  same  faculties  should  be  exercised  upon  ideas,  now  of  one 


1 Pcnsees,  I.  Partie,  art.  10,  sect.  2. 


2 Analyst,  Qu.  38,  39. 


288 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


kind,  now  of  another,  and  different  from  mathematical.  Those  who  are 
habituated  to  the  consideration  of  ideas  of  a single  class,  however  skillful 
they  may  be  in  the  handling  of  these,  reason  absurdly  upon  other  matters. 

A pliant  genius  ought  to  be  acquired ; and  this  is  only  to  be  compassed 
by  applying  the  mind  to  a plurality  of  studies,  ivliolly  different  from 
each  other.  . . . We  ought  to  be  peculiarly  attentive  to  this — that  the 
mind  be  inured  to  abstract  consideration.  Where  ideas  are  to  be  com- 
pared, things  are  never  more  clearly  illustrated  than  when  we  examine 
these  ideas  separately  from  all  others.  In  such  an  exercise  of  mind  the 
study  of  metaphysics  is  peculiarly  useful , provided  that  all  confused 
ideas  be  removed,  and  the  others  expounded  in  a natural  order.”1 

D'  Alembert  is  the  fourth  mathematical  authority. 

“ It  seems  as  if  great  mathematicians  ought  to  be  excellent  metaphysi- 
cians, at  least  upon  the  objects  about  which  their  science  proper  is  con- 
versant ; nevertheless,  this  is  very  far  from  being  always  the  case.  The 
logic  of  some  of  them  is  comprehended  in  their  formula?,  and  does  not  ex- 
tend beyond.  The  case  resembles  that  of  a man  who  has  the  sense  of 
sight  contrary  to  that  of  touch,  or  in  whom  the  latter  of  these  senses  is  only 
perfected  at  the  expense  of  the  former.  These  bad  metaphysicians  in  a 
science  in  which  it  is  so  easy  not  to  reason  wrong,  would  infallibly  be 
much  worse,  as  experience  proves,  on  matters  in  which  they  had  not  the 
calculus  for  a guide.'"* 

[Lichtenberg,  the  celebrated  Professor  of  Mathematics  and 
Physics  in  Goettingen,  hut  who  is  also  something  better,  being- 
one  of  the  wittiest  writers  and  most  philosophical  thinkers  of  his 
country,  is  our  fifth  mathematical  authority.  After  stating  that 
“ Mathematics  are  not  only  the  most  certain  of  all  human  sciences 
but  also  the  easiest,”  he  makes  the  following  observation : 

“ Mathematics  are  a noble  science,  but  as  for  the  mathematicians  they 
are  often  not  worth  the  hangman.  It  is  nearly  the  same  with  mathe- 
matics as  with  theology;  for,  as  those  who  apply  themselves  to  the  latter, 
especially  if  they  once  obtain  an  office,  forthwith  arrogate  to  themselves  : 
the  credit  of  peculiar  sanctity  and  a closer  alliance  with  God,  though  very 
many  among  them  are  in  reality  but  good-for-nothing  subjects ; in  like 
manner,  he  who  is  styled  a mathematician  Very  frequently  succeeds  in 
passing  for  a deep  thinker,  although  under  that  name  are  included  the  ! 
veriest  dunderheads  (die  groessten  Plunderkoepfe)  in  existence,  incapable  ; 
of  any  business  whatsoever  which  requires  reflection,  since  this  can  not  be 
immediately  performed  by  the  easy  process  of  connecting  symbols,  which 
is  more  the  product  of  routine  than  of  thought.”* 3] 

To  this  category  we  may  also  not  improperly  refer  Dugald 
Stewart , for  though  not  an  author  in  mathematical  science, 

1 Introductio  ad  Philosophiam,  <Sj -c.,  t)  887,  sq.  2 Elemens  de  Philosophie,  c.  15. 

3 [ Vermischde  Schriftcn,  II.,  p.  287,  1st  ed. — I had  resolved  to  add  no  new  authori- 
ties to  those  which  the  article  originally  contained  ; both  because,  in  fact,  these  were 
perhaps  superabundant,  and  because  there  need  be  no  end  to  additions,  if  any  be 
allowed.  But  this  and  those  of  Vives  had  been  intended  for  the  article  ; in  the  haste, 
however,  with  which  it  was  prepared,  they  were  overlooked,  until  too  late  for  insertion  ] 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


289 


he  was  in  early  life  a distinguished  professor  of  mathematics ; 
while  his  philosophical  writings  prove  that,  to  the  last,  he  had 
never  wholly  neglected  the  professional  studies  of  his  youth.  In 
other  respects,  it  is  needless  to  say  that  his  authority  is  of  the 
highest. 

“ How  accurate  soever  the  logical  process  maybe,  if  our  first  principles 
be  rashly  assumed,  or  if  our  terms  be  indefinite  and  ambiguous,  there  is  no 
absurdity  so  great  that  we  may  not  be  brought  to  adopt  it ; and  it  unfortu- 
nately happens  that,  while  mathematical  studies  exercise  the  faculty  of 
reasoning  or  deduction,  they  give  no  employment  to  the  other  powers  of  the 
understanding  concerned  in  the  investigation  of  truth.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  apt  to  produce  a facility  in  the  admission  of  data,  and  a circum- 
scription of  the  field  of  speculation  by  partial  and  arbitrary  definitions. 

. . . When  the  mathematician  reasons  upon  subjects  unconnected  with 
his  favorite  studies,  he  is  apt  to  assume , too  confidently  certain  intermedi- 
ate principles  as  the  foundation  of  his  arguments.  ...  I think  I have  ob- 
served a peculiar  proneness  in  mathematicians,  on  occasions  of  this  sort,  to 
avail  themselves  of  principles  sanctioned  by  some  imposing  names , and  to 
avoid' all  discussion  which  might  lead  to  an  examination  of  ultimate 
truths,  or  involve  a rigorous  analysis  of  their  ideas.”1 

And  much  more  to  the  same  effect,  which  we  do  not  quote,  as 
the  work  is,  or  ought  to  he,  in  the  hands  of  every  one  to  whom  a 
discussion  like  the  present  can  he  of  any  interest. 

The  other  authorities  we  shall  take  also  in  the  order  of  time. 

[The  testimonies  of  Ludovicus  Vives , are  valuable  alike  for  the 
high  authority  of  the  witness,  and  for  the  number  of  points  to 
which  his  evidence  applies.  He  says  : 

“ These  arts  [the  mathematical]  as  they  appertain  to  use,  so  if  use  be 
superseded,  are  elevated  to  matters  wholly  profitless,  affording  only  a sterile 
contemplation  and  inquiry  without  end,  in  as  much  as  step  determines  step 
to  an  infinite  series  : and  while  the  rudiments  of  these  disciplines,  and  a 
certain  legitimate  progress  in  their  study,  aids,  sharpens,  and  delights  the 
mind.;  so  their  intense  and  assiduous  exercise  constitutes  the  torture 
(carnificiiue)  of  noble  intellects,  of  those  born  for  the  benefit  of  man- 
kind. 

“ Minds  volatile  and  restless,  prone  to  self-indulgence,  and  incapable  of 
the  labor  of  an  unremitted  attention,  are  vehemently  abhorrent  from  these 
studies.  For  they  tie  down  the  intellect,  compel  it  to  do  this  or  that,  and 
permit  it  not  to  wander  to  any  other  object.  Persons  of  an  oblivious 
memory  are,  likewise,  disqualified  ; for  if  the  previous  steps  be  forgotten, 
not  a hundreth  of  the  others  can  be  retained — such,  in  these  sciences,  is 
the  series  and  continuous  concatenation  of  the  proofs.  And  for  this  reason, 
they  very  soon  slip  from  the  mind,  unless  beaten  in  by  frequent  exercise. 
Those  ill  adapted  for  the  other  and  more  agreeable,  are  frequently  the 
subjects  peculiarly  fitted  for  these  severe  and  repulsive  studies.  But  such 

1 Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  iii.  pp.  271,  288,  290. 

2 [Be  Causis  corruptarum  artium.  L.  v.  c.  De  Mathematicis.] 

T 


290 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


knowledge,  if  any  one  continue  to  indulge  himself  therein,  is  without  end  ; 
while  its  sedulous  pursuit  leads  away  from  the  business  of  life,  and  even 
deprives  its  votaries  of  common  sense."1 

After  Sir  Kcnelni  Dig-bp,  already  quoted  (p.  277),  and  to  whom 
we  here  again  refer,  the  next  is  that  of  Sorbiere,  Historiographer 
Royal  of  France,  who,  if  not  a mathematical  author  himself,  was 
the  intimate  friend  of  the  most  distinguished  mathematicians  of 
his  age — as  Gassendi  (of  whose  philosophy  he  was  acknowledged 
even  by  Bernier  to  he  the  most  accomplished  disciple),  Marsenne, 
Fermat,  Carcavi,  &c.  Speaking  of  Gassendi’s  disregard  of  the 
higher  geometry  and  algebra,  and  his  valuing  mathematics  in 
general,  only  as  the  instrument  of  more  important  sciences,  he 
says  : 

“ It  is  certain  that  the  abstrusest  Mathematics  do  not  much  con- 
duce, to  say  nothing  worse  of  them,  to  the  acquisition  of  right  reason- 
ing, and  the  illustration  of  natural  phenomena;  as  every  one  is  aware 
that  mathematicians,  distinguished  in  the  higher  branches  of  their  sci- 
ence, are  sometimes  none  of  the  most  clear-sighted  in  matters  beyond  its 
province.”2 

(And  in  another  work  :) — l:  It  is  an  observation  which  all  the  world  can 
verify,  that  there  is  nothing  so  deplorable  as  the  conduct  of  some  celebrated 
mathematicians  in  their  oivn  affairs,  nor  any  thing  so  absurd  as  their 
opinions  on  the  sciences  not  within  their  jurisdiction.  I have  seen  of 
them,  those  who  ruined  themselves  in  groundless  lawsuits;  who  dissipated 
their  whole  means  in  quest  of  the  philosopher’s  stone  ; who  built  extrava- 
gantly ; who  embarked  in  undertakings  of  which  every  one  foresaw  the  ill 
success ; who  quaked  for  terror  at  the  pettiest  accident  in  life ; who  formed 
only  chimeras  in  politics ; and  who  had  no  more  of  our  civilization  than 
if  born  among  the  Hurons  or  the  Iroquois.” — (After  a curious  example.) 

Hence,  sir,  you  may  form  some  judgment  of  how  far  algebra  conduces  to 
common  sense,  when  the  question  is  not  about  an  affair  of  figures,  and  if 
there  he  not  reason  to  believe  that  its  abstractions  are  themselves  of  a nox- 
ious influence  in  the  commerce  of  the  world.  They  are  too  minute  for  the 
ordinary  usage  of  civil  society ; and  it  is  requisite  to  incorporate  them  with 
something  less  spiritual,  in  order  that  the  thought  may  not  he  so  piercing, 
so  decisive,  and  so  difficult  to  control.”3 

Clarendon : 

“ The  Earl  of  Leicester  was  a man  of  great  parts,  very  conversant  in 
books,  and  much  addicted  to  the  mathematics  ; but  though  he  had  been 
a soldier,  and  commanded  a regiment  in  the  service  of  the  states  of  the 
United  Provinces,  and  was  employed  in  several  embassies,  as  in  Denmark 
and  France,  was,  in  truth,  rather  a speculative  than  a practical  man,  and 
expected  a greater  certitude  in  the  consultation  of  business,  than  the  busi- 
ness of  this  world  is  capable  of,  which  temper  proved  very  inconvenient  to 
him  through  the  course  of  his  life.”4 

1 \_De  trade.nd.is  discvplinis.  L.  iv. ] 3 Vita  Gassendi;  Praef.  Operwrn  Gassendi. 

3 Lctlres , let.  Ixviii.  4 History,  &c.  vol.  ii.  p,  153,  Ed.  1704. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


291 


Le  Clerc  : 

There  is  also  sometimes  to  be  considered  so  great  a number  of  Modes 
and  Relations,  and  these  so  minute,  that  they  can  not,  without  a far  greater 
expense  of  time  than  we  can  afford  them,  be  arranged  in  geometric  order. 
And  yet  to  form  a correct  judgment  in  regard  to  these,  is  a matter  of  much 
greater  importance  to  us  than  concerning  mathematical  problems.  Such 
are  the  various  affections  of  the  minds  of  men  and  of  the  affairs  of  life,  con- 
cerning which,  the  most  expert  geometers  do  not  judge  better  than  tlieir 
neighbors , nay , frequently  worse.  It  is  a question,  for  instance,  whether 
a certain  plan  or  undertaking  is  to  have  a prosperous  result.  In  that  un- 
dertaking there  are  a multitude  of  ideas  which  can  not  he  brought  to  an 
issue  unless  in  a great  variety  of  ways,  which  again  depend  on  innumera- 
ble circumstances.  Those  accustomed  to  mathematical  ideas , ivhich  are 
very  easily  observed,  and,  very  easily  discriminated  from  each  other,  when, 
by  the  rules  of  their  science  they  attempt  to  judge  of  the  administration 
of  public  or  private  affairs,  ar  rive  at  conclusions  the  most  absurd.  For 
they  take  into  account  only  the  abstract  possibilities,  omitting  in  their 
reasonings  certain  dispositions  of  things  and  persons,  which  by  their  mul- 
tiplicity and  minuteness,  almost  elude  the  acutest  observation.  It  also 
happens,  for  the  most  part,  that  they  who  judge  correctly  in  regard  to 
such  matters  are  wholly  wrong  in  regard  to  mathematical  questions,  if, 
indeed  they  did  not  eschew  them  as  difficult,  and  alien  from  their  habits.”1 

Buddeus : 

“ Such  is  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  that,  if  habituated  to  certain 
kinds  of  thought,  it  can  not  forthwith  divest  itself  thereof,  when  passing  to 
the  consideration  of  other  objects,  but  conjures  up  notions  concerning  these 
analogous  to  those  already  irradicated  in  it  by  custom.  This  is  the  real 
cause  of  errors  almost  infinite.  Thus  they,  who  inconsiderately  carry  over 
mathematical  notions  into  morals  and  theology,  seem  to  themselves  to  find 
in  these  new  sciences  the  same  necessary  connection  ivhich  they  discovered 
in  the  old.”2 

Barbeyrac,  speaking  of  the  notes  on  Grotius  De  Jure  Belli , 
&c.  by  Feldenus,  professor  of  mathematics  at  Helmstadt,  of  which 
Salmasius  “ had  promised  mountains  and  marvels,”  says  : 

“ Never  was  there  seen  aught  more  wretched ; and  we  might  be  sur- 
prised that  a mathematician  could  reason  so  ill,  had  we  not  other,  and 
far  more  illustrious  examples,  which  clearly  evince,  that  the  study  of  the 
mathematics  does  not  always  render  the  mind  more  correct  in  relation  to 
subjects  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  sciences.”3 

Warburton : 

“ It  may  seem,  perhaps,  too  much  a paradox  to  say,  that  long  habit  in 
this  science  ( mathematics ) incapacitates  the  mind  for  reasoning  at  large , 
and  especially  in  the  search  of  moral  truth.  And  yet,  I believe,  nothing 
is  more  certain.  The  object  of  geometry  is  demonstration,  and  its  subject 
admits  of  it,  and  is  almost  the  only  one  that  doth.  In  this  science,  what- 


1 Clerici  Logica,  Pars.  iii.  c.  3,  13,  14. 

2 Isagogc  Historico-Thcologica,  1.  i.,  c.  4. 

3 Preface  to  his  Grotius,  t.  i.  p.  ix.  Ed.  1724. 


292 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


ever  is  not  demonstration  is  nothing,  or,  at  least,  below  the  sublime  inquir- 
er’s regard.  Probability,  through  its  almost  infinite  degrees,  from  simple 
ignorance  up  to  absolute  certainty,  is  the  terra  incognita  of  the  geome- 
trician. And  yet  here  it  is,  that  the  great  business  of  the  human  mind  is 
carried  on — the  search  and  discovery  of  all  the  important  truths  which 
concern  us  as  reasonable  creatures.  And  here  too  it  is,  that  all  its  vigor 
is  exerted;  for  to  proportion  the  assent  to  the  probability  accompanying 
every  varying  degree  of  moral  evidence,  requires  the  most  enlarged  and 
sovereign  exercise  of  reason.  But  the  harder  the  use  of  any  thing,  the 
more  of  habit  is  required  to  make  us  perfect  in  it.  Is  it  then  likely  that 
the  geometer,  long  confined  to  the  routine  of  demonstration,  the  easiest  ex- 
ercise of  reason,  where  much  less  of  the  vigor  than  of  the  attention  of 
mind  is  required  to  excel,  should  form  a right  judgment  on  subjects  whose 
truth  or  falsehood  is  to  be  rated  by  the  probabilities  of  moral  evidence  ?”* 

Basedow : 

“ Mathematics  tolerate  no  reasoning  from  analogy.  Of  the  coacerva- 
tion  of  proofs  from  many  probable  grounds ; of  arguments  from  the  cer- 
tainty and  adaptation  of  thought;  of  the  collision  of  proofs ; of  useful  prob- 
abilities ; of  exceptions  from  ordinary  truths  in  extraordinary  circum- 
stances— of  all  these  they  take  no  account.  Every  thing,  on  the  contrary, 
is  determinately  certain  from  the  commencement ; of  exceptions  no  math- 
ematician ever  dreams.  But  is  this  character  of  thought  applicable  to 
the  other  branches  of  our  knowledge  ? The  moment  we  attempt  to  treat 
logic,  morals,  theology,  medicine,  jurisprudence,  politics,  criticism,  or  the 
theory  of  the  fine  arts  in  this  mathematical  method,  we  play  the  part,  not 
of  philosophers  hut  of  dreamers,  and  this  to  the  great  detriment  of  human 
reason  and  happiness.”  &c.  &c.3 

Walpole  : 

“ The  profound  study  of  mathematics  seems  to  injure  the  more  general 
and  useful  mode  of  reasoning — that  by  induction.  Mathematical  truths 
being,  so  to  speak,  palpable,  the  moral  feelings  become  less  sensitive  to 
impalpable  truths.  As  when  one  sense  is  carried  to  great  perfection,  the 
others  are  usually  less  acute,  so  mathematical  reasoning  seems,  in  some 
degree,  to  injure  the  other  modes  of  ratiocination ,”3 

Gibbon : 

'• ‘ From  a blind  idea  of  the  tisefulness  of  such  abstract  science,  my  fa- 
ther had  been  desirous,  and  even  pressing,  that  I should  devote  some  time 
to  the  Mathematics ; nor  could  I refuse  to  comply  w'ith  so  reasonable  a 
wish.  During  two  winters  I attended  the  private  lectures  of  M.  de  Tray- 
torrens,  who  explained  the  elements  of  algebra  and  geometry,  as  far  as 
the  conic  sections  of  the  Marquis  de  l’Hopital,  and  appeared  satisfied  with 
my  diligence  and  improvement.  But  as  my  childish  propensity  for  num- 
ber and  calculations  was  totally  extinct,  I was  content  to  receive  the 
passive  impressions  of  my  professor’s  lectures,  without  any  active  exer- 
cise of  my  own  powers.  As  soon  as  1 understood  the  principles,  I relin- 
quished for  ever  the  pursuit  of  the  mathematics  ; nor  can  I lament  that 
I desisted  before  my  mind,  was  hardened  by  the  habit  of  rigid  demon- 


1 Julian,  Pref.  p.  xix.  ; Works,  vol.  iv.  p.  345. 

2 Philalethie.  Bd.  ii.  t).  179.  3 Walpoliana,  vol.  i.  p.  113. 


MATHEMATICS  NOT  A LOGICAL  EXERCISE. 


293 


stration,  so  destructive  of  the  finer  feelings  of  moral  evidence , which 
must,  however,  determine  the  actions  and  opinions  of  our  lives.”1 

Kirwan : 

“ Some  have  been  led  to  imagine — ‘ that  the  true  way  of  acquiring  a 
habit  of  reasoning  closely,  and  in  train,  is  to  exercise  ourselves  in  mathe- 
matical demonstrations  ; that  having  got  the  way  of  reasoning  which 
that  study  necessarily  brings  the  mind  to,  they  may  he  able  to  transfer  it 
to  other  parts  of  knowledge  as  they  shall  have  occasion.’  This,  however , 
is  an  egregious  mistake  ; the  mode  of  reasoning  of  mathematicians  being 
founded  on  the  relation  of  identity  or  equality,  is  not  transferable  to  any 
other  science  into  which  mathematical  considerations  do  not  enter,  as 
ethics,  jurisprudence,  whether  natural  or  municipal,  medicine,  chemistry, 
theology,  metaphysics,  &c.,  which  are  founded  on  relations  entirely  differ- 
ent. On  the  contrary,  the  habit  of  mathematical  reasoning  seems  to  un- 
fit a person  for  reasoning  justly  on  any  other  subject ; for,  accustomed 
to  the  highest  degree  of  evidence,  a mathematician  frequently  becomes 
insensible  to  any  other.”2 

De  Stael: 

“ The  study  of  languages , which  in  Germany  constitutes  the  basis  of 
education,  is  much  more  favorable  to  the  evolution  of  the  faculties,  in  the 
earlier  age,  than  that  of  mathematics,  or  of  the  physical  sciences.  Pascal, 
that  great  geometer,  whose  profound  thought  hovered  over  the  science  which 
he  peculiarly  cultivated,  as  over  every  other,  has  himself  acknowledged  the 
insuperable  defects  of  those  minds  which  oice  their  first  formation  to  the 
mathematics.  This  study,  in  the  earlier  age,  exercises  only  the  mechan- 
ism of  intelligence.  In  boys  occupied  so  soon  with  calculations,  the  spring 
of  imagination,  then  so  fair  and  fruitful,  is  arrested  ; and  they  acquire  not, 
in  its  stead,  any  pre-eminent  accuracy  of  thought — for  arithmetic  and 
algebra  are  limited  to  the  teaching,  in  a thousand  forms,  propositions 
always  identical.  The  problems  of  life  are  more  complicated ; not  one 
is  positive,  not  one  is  absolute ; we  must  conjecture,  we  must  decide  by 
the  aid  of  indications  and  assumptions,  which  bear  no  analogy  with  the 
infallible  procedure  of  the  calculus.  Demonstrated  truths  do  not  con- 
duct to  probable  truths  ; which  alone,  however,  serve  us  for  our  guide  in 
business,  in  the  arts,  and  in  society.  There  is,  no  doubt,  a point  at  which 
the  mathematics  themselves  require  that  luminous  power  of  invention, 
without  which  it  is  impossible  to  penetrate  into  the  secrets  of  nature. 
At  the  summit  of  thought  the  imaginations  of  Homer  and  of  Newton  seem 
to  unite  ; hut  how  many  of  the  young,  without  mathematical  genius,  con- 
secrate their  time  to  this  science  ! There  is  exercised  in  them  only  a 
single  faculty , while  the  ivhole  moral  being  ought  to  he  under  develop- 
ment at  an  age  when  it  is  so  easy  to  derange  the  soul  and  the  body  in 
attempting  to  strengthen  only  a part.  Nothing  is  less  applicable  to  life 
than  a mathematical  argument.  A proposition  couched  in  ciphers,  is 
decidedly  either  true  or  false.  In  all  other  relations  the  true  and  the 
false  are  so  intermingled,  that  frequently  instinct  alone  can  decide  us  in 
the  strife  of  motives,  sometimes  as  powerful  on  the  one  side  as  on  the 
other.”3 

1 Life  in  Miscellaneous  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  92.  Ed.  1814. 

2 Logick  vol.  i.  Pref.  p.  iii.  3 De'  V Allemagne,  t.  L c.  IS.  p.  163. 


294 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


We  have  already  noticed  in  general  that,  beyond  the  narrow 
sphere  of  necessary  matter,  mathematicians  are  disposed  to  one 
or  other  of  two  opposite  extremes — credulity  and  skepticism. 
The  cause  is  manifest. 

Alienated,  by  the  opposite  character  of  their  studies,  from  those 
habits  of  caution  and  confidence,  of  skill  and  sagacity,  which  the 
pursuit  of  knowledge  in  the  universe  of  probability  requires  and 
induces ; they  are  constrained,  when  they  venture  to  speculate 
beyond  their  diagrams  and  calculations,  either , to  accept  their 
facts,  on  authority,  if  not  on  imagination — or,  to  repudiate  alto- 
gether, as  unreal,  what  they  are  themselves  incapable  of  verify- 
ing. These  opposite  dispositions  are  not,  however,  incapable  of 
conjunction  ; they  are  indeed  often  united  in  the  same  individual, 
but  in  relation  to  different  objects. 

This  twofold  tendency  of  mathematical  study  has  frequently 
been  noticed.  In  reference  to  philosophy,  it  is  observed  by  Salat , 
a distinguished  German  metaphysician  : 

“ The  study  of  Mathematics,  unless  special  precaution  be  taken,  is  rather 
a hinderance  than  an  aid. — For,  in  so  far  as  the  mathematician,  accus- 
tomed to  his  own  mode  of  thinking,  and  ignorant  of  any  other,  applies,  or 
does  not  apply  it  to  the  supersensible — what  must  follow  ? In  the  former 
case,  the  supersensible  world  is  denied,  inasmuch  as  it  can  not  be  mathe- 
matically demonstrated  ; and,  in  the  latter,  affirmed  only  on  the  ground  of 
feeling  and  imagination.  Thus,  on  the  one  alternative,  the  mathematician 
becomes  necessarily  a Materialist;  on  the  other,  a Mystic.”1 

Of  the  two  extremes,  that  of  credulity , as  relative,  at  least,  to 
the  affairs  of  life,  is  by  far  the  more  frequent  and  obtrusive.  Mr. 
Dugald  Stewart  seems  even  not  indisposed  to  explain  the  appar- 
ent manifestations  of  the  opposite  tendency,  on  the  ground  of 
credulity  alone.  He  says  : 

“ In  the  course  of  my  own  experience,  I have  never  met  with  a mere 
mathematician  who  teas  not  credulous  to  a fault : credulous  not  only 
with  respect  to  human  testimony,  hut  credulous  also  in  matters  of  opinion ; 
and  prone,  on  all  subjects  which  he  had  not  carefully  studied,  to  repose 

too  much  faith  in  illustrious  and  consecrated  names The  atheism 

and  materialism  professed  by  some  late  mathematicians  on  the  Continent, 
is,  I suspect,  in  many  cases,  to  be  ascribed  to  the  very  same  cause  ; a cre- 
dulity yielding  itself  up  as  blindly  to  the  fashionable  disbelief  of  the  day, 
as  that  of  their  predecessors  submitted  itself  to  the  creed  of  the  Infallible 
Church.”2 

Our  limits,  we  regret,  preclude  us  from  adverting  to  Mr.  Stew- 

1 Grundzeuge  der  allgemeiner  Philosophic ; by  J.  Salat,  Ordinary  Professor  of  Moral 
Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Landshut,  &c.  1820. 

Elements,  vol.  iii.  p.  271,  280. 


MATHEMATICS  INDUCE  CREDULITY. 


29o 


art’s  ingenious  suggestion  of  one  cause,  at  least,  of  the  disposition 
shown  by  mathematicians  to  fanaticism  ; but  we  shall  quote  his 
testimony  to  the  phenomenon. 

“ It  is  a certain  fact,  that,  in  mathematicians  who  have  confined  their 
studies  to  mathematics  alone,  there  has  often  been  observed  a proneness  to 
that  species  of  religious  entlmsiasm  in  which  imagination  is  the  predom- 
inant element,  and  which , like  a contagion , is  propagated  in  a crowd.  In 
one  of  our  most  celebrated  universities,  which  has  long  enjoyed  the  proud 
distinction  of  being  the  principal  seat  of  mathematical  learning  in  this 
island,  I have  been  assured,  that  if,  at  any  time,  a spirit  of  fanaticism  has 
infected  (as  will  occasionally  happen  in  all  numerous  societies)  a few  of 
the  unsounder  limbs  of  that  learned  body,  the  contagion  has  invariably 
spread  much  more  widely  among  the  mathematicians  than  among  the  men 
of  erudition.  Even  the  strong  head  of  Waring,  undoubtedly  one  of  the 
ablest  analysts  that  England  has  produced,  was  not  proof  against  the 
malady,  and  he  seems  at  last  (as  I was  told  by  the  late  Dr.  Watson,  Bishop 
of  Llandaff)  to  have  sunk  into  a deep  religious  melancholy,  approaching 
to  insanity.”1 

On  this  principle  of  facile  credence,  it  is  to  he  explained  why 
of  metaphysicians,  the  most  fanciful  and  most  confident  specula- 
tors have  been  usually  the  most  mathematical.  Pythagoras,  Plato, 
Cardan,  Descartes,  Mallebranche,  and  Leibnitz,  are  names  not 
more  distinguished  for  their  philosophical  genius  than  for  their 
philosophical  credulity.  Conversant,  in  their  mathematics,  only 
about  the  relations  of  ideal  objects,  and  exclusively  accustomed 
to  the  passive  recognition  of  absolute  certainty,  they  seem  in  their 
metaphysics  almost  to  have  lost  the  capacity  of  real  observation 
and  of  critically  appreciating  comparative  degrees  of  probability. 
In  their  systems,  accordingly,  hypothesis  is  seen  to  take  the  place 
of  fact ; and  reason,  from  the  mistress,  is  degraded  to  the  hand- 
maid, of  imagination. 

“Mathematical  science,”  says  the  marvelous  Prince  of  Miran- 
clola,  11  does  not  bestow  wisdom : it  was  therefore,  by  the  ancients, 
made  the  discipline  of  boys.  On  the  contrary,  though  preparing 
for  philosophy,  if  previously  sipped  in  moderation , when  raised  to 
an  object  of  exclusive  study,  it  affords  the  greatest  occasions  of 
jjliilosophical  error.  To  this  Aristotle  bears  evidence.”2 

“ Descartes,”  says  Voltaire , “ was  the  greatest  mathematician 
of  his  age ; but  mathematics  leave  the  intellect  as  they  find  it. 
That  of  Descartes  was  too  prone  to  invention.  He  preferred  the 

1 Elements^  vol.  iii.  p.  291. 

3 Joannes  Picus  Mirandulanus  in  Astrologiam,  1.  xii.  c.  2.  He  is  still  more  decided 
in  his  Conclusion's : — “ There  is  nothing  more  hurtful  to  a divine  than  a frequent  and 
assiduous  exercise  in  the  mathematics  of  Euclid.”  (lxxxv.  6).  See  also  his  nephew’s 
(John  Francis)  Examcn  Vanitalis  Doctrines  Gentium , 1.  iii.  c.  6. 


296 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


divination  to  the  study  of  nature.  The  first  of  mathematicians 
produced  nothing  almost  hut  romances  of  philosophy.”1 2  A more 
felicitous  expression  had  been  preoccupied  by  Father  Daniel ; — 
“ The  philosophy  of  Descartes  is  the  romance  of  nature.”  But 
in  fact,  Descartes  himself  was  author  of  the  mot: — “My  theory  of 
vortices  is  a philosophical  romance.” 

In  regard  to  Leibnitz,  even  his  intelligent  and  learned  friend, 
the  first  Queen  of  Prussia,  was  not  blind  to  the  evil  influence  of 
his  mathematics  on  his  philosophy.  She  was  wont  to  say,  with 
an  eye  to  the  “Pre-established  Harmony”  and  “Monads,” — “that, 
of  all  who  meddled  with  philosophy,  the  mathematicians  satisfied 
her  the  least,  more  especially  when  they  attempted  to  explain  the 
origin  of  things  in  general,  or  the  nature  of  the  soul  in  particular; 
and  that  she  was  surprised,  that,  notivithstanding  their  geometri- 
cal exactness , metaphysical  notions  were,  for  most  of  them , lost 
countries,  and  exhaustless  sources  of  chimeras.'1 

“ There  are  four  celebrated  metaphysicians,”  says  Condillac — 
“ Descartes,  Mallebranche,  Leibnitz,  and  Locke.  The  last  alone 
was  not  a mathematician,  and  yet,  how  greatly  is  he  superior  to 
the  other  three  ?”3  This  may  be  disputed. 

But,  if  such  be  even  the  metaphysical,  what,  out  of  their 
sciences,  are  other  mathematicians  ? It  is  enough  to  say,  that 
astrology  was  the  least  visionary  of  Kepler's  beliefs  ; while  Napier 
and  Newton  and  Whiston  sought,  and  found  their  fancies  in  the 
Apocalypse — a book  of  which  a great  Anglican  divine  has  said, 
that,  “ it  either  finds  a man  mad,  or  leaves  him  so.” 

The  causes  that  determine  the  mathematician  to  an  irrational 
belief,  determine  him  also  to  an  irrational  confidence  in  his 
opinions. 

Poiret,  that  deep-thinking  mystic,  truly  observes : 

“ From  the  same  source,  mathematicians  are  also  infested  ivith  an 
overweening  presumption  or  incurable  arrogance ; for,  believing  them- 
selves in  possession  of  demonstrative  certainty  in  regard  to  the  objects  of 
their  peculiar  science,  they  persude  themselves  that,  in  like  manner,  they 
possess  a knowledge  of  many  things  beyond  its  sphere.  Then,  co-ordi- 
nating these  with  the  former,  as  if  demonstrated  by  equal  evidence,  they 
spurn  every  objection  to  every  opinion,  with  the  contempt  or  indignation 
they  would  feel  at  an  endeavor  to  persuade  them  that  two  plus  two  are 


1 Le  Siccle  de  Louis  XIV.  c.  29. 

2 Hist.  Crit.  de  la.  Republique  des  Lettres,  t.  xi.  p.  128. 

3 L'Art  de  Penser  (Cours.  t.  iii.  p.  398,  Ed.  1780).  CEuvres  Philosophiques,  t.  vi. 
p.  225.  Ed. 


MATHEMATICS  INDUCE  CREDULITY. 


297 


not  four,  or  that  the  angles  of  a triangle  are  not  equal  to  two  right  angles.” 

&C.1 

Warburton : 

“ Besides  this  acquired  inability  [p.  292],  prejudice  renders  the  veteran 
mathematician  still  less  capable  of  judging  of  moral  evidence.  He  who 
hath  been  so  long  accustomed  to  lay  together  and  compare  ideas,  and  hath 
reaped  demonstration,  the  richest  fruit  of  speculative  truth,  for  his  labor, 
regards  all  the  lower  degrees  of  evidence  as  in  the  train  only  of  his  mathe- 
matical principality ; and  he  commonly  ranks  them  in  so  arbitrary  a 
manner,  that  the  ratio  ultima  matliematicorum  is  become  almost  as  great 
a libel  upon  common  sense  as  other  sovereign  decisions.  I might  appeal 
lor  the  truth  of  this  to  those  wonderful  conclusions  which  Geometers,  when 
condescending  to  write  on  history,  ethics,  or  theology,  have  made  of  their 
premises.  But  the  thing  is  notorious  ; and  it  is  no  secret  that  the  oldest 
mathematician  in  England  is  the  ivorst  reasoner  in  it.”  2 

De  Stael  : 

“ The  study  of  mathematics,  habituating  us  to  certainty,  inflames  us 
against  all  opinions  in  contradiction  with  our  own,”  &c.3 

Dugalcl  Stewart  : 

“ The  bias  now  mentioned,  is  strengthened  by  another  circumstance — 
the  confidence  which  the  mere  mathematician  naturally  acquires  in  his 
powerfe  of  reasoning  and  judgment — in  consequence  of  which,  though  he 
may  he  prevented  in  his  own  pursuits  from  going  far  astray,  by  the  ab- 
surdities to  which  his  errors  lead  him,  he  is  seldom  apt  to  be  revolted  by 
absurd  conclusions  in  the  other  sciences.  Even  in  physics,  mathemati- 
cians have  been  led  to  accjuiesce  in  conclusions  which  appear  ludicrous 
to  men  of  different  habits.”  4 

We  must  refer  to  the  original  for  some  curious  and  instructive 
instances  of  this,  in  Euler,  Leibnitz,  D.  Bernoulli,  Grandi,  La 
Place,  Leslie,  Pitcairn,  and  Cheyne. 

The  opposite  bias— the  skepticism  of  the  mathematician,  is 
principally  relative  to  the  spiritual  or  moral  world.  His  studies 
determine  him  to  this  in  two  ways. — In  the  first  place,  by  ab- 
stracting him  from  the  view,  and  disqualifying  him  for  the  ob- 
servation, of  the  phenomena  of  moral  liberty  in  man  ; and  in  the 
second , by  habituating  him  to  the  exclusive  contemplation  of  the 
phenomena  of  a mechanical  necessity  in  nature.  But  an  igno- 
rance of  the  one  order,  and  an  extensive  and  intimate  and  con- 
stant consideration  of  the  other,  are  tantamount  to  a negation 
of  the  unknown.  For  on  the  one  hand,  as  we  naturally  believe 
to  exist  that  only  which  we  know  to  exist ; and  on  the  other,  as 


1 De  Eruilitione  Solida,  &c.  Ed.  1692,  p.  306. 

2 Julian,  Pref.  p.  xx. ; Works,  iv.  p.  346. 

3 De  l' AUemagne,  i.  c.  18.  4 Elements,  iii.  p.  272. 


298 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


all  science  tends  to  unity,  reason  forbidding  us  to  assume,  with- 
out necessity,  a plurality  of  causes ; consequently  the  mathe- 
matician, if  he  thinks  at  all,  is  naturally  and  rationally  disposed 
to  hold,  as  absolutely  universal,  what  is  universal  relatively  to  his 
own  sphere  of  observation. 

It  is  chiefly,  if  not  solely,  to  explain  the  one  phenomenon  of 
morality,  of  freewill,  that  we  are  warranted  in  assuming  a second 
and  hyperphysical  substance,  in  an  immaterial  principle  of  thought ; 
for  it  is  only  on  the  supposition  of  a moral  liberty  in  man,  that 
we  can  attempt  to  vindicate,  as  truths,  a moral  order,  and,  conse- 
quently, a moral  governor,  in  the  universe  ; and  it  is  only  on  the 
hypothesis  of  a soul  within  us,  that  we  can  assert  the  reality  of  a 
Gfod  above  us — “ Nullus  in  microcosmo  Spiritus,  nullusin  macro - 
cosmo  Deus 

In  the  hands  of  the  materialist,  or  physical  necessitarian,  every 
argument  for  the  existence  of  a deity  is  either  annulled,  or  reversed 
into  a demonstration  of  atheism.  In  his  hands,  with  the  moral 
worth  of  man,  the  inference  to  a moral  ruler  of  a moral  world  is 
gone.  In  his  hands,  the  argument  from  the  adaptations  of  end  and 
mean,  every  where  apparent  in  existence,  to  the  primary  causality 
of  intelligence  and  liberty,  if  applied,  establishes,  in  fact,  the 
primary  causalty  of  necessity  and  matter.  For  as  this  argument 
is  only  an  extension  to  the  universe  of  the  analogy  observed  in 
man : if  in  man,  design — intelligence,  be  only  a phenomenon  of 
matter,  only  a reflex  of  organization  ; this  consecution  of  first  and 
second  in  us,  extended  to  the  universal  order  of  things,  reverses 
the  absolute  priority  of  intelligence  to  matter,  that  is,  subverts 
the  fundamental  condition  of  a deity.  Thus  it  is,  that  our  the- 
ology is  necessarily  founded  on  our  psychology ; that  we  must 
recognize  a God  from  our  oivn  minds , before  we  can  detect  a God 

in  the  universe  of  nature. 

% J 

Now,  the  mathematical  sciences,  on  the  one  hand,  by  leaving 
wholly  unexercised  the  capacity  of  philosophical  reflection,  pre- 
vent the  mind  from  rising  to  a clear  consciousness  of  those  fun- 
damental facts  on  which  its  moral  f reedom  is  established  ; and  on 
the  other,  by  accustoming  it  to  the  exclusive  contemplation  of  the 
laws  of  physical  necessity,  indispose  it  to  tolerate  so  extraordinary 
an  assumption,  so  indemonstrable  an  anomaly,  as  a moral  order , 
an  hyperphysical  liberty,  and  an  immaterial  subject. 

This  tendency  of  mathematical  study  has  been  always  suf- 
ficiently notorious.  Hence — (to  take  only  the  three  contemporary 


MATHEMATICS  INDUCE  SKEPTICISM. 


299 


fathers) — hy  St.  Austin  mathematics  are  said  “ to  lead  away 
from  G-od;”  by  St.  Jerome  to  be  “not  sciences  of  piety;”1  while 
St.  Ambrose  declares,  that  “ to  cultivate  astronomy  and  geometry 
is  to  abandon  the  cause  of  salvation,  and  to  follow  that  of  error.”2 

We  may  here  again  refer  to  Sir  Kenelm  Digbifs  testimony, 
previously  adduced  (p.  277). 

And  Poiret,  again,  who,  though  a mystic  in  religion,  was  one 
of  the  profoundest  thinkers  of  his  age. 

11  The  mathematical  genus  is  wont,  unless  guarded  against,  to  imbue 
the  minds  of  its  too  intemperate  votaries  with  the  most  pestilent  disposi- 
tions. For  it  infects  them  with  fatalism,  spiritual  insensibility,  brutal- 
ism,  disbelief,  and  an  almost  incurable  presumption.  For  when,  in  the 
handling  of  their  numbers,  figures,  and  machines,  they  perceive  all  things 
to  follow  each  other,  as  it  were  by  fate,  to  the  exclusion  of  liberty ; they 
hence  become  so  accustomed  to  the  consideration  of  necessary  connection 
alone,  that  they  altogether  eliminate  freewill  from  the  nature  and  govern- 
ment of  things  spiritual,  and  establish  the  universal  supremacy  of  a fatal 
necessity.” 3 

So  Bayle : 

“ It  can  not  be  disputed,  that  it  is  rare  to  find  much  devotion  in  per- 
sons ivho  have  once  acquired  a taste  for  the  study  of  the  mathematics, 
and  who  have  made  in  these  sciences  an  extraordinary  progress.”4 

So  Gundling : 

“ He  who  too  zealously  devotes  himself  to  the  physical  and  mathemat- 
ical sciences,  may  lightly  lapse  into  an  atheist.  Hence  we  find,  that  all 
the  more  ancient  philosophers  were  atheists,  and  this  because  too  exclu- 
sively absorbed  in  physical  and  mathematical  contemplations.”5 

Berkeley , himself  no  vulgar  mathematician,  asks  : 

“ Whether  the  corpuscularian,  experimental,  and  mathematical  philos- 
ophy, so  much  cultivated  in  the  last  age,  hath  not  too  much  engrossed 
men’s  attention  ; some  part  whereof  it  might  have  usefully  employed  ? — 
Whether  from  this,  and  other  concurring  causes,  the  minds  of  speculative 
men  have  not  been  borne  downward,  to  the  debasing  and  stupefying  of 
the  higher  faculties  ? And  whether  we  may  not  hence  account  for  that 
prevailing  narrowness  and  bigotry  among  many  who  pass  for  men  of 
science,  their  incapacity  for  things  moral,  intellectual,  or  theological, 
their  proneness  to  measure  all  truths  by  sense  and  experience  of  animal 
life?”6 

Dr.  John  Gregory , of  a family  to  which  mathematical  genius 
seems  almost  native,  and  one  of  the  most  distinguished  founders 
of  the  Edinburgh  School  of  Medicine,  in  his  “ Lectures  on  the 


1 Vide  Agrippam,  De  Van.  Scient.  c.  xi.  3 Officiorum,  1.  i.  26. 

3 De  Eruditione  Solida,  p.  304.  Ed.  1692.  4 Diet.  Hist,  voce  Pascal,  note  G. 

5 Historie  dcr  Gclehrheit,  vol.  i.  Disc.  Prelim,  p.  8.  6 Analyst,  Qu.  56,  57 


300 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


Duties  and  Qualifications  of  a Physician,”  after  confessing  that 
he  distrusted  his  own  judgment  in  relation  to  the  study  of  mathe- 
matics, as  afraid  of  his  partiality  to  a science  which  he  viewed 
with  a kind  of  innate  and  hereditary  attachment,  and  which  had 
heen  at  once  the  business  and  the  pleasure  of  his  early  years, 
thus  warns  his  pupils  : 

“ Let  me  also  desire  you  to  guard  against  its  leading  you  to  a disposition 
to  skepticism,  and  suspense  of  judgment  in  subjects  that  do  not  admit  of 
mathematical  science 

Monboddo : 

“ Those  who  have  studied  mathematics  much,  and  no  other  science, 
are  apt  to  grow  so  fond  of  them,  as  to  believe  that  there  is  no  certainty 
in  any  other  science,  nor  any  other  axioms  than  those  of  Euclid.”1 2 

De  Stael  : 

“ The  mathematics  lead  us  to  lay  out  of  account  all  that  is  not  proved  ; 
while  the  primitive  truths,  those  which  sentiment  and  genius  apprehend, 
are  not  susceptible  of  demonstration.” 3 

This  tendency  in  their  too  exclusive  cultivation,  to  promote  a 
disbelief  in  any  other  than  an  order  of  necessity  and  nature,  is 
common  to  the  physical  and  the  mathematical  sciences ; hence,  in 
reference  to  the  former,  the  old  adage — “ Tres  Medici,  duo  Atheif 
It  is,  however,  when  the  two  studies  are  conjoined  and  carried 
out  to  the  most  extensive  sphere  of  application,  that  this  tendency 
is  more  powerfully  and  conspicuously  manifested — that  is,  in 
astronomy. 

In  the  following  sublime  passage,  Kant , with  a different  inten- 
tion indeed,  finely  illustrates  the  opposite  influences  of  material 
and  mental  studies,  and  this  by  the  contrast  of  the  two  noblest 
objects  of  our  contemplation  : 

“ Two  things  there  are,  which,  the  oftener  and  the  more  steadfastly  we 
consider,  fill  the  mind  with  an  ever  new,  an  ever  rising  admiration  and 
reverence — the  Starry  Heaven  above , the  Moral  law  ivithin.  Of  neither 
am  I compelled  to  seek  out  the  existence,  as  shrouded  in  obscurity,  or 
only  to  surmise  the  possibility,  as  beyond  the  hemisphere  of  my  knowledge. 
Both  I contemplate  lying  clear  before  me,  and  connect  both  immediately 
with  the  consciousness  of  my  being. — The  one  departs  from  the  place  I 
occupy  in  the  outer  world  of  sense  ; expands,  beyond  the  limits  of  imagin- 
ation, that  connection  of  my  being  with  worlds,  rising  above  worlds,  and 
systems  blending  into  systems  ; and  protends  it  also  to  the  illimitable  times 
of  their  periodic  movement — to  its  commencement  and  continuance. — The 
other  departs  from  my  invisible  self,  from  my  personality  ; and  represents 


1 Works,  iii.  p.  107.  2 Ancient  Metaphysics,  i.  p.  394. 

3 De  I'Allemagne,  i.  c.  18. 


MATHEMATICS  INDUCE  SKEPTICISM. 


301 


me  m a world,  truly  infinite  indeed,  but  whose  infinity  is  to  be  fathomed 
only  by  the  intellect,  with  which  also  my  connection,  unlike  the  fortuitous 
relation  I stand  in  to  the  world  of  sense,  I am  compelled  to  recognize,  as 
necessary  and  universal. — In  the  former,  the  first  view  of  a countless  mul- 
titude of  worlds  annihilates,  as  it  were,  my  importance  as  an  animal  na- 
ture, which,  after  a brief  and  incomprehensible  endowment  with  the  pow- 
ers of  life,  is  compelled  to  refund  its  constituent  matter  to  the  planet — 
itself  an  atom  in  the  universe — on  which  it  grew. — The  aspect  of  the 
other,  on  the  contrary,  elevates  my  worth  as  an  intelligence,  even  to  infin- 
itude ; and  this  through  my  personality,  in  which  the  moral  law  reveals 
a faculty  of  life  independent  of  my  animal  nature,  nay,  of  the  whole  ma- 
terial world  : — at  least,  if  it  be  permitted  to  infer  as  much  from  the  reg- 
ulation of  my  being,  which  a conformity  with  that  law  exacts ; proposing, 
as  it  does,  my  moral  worth  for  the  absolute  end  of  my  activity,  conced- 
ing no  compromise  of  its  imperative  to  a necessitation  of  nature,  and  spurn- 
ing in  its  infinity  the  limits  and  conditions  of  my  present  transitory  life.” 1 

“ Spirat  enim  majora  animus  seque  altius  effert 
Sideribus,  transitque  vias  et  nubila  fati, 

Et  momenta  premit  pedibus  qutecunque  putantur 
Figere  propositam  natali  tempore  sortem.”2 

As  a pendant  to  this,  we  shall  adduce  another  testimony  hy  a 
profound  philosopher  of  an  opposite  school  ; by  him  whom  his 
countrymen  have  hailed  the  Plato  of  the  latter  age, — Frederic 
Henry  Jacobi. 

“What,  in  opposition  to  Fate,  constitutes  the  ruling  principle  of  the 
universe  into  a true  God,  is  termed  Providence.  Where  there  is  no  fore- 
cast there  is  no  intelligence,  and  where  intelligence  is,  there  also  is  there 
providence.  This  alone  is  mind  ; and  only  to  what  is  of  mind,  respond 
the  feelings  that  manifest  its  existence  in  ourselves — Wonder,  Veneration, 
Love.  We  can,  indeed,  pronounce  an  object  to  be  beautiful  or  perfect, 
without  a previous  knowledge  that  it  is  the  work  of  foresight  or  not : but 
the  power  by  which  it  was  produced,  that  we  can  not  admire,  if,  without 
thought,  and  without  a purpose,  it  operated  in  obedience  to  the  laws  of  a 
mere  physical  necessity.  Even  the  glorious  majesty  of  the  heavens,  the 
object  of  a kneeling  adoration  to  an  infant  world,  subdues  no  more  the 
mind  of  him  who  comprehends  the  one  mechanical  law  by  which  the 
planetary  systems  move,  maintain  their  motion,  and  even  originally  form 
themselves.  He  no  longer  marvels  at  the  object,  infinite  as  it  always  is, 
but  at  the  human  intellect  alone,  which,  in  a Copernicus,  Kepler,  Gas- 
sendi, Newton,  and  Laplace,  was  able  to  transcend  the  object,  by  science 
to  terminate  the  miracle,  to  reave  the  heaven  of  its  divinities,  and  to  dis- 
enchant the  universe. — But  even  this,  the  only  admiration  of  which  our 
intelligent  faculties  are  now  capable,  would  vanish,  were  a future  Hartley, 
Darwin,  Condillac,  or  Bonnet,  to  succeed  in  displaying  to  us  a mechani- 
cal system  of  the  human  mind,  as  comprehensive,  intelligible,  and  satis- 
factory as  the  Newtonian  mechanism  of  the  heavens.  Fallen  from  their 
elevation,  Art,  and  Science,  and  Virtue,  would  no  longer  be  to  man  the 
objects  of  a genuine  and  reflective  adoration.  The  works  and  actions  of 


1 Cr.  d.  pr.  V.  Beschluss.  This  suggests  Prudentius. 

2 Prudent.  Contra  Sym.  ii.  479. 


302 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


the  heroes  of  mankind — the  life  of  a Socrates  and  Epaminondas— the 
science  of  a Plato  and  Leibnitz — the  poetical  and  plastic  representations 
of  a Homer.  Sophocles  and  Phidias — these  might  still  pleasurably  move, 
might  still  rouse  the  mind  to  an  enjoyment  rising  into  transport;  even  so 
as  the  sensible  aspect  of  the  heavens  might  still  possibly  afiect  and  grat- 
ify the  disciple  of  a Newton  or  Laplace  : but  we  must  no  longer  ask  about 
the  principle  of  our  emotion  ; for  reflection  would  infallibly  chide  our  pu- 
erile infatuation,  and  dash  our  enthusiasm  by  the  suggestion — That  Won- 
der is  only  the  daughter  of  Ignorance."  1 

We  shall  terminate  our  cloud  of  witnesses  with  the  testimony 
of  a celebrated  metaphysician,  a distinguished  professor  also  of 
mathematics  and  physics  in  one  of  the  principal  universities  of 
Grermany.  Fries,  in  his  Lectures  on  Astronomy  thus  speaks  : 

But  it  is  rejoined — You  explain  every  thing  by  your  omnipotent  gravi- 
tation ; — what  is  the  origin  of  that  ? I answer  : — This,  too,  we  know 
full  well  1 The  daughter  of  the  old  blind  Fate,  her  servants  Magnitude, 
Number,  and  Proportion,  her  inheritance  a universe  without  a God,  which 

requires  no  God When  the  great  astronomer  Lalande  denied  a 

deity — could  trace  in  the  heavens  no  God,  in  the  movement  of  the  stars 
no  finger  of  God,  we  are  compelled  to  allow  the  logical  consequence  of  his 
reasoning.  That  high  order  and  adaptation  of  end  and  means  is  only  the 
product  of  the  rigid  mechanism  of  necessary  physical  laws  ; there,  above, 
is  only  a blind  mindless  destiny,  the  absolute  ruler  of  its  universe.  But  I 
appeal  to  the  truth  of  the  saying  in  St.  John,  “ In  the  spirit  only  shall 
we  worship  God and  in  what  only  our  science  is  for  mind,  are  its  dig- 
nity and  value  to  be  found.  He  alone  can  style  the  order  of  the  universe 
an  adaptation  of  means  to  end,  who  brings  to  its  observation  a belief  in 
the  reality  of  design.  But  the  true  interpretation  of  the  order  of  design, 
lies  far  more  clearly  apparent  in  the  mind  of  man.  The  infinite  spirit 
does  not  bail  itself  under  proportion  and  number ! The  play  with  num- 
ber is  an  easy  play — its  joy  only  the  joy  of  the  imprisoned  spirit  at  the 
clank  of  its  fetters.”2 

Are  Mathematics  then  of  no  value  as  an  instrument  of  mental 


1 [Werkc,  ii.  p.  54. — The  philosophy  of  the  modem  Plato  is,  in  this  respect,  strictly 
correspondent  with  the  philosophy  of  the  ancient.  “ The  doctrine,”  (to  this  effect 
speaks  the  Athenian),  “ which  has  propagated  impiety  among  men,  and  occasioned 
all  erroneous  opinions  concerning  the  nature  of  the  Deity  : is  that,  which  reversing  the 
real  consecution  of  existence,  affirms  in  regard  to  the  generation  of  the  universe,  that 
to  be  posterior  which  is,  in  truth,  the  cause  ; and  that  to  be  antecedent,  which  is  only 
the  effect.  For,  though  mind  and  its  operations  are  anterior  to  matter  and  its  phe- 
nomena, and  though  nature  and  natural  production  are  preceded  and  determined  by 
intelligence  and  design  ; some,  however,  have  preposterously  sisted  nature  as  the  first 
or  generative  principle,  and  regarded  mind,  as  merely  the  derivative  of  corporeal  organ- 
ism.” ( De  Lcgibus,  x.)  The  relative  passage  of  Plato  is,  I see,  quoted  by  the  great 
Cudworth,  (in  Cambridge,  “ there  were  giants  in  those  days,”)  in  his  Immutable  Mo- 
rality (B.  iv.  ch.  6,  $ 6.  sq.)  (In  connection  with  this  matter,  I may  here  notice  a 
monstrous  erratum  (t)  24)  which  stands,  both  in  the  English  edition  of  that  posthumous 
work,  procured  by  Chandler,  Bishop  of  Durham,  and,  what  is  more  remarkable,  in  the 
Latin  version  by  the  learned  Mosheim  ; contemplation  for  contemperation .)] 

- Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Sternkundc,  pp.  16,  18,  227. 


MATHEMATICS  INDUCE  SKEPTICISM. 


303 


culture  ? Nay,  do  they  exercise  only  to  distort  the  mind  ? To 
this  we  answer  : That  their  study,  if  pursued  in  moderation  and 
efficiency  counteracted,  may  be  beneficial  in  the  correction  of  a 
certain  vice,  and  in  the  formation  of  its  corresponding  virtue. 
The  vice  is  the  habit  of  mental  distraction  ; the  virtue  the  habit 
of  continuous  attention.  This  is  the  single  benefit,  to  which  the 
study  of  mathematics  can  justly  pretend,  in  the  cultivation  of  the 
mind ; and  it  is  almost  the  one  only,  or  at  least  the  one  principal, 
accorded  to  it  by  the  most  intelligent  philosophers. — Bacon , who 
in  his  earlier  writings  admitted  the  utility  of  mathematics  in 
sharpening  the  intellect ; in  his  maturer  works  recommended  a 
study  of  the  school  philosophy,  as  the  best  discipline  of  subtility 
and  discrimination.1 * — In  like  manner,  the  mathematical  philoso- 
pher Du  Hamel  seems  to  accord  no  higher  mental  advantage  to 
the  mathematics  ; and  at  the  same  time  observes,  that  “ they 
have  this  of  vice,  that  for  the  most  part  they  render  us  alien  and 
abhorrent  from  the  business  of  life.,,'! — Of  mathematical  science 
Warburton  holds,  that  besides  affording  us  a knowledge  of  its 
peculiar  method,  “ all  its  use,  for  the  purpose  in  question  (the 
improvement  of  the  powers  of  reasoning),  seems  to  he  only  habi- 
tuating the  mind  to  think  long  and  closely ; and  it  would  he  well 
if  this  advantage  made  amends  for  some  inconveniences , as  in- 
separable from  it.” 3 — This,  likewise,  is  all  that  is  admitted  of 
the  study  by  one  of  the  most  acute  and  cautious  observers  of  the 
human  mind  and  its  modifications,  and  whose  predilections,  if  we 
could  suppose  him  biased,  were  naturally  all  in  favor  of  its  im- 


1 In  the  first  edition  of  his  Essays,  published  in  1597,  Bacon  says,  “ Mathematiks 
make  men  subtill but  having  learned  better  in  the  interval,  in  the  second,  which 
appeared  fifteen  years  thereafter,  he  withdrew  this  commendation,  and  substituted  the 
following,  which  stands  unaltered  in  all  the  after  editions  ; — “ If  a man’s  wit  be  wan- 
dering, let  him  study  the  mathematiks  ; for  in  demonstrations  if  his  thought  be  called 
ever  so  little  away  he  must  begin  again ; if  his  wit  be  not  apt  to  distinguish  or  find 
differences  [i.  e.  be  not  subtile],  let  him  study  the  schoolmen,  for  they  are  the  Cymini 
sectores — By-the-by,  a mistake  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  adage. — ( Essay  on  Studies.) 
[Here  there  is,  I find,  an  oversight.  Though  at  a different  place  of  the  same  Essay. 
“Mathematics”  are  said  to  “make  men  subtile;”  and  this  even  in  the  last  editions  of 
the  work.]  In  like  manner,  in  The  Advancement  of  Learning,  published  in  1605,  he 
says  of  mathematics,  “ If  the  wit  be  too  dull,  they  sharpen  it ; if  too  wandering,  they 
fix  it;  if  too  inherent  in  the  sense,  they  abstract  it.”  (Book  II.  Mathematique.)  But 
in  the  relative  place  of  the  De  Augmentis  Scientiarum,  the  great  work  in  which,  after 
a meditation  of  eighteen  years,  the  Advancement  was  corrected,  remodeled,  and  greatly 

enlarged,  he  disallows  the  first  and  third  of  these  utilities,  and  admits  only  the  second. 
“ Si  cuipiam  ingenium  tale  est  quale  est  avium,  ut  facile  abripiatur,  nec  per  moram 
(qualem  oportet)  intentum  esse  sustineat ; remedium  huic  rei  prasbebunt  mathematica, 
in  quibus  si  evagetur  paulo  mens,  de  integro  renovanda  est  demonstratio.”  (L.  vi.  c.  4.) 

3 De  Mente  Humana,  L.  i.  c.  8.  3 Julian,  Pref.,  p.  xviii. 


304 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


portance — we  mean  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart.  A skillful  mathema- 
tician, his  writings  abound  with  allusions  to  that  science ; hut 
we  make  hold  to  say,  that  there  is  not  to  he  found  in  the  whole 
compass  of  his  works  a single  passage  attributing  another  or  a 
higher  advantage  to  mathematical  study,  in  relation  to  the  mind, 
than  that  of  “ strengthening  the  power  of  steady  and  concatenated 
thinking.”  Nay,  when  controverting  Mr.  Hume's  contemptuous 
estimate  of  the  utility  and  importance  of  mathematics,  and  when 
thus  called  upon  to  specify  their  various  uses,  he  ascribes  to  them 
any  value,  not  as  affording  a profitable  exercise  of  mind,  but  ex- 
clusively, “as  an  organ  of  physical  discovery,  and  as  the  founda- 
tion of  some  of  the  most  necessary  arts  of  civilized  life.” 1 And, 
in  the  chapter  of  his  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  entitled, 
The  Mathematician — a chapter  admirable  alike  for  its  depth  and 
its  candor — the  improvement  of  the  power  of  continuous  attention 
is  the  only  benefit  which  he  admits  ; and  that,  likewise,  to  the 
express  exclusion  of  the  mechanical  process  of  the  algebraic  anal- 
ysis— an  exclusion  in  which  he  is  supported  by  the  highest  prac- 
tical authorities  in  education.  “ This  command  of  attention , how- 
ever, it  may  be  proper  to  add,  is  to  be  acquired,  not  by  practice 
of  the  modern  methods , but  by  the  study  of  the  Greek  geometry  ; 
more  particularly,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  pursue  long  trains 
of  demonstration,  without  availing  ourselves  of  the  aid  of  any  sen- 
sible diagrams  ; the  thoughts  being  directed  solely  to  those  ideal 
delineations  which  the  powers  of  conception  and  of  memory  enable 
us  to  form.”2 

[This  observation  of  Stewart  suggests  the  propriety  of  stating 
more  articulately  the  contrast  of  the  two  species  of  mathematics 
— the  Geometric  or  Ostensive,  and  the  Algebraic  or  Symbolical. 
The  former  was  invented,  and  exclusively  cultivated,  in  antiquity ; 
the  latter,  which  owes  its  origin  to  the  Arabians,  has  been  princi- 
pally perfected  during  the  two  last  centuries.  These  species  of 
mathematics  differ  in  their  methods ; exert  a different  influence 
on  their  student;  and  merit  cultivation,  by  different  persons,  and 
for  different  ends.  The  Geometric  process  is  of  a minor  advan- 
tage in  education  ; whereas  the  study  of  the  Algebraic,  if  carried 
beyond  a very  limited  extent,  is  positively  disadvantageous.  As 
instruments  of  science,  however,  and  where  the  mathematician  is 
considered,  not  as  an  end  to  himself,  but  as  a mean  toward  an 


1 Dissertation,  &c.  p.  171. 


1 Elements,  vol.  iii.  p.  267. 


COMPARATIVE  USE  OF  GEOMETRIC  AND  ALGEBRAIC  STUDY.  303 

end  out  of  himself,  their  comparative  superiority  is  reversed.  For, 
in  the  Geometric  method,  while  the  movement  is  more  tedious, 
no  step  is  possible  without  consciousness  and  a certain  self-ac- 
tivity ; whereas  the  Algebraic,  though  a more  rapid  process,  works 
out  its  result  by  a mechanical  operation,  and  with  hardly  any 
awakening  of  thought.  The  one  thus  affords,  in  some  respects, 
an  improving  exercise  to  any ; the  other  a convenient  instrument, 
improving  to  none,  and  useful  only  to  a few. 

The  opinion  of  Newton  himself  upon  this  point  is  given  by  his 
friend  and  expositor,  Dr.  Pemberton,  whose  words  in  the  Preface 
to  his  “ Yiew  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton’s  Philosophy”  are  as  follows  : 

“ I have  often  heard  him  censure  the  handling  geometrical  subjects  by 
algebraic  calculations;  and  his  book  of  Algebra  he  called  by  the  name 
of  Universal  Arithmetic,  in  opposition  to  the  injudicious  title  of  Geometry, 
which  Descartes  had  given  to  the  treatise,  wherein  he  shows  how  the 
geometer  may  assist  his  invention  by  such  kind  of  computations.  He  fre- 
quently praised  Slusius,  Barrow,  and  Huygens  for  not  being  influenced  by 
the  fcdse  taste  which  then  began  to  'prevail.  He  used  to  commend  the 
laudable  attempt  of  Hugo  de  Omerique  to  restore  the  ancient  analysis, 
and  very  much  esteemed  Apollonius’s  book  De  Sectione  Rationis,  for  giv- 
ing us  a clearer  notion  of  that  analysis  than  we  had  before.  Dr.  Barrow 
may  be  esteemed  as  having  shown  a compass  of  invention  equal,  if  not 
superior  to  any  of  the  moderns,  our  author  only  excepted ; but  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  has  several  times  particularly  recommended  to  me  Huygen’s  style 
and  manner.  He  thought  him  the  most  elegant  of  any  mathematical 
ivriter  of  modern  times , and  the  most  just  imitator  of  the  ancients.  01' 
their  taste  and  form  of  demonstration  Sir  Isaac  always  professed  himself  a 
great  admirer.  I have  heard  him  even  censure  himself  for  not  following 
them  more  closely  than  he  did  [yet  he  demonstrated  every  thing  osten- 
sively]  ; and  speak  with  regret  of  his  mistake  at  the  beginning  of  his 
mathematical  studies,  in  applying  himself  to  the  works  of  Descartes  and 
other  algebraic  writers,  before  he  had  considered  the  Elements  of  Euclid 
with  that  attention  which  so  excellent  a writer  deserves.”1 

Sir  Isaac  was  conscious  that  if  ever  the  handmaid  should  sup- 
plant the  mistress — if  ever  devotion  to  the  algebraic,  method 
should  supersede  the  cultivation  of  the  geometric,  then  would 
mathematics  sink  from  the  rank  of  a liberal  study  into  something- 
little  better  than  a handicraft  dexterity.  What  would  he  have 
said,  had  he  foreseen  the  present  degeneracy  of  his  own  university  ! 

The  next  authority  which  I adduce  is  that  of  the  profoundest 
thinker  whom  Italy  produced  during  the  last  century ; one  in 
fact,  so  far  ahead  of  his  own  age,  that  it  remained  for  ours  to  ap- 
preciate those  great  views  in  politics  and  history  which  the  phi- 


1 View,  &c.  Pref.  p.  ii. 

u 


306 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


losophers  of  his  own  country,  France,  and  Germany,  are  now  emu- 
lously  engaged  in  expounding,  vindicating,  and  applying.  The 
following  quotation  is  from  an  address,  which  Vico  was  in  the 
habit  of  annually  delivering  to  the  academical  youth,  on  the  selec- 
tion and  conduct  of  their  studies : 

“ The  practice  of  giving  to  young  men  the  elements  of  the  science  of 
magnitude  on  the  algebraic  method,  chills  all  that  is  lively  and  vigorous 
in  the  youthful  mind , clouds  the  imagination,  debilitates  the  memory, 
dulls  the  ingenuity , and  enervates  the  intellect;  which  four  are  the 
things  most  necessary  for  the  cultivation  of  the  best  pursuits  of  human- 
ity ; the  first  for  painting,  sculpture,  architecture,  music,  poetry,  and  elo- 
quence ; the  second  for  the  learning  of  languages  and  of  history ; the  third 
Tor  invention  ; the  fourth  for  wisdom.  . . . And  thus  with  the  Algebraic 
calculus  the  ingenuity  is  repressed,  because  in  tbis  process  we  perceive 
not  even  what  lies  most  immediately  before  us  ; — tltc  memory  is  stupefied, 
because  the  second  sign  being  discovered,  we  no  longer  take  thought  about 
the  first ; — the  imagination  is  benighted,  because  we  imagine  to  our- 
selves absolutely  nothing  ; — the  intellect  is'  ruined,  because  we  substitute 
divination  for  reasoning ; — in  so  much  that  those  young  men  who  have 
spent  much  time  in  this  study  have  afterward,  to  their  utmost  sorrow 
and  repentance,  found  themselves  disqualified  for  the  business  of  real 
life.  And  therefore,  in  order  to  render  it  productive  of  any  benefit,  and 
unproductive  of  those  evils  which  it  might  otherwise  cause,  Algebra  ought 
to  be  studied  for  a short  time  at  the  close  of  the  mathematical  course.  . . . 
When,  in  order  to  find  the  required  quantity,  we  should  have  to  encounter 
meat  mental  fatigue  by  using  the  Synthetic  method,  we  ought  then  to 
have  recourse  to  the  Algebraic  Analysis.  But  in  so  far  as  regards  rea- 
soning well  by  this  sort  of  method,  it  is  better  to  acquire  the  habit  by 
Metaphysical  Analysis.1 

The  last  testimony  which  I shall  adduce,  in  regard  to  the  oppo- 
site characters,  and  the  different  importance  of  the  two  species  of 
Mathematics,  in  an  educational  point  of  view,  is  that  of  Thiersch , 
one  of  the  most  illustrious  scholars  of  Europe,  and  not  inferior  to 
any  authority  in  matters  of  education.  The  following  quotation 
I rudely  translate  from  his  work  on  Learned  Schools,  in  con- 
formity to  the  views  of  which  the  national  seminaries  of  Bavaria 
have  been  principally  modeled  and  reformed.  It  is  to  be  noticed 
that  his  observations,  though  relative  to  Gymnasia  and  Lycsea — 
an  order  of  learned  schools  in  Germany  inferior  to  the  Universities 
— apply  to  a class  of  students  in  general  more  advanced  than  those 
who  matriculate  in  Cambridge. 

“ In  order  that  Mathematical  science  should  be  more  perfectly  accom- 
modated to  the  end  which  a Gymnasium  proposes,  and  brought  into  so 
intimate  a relation  with  the  other  branches  of  study  that  it  may  be  viewed 


1 Opere  Complete,  i.  p.  31. 


COMPARATIVE  USE  OF  GEOMETRIC  AND  ALGEBRAIC  STUDY.  307 


as  their  complement  and  equipoise,  it  is  necessary  to  bring  back  its  method 
to  the  procedure  of  the  ancients — of  Euclid,  of  Archimedes,  and  of  Apol- 
lonius of  Perga 

“ Though  never  abandoning  the  confines  of  the  universal,  Geometry 
reduces  the  laws  and  attributes  of  magnitude  to  perfect  clearness — by 
according  to  the  senses  a representation  of  those  lines,  surfaces,  and  solids 
which  it  conceives  with  the  utmost  completeness  and  precision;  and  thus 
issuing  forth  from  behind  the  vail  of  mental  invisibility  into  the  visible 
and  palpable,  its  doctrines  may  almost  be  seen  and  handled,  and  yet  with- 
out losing  aught  of  their  purity  and  necessity.  Thus  Geometry,  if  I may 
so  express  myself,  becomes  a thinking  with  the  eye,  while  Grammar 
through  the  ear  holds  intercourse  with  the  inner  mind.  This  relation  of 
its  laws- to  determinate  figures,  this  apprehension  of  the  highest  and  most 
surprising  doctrines  through  the  visibility  of  body,  is  precisely  what  at 
once  attracts  and  animates  the  young — what  gradually  elevates  and  pre- 
pares for  high  abstraction  their  powers  as  yet  incapable  of  such  an  exer- 
cise. On  this  account  all  employment  of  the  Algebraic  formula  even  for 
conic  sections , ought  to  be  discarded  from  the  Geometry  of  the  Gym- 
nasium. Essential  as  these  are  to  the  Mathematician,  in  order  to  rise  to 
the  higher  regions  of  his  science,  they  are  profitless  and  even  hurtful  in 
the  course  of  discipline  preparatory  to  its  acquisition,  and  in  the  general 
cultivation  of  youth,  inasmuch  as  they  are  only  the  repetition  in  another 
form,  of  a procedure  already  familiar.  He  who  five  or  six  times  trans- 
poses or  transforms  a given  equation  so  as  in  the  end  to  obtain  a solution, 
teaching  him,  for  example,  that  a projectile  in  its  flight  describes  a para- 
bolic curve  ; — to  be  conducted,  I say,  to  this  important  result  as  by  an  in- 
visible constraining  force,  rapidly  and  unerringly,  indeed — this  will  content 
him  if  an  adept  in  Mathematics  ; but  to  the  student  it  is  profitless,  inas- 
much as  the  compulsory  conclusion  only  exhibits  to  him  in  a new  formula 
what  he  already  knew  by  superfluous  experience  to  be  true.  But  some- 
thing more  than  this  is  obtained  by  him  who  reaches  the  same  truth  by 
the  Geometrical  procedure  of  the  ancients,  in  which  Algebra  was  un- 
known, viz.,  by  the  constructive  method  of  figures  and  the  intuition 
founded  on  it.  While  the  Algebraic  formulae  conduct  us  blindfold  to  the 
conclusion,  the  constructive  method  of  Archimedes  shows  to  us  the  whole 
machinery  of  the  procedure  laid  open  to  the  light,  especially  -when  the 
omission  of  the  intermediate  propositions  is  supplied  by  an  intelligent 
teacher.  Here  every  step  is  made  with  open  eyes,  with  consciousness, 
and  understanding;  and,  in  the  example  adduced,  from  the  harmonic  con- 
nection of  figures,  and  from  the  consequences  fully  and  lucidly  evolved 
out  of  their  properties,  the  result  is  finally  obta'ined  of  the  parabolic  flight 
of  projectiles.  The  same  is  the  case  with  every  other  law,  each  being  dis- 
played to  the  view  of  the  satisfied  and  admiring  pupil,  as  a consequence 
clear  and  rigorous.  Nothing  can  be  better  calculated  than  such  a process 
to  awaken  the  intellect  to  the  clearest  apprehension  of  the  nature  and 
cogency  of  strict  probation ; and  thus  to  place  it  in  possession  of  itself  and 
its  highest  faculty — that  of  deducing  what  it  sought  from  what  is  given, 
what  is  invisible  from  what  is  seen,  in  order,  like  Archimedes,  from  a 
point  beyond  the  earth  to  move  the  earth  itself.  What  therefore  is  requi- 
site, and  even  indispensable,  is  a complete  and  systematic  manual  of 
Geometry  on  the  principles  of  Euclid,  Archimedes,  and  Apollonius  Per- 
gteus,  which,  assuming  their  capital  propositions,  and  connecting  these 


308 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


with  others,  would  afford  a comprehensive  view  of  constructive  Geometry, 
in  the  spirit  of  antiquity,  for  the  instruction,  awakening,  and  improvement 
of  youth.”  1 

Nay,  the  present  predominance  in  Cambridge  of  the  Algebraic 
Mathematics  (a  predominance  perhaps  partly  owing  to  the  re- 
proach cast  by  Playfair,  some  forty  years  ago,  on  the  ignorance 
prevalent  in  Cambridge  of  the  Continental  analysis,  but  which, 
assuredly,  is  no  longer  applicable,  seeing  that  the  second  English 
University,  the  second  Theological  Seminary  of  the  Anglican  Es- 
tablishment, is  now  a second-rate  Ecole  Polytechnique) — this  is 
lamented,  and  its  effect,  as  a slaughtering  of  intellect,  reluctantly 
confessed,  by  the  most  intelligent  friends  of  Cambridge  herself. 
The  two  following  extracts  from  the  Quarterly  Review  may  suf- 
fice to  prove  this  ; for  that  journal  has  always  been  the  cham- 
pion of  the  actual  system  of  the  English  Universities,  where  this 
could  with  any  justice  be  defended. — The  first  is  from  an  able 
article  on  Paley  ; and  it  is  justly  considered  as  a sign  of  his  un- 
common intellectual  vigor  (and  this  even  before  Cambridge  had 
again  turned  Anti-Newtonian  and  Algebraic),  that  he  was  senior 
wrangler,  yet  his  mind  not  apparently  enfeebled  by  the  exertion. 

“ The  Cambridge  system  of  study  is  a forcing  system,  which  applying 
itself  almost  wholly  to  one  subject,  and  being  adapted  to  minds  of  a 
single  cast,  frequently  debilitates  the  understanding  through  life,  by  the 
effort  to  produce  a single  fruitage.”2 

What  can  be  confessed — what  can  be  conceived,  worse  of  a 
University? 

The  second  extract  is  from  an  intelligent  article  on  the  Life  of 
Bishop  Watson. 

“The  period  at  which  Watson  appeared  in  the  University  of  Cam- 
bridge may  justly  be  regarded  as  the  Augustan  age  of  that  University  ; 
the  physics  of  Descartes  had  just  before  [Watson  entered  the  University  in 
1757,  that  is  seventy  years  after  the  publication  of  the  Principia],  given 
place  to  the  sublime  Geometry  of  Newton  ; the  Metaphysics  of  human 
nature,  as  taught  by  Locke,  had  supplanted  Aristotle  ; and  the  old  scho- 
lastic Theology  had  been  superseded  in  the  schools  by  a set  of  rising  and 
enlightened  divines,  under  a learned  and  candid  professor  it  was  certainly 
to  the  advantage  of  the  academical  studies  that  the  higher  Algebra  was 
not  yet  invented,  [?]  and  that  the  study  of  philosophy  \i.  e.  physics]  in 
general  was  not  hitherto  pushed  so  far  as  either  to  engross  or  to  exhaust 
the  understanding  of  the  academical  youth.  A due  place  was  also  allow- 
ed and  required  for  classical  pursuits,  while  the  purest  writers  of  antiquity 
were  studied,  not  so  much  lor  the  purpose  of  consummating  the  knowl- 
edge of  points  and  metres,  as  of  acquiring  the  noblest  ideas  of  morals  and 


Uebcr  gclehrtcn  Schulen,  iv.  Abth.  p.  374,  seq. 


2 Vol.  ix.  p.  390. 


TRUE  USE  OF  MATHEMATICAL  STUDY. 


309 


politics  in  the  clearest  and  most  elegant  language.  Precisely  at  this  period 
arose  a constellation  of  young  men  eminently  qualified,  both  by  the  force 
of  their  understandings  and  the  elegance  of  their  taste,  to  avail  themselves 
of  these  advantages  ; and  the  names  of  Hurd  and  Powell,  of  Balguy,  and 
Ogden,  are  never  heard  by  those  who  knew  them  or  know  their  books, 
without  the  associated  ideas  of  all  that  is  clear  in  ratiocination,  profound 
in  research,  and  beautiful  in  language.  As  they  disappeared  from  the 
scene,  abstract  mathematics  began  to  prevail  in  the  university ; the 
equilibrium  of  study  was  destroyed  ; the  liberal  and  manly  system  of  edu- 
cation which  had  produced  so  many  men  of  business  and  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  of  science,  gradually  disappeared  : while  the  rewards  which  be- 
came necessary  as  stimuli  to  the  higher  acquirements  of  classical  litera- 
ture, tended  to  urge  on  the  pursuits  of  difficult  and  recondite  minutiae  in 
criticism,  as  inapplicable,  in  one  way,  to  any  practical  purpose  of  life,  as 
the  obscurities  of  Waring’ s Miscellanea  Analytica,  in  another.  The  effects 
of  this  declension  are  but  too  visible  at  present  in  a hard,  dry,  ‘ exsuccous’ 
style  of  writing,  which  has  long  since  superseded,  excepting  in  one  or  two 
solitary  instances,  the  attic  graces  of  the  last  generation.”1 

But  returning  from  our  digressive  contrast  of  the  ostensive  and 
symbolical,  of  the  geometric  and  algebraic  processes,  in  an  educa- 
tional point  of  view;  and  calling  to  mind,  that  the  former  had, 
exclusively  of  the  latter,  been  proposed  as  a mean  conducive  to 
the  one  sole  intellectual  virttie  of  continuous  attention : we  pro- 
ceed to  consider,  how  far  the  study  of  geometry  may  pretend  to 
be  the  appropriate  discipline  even  of  this.] 

But  mathematics  are  not  the  only  study  which  cultivates  the 
attention  ; neither  is  the  kind  and  degree  of  attention  which  they 
tend  to  induce,  the  kind  and  degree  of  attention  which  our  other 
and  higher  speculations  require  and  exercise.  In  the  study  of 
mathematics  we  are  accustomed,  if  we  may  so  express  ourselves, 
to  a protensive,  rather  than  to  either  an  extensive,  a comprehen- 
sive, or  an  intensive,  application  of  thought.  It  does  not  compel 
us  to  hold  up  before  the  mind,  and  to  retain  the  mind  upon,  a 
multitude  of  different  objects ; far  less  does  it  inure  us  to  a steady 
consideration  of  the  fugitive  and  evanescent  abstractions  ami  gene- 
ralities of  the  reflective  intellect.  Mr.  Kirwan  truly  observes  : — 

“ As  to  Mathematics  habituating  the  mind  to  intense  application 
there  is  no  science  that  does  not  equally  require  it,  and,  in  study- 
ing it,  the  habit  is  much  more  advantageously  obtained .”2  And 
Madame  de  Stael  admirably  says: — “I  shall  be  told,  I know, 
that  Mathematics  render  the  attention  peculiarly  close  (appliquee) ; 
but  they  do  not  habituate  to  collect,  to  appreciate,  to  concentrate; 
the  attention  they  require  is,  so  to  speak,  in  a straight  line  ; the 


1 Vol.  xviii.  p.  235. 


2 Logick,  I.  preface,  p.  6. 


310 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS 


human  mind  acts  in  mathematics  as  a spring  tending  in  one  uni- 
form direction .”' 

We  should  remember  also  that  the  minds  for  whose  peculiar 
malady  a course  of  mathematics,  as  the  appropriate  specific,  is 
prescribed,  are  precisely  those  which  will  not,  in  fact,  can  not , 
submit  to  the  prescription.  “ In  vain”  (observes  Du  Hamel) 
“do  we  promulgate  rules  for  awakening  attention,  if  the  disposi- 
tion be  headlong,  instable,  presumptuous.  Besides,  all  applica- 
tion of  the  mind  is  an  act  of  will,  and  the  will  can  not  be  com- 
pelled.’”— After  all,  we  are  afraid  that  Vines  and  D' Alembert  are 
right : Mathematics  may  distort , but  can  never  rectify , the  mind. 

But  although  of  slender,  and  even  ambiguous  utility,  as  a gym- 
nastic of  the  intellect,  mathematics  are  not  undeserving  of  atten- 
tion, as  supplying  to  the  metaphysician  and  psychologist  some 
interesting  materials  of  speculation.  The  notions,  and  method, 
and  progress  of  these  sciences  are  curious,  both  in  themselves, 
and  in  contrast  to  those  of  philosophy.  Although,  therefore,  the 
inscription  over  Plato's  school  be  but  a comparatively  modern 
fiction , we  are  willing  to  admit  its  truth — nay,  aie  decidedly  of 
opinion,  that  mathematics  ought  to  be  cultivated,  to  a certain 
extent,  by  every  one  who  would  devote  himself  to  the  higher 
philosophy.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  agree  with  Socrates , 
who  “ disapproved  of  the  study  of  geometry”  (and  he  says  the 
same  of  astronomy),  “ when  carried  the  length  of  its  more  diffi- 
cult diagrams.  For,  though  himself  not  inconversant  with  these,” 
(which  he  had  studied  under  the  celebrated  geometer,  Theodoras 
of  Cyrene),  “he  did  not  perceive  of  what  utility  they  could  be, 
calculated  as  they  were  to  consume  the  life  of  a man,  and  to  turn 
him  away  from  many  other  and  important  acquirements.”* 3 

We  must  now  abruptly  terminate.  Our  limits  are  already 
greatly  exceeded.  But  we  must  still  state,  in  a few  words,  what 
many  sentences  would  be  required  to  develope. 

In  extending  so  partial  an  encouragement  to  mathematical  and 
physical  pursuits,  thus  indirectly  discouraging  the  other  branches 
of  liberal  education,  the  University  of  Cambridge  has  exactly  re- 
versed every  principle  of  academical  policy. — What  are  the  grounds 
on  which  one  study  ought  to  be  forstered  or  forced,  in  such  a 
seminary,  in  preference  to  others  ? 

The  first  and  principal  condition  of  academical  encouragement 

1 Be  V Allemagnc,  I.  c.  18.  3 Be  Mente  Humana,  1.  i.  c.  8. 

3 Xenophontist  Memorabilia,  1.  iv.  c.  T,  ()§  3,  5. 


CAMBRIDGE  SYSTEM  ABSURD. 


311 


is,  that  the  study  tends  to  cultivate  a greater  number  of  the  nobler 
faculties  in  a higher  degree.  That  the  study  of  mathematics 
effects  any  mental  development,  at  best,  in  a most  inadequate 
and  precarious  manner,  while  its  too  exclusive  cultivation  tends 
positively  to  incapacitate  and  to  deform  the  mind — this  it  has 
been  the  scope  of  the  preceding  argument  to  establish. 

The  second  condition  is,  that  the  protected  study  comprehends 
within  its  sphere  of  operation  a larger  proportion  of  the  academic 
youth.  It  can  easily  be  shown  that,  in  this  respect,  mathematics 
have  less  claim  to  encouragement  than  any  other  object  of  educa- 
tion. [They  present  no  allurement  for  those  not  constrained  to  a 
degree  ; they  qualify  for  none  of  the  professions  ; and  Cambridge 
stands  alone  in  turning  out  her  clergy,  accomplished  for  actuaries 
or  engineers,  it  may  be,  but  unaccomplished  for  divines.] 

The  third  is,  that  it  is  of  greater  general  utility  for  the  conduct 
of  the  business  or  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  leisure  of  after  life. 
— In  regard  to  the  business : — For  men  in  general,  no  study  is 
more  utterly  worthless  than  that  of  mathematics.  In  regard  to 
the  leisure: — For  which,  as  Aristotle  properly  observes,  a liberal 
education  ought  equally  to  provide,  this  study  is  of  even  less  im- 
portance than  for  the  business.  No  academical  pursuit  has  so 
few  extra-academical  votaries.  The  reasons  are  manifest.  In 
the  first  place,  mathematics,  to  he  spontaneously  loved,  require  a 
more  peculiar  constitution  of  mind  and  temperament  than  any 
other  intellectual  pursuit.  In  the  second , as  observed  by  Plato , 
no  study  forced  in  the  school  is  ever  voluntarily  cultivated  in  life ; 
fifvyfi  filcuov  ov8ev  ipyeves  /addy/aa,).  In  the  third , to  use  the 
words  of  Seneca  : — “ Some  things,  once  known,  stick  fast ; others 
it  is  not  enough  to  have  learnt,  our  knowledge  of  them  perishing 
when  we  cease  to  learn.  Such  are  mathematics — The  maxim, 
“ Non  scholse  sed  vitas  discendum,”  is  thus,  in  every  relation,  by 
the  University  of  Cambridge,  reversed. 

The  fourth  is,  that,  independently  of  its  own  importance,  it  is 
the  passport  to  other  important  branches  of  knowledge.  In  this 
respect  mathematical  sciences  (pure  and  applied)  stand  alone ; to 
the  other  branches  of  knowledge  they  conduce — to  none  directly, 
and  if  indirectly  to  any,  the  advantage  they  afford  is  small,  con- 
tingent and  dispensable. 

The  fifth  is,  that,  however  important,  absolutely  and  relatively, 
it  is  yet  of  such  a nature,  that,  without  an  external  stimulus , it 


1 De  Beneficiis,  1.  iii.  c.  5.  [See  also  Vives,  above,  p.  290.] 


312 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS. 


will  not  be  so  generally  and  so  thoroughly  cultivated  as  it  deserves. 
Mathematics,  certainly,  from  the  nature  of  their  study,  require 
such  stimulus  ; the  question  is — Do  they  deserve  it  ? 

We  can  not  conclude,  -without  strongly  expressing  our  sincere 
respect  for  the  venerable  school  of  which,  in  this  article,  we  have 
endeavored  to  expose  a modern  abuse.  With  all  its  defects,  there 
is  even  now,  in  the  spirit  of  the  place,  what,  were  its  mighty 
means  all  as  well  directed  as  some  already  are,  would  raise  it  in 
every  faculty,  in  every  department,  to  the  highest  rank  among 
the  European  universities.  Some  parts  of  the  reform  are  diffi- 
cult, and  must  be  accomplished  from  without.  Others  are  com- 
paratively easy,  and,  it  is  not  too  much  to  hope,  may  be  determ- 
ined from  within.  Of  these,  the  first  and  most  manifest  improve- 
ment would  be  the  establishment  of  three  Triposes  of  co-ordinate 
and  independent  honors;  of  which  one  should  comprise  the  differ- 
ent departments  of  philosophy  proper,  ancient,  and  modern — an- 
other the  mathematical  and  physical  sciences — and  a third  the 
multifarious  branches  of  classics,  classical  philology,  history,  &c. 
We  can  not  add  a word  in  reference  to  the  expediency  and  details 
of  such  a plan ; but,  in  allusion  to  a philosophical  Tripos,  a noble 
testimony  to  the  influence  of  metaphysical  and  moral  studies  in 
the  improvement  of  the  mind,  rises  to  our  recollection,  which,  as 
peculiarly  appropriate  to  the  occasion,  we  can  not  refrain  from 
adducing.  It  is  by  one  of  the  acutest  of  thinkers — the  elder 
Scaliger. — “Harum  indagatio  subtilitatum  etsi  non  est  utilis  ad 
machinas  farinarias  conficiendas,  exuit  tamen  animum  inscitiae 
rubigine,  acuitque  ad  alia.  Eo  denique  splendore  afficit,  ut  prae- 
luceat  sibi  ad  nanciscendum  primi  opificis  similitudinem.  Q,ui 
ut  omnia  plene  ac  perfecte  est,  at  praeter,  et  supra  omnia  ; ita  eos 
qui  scientiarum  studiosi  sunt,  suos  esse  voluit,  ipsorumque  intel- 
lectum  rerum  dominum  constituit.”1 

1 De  Subtilitate,  Exerc.  cccvii.  3.  [When  this  was  quoted,  the  fuller  extract  above 
(p.  40.)  was  in  abeyance.] 


NOTE, 

TOUCHING  THE  PRECEDING  ARTICLE. 


(April,  183H.) 

It  is  contrary  to  our  practice  to  publish  any  answers  or  com- 
plaints, by  authors  dissatisfied  with  our  criticisms  ; but  we  are 
induced  to  make  an  exception  of  Mr.  Whewell.  He  complains, 
that  we  have  not  fairly  stated  the  purport  of  his  recent  publica- 
tion on  the  Study  of  Mathematics.  The  nature  of  the  charger" 
and  the  great  respectability  of  the  gentleman  by  whom  if  is  made, 
render  it  impossible  for  us  to  be  altogether  silent ; wcy-Thspefore, 
reprint  his  letter  (which  has  already  appeared  both  in  the  News- 
papers, and  in  the  second  edition  of  his  Pamphlet1),  with  a few 
observations  under  the  form  of  Notes,  in  vindication  of  ourselves 
— [Editor.] 


“ To  the  Editor  of  the  Edinburgh  Review. 

Cambridge,  Jan.  23 d,  1836. 

“ My  Dear  Sir — I was  gratified  to  find  that  a little  pamphlet 
which  I recently  published,  as  ‘ Thoughts  on  the  Study  of  Mathe- 
matics,’ had  excited  so  much  notice  as  to  give  it  a place  at  the 
head  of  an  article  in  the  Edinburgh  Review ; — and  in  regard  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  Reviewer  has  spoken  of  me,  I have  cer- 
tainly no  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  ; nor  am  I at  all  disposed  to 
complain  of  the  way  in  which  he  has  urged  his  own  opinions. 
But  I think  the  article  is  likely  to  give  rise  to  a misapprehension 
which  ought  to  be  corrected ; and  for  that  purpose  I trouble  you 
with  this  letter. 


1 [This  Letter  Mr.  Whewell  republished  also  in  the  following  year  at  the  end  of  his 
book  “ On  the  Principles  of  English  University  Education’- — but  without  the  notes  in 
reply — For  that  book  and  for  the  Preface  to  his  Mechanics,  on  both  of  which  1 .-hall 
be  obliged  to  comment,  I am  indebted  to  the  politeness  of  the  author. 


314 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


“ I wrote  my  pamphlet  in  order  to  enforce  certain  views  re- 
specting the  conduct  of  our  mathematical  examinations  at  Cam- 
bridge. The  question  on  which  I threw  out  a few  £ Thoughts’ 
was,  what  kind  of  mathematics  is  most  beneficial  as  a part  of  a 
liberal  education.  That  this  was  the  question  to  which  I was 
trying  to  give  some  answer  I stated  in  a passage  (quoted  by  the 
Reviewer)  at  page  8 of  the  pamphlet.  The  previous  seven  pages, 
in  which  among  other  matter  I had  said  a few  words  on  the  ques- 
tion, whether  mathematics  in  general , or  logic  is  the  better  men- 
tal discipline,  were  obviously  only  an  introduction  to  the  discus- 
sion of  certain  propositions,  which,  as  the  Reviewer  observes, 
‘ occupy  the  remainder  of  the  pamphlet.’  (1) 

“ It  was  therefore  with  no  slight  surprise  that  I looked  at  the 
magnificent  manner  in  which  the  Reviewer  has  spoken  of  the 
small  portion  of  these  seven  small  pages  which  refers  to  the  more 
general  question.  He  calls  it  1 a treatise  (a  Treatise  !)  apparently 
on  the  very  point’  (2),  (p.  259),  ‘ a vindication  of  mathematical 
study’  (3),  (p.  260) ; and  having  thus  made  me  work  at  a task  of 
his  own  devising,  he  repeatedly  expresses  great  disappointment 
that  I have  executed  it  so  ill ; — that  ‘ so  little  is  said  on  the  gen- 
eral argument.’  J should  have  thought  that  this  circumstance 
might  have  helped  him  to  perceive  that  it  was  not  my  general 
argument. 

“ I see  nothing  but  the  convenient  and  blameless  practice  of 
Reviews  in  making  the  title  of  my  book  the  occasion  of  publish- 
ing an  Essay  on  a subject  only  slightly  connected  with  mine  ; 
but  it  appears  to  me  that  to  attempt  to  gain  a victory  by  repre- 
senting a page  or  two  of  my  ‘ Thoughts’  as  containing  all  that 
can  be  said  by  an  able,  earnest,  official  advocate  on  the  other 
side,  is  not  a reasonable  treatment  of  the  question.  The  writer 
proclaims  that  he  means  to  give  ‘ no  quarter  to  my  reasonings  ;’ 
but  this  proceeding  looks  rather  like  making  an  unexpected  at- 
tack on  a point  when  he  thinks  himself  well  prepared,  on  the 
arbitrary  pretext  that  the  truce  has  been  broken  by  the  adver- 
sary. (4) 

“ I should  have  no  disinclination  on  a convenient  occasion,  to 
discuss  the  very  important  and  interesting  question  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  Review.  I can  not,  however,  look  forward  with 
confidence  to  the  prospect  of  my  being  able  to  take  it  up  for  a 
considerable  period  ; and  shall  probably  leave  the  Reviewer  in 
possession  of  his  self-chosen  field  of  battle  for  several  months,  it 


MR.  WHEWELL’S  LETTER. 


315 


may  be  years.  But  if  I should  return  to  the  subject,  I should 
wish  to  know,  as  definitely  as  is  possible,  what  are  the  questions 
at  issue  between  us  ; (5)  and  I would  therefore  beg  from  the 
Reviewer  information  on  the  following  points  : 

“ The  Works  which  form  our  examples  of  Mathematical  reason- 
ing are  well  known ; I wish  to  know  also  what  works  of  ‘ Prac- 
tical Logic’  on  other  subjects  (p.  263)  the  Reviewer  is  willing  to 
propose  as  rival  instruments  of  education.  (6) 

“ I wish  to  have  some  distinct  account  of  the  nature  of  that 
‘ Philosophy’  which  is  by  the  Reviewer  put  in  contrast  to  Ma- 
thematical study  (p.  272) ; and  if  possible  to  have  some  work  or 
works  pointed  out,  in  which  this  Philosophy  is  supposed  to  be 
presented  in  such  a way  as  to  make  it  fit  to  be  a cardinal  point 
of  education. 

“I  may  remark  also,  that  all  the  Reviewer’s  arguments,  and,  I 
believe,  the  judgments  of  all  his  1 cloud  of  witnesses,’  are  found- 
ed upon  the  nature  and  processes  of  pure  mathematics  only  ; — 
on  a consideration  of  the  study  of  the  mere  properties  of  space 
and  number.  My  suggestion  of  the  means  of  increasing  the  util- 
ity of  mathematical  studies  was  directed  mainly  to  this  point ; — 
that  we  should  avoid  confining  ourselves  to  pure  mathematics  ; 
— that  we  should  resort  to  departments  in  which  we  have  to  deal 
with  other  grounds  of  necessary  truth,  as  well  as  the  intuitions 
of  space  and  time  : so  far,  therefore,  the  Reviewer  and  I have  a 
common  aim,  and  I notice  this  with  the  more  pleasure,  since  we 
have  so  far  a better  prospect  of  understanding  each  other  in  any 
future  discussion.  (7) 

“ I will  not  now  trespass  further  on  your  patience.  In  order 
to  remind  my  Cambridge  readers  of  the  state  of  the  question,  I 
shall  probably  place  before  them  something  to  the  same  effect  as 
what  I have  now  written. 

“ Believe  me,  my  dear  Sir, 

“ Yours  very  faithfully, 

“ W.  Whewell.” 


316 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


Notes  on  the  preceding  Letter. 

(1)  AVe  of  course  willingly  admit  whatever  Mr.  Whewell  says 
was  his  intention  in  writing  his  pamphlet ; but  we  must  he  al- 
lowed to  maintain  that,  as  written , our  view  of  its  purport  (in  re- 
commendation and  defense  of  mathematics  in  general,  as  a mean 
of  liberal  education)  is  the  view  which  every  reader,  looking  either 
at  the  title  of  the  treatise,  or  at  the  distribution  and  conduct  of 
its  argument,  must  necessarily  adopt.  The  title  is — <!  Thoughts 
on  the  Study  of  Mathematics,  as  a part  of  a Liberal  Education.” 
The  pamphlet  opens  with  a statement  of  the  two  counter-opinions 
in  regard  to  the  study  of  mathematics,  as  a mental  discipline ; — 
the  one  holding  it  to  be  highly  beneficial,  the  other,  highly  detri- 
mental. Mr.  Whewell  then  proceeds  : “Any  view  of  this  subject 
which  would  show  us  how  far  and  under  what  circumstances 
each  of  these  opinions  is  true,  would  probably  help  us  to  see  how 
we  must  regulate  our  studies  so  as  to  make  them  most  benefi- 
cial,” &c.  “It  is  in  this  belief  that  the  few  reflections  which  fol- 
low have  been  written.”  The  plan  of  the  work  being  thus  laid 
down,  the  author  goes  on  to  accomplish  the  first  part  of  his  un- 
dertaking, by  endeavoring  to  show,  that  the  former  opinion  is 
absolutely  true  ; inasmuch  as  the  study  of  mathematics  is  con- 
ducive, even  more  than  logic,  to  the  cultivation  of  the  reasoning 
faculty.  This  being  done,  he  passes  to  the  second  part , and  en- 
deavors to  show,  that  the  tatter  opinion  is  conditionally  true,  in- 
asmuch as  certain  modes  of  teaching  the  science,  to  which  Mr. 
Whewell  is  opposed,  are  given  up  as  worthy  of  all  condemnation. 
These  two  parts  are,  ex  facie  libri,  co-ordinate;  nay,  so  far  is  the 
first  part,  though  occupying  a smaller  portion  of  the  pamphlet, 
from  being  “ obviously  only  an  introduction”  to  the  second,  that, 
whatever  were  the  intentions  of  the  writer,  if  the  two  be  not 
allowed  to  be  co-ordinate,  the  reader  must,  from  the  tenor  of  the 
writing,  hold  the  second  to  he  correlative  to  the  first.  For  it  is 
only  on  the  ground  of  the  first  part — only  on  the  supposition  of 
the  general  argument  being  conclusive,  that  the  second  part,  or 
special  argument,  is  allowed  by  the  pamphlet  subordinately  to 
emerge.  The  following  are  the  words  of  transition  from  the  one 
head  to  the  other:  “Supposing,  then,  that  we  wish  to  consider 
mathematics  as  an  element  of  education,  and  as  a means  of  form- 


OBSERVATIONS  ON  MR.  WHEWELL’S  LETTER. 


317 


ing  logical  habits  better  than  logic  itself,  it  becomes  an  important 
question,  bow  far  this  study,  thus  recommended , is  justly  charge- 
able with  evil  consequences,  such  as  have  been  already  mention- 
ed.” Then  follows  the  rest  of  the  passage  (p.  263)  referred  to  by 
Mr.  Whewell  and  quoted  in  the  Review ; where,  however,  there 
is  not  to  be  found  a single  .word  of  a different  tendency. 

(2)  We  must  be  allowed  jto  observe,  that  we  did  not.  That  ex- 
pression was  used  by  us  in  speaking  of  the  whole  work,  and  in 
speaking  of  it  as  yet  known,  only  from  the  advertisement  of  its 
title.  What  is  Mr.  Whewell’s  notion  of  a treatise  ? 

(3)  If  the  first  division  of  the  pamphlet  be  not  a “ vindication 
of  mathematical  study  as  a principal  mean  in  the  cultivation  of 
the  reasoning  faculty”  (for  that  is  our  full  expression),  what  is 
it?  We  said  that  it  was  too  short;  and  that  it  took  notice  of 
none  of  the  objections  to  the  study  in  general,  as  disqualifying 
the  mind  for  observation  and  common  reasoning.  We  can  not, 
therefore,  justly  be  accused  of  allowing  it  to  be  supposed,  far  less 
of  holding  it  out,  to  be  other  than  what  it  actually  is.  How  then 
can  Mr.  Whewell  assert,  as  he  afterward  does,  that  we  “attempted 
to  gain  a victory  by  .representing  a page  or  two  of  his  ‘ Thoughts’ 

• as  containing  all  that  can  be  said  by  an  able , earnest , official 
advocate?'1'1  But  though  the  general  argument  was,  as  we  stated, 
brief  and  only  confirmatory,  were  we  not  warranted,  on  that  very 
ground,  in  supposing  that  Mr.  Whewell  regarded  it  as  of  itself 
sufficiently  strong — as  of  itself  decisive  ? Because  it  is  shown  to 
be  illogical,  it  does  not  cease  to  exist. 

(4)  The  expression  quoted  was,  in  its  connection , manifestly 
only  one  of  personal  civility  to  Mr.  Whewell.  Of  all  meanings,  as- 
suredly the  one  here  put  upon  it  is  about  the  last  which  it  could 
reasonably  bear.  We  were  too  conscious  of  the  unavoidable  haste 
in  which  the  article  and  its  authorities  were  thrown  together, 
with  sole  reference  to  Mr.  Whewell’s  treatise,  to  dream  of  plum- 
ing ourselves  on  our  preparation  for  attack.  On  this  ground  we 
must  even  found  an  excuse  for  one  error  at  least,  incurred  in  our 
too  absolute  assertion  touching  Bacon,  in  the  text  [now  corrected] 
and  relative  note  at  p.  304.  As  to  “truce” — “pretext” — “ad- 
versary,” we  comprehend  nothing. 

(5)  The  one  general  thesis  which  we  maintained  was  : That 
the  study  of  the  mathematical  sciences  is,  for  reasons  assigned, 
undeserving  of  special  encouragement,  as  a mean  of  mental  cul- 
tivation ; and,  therefore,  that  the  University  of  Cambridge,  in  so 


318 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


far  as  its  system  of  education  bestows  not  only  a special , but  a 
paramount,  not  to  say  an  exclusive,  encouragement  on  these 
sciences,  violates  every  principle  of  academical  policy.1 

1 [Dr.  Whewell  on  this  says  : — “ The  charge,  that  the  University  of  Cambridge 
bestows  not  only  a special  but  a paramount  and  exclusive  encouragement  on  these 
(the  mathematical)  sciences  is  not  only  unfounded,  but  is  inexcusably  so,  because  it 
is  impossible  to  refer  to  any  record  of  the  prizes  which  the  University  bestows,  with- 
out seeing  that  there  is  a much  greater  number  offered  and  given  in  other  subjects 
than  in  Mathematics.”  (Mechanics,  fifth  edition,  Preface,  p.  viii.) 

What  I stated  (though  Dr.  Whewell  is  pleased  to  call  it  ‘‘not  only  unfounded,  but 
inexcusably  so”),  is  literally  correct. 

But  Dr.  Whewell,  in  the  first  place,  misrepresents  my  words.  I did  not  say,  “that 
the  University  of  Cambridge  bestows  an  exclusive  encouragement  on  the  mathematical 
sciences;”  and  what  did  I say,  “that  the  University  of  Cambridge  bestows  not  only 
a special  but  a paramount,  not  to  say  an  exclusive,  encouragement  on  these  sciences” 
— this  is  rigidly  true. 

But  in  the  second  place,  Dr.  Whewell  himself  asserts  what,  to  use  his  own  words', 
“is  not  only  unfounded,  but  inexcusably  so,”  inasmuch  as  he  makes  “the  prizes 
which  the  University  bestows,”  and  their  “ number ,”  the  measure  of  academical  en- 
couragement. This  is  wholly  fallacious;  and  for  these  reasons: — 1°,  The  prizes, 
afford  they  what  encouragement  they  may,  arc  not  founded,  can  not  be  withheld,  and 
therefore  are  not,  in  propriety  bestowed,  by  the  University,  that  is  by  its  dominant 
body,  at  all.  They  are  the  accidental  bequests  of  individuals,  in  favor  of  certain  favor- 
ite pursuits  (it  may  be)  of  certain  personal  crotchets.  2°,  Their  number  is  insignifi- 
cant, and  a large  minority  given  to,  or  not  without,  mathematical  eminence.  3°,  Their 
pecuniary  value  is  small,  and,  in  this  respect,  the  highest  are  the  mathematical.  4°, 
The  competition  is  principally  for  those  mathematical,  as  to  them  the  highest  honor  ^ 
and  the  surest  advantages  are  attached.  5°,  But  to  these  inadequate  marks  of  dis- 
tinction, which  the  University  really  does  not  bestow,  and  for  which,  be  it  for  good  or 
ill,  it  is,  in  fact,  not  responsible,  Dr.  Whewell  would  not  only  himself  limit,  but  would 
compel  me  to  limit,  the  encouragement  which  Cambridge  extends  to  the  several 
branches  of  education.  Marvelous  to  say  ! he  wholly  overpasses  the  one  encourage- 
ment, in  comparison  to  which  all  others  fade  out  of  view  ; I mean  the  Tripos,  that  is, 
as  he  himself  defines  it,  “the  list  of  the  names  of  those  to  whom  the  University  assigns 
honorable  distinction  after  a public  trial,”  and  this  in  the  order  of  merit. 

It  will  not  be  denied  that  this  is  the  standard,  according  to  which  in  Cambridge 
(and  be  it  spoken  to  the  credit  of  the  place),  appointments  in  University  and  College 
are  usually  determined.  The  Tripos,  and  not  the  Prizes,  is  therefore  the  measure  by 
which  principally  if  not  exclusively  is  to  be  gaged  the  amount  of  encouragement — the 
quantum  of  honor  and  advantage,  bestowed  in  Cambridge  on  the  several  academical 
studies.  This  being  premised,  the  following  facts  can  not  be  denied. — 1°,  That  for 
near  a century,  to  go  no  higher  (from  1739  to  1824)  there  was  no  Tripos  list,  that  is, 
no  public  honor,  except  for  mathematical  distinction. — 2°,  That  during  that  time,  and 
down  to  1830  (when  “the  Previous  Examination”  with  its  sorry  minimum  began),  no 
qualification  whatsoever,  besides  a certain  mathematical  competence,  was  requisite  for 
a degree  ; the  University  of  Cambridge  according  its  certificate  of  proficiency  in  the 
seven  liberal  arts  to  every  illiterate  barbarian  who  went  up  evcir  for  the  lowest  of  its 
three  classes  of  mathematical  honors  : and  as  such  degree  was  a passport  into  holy 
orders,  this  “Venerable  School”  was  allowed,  for  generations,  to  deluge  the  Church 
of  England  with  a clergy  void  even  of  one  ascertained  qualification  for  their  sacred 
calling.  So  far,  though  all  our  British  Universities  are  in  various  respects  absurd,  the 
University  of  Cambridge,  in  this  absurdity,  may  rank  supreme. — 3°,  That  when,  in 
1824,  the  Classical  Tripos  commenced,  though  no  classical  proficiency  was  required 
from  the  competitor  for  mathematical  honors,  a mathematical  honor  was  required  as  a 
preliminary  from  all  who  would  compete  for  classical  distinction.  Thus,  encourage- 
ment to  classical  study  was  only  allowed  as  an  additional  stimulus  to  mathematical ; 


OBSERVATIONS  ON  MR.  WHEWELL’S  LETTER,  ETC. 


319 


(6)  We  objected  not  to  the  works  in  which  mathematics  are 
studied  in  Cambridge  ; but  to  the  disproportioned  encouragement 
which  that  university  accords  to  the  study  of  mathematics  alto- 
gether ; and  we  argued  for  the  restoration  of  philosophy  proper, 
to  its  old  and  legitimate  pre-eminence,  and  not  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  any  particular  books  in  which  that  philosophy  may  be 
best  presented.  This  may  form  the  subject  of  ulterior  discussion. 
But  we  shall  certainly  not  perplex  the  present  question,  by  a 
compliance  with  Mr.  Whewell’s  misplaced  request.* 1 

and  accordingly,  if  I had  asserted,  as  I did  not,  that  the  University  of  Cambridge  be- 
stowed an  exclusive  encouragement  on  the  latter  study,  I should  not  perhaps  have 
asserted  more  than  what  any  one  was  warranted  to  do.  (Of  the  recent  changes  in  the 
academical  system  of  Cambridge  it  would  be  here  out  of  place  to  say  any  thing.  But 
see  Appendix,  III.) — Whether  then,  is  Dr.  Whewell’s  statement  or  mine — “not  only 
unfounded,  but  inexcusably  sol”] 

1 [Referring  to  this  paragraph.  Dr.  Whewell  (in  his  book  on  the  Principles  of  En- 
glish University  Education,  p.  2)  says  : — There  is  another  controversy,  to  which  some 
part  of  the  following  pages  may  appear  to  have  reference; — the  question  of  the  com- 
parative value  of  Mathematics,  and  of  certain  other  studies  which  have  been  termed 
Philosophy,  as  instruments  of  education.  An  Edinburgh  Reviewer,  in  a criticism  upon 
a former  publication  of  mine,  -maintained  that  the  study  of  mathematics  is,  for  such  a 
purpose,  useless  or  prejudicial  ; and  recommended  the  cultivation  of  ‘ philosophy’  in 
its  place.  In  a letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Review  (which  I published),  I expressed 
my  willingness  to  discuss  the  subject  at  a future  time ; and,  referring  to  the  mathema- 
^ tical  course  of  this  University,  as  my  example  of  mathematical  education,  I requested 
to  be  informed,  by  description,  or  by  reference  to  books,  what  that  ‘ philosophy’  was, 
which  the  Reviewer  was  prepared  to  contend  for,  as  a better  kind  of  education.  I 
considered  this  as  a proceeding,  in  the  courtesy  of  literary  combat,  equivalent  to  send- 
ing my  opponent  the  measure  of  my  weapon,  and  begging  to  be  furnished  with  the 
dimensions  of  his.  When,  therefore,  the  reviewer,  in  reply,  flatly  refused  ‘ to  perplex 
the  question  by  a compliance  with  Mr.  Whewell’s  misplaced  request,’  I certainly  con- 
sidered myself  as  freed  from  any  call  to  continue  the  controversy.  No  adherent  of 
the  reviewer  could  expect  me  to  refute  a proposition  which  the  author  himself  did  not 
venture  to  enunciate  in  an  intelligible  form.  And,  therefore,  in  the  present  book,  I 
do  not  at  all  profess  to  discuss  the  question  of  the  value  of  mathematics,  and  other 
kinds  of  philosophy,  with  reference  to  the  reviewer’s  assertion,  but  simply  so  far  as  it 
;s  brought  before  me  by  the  general  course  of  my  reflections.” 

On  this  I must  be  permitted  to  observe,  that  Dr.  Whewell  represents  me  as  saying 
what,  in  fact,  is  a reversal  of  my  real  expression.  For  I did  not  “ flatly  refuse ” to 
state  what  I thought  were  the  particular  books  in  which  philosophy  might  be  most 
profitably  studied,  I merely  adjourned  it  to  its  proper  season.  “This,”  I said,  “may 
form  the  subject  of  ulterior  discussion.”  I did  not,  as  Dr.  Whewell  quotes  me,  “refuse 
‘to  perplex  the  question,'  ” &c.,  but  “to  perplex  the  present  question,”  &c.  This  is 
what  I actually  said. 

In  this  proceeding  I was  fully  persuaded  of  its  propriety.  The  question  on  which 
I had  engaged  was,  the  utility  of  mathematical  study,  in  general,  in  any  form,  in  any 
hooks,  as  a liberal  exercise  of  mind ; and  this  question  behoved  to  be  disposed  of,  before 
entering  on  another — and  another  which  only  emerged,  and  that  too  subordinately, 
after  the  primary  and  principal  problem  had  been  decided.  On  this  problem,  I was 
firmly  convinced  that  Dr.  Whewell  could  allege  nothing  solid  in  favor  of  mathematical 
study,  to  the  extent  in  which  it  is  fostered  or  forced  in  Cambridge  ; for  to  that  extent, 
I knew  that  nothing  solid  ever  had  been,  nor  I believed  ever  could  be,  alleged  in  favor 
of  mathematical  study.  Was  I therefore  to  descend  from  this  impregnable  position, 


320 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


(7)  Our  objections  and  those  of  the  authorities  which  we 
adduced,  are  directed  against  [the  excessive  study  of]  the  mathe- 

where  I stood  secure,  and  of  which  I believed  (the  event  has  justified  the  anticipation), 
that  Dr.  Whewell  was  too  prudent  to  attempt  the  assault  1 — Counter  arguments, 
worthy  of  consideration,  there  are  none  ; and  as  to  authorities  of  any  cogency,  there 
is  only  the  authority  of  the  University  of  Cambridge  itself.  And  of  what  value  is 
that  ? It  is  not,  in  fact,  the  University  of  Cambridge,  in  propriety,  which  can  be 
alleged  as  such  authority  ; that  is,  the  University  organized  by  statute.  It  is  only  a 
private  and  intrusive  interest  which  has  there  superseded  the  public  seminary,  and  this 
has  calculated  for  the  advantage  of  its  members,  and  not  for  the  national  good,  the 
education  which  Cambridge  has  long  been  permitted  to  dispense.  This  private  interest 
is  that  of  the  Colleges  and  of  their  Tutors  ; and  in  Cambridge  there  has  for  genera- 
tions been  taught,  not  what  the  ends  of  education,  not  what  the  ends  of  science,  pre- 
scribe, but  only  what  and  how  the  College  Tutors  are  capable  of  teaching.  It  would 
be  here  out  of  place  (and  is  indeed  done  elsewhere)  to  explain  how  a mere  tutorial 
instruction  must  be  scanty  and  mechanical,  and  how  the  mechanism  once  made  up, 
remains,  and  must  remain,  long  after  the  opinions  which  it  chances  to  comprehend 
and  teach  are  elsewhere  exploded.  Suffice  it  for  an  example,  that  fifty,  that  sixty 
years  after  Newton  had  published  his  Principia,  the  physical  hypotheses  of  Descartes 
were  still  tutorially  inculcated  in  Newton's  own  University  : in  fact,  I believe,  that 
the  Cambridge  Colleges  were  about  the  last  seminaries  throughout  Europe  in  which 
the  Newtonian  doctrine  superseded  the  Cartesian  ; and  this  too  in  opposition  to  the 
Professorial  authority  of  Newton  himself,  and  his  successors  in  the  public  chair.  And 
why  1 Simply  because  in  these  colleges  instruction  was  dispensed  by  tutors,  for  their 
own  convenience  and  advantage  ; and  these  tutors,  educated  in  the  older  system,  were 
unable  or  unwilling  to  re-educate  themselves  for  teachers  of  the  new.  This  is  an  ex- 
ample of  the  value  of  Collegial,  of  Tutorial,  authority  in  Cambridge  ; and  we  may  be 
sure,  that  whatever  are  the  subjects  comprised  in  the  tutorial  mechanism  of  the  time, 
will  be  clamorously  asserted  by  the  collegial  interest  to  be  the  best  possible  subjects 
of  academical  education  ; while  all  beyond  it,  all  especially  that  can  not  be  reduced  to 
a catechetical  routine,  will  be  as  clamorously  decried.  Even  the  noble  and  invigor- 
ating study  of  ancient  literature  may  be  reduced  to  a comparatively  barren  and  unim- 
proving exercise  of  the  lower  faculties  alone.  But  on  this  matter  I am  happy  to  agree 
with  Dr.  Whewell ; and  nothing  certainly  can  be  more  deserved  than  his  censure  of 
the  Cambridge  tutorial  methods  of  classical  reading  and  examination. 

But  the  notion  of  Dr.  Whewell,  that  because  the  Cambridge  text  books  on  mathe- 
matics are  “well  known”  (though,  if  I knew,  I never  once  referred  to  any),  therefore, 
that  I was  bound,  and  hoc  statu,  to  specify  the  book  or  books  on  philosophy  which  I 
would  recommend  in  their  room  ; — this  notion  is  not  merely  preposterous.  For — 

1°.  In  mathematics  there  is  no  difference  of  opinion  about  mathematical  truth;  all 
mathematical  books  are  all  true  ; and  the  only  difference  of  better  and  worse,  between 
one  mathematical  book  and  another  is,  that  this  presents  the  common  truths  under 
an  easier  form  than  that,  exacting,  therefore,  from  the  student  a less  amount  of  intel- 
lectual effort.  The  best  mathematical  treatise  thus  constitutes,  pro  tanto,  in  itself, 
the  worst  instrument  of  education.  For — - 

2°.  The  highest  end  of  education  is  not  to  dictate  truths,  but  to  stimulate  exertion : 
since  the  mind  is  not  invigorated,  developed,  in  a word,  educated,  by  the  mere  posses- 
sion of  truths,  but  by  the  energy  determined  in  their  quest  and  contemplation.  But — 
3°.  This  is  better  done  by  any  work  on  philosophy  which  stimulates  to  strong  and 
independent  (be  it  even  for  the  time  erroneous)  speculation,  than  by  the  best  work  in 
mathematics  which  delivers  truth  but  does  not  excite  thought.  Mathematical  con- 
trasted with  philosophical  truths,  are,  indeed,  comparatively  uninteresting,  compara- 
tively worthless  ; but  they  are  more  certain.  I admit,  indeed,  now,  as  I have  done 
before  : — “ Mathematics,  from  the  first,  have  been  triumphant  over  the  husk  ; Philo- 
sophy is  still  militant  for  the  kernel.”  But  what  is  this  to  the  question — Which  study 
best  cultivates  the  mind  ?] 


OBSERVATIONS  ON  MR.  WHEWELL’S  LETTER,  ETC. 


321 


matical  sciences  in  general.  Mathematics  can  be  applied  to 
objects  of  experience  only  in  so  far  as  these  are  measurable  ; 
that  is,  in  so  far  as  they  come,  or  are  supposed  to  come,  under 
the  categories  of  extension  and  number.  Applied  mathematics 
are,  therefore,  equally  limited  and  equally  unimproving  as  pure. 
The  sciences,  indeed,  with  which  mathematics  are  thus  associated, 
may  afford  a more  profitable  exercise  of  mind  ; but  this  is  only 
in  so  far  as  they  supply  the  matter  of  observation,  and  of  probable 
reasoning,  and  therefore,  before  this  matter  is  hypothetically  sub- 
jected to  mathematical  demonstration  or  calculus.  Were  there 
in  the  physical  sciences,  as  Mr.  Whewell  supposes,  other  grounds 
of  necessary  truth  than  the  intuitions  of  Space  and  Time,  the 
demonstrations  deduced  from  these  would  be  equally  monotonous, 
equally  easy,  and  equally  unimproving,  as  the  mathematical. 
But,  that  Mr.  Whewell  confounds  empirical  with  pure  knowledge, 
is  shown  by  the  very  example  which  he  adduces  at  p.  33  of  his 
pamphlet.  The  solution  of  that  requires  nothing  but  experience 
and  the  logical  analysis  of  thought.1 

1 [Referring  to  this  paragraph,  Dr.  Whewell  (Preface  to  the  fifth  edition  of  his 
Mechanics,  p.  vi.)  says  : “ Some  persons  appear  to  doubt  whether  there  are,  in  the 
physical  sciences,  other  grounds  of  necessary  truth  than  the  intuitions  of  space  and 
time.  We  might  demand  of  such  persons  whether  the  properties  of  the  pressures 
which  balance  each  other  on  the  lever,  as  proved  by  Archimedes,  be  not  necessary 
truths  ! whether  our  conceptions  of  pressures,  and  the  properties  of  pressures,  are 
modifications  of  our  conceptions  of  space  and  time!  and  if  they  are  not,  whether  nec- 
essary truths  concerning  pressures  must  not  have  some  other  ground  than  the  Axioms 
of  Geometry  and  Number!  We  might  ask  them  whether  we  do  not,  in  fact,  in  works 
like  this,  show  that  there  are  such  other  grounds,  by  actually  enunciating  them ! 
whether  the  Axiom,  that  the  pressure  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
weights,  be  not  self-evident,  and  therefore  necessary ! 

“ If  it  be  said,  that  the  establishment  of  such  propositions  as  this  ‘ requires  nothing 
but  experience  and  the  logical  analysis  of  thought,’  we  can  not  help  replying,  that 
such  a remark  seems  to  betray  confusion  of  thought  and  ignorance  of  the  subject. 
For  it  w'ould  appear  as  if  the  author  denied  the  character  of  necessary  truth  to  such 
principles  because  they  depend  only  on  experience  and  analysis  ; and  that  if,  besides 
these,  they  depended  upon  some  additional  grounds,  he  would  allow  them  to  be  neces- 
sary. Again,  it  is  clear  that,  in  fact,  such  propositions  do  not  depend  at  all  upon  ex- 
perience ; for,  as  has  elsewhere  been  urged — ‘ Who  supposes  that  Archimedes  thought 
it  necessary  to  verify  this  result  by  actual  trial ! Or  if  he  had  done  so,  by  what  more 
evident  principle  could  he  have  tested  the  equality  of  the  weights  !’  (Thoughts  on  the 
Study  of  Mathematics,  &c.  p.  33.)  And  if  such  propositions  depend  upon  logical 
analysis  only,  how  can  they  be  otherwise  than  necessary ! Does  the  objector  hold 
that  truths  which  resolve  themselves  into  logical  analysis,  are  empirical  truths ! 

“ I conceive,  therefore,  that  the  cultivation  of  such  a subject  as  this  may  be  of  great 
use  both  to  the  Students  of  this  University  and  to  other  persons,  not  only  in  familiar- 
izing them  with  the  character  of  necessary  truths,  and  the  processes  of  reasoning  by 
which  a system  of  such  truths  is  built  up  ; but  also  by  showing  that  such  truths  are 
not  confined  to  the  domain  of  space  and  number  merely.” 

Here  the  tables  are  completely  turned. — I had  objected  to  mathematical  study — that, 
if  too  exclusively  pursued,  it  tended  to  induce  a habit  of  confused  thinking  ; but  “ con- 

X 


322 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


fusion  of  thought  and  ignorance  of  the  subject”  are  here  objected  to  the  objector 
This  stroke  is  bold,  but  dangerous.  If  not  successful  it  is  suicidal ; for  it  challenges 
retort,  and  should  the  missile  from  Dr.  Whewell  fall  harmless,  it  may  be  returned  with 
even  fatal  effect. 

Dr.  Whewell,  by  position,  is  the  first  man  in  the  first  college,  as  by  reputation,  he 
is  the  ablest  functionary,  of  Cambridge.  In  that  mathematical  university  he  stands 
the  foremost  mathematician  ; but  there,  he  likewise  rises  pre-eminent,  out  of  mathe- 
matics, as  a philosopher.  Cambridge  and  mathematics  could  not,  therefore,  be  more 
favorably  represented.  In  these  circumstances,  if  Dr.  Whewell,  accusing  others,  be 
himself,  and  from  the  very  terms  of  his  accusation,  proved  guilty  of  his  own  charge ; 
how  virulent,  how7  permanently  deleterious,  must  be  the  effect  of  mathematical  study, 
when  a naturally  vigorous  intellect  could  not  resist,  when  other  and  invigorating 
studies  could  not  counteract,  the  mathematical  alacrity  to  confusion  of  thought,  even 
during  the  brief  act  of  preferring  that  reproach  itself,  and  with  reference  likewise  to 
a favorite  science  1 But  so  it  is.  For  to  establish  the  fact,  it  is  unnecessary  to  look 
beyond  the  previous  extract ; which,  both  in  the  ground  of  charge  itself,  and  in  the 
statements  by  which  that  charge  is  accompanied,  supplies  abundant  evidence  of  con- 
fused and  inadequate  thinking. 

Dr.  Whewell  here,  as  in  his  “ Thoughts  on  the  Study  of  Mathematics,”  repeated- 
ly propounds  it,  as  “a  self-evident,  and  therefore  necessary”  proposition — as  an 
“ Axiom  that  “ the  pressure  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  weights.”  But 
to  common  sense  and  unconfused  consciousness  this  proposition  is  nothing  of  the 
kind  ; it  is  not  self-evident,  it  is  not  necessary,  it  is  not  an  axiom,  for  it  is  not  true. 
The  pressure  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  weights,  plus  the  weight  of  the 
lever ; in  other  w'ords,  it  is  equal  to  the  weight  of  the  system.  Of  course,  no  one 
knows  this  better  than  Dr.  Whewell,  but  having  ideally  abstracted  from  the  weight  of 
the  lever,  he  inadvertently  advanced,  in  his  popular  pamphlet,  without  warning  or  ex- 
planation, a statement  which,  to  popular  apprehension,  is  manifestly  false.  There  are 
other  parts  of  this  extract  which  I for  one  do  not  pretend  to  understand — without  at 
least  supplying  what  the  author  has  omitted  ; but  let  that  pass. 

Having  so  indistinctly  expressed  himself,  I can  not  wonder  that  Dr.  Whewell  has  so 
completely  misconceived  me;  supposing,  as  he  does,  that  I could  possibly  hold  pro- 
positions to  be  empirical,  to  be  not  necessary,  in  so  far  as  these  are  applications  of  the 
canons  of  Logic.  What  T said,  and  clearly  said,  was  this: — that  the  proposition  in 
question  (waving  all  inadequacy  of  expression)  is  no  axiom,  is  no  principle , because  a 
derivative  judgment,  derived  too  from  a double  source;  1°,  derived  from  the  exercise 
of  experience  ; 2°,  derived  from  the  laws  of  thought.  This  was  said,  in  saying,  that 
Dr.  Whewell’s  pretended  axiom  “ requires  nothing  for  its  solution  but  experience  and 
the  logical  analysis  of  thought.”  And  that  it  is  derived,  and  derived  from  these  two 
sources,  I now  proceed  to  establish. 

1°.  It  is  derived  from  experience. — Dr.  Whewell  asserts,  “that  such  propositions 
do  not  depend  at  all  upon  experience.”  On  the  contrary,  I maintain  that  all  propo- 
sitions which  involve  the  notion  of  gravitation,  weight,  pressure,  presuppose  experience ; 
for  by  experience  alone  do  we  become  aware,  that  there  is  such  a quale  and  quantum 
in  the  universe.  To  think  it  existent,  there  is  no  necessity  of  thought  ; for  we  can 
easily  in  thought  conceive  the  particles  of  matter,  indifferent  to  each  other,  nay,  en- 
dowed with  a mutually  repulsive,  instead  of  a mutually  attractive  force.  We  can 
even,  in  thought,  annihilate  matter  itself.  So  far  the  asserted  axiom  is  merely  a 
derived,  and  that  too  merely  an  empirical,  proposition. — But,  moreover,  not  only  are 
we  dependent  on  experience,  for  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  gravitation,  &c.,  we  are 
also  indebted  to  observation  for  the  further  facts  of  the  uniform  and  continuous  opera- 
tion of  that  force  ; and  thus,  in  a second  potence,  are  all  such  propositions  dependent 
upon  experience. — In  sum  : We  can  not  think  this  and  such  like  propositions,  without 
founding  doubly  upon  experience. — Dr.  Whewell.  indeed  observes,  in  addition  to  what 
has  been  extracted  : — “ If  it  be  said,  that  we  can  not  possess  the  ideas  of  pressure  and 
mechanical  action  without  the  use  of  our  senses,  and  that  this  is  experience  ; it  is 
sufficient  to  reply,  that  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  ideas  of  relations  in  space  ; and 
that  thus  Geometry  depends  upon  experience  in  this  sense,  no  less  than  Mechanics.” 


OBSERVATIONS  ON  MR.  WHEWELL’S  LETTER.  ETC. 


323 


(lb.  p.  viii.) — This  is,  however,  only  another  instance,  in  him,  of  the  “confusion  of 
thought  and  ignorance  of  the  subject,”  which  he  imputes  to  me.  “The  ideas  of  rela- 
tions in  space,”  and  “ the  ideas  of  pressure,”  &c.,  differ  obtrusively  in  this  : — that  we 
can  in  thought  easily  annul  pressure,  all  the  properties  of  matter,  and  even  matter 
itself;  but  are  wholly  unable  to  think  away  space  and  its  relations.  The  latter  are 
conditions,  the  former  are  educts,  of  experience  ; and  it  is  this  difference  of  their  object- 
matters  which  constitutes  Geometry  a pure  or  a priori,  and  Mechanics,  an  empirical 
or  a posteriori,  science.  (Dr.  Whewell's  errors,  upon  this  and  other  kindred  points, 
are  refuted  with  great  acuteness  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  Mansel  of  St.  John’s,  Oxford,  in  his 
valuable  work  just  published,  entitled — “ Prolegomena  Logica ; an  Inquiry  into  the 
Psychological  character  of  Logical  Processes.”  See  Note  A and  pp.  77,  sq.) 

I now  proceed  to  the  second  head  of  reduction. 

2°,  It  is  derived  from  the  logical  analysis  of  thought. — Under  this  head  my  objection 
to  Dr.  Whewell’s  “Axiom”  is,  that  it  is  merely  a predication  of  a thing  of  itself,  a 
mistaken  commutation  of  the  analytical  principle  of  identity  in  logic  with  a synthetical 
principle  of  some  non-identity  in  mechanics.  This  pretended  axiom  is,  in  fact,  nothing 
more  than  the  tautological  judgment,  “that  the  whole  is  equal  to  all  its  parts  the 
confusion  being  occasioned  and  vailed  by  different  words  being  employed  to  denote 
the  same  thing.  These  different  words  are  weight  and  pressure.  But  weight  and 
pressure  are  (here)  only  various  terms  for  the  same  force.  What  weighs,  pro  tanto, 
is  supposed  to  press  ; what  presses,  pro  tanto,  is  supposed  to  weigh.  The  pressure 
on  the  fulcrum — -is  thus  only  another  phrase  for — the  weight  on  the  fulcrum ; and  to 
say,  with  Dr.  Whewell,  that  “ the  pressure  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the 
weights,”  this  (waving  always  the  inaccuracy)  is  only  tantamount  to  saying — either, 
that  the  pressure  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  pressures  on  the  lever — 
or,  that  the  weight  on  the  fulcrum  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  weights  on  the  lever. 

It  consequently  requires,  as  I said,  only  a logical  analysis  of  the  enouncement  that 
“the  whole  is  equal  to  all  its  parts,  therefore,  to  its  two  halves,”  &c.,  to  obtain  the 
idle  proposition  which  Dr.  Whewell  has  dignified  by  the  name  of — Axiom  in  Mechanics. 

Dr.  Whewell’s  error  from  “ confusion  of  thought,”  in  this  instance,  is  akin  to  a 
mistake  which  I have  elsewhere  found  it  necessary  to  expound  (Dissertations  on 
Reid,  p.  853) ; — I mean  his  attempted  “ Demonstration”  (from  a supposed  law  of 
thought),  “ that  all  matter  is  heavy.” 

But — I had  almost  forgotten — what  shall  we  say  of  Archimedes  1 “ The  Axiom” 

is  apparently  fathered  upon  him  ; he  was  a great  mathematical  inventor ; and  it  is 
maintained  above  (p.  283,  sq.)  that  mathematical  invention  and  philosophical  genius 
(in  which  are  necessarily  comprehended  distinct  and  perspicuous  thinking)  coincide. 

I was  certain,  before  re-examining  the  treatise  on  ^Equiponderants  by  Archimedes, 
that  it  could  contain  no  such  principle,  no  such  truism  ; nor  does  it. 

The  reader  is  now  in  a condition  to  decide  : — Whether  the  charge  of  “ confusion 
of  thought  and  ignorance  of  the  subject"  weigh  on  the  accuser  or  on  the  accused  ; and, 
in  general,  Whether  “ Mathematics  be  a means  of  forming  logical  habits  better  than 
Logic  itself." 

But  before  concluding,  I am  tempted  to  give  one  other  specimen  of  “ the  conclusion 
of  thought”  in  Dr.  Whewell’s  reasoning,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  ( telumquc  imbelle 
sine  ictu)  his  “ Mathematical  Logic”  is  brought  to  bear  against  my  arguments. — “ I 
shall  not  pursue,”  says  he,  “ the  consideration  of  the  beneficial  intellectual  influence 
of  Mathematical  studies.  It  would  be  easy  to  point  out  circumstances,  which  show 
that  this  influence  has  really  operated  ; — for  instance,  the  extraordinary  number  of 
persons,  who,  after  giving  more  than  common  attention  to  mathematical  studies  at  the 
University,  have  afterward  become  eminent  as  English  lawyers."  (English  Univer- 
sity  Education,  p.  14.) — The  fact  of  the  consecution  I do  not  doubt.  But  if  Dr.  Whe- 
well  had  studied  logic,  as  he  has  studied  mathematics,  he  would  not  have  confounded  V 
an  antecedent  with  a cause,  a consequent  with  an  effect.  There  is  a sophism  against 
which  logic,  the  discipline  of  unconfused  thinking,  puts  us  on  our  guard,  and  which 
is  technically  called  the  “ Post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc."  Of  this  fallacy  Dr.  Whewell 
is,  in  this  his  one  selected  instance,  guilty.  And  how  1 English  law  has  less  of 
principle,  and  more  of  detail,  than  any  other  national  jurisprudence.  Its  theory  can 


324 


STUDY  OF  MATHEMATICS— NOTE. 


be  conquered,  not  by  force  of  intellect  alone  ; and  success  in  its  practice  requires, 
with  a strong  memory,  a capacity  of  the  most  continuous,  of  the  most  irksome  appli- 
cation. Now  mathematical  study  requires  this  likewise  ; it  therefore  tests,  no  doubt, 
to  this  extent,  “ the  bottom”  of  the  student.  But  because  a great  English  Lawyer 
has  been  a Cambridge  wrangler,  it  is  a curious  logic  to  maintain,  that  mathematical 
study  conduces  to  legal  proficiency.  The  Cambridge  honor  only  shows,  that  a man 
has  in  him,  by  nature,  one  condition  of  a good  English  lawyer.  And  we  might  as 
■well  allege,  in  trying  the  blood  of  a terrier  puppy,  by  holding  him  up  from  ear  or  paw, 
that  the  suspension  itself  was  the  cause  of  his  proving  “ of  the  right  sort as  that 
mathematical  study  bestowed  his  power  of  dogged  application,  far  less  his  power  of 
legal  logic,  on  the  future  counselor.  For  one  man  of  genuine  talent  and  accomplish- 
ment, who  has  sacrificed  to  the  Molech  of  Cambridge  idolatry,  how  many  illiterate 
incapables  do  the  lists  of  mathematical  Wranglers  exhibit  1 How  many  noble  minds 
has  a forced  application  to  mathematical  study  reduced  to  idiocy  or  madness  1 How 
many  generous  victims  (they  “ died  and  made  no  sign”)  have  perished,  and  been  for- 
gotten, in  or  after  the  pursuit  of  a mathematical  Honor  1 This  melancholy  observation 
is  familiarly  made  in  Cambridge  itself.1  Again,  do  “ Mathematics  form  logical  habits 
better  than  Logic  itself V’  As  the  elegant  Lagomarsini  (“vir  melioris  Latinitatis 
peritissimus,”  to  use  the  words  of  Ruhnkenius),  in  his  oration  on  the  Grammar  Schools 
of  Italy,  said  in  reference  to  an  English  criticism  : — “ Hoc  tantum  dicam ; tunc  me 
aequo  animo  de  re  latina  prmcipientes,  Italorumque  in  ea  tractanda  rationem  reprehen- 
dentes,  Britannos  homines  auditurum,  quum  aliquid  vere  latinum  (quod  jamdiu  desi- 
deramus)  ab  se  elaboratum  ad  nos  ex  illo  Oceano  suo  miserint :”  so  for  us,  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  listen  to  any  Cambridge  disparagement  of  non- mathematical  logic, 
when  a bit  of  reasoning  has  issued  from  that  University,  in  praise  of  mathematical 
logic,  not  itself  in  violation  of  all  logical  law — for  such,  as  yet,  certainly,  has  not  been 
vouchsafed.  In  fact,  we  need  look  no  farther  than  the  Cambridge  panegyrics  them- 
selves of  mathematical  study,  to  see  how  illogical  are  the  habits  which  a too  exclusive 
pursuit  of  that  study  fosters. — But  in  conclusion,  Dr.  Whewell  also  says  : — “I  have 
already  noticed  how  well  the  training  of  the  college  appears  to  prepare  men  to  become 
good  lawyers.  I will  add,  that  I conceive  our  physicians  to  be  the  first  in  the  world,” 
&c.  (Ib.  p.  51.)  In  so  far  as  Cambridge  is  concerned,  I should  be  glad  if  Dr.  Whe- 
well had  specified  these  paragons,  who  with  merit  so  transcendent,  hide  their  talent 
under  a bushel ; for  of  their  names,  discoveries,  and  reputations,  I profess  myself 
wholly  ignorant,  and  suspect  that  the  world  is  not  better  informed,  touching  those 
who  are  its  “ first  physicians But  this  fact,  is  it  not  on  a level  with  the  previous 
reasoning  1] 


i With  others,  above,  and  especially  the  two  testimonies  from  the  Quarterly  Review  (pp.  309, 310), 
see  the  Cambridge  pamphlet  lately  published  by  a “Member  of  the  Senate,”  entitled  “ The  Next 
Step”  (p.  43).  The  author,  likewise,  refers  to  a pamphlet  (which  I have  not  seen)  by  Mr.  Blakesley, 
for  a corresponding  statement. 


II.-ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL 
LEARNING. 

WITH  RELATION  TO  THE  DEFENSE  OF  CLASSICAL 
INSTRUCTION  BY  PROFESSOR  PILLANS. 


(October,  1836.) 

Three  Lectures  on  the  Proper  Objects  and  Methods  of  Education 
in  reference  to  the  different  Orders  of  Society ; and  on  the 
relative  Utility  of  Classical  Instruction.  Delivered  in  the 
University  of  Edinburgh,  November,  1835.  By  James  Pillans, 
M.A.,  F.R.S.E.,  Professor  of  Humanity  in  that  University. 
8vo.  Edinburgh : 1836. 

We  regret  that  circumstances  prevented  our  noticing  these 
discourses  in  either  of  our  last  Numbers.  They  are  a good  word 
spoken  in  due  season ; and  sure  we  are,  that  it  will  not  be  spoken 
in  vain,  if  our  Scottish  countrymen  are  not  wholly  disabled  from 
appreciating  at  their  real  value,  this  vindication  of  classical  stu- 
dies, and  the  objections  by  which  they  have  been  here  recently 
assailed.  It  would,  however,  be  a disparagement  of  these  lectures 
to  view  them  as  only  of  temporary  and  local  value  ; far  less,  as 
merely  an  answer  to  what  all  entitled  to  an  opinion  on  the  matter 
must  view  as  undeserving  of  refutation  or  notice — on  its  own 
account.  They  form,  in  fact,  a valuable  contribution  to  the  phi- 
losophy of  education  ; and,  in  particular,  one  of  the  ablest  expo- 
sitions we  possess  of  the  importance  of  philological  studies  in  the 
higher  cultivation  of  the  mind.  As  an  occasional  publication, 
the  answer  does  too  much  honor  to  the  attack.  Indeed,  the  only 
melancholy  manifestation  in  the  opposition  now  raised  to  the 
established  course  of  classical  instruction,  is  not  the  fact  of  such 
opposition  ; but  that  arguments  in  themselves  so  futile — argu- 
ments which,  in  other  countries,  would  have  been  treated  only 


326 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


with  neglect,  should  in  Scotland  not  have  been  wholly  harmless. 
If  such  attacks  have  had  their  influence  on  the  public  mind,  this 
affords  only  another  proof,  not  that  ancient  literature  is  with  us 
studied  too  much,  but  that  it  is  studied  far  too  little.  Where 
classical  learning  has  been  vigorously  cultivated,  the  most  power- 
ful attacks  have  only  ended  in  the  purification  and  improvement 
of  its  study.  In  Germany  and  Holland,  in  Italy,  and  even  in 
France,  objections,  not  unreasonably,  have  been  made  to  an 
exclusive  and  indiscriminate  classical  education ; but  the  experi- 
mental changes  they  determined,  have  only  shown  in  their  result; 
that  ancient  literature  may  be  more  effectually  cultivated  in  the 
school,  if  not  cultivated  alone  ; and  that  while  its  study,  if  pro- 
perly directed,  is,  absolutely,  the  best  mean  toward  an  harmoni- 
ous development  of  the  faculties — the  one  end  of  all  liberal 
education  ; yet,  that  this  mean  is  not  always,  relatively,  the  best, 
when  circumstances  do  not  allow  of  its  full  and  adequate  appli- 
cation. 

It  is  natural  that  men  should  be  inclined  to  soothe  their  vanity 
with  the  belief,  that  what  they  do  not  themselves  know  is  not 
worth  knowing ; and  that  they  should  find  it  easy  to  convert 
others,  who  are  equally  ignorant,  to  the  same  opinion,  is  what 
might  also  confidently  be  presumed.  “ Ce  n’est  pas  merveille,  si 
ceux  qui  n’ont  jamais  mange  de  bonnes  choses,  ne  S9avent  que 
e’est  de  bonnes  viandes.”  On  this  principle,  Scotland  is  the 
country  of  all  others  in  which  every  disparagement  of  classical 
learning  might  be  expected  to  be  least  unsuccessful.  For  it  is 
the  country  where,  from  an  accumulation  of  circumstances,  the 
public  mind  has  been  long  most  feebly  applied  to  the  study  of 
antiquity,  and  where  it  is  daily  more  and  more  diverted  to  othei 
departments  of  knowledge.  A summary  indication  of  the  more 
important  of  these  circumstances  may  suffice  to  show,  that  the 
neglect  of  classical  learning  in  Scotland  is  owing,  neither  to  the 
inferior  value  of  that  learning  in  itself,  nor  to  any  want  of  capa- 
city in  our  countrymen  for  its  cultivation. 

There  are  two  principal  conditions  of  the  prosperity  of  classical 
studies  in  a country.  The  one — the  necessity  there  imposed  of  a 
classical  training  for  the  three  learned  professions  ; the  other — 
the  efficiency  of  its  public  schools  and  universities  in  the  promo- 
tion of  classical  erudition.  These  two  conditions,  it  is  evident, 
severally,  infer  each  other.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  where  a cer- 
tain amount  and  quality  of  learning  is  requisite  for  the  successful 


SCOTLAND  DEFECTIVE  IN  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


32- 


cultivation  of  the  Law,  Medicine,  and  Divinity  of  a country,  this 
of  itself  necessitates  the  existence  of  Schools  and  Universities 
competent  to  its  supply ; and  on  the  other,  where  an  efficient 
system  of  classical  education  has  become  general,  there  the  three 
professions  naturally  assume  a more  learned  character,  and 
demand  a higher  compliment  of  erudition  from  their  members. 
The  prosperity  of  ancient  learning  is  every  where  found  depend- 
ent on  these  conditions  ; and  these  conditions  are  always  found 
in  harmony  with  each  other.  To  explain  the  rise  and  decline 
of  classical  studies  in  different  nations  and  periods,  is  therefore 
only  to  trace  the  circumstances  which  have  in  these  modified  the 
learned  character  of  the  professions,  and  the  efficiency  and  appli- 
cation of  the  great  public  seminaries. 

It  would  be  foolish  to  imagine  that  the  study  of  antiquity  can 
ever  of  itself  secure  an  adequate  cultivation.  How  pleasant  and 
wholesome  soever  are  its  fruits,  they  can  only  he  enjoyed  by  those 
who  have  already  fed  upon  its  bitter  roots.  The  higher  and  more 
peculiar  its  ultimate  advantages  and  pleasures — the  more  it  edu- 
cates to  capacities  of  thought  and  feeling,  which  we  should  never 
otherwise  have  been  taught  to  know  or  to  exert — and  the  more 
that  what  it  accomplishes  can  be  accomplished  by  it  alone — the 
less  can  those  who  have  had  no  experience  of  its  benefits,  ever 
conceive,  far  less  estimate  their  importance.  Other  studies  of 
more  immediate  profit  and  attraction  will  divert  from  it  the  great 
mass  of  applicable  talent.  "Without  external  encouragement  to 
classical  pursuits,  there  can  be  no  classical  public  in  a country, 
there  can  be  no  brotherhood  of  scholars  to  excite,  to  appreciate, 
to  applaud,  o-vfjLcfiiXokoyeiv  ical  crvvevdovcrid^etv.  The  extensive 
diffusion  of  learning  in  a nation  is  even  a requisite  of  its  intensive 
cultivation.  Numbers  are  the  condition  of  an  active  emulation; 
for  without  a rivalry  of  many  vigorous  competitors  there  is  little 
honor  in  the  contest,  and  the  standard  of  excellence  will  be  ever 
low.  For  a few  holders  of  the  plow  there  are  many  prickers 
of  the  oxen  ; and  a score  of  Barneses  are  required  as  the  possibi- 
lity of  a single  Bentley. 

In  accounting,  therefore,  for  the  low  state  of  classical  erudition 
in  Scotland,  we  shall,  in  the  first  place,  indicate  the  causes  why 
in  this  country  an  inferior  amount  of  ancient  learning  has  been 
long  found  sufficient  for  its  Law,  Medicine,  and  Divinity ; and, 
in  the  second , explain  how  our  Scottish  Schools  and  Universities 
are  so  ill  adapted  for  the  promotion  of  that  learning. 


328 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


1.  The  Professions. — Law  can  be  only  viewed  as  conducive  to 
the  cause  of  classical  erudition,  in  so  far  as  (what  in  most  coun- 
tries is  the  case)  it  renders  necessary  a knowledge  of  the  Roman 
jurisprudence;  the  necessity  of  such  a knowledge  being,  in  fact, 
tantamount  to  a necessity  for  the  cultivation  of  Latin  history  and 
literature.  For  while  the  Roman  law  affords  the  example  of  a 
completer  and  more  self-connected  system  than  the  jurisprudence 
of  any  modern  nation  can  exhibit ; without  a minute  and  compre- 
hensive knowledge  of  that  system  in  its  relations  and  totality,  its 
principles  can  neither  be  correctly  understood,  nor  its  conclusions 
with  any  certainty  applied.  This,  however,  is  impossible  without 
a philological  knowledge  of  the  language  in  which  this  law  is 
written,  and  an  historical  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  is  gradually  developed.  On  the  other  hand,  an  acquaint- 
ance with  the  Roman  jurisprudence  has  been  always  viewed  as 
indispensable  for  the  illustration  of  Latin  philology  and  antiqui- 
ties ; insomuch,  that  in  most  countries  of  Europe,  ancient  litera- 
ture and  the  Roman  law  have  prospered  or  declined  together ; 
the  most  successful  cultivators  of  either  department  have  indeed 
been  almost  uniformly  cultivators  of  both. — In  Italy , Roman  law 
and  ancient  literature  revived  together ; and  Alciatus  was  not 
vainer  of  his  Latin  poetry,  than  Politian  of  his  interpretation  of 
the  Pandects. — In  France , the  critical  study  of  the  Roman  juris- 
prudence was  opened  by  Budaeus,  who  died  the  most  accomplished 
Grecian  of  his  age ; and  in  the  following  generation,  Cujacius 
and  Joseph  Scaliger  were  only  the  leaders  of  an  illustrious  band, 
who  combined,  in  almost  equal  proportions,  law  with  literature, 
and  literature  with  law. — To  Holland  the  two  studies  migrated 
in  company ; and  the  high  and  permanent  prosperity  of  the  Dutch 
schools  of  jurisprudence  has  been  at  once  the  effect  and  the  cause 
of  the  long  celebrity  of  the  Dutch  schools  of  classical  philology. — 
In  Germany,  the  great  scholars  and  civilians,  who  illustrated  the 
sixteenth  century,  disappeared  together;  and  with  a few  partial 
exceptions,  they  were  not  replaced  until  the  middle  of  the  eigh- 
teenth, when  the  kindred  studies  began,  and  have  continued  to 
flourish  in  reciprocal  luxuriance. — Classical  literature  and  Roman 
law  owe  less  to  the  jurists  of  England  than  to  those  of  any  other 
country.  The  English  common  law  is  derived  from  sources 
which  it  requires  no  classical  erudition  to  elucidate  ; in  no  other 
nation,  except  our  own,  has  jurisprudence  been  less  liberally  cul- 
tivated as  a general  science — more  exclusively  as  a special  prac- 


LAW,  HOW  CONDUCIVE  TO  CLASSICAL  STUDY.  329 

tice  ; and  though  of  some  recognized  authority  in  certain  English 
Courts,  so  little  has  the  civil  law  been  made  an  object  of  profes- 
sional study,  that  an  English  lawyer  rarely  hazards  an  allusion 
to  the  Imperial  Collections,  without  betraying  his  ignorance  of 
their  very  titles.  Classical  learning  has,  however,  been  always 
laudably  cultivated  in  England,  and  English  jurists  have  accord- 
ingly sometimes  acquired,  as  scholars,  a legal  erudition,  wholly 
superfluous  in  professional  practice.  [This  peculiarity  of  the  En- 
glish jurisprudence  is  noticed  and  commented  on  by  John  Barclay 
in  his  Icon  Animarum.] 

In  Scotland  the  causes  are  different,  although  the  result  is 
nearly  the  same.  In  this  kingdom  the  Roman  jurisprudence 
formerly  possessed  a high,  but  always  an  indefinite,  authority. 
It  exerted  a conspicuous  influence  on  the  genius  and  original 
development  of  the  Scottish  law  ; where  not  controlled  by  statute 
or  custom,  its  determinations  were  usually  admitted  as  decisive ; 
and  some  of  the  most  eminent  of  our  jurists  have  even  recognized 
it  as  the  written  law  of  Scotland.  It  was  usual  also,  until  a com- 
paratively recent  period,  for  those  educated  for  the  Scottish  bar 
to  study  the  Roman  law  under  the  illustrious  civilians  of  France 
or  Holland  ; and  they  returned  from  the  continental  universities, 
if  not  always  profound  scholars,  more  aware,  at  least,  of  the  value 
of  classical  learning,  and  with  a higher  standard  of  classical  at- 
tainment. Still,  however,  the  authority  of  the  Civil  Law  in  Scot- 
land was  never  strong  enough  to  constrain  the  profession  to  its 
profound  and  universal  study ; and  the  necessity  of  resorting  to 
foreign  seminaries  for  the  requisite  education,  showed  that  this 
could  not  adequately  he  procured  at  home.  Among  the  myriads 
of  works  illustrative  of  Roman  jurisprudence,  we  recollect  not 
even  one  that  has  appeared  in  Scotland;  and  the  little  that  has 
been  done  in  this  department  by  Scotsmen  was  executed  abroad, 
— the  result  of  foreign  training,  stimulus,  and  example.  The 
profession  can  lay  no  claim  to  what  Cuningham  proposed — to 
what  Scrymger  and  Henryson  performed.  But  the  authority  of 
the  Roman  jurisprudence,  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  its 
study,  was  destined  gradually  to  decline.  The  Scottish  law  be- 
came more  and  more  reduced  to  statute ; and  after  the  union  of 
the  kingdoms  was  constrained  to  gravitate  with  an  ever  increas- 
ing velocity  toward  the  indigenous  and  anti-Roman  jurisprudence 
of  England.  The  knowledge  of  the  Roman  system  became  always 
rarer  and  less  profound.  The  judges,  perhaps  prudently,  began 


330 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


to  neglect  an  authority  which  was  seldom  adequately  understood ; 
and  in  Scottish  practice  a quotation  from  the  Pandects  now  savors 
rather  of  ostentation  than  of  use. 

Medicine  was  formerly  a profession  which  required  a large 
amount  of  classical  erudition  ; and  among  the  most  illustrious 
scholars  since  the  revival  of  letters,  no  inconsiderable  number 
have  been  physicians.  The  practical  importance  of  this  learning 
in  Scottish  medicine  has,  however,  been  long  gradually  falling. 
Hippocrates  and  Galen  are  not  now  the  authorities.  Medical 
works  are  no  longer  written  and  read  only  in  Latin ; nay,  the 
late  Dr.  Gregory  (the  “Ultimus  Romanorum”)  apologizes  in  his 

Conspectus”  for  not  abandoning  a language  which  promised 
erelong  to  be  unintelligible  to  his  professional  brethren.  The 
future  physician  does  not  now  resort  to  the  classical  schools  of 
Leyden  and  Padua ; and  in  the  universities  of  Scotland,  the  lan- 
guage of  the  learned  has  been  dispensed  with,  not  only  in  medical 
lectures,  but  in  medical  examination.  [In  the  chief  of  these, 
literary  qualification  is  indeed  tested  only  by  the  professional 
teachers  ; while  the  proportion  of  graduates  has  risen  as  the 
number  of  students  has  fallen  off : so  that  a Scottish  degree  in 
medicine  is  now  a valid  guarantee  of  no  higher  classical  accom- 
plishment, than  the  license  from  a Surgical  College  or  certificate 
from  Apothecaries’  Hall.  But  was  it  for  this,  that  the  privilege 
is  intrusted  to  a University  of  conferring  the  “ Summi  in  Medi- 
eina  Plonores?”] 

Theology,  however,  far  more  than  either  Law  or  Medicine, 
affords  an  effectual  support  to  classical  studies  ; for  Christian, 
and  more  especially,  Protestant  theology  is  little  else  than  an 
applied  philology  and  criticism;  of  which  the  basis  is  a profound 
knowledge  of  the  languages  and  history  of  the  ancient  world. 
To  be  a competent  divine  is,  in  fact,  to  be  a scholar. 

Christianity  is  founded  upon  Miracles  ; but  these  miracles  are 
not  continued,  and  the  proof  of  their  original  occurrence  is  con- 
sequently left  to  human  learning  as  a matter  of  historical  evi- 
dence.— Again,  Revelation,  under  either  dispensation,  was  made 
through  writers  divinely  authorized  and  inspired.  But  in  some 
cases  it  is  doubted,  whether  certain  of  these  writers  have  been 
actually  inspired ; and  in  others,  whether  the  works  purporting 
to  have  been  written  by  them  are  actually  theirs.  This  necessi- 
tates profound  researches  in  regard  to  the  authors  of  the  several 
writings — to  the  time  when — to  the  circumstances  under  which 


THEOLOGY,  HOW  CONDUCIVE  TO  CLASSICAL  STUDY.  331 

--to  the  place  where — and  to  the  persons  for  whom,  they  were 
first  written.  It  behoves,  to  discover  all  that  is  known  or  not 
known  touching  the  first  publication  of  these  writings — what  is 
historically  certain  or  probable  as  to  their  original  recognition, 
and  annexation  to  the  general  collection  of  inspired  writings — 
and,  in  fine,  all  that  is  known  of  the  fate,  of  the  contradiction  it 
encountered,  and  of  the  changes  which  this  collection  or  Canon 
may  have  undergone. 

The  vehicle  of  revelation  is  Writing ; and  no  miracle  was 
vouchsafed  to  preserve  the  sacred  documents  from  the  fate  of 
other  ancient  manuscripts,  or  to  prevent  the  omissions,  changes, 
and  interpolations  of  careless  or  perfidious  transcribers,  through 
the  period  of  fourteen  centuries.  This  was  left  to  the  resources 
of  human  Criticism;  and  the  task  requires  for  its  accomplish- 
ment the  profoundest  scholarship.  The  collation  of  the  most 
ancient  manuscripts,  the  discrimination  of  their  families,  and  a 
comparison  of  the  oldest  versions  may  afford  certain  valuable 
criteria  ; hut  the  one  paramount  and  indispensable  condition  for 
the  determination  of  the  genuine  reading,  is  a familiar  acquaint- 
ance with  the  spirit  of  the  languages  in  which  the  sacred  volume 
is  written. 

Interpretation , therefore,  is  not  only  the  most  extensive  and 
arduous,  but  the  most  important  function  of  the  theologian: — 
that  is,  an  inquiry  into  the  sense  of  the  inspired  writings,  and  an 
exposition  of  the  truths  which  they  contain.  To  speak  only  of 
the  New  Testament.  G-od  did  not  select  for  his  apostles  the  elo- 
quent and  the  learned.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  evolve  the 
sense  from  the  phraseology  of  unlearned  men,  writing  also  in  a 
language  not  their  own.  At  the  same  time,  the  circumstances 
which  determined  the  associations  and  course  of  thought,  and 
consequently  explain  the  meaning  of  the  authors,  are  to  be  dis- 
covered only  through  a knowledge  of  the  literature  to  which  the 
writings  belong — of  the  age  in  which  they  appeared — of  the  par- 
ticular public  whom  they  addressed — and  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  were  produced.  Add  to  this,  that  the  original 
language,  though  Hellenistic  Greek,  is  yet  in  a great  part  imme- 
diately, and  in  a still  greater,  mediately,  translated  from  the 
Aramaic  or  Syro-Chaldsean ; and  it  is  universally  admitted  by 
the  learned,  that  without  a knowledge  of  the  various  Semitic 
dialects,  it  is  impossible  to  enter  thoroughly  into  that  peculiar 
character  of  thought  and  expression,  which  is  necessary  to  he 


332  ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 

understood,  to  understand  the  real  import  of  the  vehicle  in  which 
revelation  is  conveyed.  The  interpretation  of  the  sacred  books 
thus  supposes  a profound  and  extensive  knowledge  of  the  lan- 
guages of  antiquity , not  merely  in  their  words,  but  in  their 
spirit ; and  an  intimate  familiarity  with  the  historical  circum- 
stances of  the  period , which  can  only  be  acquired  through  a com- 
prehensive study  of  the  contemporary  authors. 

It  is  thus  evident,  on  the  one  hand,  that  no  country  can  possess 
a theology  without  also  possessing  a philological  erudition ; and 
on  the  other,  that  if  it  possess  a philological  erudition,  it  possesses 
the  one  necessary  condition  of  a theology.  Now,  for  nearly  two 
centuries,  Scotland,  compared  with  other  countries,  may  he 
broadly  said  to  have  been  without  a theology ; hut  as  no  other 
country  has  been  more  strongly  actuated  by  religious  interests, 
it  can  not  he  supposed  that  its  clergy  held  in  their  hands  the 
condition  of  a theology  which  (overlooking  hvo  qualified  excep- 
tions) has  been  never  realized  by  any.  What  then  are  the 
peculiar  circumstances  which  caused,  or  which  allowed,  the 
Scottish  Church  to  remain  so  far  behind  all  other  national  es- 
tablishments in  theological,  and,  consequently,  in  classical  erudi- 
tion ? 

In  the  first  place,  the  Reformation  in  Scotland,  and  the  consti- 
tution of  the  Scottish  Church  were  not  indigenous — were  not  the 
conclusions  of  a native  theology.  In  Scotland  the  new  opinions 
were  a communication  from  abroad.  The  polity  and  principles 
of  the  Scottish  Church  were  borrowed — borrowed  from  Calvin 
and  Geneva ; and  it  was  only  one,  and  one  of  the  least  prominent, 
of  the  many  Calvinist  and  Presbyterian  Churches  throughout 
Europe.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  neither  the  creature  nor  the 
favorite  of  the  Prince.  The  defense  of  that  modification  of  Chris- 
tianity established  in  Scotland  was  thus  no  peculiar,  no  principal 
point  of  honor  with  the  nation  or  the  state  ; and  the  Scottish 
clergy,  geographically  remote  from  the  great  centre  of  European 
polemic,  were  able,  without  manifest  discredit,  to  devolve  upon 
the  kindred  communions  the  vindication  of  their  common  polity 
and  doctrine. — In  this  respect  the  English  Church  exhibits  a 
striking  contrast  to  the  Scotch.  The  former  stood  alone  among 
the  Protestant  communions.  It  was  at  once  opposed  to  these  and 
to  the  Church  of  Rome.  It  was  the  establishment  of  a great  and 
prominent  nation ; and  the  personal  and  political  honor  of  the 
Monarch — the  dispenser  of  its  high  distinctions  and  emoluments 


THEOLOGY,  HOW  CONDUCIVE  TO  CLASSICAL  STUDY.  333 

— was  long  deeply  interested  in  its  credit  and  support.  The 
Church  of  England  was  thus-,  from  its  origin,  in  a relation  of  hos- 
tility to  every  other.  Polemical  it  must  he  ; and  in  the  general 
warfare  which  it  waged,  as  it  possessed  the  means,  so  it  had 
every  motive  to  reward,  in  its  champions,  the  higher  qualities  of 
theological  prowess.  If  the  Church  of  England  could  dispense 
with  a learned  clergy,  it  could  not  dispense  with  a complement 
of  learned  divines. 

In  the  second  place,  the  determination  given  to  the  Church  of 
Scotland  by  those  through  whom  it  was  established  was  not  one 
of  erudition. 

In  Germany  the  Reformation  proceeded  from,  and  was  princi- 
pally carried  through  by,  the  academical  divines;  the  princes, 
the  cities,  and  the  people  only  obeyed  the  impulsion  first  given 
and  subsequently  continued  from  the  universities.  In  its  origin 
the  religious  revolution  was,  in  the  empire,  a learned  revolution; 
and  every  permanent  modification,  every  important  movement  in 
its  progress  had  some  learned  theologian  for  its  author.  From 
this  character  of  the  Reformation  in  Germany,  the  determination 
of  religious  ^dogmas  was  there  naturally  viewed  as  a privilege  of 
erudition — as  more  the  function  of  the  universities  than  of  the 
church,  the  people,  or  the  state.  Religion  consequently  remained 
in  the  German  schools  a matter  peculiarly  proposed  for  learned 
investigation ; the  authority  of  confessions  was  not  long  allowed 
to  suspend  the  Protestant  right  of  inquiry ; and  the  alarming 
freedom  with  which  this  right  has  been  latterly  exercised  by  the 
Lutheran  divines,  may  he  traced  hack  to  the  license  and  example 
of  Luther  himself.  In  Germany,  indeed,  theology  necessarily 
shared  the  fate  of  classical  learning.  The  causes  which,  from 
the  conclusion  of  the  sixteenth  century,  depressed  the  latter, 
reduced  the  former  to  a shallow  and  barbarous  polemic  ; and  the 
revival  of  the  study  of  antiquity,  from  the  middle  of  the  eight- 
eenth, was  principally  the  condition,  and  partly  the  consequence, 
of  a revival  of  theological  learning. 

In  England  the  peculiar  form  under  which  the  Reformation 
was  established  was  principally  determined  by  the  royal  ivill. 
But  the  very  fact  that  the  Church  of  England  was  neither  in  its 
origin  the  free  creation  of  a learned  theology,  nor  the  spontaneous 
choice  of  a persuaded  people,  only  enhanced  the  necessity  of  a 
higher  erudition  to  illustrate  and  to  defend  it  when  established. 
Besides  standing,  in  Europe,  opposed  to  every  other  establish- 


334 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


ment.  and  communion,  it  was,  in  its  own  country,  surrounded  by 
a more  powerful  host  of  sectaries  than  any  other  national  church  ; 
— who,  originally  hostile  to  its  polity  and  privileges,  became,  on 
its  conversion  from  Calvinism,  by  Laud,  the  more  deadly  enemies 
of  its  doctrine.  The  difficulty  and  increasing  danger  of  this 
position  kept  up  an  unceasing  necessity  for  able  and  erudite 
defenders  ; and  as  honors  and  riches  were  not  stinted  as  the 
price,  the  supply  of  the  commodity  was  hardly  inferior  to  the 
demand. 

The  Church  of  Scotland,  on  the  contrary,  was  neither  the  off- 
spring of  learning  nor  of  power  ; it  was  the  choice  of  an  unlearn- 
ed people,  and  after  being  long  upheld  by  the  nation  in  defiance 
of  every  effort  of  the  government,  it  was  finally  established  by  a 
revolution. 

As  the  Scottish  Reformation  did  not  originate  in  native  learn- 
ing, so  it  did  not  even  come  recommended  to  the  Scottish  people, 
by  the  learned  authority  of  its  propagators.  In  relation  to  other 
national  Reformers,  the  Reformer  of  Scotland  was  an  unlettered 
man.  “ Compared  with  Knox,”  says  a great  Gferman  historian, 
“ Luther  was  but  a timorous  boy;”  but  if  Knox  surpassed  Luther 
himself  in  intrepidity,  even  Luther  was  a learned  theologian  by 
the  side  of  Knox.  With  the  exception  of  Melville,  who  obtained 
what  erudition  he  possessed  abroad,  the  religion  of  the  people  of 
Scotland  could  boast  of  no  theologian  worthy  of  the  name.  Some 
remarkable  divines  indeed  Scotland  has  possessed ; but  these  were 
all  adherents  of  that  church,  which  for  a season  was  established 
by  the  will  of  the  monarch  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the 
nation.  The  two  Forbeses,  to  say  nothing  of^Leighton,  Burnet, 
and  Sage,  were  Episcopalians.  In  fact  the  want  of  popular  sup- 
port made  it  necessary  for  the  divines  of  that  establishment  to 
compensate  by  the  strength  of  their  theological  learning  for  the 
weakness  of  their  political  position.  The  struggle  which  ensued 
between  the  Episcopal  and  Presbyterian  parties  was,  from  first  to 
last,  more  a popular  than  a scientific — more  a civil  than  a theo- 
logical contest ; and  the  Covenanters,  whose  zeal  and  fortitude 
finally  wrought  out  the  establishment  of  the  religion  and  liberty 
of  the  nation,  were  unlearned  as  they  were  enthusiastic.  With 
the  triumph  of  the  Presbyterian  polity  and  doctrines,  the  contro- 
versy between  the  rival  persuasions  ceased.  The  Scottish  Epis- 
copalians were  few  in  numbers,  and  long  politically  repressed  ; 
and  the  other  separatists  from  the  establishment,  so  far  from  being, 


THEOLOGY,  HOW  CONDUCIVE  TO  CLASSICAL  STUDY. 


335 


as  in  England,  the  enemies  of  the  dominant  church,  were  in  reality 
its  useful  friends.  They  pitched  in  general  somewhat  higher  the 
principles  which  they  held  in  common  with  the  establishment ; 
and  whereas  in  England  the  Dissenters  would  have  radically 
destroyed  what  they  condemned  as  vicious,  in  Scotland  they 
wished  only,  as  they  in  fact  contributed,  to  brace  what  they 
viewed  as  relaxed.  Thus,  in  Scotland,  if  sectarian  controversy 
did  not  wholly  cease,  theological  erudition  was  not  required  for 
its  persecution.  The  learning  of  the  Dissenters  did  not  put  to 
shame  the  ignorance  of  the  Establishment ; and  the  people  were  so 
well  satisfied  with  their  own  triumph,  and  their  adopted  church, 
that  its  clergy  had  no  call  on  them  for  erudition  to  illustrate  what 
was  already  respected,  or  to  vindicate  what  was  not  assailed.1 
Even  the  attacks  on  Christianity  which  were  subsequently  made 
in  Scotland,  and  which  it  was  therefore  more  immediately  incum- 
bent on  the  Scottish  clergy  to  repel,  were  not  such  as  it  required  any 
theological  erudition  to  meet ; while,  from  the  religious  disposi- 
tions of  the  public,  these  attacks  remained  always  rather  a scandal 
than  a danger.  At  the  same  time,  in  no  other  country  was  there 
so  little  verge,  far  less  encouragement,  allowed  to  theological 
speculation.  The  standards  of  Scottish  orthodoxy  were  more  ar- 
ticulate and  unambiguous  than  those  of  any  other  church ; and 
to  its  members  the  permissible  result  of  all  inquiry  was  in  propor- 
tion rigorously  predetermined.  Though  often  ignorantly  mistaken, 
often  intentionally  misunderstood,  the  national  creed  could  not, 
as  in  other  countries,  by  any  section  of  the  established  clergy,  he 
either  professedly  abandoned  or  openly  attacked.  In  religious 
controversy,  popular  opinion  remained  always  the  supreme  tribu- 
nal ; and  a clamor,  when  this  could  be  excited,  was  at  once  decis- 
ive of  victory.  At  the  same  time  the  highest  aim  of  clerical 
accomplishment  was  to  preach  a popular  discourse.  Under  the 
former  system  of  church  patronage,  this  was  always  a principal 
condition  of  success  ; under  the  present,  it  promises  to  be  soon 

1 [When  yet  comparatively  learned — before  its  secure  establishment.,  and  the  conse- 
quent slumber  into  which  it  was  allowed  to  sink,  the  Presbyterian  Church  of  Scotland, 
sensible  of  its  deficiencies,  sought  more  especially  from  Holland,  for  theologians  and 
scholars  who  might  raise  the  fallen  and  falling  standard  of  its  aspirants  to  the  ministry. 
This  consciousness  of  self-deficiency  is  an  honorable  testimony  to  the  older  Church. 
Of  these  movements,  I am  aware  of  two,  and  of  these  I write  merely  from  recollection. 
The  one  will  be  found  in  the  records  of  an  Assembly,  during  what  has  been  here  called 
“ the  Second  Reformation the  other  is  recorded  by  Calamy,  in  the  memoirs  of  his 
own  life,  who  mentions,  that  when  a student  in  Holland  he  there  met  Carstairs,  on  a 
mission  into  that  country  to  recruit  for  persons  qualified  to  fill  the  chairs  in  the  several 
Universities  of  Scotland.  How  this  effort  unfortunately  failed,  I am  unable  to  state.] 


336 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


the  only  one.1  Theological  learning  remained  thus  superfluous, 
if  not  unsafe. 

Nor,  in  the  third  place,  must  it  he  overlooked,  that  the  laud- 
able accommodation  of  the  Scottish  Church  to  its  essential  end — 
the  religious  instruction  of  the  people — secured  it  consideration 
and  usefulness  without  any  high  attainment  in  theological  science. 
This,  indeed,  it  neither  felt  as  necessary,  nor  possessed  the  means 
of  encouraging.  Ecclesiastical  property  was  fairly  applied  to 
ecclesiastical  purposes  ; and  the  duties  and  salaries  of  the  clergy 
were  neither  inadequately  nor  unequally  apportioned.  If  the  pro- 
fessional education  of  the  churchman  was  defective,  still  it  was 
better  than  none.  If  not  learned,  he  was  rarely  incompetent  to 
parochial  duties,  which  he  could  not  neglect ; while  his  religious 
and  moral  character  were  respectable  and  respected.  The  people 
of  Scotland  were  justly  contented  with  their  Church. 

In  the  Church  of  England , on  the  contrary,  the  splendor  of 
extraordinary  learning  was  requisite  to  throw  into  the  shade  its 
manifold  defects  and  abuses  ; — its  want  of  professional  education 
— its  pluralities — its  sinecures — its  non-residence — its  princely 
pampering  of  the  few — its  beggarly  starvation  of  the  many.  The 
grosser  the  ignorance  which  it  tolerated,  the  more  distinguished 
must  be  the  erudition  which  it  encouraged ; and  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  its  higher  honors,  the  promotion  of  merit,  in  some  cases, 
was  even  necessary  to  redeem  the  privilege  of  neglecting  it  in 
general.  Thus  the  different  circumstances  of  the  two  churches 
rendered  the  clergy  of  the  one,  neither  ignorant  nor  learned  ; of 
the  other,  ignorant  and  learned  at  once. 

The  circumstance,  however,  of  most  decisive  influence  on  the 
erudition  of  a clergy  is  the  quality  and  amount  of  the  preparatory 
and  professional  education  they  receive.  As  almost  exclusively 
bred  in  the  common  schools  and  universities  of  a country,  and 
their  necessary  course  of  education  being  in  general  considerably 


1 [This  was  written  soon  after  the  passing  of  what  is  called  the  Veto  Act  by  the 
General  Assembly  of  the  Church  of  Scotland,  which  declared,  as  ancient  and  indefeasi- 
ble, the  right  of  the  people  to  refuse,  without  reasons,  any  pastor  presented  to  them ; 
and  before  this  act  had  been  pronounced,  by  the  competent  tribunals,  illegal.  Had  the 
measure  gone  to  compel  an  adequate  education  and  trial  of  the  clergy — had  it  provided 
that  none  should  assume  the  character  of  pastor  who  was  not  fully  competent  to  pas- 
toral duties — and  that  each  parish  should  obtain,  among  qualified  candidates,  the  min- 
ister best  suited  to  its  reasonable  wants ; — had  it,  in  fact,  abolished  private  patronage 
— and  declared  as  imperative,  all  that  the  national  Church,  in  this,  or  any  other  Prot- 
estant state,  had  ever  even  sought  to  confer  upon  the  people  : in  that  case  I,  for  one, 
should  have  wished  it  all  suocess.  But — .] 


SCOTTISH  SEMINARIES,  CLASSICALLY  INCOMPETENT.  337 

longer  than  that  of  the  other  learned  professions,  the  clergy  con- 
sequently express  more  fully  and  fairly  than  any  other  class  the 
excellences  and  defects  of  the  native  seminaries.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  quality  and  amount  of  their  learning  principally  determ- 
ine for  good  or  evil  the  character  of  the  whole  education,  public 
and  private,  of  a country  ; for  the  clergy,  or  those  trained  for  the 
church,  constitute  not  only  the  most  numerous  body  of  literary 
men,  but  the  class  from  which  tutors,  schoolmasters,  and  even 
professors,  are  principally  taken.  Their  ignorance  or  erudition 
thus  reacts  most  powerfully  and  extensively,  either  to  raise  and 
keep  np  learning,  or  to  prevent  its  rising  among  all  orders  and 
professions.  The  standard  of  learning  in  a national  clergy  is, 
in  fact,  the  standard  of  learning  in  a nation. 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  general  condition  of  classical  erudi- 
tion. 

II.  The  system  of  Schools  and  Universities. — And  in  Scotland 
our  higher  and  lower  seminaries  are,  perhaps,  worse  calculated 
for  the  promotion  of  ancient  learning  than  those  of  any  other 
European  country. 

No  other  country  is  so  defective  in  the  very  foundation  of  a 
classical  instruction — the  number  and  quality  of  Grammar  Schools. 
England 'has  its  five  hundred  of  these,  publicly  endowed:  how 
many  has  Scotland  ! The  attempt  to  supply  this  want  by  making 
the  parochial  schoolmaster  teach  the  elements  of  Latin — Greek 
is  out  of  the  question — proclaims  hut  does  not  remedy  the  defi- 
ciency. If  sometimes  hardly  competent  to  the  work  of  primary 
education,  this  functionary  is  rarely  qualified  for  a classical  in- 
structor. Yet  to  his  incompetency  has,  in  general,  been  aban- 
doned the  preparation  of  the  future  clergy  and  schoolmasters  of 
the  nation.  It  is,  indeed,  only  of  later  years  that  a few  grammar 
schools  have  ventured  upon  Greek ; the  alphabet  of  which  is,  by 
country  students  at  least,  still  usually  acquired  in  the  university. 
The  universities  were,  indeed,  obliged,  changing  their  proper 
character,  to  stoop,  in  order  to  supply  the  absence  or  the  incom- 
petency of  the  inferior  seminaries.  To  do  this  adequately  was,  in 
the  circumstances,  impossible.  Professorial  prelections  are  no 
substitute  for  scholastic  discipline.1  Prematurely  matriculated, 

1 [It  is  part  and  parcel  of  its  general  defect  in  scholarship,  that  the  want  of  grammar 
or  classical  schools  throughout  the  country  has  never,  for  some  two  centuries,  been 
felt  by  our  Church.  A tythe  of  the  agitation  fruitlessly  expended  on  some  mistaken 
object,  would  have  succeeded  in  forcing  the  state  to  remedy  this  opprobrium,  which 
has  so  long  and  so  heavily  weighed  on  the  clergy  and  people  of  Scotland.] 

Y 


338 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


the  student  often  completed  his  academical  course  of  philology, 
before  boys  in  other  countries  had  finished  school ; and,  in  his 
progress  through  the  superior  classes,  he  soon  forgot  the  scantling 
of  the  languages  which  he  had  now  no  longer  any  occasion  to 
employ.  Even  in  the  long  course  of  academical  instruction,  to 
which  the  future  churchman  was  astricted,  a few  trifling  exercises 
of  form  are  all,  we  believe,  that  render  some  knowledge  of  Latin 
a convenient  accomplishment. — What,  in  fine,  is  the  character 
of  his  professional  examination  ? It  is  peculiar  to  Scotland,  that 
the  candidate  for  holy  orders  is  tried,  not  by  one  or  a few  respons- 
ible individuals,  specially  nominated  for  that  purpose  from  superior 
erudition  and  ability;  but  left  to  the  low  standard  and  fortuitous 
examination  of  all  or  any  members  of  the  Presbytery  (clergy  of  a 
district)  to  which  we  may  apply.  This  perhaps  is  worse  even 
than  the  examination  by  a Bishop’s  Chaplain : but  the  English 
and  Scottish  Churches  have,  between  them,  the  worst  tests  of 
clerical  competency  in  Christendom. 

Nor  even  indirectly  was  there  encouragement  of  any  kind  pre- 
sented by  the  universities  for  proficiency  in  classical  attainments. 
The  Degree  in  Arts,  as  it  conferred  no  honor,  was  no  object  of 
ambition  ; and  when  not  an  empty  compliment,  a minimum  of 
the  learned  languages  sufficed  for  the  examination.1 

Of  old,  the  Scottish  educational  system  was  a more  effectual 
mean  of  classical  instruction  than  it  proves  at  present ; but  that 
it  was  never  adequate  to  this  end  is  proved  by  two  facts,  to  which 
on  a former  occasion,  [Ed.  No.  iii.j  we  have  alluded. — The  first: 
— that  although  a trifling  proportion  of  the  educated  ranks  could 
have  received  their  instruction  and  literary  impulses  abroad ; yet 
of  Scottish  scholars,  all  of  the  highest  celebrity,  and  far  more  than 
nine-tenths  of  those,  worthy  of  the  name  at  all,  have  been  either 
educated  in  foreign  seminaries,  or  their  tastes  and  studies  deter m- 

1 [In  Edinburgh,  a greater  amount  of  knowledge  is  ostensibly  required  for  this  de- 
gree than  in  any  other  University ; but  no  other  University  can  accept  less,  no  other, 

I believe,  accepts  so  little.  The  fundamental  principle  of  academical  graduation,  not 
to  ask  more  than  must  be  given,  is  here,  not  only  violated,  but  reversed.  Had  there 
been  any  prospect  of  a reform  from  without,  I should  long  ago  have  proclaimed  the 
evils  to  be  amended  ; and  having  no  hope  of  a reform  from  within,  it  is  now  (I  deem 
it  proper  publicly  to  state)  many  years  since  I overtly  withdrew  from  every  responsi- 
bility in  the  discharge  of  this,  as  of  all  other  trusts,  reposed  in  the  Senatus  Academi- 
cus. — One  very  simple  remedy  for,  at  least,  the  most  disgraceful  part  of  the  degrees 
in  Medicine  and  in  Arts,  would  be  to  make  it  necessary  for  the  candidate  to  pass,  for 
a preliminary  minimum,  an  examination  by  some  extra  academical  and  disinterested 
board,  taken,  say,  from  the  Masters  of  the  High  School  or  Edinburgh  Academy,  either 
or  both. ] 


SCOTTISH  SEMINARIES,  CLASSICALLY  INCOMPETENT.  339 

ined  in  the  society  of  foreign  learned  men. — The  second : — that 
although  in  other  countries  the  clergy  take,  as  a class,  the  high- 
est place  in  the  higher  regions  of  erudition  ; yet  in  Scotland,  from 
their  dependence  on  the  native  seminaries  for  education,  they 
have  remained  comparatively  inferior  in  classical  learning ; almost 
every  scholar  of  distinguished  note  having,  for  nearly  two  centu- 
ries, been  found  among  the  laity. 

For  those  able  to  supply  their  development,  the  preceding  hints 
may  suffice,  to  explain  the  causes  of  the  low  state  of  classical 
learning  in  Scotland.  In  fact,  were  it  not  for  the  neighborhood 
and  ascendency  of  England,  and  that  a considerable  proportion  of 
those  who  give  a bias  to  public  opinion  receive  their  education  and 
literary  convictions  out  of  Scotland,  we  are  almost  disposed  to  be- 
lieve that  in  this  country,  Greek  and  Latin  would  long  ere  now 
have  been  studied,  as  we  study  Hebrew  or  Sanscrit.  As  it  is, 
these  influences  are  only  decisive  in  the  capital ; and  even  here 
the  opinion  of  the  more  intelligent  in  favor  of  the  primary  import- 
ance of  classical  education  is  encountered  by  a numerous  opposi- 
tion. It  is,  indeed,  fortunate  for  Edinburgh,  that  its  classical  in- 
stitutions have  been  powerfully  upheld  by  the  reputation  and 
talents  of  their  teachers ; but  all  that  individual  men — all  that 
individual  seminaries — all  that  partial  and  precarious  influences 
can  effect,  are  insufficient  to  turn  back  that  tide  of  circumstances, 
which  threatens,  unless  some  public  effort  may  arrest  it,  to  whelm 
in  one  flood  of  barbarism,  all  that  is  most  conducive  to  our  intel- 
lectual and  moral  well-being — all  that  is  not  subsidiary  to  vulgar 
interests,  and  to  the  comforts  of  an  animal  existence. 

The  public  is  now  awakening  to  the  necessity  of  a better  edu- 
cation for  the  people ; our  self-satisfied  contentment  with  the 
sufficiency  of  our  parish  schools,  is  already  dissipated  even  in 
Scotland  ; and  the  state  can  not  long  withhold  from  the  British 
nation  what  is  already  enjoyed  by  the  other  countries  of  Europe. 
But  it  is  the  duty  of  a government,  not  only  to  provide  for  the 
necessary  instruction  of  the  people,  but  also  to  promote  the  liberal 
education  of  the  higher  orders  ; and  in  particular,  to  secure  a 
competent  erudition  in  the  church,  and  the  other  privileged  pro- 
fessions. In  Scotland,  how  defective  soever  be  the  system  of 
popular  schools,  this  may  be  viewed  as  complete  and  perfect,  com- 
pared with  the  system  of  grammar  school^.  Until  a sufficient 
number  of  these  be  established  over  Scotland,  and  brought  within 
the  reach  of  those  destined  for  an  academical  career,  it  is  impossi- 


340 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


ble  that  the  universities  can  perform  their  proper  function  in  the 
cultivation  of  learning ; or  that  the  professions,  and  the  clergy  in 
particular,  should  be  insured  in  that  amount  and  quality  of  clas- 
sical knowledge  which  is  requisite  to  place  them  on  a level  with 
their  brethren  in  other  countries.  Nor  until  the  patronage  and 
regulation  of  our  universities  be  deposited  in  more  enlightened 
and  disinterested  hands,  can  we  hope  that  solid  learning  will  re- 
ceive the  preference  and  encouragement  which  a university  should 
afford : if  academical,  if  liberal  study  is  to  be  something,  higher 
than  a mere  popular  cultivation  of  the  amusing,  of  the  palpable, 
of  the  vulgarly  useful.  Amid  all  the  corruptions  of  Oxford,  that 
university  has  maintained  (from  accidental  circumstances,  in- 
deed), this  fundamental  principle ; and  it  is  the  maintenance  of 
this  principle,  however,  imperfectly  applied,  that  was  mainly  the 
ground  of  our  conviction,  that  if  the  legislature  do  its  duty,  Ox- 
ford is  the  university  susceptible  of  the  easiest  and  most  effectual 
regeneration.1  [Ed.  No.  iv.] 


These  observations  have  detained  us  too  long  from  our  author ; 
and  the  length  to  which  they  have  extended  precludes  us  from 
offering,  as  we  meant,  some  contributions  of  our  own  in  connec- 
tion with  the  argument  which  he  so  ably  and  conclusively  main- 
tains. 

Professor  Pillans  opens  the  first  Lecture  with  a rapid  survey 
of  national  education  in  ancient  and  in  modern  times  ; and  he 
justly  attributes  to  the  states  of  the  G-er manic  Union  the  glory  of 
having  first  practically  realized  it  as  a great  principle  of  political 
morality — that  every  government  is  bound  to  provide  and  to  in- 
sure the  moral  training  and  intellectual  instruction  of  the  whole 
body  of  its  subjects.  He  shows  the  humiliating  contrast  in  which 
Britain  stands  in  this  respect  to  the  states  of  Germany ; vindicates 


1 We  have  said  nothing  of  the  effect  of  endowments  specially  destined  for  the  en- 
couragement of  learning,  by  enabling  the  beneficiary  to  devote  himself,  without  dis- 
traction, to  the  pursuits  of  erudition.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  a mean,  if 
properly  applied,  might  be  of  important  service.  But  where  they  do  actually  exist— 
as  in  England — these  endowments  have  seldom  been  found  wisely  administered,  and 
their  effect,  upon  the  whole,  has  been  injurious  rather  than  beneficial.  In  point  of 
fact,  the  countries  of  Europe  where  learning  in  general,  and'classical  learning  in  par- 
ticular, has  been  most  successfully  cultivated,  as  Holland  and  Protestant  Germany, 
possess  no  advantages  of  the  land  ; and  are  only  superior  to  Scotland  in  a completer 
organization  of  schools,  and  a tolerable  system  of  university  patronage. — [See  the  next 
following  article.] 


AUTHOR’S  LECTURES. 


341 


their  enforcement  of  education  by  law ; and  accord  s a well-merited 
encomium  to  the  enlightened  magnanimity  of  France  in  profiting 
by  the  experience,  and  in  adopting  the  institutions  of  Prussia. 
After  some  valuable  observations  on  the  methods  and  principles 
of  popular  instruction,  he  signalizes  the  difference,  in  end  and 
means,  between  the  education  of  the  lower  and  the  education  of 
the  higher  classes  of  society.  . . . 

In  the  second  Lecture,  after  exposing  that  most  contemptible 
of  all  delusions,  that  the  mere  possession  of  facts — the  simple 
swallowing  of  truths — is  the  end  proposed  by  education,  and  show- 
ing that  it  is  not  by  the  amount  of  kuoiv ledge  communicated, 
but  by  the  amount  of  thought  which  such  knowledge  calls  into 
activity,  that  the  mind  is  exercised  and  developed,  our  author 
proceeds  to  contrast  the  advantages  in  this  respect  of  mathemat- 
ical and  classical  instruction.  We  are  gratified  to  find  that  our 
own  conclusions  in  regard  to  the  minor  value  of  mathematical 
study  as  a mean  of  mental  cultivation  are  not  opposed  to  those 
of  so  high  an  authority  in  practical  education ; and  that  our  con- 
victions, both  of  the  paramount  utility,  in  this  relation,  of  classi- 
cal study,  and  of  the  errors  by  which,  in  practice,  this  utility  is 
too  often  compromised,  are  in  all  respects  the  same  with  those  of 
so  philosophical  a scholar.  We  must  pass  over  his  strictures  on 
the  great  schools  of  England,  in  order  to  quote  his  unfavorable 
opinion  of  the  organization  of  our  Edinburgh  classical  schools  ; 
an  organization  now  peculiar,  we  believe,  to  Scotland,  and  which 
we  have  long  been  convinced  is  almost  the  only  impediment  that 
prevents  the  distinguished  zeal  and  ability  of  their  teachers  from 
carrying  these  seminaries  to  their  attainable  ••perfection.  On  the 
present  plan,  a new  class  commences  every  year  under  a separate 
master  ; and  the  boys,  however  numerous,  and  however  different 
in  capacity,  remain  during  four  years — i.  e. — until  they  enter 
under  the  Rector — the  exclusive  pupils  of  the  same  classical  in- 
structor, whose  emoluments  are  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
his  peculiar  scholars 

On  the  manifold  disadvantages  of  this  arrangement  much  might 
be  said ; — and  we  could  quote  a host  of  authorities  in  favor  of 
the  scheme  of  promotion  and  retardation,  as  determined  by  solemn 
terminal  examinations  ; — a scheme  for  centuries  established  in 
Holland,  G-ermany,  and  other  continental  countries.  Buchanan, 
in  his  plan  of  a classical  school,  in  his  “ Opinion  anent  the  Refor- 
mation of  the  Universitie  of  St.  Androisf  orders  “ that  the 


342 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


classes  shall  be  visit  every  quarter  of  a year,  and  promovit  aftir 
ther  merits.”1 11  In  most  countries  this  act  takes  place  at  half- 
yearly  intervals. 

In  his  third  and  last  Lecture  our  author  is  occupied  with  his 
principal  subject,  the  vindication  of  classical  studies  from  the 
charge  of  inutility — an  easy  matter ; and  the  far  more  difficult 
task  of  illustrating  the  various  and  peculiar  modes  in  which  these 
studies  exercise  and  improve  the  mind.  We  regret  that  we  are 
unable  to  afford  our  readers  more  than  a sample  of  his  admirable 
observations.  After  a copious  enumeration  of  the  general  advan- 
tages to  be  reaped  from  the  study  of  the  ancient  authors,  he  pro- 
ceeds : 

“ But,  again,  it  may  be  argued,  Why  might  not  all  this  be  done,  and 
done  more  compendiously  and  expeditiously,  by  taking  the  works  of  our 
own  English  authors  for  the  substratum  of  this  intellectual  and  moral 
training  ? My  answer  is,  that,  with  such  means,  it  could  not,  I think, 
be  done  at  all.” 

“ It  is,  indeed,  a great  and  just  boast  of  these  languages  (which  have 
been  called,  from  the  circumstance,  transpositive),  that  this  liberty  of  ar- 
rangement enables  the  speaker  or  writer  to  dispose  his  thoughts  to  the 
best  advantage,  and  to  place  in  most  prominent  relief  those  which  he 
wishes  to  be  peculiarly  impressive ; and  that  thus  they  are  pre-eminently 
fitted  for  the  purposes  of  eloquence  and  poetry.  It  is  owing  to  the  same 
peculiarities  in  the  structure  of  the  ancient  languages,  that  the  writers  in 
them  were  enabled  to  construct  those  long  and  curiously  involved  sen- 
tences, Avhich  any  attempt  to  translate  literally  serves  only  to  perplex 
and  obscure  ; but  which  presented  to  the  ancient  reader,  as  they  do  to 
the  modern  imbued  with  his  taste  and  perceptions,  a beautiful,  and,  in 
spite  of  its  complexity,  a sweetly  harmonizing  system  of  thoughts.  I have 
already  alluded  to  the  exertion  of  mind  required  to  perceive  all  the  bear- 
ings of  such  a sentence,  as  to  an  exercise  well  fitted  for  sharpening  the 
faculties ; and  this  view  of  the  ancient  tongues — considered  as  instru- 
ments of  thought  widely  differing  from,  and  in  most  respects  superior  to, 
our  own — is  one  which  recommends  them  to  be  used  also  as  instruments 
of  educatioir. 

“ Again,  our  mother  tongue  is  so  entwined  and  identified  with  our 


1 Professor  Pillans  will  also  be  pleased  to  find,  from  the  same  Opinion , which  is, 
we  believe,  very  little  known,  that  his  favorite  “ Monitorial  System”  was  carried  into 
effect  by  Buchanan.  It  has  not  been  noticed  that  in  this  plan  of  studies  Buchanan 
was  greatly  indebted  to  his  friend  Sturmius  ; and  that  great  pedagogue  is  also  a high 
authority  in  favor  of  the  plan  of  instruction  of  the  younger  by  older  pupils.  It  had 
also  previously  been  reduced  to  practice  by  Trotzendorf.  For  centuries,  it  has  been 
prudently  applied  in  Schulpforte,  the  prime  classical  school  of  Europe.  The  compul- 
sory lecturing — the  necessary  regency — of  graduates  or  inceptors  in  the  ancient  uni- 
versities mainly  proceeded  on  the  profound  principle,  Doce  ut  Discas.  As  the  scho- 
lastic brocard  runs : 

11  Discere  si  quarts,  doceas,  sic  ipse  doccris ; 

Nam  studio  tali  libi  profcis  atquc  sodali." 


AUTHOR’S  LECTURES. 


343 


early  and  ordinary  habits  of  thinking  and  speaking,  it  forms  so  much  a 
part,  of  ourselves  from  the  nursery  upward,  that  it  is  extremely  difficult 
to  place  it,  so  to  speak,  at  a sufficient  distance  from  the  mind’s  eye  to 
discern  its  nature,  or  to  judge  of  its  proportions.  It  is,  besides,  so  uncom- 
pounded in  its  structure — so  patch-work-like  in  its  composition,  so  broken 
down  into  particles,  so  scanty  in  its  inflections,  and  so  simple  in  its  fun- 
damental rules  of  construction,  that  it  is  next  to  impossible  to  have  a true 
grammatical  notion  of  it,  or  to  form  indeed  any  correct  ideas  of  grammar 
and  philology  at  all,  without  being  able  to  compare  and  contrast  it  with 
another  language,  and  that  other  of  a character  essentially  different.” 

Nothing  has  more  contributed  in  this  country  to  disparage  the 
cause  of  classical  education  than  the  rendering  it  the  education 
of  all.  That  to  many  this  education  can  be  of  little  or  no  advant- 
age, is  a truth  too  manifest  to  be  denied  ; and  on  this  admission 
the  sophism  is  natural,  to  convert  “useless  to  many”  into  “useful 
to  none.”  With  us,  the  learned  languages  are  at  once  taught  too 
extensively,  and  not  intensively  enough ; an  absurdity  in  which 
we  are  now  left  almost  alone  in  Europe.  We  may  notice  that 
the  distinction  of  schools,  to  which,  in  the  following  passage,  Mr. 
Pillans  alludes,  is  not  peculiar  to  Prussia,  hut  has  been  long  uni- 
versal in  the  German  and  Scandinavian  states  : even  Russia  has 
adopted  it. 

The  strongest  case  against  the  advocates  for  classical  education,  is 
the  practice  that  has  hitherto  prevailed  of  making  it  so  general  as  to  in- 
clude boys  of  whom  it  is  known  beforehand  that  they  are  to  engage  in  the 
ordinary  pursuits  of  trade  and  commerce ; who  are  not  intended  to  pros- 
ecute their  education  farther  than  school,  and  are  not  therefore  likely  to 
follow  out  the  subject  of  their  previous  studies  much,  or  at  all,  beyond  the 
period  of  their  attendance  there. 

“ I willingly  allow,  and  have  already  admitted,  that  a youth  who  looks 
forward  from  the  very  outset  to  the  practice  of  some  mechanical  or  even 
purely  scientific  art,  may  employ  his  time  better,  in  acquiring  manual 
dexterity  and  mathematical  knowledge,  than  in  making  himself  imper- 
fectly acquainted  with  a dead  language.  There  must  be  in  all  very  large 
and  populous  towns,  a class  of  persons  in  tolerably  easy  circumstances, 
and  whose  daily  business  affords  them  considerable  leisure,  but  who  con- 
template for  their  children  nothing  beyond  such  acquirements  as  shall 
enable  them  to  follow  out  the  gainful  occupation,  and  move  in  the  narrow 
circle,  in  which  they  themselves,  and  their  fathers  before  them,  have 
spent  a quiet  and  inoffensive  life.  It  was  for  youth  of  this  sort  that  the 
Prussian  government,  wdth  a sagacity  and  foresight  characteristic  of  all 
its  educational  proceedings,  provided  what  are  called  buerger  and  mittel- 
scliulen — intermediate  steps  between  the  volks-schulen,  and  primary 
schools,  and  the  Gymnasia,  or  gelehrte-schulen ; and  the  French  have 
wisely  followed  the  example  of  Prussia,  by  ordaining  the  establishment 
of  ecoles  moyennes , called  also  bcoles  primal-res  superieures,  in  all  towns 
above  a certain  population.” 


344 


ON  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  CLASSICAL  LEARNING. 


From  the  specimens  now  adduced,  the  reader  is  enabled  to 
form  certainly  a high,  but  by  no  means  an  adequate  estimate  of 
these  lectures.  To  be  properly  appreciated,  the  whole  reasoning 
must  be  studied  in  connection — which,  we  are  confident,  few, 
sincerely  interested  in  the  subject,  will  fail  to  do. 


III. — ON  THE  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE 
OF  UNIVERSITIES.1 


(April,  1834.) 

Report  made  to  His  Majesty , by  a Royal  Commission  of  Inquiry 
into  the  State  of  the  Universities  of  Scotland.  (Ordered  by 
the  House  of  Commons  to  be  printed,  7th  October,  1831.) 

We  have  long  had  it  in  view  to  consider  this  Report,  both  with 
respect  to  what  it  contains,  and  to  what  it  omits.  At  present  we 
must  limit  ourselves  to  the  latter  head  ; and  in  particular  shall 
endeavor  to  make  up  for  its  remarkable  silence  as  to  the  systems 
of  Academical  Patronage  in  this  country,  their  palpable  defects, 
and  the  means  of  improvement.  This,  and  the  revision  and  for- 
mation of  constitutions,  were  the  only  objects  upon  which  its 
framers  could  have  employed  themselves  beneficially ; for  it  is  of 
far  more  importance  to  secure  good  Teachers,  than  to  make  rules 
about  Teaching  ; and  it  shall  be  our  present  endeavor  to  show  in 
what  way  this  primary  end  must  be  attained  in  principle,  how 
it  has  been  attained  in  other  countries,  and  might  be  rendered 
attainable  in  our  own.  On  a future  occasion,  we  may  perhaps 
make  some  observations  on  the  more  censurable  parts  of  the 
Report  with  respect  to  Teaching  and  Academical  Policy ; mean- 
while, we  shall  touch  principally  on  the  one  capital  omission  now 
commemorated. 

This  omission,  however  singular  it  may  appear,  is  not  without 
excuse.  During  the  ascendency  of  those  principles  of  govern- 
ment under  which  the  Commission  was  constituted,  to  have 
deprived  public  trustees  of  their  office  only  for  incompetence 
and  self-seeking,  would  have  been  felt  a far-reaching  and  a very 

1 [Omitted,  some  interpolations  of  little  moment.] 


346  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

dangerous  precedent ; and  so  long  as  the  Great  Corporation 
remained  the  pattern  and  the  patron  of  corruption,  to  have  at- 
tempted a reform  of  minor  corporations  would  have  been  at  once 
preposterous  and  unavailing.  At  the  same  time  the  theory  of 
educational  establishments  is  so  little  understood  in  this  country, 
and  so  total  an  ignorance  prevails  in  regard  to  what  has  been 
practically  accomplished  in  foreign  Universities,  past  and  present, 
that  the  Commissioners  are  hardly  to  he  blamed  for  any  limited 
and  erroneous  views  of  the  imperfections  of  our  academical  sys- 
tem, or  of  the  measures  to  be  adopted  for  its  improvement.  To 
the  same  cause  is  it  to  he  attributed,  that  while  all  admit,  in 
proportion  to  their  intelligence,  the  defective  patronage  of  our 
Universities,  there  are  few  who  do  not  resign  themselves  to  a 
comfortless  despair  of  the  possibility  of  any  important  melioration. 
Yet,  this  despair  is  itself  the  principal — indeed,  the  only  obstacle 
to  such  a result.  And  to  show  that  it  is  totally  unfounded,  that, 
in  theory,  the  principles  which  regulate  the  right  organization  of 
academical  patronage  are  few,  simple,  and  self-evident,  and  that 
in  practice,  these  have  always  proved  successful,  even  when  very 
rudely  applied,  is  the  purpose  of  the  following  observations. 
They  pretend  only  to  attract  public  attention  to  the  subject ; and 
fully  convinced  of  the  truth  and  expediency  of  our  views,  we  re- 
gret that  the  exposition  we  can  now  afford  them,  is  so  inadequate 
to  their  paramount  importance. 

Universities  are  establishments  founded  and  privileged  by  the 
State  for  public  purposes  : they  accomplish  these  purposes  through 
their  Professors  ; 1 and  the  right  of  choosing  professors  is  a pub- 
lic Trust  confided  to  an  individual  or  body  of  men , solely  to  the 
end , that  the  persons  best  qualified  for  its  duties , may  be  most 
certainly  procured  for  the  vacant  chair. — Let  us  explicate  this 
definition  of  academical  patronage  in  detail. 

I.  In  the  first  place,  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  academical  pat- 
ronage : 2 — That  it  is  a trust  conferred  by,  and  to  be  administered 
solely  for,  the  benefit  of  the  public,  no  one,  we  are  confident,  will 


1 Oxford  and  Cambridge  are  no  exceptions.  Inasmuch  as  they  now  accomplish 
notliing  through  their  professors,  they  are  no  longer  Universities ; and  this  even  by 
their  own  statutes. 

2 The  term  Patron,  as  applied  to  those  to  whom  the  election  of  public  functionaries 
is  confided,  is  not  unobjectionable  ; inasmuch  as  it  comprehends  both  those  who  have 
at  least  a qualified  right  of  property  in  the  situations  to  which  they  nominate,  and 
those  who  are  purely  trustees  for  the  community.  In  the  poverty  of  language,  preci- 
sion must,  however,  often  bend  to  convenience. 


PATRONAGE— ITS  CONDITIONS. 


347 


be  intrepid  enough  to  deny.  On  the  part  of  a University  pat- 
ron, such  denial  would  be  virtually  an  act  of  official  suicide. 
Assuming,  therefore,  this  as  incontrovertible,  it  necessarily  fol- 
lows : — 

1°,  That  the  reason  of  lodging  this  patronage  in  certain  hands, 
was  the  belief  held  at  the  time  by  the  public  or  its  administra- 
tors, that  these  were,  under  circumstances,  the  best  qualified  to 
work  out  the  intention  of  the  trust;  consequently,  if  this  belief, 
be  subsequently  found  erroneous,  or,  if  circumstances  change,  so 
as  to  render  either  these  hands  less  competent  to  discharge  the 
duty,  or  others  more ; then  is  the  only  reason  gone  for  the  longer 
continuance  of  the  patronage  in  the  original  trustees,  and  it  forth- 
with becomes  the  duty  of  the  State  to  consign  it  anew  to  worthier 
depositaries. 

2°,  That  the  patronage  is  wisely  deposited  in  proportion  as  the 
depositary  is  so  circumstanced  as  to  be  kept  ever  conscious  of 
his  character  of  trustee,  and  made  to  appreciate  highly  the  im- 
portance of  his  trust.  Consequently,  that  organization  is  radi- 
cally vicious,  which  conjoins  in  the  same  person,  the  trustee  and 
the  beneficiary  ; in  other  words,  where  the  academical  patron  and 
professor  are  identical. 

3°,  That  the  patron  has  no  claim  to  a continuance  of  his  office, 
from  the  moment  that  the  interest  of  the  public  demands  its  re- 
sumption, and  transference  to  better  hands. 

II.  In  the  second  place,  in  regard  to  the  end  which  academical 
patronage  proposes — the  surest  appointment  of  the  highest  qua- 
lifications— it  is  evident  that  this  implies  two  conditions  in  the 
patron  : — 1°,  The  capacity  of  discovering  such  qualifications ; and, 
2°,  The  inclination  to  render  such  discovery  effectual. 

In  regard  to  the  former : — The  capacity  of  discovering  the 
highest  qualifications  is  manifestly  in  proportion  to  the  higher 
intelligence  of  the  patron,  and  to  the  wider  comprehension  of  his 
sphere  of  choice. — The  intelligence  of  the  patron  requires  no 
comment.  As  to  his  sphere  of  choice,  this  may  either  be  limited 
by  circumstances  over  which  he  has  no  control,  or  it  may  be  con- 
tracted, without  external  necessity,  by  his  own  incapacity  or 
want  of  will.  Religion,  country,  language,  &c.,  may,  on  the  one 
hand,  by  law,  exclude  from  his  consideration  the  worthiest  objects 
of  preference ; and  on  the  other,  the  advantages  attached  to  the 
office  in  his  gift,  may  not  afford  an  adequate  inducement  to  those 
whom  he  finds  most  deserving  of  his  choice.  For  these  a patron 


348  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

has  not  to  answer.  But  if  he  allow  himself  to  be  restricted  in  his 
outlook  by  sectarian  and  party  prejudices — above  all,  if  he  con- 
fine his  choice  to  those  only  who  will  condescend  to  sue  him  as 
candidates  for  the  office  ; he  certainly  excludes  from  his  consider- 
ation the  greater  proportion  of  those  best  qualified  for  the  appoint- 
ment, possibly  even  the  whole  ; and  the  end  of  the  trust  confided 
to  him  remains  most  imperfectly  accomplished. 

In  regard  to  the  latter  condition — the  disposition  in  the  patron 
to  render  the  discovery  of  the  best  qualified  persons  available  : — 
It  is  evident  that  his  power  to  do  this  must  depend  on  the  tempt- 
ation which  he  can  hold  out  to  their  ambition. — A system  of 
patronage  is  therefore  good  or  bad,  in  proportion  as  it  tends  to 
elevate  or  to  degrade  the  value  of  its  appointments  ; that  is,  as 
it  tends  to  render  them  objects  of  competition  or  contempt.  The 
value  of  an  academical  office,  estimated  by  the  inducements 
which  it  holds  out  to  men  of  eminence,  is  a sum  formed  by  an 
addition  of  sundry  items.  There  are — 1°,  The  greater  emolu- 
ment attached  to  it ; 2°,  The  less  irksome  and  more  intellectual 
character  of  its  duty  ; 3°,  The  amenity  of  situation,  the  agreeable 
society,  and  other  advantages  of  the  town  and  country  in  which 
the  University  is  situated.  These  are  more  or  less  beyond  the 
power  of  the  patron.  But,  in  another  way,  it  is  in  the  power  of 
patrons,  and  of  patrons  only,  greatly  to  raise  or  sink  the  value 
of  academical  appointments.  As  the  patronage  is  administered, 
the  professorial  body  is  illustrious  or  obscure,  and  the  place  of 
colleague  either  an  honor  or  a discredit.  In  one  University,  an 
appointment  is  offered  by  a spontaneous  call,  and  prized  as  a cri- 
terion of  celebrity.  In  another,  even  the  chance  of  success  must 
be  purchased  by  humiliation ; success  is  but  the  triumph  of 
favor,  and  an  appointment  the  badge  of  servility  and  intrigue. 
Thus,  under  one  set  of  patrons,  a professorship  will  be  accepted 
as  a distinction  by  the  person  who  would  scorn  to  solicit,  or  even 
accept,  a chair  of  thrice  its  emolument,  under  another.  In  one 
country  the  professorial  status  is  high,  and  the  academy  robs  the 
professions  of  the  best  abilities  ; in  another,  it  is  low,  and  the 
professions  leave  the  academy,  however  amply  endowed,  only 
their  refuse.  Of  this,  the  comparative  history  of  the  European 
Universities,  and  our  own  in  particular,  afford  numerous  and 
striking  proofs. 

III.  In  the  third  place,  such  being  the  nature , and  such  the 
end , of  academical  patronage,  we  must  finally  consider  what  is 


PATRONAGE— ITS  CONDITIONS. 


349 


the  proper  organization  of  its  instruments ; in  other  words,  what 
person  or  persons  are  most  likely  to  feel  intensely  the  obligations 
of  the  trust,  and  to  be  able  to  realize  completely  its  intention.  It 
is  evident  that  the  problem  here,  is,  simply,  how  to  find  a patron, 
or  how  to  constitute  a board  of  patrons,  that  shall  most  certainly, 
and  in  the  highest  degree,  possess  these  two  qualities — Good  Will 
and  Capacity. 

In  regard  to  good  will — a patron  will  be  well  disposed  pre- 
cisely in  proportion  as  he  has  motives  more  and  stronger  to  fulfill, 
fewer  and  weaker  to  violate,  his  duty.  The  aim,  therefore,  of  an 
enlightened  scheme  of  patronage,  is,  in  the  first  place,  to  supply 
him  with  as  many  as  possible  of  the  one  class,  and  in  the  second, 
to  remove  from  him  as  many  as  possible  of  the  other. 

As  to  the  supply  of  direct  motives : — Independently  of  the 
general  interest  which  academic  patrons,  in  common  with  all 
intelligent  and  patriotic  citizens  must  feel  in  the  welfare  of  their 
Universities,  it  is  evident,  that  motives  peculiarly  determining 
them  to  a zealous  discharge  of  their  trust,  will  be  given  by  con- 
necting their  personal  honor  and  dishonor  with  the  appointment 
of  worthy  and  unworthy  professors  ; and  that  this  motive  will 
be  strong  or  weak,  in  proportion  as,  on  the  one  hand,  the  honor 
or  dishonor  is  more  or  less  intense  and  enduring  in  its  applica- 
tion, and  on  the  other,  as  the  patrons  are  persons  of  a character 
more  or  less  alive  to  the  public  opinion  of  their  conduct.  These 
conditions  determine  the  following  principles,  as  regulating  the 
organization  of  a board  of  academical  patronage. 

1°,  The  patrons  must  be  few:  to  the  end  that  their  responsibi- 
lity may  be  concentrated  ; in  other  words,  that  the  praise  or 
blame  attributed  to  their  acts  may  not  be  weakened  by  dissemi- 
nation among  numbers. 

2,  The  board  of  patrons  must  be  specially  constituted  ad  hoc  ; 
at  least,  if  it  discharges  any  other  function,  that  should  be  of  an 
analogous  and  subordinate  nature.  Nothing  tends  more  directly 
to  lower  in  the  eyes  of  the  patron  and  of  the  public,  the  import- 
ance of  an  academical  patronage  ; consequently,  nothing  tends 
more  to  enervate  and  turn  off  the  credit  or  discredit  attached  to 
its  acts,  and  to  weaken  the  sense  of  responsibility  felt  in  its  dis- 
charge, than  the  right  of  appointing  professors  in  general,  or, 
still  more,  of  appointing  to  individual  chairs,  being  thrown  in  as 
an  accidental,  and  consequently  a minor  duty,  to  be  lightly  per- 
formed by  functionaries  not  chosen  as  competent  to  this  particular 


350  ACADEMICAL  PATEONAGE  AND  SUPEEINTENDENCE. 

duty,  but  constituted  for  a wholly  different  purpose. — But  with 
its  patronage  is  naturally  conjoined  as  an  inferior  function,  the 
general  superintendence  of  a University  ; academical  curators 
and  patrons  should  in  fact  always  be  the  same. 

3°,  Where  a country  possesses  more  than  one  University,  each 
should  have  its  separate  board  of  patronage ; in  order  that  the 
patrons  may  have  the  motive  of  mutual  emulation,  and  that 
public  opinion  may  be  formed  on  a comparative  estimate. 

4°,  The  patrons  should  be,  at  least,  conditionally  permanent ; 
that  is,  not  holding  their  office  for  life,  but  re-appointed,  from 
time  to  time,  if  their  conduct  merit  approval.  And  this  for  two 
reasons.  Because  honor  and  dishonor  apply  with  less  effect  to 
a transitory  patron — seldom  known  and  soon  forgotten ; and  be- 
cause as  it  is  only  after  a considerable  term  of  years  that  patrons 
can  effect  the  elevation  or  decline  of  a University,  so  it  is  only  a 
permanent  patron  who  can  feel  a strong  personal  interest  in  the 
celebrity  of  a school,  and  to  whom  the  glory  of  being  the  promoter 
of  its  prosperity,  can  operate  as  a high  inducement. 

5°,  To  impress  more  deeply  on  the  patrons  the  obligations  and 
importance  of  their  office,  they  should  make  oath,  in  the  most 
solemn  manner,  on  their  entrance  upon  office,  to  the  impartial 
and  diligent  discharge  of  their  duty  ; and  perhaps  in  every  report 
to  the  higher  authority,  they  should  declare  upon  their  honor, 
and  with  special  reference  to  their  oath,  that  their  choice  has 
been  determined,  without  favor,  and  solely  by  the  pre-eminent 
qualifications  of  its  object. 

6°,  The  patrons  will  be  most  likely  to  appreciate  highly  the 
importance  of  their  function,  and  to  feel  acutely  the  praise  or 
reprobation  which  their  acts  deserve,  if  taken  from  the  class  of 
society  inferior,  but  only  inferior,  to  the  highest.  If  a patron  is 
appointed  from  his  rank  or  station — he  is  perhaps  above  the  in- 
fluence of  public  opinion  ; the  office  is  to  him  only  a subordinate 
distinction ; and  the  very  fact  of  his  appointment,  while  it  tells 
him  that  its  duties  are  neither  difficult  nor  momentous — for,  was 
he  selected  for  his  ability  to  discharge  them  ? — is  in  fact  the  most 
pernicious  precedent  to  him  in  his  own  disposal  of  the  patronage 
itself.  If  the  patron  be  of  a low  rank,  he  is  probable  patron  only 
by  official  accident ; is  too  uninstructed  to  understand  the  im- 
portance of  a duty  thus  abandoned  to  hazard ; is  too  groveling 
to  be  actuated  by  public  opinion,  and  too  obscure  to  be  its  object; 
while  at  the  same  time  he  is  exposed  to  incentives  to  violate  his 


PATRONAGE — ITS  CONDITIONS. 


351 


trust,  strong  in  proportion  to  the  impotence  of  the  motives  per- 
suading its  fulfillment.  That  patron  will  perform  his  duty  best, 
who  owes  his  nomination  solely  to  his  competence  ; who  regards 
the  office  as  his  chiefest  honor ; and  who,  without  being  the  slave 
of  public  opinion,  which  he  should  be  qualified  to  guide,  is  neither 
above  or  beneath  its  salutary  influence. 

The  removal  of  all  counter  motives  from  a patron,  to  the  dis- 
charge of  his  duty,  or  of  all  ability  to  carry  such  into  effect, 
determines  the  following  precautions : 

7°,  The  patrons  must  he  a body  as  much  as  possible  removed 
from  the  influence  of  personal  motives,  apart  from  or  opposed  to 
their  preference  of  the  most  worthy.  The  professorial  college 
will  therefore,  of  all  others,  not  constitute  the  body  by  which  it 
is  itself  elected. 

8°,  The  patrons  should  have  the  virtual  and  recommendatory, 
hut  not  the  formal  and  definitive  appointment.  This  should  belong 
to  a higher  authority — says  a Minister  of  State.  A non-acquies- 
cence in  their  recommendation,  which  would  of  course  necessitate 
their  resignation,  and  throw  them  back  on  their  electors,  could 
never  take  place  without  strong  reason  : but  its  very  possibility 
would  tend  effectually  to  prevent  its  occurrence. 

9°,  With  the  report  of  their  decision,  the  patrons  should  be 
required  to  make  an  articulate  statement  of  the  grounds  on  which 
their  opinion  has  been  formed,  that  the  object  of  their  preference 
is  the  individual  best  qualified  for  the  vacant  chair. 

Touching  the  quality  of  capacity — that  is,  the  power  of  discov- 
ering and  making  effectual  the  discovery  of  the  best  accomplished 
individuals — this  affords  the  following  conditions : 

1°,  The  patrons  should  be  appointed  specially  ad  hoc , and  from 
their  peculiar  qualification  for  the  discharge  of  the  office. 

2°,  They  should  be  men  of  integrity,  prudence,  and  competent 
acquirement,  animated  by  a love  of  literature  and  science,  and 
of  an  unexclusive  liberality ; in  short,  either  knowing  them- 
selves, or  able  to  discover,  who  are  the  individuals  worthy  of 
preference. 

3°,  The  patronage  should  be  vested  in  a small  plurality.  In 
more  than  one  ; — to  obviate  the  errors  of  individual  judgment,  and 
to  resist  the  influences  that  might  prove  too  powerful  for  a single 
will ; to  secure  the  animation  of  numbers,  a division  of  labor, 
more  extensive,  applicable,  and  impartial  information,  opposite 
views,  and  a many-sided  discussion  of  their  merits.  Not  in 


352 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


many  ; — that  the  requisite  intelligence,  &c.,  may  he  possessed  by 
the  whole  body ; that  the  presence  of  all  may  be  insured ; that 
each  may  feel  his  importance,  and  co-operate  in  the  inquiries  and 
deliberations ; that  they  may  understand  each  other ; take,  in 
common,  comprehensive,  anticipative  views  ; and  concur  in  active 
measures  to  obtain  the  object  of  their  preference : for,  be  it  re- 
membered, a numerous  body  can  elect  only  out  of  those  whom 
a situation  suits ; a small  body  out  of  those  who  suit  the  situa- 
tion. Reasoning  and  experience  prove  that  this  patronage  is  best 
vested  in  a board  varying  from  two  to  five  members.  Four  is 
perhaps  the  preferable  number  ; the  senior  patron  having,  in  case 
of  divided  opinions,  a decisive  suffrage. 

4°,  The  office  of  academical  patron  should  be  permanent,  under 
the  condition  we  have  already  stated ; as  no  other  is  more  de- 
pendent for  its  due  discharge  on  the  experience  of  the  functionary, 
on  the  consistency  and  perseverance  of  his  measures. 

The  principles  thus  manifest  in  theory , have  been  universally 
and  exclusively  approved  in  practice.  Precisely  as  they  have 
been  purely  and  thoroughly  applied,  have  Universities  always 
risen  to  distinction ; precisely  as  they  have  been  neglected  or 
reversed,  have  Universities  always  sunk  into  contempt. 

The  intrinsic  excellence  of  a school  is  not  to  be  confounded 
with  its  external  prosperity , estimated  by  the  multitude  of  those 
who  flock  to  it  for  education.  Attendance  may  be  compelled  by 
exclusive  privileges,  or  bribed  by  numerous  endowments.  [Its 
degree  may  be  still  required  for  this  or  that  profession,  though 
no  longer  furnishing  a true  certificate  of  the  relative  acquirement 
which  it  originally  guaranteed.  (The  degrees  of  the  English 
Universities).  Its  degree,  with  ostensible  higher  honors,  may  be 
offered  at  really  as  cheap  a rate  as  the  corresponding  license  of 
less  privileged  incorporations.  (The  medical  degrees  of,  some  at 
least,  of  our  Scottish  Universities.)]  The  accident  of  its  locality, 
as  in  a great  city  ; the  cheapness  of  its  instruction ; the  distance 
of  other  seminaries,  or  seminaries  of  superior  character  ';  and, 
withal,  the  low  standard  of  learning  in  a nation,  and  the  conse- 
quent ignorance  of  its  defects,  may  all  concur  in  causing  the  ap- 
parent prosperity  of  a University,  which  merits,  from  its  real  ex- 
cellence, neither  encouragement  nor  toleration.  It  is  only  when 
Universities  are  placed  in  competition,  and  that  on  equal  terms, 
that  the  two  attributes  are  convertible.  To  this  explanation  we 
must  add  another.  Our  assertion  only  applies  to  Universities  in 


EXCELLENCE  AND  PROSPERITY  NOT  IDENTICAL. 


353 


the  circumstances  of  their  more  modern  co-existence.  When  the 
same  religion,  studies,  and  literary  language,  connected  Europe 
into  a single  community ; when  Universities,  cosmopolite  in  char- 
acter, few  in  number,  and  affording  the  only  organs,  not  of  in- 
struction and  exercise  merely,  but  of  publication,  counted  by 
myriads  the  scholars  they  attracted  from  the  most  distant  coun- 
tries ; when,  opening  to  their  graduates  a free  concurrence  in  the 
then  all-glorious  field  of  academical  instruction,  prelates,  and  even 
princes,  sought  to  earn  from  the  assembled  nations  the  fame  of 
talent,  eloquence,  and  learning ; then  the  best  instructor  naturally 
found  his  place,  and  an  artificial  patronage  was  as  inexpedient 
as  it  would  have  proved  impracticable.  Its  necessity  arose  during 
the  progress  of  a total  change  of  circumstances.  When  Christen- 
dom was  shattered  into  fragments  ; when  the  Universities,  mul- 
tiplied to  excess  in  every  country,  speaking  each  only  its  own 
vernacular,  and  dwindled  to  sectarian  schools,  no  longer  drew 
distant  nations  to  their  seat,  and  concentrated  in  a few  foci  the 
talent  of  the  Christian  world ; when  the  necessity  of  personal 
congress  at  points  of  literary  communication  was  superseded  by 
the  press  ; when  the  broad  freedom  of  academical  instruction  was 
replaced  by  a narrow  monopoly,  and  even  the  interest  of  the 
monopolists  themselves  remained  no  longer  solely  dependent  on 
their  ability  and  zeal ; — in  this  complete  reversal  of  all  old  rela- 
tions, the  necessity  of  a careful  selection  of  the  academical  teacher 
arose,  and  henceforward  the  worth  of  Universities  was  regulated 
by  the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  those  to  whom  this  choice  was 
confided. 

The  excellence  of  a University  is  to  be  estimated  by  a criterion 
compounded  of  these  two  elements  : — 1.  The  higher  degree  of 
learning  and  ability  displayed  by  its  professorial  body ; and. 
2.  The  more  general  diffusion  of  these  qualities  among  the  mem- 
bers of  that  body. 

Taking  a general  survey  of  the  European  Universities,  in  their 
co-existence  and  progress,  and  comparing  them  by  this  criterion 
we  find  three  groups  prominently  distinguished  from  the  others, 
by  the  higher  celebrity  of  a larger  proportion  of  their  professors. 
These  are  the  Italian — the  Dutch — and,  for  nearly  the  last 
hundred  years,  the  German  Protestant  Universities.  On  exam- 
ining their  constitution,  we  find  that  the  only  circumstance  of 
similarity  among  themselves,  and  of  contrast  to  all  others,  is  the 
machinery  of  their  patronage  and  superintendence,  consisting  of 

Z 


35-1  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

a board  of  trustees  specially  constituted  for  the  purpose,  small, 
intelligent,  perennial. 

Of  the  three  great  Universities  of  Italy,  Bologna,  Padua , and 
Pisa , our  information  is  less  precise  in  relation  to  the  first ; but, 
although  the  most  wealthy  and  ancient  of  the  Italian  schools, 
Bologna  did  not  continue  to  equal  her  two  principal  rivals  in  the 
average  celebrity  of  her  teachers.  Of  Pavia  we  need  not  speak. 

The  Italian  were  originally  distinguished  from  the  Transalpine 
Universities  by  tivo  differences  ; — the  early  introduction  of  sala- 
ried teachers ; and  the  restriction  of  privileged  instruction  to 
these  teachers , who  in  Italy,  as  throughout  the  rest  of  Europe, 
enjoyed  their  salary  under  condition  of  gratuitous  instruction. 
The  evil  consequences  of  such  a system  were,  hoAvever,  in  Italy, 
counteracted  by  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  carried 
into  operation. 

The  endowed  chairs  were  there  of  two  kinds — Ordinary  and 
Extraordinary . The  former,  fewer  in  number,  were  generally 
of  higher  emolument  than  the  latter.  For  each  subject  of  import- 
ance there  were  always  two , and  commonly  three  rival  chairs ; 
and  a powerful  and  ceaseless  emulation  was  thus  maintained 
among  the  teachers.  The  Ordinary  Doctors  strove  to  keep  up 
their  celebrity — to  merit  a still  more  lucrative  and  creditable 
appointment — and  not  to  be  surpassed  by  their  junior  competi- 
tors. The  Extraordinary  Doctors  struggled  to  enhance  their 
reputation — to  secure  their  re-election — and  to  obtain  a chair  of 
higher  emolument  and  honor. 

The  appointment,  continuance,  and  dismissal  of  professors,  long 
appertained  to  the  Students  (there  comparatively  old),  who,  in 
their  Faculties  and  Nations,  annually  or  biennially  elected  to  all, 
or  to  a large  proportion  of  the  chairs. 

In  Padua , the  policy  of  the  Venetian  Senate  was,  from  the 
middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  (when  the  ancient  numerous 
resort  of  the  University  had  declined),  directed  to  the  restriction 
and  abolition  of  this  popular  right,  and  after  several  fruitless, 
and  sundry  partial  measures,  the  privilege  was  at  length,  in  1560, 
totally  withdrawn.  The  Venetian  Fathers  were,  however,  too 
wise  in  their  generation  to  dream  of  exercising  this  important 
function  themselves.  Under  the  Republic  of  Padua,  the  Princes 
of  Carrara,  and  the  Venetian  domination,  prior  to  1515,  two,  and 
subsequently  four  Paduan  citizens,  of  distinguished  prudence,  had 
been  chosen  to  watch  over  the  University,  and  to  suggest  the 


ITALIAN  UNIVERSITIES— PISA. 


365 


persons  proper  to  be  nominated  to  vacant  chairs.  In  1516,  they 
were  reduced  to  three , and  the  election  of  these  academical  Tri- 
umvirs ( Triumviri  Studiorum , Moderatores  Academies , Rifor- 
matori  dello  Studio  di  Padova ) intrusted  to  the  six  senators  of 
the  venerable  College  of  Seniors,  by  whose  wisdom  the  most  im- 
portant affairs  of  the  Republic  were  administered.  To  this  small 
and  select  body  of  Moderators,  the  Senate  delegated  the  general 
care  of  the  University;  and,  in  particular,  that  of  looking  around 
through  Europe  for  the  individuals  best  qualified  to  supply  the 
wants  of  the  University.  Nor  were  they  easily  satisfied.  The 
plurality  of  concurrent  chairs  (which  long  continued)  superseded 
the  necessity  of  hasty  nominations ; and  it  not  unfrequently 
happened  that  a principal  Ordinary  was  vacant  for  years , before 
the  Triumvirs  found  an  individual  sufficiently  worthy  of  the 
situation.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  highest  celebrity  was 
possibly  to  be  obtained,  nothing  could  exceed  the  liberality  of  the 
Senate,  or  the  zeal  of  the  Moderators  ; and  Padua  was  thus  long 
eminently  fortunate,  in  her  competition  for  illustrious  teachers 
with  the  most  favored  Universities  of  Europe. 

In  Pisa,  the  students  do  not  appear  to  have  ever  exercised  so 
preponderant  an  influence  in  the  election  of  their  teachers  as  in 
Padua,  or  even  Bologna.  From  the  period  of  the  restoration  of 
the  University  by  Lorenzo  de’  Medici,  the  academical  patronage 
of  the  state  was  virtually  exercised  by  a small,  intelligent  and 
responsible  body.  In  1472,  the  Senate  of  Florence  decreed  that 
five  Prefects  should  be  chosen  out  of  the  citizens,  qualified  for 
the  magistracy,  to  whom  should  be  confided  the  superintendence 
both  of  the  Florentine  and  Pisan  Universities.  These  were  annu- 
ally elected  ; but  as  re-election  was  competent,  the  body  was  in 
reality  permanent.  Lorenzo  appears  among  the  first.  In  1543, 
Cosmo  de’  Medici  gave  new  statutes  to  the  University  of  Pisa, 
with  which  that  of  Florence  had  been  united.  By  these,  beside 
the  Prefects,  who  were  not  resident  in  Pisa,  a Curator  or  Provi- 
sor was  established  on  the  spot.  This  office  was  for  life  ; nor 
merely  honorary,  for  attached  to  it  was  the  Priorship  of  the 
Knights  of  St.  Stephen.  The  Curator  was  charged  with  the 
general  superintendence  of  student  and  professor ; and  whatever 
directly  or  indirectly  concerned  the  well-being  of  the  University, 
was  within  his  sphere.  In  the  appointment  of  professors,  he 
exercised  a great  and  salutary  influence.  The  Prefects  were  the 
definitive  electors  ; it  was,  however,  the  proximate  duty  of  the 


356  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

Curator  to  look  around  for  the  individuals  suited  to  the  wants 
of  the  University,  and  to  bring  their  merits  under  the  judgment 
of  the  Prefects.  How  beneficially  the  Curator  and  Prefects  acted 
as  mutual  stimuli  and  checks,  requires  no  comment. 

By  this  excellent  organization  of  the  bodies  to  whom  their 
academical  patronage  was  confided,  Padua  and  Pisa,  in  spite  of 
many  unfavorable  circumstances,  long  maintained  a distinguished 
reputation ; nor  was  it  until  the  system  which  had  determined 
their  celebrity  was  adopted  and  refined  in  other  seminaries,  that 
they  lost  the  decided  pre-eminence  among  the  Universities  of 
Europe.  From  the  integrity  of  their  patrons,  and  the  lofty  stan- 
dard by  which  they  judged,  the  call  to  a Paduan  or  Pisan  chair 
was  deemed  the  highest  of  all  literary  honors.  The  status  of 
Professor  was  in  Italy  elevated  to  a dignity,  which  in  other 
countries  it  has  never  reached  ; and  not  a few  of  the  most  illus- 
trious teachers  in  the  Italian  seminaries,  were  of  the  proudest 
nobility  in  the  land.  While  the  Universities  of  other  countries 
had  fallen  from  Christian  and  cosmopolite,  to  sectarian  and  local 
schools,  it  is  the  peculiar  glory  of  the  Italian,  that  under  the 
enlightened  liberality  of  their  patrons,  they  still  continued  to 
assert  their  European  universality.  Creed  and  country  were  in 
them  no  bar  ; the  latter  not  even  a reason  of  preference.  For- 
eigners of  every  nation  are  to  he  found  arntong  their  professors  ; 
and  the  most  learned  man  of  Scotland  (Dempster)  sought  in  a 
Pisan  chair,  that  theatre  for  his  abilities  which  he  could  not  find 
at  home.  When  Calvinist  Leyden  was  expatriating  her  second 
Boerhaave,  the  Catholic  Van  Swieten  ; Catholic  Pisa  had  drawn 
from  Leyden  the  Calvinist  foreigner  Gronovius.  In  Schismatic 
England,  a single  sect  excludes  all  others  from  the  privileges  of 
University  instruction;  in  Catholic  Italy,  even  the  academic 
chairs  have  not  been  closed  against  the  heretic. 

The  system  was,  however,  carried  to  a higher  perfection  in  the 
Dutch  Universities  ; and  notwithstanding  some  impediments 
arising  from  religious  restrictions  (subsequent  to  the  Synod  of 
Dordt),  its  efficiency  was  in  them  still  more  conspicuously  dis- 
played. 

It  was  first  realized  in  Leyden,  the  oldest  of  these  seminaries ; 
and  from  the  greater  means  and  more  extensive  privileges  of  that 
University,  whose  degrees  were  favored  throughout  France,  its 
operation  was  there  more  decisive. 

In  reward  of  the  heroic  defense  made  by  the  citizens  in  the 


DUTCH  UNIVERSITIES— LEYDEN. 


357 


memorable  siege  of  Leyden,  they  received  from  the  States  their 
choice  of  an  immunity  from  taxation,  or  of  a University.  They 
chose  the  latter.  But  though  a recompense  to  the  city,  and 
though  the  civic  aristocracy  was  in  no  other  country  so  prepon- 
derant as  in  Holland,  the  patronage  of  the  new  establishment 
was  not  asked  by,  nor  conceded  to,  the  municipality.  Independ- 
ently of  reason,  experience  had  shown  the  evil  effects  of  such  a 
constitution  in  the  neighboring  University  of  Louvain , where  the 
magistrates  and  the  professors  rivaled  each  other  in  their  char- 
acter of  patrons,  to  prove,  by  a memorable  example,  how  the 
wealthiest  endowments,  and  the  most  extensive  privileges,  only 
co-operate  with  a vicious  system  of  patronage  in  sinking  a ven- 
erable school  into  contempt.  The  appointment  of  professors,  and 
the  general  superintendence  of  the  new  University,  were  confided 
to  a body  of  three  Curators , with  whom  was  associated  the  Mayor 
of  Leyden  for  the  time  being.  One  of  these  Curators  was  taken 
from  the  body  of  nobles,  and  chosen  by  them  ; the  two  others, 
drawn  from  the  cities  of  Holland,  or  from  the  courts  of  justice, 
were  elected  by  the  States  of  the  province.  The  duration  of  the 
office  was  originally  for  nine  years,  but  custom  soon  prolonged 
it  for  life.  The  Curators  were  recompensed  by  the  high  distinc- 
tion of  their  office,  but  were  allowed  a learned  Secretary,  with  a 
salary  proportioned  to  his  trouble. 

The  system  thus  established  continues,  to  the  present  hour,  in 
principle  the  same  ; but  the  changes  in  the  political  circumstances 
of  the  country  have  necessarily  occasioned  changes  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  body — whether  for  the  interest  of  the  University  is 
still  a doubtful  problem.  Until  the  revolutionary  epoch,  no  alter- 
ation was  attempted  in  the  college  of  Curators  ; and  its  perma- 
nence, amid  the  ruin  of  almost  every  ancient  institution,  proves, 
independently  of  other  evidence,  that  all  parties  were  at  one  in 
regard  to  its  virtue  and  efficiency.  In  1795,  the  four  Curators 
were  increased  to  five , and  all  made  permanent.  Of  these,  three 
were  elected  by  the  national  delegates,  two  by  the  municipality 
of  Leyden ; and  the  spirit  in  which  they  were  chosen,  even  dur- 
ing the  frenzy  of  the  period,  is  shown  in  the  appointments  of  San- 
tenius  and  De  Bosch — the  most  illustrious  scholars  in  the  cura- 
tory since  the  age  of  Douza.  On  the  restoration  of  the  House  of 
Orange,  and  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,  a 
uniform  constitution  was  given  to  the  Batavian  and  Belgian  Uni- 
versities. By  the  statutes  promulgated  in  1815  for  the  former, 


35?  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

and  in  1816  for  the  latter,  it  is  provided  that  “ in  each  Univer- 
sity” (these  were  now  Leyden , Utrecht , and  Groningen , Louvain , 
Ghent , and  Liege)  “ there  shall  be  a board  of  Curators,  consist- 
ing of yfre  persons,  distinguished  both  by  their  love  of  literature 
and  the  sciences,  and  by  their  rank  in  society.”  “ The  Curators 
shall  take  precedence  according  to  the  date  of  their  appoint- 
ment ;”  but  in  the  statutes  of  the  Belgian  Universities,  it  is 
stated,  “ the  President  shall  be  named  by  the  King,  and  must 
be  resident  in  the  town  where  the  University  is  established.” 
“ These  curators  shall  be  nominated  immediately  by  the  King, 
and  chosen — at  least  three-fifths  of  them — in  the  province  where 
the  University  is  established  ; the  two  others  may  be  chosen  from 
the  adjacent  provinces.”  “ The  chief  magistrate  of  the  town  in 
which  the  University  is  situated,  is,  in  virtue,  but  only  during 
the  continuance,  of  his  office,  a member  of  the  college  of  Cura 
tors.”  Besides  the  duties  touching  the  superintendence  and  ad- 
ministration of  the  University,  “ when  a chair  falls  vacant,  the 
Curators  shall  propose  to  the  Department  of  Instruction  in  the 
Arts  and  Sciences”  (in  the  Batavian  statutes,  “ to  the  ministry 
of  the  Home  Department”)  “two  candidates  for  the  situation,  and 
they  shall  subjoin  to  their  proposal  the  reasons  which  have  de- 
termined their  choice.  The  definitive  nomination  shall  be  made 
by  the  King.”  To  hold,  annually,  two  ordinary  and  as  many  occa- 
sional meetings  as  circumstances  may  require.  “ The  Curators 
shall,  on  their  appointment,  make,  before  the  King,  the  following 
oath  : I sivear  (I promise)  fidelity  to  the  country  and  to  the  King. 
I swear  to  observe  the  regulations  and  enactments  concerning 
academical  establishments , in  so  far  as  they  concern  my  function 

of  Curator  of  the  University  of , and  to  co-operate,  in  so 

far  as  in  me  lies,  to  its  welfare  and  celebrity .”  Office  of  Cura- 
tor gratuitous  ; certain  traveling  expenses  allowed.  “ To  every 
college  of  Curators  a Secretary  is  attached,  bearing  the  title  of 
Secretary-inspector,  and  having  a deliberative  voice  in  their  meet- 
ings. He  shall  be  bound  to  residence  in  the  town  where  the 
University  is  established,  and  when  the  college  of  Curators  is 
not  assembled,  shall  watch  that  the  measures  touching  the  high 
instruction  and  the  regulations  of  the  University  are  observed, 
&c.”  This  Secretary  was  salaried. 

We  have  spoken  specially  of  Leyden,  but  all  the  schools  of 
Holland  owed  their  celebrity  to  the  same  constitution ; and  the 
emulation  of  these  different  boards  contributed  greatly  to  their 


DUTCH  UNIVERSITIES— LEYDEN. 


359 


prosperity.  The  University  of  Frane/cer,  founded  in  1585,  had 
three  Curators  and  a Secretary.  That  of  Groningen , founded  in 
1615,  was  governed  by  a college  of  six  Curators , appointed  by 
the  States  of  the'  province.  Utrecht , raised  from  a Schola  Illus- 
tris  to  a University  in  1636,  and  in  endowments  second  only  to 
Leyden,  had  five  Curators  and  a Secretary.  For  Harclerwick 
(we  believe)  there  was  a hoard  of  five  Curators  and  a President. 
The  Athenaeum  of  Amsterdam,  which  emulated  the  Universities 
of  Leyden  and  Utrecht,  was  governed  by  two  Curators ; and  the 
other  Scholse  Illustres  were  under  a similar  constitution.  On 
the  curatorial  system  likewise  was  established  the  excellence  of 
the  classical  schools  of  Holland  ; and  these,  as  recently  admitted 
by  the  most  competent  authority  in  Germany  (Thiersch),  have 
been  long,  with  a few  individual  exceptions  in  Germany,  the 
best  throughout  Europe. 

But  let  us  consider  how  the  system  wrought.  We  shall  speak 
only  of  Leyden. 

It  is  mainly  to  John  Van  der  Does,  Lord  of  Noortwyk,  a dis- 
tinguished soldier  and  statesman,  hut  still  more  celebrated  as  a 
universal  scholar,  under  the  learned  appellative  of  Janus  Douza, 
that  the  school  of  Leyden  owes  its  existence  and  reputation.  As 
governor  of  that  city,  he  had  baffled  the  leaguer  of  Requesens  ; 
and  his  ascendency,  which  moved  the  citizens  to  endure  the  hor- 
rors of  the  blockade,  subsequently  influenced  them  to  prefer,  to 
a remission  of  imposts,  the  boon  of  a University.  In  the  con- 
stitution of  the  new  seminary  it  was  he  who  was  principally  con- 
sulted ; and  his  comprehensive  erudition,  which  earned  for  him 
the  titles  of  the  “ Batavian  Varro,”  and  “ Common  Oracle  of  the 
University,”  but  still  more  his  lofty  views  and  unexclusive  lib- 
erality, enabled  him  to  discharge,  for  above  thirty  years,  the  func- 
tion of  first  curator  with  unbounded  influence  and  unparalleled 
success.  Gerard  Yan  Hoogeveen  and  Cornelius  de  Coning  were 
his  meritorious  colleagues. 

Douza’s  principles  were  those  which  ought  to  regulate  the 
practice  of  all  academical  patrons ; and  they  were  those  of  his 
successors.  He  knew,  that  at  the  rate  learning  was  seen  prized 
by  the  state  in  the  academy,  would  it  be  valued  by  the  nation  at 
large.  In  his  eyes,  a University  was  not  merely  a mouthpiece 
of  necessary  instruction,  hut  at  once  a pattern  of  lofty  erudi- 
tion, and  a stimulus  to  its  attainment.  He  knew  that  professors 
wrought  more  even  by  example  and  influence  than  by  teaching ; 


360 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


that  it  was  theirs  to  pitch  high  or  low  the  standard  of  learning 
in  a country ; and  that  as  it  proved  arduous  or  easy  to  come  up 
to  them,  they  awoke  either  a restless  endeavor  after  an  ever  loftier 
attainment,  or  lulled  into  a self-satisfied  conceit.’  And  this  rela- 
tion between  the  professorial  body  and  the  nation,  held  also  be- 
tween the  professors  themselves.  Imperative  on  all,  it  was  more 
particularly  incumbent  on  the  first  curators  of  a University,  to 
strain  after  the  very  highest  qualifications ; for  it  was  theirs  to 
determine  the  character  which  the  school  should  afterward  main- 
tain ; and  theirs  to  give  a higher  tone  to  the  policy  of  their  suc- 
cessors. With  these  views,  Douza  proposed  to  concentrate  in 
Leyden  a complement  of  professors  all  illustrious  for  their  learn- 
ing ; and  if  the  most  transcendent  erudition  could  not  be  procured 
for  the  University,  with  the  obligation  of  teaching,  that  it  should 
still  be  secured  to  it  without.  For  example.  Lipsius,  “the 
Prince  of  Latin  literature,”  had  retired.  Who  was  to  replace 
him  ? Joseph  Scaliger,  the  most  learned  man  whom  the  world 
has  ever  seen,  was  then  living  a dependent  in  the  family  of  Roche- 
pozay.  He,  of  all  men,  was  if  possible,  to  be  obtained.  The 
celebrated  Baudius,  and  Tuningius,  professor  of  civil  law,  were 
commissioned  to  proceed  as  envoys  to  France,  with  authority  to 
tender  the  appointment,  and  to  acquiesce  in  any  terms  that  the 
illustrious  scholar  might  propose.  Nor  was  this  enough.  Not 
only  did  the  Curators  of  the  University  and  the  Municipality  of 
Leyden  write  in  the  most  flattering  strain  to  the  “ Prince  of  the 
literary  Senate,”  urging  his  acquiescence,  but  also  the  States  of 
Holland,  and  Maurice  of  Orange.  Nay,  the  States  and  Stadthol- 
der  preferred  likewise  strong  solicitations  to  the  King  of  France 
to  employ  his  influence  on  their  behalf  with  the  “ Phoenix  of 
Europe  ;”  which  the  great  Henry  cordially  did.  The  negotiation 
succeeded.  Leyden  was  illustrated ; the  general  standard  of 
learned  acquirement  in  the  country,  and  the  criterion  of  profes- 
sorial competency,  were  elevated  to  a lofty  pitch ; erudition  was 
honored  above  riches  and  power,  in  the  person  of  her  favorite 
son ; nor  had  the  fallen  despot  of  Verona  to  regret  his  ancestral 
dignity,  while  republics,  and  princes,  and  kings,  were  suitors  to 
the  “ Dictator  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Letters.” — After  the  death 
of  Scaliger,  who  never  taught,  the  curators,  with  a liberality  in 
which  they  were  soon  after  checked,  tried  to  induce  Julius  Pa- 
cius  (for  whom  the  Universities  of  Germany,  of  France,  and 
though  a heretic,  of  his  native  Italy,  likewise  contended)  to 


DUTCH  UNIVERSITIES— LEYDEN. 


361 


accept  a large  salary,  on  condition  only  of  residence  in  Leyden. 
But  the  place  of  Scaliger  was  to  be  filled  by  the  only  man  who 
may  contest  with  him  the  supremacy  of  learning ; and  Salmasius, 
who,  though  a Protestant,  had  been  invited  to  Padua,  but  under 
the  obligation  of  lecturing,  preferred  the  literary  leisure  of  Ley- 
den, with  the  emoluments  and  honors  which  its  curators  and 
magistracy  lavished  on  him : — simply,  that,  as  his  call  declares, 
“ he  might  improve  by  conversation,  and  stimulate  by  example, 
the  learned  of  the  place  or,  in  the  words  of  his  funeral  orator, 
“ ut  nominis  sui  honorem  Academise  huic  impertiret,  scriptis 
eandem  illustraret,  prgesentia  condecoraret.”  And  yet  the  work- 
ing professors  of  Leyden,  at  that  time,  formed  a constellation  of 
great  men  which  no  other  University  could  exhibit.1 

Such  is  a sample  of  the  extraordinary  efforts  (for  such  sinecures 
were  out  of  rule)  of  the  first  curators  of  Leyden,  to  raise  their 
school  to  undisputed  pre-eminence,  and  their  country  to  the  most 
learned  in  Europe.  In  this  attempt  they  were  worthily  seconded 
by  their  successors,  and  favored  by  the  rivalry  of  the  patrons  of 
the  other  Universities  and  Scholse  Ulustres  of  the  United  Pro- 
vinces. And  what  was  their  success  ? In  the  Batavian  Nether- 
lands, when  Leyden  was  founded,  erudition  was  at  a lower  ebb 
than  in  most  other  countries  ; and  a generation  had  hardly 
passed  away  when  the  Dutch  scholars,  of  every  profession,  were 
the  most  numerous  and  learned  in  the  world.  And  this  not  from 
artificial  encouragement  and  support,  in  superfluous  foundations, 
affording  at  once  the  premium  of  erudition,  and  the  leisure  for 
its  undisturbed  pursuit,  for  of  these  the  Provinces  had  none  ; 
not  from  the  high  endowments  of  academic  chairs,  for  the  mode- 
rate salaries  of  the  professors  were  returned  (it  was  calculated) 
more  than  twelve  times  to  the  community  by  the  resort  of  foreign 
students  alone  ; but  simply  through  the  admirable  organization 
of  all  literary  patronage,  by  which  merit,  and  merit  alone,  was 
always  sure  of  honor,  and  of  an  honored,  if  not  a lucrative  ap- 
pointment ; — a condition  without  which  Colleges  are  nuisances, 
and  Universities  only  organized  against  their  end.  Leyden  has 
been  surpassed  by  many  other  Universities,  in  the  emoluments 
and  in  the  number  of  her  chairs,  but  has  been  equaled  by  none 


1 [I  may  mention  for  the  glory  of  England  (or  rather  of  Ireland),  that  Usher,  when 
deprived  of  his  Archiepiseopal  emoluments,  and  a mere  preacher  in  Lincoln’s  Inn, 
was  invited  to  Leyden  on  the  same  honorable  conditions.  But  Usher  was,  virtually, 
a Presbyterian .] 


362  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

in  the  average  eminence  of  her  professors.  Of  these,  the  obscur- 
er names  would  he  luminaries  in  many  other  schools ; and  from 
the  circle  of  her  twelve  professors,  and  in  an  existence  of  two 
hundred  years,  she  can  select  a more  numerous  company  of  a 
higher  erudition  than  can  he  found  among  the  public  teachers  of 
any  other  seminary  in  the  world.  Far  more,  indeed,  is  admitted 
of  Leyden  by  a learned  German,  himself  an  illustrious  ornament 
of  a rival  University.  “ Hanc  urbem,”  says  Grmvius  (who,  though 
a Protestant,  was  also  invited  by  the  Moderators  of  Padua) — 
“hanc  urbem  prse  ceteris  nobilitavit,  et  super  omnes  extulit  illus- 
trissimum  et  augustissimum  illud  sapientiee  et  omnis  doctrines 
sacrarium,  maximum  orbis  museum,  in  quo  plures  viri  summit 
qui  principatum  ingenii  et  eruditionis  tenuerunt , jioruere,  quam 
in  ceteris  omnibus  Europcc  Academiis.’’' 

That  Leyden  and  the  other  Dutch  Universities  do  not  now  re- 
tain their  former  relative  superiority,  is  not  owing  to  any  absolute 
decline  in  them,  or  corruption  in  their  system  of  patronage,  but 
principally,  if  not  entirely,  to  the  fact,  that  as  formerly  that 
system  wrought  almost  exclusively  in  their  behalf,  so  it  has 
now,  for  a considerable  period,  been  turned  very  generally  against 
them.  The  rise  of  the  German  Universities,  in  fact,  necessarily 
determined  a decline  in  the  external  prosperity  of  the  Dutch. 

The  Universities  of  the  Empire,  indeed,  exhibit  perhaps  the 
most  striking  illustration  of  the  exclusive  efficacy  of  our  prin- 
ciple. For  centuries,  these  institutions  had  languished  in  an 
obscurity  which  showed  the  darker  by  contrast  to  the  neighbor- 
ing splendor  of  the  Batavian  schools : when,  by  the  simple  applica- 
tion of  the  same  curatorial  patronage,  with  some  advantages,  and 
relieved  from  the  religious  restrictions  which  clogged  its  exercise 
in  Holland,  the  Protestant  Universities  of  Germany  shone  out  at 
once  with  a lustre  that  threw  almost  into  the  shade  the  semina- 
ries by  which  they  had  themselves  been  previously  eclipsed. 

The  older  German  Universities,  like  those  of  France,  the 
Netherlands,  England,  and  Scotland,  were  constituted  on  the 
Parisian  model;  consequently,  all  graduates  became,  in  virtue 
of  their  degree,  ordinary  members  of  the  several  faculties,  with 
equal  rights  in  the  government  of  the  corporation,  and  equal  privi- 
leges and  obligations  as  academical  teachers.  But  though  the 
privilege  of  lecturing  in  the  University  was  preserved  to  the 
graduates  at  large,  a general  dispensation  of  its  compulsory 
exercise  was  in  Germany,  as  in  other  countries,  soon  rendered 


GERMAN  UNIVERSITIES. 


363 


possible  by  the  endowment  which  took  place  of  a certain  num- 
ber of  lectureships  on  the  most  important  subjects,  with  salaries 
arising  fyom  ecclesiastical  benefices,  or  other  permanent  funds. 
Of  these,  which  were  usually  twelve,  at  most  twenty,  in  all,  the 
holders  were,  of  course,  bound  to  gratuitous  instruction;  for, 
throughout  the  European  Universities  the  salary  of  an  academi- 
cal teacher  was  always  given  (as  a boon  to  the  public,  and  more 
especially  to  the  poor)  in  lieu  of  his  exigible  pastus.  The  devices 
by  which  this  obligation  has  been,  in  various  countries,  variously 
(per  fas,  per  nefas)  eluded,  would  form  a curious  history. 

From  toward  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  no  Grerman 
University  was  founded  without  a complement  of  such  salaried 
teachers,  or — as  they  began  from  the  commencement  of  that 
century,  distinctively  to  be  denominated — Professors ; and  from 
this  period,  these  appointments  were  also  generally  for  life.  These 
professors  thus  came  to  constitute  the  ordinary  and  permanent 
members  of  the  faculties  to  which  they  belonged ; the  other  gradu- 
ates soon  lost,  at  least  on  equal  terms,  the  privilege  of  academi- 
cal teaching,  and  were  wholly  excluded  from  the  everyday  admin- 
istration of  the  University  and  its  Faculties. 

To  the  salaried  teachers  thus  established  in  the  Universities — 
to  them  collectively,  in  colleges,  or  in  faculties,  the  privilege  was 
generally  conceded  of  choosing  their  own  colleagues  ; and  this  in 
the  fond  persuasion,  as  the  deed  of  concession  usually  bore,  that 
the  election  would  be  thus  always  determined  with  knowledge, 
and  by  the  superior  merit  of  the  candidate.  The  princes  and 
free  cities,  who,  in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  founded 
Universities  and  endowed  Professorships,  abandoned  to  the  salaried 
teachers  this  right  either  entirely  or  in  part.  Leipsic  and  Tue- 
bingen are  examples  of  the  one,  Ingoldstadt  of  the  other.  In  the 
sixteenth  and  following  centuries,  on  the  contrary,  when  the 
custom  of  endowing  every  public  chair  with  a salary,  and  that 
for  life,  became  more  and  more  universal,  no  Grerman  University 
was  erected  in  which  an  unfettered  right  of  election  was  granted 
to  the  professors  ; and  as  experience  had  now  proved  the  pernicious 
policy  of  such  a concession  to  the  older  Universities,  it  was  also 
from  them  generally  withdrawn.  The  Senate'  or  the  Faculties 
obtained  at  most  the  privilege  of  presenting  candidates  for  ap- 
pointment. Of  this  Koenigsberg  is  an  instance.  But  until  the 
foundation  of  the  University  of  Halle,  in  1694,  by  the  statutes 
of  which  the  chairs  in  the  juridical  and  medical  faculties  were 


31)4  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

declared  absolutely  in  the  appointment  of  the  Prince,  (though 
these  bodies  still  ventured  to  interpose  their  advice)  ; the  selection 
and  ordinary  appointment  of  professors,  under  the  various  forms 
of  presentation,  commendation,  proposal , or  designation,  was  vir- 
tually exercised  by  the  professorial  bodies.  There  was,  in  fact, 
in  the  state,  no  other  authority  on  whom  this  function  peculiarly 
Or  responsibly  devolved.  It  was  the  establishment  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Goettingen,  exactly  a century  ago,  which  necessitated  a 
total  and  most  salutary  change  of  system.  “ The  great  Muench- 
hausen,”  says  an  illustrious  professor  of  that  seminary,  “allowed 
our  University  the  right  of  Presentation,  of  Designation,  or  of 
Recommendation,  as  little  as  the  right  of  free  Election ; for  he 
was  taught  by  experience,  that  although  the  faculties  of  Univer- 
sities may  know  the  individuals  best  qualified  to  supply  their 
vacant  chairs,  that  they  are  seldom  or  never  disposed  to  propose 
for  appointment  the  worthiest  within  their  knowledge.” 

The  length  to  which  this  article  has  already  run,  warns  us  not 
to  attempt  a contrast  of  the  past  and  present  state  of  the  German 
Universities.  On  this  interesting  subject,  “satius  est  silere  quam 
parum  dicere.”  By  Germans  themselves,  they  are  admitted  to 
have  been  incomparably  inferior  to  the  Dutch  and  Italian  Uni- 
versities, until  the  foundation  of  the  University  of  Goettingen. 
Muenchhausen  was  for  Goettingen  and  the  German  Universities, 
what  Douza  was  for  Leyden  and  the  Dutch.  But  with  this  dif- 
ference : — Leyden  was  the  model  on  which  the  younger  Univer- 
sities of  the  Republic  were  constructed  ; Goettingen  the  model  on 
which  the  older  Universities  of  the  Empire  were  reformed.  Both 
were  statesmen  and  scholars.  Both  proposed  a high  ideal  for 
the  schools  founded  under  their  auspices  ; and  both,  as  first  Cura- 
tors, labored  with  paramount  influence  in  realizing  this  ideal  for 
the  same  long  period  of  thirty-two  years.  Under  their  patronage 
Leyden  and  Goettingen  took  the  highest  place  among  the  Uni- 
versities of  Europe  ; and  both  have  only  lost  their  relative  suprem- 
acy, by  the  application  in  other  seminaries  of  the  same  measures 
which  had  at  first  determined  their  superiority. 

From  the  mutual  relations  of  the  seminaries,  states,  and  people 
of  the  Empire,  the  resort  to  a German  University  has  in  general 
been  always  mainly  dependent  on  its  comparative  excellence ; and 
as  the  interest  of  the  several  states  was  involved  in  the  prosperity 
of  their  several  Universities,  the  improvement  of  one  of  these 
schools  necessarily  occasioned  the  improvement  of  the  others. 


GERMAN  UNIVERSITIES— GOETTINGEN. 


365 


No  sooner,  therefore,  had  Goettingen  risen  to  a decided  superior- 
ity through  her  system  of  curatorial  patronage,  and  other  subor- 
dinate improvements,  than  the  different  governments  found  it 
necessary  to  place  their  seminaries,  as  far  as  possible,  on  an  equal 
footing.  The  nuisance  of  professorial  recommendation,  under 
which  the  Universities  had  so  long  pined,  was  generally  abated; 
and  the  few  schools  in  which  it  has  been  tolerated,  subsist  only 
through  their  endowments,  and  stand  as  warning  monuments  of 
its  effect.  Compare  wealthy  Greifswalde  with  poor  Halle.  The 
virtual  patronage  was  in  general  found  best  confided  to  a small 
body  of  Curators;  though  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  coun- 
try, and  the  peculiar  organization  of  its  machinery  of  government 
have  recently  enabled  at  least  one  of  the  German  states  to  con- 
centrate, without  a violation  of  our  principles,  its  academical 
patronage  in  a ministry  of  public  instruction.  This,  however,  we 
can  not  now  explain.  It  is  universally  admitted,  that  since  their 
rise  through  the  new  system  of  patronage,  the  Universities  of 
Germany  have  drawn  into  their  sphere  the  highest  talent  of  the 
nation ; that  the  new  era  in  its  intellectual  life  has  been  wholly 
determined  by  them ; as  from  them  have  emanated  almost  all  the 
most  remarkable  products  of  German  genius,  in  literature,  erudi- 
tion, philosophy,  and  science. 

The  matter  of  academical  patronage  has  of  course  been  dis- 
cussed in  Germany,  where  education  in  general  has  engrossed 
greater  attention  than  throughout  the  world  beside ; and  where, 
in  particular,  the  merits  of  every  feasible  mode  of  choosing  pro- 
fessors have  been  tried  by  a varied  experience.  But  in  that 
country  the  question  has  been  hardly  ever  mooted.  All  are  at 
one.  Every  authority  supports  the  policy  of  concentrating  the 
academical  patronage  in  an  extra-academical  body , small,  intelli- 
gent, and  responsible ; and  we  defy  the  allegation  of  a single 
modern  opinion  in  favor  of  distributing  that  patronage  among  a 
numerous  body  of  electors — far  less  of  leaving  it,  in  any  circum- 
stances, modification,  or  degree,  under  the  influence  of  the  pro- 
fessorial college.  The  same  unanimity  has  also,  we  have  noticed, 
always  prevailed  in  Holland.  As  a specimen  of  the  state  of 
opinion  in  Germany  on  this  decided  point,  we  shall  cite  only 
three  witnesses,  all  professors,  all  illustrious  authors,  and  all  of 
the  very  highest  authority,  in  a question  of  learned  education  or 
of  academical  usage.  These  are  Michaelis,  Meiners,  and  Schleier- 
macher. 


366 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


Michaelis. — “ It  is  inexpedient  to  allow  the  choice  of  academical 
teachers  to  the  professors  themselves,  be  it  either  to  the  whole  concilium 
or  to  the  several  faculties  ; and  those  Universities  which  exercise  this  right 
pay  the  penalty  of  the  privilege.  A choice  of  this  description  is  always 
ill  made  by  a numerous  body,  and  a single  intelligent  judge  is  better  than 

a multitude  of  electors In  an  election  by  professors,  it  is  also  to 

be  feared  that  partiality,  nepotism,  complaisance  to  a colleague  in  expect- 
ation of  a return,  would  be  all-powerful ; and  were  it  only  a patriotic  pref- 
erence of  natives  to  strangers,  still  would  the  election  be  perverted.  There 
is,  moreover,  a painful  circumstance  on  which  I am  loath  to  touch.  It  is 
not  impossible  that  the  most  intelligent  judge  among  the  professors,  one  in 
the  enjoyment  of  distinguished  influence  and  reputation,  may,  in  the  ap- 
pointment of  a colleague,  look  that  this  reputation  and  influence  be  not 
eclipsed,  and  consequently,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  higher  talent,  confine 
his  choice  to  such  inferior  qualifications  as  he  can  regard  without  dread 
of  rivalry.  Professors  may,  it  is  true,  be  profitably  consulted  ; but  no  re- 
liance should  be  placed  on  the  advice  of  those  who  have  any  counter  in- 
terest to  the  new  professor The  direst  evil  in  the  choice  of  pro- 

fessors, and  the  certain  prelude  to  the  utter  degradation  of  a University,  is 
nepotism ; that  is,  if  professors,  whether  directly  through  election,  or  in- 
directly through  recommendation  and  advice,  should  succeed  in  obtaining 
academical  appointments  for  sons,  sons-in-law,  & c.,  of  inferior  learning. 
The  man  who  in  this  manner  becomes  extraordinary  professor  will,  with- 
out merit,  rise  also  to  the  higher  office  ; and  the  job  which  is  tolerated  on 
one  occasion,  must,  from  collegial  friendship  and  even  equitable  reciprocity, 
be  practiced  on  others.”  ( Raisonnement  ueber  die  protestantisclien  TJni- 
versitaeten  Deutschland  (1770),  ii.  p.  412.) 

Meiners. — “ It  should  be  no  matter  of  regret  that  faculties  have  now 
lost  the  privilege  of  electing  their  members,  or  of  recommending  them  for 
appointment.  Certain  as  it  is,  that  each  faculty  is  best  competent  to 
determine  w'hat  qualifications  are  most  wanted  for  its  vacant  chairs,  and 
who  are  the  persons  possessing  these  qualifications  in  the  highest  eminence ; 
certain  also  is  it,  that  in  very  many  cases  the  faculties  would  neither  elect 
nor  recommend  the  individual  deserving  of  preference  ; — that  is,  in  all 
cases  where  they  might  apprehend  that  the  worthiest  would  prejudice  the 
interests,  or  throw  into  the  shade  the  reputation,  of  themselves  or  friends. 
....  Let  academical  patrons  be  cautious  as  possible,  and  let  them  consult 
whom  they  may  in  the  choice  of  public  teachers,  it  can  not  but  happen  that 
they  should  commit  occasional  mistakes.  And  when  such  occur,  then  is 
it  that  we  are  sure  to  hear — 1 This  could  not  have  happened,  had  the 
University  of  Faculty  been  consulted.’  Yet  far  worse  and  far  more  fre- 
quent errors  would  occur,  did  the  faculties  possess  the  right  of  free  election, 
or  did  the  higher  authorities  only  choose  out  of  a list  presented  by  the  pro- 
fessors  

“ The  actual  choice  and  confirmation  of  public  teachers  is  now,  in  most 
Universities,  in  the  hands  of  the  Prince,  and  of  the  curators  appointed  by 
him  ; in  very  few  is  it  exercised  by  the  Universities  themselves,  or  by  their 
several  faculties  and  functionaries.  The  Universities  in  which  teachers 
are  chosen  and  confirmed  by  the  Prince,  or  by  the  curators  nominated  by 
him,  are.  distinguished  among  themselves  by  this  difference; — that  in 
some,  the  whole  professorial  body,  or  the  several  faculties,  have  either  the 
right  or  the  permission  to  propose,  or  at  least  recommend,  candidates  for 


TESTIMONY  OE  MEINEES. 


367 


the  vacant  places ; and  that,  in  others,  they  have  not.  The  questions 
thus  arise  : — Is  it  better  that  the  Universities  themselves,  or  those  in 
authority  over  them,  should  elect  the  professors?  Is  it  better  that  the 
University  or  academical  bodies  should  or  should  not  have  the  right  or 
permission  to  propose  or  recommend  for  appointment  ? 

“ It  does  not  admit  of  doubt,  that  the  choice  of  professors  by  extra- aca 
demical  governors,  is  preferable  to  their  election  by  the  senatus  or  facul- 
ties. Curators,  however  learned  they  may  be,  still  can  not  be  so  familiar 
with  every  department  of  erudition,  as  to  be  able,  on  every  vacancy,  to 
determine,  from  their  own  knowledge,  what  individuals  ought  to  be  taken 
into  consideration,  and  who  of  these  is  best  deserving  of  preference.  To  this 
the  most  learned  professor  would  be  equally  incompetent  as  the  academical 
curators.  It  is  not,  however,  difficult  for  well  disposed  and  enlightened 
curators  to  obtain  the  information  which  they  themselves  can  not  possibly 
possess.  They  reside,  in  general,  either  in  great  cities,  or,  at  least,  in 
towns  inhabited  by  men  of  learning,  intimately  acquainted  with  every 
branch  of  literature.  They  likewise  in  general  personally  know,  in  the 
Universities  over  which  they  preside,  individuals  of  approved  erudition, 
who  can  either  afford  advice  themselves,  or  obtain  it  from  others  with 
whom  they  are  acquainted.  In  either  way,  it  is  easy  to  ascertain  both 
the  number  and  the  relative  qualifications  of  those  who  would  accept  the 
office.  This  must  be  admitted  ; nor  can  it  be  denied,  that  curators  will  in 
almost  every  instance  elect  those  recommended  to  them  as  the  worthiest,  by 
the  best  informed  and  most  impartial  advisers.  Curators  have  no  other, 
at  least  no  stronger  interest,  than  the  maintenance  and  increase  of  the  pros- 
perity of  the  University  intrusted  to  their  care.  This  interest  induces  them, 
in  the  academical  appointments,  rigidly  to  scrutinize  the  qualifications  of 
candidates,  and  to  accord  the  preference  only  to  the  most  deserving.  The 
individuals  out  of  whom  they  choose  are  not  of  their  connections,  and 
seldom  even  their  personal  acquaintances.  There  is  thus  rarely  any  ground 
of  partiality  or  disfavor.  If  curators  elect  according  to  merit,  they  enjoy, 
besides  the  inestimable  approbation  of  a good  conscience,  the  exclusive 
honor  of  their  choice.  Do  they  allow  themselves  to  be  influenced  by 
unsifted  recommendations,  to  choose  another  than  the  worthiest — they 
expose  themselves,  by  their  neglect  of  duty,  to  public  and  private  reproba- 
tion. 

“ Academical  senates  and  faculties  possessing  the  privilege  of  self- 
election, have  at  least  this  advantage  over  curators  of  Universities,  that 
they  are  able  from  their  own  knowledge,  to  appreciate  the  merit  of  candi- 
dates. But,  on  the  other  hand,  they  in  this  are  inferior  to  curators,  that 
we  can  rarely  allow  them  credit  for  the  will  to  elect  him  whom  they  are 
themselves  conscious  is  best  entitled  to  the  place.  The  worthiest  are 
either  opponents  or  rivals  of  the  electors  themselves,  or  of  their  friends. 
The  electors,  or  their  friends,  have  relations  or  favorites  for  whom  they 
are  desirous  to  provide.  In  most  cases,  likewise,  the  very  interest  of  the 
electors  excludes  the  most  deserving,  and  prescribes  the  choice  of  an  in- 
ferior candidate.  Impartial  elections  can  only  take  place  in  academical 
senates  and  faculties,  when  a chair  is  to  be  filled  for  which  there  is  no 
competition,  and  the  prosperity  of  which  is  for  the  direct  and  immediate 
advantage  of  the  electors  at  large.  It  will  be  granted  that  the  case  occurs 
but  seldom.  As  long,  therefore,  as  we  must  admit  that  academical  sen- 
ates and  faculties  are  more  frequently  partial  than  curators  of  Universi- 


368 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


lies  are  all  ill-informed,  so  long  must  we  maintain,  that  professors  should 
he  elected  by  a superior  authority,  and  not  by  the  University  itself.  This, 
history  and  experience  have  already  for  centuries  determined. 

“ Proposals  and  recommendations  of  candidates  by  senates  and  faculties, 
are  a minor  evil  to  actual  election ; hut  still  an  evil  which  should  he 
abolished  or  avoided.  The  same  causes  which  determine  the  election  of 
inferior  merit,  must  operate  against  the -proposal  and  recommendation  of 
superior.  Where  it  is  the  custom  that  the  senate  of  faculty  proposes  a 
certain  number  of  candidates,  out  of  which  the  higher  authorities  make 
choice,  there  arises,  if  not  an  open  nepotism,  at  least  a provincial  spirit 
of  preference,  and  a secret  conspiracy  against  foreigners,  pernicious  to  a 
University.  If  the  higher  authorities,  therefore,  confine  their  choice  to 
those  thus  recommended,  they  will  always  find  that  the  vacant  chairs  are 
not  provided  with  the  most  eminent  professors.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
they  disregard  their  recommendation,  they  afford  the  academical  bodies 
cause  of  umbrage,  and  render  them  the  sworn  enemies  of  the  professor 
actually  appointed  ; complaints  are  raised  of  broken  privileges ; and  he 
who  is  forced  on  them  through  such  a breach,  becomes  the  object  of  odium 
or  persecution.  It  is,  therefore,  highly  advisable,  that  the  founder,  and 
those  in  authority  over  Universities,  should  remain  unfettered  in  the  choice 
of  professors  ; and  that  in  the  exercise  of  this  function,  they  should  obtain 
the  advice  of  those,  within  and  without  their  Universities,  who  will  afford 
them  the  most  impartial  and  enlightened  counsel.”  ( Vemvaltung  clents- 
cher  Universitaeten  (1801),  i.  p.  124,  ii.  p.  35.) 

Schleiebmacheh. — “The  University  itself  must  certainly  best  know 
its  want,  when  a vacancy  occurs,  or  the  opportunity  oilers  of  extending 
the  sphere  of  its  instruction  ; and  as  we  are  bound  to  presume  in  its  mem- 
bers a knowledge  of  all  that  appears  of  any  scientific  importance  in  the 
country,  they  must  likewise  know  from  whence  to  obtain  wherewithal  to 
supply  this  want.  But,  alas ! no  one  would  on  that  account  be  inclined 
to  accord  to  a University  the  choice  of  its  teachers.  Universities  are,  one 
and  all,  so  infamous  for  a spirit  of  petty  intrigue,  that  were  this  privilege 
once  conceded,  what  rational  being  is  there  who,  from  their  devotion  to 
party,  from  the  passions  excited  in  their  literary  feuds,  and  from  their 
personal  connections,  could  not  anticipate  the  pernicious  consequences?” 
( Gcdanken  ueber  Universitaeten  in  deutscliem  Sinn  (1808),  p.  97.) 

Having  thus  generalized  the  principles  which  govern  a well- 
organized  system  of  academic  patronage,  and  historically  shown 
that  these  principles  have  been  actually  applied  in  all  the  most 
distinguished  Universities,  we  shall  now  conclude  our  discussion 
by  considering  the  modes  of  appointing  professors  in  use  in  Scotland. 

To  say  nothing  of  the  special  patronage  of  a few  individual 
chairs,  the  merits  of  which  we  can  not  at  present  pause  to  con- 
sider, the  general  systems  of  academical  patronage  here  preva- 
lent are  three  ; the  trust  being  deposited  in  the  hands  either  of 
a Municipal  Magistracy — of  the  Professorial  body  itself — or  of 
the  Crown. 

The  first  of  these  systems,  though  not  unknown  in  one  of  the 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  BY  MUNICIPALITIES. 


369 


other  Universities,  is  preponderant  only  in  that  of  Edinburgh, 
where  the  far  greater  number  of  professors  are  elected  imme- 
diately by  the  suffrages  of  the  thirty-three  members  of  the  Town 
Council. 

This  system  is  generally  and  justly  admitted  to  be  greatly 
preferable  to  the  other  two.  An  admission,  however,  of  the  kind, 
proves  aught  rather  than  the  absolute  excellence  of  the  method. 
It  is  melancholy  indeed  that  such  a system  should  be  tolerated  in 
our  country  ; still  more  melancholy  that  it  must  be  lauded  as  the 
best  we  have.  The  utmost  that  can  be  said  in  its  favor  is,  that 
compared  with  the  other  two,  it  is  of  itself  less  disposed  to  evil, 
and  more  capable  of  being  inclined  to  good. 

A body  like  the  Edinburgh  Town  Council  as  it  tuas,  fulfills 
none  of  the  conditions  of  a well-organized  board  of  academical 
patrons.  From  their  education  and  rank  in  society,  they  were, 
on  the  average,  wholly  destitute  of  that  information  and  intel- 
ligence which  such  patrons  ought  to  possess  ; they  were  a col- 
lection of  individuals — numerous — transitory — obscure  ; and  the 
function  itself  was  an  appendage  wholly  accidental  to  their  office. 

Such  a body  of  patrons  was  wholly  incapable  of  an  active  ex- 
ercise of  their  trust.  Their  unintelligence,  numbers,  and  fluctu- 
ating association,  prevented  them  from  anticipating  and  following 
out  any  uniform  and  systematic  measures.  No  general  principle 
determined  among  them  a unity  of  will.  They  could  not  attempt 
an  extensive  survey  for  a discovery  of  the  highest  qualifications ; 
nor  make  a tender  of  the  appointment  to  those  who  might  accept 
what  they  would  not  solicit.  Their  sphere  of  choice  was  thus 
limited  to  actual  candidates ; and  the  probabilities  of  success 
again  always  limited  candidates  to  those  whose  merits  were  sup- 
ported or  supplied  by  local  and  adventitious  circumstances.  Even 
in  the  narrow  circle  of  candidates,  the  choice  of  the  civic  patrons 
was  always  passive  ; and  its  character  for  good  or  ill,  wholly 
dependent  on  the  nature  of  some  external  determination.  The 
judgment  of  a proper  body  of  patrons  should  be  higher  than  that 
of  the  community  at  large ; it  should  guide,  not  merely  follow, 
public  opinion.  This,  however,  was  not  to  be  expected  from  a 
body  of  burgesses ; in  fact,  it  has  been  the  only  merit  of  the 
Town  Council  of  Edinburgh,  either  claimed  or  accorded,  that 
public  opinion  was  not  without  a certain  weight  in  then  decision. 
But  public  opinion  is  not  unfrequently  at  fault ; it  favors  the 
popular  and  superficial,  not  the  learned  and  profound.  The  qual- 

Aa 


370  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

ifications  of  a professor  are  frequently  wholly  beyond  its  cogni- 
zance ; and  still  more  frequently  the  qualifications  of  candidates 
are  unknown.  Public  opinion  was  thus  either  not  expressed  in 
favor  of  any  candidate,  or  it  was  divided  ; and  the  patrons  solely 
abandoned  to  accident,  or  the  impulsion  of  some  less  salutary  in- 
fluence— an  influence  frequently  found  omnipotent,  even  against 
public  opinion  itself. 

The  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh  was,  in  fact,  peculiarly  ex- 
posed to  have  its  patronage  corrupted  through  a variety  of  chan- 
nels ; and  the  history  of  the  University  shows,  that  the  highest 
merit,  and  the  public  opinion  of  that  merit  most  emphatically 
pronounced,  have  never,  in  a single  instance,  prevailed,  when  a 
perverse  influence  has  been  adequately  brought  to  bear  on  the 
electors.  Nor  could  it  possibly  be  otherwise.  A body  of  electors 
more  completely  relieved  of  responsibility,  and  the  consciousness 
of  responsibility,  could  scarcely  be  imagined.  We  had  here  a 
body,  itself  the  creature,  and  consequently  the  pliant  instrument, 
of  favor,  intrigue,  and  corruption.  The  members  of  this  body 
were  men,  in  general,  wholly  unable  to  represent  to  themselves 
the  high  importance  of  their  decision,  or  to  be  actuated  by  any 
refined  conception  of  their  duty  ; nor  could  public  reprobation  be 
felt  at  all,  when  the  responsibility  was  so  pulverized  among  a 
passing  multitude  of  nameless  individuals.  Such  a body  was,  of 
all  others,  liable  to  be  led  astray  from  their  duty  by  those  who 
had  an  interest  in  perverting  their  choice.  “It  is  remarkable,” 
says  Dr.  Chalmers,  “that  some  of  the  chief  deviations  by  Magis- 
trates and  Councils  in  the  exercise  of  this  trust,  have  been 
brought  about  by  the  influence  of  leading  men  in  the  Church  or 
in  the  University.”  This  influence,  which  was  long  as  systemat- 
ically as  perniciously  exerted,  operated  equally  to  the  corruption 
of  the  Church  and  of  the  University ; and  the  last,  worst  form 
of  academical  patronage,  that  by  the  professorial  body  itself,  was 
thus  covertly  at  work,  without  even  the  trifling  checks  which 
accompanied  its  open  exercise.  Itself  the  breath  of  party,  the 
Town  Council  hardly  pretended  to  impartiality  when  politics  dis- 
turbed its  choice ; and  the  most  transcendent  claims  were  of  no 
avail  against  the  merits  of  a municipal  relationship.  A large 
proportion  of  the  electors  were  necessarily  in  dependent  relations  ; 
and  some  hardly  above  the  condition  of  paupers.  They  were  thus 
wholly  incapacitated  from  resisting  the  various  sinister  influences 
which  assailed  their  integrity ; and  even  direct  bribery,  which  is 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  BY  MUNICIPALITIES. 


371 


known  to  have  been  sometimes  tried,  was  probably  not  always 
unsuccessful.  It  was  thus,  only  when  left  to  themselves,  and  to 
the  guidance  of  public  opinion,  that  the  civic  patrons  could  be 
trusted  ; — only  when  the  powers  which  commanded  their  voices 
had  no  sufficient  interest  in  warping  their  decision.  The  fact, 
that  they  not  only  tolerated,  but  expected,  the  personal  solicita- 
tions of  candidates  and  their  friends,  proves  also,  of  itself,  that 
they  had  no  true  conception  of  their  office ; — that  they  thought 
of  granting  a favor,  not  merely  of  performing  a duty.  Patrons 
who  exercise  their  power  only  as  a trust  will  spurn  all  canvassing 
as  an  insult,  if  candidates  do  not  feel  it  as  a disgrace.  Judges 
were  once  courted  in  this  and  other  countries  in  a similar  man- 
ner. We  look  back  on  such  a practice  as  on  a marvel  of  political 
barbarism ; and  it  will  not,  we  trust,  be  long  until  we  recollect 
with  equal  wonder  the  abomination  of  solicited  trustees. 

That  municipal  magistrates  could  possibly  exercise,  of  them- 
selves, the  function  of  academic  patrons,  seems  in  no  other  coun- 
try to  have  been  imagined  ; and  even  in  Edinburgh,  the  right  of 
choice  was  originally  limited  by  conditions  which  the  Town  Coun- 
cil have  only  latterly  evaded.  Their  election  formerly  expressed 
only  the  issue  of  a public  concourse  of  candidates,  and  disputation 
in  the  Latin  tongue ; and  the  decision,  too,  we  believe,  was  only 
valid  when  sanctioned  by  the  approval  of  the  Presbytery.  We 
recollect  only  two  foreign  Universities  in  which  the  municipality 
were  patrons — Louvain  and  Altdorf.  In  the  former,  this  right, 
which  extended  only  to  certain  chairs,  was  controlled  by  the  fac- 
ulties, whose  advice  was  to  be  always  previously  taken  ; and  the 
decline  of  that  great  and  wealthy  seminary  was  mainly  determined 
by  its  vicious  patronage,  both  as  vested  in  the  University  and  in 
the  Town.  Altdorf,  on  the  other  hand,  founded  and  maintained 
by  the  free  city  of  Nuremberg,  was  about  the  poorest  University 
in  Germany,  and  long  one  of  the  most  eminent.  Its  whole  en- 
dowments never  rose  above  £800  a year ; and  till  the  period  of 
its  declension,  the  professors  of  Altdorf  make  at  least  as  distin- 
guished a figure  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  as  those  of  all  the 
eight  Universities  of  the  British  Empire  together.  On  looking 
closely  into  its  constitution,  the  anomaly  is  at  once  solved.  The 
patrician  Senate  of  Nuremberg  were  not  certainly  less  qualified 
for  academical  patrons  than  the  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh  ; but 
they  were  too  intelligent  and  patriotic  to  attempt  the  exercise  of 
such  a function.  The  nomination  of  professors,  though  formally 


372  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

ratified  by  the  senate,  was  virtually  made  by  a board  of  four 
Curators;  and  what  is  worthy  of  remark,  so  long  as  curatorial 
patronage  was  a singularity  in  Germany,  Altdorf  maintained  its 
relative  pre-eminence — losing  it  only  when  a similar  mean  was 
adopted  in  the  more  favored  Universities  of  the  Empire. 

These  observations  are,  in  their  whole  extent,  applicable  only 
to  the  old  Toivn  Council ; but  it  is  manifest  that  all  the  princi- 
pal circumstances  which  incapacitated  that  body,  under  its  for- 
mer constitution,  for  a competent  exercise  of  academic  patronage, 
continue  still  to  operate  under  its  present ; and  if  some  minor 
objections  are  removed,  others,  perhaps  of  even  greater  moment, 
have  arisen.  On  these,  however,  we  can  not  at  present  touch. 
Indeed,  it  is  only  in  a country  far  behind  in  all  that  regards  the 
theory  and  practice  of  education,  that  the  notion  of  intrusting  a 
body  like  a municipal  magistracy  with  such  a trust,  would  not 
be  treated  with  derision ; and  we  have  so  high  an  opinion  of  the 
intelligence  and  good  intentions  of  the  present  Town  Council,  that 
we  even  confidently  expect  them  to  take  the  lead  in  depositing 
in  proper  hands  that  important  part  of  their  public  trust,  which 
they  are  unable  adequately  to  discharge  themselves.  [But 
alas !] 

Their  continuance  as  patrons  would,  in  fact,  seal  the  downfall 
of  the  University  of  Edinburgh ; unless,  what  is  now  impossible, 
systems  of  patronage  still  more  vicious  should  continue  to  keep 
down  the  other  Universities  of  Scotland  to  their  former  level. 
All  of  these  are  superior  to  Edinburgh  in  endowments ; and  if 
the  one  decisive  superiority  which  Edinburgh  has  hitherto  enjoy- 
ed over  them,  in  the  comparative  excellence  of  her  patronage,  be 
reversed  in  their  favor,  the  result  is  manifest. 

From  the  best  pf  our  Scottish  systems  of  academical  patronage, 
we  now  pass  to  the  worst ; and  public  opinion  is,  even  in  this 
country,  too  unanimous  in  condemnation,  to  make  it  necessary  to 
dwell  upon  its  vices.  We  mean  that  of  self-patronage. 

In  the  unqualified  form  in  which  it  has  so  long  prevailed  in 
Scotland,  it  was  tried,  in  the  darkness  of  the  middle  ages,  in  a 
very  few  of  the  continental  Universities  ; and  in  these  the  expe- 
riment was  brief.  In  an  extremely  modified  shape,  and  under 
circumstances  which  greatly  counteracted  its  evils,  it  was  tole- 
rated for  a considerable  period  in  the  German  Universities ; expe- 
rience, however,  proved  its  inexpediency  under  every  mitigation, 
and  it  has  been  long  in  that  country,  as  we  have  shown,  abso- 


ACADEMICAL  SELF-PATRONAGE. 


373 


lutely  and  universally  condemned.  [See  the  authorities  above, 

p.  366—368.] 

As  established  in  Scotland,  this  system  violates,  or  rather 
reverses,  almost  every  condition  by  which  the  constitution  of  a 
hoard  of  patrons  ought  to  he  regulated. — In  the  first  place,  by 
conjoining  in  the  same  persons  the  right  of  appointment  and  the 
right  of  possession,  it  tends  to  confound  patronage  with  property, 
and  thus  to  deaden  in  the  trustee  the  consciousness  of  his  charac- 
ter ; in  fact,  to  foster  in  him  the  feeling,  that,  in  the  exercise  of 
his  function,  he  is  not  discharging  an  imperative  duty,  hut  doing 
arbitrarily  what  he  chooses  “with  his  own.” — In  the  second  place, 
as  it  disposes  the  patron  to  forget  that  he  is  a trustee,  so  it  also 
primes  him  with  every  incentive  to  act  as  a proprietor.  Natural 
affection  to  children  and  kindred ; 1 personal  friendship  and  enmi- 
ty ; party  (and  was  there  ever  a University  without  this  curse  ?) ; 
jealousy  of  superior  intelligence  and  learning,  operating  the 
stronger  the  lower  the  University  is  degraded ; the  fear  of  an  un- 
accommodating integrity ; and  finally,  the  acquiescence  even  of 
opposite  parties  in  a job,  with  the  view  of  a reciprocity  ; — these 
and  other  motives  effectually  co-operate  to  make  the  professorial 
patron  abuse  his  public  duty  to  the  furtherance  of  his  private 
ends.  The  single  motive  for  bestowing  on  professors  the  power 
of  nominating  their  colleagues,  was  the  silly  persuasion  that  they 
were  the  persons  at  once  best  able  to  appreciate  ability,  and  the 
most  interested  in  obtaining  it.  If  this  were  true — if  it  were  not 
the  reverse  of  truth,  we  should  surely  find  our  professorial  patrons 
in  Scotland,  like  the  Curators  of  foreign  universities,  looking 
anxiously  around,  on  every  vacancy,  for  the  individual  of  highest 
eminence,  and  making  every  exertion  to  induce  his  acceptance 
of  the  chair.  But  has  it  been  heard  that  this  primary  act  of  a 
patron’s  duty  was  ever  yet  performed  by  a college  of  professorial 
patrons  ? In  the  nature  of  things  it  could  hardly  he.  For  why  ? 
This  would  he  an  overt  admission,  that  they  were  mere  trustees 
performing  a duty,  not  proprietors  conferring  a favor.  Were  the 
highest  qualifications  once  recognized  as  the  sole  rule ; why  not 


1 “ Hence  the  hereditary  successions  in  colleges  which  are  thus  patronized — the 
firm  and  infrangible  compacts,  which  sometimes  last  for  generations,  cemented  as  they 
are  by  the  affinities  of  blood  and  relationship — the  decaying  lustre  of  chairs  once 
occupied  by  men  of  highest  celebrity  and  talent,  but  the  very  ascendency  of  whose 
influence  when  living,  or  of  whose  names  after  they  were  dead,  effected  the  transmis- 
sion of  their  offices  to  a list  of  descendants." — Dr.  Chalmers. 


374  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

make  its  application  universal  ? But  then,  the  standard  of  pro- 
fessorial competence  would  be  inconveniently  raised ; the  publio 
would  expect  that  the  reputation  of  the  University  should  not  he 
allowed  to  fall ; and  the  chairs  could  therefore  no  longer  he  dealt 
about  as  suited  the  private  iirterest  of  the  patrons.  The  private 
interest  of  the  patrons,  therefore,  determined  an  opposite  policy. 
The  standard  of  professorial  competence  must  he  kept  down — it 
seldom  needed  to  he  lowered — to  the  average  level  of  their  rela- 
tives and  partisans.  Not  only  must  no  invitation  be  given  to 
men  of  reputation,  they  must  he  disgusted  from  appearing  as 
candidates.  The  value  of  the  chairs,  as  places  of  honor,  must  be 
reduced  ; that,  as  places  of  emolument,  they  might  not,  and  that 
in  an  unlearned  country,  be  beyond  the  reach  of  ordinary  men. 
Instead  of  receiving  an  unsolicited  call  to  take  his  seat  among 
the  members  of  an  illustrious  body,  the  man  of  highest  reputa- 
tion, to  obtain  the  cliavice  even  of  a chair,  must  condescend  to 
beg  the  lowered  office  as  a favor,  from  a crowd  of  undistinguished 
individuals,  to  obtain  whose  voices  was  no  credit,  and  not  to  ob- 
tain them  would  still  be  felt  as  a disgrace ; and  submit  to  the 
humiliation  of  being  fellow-candidate  of  all  and  sundry,  whom 
the  humble  vanity  of  standing  for  a chair,  or  personal  and  party 
interest  with  the  electors,  called — and  with  probable  success — 
into  the  field.  To  he  left  to  divide  the  cake  in  the  shade,  has 
been  the  aim  of  all  professorial  patronage.  We  do  not  assert, 
that  under  this  system  no  men  of  distinguished  merit  have  illus- 
trated our  Universities  ; — far  from  it  ; hut  we  assert  that  of  all 
others  it  tends  to  make  celebrity  the  exception,  obscurity  the 
rule.  And  of  the  small  number  of  great  names  to  which  the 
professorial  patronage  can  lay  claim,  some  conquered  their  ap- 
pointments by  other  reasons  than  their  merits,  and  more  took 
their  patrons  and  the  world  by  surprise  in  their  subsequent  repu- 
tation. We  know  something  of  the  history  of  foreign  Universities, 
and  something,  at  least  by  negation,  of  the  history  of  our  own. 
And  this  we  affirm,  that  if  a premium  were  given  to  the  Univer- 
sity which  could  exhibit  among  its  professors  the  largest  propor- 
tion of  least  distinguished  names,  the  Scottish  Universities,  where 
self-election  is  prevalent,  would  have  it  only  to  contend  for  among 
themselves. 

We  may  here  anticipate  an  objection  we  have  often  heard,  that, 
however  had  in  theory,  the  patronage  of  the  Scottish  Universities 
s found,  in  practice,  to  work  well ; these  seminaries  fully  ac 


SCOTLAND  LOW  IN  LEARNING. 


375 


complishing  their  end,  as  shown  hy  the  flourishing  state  of  learn- 
ing in  the  country,. 

Assuming,  with  the  objector,  the  effect  produced,  as  a test  of 
the  instrument  producing,1  this  patronage  must  on  the  contrary 
he  granted  to  have  wrought  almost  worse  in  practice,  than  rea- 
soning could  have  led  us  to  anticipate  ; erudition , in  every  higher 
acceptation , being  in  Scotland  at  a lower  pass  than  in  any  other 
country  almost  of  Europe. — Without,  we  think,  any  overweening 
patriotism,  we  may  assert,  that  no  people  in  modern  times  has 
evinced  more  natural  ability  than  our  own ; and  in  all  the  depart- 
ments of  knowledge  where  intellectual  vigor,  rather  than  extensive 
erudition,  may  command  success,  the  Scotch  are  at  least  not  in- 
ferior to  any  other  nation  in  the  world.  “ Animi  illis,”  says  Bar- 
clay, “ in  qusecunque  studia  inclinant,  mirifico  successu  inclyti ; 
ut  nullis  major  patientia  castrorum,  vel  audacia  pugnse,  et  Musae 
nunquam  delicatius  habeant,  quam  cum  inciderunt  in  Scotos.” 
Nor,  assuredly,  have  they  shown  an  incapacity  for  the  highest 
scholarship,  when  placed  in  circumstances  disposing  them  to  its 
cultivation.  On  the  contrary,  no  other  people  have  achieved  so 
much  in  this  department  in  proportion  to  their  means.  From  the 
petty  portion  of  her  scanty  population,  whose  education  was  not 
stunted  in  her  native  seminaries,  Scotland  can  show  at  least  some 
three  or  four  more  consummate  masters  of  a Latin  style,  and  that 
both  in  prose  and  verse,  than  all  the  other  nations  of  the  British 
Empire  can  exhibit,  with  ten  times  her  population,  and  so  many 
boasted  schools.  Nature  gives  ability,  education  gives  learning : 
and  that  a people  of  such  peculiar  aptitude  for  every  study,  should 
remain  behind  all  others  in  those  departments  and  degrees  of 
erudition,  for  the  special  cultivation  of  .which  Universities  were 
established,  proves,  by  the  most  appropriate  of  evidence,  that 
those  of  Scotland  are,  in  their  present  state,  utterly  unqualified 
for  the  higher  purposes  of  their  existence.  Of  these  correlative 
facts,  we  shall  supply  two  only,  but  these,  significant  illustrations. 
[On  these  compare  also  Ed.  No.  ii.] 

The  first.  It  will  be  admitted,  that  a very  trifling  fraction  of 
the  cultivated  population  of  any  country  can  receive  its  education 
and  literary  impulsion  in  foreign  lands  ; consequently,  if  the  sem- 
inaries of  Scotland  were  now  incomparably  inferior,  as  instru- 

1 Though  the  principal,  we  do  not,  of  course,  hold  that  a good  academical  patronage 
is  the  only  condition  of  high  learning  in  a country.  An  exposition  of  all  the  concur- 
rent causes  of  this  result  would  form  the  subject  of  an  important  discussion. 


376  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

ments  of  erudition,  that  the  immense  majority  of  Scottish  scholars 
must  have  owed  their  education  exclusively  to,  Scottish  schools. 

Now,  on  this  standard,  what  is  the  case  ? Of  Scottish  scholars, 
all  of  the  highest  eminence,  and  far  more  than  nine-tenths  of  those 
worthy  of  the  name  of  scholar  at  all,  have  been  either  educated 
in  foreign  seminaries,  or  their  tastes,  and  the  direction  of  then- 
studies,  determined  in  the  society  of  foreign  learned  men. 

Nor  is  the  second  illustration  less  remarkable.  It  will  be  ad- 
mitted, that  the  erudition  of  a national  (we  do  not  mean  merely 
established)  church,  affords  not  only  a fair,  but  the  most  favor- 
able criterion  of  the  erudition  of  a nation.  For,  in  the  first  place  ; 
Theology,  comprehending  (or  rather  being  itself  contained  in)  a 
wider  sphere  of  scholarship  than  any  other  learned  profession, 
and  its  successful  cultivation  necessarily  proportioned  to  the 
degree  in  which  that  scholarship  is  applied  ; it  follows,  that  the 
Theology  of  a country  can  never  transcend,  and  will  rarely  fall 
beneath,  the  level  of  its  erudition.  In  the  second;  the  clergy 
form  every  where  the  most  numerous  body  of  literary  men ; con- 
sequently, more  than  any  other,  express  the  general  diffusion  of 
literary  accomplishment  throughout  a people.  In  the  third;  the 
clergy  or  those  educated  for  the  church,  constitute  the  class  from 
which  tutors,  schoolmasters,  and  professors,  are  principally  taken. 
Their  proficiency  and  example  thus  react  most  powerfully  and 
extensively,  either  to  raise  and  keep  up  learning,  or  to  prevent  its 
rising  among  all  orders  and  professions.  In  the  fourth  ; as  almost 
exclusively  bred  in  the  schools  and  Universities  of  their  country, 
they  reflect  more  fairly  than  the  rest  of  the  educated  ranks,  the 
excellences  and  defects  of  the  native  seminaries.  And  in  the 
fifth  ; as  their  course  of  academical  study  is  considerably  longer 
than  that  of  the  other  learned  professions,  they  must  be  viewed 
as  even  a highly  favorable  specimen  of  what  their  native  semina- 
ries can  accomplish. 

Now,  in  Scotland,  on  this  criterion,  what  is  the  result?  Simply 
this : Though  perhaps  the  country  in  Europe  where  religious  in- 
terests have  always  maintained  the  strongest  hold,  Scotland,  in 
the  history  of  European  Theology,  has,  for  nearly  two  centuries , 
no  name , no  place.  For  nearly  two  centuries,  the  home-bred 
clergy  of  Scotland,  established  and  dissenting,  among  their  count- 
less publications  of  a religious  character,  some  displaying  great 
and  various  talent,  have,  with  two  [one],  not  illustrious  exceptions, 
contributed  not  a single  work  to  the  European  stock  of  theologi- 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  BY  THE  CROWN. 


377 


cal  erudition ;*  1 and  for  an  equal  period,  they  have  not  produced 
a single  scholar  on  a level  with  a fifth-rate  philologer  of  most 
other  countries.  In  these  respects,  many  a dorf  in  Germany  or 
Holland  has  achieved  far  more  than  the  broad  realm  of  Scotland. 
A comparison  of  the  Scotch  and  English  Churches  affords  a curi- 
ous illustration  in  point.  In  the  latter,  the  clergy  have  a toler- 
able classical  training,  hut  for  ages  have  enjoyed,  we  may  say, 
no  theological  education  at  all.  In  the  former,  the  clergy  must 
accomplish  the  longest  course  of  theological  study  prescribed  in 
any  country,  but  with  the  worst  and  shortest  classical  prepara- 
tion. Yet  in  theological  erudition,  what  a contrast  do  the  two 
Churches  exhibit ! And  this,  simply  because  a learned  scholar 
can  easily  slide  into  a learned  divine,  without  a special  theological 
education ; whereas  no  theological  education  can  make  a man 
a competent  divine,  who  is  not  a learned  scholar ; — theology  being , 
in  a human  sense,  only  a 'philology  and  history,  applied  by  phi- 
losophy.— But  again.  In  other  countries,  the  clergy,  or  those  edu- 
cated for  the  church,  as  a class,  take  the  highest  place  in  the 
higher  departments  of  learning.  Scotland,  on  the  contrary,  is 
singular  in  this,  that  all  her  scholars  of  any  eminence,  have,  for 
almost  two  centuries,  been  found  exclusively  among  the  laity, 
and  these,  as  we  have  noticed,  rarely  educated  in  her  native  in- 
stitutions. 

The  third  and  last  mode  of  appointing  to  academical  offices  in 
Scotland,  is  nomination  by  the  Crown. — There  being  no  special 
department,  in  our  Government,  for  public  instruction,  this  pa- 
tronage has  fallen  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Depart- 
ment. The  defects  of  this  mode  of  appointment  are  sufficiently 
obvious.  Here  a great  deal  certainly  depends  on  the  intelligence 
and  liberality  of  the  individual  Minister,  to  counteract  the  natural 
defects  of  the  system.  But,  even  under  the  best  and  most  im- 
partial Minister,  it  can  accomplish  its  end  only  in  a very  precari- 
ous and  unsatisfactory  manner.  The  Minister  is  transitory  ; the 
choice  of  professors  is  a function  wholly  different  in  kind  from  the 
ordinary  duties  of  his  department ; is  not  of  very  frequent  recur- 
rence; and  concerns  a distant  quarter  of  the  empire,  where  the 
Universities  are  situated,  and  the  candidates  generally  found. 


1 [See  p.  335,  sq. — Even  the  one , to  which  the  two  exceptions  are  here  reduced,  is, 

I am  sorry  to  find,  hardly  valid.  For  “ the  Harmony  of  the  Gospels'’  by  Dr.  Macknight 
(and  to  him  I alluded),  was,  indeed,  translated  into  Latin  and  printed  at  Bremen  in 
1777 ; but  the  author,  I see,  had  studied  in  the  great  classical  school  of  Leyden.] 


378  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 

The  Minister  can  not,  therefore,  he  presumed  to  think  of  specially 
qualifying  himself  for  this  contingent  fraction  of  his  duty.  He 
must  rely  on  the  information  of  others.  But  can  he  obtain  im- 
partial information,  or  be  expected  to  take  the  trouble  necessary 
in  seeking  it?  On  the  other  hand,  he  will  be  besieged  by  the 
solicitations  of  candidates  and  their  supporters.  Testimonials, 
collected  by  the  applicant  himself  among  his  friends,  and  strong 
in  proportion  to  the  partialities  of  the  testifier,  and  the  lowness 
of  the  criterion  by  which  he  judges,  will  be  showered  in,  and 
backed  by  political  and  personal  recommendations.  If  he  trust 
to  such  information,  he  limits  his  patronage  to  those  who  apply 
for  the  appointment ; and  as  all  certificates  of  competence  are  in 
general  equally  transcendent,  he  will  naturally  allow  inferior  con- 
siderations to  incline  his  preference  among  candidates  all  ostensi- 
bly the  very  best. 

To  lift  this  patronage  out  of  the  sphere  of  political  partiality, 
and  to  secure  precise  and  accurate  information  from  an  unbiassed, 
intelligent,  and  responsible  authority,  is  what  every  patriotic 
Minister  of  the  Crown  would  be  desirous  to  effect.  But  this  can 
be  best  accomplished  by  organizing  a board  of  Curators  (the  name 
is  nothing)  for  each  University,  on  the  principles  of  patronage  we 
have  explained  ; whose  province  would  be  to  discover,  to  compare, 
to  choose,  to  recommend,  and  to  specify  the  grounds  of  their  pre- 
ference, to  the  Minister,  with  whom  the  definitive  nomination 
would  remain — a nomination,  however,  which  could  be  only  form- 
al, if  the  Curators  conscientiously  fulfilled  the  duties  of  their 
trust.  How  beneficially  these  authorities  would  reciprocally  act 
as  checks  and  counter-checks,  stimuli  and  counter-stimuli,  is 
apparent.  By  this  arrangement,  the  Crown  would  exchange  an 
absolute  for  a modified  patronage  in  those  chairs  now  in  its  pre- 
sentation ; but  this  modified  patronage  would  be  extended  over 
all  others.  The  definitive  nomination  would  certainly  be  no 
longer  of  value  as  a petty  mean  of  ministerial  influence  ; but  the 
dignity  of  the  Crown  would  thus  be  far  better  consulted  in  making 
it  the  supreme  and  general  guardian  of  the  good  of  all  the  Uni- 
versities. Nor  would  the  system  of  curatorial  boards  be  super- 
seded, were  a separate  department  of  public  instruction  to  be 
established  in  the  administration  of  the  State.  On  the  contrary, 
in  most  countries  where  this  organization  of  government  pre- 
vails, the  University  Curators  form  one  of  the  most  useful  parts 
of  its  machinery ; and  nothing  contributes  more  to  perfect  the 


HOW  ACADEMICAL  CURATORS  TO  BE  HERE  APPOINTED.  379 


curatorial  system  itself,  than  the  consciousness  of  the  Curator 
that  his  recommendation  is  always  strictly  scrutinized  by  an  in- 
telligent and  well-informed  Ministry,  before  being  carried  into 
effect. 

In  the  present  article,  we  have  limited  our  discussion  to  the 
general  conditions  of  a good  system  of  academic  patronage.  We 
do  not,  therefore,  now  touch  on  the  difficult  and  important  ques- 
tion— How  is  a board  of  academic  patrons  and  governors  to  be 
best  constituted  under  the  particular  circumstances  of  this  coun- 
try?' 


1 [As  in  part  supplying  an  answer  to  this  important  question,  it  may  not  be  im- 
proper here  to  extract  that  portion  of  the  Evidence  given  by  me  in  the  course  of  the 
same  year,  when  examined  by  “ The  Commissioners  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 
state  of  Municipal  Corporations  in  Scotland.”  In  Appendix  III.  will  be  found  like- 
wise a relative  extract  from  the  General  Report  of  these  Commissioners,  presented  to 
both  Houses  of  Parliament. 

“ The  best  mode  of  organizing  a board  of  Curatorial  Patrons  for  the  University  of 
Edinburgh,  appears  to  me  the  only  point  of  any  considerable  difficulty  ; and  this  be- 
cause we  have  here  not  to  deal  merely  with  principles  in  the  abstract,  but  to  determine 
what,  under  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case,  is  the  highest  point  of  perfection 
which  we  can  practically  realize. 

“ But,  before  stating  what  appears  to  me  the  most  expedient  plan  of  constituting 
such  a board,  I would  premise  that  a board  of  Curators,  almost  any  how  elected,  and 
of  only  ordinary  intelligence  and  probity,  would,  if  small,  and  not  of  a transitory  con- 
tinuance in  office,  be  always  greatly  preferable  as  academical  governors  and  patrons 
to  the  passing  mob  of  civic  councilors,  either  under  the  past  or  present  constitution 
of  the  city  ; because  such  a body  could  hardly  fail  of  being  more  competent  to  their 
office,  from  greater  average  understanding,  from  their  not  being  disabled  for  active 
and  harmonious  measures  toward  obtaining  University  teachers  of  the  very  highest 
qualifications,  and  from  their  standing  prominently  forward  to  public  view,  and  con- 
sequently acting  under  a powerful  feeling  of  responsibility  in  the  exercise  of  their 
trust.  But  merely  to  improve  on  so  vicious  a system  of  patronage  as  the  present 
would  be  doing  very  little  ; and,  though  a small  board  of  Curators  could  not  but  be 
preferable  to  the  town-council,  still  the  all-important  question  remains — How  is  such 
a : board,  of  the  highest  possible  excellence,  to  be  most  securely  obtained  ? 

“ In  attempting  a feasible  solution  of  this  problem,  we  must  accommodate  our  plan 
to  existing  circumstances,  and  construct  our  building  with  the  materials  that  lie 
around  us.  These  are  certainly  not  the  best  possible  ; but  they  seem  to  me  not  in- 
adequate to  the  end  in  view  ; and  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  better,  if  such  could  act- 
ually be  obtained,  would  probably  far  more  than  overbalance  the  superior  advantages 
they  might  otherwise  promise.  Taking,  therefore,  the  public  bodies,  such  as  we  find 
them  in  this  city,  and  employing  the  principal  of  these  as  the  means  of  organizing  a 
board  of  academical  Curators,  the  following  appears  to  me  the  plan  which  would 
probably  accomplish,  to  the  highest  practical  perfection,  the  end  in  view,  i.  e.  the  elec- 
tion of  Curators  competent  to  their  duty,  and  actuated  by  the  strongest  motives  to  its 
fulfillment. 

“ Let  the  Curators  be  elected  for  a fixed  term  of  years,  say  seven  ; and  there  may 
either  be  a general  septennial  election,  or  each  Curator  may  continue  in  office  the  full 
term,  from  the  actual  date  of  his  appointment.  Curators  to  be  re-eligible  ; it  being 
also  understood  that  they  ought  to  be  re-clected,  if  their  conduct  merit  approbation. 

“When  a vacancy  occurs,  a writ  to  be  issued  from , requiring  each  of  the  six 

following  bodies  to  elect,  and  their  president  to  return  to , as  elected  by  a ma- 

jority of  at  least  two-thirds,  a Delegate , qualified  (as  the  writ  would  bear)  by  his 


380 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


intelligence,  probity,  and  general  liberality,  to  concur  in  electing  a Curator  or  Cura- 
tors of  the  University.  These  bodies  are,  1.  The  Faculty  of  Advocates;  2.  The 
Society  of  Writers  to  the  Signet ; 3.  The  Royal  College  of  Physicians  ; 4.  The  Royal 
College  of  Surgeons  ; 5.  The  Presbytery  of  Edinburgh  (or,  perhaps,  under  certain 
regulations,  the  Synod  or  General  Assembly) ; 6.  The  Town  Council.  The  Delegate 
to  be  either  a member  of  the  constituent  body  or  not,  but  never  its  ordinary  presiding 
functionary.  In  the  case  of  the  Town  Council,  the  Delegate  ought  certainly  not  to 
be  a member  of  that  body,  and  perhaps  it  would  be  better  if  the  same  rule  were  even 
extended  to  the  others.  On  his  appointment  the  Delegate  to  make  a solemn  declara- 
tion, before  a meeting  of  his  constituents — ‘ that  he  has  not  canvassed  for  the  ap- 
pointment himself,  or  sanctioned  any  canvassing  by  others  on  his  behalf ; that  he 
feels  no  sense  of  obligation  to  vote  for  any  individual ; and  that,  in  the  election,  he 
will  be  solely  biassed  by  his  honest  conviction  that  the  object  of  his  choice  is  the  per- 
son best  qualified  to  discharge  with  intelligence,  and  without  personal,  political,  or 
religious  partiality,  the  functions  of  Academical  Curator.’  Should  any  of  the  bodies 
fail  in  returning  a Delegate  by  the  requisite  majority,  the  complement  of  six  to  be 
supplied  by  allowing  one  or  other  of  the  remaining  bodies,  in  what  order,  and  under 
what  regulations  may  be  deemed  expedient,  to  elect  a second  Delegate.  The  Dele- 
gate to  be  ineligible  to  an  academical  chair  by  the  Curators  whom  he  has  concurred  in 
electing,  and  perhaps,  likewise  his  sons,  sons-in-law,  and  brothers,  or  only  under  cer- 
tain restrictions,  as,  for  instance,  only  by  a unanimous  choice  of  the  Curators. 

“ The  Delegates  to  report  their  elections  of  Curators  to  the  relative  Minister  of 
State,  specifying  the  votes  of  each  Delegate  for  each  Curator ; and  each  Delegate 
also  to  report  his  own  vote  to  his  constituents.  If  the  choice  be  unanimous,  the  Min- 
ister bound  to  confirm  the  nomination  ; but  otherwise,  it  shall  be  in  his  power  to 
order  a new  election  of  Delegates  and  Curator  : but  should  'the  same  Curator  be  again 
returned,  his  appointment  to  be  hereby  determined. 

“ Ineligible  to  the  curatorial  office — peers,  the  lords  president  and  justice- clerk,  pro- 
fessors, clergymen,  and  practicing  medical  men  ; and  not  more  than  two  Curators,  at 
most,  to  be  elected  from  the  judges  of  the  supreme  court. 

“ Before  entering  on  their  function,  an  instruction  for  their  conduct  in  office,  ratified 
by  his  Majesty  and  Parliament,  to  be  accepted  and  signed  by  the  Curators.  This 
instruction  should,  inter  alia,  anxiously  prescribe  that  they  are  not  (as  has  in  this 
country  hitherto  been  the  case)  merely  to  bestow  the  vacant  chairs  on  one  of  those 
who  may  happen  to  come  forward  as  candidates  ; but  that  they  are  to  look  carefully 
around  for  the  person  of  the  highest  competence,  and  make  to  him  a tender  of  the 
appointment,  even  at  the  risk  of  it  being  declined.  They  should  also  make  an  articu- 
late oath  to  the  upright  discharge  of  their  duty,  and  this  in  the  most  impressive  form, 
as  before  the  whole  Court  of  Session,  specially  commissioned  for  the  purpose  by  the 
King. 

“As  formerly  stated,  the  Curators,  on  each  designation  of  professor,  to  make  a 
detailed  report  of  their  choice  and  its  grounds  to  the  Minister,  stating  whether  it 
were  unanimous  or  not,  and  the  names  of  the  majority  and  minority.  If  unanimous, 
their  designation  to  necessitate  the  confirmation  ; but  if  not,  then  the  Minister  may 
remit  the  matter  for  reconsideration  to  the  Curators,  and  even  ultimately  suspend  his 
ratification.  On  this  last  event  (which  is  not  of  probable  occurrence),  the  majority 
of  the  Curators  must,  of  course,  resign  ; but  if  the  new  Curators,  hereupon  appointed 
(whether  the  same  individuals  be  elected  or  not),  repeat  the  former  designation,  in 
that  case,  their  choice  to  be  held  as  final,  and  the  royal  confirmation  not  to  be  re- 
fused. 

“ The  reasons  of  the  different  parts  of  this  plan  are  sufficiently  obvious. — The 
primary  elective  bodies,  though  none  of  them  the  best  possible,  are  still  sufficiently 
numerous,  and  sufficiently  different,  to  neutralize  any  partial  interests  with  which 
they  might  severally  be  infected,  and  each  will,  consequently,  be  induced  to  act  only 
for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  in  which  they  themselves  always  participate.  Then,  as 
the  Delegates  are  to  be  chosen  by  a large  majority,  no  one  is  likely  to  be  proposed, 
far  less  to  be  elected,  who  does  not  enjoy  the  general  confidence  of  the  electors  apar; 

: n all  considerations  of  party. — The  writ,  and  its  tenor,  takes  the  election  of  Dele- 


HOW  ACADEMICAL  CURATORS  TO  RE  HERE  APPOINTED.  381 


gate  out  of  the  ordinary  routine,  gives  it  a certain  solemnity,  and  puts  the  electors 
on  their  honor  ; while  this  is  still  more  efficiently  done  with  the  Delegates  by  the 
public  declaration  they  must  make  on  accepting  their  commission. — The  report  of 
the  Delegates  to  the  Minister  and  their  constituents  is  useful,  by  impressing  more 
strongly  on  them  the  importance  of  their  choice  ; by  bringing  their  individual  conduct 
before  the  world,  and  thus  enhancing  their  consciousness  of  responsibility. — The 
signature  of  the  instruction,  and  the  solemn  oath  by  the  Curators,  will  tend  to  keep 
them  alive,  and,  what  is  even  of  greater  consequence,  to  keep  the  public  alive  to  the 
nature  and  high  value  of  their  duties.  If  the  public  know  what  they  have  a right  to 
expect,  then  trustees  will  be  sure  to  feel  as  a necessity  what  they  ought  to  perform. 
— But  every  precaution  to  raise  an  academical  patronage  out  of  the  sphere  of  private 
and  party  influence  is  the  more  anxiously  to  be  taken,  as  in  no  other  country  of  Eu- 
rope, both  from  the  relations  of  our  Universities,  and  the  constitution  of  our  govern- 
ment, has  merit  hitherto  obtained  so  little  weight  in  the  choice  of  professors — in  no 
other  country  is  the  national  conscience  in  regard  to  the  distribution  of  public  patron- 
age so  blunted.  To  this  end  the  other  regulations  likewise  concur  ;• — the  checks  and 
counter-checks  of  the  Minister,  Curators,  and  primary  bodies  on  each  other ; and  the 
necessity  imposed  on  the  Curators  of  vindicating  their  choice  by  an  exposition  of  its 
grounds.  The  reason  of  the  exclusion  of  the  presidents  of  the  primary  bodies  from 
the  office  of  Delegate  is  to  prevent  the  delegation  from  the  risk  of  falling  into  routine, 
or  being  considered  as  other  than  a special  and  most  important  trust.  The  exclusion 
of  peers,  the  president,  and  justice-clerk,  &c.,  from  the  office  of  Curator,  is  to  pre- 
vent that  honor  from  being  made,  or  appearing  to  be  made,  a sequel  to  any  personal 
or  official  rank — from  being  regarded  as  other  than  the  highest  and  most  unequivocal 
mark  of  public  confidence  in  the  high  character  and  peculiar  capacity  of  the  individual 
elected  to  the  situation. 

“Without  attempting  an  ideal  perfection  by  this  plan,  I am  confident  a board  of 
academical  Curators  would  easily  and  surely  be  obtained,  who  would  perform  all 
that  could  reasonably  be  expected,  and  determine  a golden  era  in  the  fortunes  of  our 
Scottish  Universities.” 

On  reading  over  the  preceding,  the  scheme  now  strikes  me  as  too  complex,  and  it 
might,  I think,  be  simplified,  without  essential  detriment,  by  several  omissions.  In 
principle,  I am  however  persuaded,  it  is  right,  and  favor  strongly  the  plan  of  indirect 
or  mediate  election ; for  it  is  of  great  importance,  that  Curators  should  be  chosen  by 
the  joint,  intelligence  of  a small  body,  nor  feel  themselves  the  nominees,  of  any  par- 
ticular interest  or  class.  However,  as  indirect  election  is  not  generally  understood 
in  this  country,  if  the  elective  bodies  are  precluded  from  choosing  among  their  own 
members,  I have  no  doubt  that  a fair  board  of  academical  appointment  and  control 
would  be  obtained ; nay,  that  one  constituted  in  the  simple  mode  recommended  by 
the  Burgh  Commissioners  would  be  a marvelous  improvement  on  the  present  reign 
of  ignorance,  favor,  passion,  and  caprice.  How  greatly  the  University  of  Edinburgh 
is  in  want  of  a good  superintendence  (to  say  nothing  of  a good  patronage),  is  shown 
by  the  actual  state  of  its  Examinations  and  Degrees.  The  Senatus  Academicus,  with 
many  individual  exceptions,  is,  as  a body,  totally  incompetent  to  self-regulation  ; and 
even  the  personal  interest  of  a majority  of  its  numerous  members  is  now  opposed  to 
the  general  interests  of  learning,  of  the  public,  and  of  the  University,  as  an  organ  of 
education.  This  is  too  manifestly  shown  in  the  misappropriation  also  of  the  funds 
left  by  General  Reid,  “ to  make  additions  to  the  Library,  or  otherwise  to  promote  the 
general  interest  and  advantage  of  the  University,  in  such  way  as  the  Principal  and 
Professors  shall  in  their  discretion  think  most  fit  and  proper.”  This  bequest,  through 
the  preponderance  of  a special  interest,  which  has  grown  into  command  of  the  Sen- 
atus since  the  will  was  made — in  opposition  to  the  manifest  intention  of  the  testator 
— and  in  opposition  to  the  most  significant  warnings  both  from  within  and  from  with- 
out the  body,  has  been  diverted,  not  only  to  special  purposes,  but  even  to  the  personal 
advantage  of  a complement  of  the  trustees  : — the  small  majority  refusing  a prelimin- 
ary inquiry,  and  not  listening  to  the  information  offered,  in  regard  to  the  general 
wants  of  the  University  ; overlooking  all  disapproval  by  the  highest  authorities  of  the 
moral  character  of  the  proceedings  ; nay,  resiling  from  their  own  previously  professed 


382 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


intention  of  interrogating  a Court  of  Law  in  regard  to  the  bare  legality  of  any  con- 
tested measures.  In  fact,  they  are  now  content  to  sit,  if  so  allowed,  even  under  the 
judicial  stigma  incidentally  called  forth  on  the  way  in  which  the  trust  has  been  ad- 
ministered. (Compromise,  concession — any  thing  for  non-discussion,  may  be  expected 
forthwith.)  Now,  had  there  been  a respected  board  of  Curators  over  the  University, 
these  proceedings  would  never  even  have  been  attempted  ; nor  would  a protesting 
minority  now  be  compelled  to  share  in  the  opprobrium  of  the  very  acts  which  they  so 
cordially  reprobated  and  so  openly  disavowed.] 


17.— ON  THE  STATE  OF  THE  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES, 

WITH  MORE  ESPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  OXFORD.* 


(June,  1831.) 

1.  — Addenda  ad  Corpus  Statutorum  Universitatis  Oxoniensis. 
4to.  Oxonii : 1825. 

2.  — The  Oxford  University  Calendar,  for  1829.  8vo.  Oxford: 
1829. 

This  is  the  age  of  reform. — Next  in  importance  to  our  religious 
and  political  establishments,  are  the  foundations  for  public  edu- 
cation ; and  having  now  seriously  engaged  in  a reform  of  “the 
constitution,  the  envy  of  surrounding  nations,”  the  time  can  not 
be  distant  for  a reform  in  the  schools  and  universities  which  have 
hardly  avoided  their  contempt.  Public  intelligence  is  not,  as 
hitherto,  tolerant  of  prescriptive  abuses,  and  the  country  now 
demands — that  endowments  for  the  common  weal  should  no 
longer  be  administered  for  private  advantage.  At  this  auspicious 

1 [In  Cross’s  Selections  ; translated  into  German  ; and  abridged  by  M.  Peisse,  &c. 

"When  this  article  was  written,  the  history  of  our  oldest  universities  (Oxford  and 
Cambridge)  had  fallen  into  oblivion  ; their  parts  and  principles  were  not  understood, 
even  by  themselves  ; nay,  opinions  asserted  and  universally  accepted  touching  the 
most  essential  points  of  their  constitution,  not  only  erroneous,  but  precisely  the  con- 
verse of  truth.  The  more  obvious  sources  of  information  did  not  remedy,  when  they 
did  not  countenance,  the  misapprehensions.  Criticism,  not  compilation,  wTas  there- 
fore requisite  ; and  a correction  of  the  more  important  errors,  avoiding  as  much  as 
possible  all  second-hand  authorities — this  a collection  of  original  documents,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  more  authentic  histories  of  universities  and  academical  antiquities, 
which  I had  succeeded  in  forming,  has  enabled  me  (I  hope  unostentatiously)  to  ac- 
complish. The  views  in  this  and  the  subsequent  articles,  have  been  followed  (often 
silently),  without  controversy,  and  almost  without  hesitation,  both  in  this  country 
and  abroad  ; while  even  the  trifling  inaccuracies  into  which  I had  inadvertently  fallen, 
are  faithfully  copied  by  those  who  would  be  supposed  to  look  and  speak  for  them- 
selves.] 


384 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


crisis,  and  under  a ministry,  no  longer  warring  against  general 
opinion,  we  should  he  sorry  not  to  contribute  our  endeavor  to  at 
tract  attention  to  the  defects  which  more  or  less  pervade  all  our 
national  seminaries  of  education,  and  to  the  means  best  calculated 
for  their  removal.  We  propose,  therefore,  from  time  to  time,  to 
continue  to  review  the  state  of  these  establishments,  considered 
both  absolutely  in  themselves,  and  in  relation  to  the  other  cir- 
cumstances which  have  contributed  to  modify  the  intellectual 
condition  of  the  different  divisions  of  the  empire. 

In  proceeding  to  the  Universities,  we  commence  with  Oxford. 
This  University  is  entitled  to  precedence,  from  its  venerable  anti- 
quity, its  ancient  fame,  the  wealth  of  its  endowments,  and  the 
importance  of  its  privileges  : but  there  is  another  reason  for  our 
preference. 

Without  attempting  any  idle  and  invidious  comparison — with- 
out asserting  the  superior  or  inferior  excellence  of  Oxford  in  con- 
trast with  any  other  British  University,  we  have  no  hesitation 
in  affirming,  that  comparing  what  it  actually  is  with  what  it  pos- 
sibly could  be,  Oxford  is,  of  all  academical  institutions,  at  once 
the  most  imperfect  and  the  most  perfectible.  Properly  directed, 
as  they  might  be,  the  means  which  it  possesses  would  render  it 
the  most  efficient  University  in  existence ; improperly  directed, 
as  they  are,  each  part  of  the  apparatus  only  counteracts  another ; 
and  there  is  not  a similar  institution  which,  in  proportion  to  what 
it  ought  to  accomplish,  accomplishes  so  little.  But  it  is  not  in 
demonstrating  the  imperfection  of  the  present  system,  that  we 
principally  ground  a hope  of  its  improvement ; it  is  in  demon- 
strating its  illegality.  In  the  reform  of  an  ancient  establishment 
like  Oxford,  the  great  difficulty  is  to  initiate  a movement.  In 
comparing  Oxford  as  it  is,  with  an  ideal  standard,  there  may  be 
differences  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  kind  of  change  expedient, 
if  not  in  regard  to  the  expediency  of  a change  at  all ; but,  in 
comparing  it  with  the  standard  of  its  own  code  of  statutes,  there 
can  be  none.  It  will  not  surely  be  contended  that  matters  should 
continue  as  they  are,  if  it  can  be  shown  that,  as  now  administer- 
ed, this  University  pretends  only  to  accomplish  a petty  fraction 
of  the  ends  proposed  to  it  by  law,  and  attempts  even  this  only  by 
illegal  means’.  But  a progress  being  determined  toward  a state 
of  right,  it  is  easy  to  accelerate  the  momentum  toward  a state  of 
excellence : — apyj)  ryuav  vr avrcx;. 

Did  the  limits  of  a single  paper  allow  us  to  exhaust  the  sub- 


UNIVERSITY  AND  COLLEGES— PRESENT  ILLEGALITY. 


385 


ject,  we  should,  in  the  first  place,  consider  the  state  of  the  Uni- 
versity, both  as  established  in  law,  hut  non-existent  in  fact,  and 
as  established  in  fact,  hut  non-existent  in  law ; in  the  second , the 
causes  which  determined  the  transition  from  the  statutory  to  the 
illegal  constitution  ; in  the  third , the  advantages  and  disadvant- 
ages of  the  two  systems  ; and,  in  the  fourth , the  means  by  which 
the  University  may  he  best  restored  to  its  efficiency.  In  the 
present  article,  we  can,  however,  only  compass — and  that  inade- 
quately— the  first  and  second  heads.  The  third  and  fourth  we 
must  reserve  for  a separate  discussion,  in  which  we  shall  endea- 
vor to  demonstrate,  that  the  intrusive  system,  compared  with 
the  legitimate,  is  as  absurd  as  it  is  unauthorized — that  the  preli- 
minary step  in  a reform  must  he  a return  to  the  Statutory  Con- 
stitution— and  that  this  constitution,  though  far  from  faultless, 
may,  by  a few  natural  and  easy  changes,  he  improved  into  an 
instrument  of  academical  education,  the  most  perfect  perhaps  in 
the  world.  The  subject  of  our  consideration  at  present  requires 
a fuller  exposition,  not  only  from  its  intrinsic  importance,  hut 
because,  strange  as  it  may  appear,  the  origin,  and  consequently 
the  cure,  of  the  corruption  of  the  English  Universities,  is  totally 
misunderstood.  The  vices  of  the  present  system  have  been  ob- 
served, and  frequently  discussed  ; hut  as  it  has  never  been  shown 
in  what  manner  these  vices  were  generated,  so  it  has  never  been 
perceived  how  easily  their  removal  might  be  enforced.  It  is 
generally  believed  that,  however  imperfect  in  itself,  the  actual 
mechanism  of  education  organized  in  these  seminaries,  is  a time- 
honored  and  essential  part  of  their  being,  established  upon  stat- 
ute, endowed  by  the  national  legislature  with  exclusive  privileges, 
and  inviolable  as  a vested  right.  We  shall  prove,  on  the  contra- 
ry, that  it  is  new  as  it  is  inexpedient — not  only  accidental  to  the 
University,  but  radically  subversive  of  its  constitution — without 
legal  sanction,  nay,  in  violation  of  positive  law — arrogating  the 
privileges  exclusively  conceded  to  another  system,  which  it  has 
superseded — and  so  far  from  being  defensible  by  those  it  profits, 
as  a right,  that  it  is  a flagrant  usurpation,  obtained  through  per- 
jury, and  only  tolerated  from  neglect. 

I.  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  as  establishments  for  education, 
consist  of  two  parts — of  the  University  proper , and  of  the  Col- 
leges. The  former,  original  and  essential,  is  founded,  control- 
led, and  privileged  by  public  authority,  for  the  advantage  of  the 
nation.  The  latter,  accessory  and  contingent,  are  oreated,  regu- 

B B 


386 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


lated,  and  endowed  by  private  munificence,  for  the  interest  of 
certain  favored  individuals.  Time  was,  when  the  Colleges  did 
not  exist,  and  the  University  was  there ; and  were  the  Colleges 
again  abolished,  the  University  would  remain  entire.  The  for- 
mer, founded  solely  for  education,  exists  only  as  it  accomplishes 
the  end  of  its  institution ; the  latter,  founded  principally  for  ali- 
ment and  habitation,  would  still  exist,  were  all  education  aban- 
doned within  their  walls.  The  University,  as  a national  estab- 
lishment, is  necessarily  open  to  the  lieges  in  general ; the  Colleges, 
as  private  institutions,  might  universally  do,  as  some  have  actu- 
ally done — close  their  gates  upon  all,  except  their  foundation 
members. 

The  Universities  and  Colleges  are  thus  neither  identical,  nor 
vicarious  of  each  other  If  the  University  ceases  to  perform  its 
functions,  it  ceases  to  exist ; and  the  privileges  accorded  by  the 
nation  to  the  system  of  public  education  legally  organized  in  the 
University,  can  not,  without  the  consent  of  the  nation — far  less 
without  the  consent  of  the  academical  legislature — be  lawfully 
transferred  to  the  system  of  private  education  precariously  organ- 
ized in  the  Colleges,  and  over  which  neither  the  State  nor  the 
University  have  any  control.  They  have , however , been  unlaw- 
fully usurped. 

Through  the  suspension  of  the  University,  and  the  usurpation 
of  its  functions  and  privileges  by  the  Collegial  bodies,  there  has 
arisen  the  second  of  two  systems,  diametrically  opposite  to  each 
other. — The  one,  in  which  the  University  was  paramount,  is 
ancient  and  statutory ; the  other,  in  which  the  Colleges  have  the 
ascendant,  is  recent  and  illegal. — In  the  former,  all  was  subser- 
vient to  public  utility,  and  the  interests  of  science  ; in  the  latter, 
all  is  sacrificed  to  private  monopoly,  and  to  the  convenience  of 
the  teacher. — The  former  amplified  the  means  of  education  in 
accommodation  to  the  mighty  end  which  a University  proposes  ; 
the  latter  limits  the  end  which  the  University  attempts  to  the 
capacity  of  the  petty  instruments  which  the  intrusive  system 
employs. — The  one  afforded  education  in  all  the  Faculties ; the 
other  professes  to  furnish  only  elementary  tuition  in  the  lowest. 
— In  the  authorized  system,  the  cycle  of  instruction  was  distri- 
buted among  a body  of  teachers,  all  professedly  chosen  from 
merit,  and  each  concentrating  his  ability  on  a single  object ; in 
the  unauthorized,  every  branch,  necessary  to  be  learned,  is  monop- 
olized by  an  individual,  privileged  to  teach  all,  though  probably 


LEGAL  SYSTEM— HISTORY  OP. 


387 


ill  qualified  to  teach  any. — The  old  system  daily  collected  into 
large  classes,  under  the  same  professor,  the  whole  youth  of  the 
University  of  equal  standing,  and  thus  rendered  possible  a keen 
and  constant  and  unremitted  competition  ; the  new,  which  ele- 
vates the  colleges  and  halls  into  so  many  little  universities,  and 
in  these  houses  distributes  the  students,  without  regard  to  ability 
or  standing,  among  some  fifty  tutors,  frustrates  all  emulation 
among  the  members  of  its  small  and  ill-assorted  classes. — In  the 
superseded  system,  the  Degrees  in  all  the  Faculties  were  solemn 
testimonials  that  the  graduate  had  accomplished  a regular  course 
of  study  in  the  public  schools  of  the  University,  and  approved  his 
competence  by  exercise  and  examination  ; and  on  these  degrees, 
only  as  such  testimonials,  and  solely  for  the  public  good,  were 
there  bestowed  by  the  civil  legislature,  great  and  exclusive  pri- 
vileges in  the  church,  in  the  courts  of  law,  and  in  the  practice  of 
medicine.  In  the  superseding  system,  Degrees  in  all  the  Facul- 
ties, except  the  lowest  department  of  the  lowest,  certify  neither 
a course  of  academical  study,  nor  any  ascertained  proficiency  in 
the  graduate ; and  these  now  nominal  distinctions  retain  their 
privileges  to  the  public  detriment,  and  for  the  benefit  only  of 
those  by  whom  they  have  been  deprived  of  their  significance. — 
Such  is  the  general  contrast  of  the  two  systems,  which  we  must 
now  exhibit  in  detail. 

System  de  jure. — The  Corpus  Statutorum  by  which  the  Uni- 
versity of  Oxford  is — we  should  say,  ought  to  be — governed,  was 
digested  by  a committee  appointed  for  that  purpose,  through  the 
influence  of  Laud,  and  solemnly  ratified  by  King,  Chancellor, 
and  Convocation,  in  the  year  1636.  The  far  greater  number  of 
those  statutes  had  been  previously  in  force  ; and,  except  in 
certain  articles  subsequently  added,  modified,  or  restricted  (con- 
tained in  the  Appendix),  they  exclusively  determine  the  law  and 
constitution  of  the  University  to  the  present  hour.  Every  mem- 
ber is  bound  by  oath  and  subscription  to  their  faithful  observ- 
ance.— In  explanation  of  the  statutory  system  of  instruction,  it 
may  be  proper  to  say  a few  words  in  regard  to  the  history  of 
academical  teaching,  previous  to  the  publication  of  the  Laudian 
Code- 

In  the  original  constitution  of  Oxford,  as  in  that  of  all  the 
older  Universities  of  the  Parisian  model,  the  business  of  instruc- 
tion was  not  confided  to  a special  body  of  privileged  professors. 
The  University  was  governed,  the  University  was  taught,  by  the 


388 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


graduates  at  large.  Professor,  Master,  Doctor,  were  originally 
synonymous.  Every  graduate  had  an  equal  right  of  teaching 
publicly  in  the  University  the  subjects  competent  to  his  faculty, 
and  to  the  rank  of  his  degree  ; nay,  every  graduate  incurred  the 
obligation  of  teaching  publicly,  for  a certain  period,  the  subjects 
of  his  faculty,  for  such  was  the  condition  involved  in  the  grant 
of  the  degree  itself.  The  Bachelor,  or  imperfect  graduate,  partly 
as  an  exercise  toward  the  higher  honor,  and  useful  to  himself, 
partly  as  a performance  due  for  the  degree  obtained,  and  of  ad- 
vantage to  others,  was  bound  to  read  under  a master  or  doctor 
in  his  faculty,  a course  of  lectures  ; and  the  Master,  Doctor,  or 
perfect  graduate,  was,  in  like  manner,  after  his  promotion,  obliged 
immediately  to  commence  ( incipere ),  and  to  continue  for  a certain 
period  publicly  to  teach  ( regere ),  some  at  least  of  the  subjects 
appertaining  to  his  faculty.  As,  however,  it  was  only  necessary 
for  the  University  to  enforce  this  obligation  of  public  teaching, 
compulsory  on  all  graduates  during  the  term  of  their  necessary 
regency , if  there  did  not  come  forward  a competent  number  of 
voluntary  regents  to  execute  this  function  ; and  as  the  schools 
belonging  to  the  several  faculties,  and  in  which  alone  all  public 
or  ordinary  instruction  could  be  delivered,  were  frequently  inad- 
equate to  accommodate  the  multitude  of  the  inceptors  ; it  came 
to  pass,  that  in  these  Universities  the  original  period  of  necessary 
regency  was  once  and  again  abbreviated,  and  even  a dispensation 
from  actual  teaching  during  its  continuance,  commonly  allowed.1 
At  the  same  time,  as  the  University  only  accomplished  the  end 
of  its  existence  through  its  regents,  they  alone  were  allowed  to 
enjoy  full  privileges  in  its  legislation  and  government;  they  alone 
partook  of  its  beneficia  and  sportulse.  In  Paris,  the  non-regent 
graduates  were  only  assembled  on  rare  and  extraordinary  occa- 
sions ; in  Oxford,  the  regents  constituted  the  House  of  Congrega- 
tion, which,  among  other  exclusive  prerogatives,  was  anciently 
the  initiatory  assembly,  through  which  it  behooved  that  every 
measure  should  pass,  before  it  could  be  submitted  to  the  House 


1 In  Oxford,  where  the  public  schools  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts,  in  School  Street , were 
proportionally  more  numerous  (there  are  known  by  name  above  forty  sets  of  schools 
anciently  open  in  that  street,  i.  c.  buildings,  containing  from  four  to  sixteen  class- 
rooms) than  those  in  Paris  belonging  to  the  different  nations  of  that  faculty,  in  the 
Rue  de  la,  Fouarre  ( Virus  Slramineus ) — in  Oxford  this  dispensation  was  more  tardily 
allowed.  In  Paris,  the  Master  who  was  desirous  of  exercising  this  privilege  of  his 
degree,  petitioned  his  faculty  pro  regentia  et  scholis  ; and  schools,  as  they  fell  vacant, 
were  granted  to  him  by  his  nation,  according  to  his  seniority. 


LEGAL  SYSTEM— HISTORY  OF. 


389 


of  Convocation,  composed  indifferently  of  all  regents  and  non- 
regents resident  in  the  University.1 2 

The  distinction  of  regent  and  non-regent  continued  most  rigid- 
ly marked  in  the  Faculty  of  Arts — the  faculty  on  which  the 
older  universities  were  originally  founded,  and  which  was  always 
greatly  the  most  numerous.  In  the  other  faculties,  both  in  Paris 
and  Oxford,  all  doctors  succeeded  in  usurping  the  style  and  priv- 
ileges of  regent,  though  not  actually  engaged  in  teaching  ; and 
in  Oxford,  the  same  was  allowed  to  masters  of  the  Faculty  of 
Arts  during  the  statutory  period  of  their  necessary  regency,  even 
when  availing  themselves  of  a dispensation  from  the  performance 
of  its  duties  ; and  extended  to  the  Heads  of  Houses  (who  were 
also  in  Paris  Regens  cPlionneur ),  and  to  College  Deans.  This 
explains  the  constitution  of  the  Oxford  House  of  Congregation  at 
the  present  day. 

The  ancient  system  of  academical  instruction  by  the  graduates 
at  large,  was,  however,  still  more  essentially  modified  by  another 
innovation.  The  regents  were  entitled  to  exact  from  their  audi- 
tors a certain  regulated  fee  ( pastus , collecta).  To  relieve  the 
scholars  of  this  burden,  and  to  secure  the  services  of  able  teach- 
ers, salaries  were  sometimes  given  to  certain  graduates,  on  consi- 
deration of  their  delivery  of  ordinary  lectures  without  collect. 
In  many  universities,  attendance  on  these  courses  was  specially 
required  of  those  proceeding  to  a degree  ; and  it  was  to  the  sala- 
ried graduates  that  the  title  of  Professors,  in  academical  language, 
was  at  last  peculiarly  attributed.  By  this  institution  of  salaried 
lecturers,  dispensation  could  be  universally  accorded  to  the  other 
graduates.  The  unsalaried  regents  found,  in  general,  their 
schools  deserted  for  the  gratuitous  instruction  of  the  privileged 
lecturers  ; and  though  the  right  of  public  teaching  competent  to 
every  graduate  still  remained  entire,  its  exercise  was,  in  a great 
measure,  abandoned  to  the  body  of  professors  organized  more  or 
less  completely  in  the  several  faculties  throughout  the  universi- 
ties of  Europe.  To  speak  only  of  Oxford,  and  in  Oxford  only  of 
the  Faculty  of  Arts  : ten  salaried  Readers  or  Professors  of  the 
seven  arts  and  the  three  philosophies 2 had  been  nominated  by  the 


1 It  was  only  by  an  abusive  fiction  that  those  were  subsequently  held  to  be  Comic- 
tores , or  actual  residents  in  the  University,  who  retained  their  names  on  the  books  of 
a Hall,  or  College.  See  Corpus  Statutorum,  tit.  x.  1. 

2 The  Faculty  of  Arts  originally  comprehended,  besides  the  three  philosophies,  the 
whole  seven  arts.  Of  these  latter,  some  were,  however,  at  different  times,  thrown 


o90 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


House  of  Congregation,  and  attendance  on  their  lectures  enforced 
by  statute,  long  prior  to  the  epoch  of  the  Laudian  digest.  At  the 
date  of  that  code,  the  greater  number  of  these  chairs  had  obtain- 
ed permanent  endowments  ; and  four  only  depended  for  a fluctu- 
ating stipend  on  certain  fines  and  taxes  levied  on  the  graduates 
they  relieved  from  teaching,  and  on  the  under-graduates  they 
were  appointed  to  teach.  At  that  period  it  was,  however,  still 
usual  for  simple  graduates  to  exercise  their  right  of  lecturing  in 
the  public  schools.  While  this  continued,  ability  possessed  an 
opportunity  of  honorable  manifestation  ; a nursery  of  experienced 
teachers  was  afforded;  the  salaried  readers  were  not  allowed  to 
slumber  in  the  quiescence  of  an  uninfringible  monopoly ; their 
election  could  less  easily  degenerate  into  a matter  of  interest  and 
favor  ; while  the  student,  presented  with  a more  extensive  sphere 
of  information,  was  less  exposed  to  form  exclusive  opinions,  when 
hearing  the  same  subjects  treated  by  different  lecturers  in  different 
manners.  These  advantages  have,  by  such  an  arrangement,  been 
secured  in  the  German  universities. 

In  Oxford,  the  Corpus  Statutorum  introduced  little  or  no 
change  in  the  mechanism  of  academical  instruction  ; nor  has  this 
been  done  by  any  subsequent  enactment.  On  the  contrary,  the 
most  recent  statutes  on  the  subject — those  of  1801  and  1808 — 
recognize  the  ancient  system  ratified  under  Laud,  as  that  still  in 
force,  and  actually  in  operation.  (Corp.  Stat.  T.  iv.  Add.  p.  129 
-133,  p.  190-192.)  The  scheme  thus  established  in  law,  though 
now  abolished  in  fact , is  as  follows  : — 

Education  is  afforded  in  all  the  faculties  in  which  degrees  are 
granted,  by  the  University  itself,  through  its  accredited  organs, 
the  public  readers  or  professors — a regular  attendance  on  whose 
lectures  during  a stated  period  is  in  every  faculty  indispensably 
requisite  to  qualify  for  a degree.  To  say  nothing  of  Music,  the 


out  of  the  faculty,  or  separated  from  the  other  arts,  and  special  degrees  given  in 
them,  either  apart  from,  or  in  subordination  to,  the  general  degree.  Thus,  in  Oxford 
(as  in  other  of  the  older  Universities),  special  degrees  were  given  in  Grammar,  in 
Rhetoric,  and  in  Music.  The  two  former  subjects  were  again  withdrawn  into  the 
faculty,  and  their  degrees  waxed  obsolete — but  Music  and  its  degree  still  remain 
apart. — The  General  Sophist  was  a special  degree  in  Logic,  but  subordinate  to  the 
general  degree  In  Arts. — It  is  needless  to  say,  that  these  particular  degrees  gave  no 
entry  into  the  academical  assemblies.  The  historians  of  the  universities  of  Pans 
and  Oxford  have  misconceived  this  subject,  from  not  illustrating  the  practice  of  the 
one  school  by  that  of  the  other.  Duboullay  and  Wood  knew  nothing  of  each 
other’s  works,  though  writing  at  the  same  time,  and  Crevier  never  looked  beyond 
Duboullay. 


LEGAL  SYSTEM— HISTORY  OF. 


391 


University  grants  degrees,  and  furnishes  instruction  in  four  facul- 
ties— Arts , Theology,  Civil  Law,  and  Medicine.1 

In  Arts  there  are  established  eleven  Public  Readers  or  Profes- 
sors ; a regular  attendance  on  whose  courses  is  necessary  during 
a period  of  four  years  to  qualify  for  Bachelor — during  seven,  to 
qualify  for  Master.  The  student  must  frequent,  during  the  first 
year,  the  lectures  on  Grammar  and  Rhetoric  ; during  the  second, 
Logic  and  Moral  Philosophy  ; during  the  third  and  fourth,  Logic 
and  Moral  Philosophy,  Geometry  and  Greek  ; during  the  fifth 
(bachelors  of  first  year),  Geometry,  Metaphysics,  History,  Greek 
— and  Hebrew,  if  destined  for  the  church ; during  the  sixth  and 
seventh,  Astronomy,  Natural  Philosophy,  Metaphysics,  History, 
Greek — and  Hebrew,  if  intending  divines. 

To  commence  student  in  the  faculty  of  Theology,  a Master- 
ship in  Arts  is  a requisite  preliminary.  There  are  two  Professors 
of  Divinity,  on  whom  attendance  is  required,  during  seven  years 
for  the  degree  of  Bachelor,  and  subsequently  during  four  for  that 
of  Doctor. 

In  the  faculty  of  Civil  Law  there  is  one  Professor.  The  stu- 
dent is  not  required  to  have  graduated  in  Arts ; but  if  a Master 
in  that  faculty,  three  years  of  attendance  on  the  professor  qualify 
him  for  a Bachelor’s  degree,  and  four  thereafter  for  a Doctor’s. 
The  simple  student  must  attend  his  professor  during  five  years 
for  Bachelor,  and  ten  for  Doctor ; and  previous  to  commencing 
student  in  this  faculty  he  must  have  frequented  the  courses  of 
logic,  moral  and  political  philosophy,  and  of  the  other  humane 
sciences  during  two  years,  and  history  until  his  presentation  for 
Bachelor.  By  recent  statute,  to  commence  the  study  of  law,  it 
is  necessary  to  pass  the  examination  for  Bachelor  of  Arts. 

To  commence  student  in  Medicine,  it  is  necessary  to  have  ob- 
tained a Mastership  in  Arts,  and  thereafter  the  candidate,  (besides 
a certain  attendance  on  the  Prselector  of  Anatomy),  must  have 
heard  the  Professor  of  Medicine  during  three  years  for  the  degree 
of  Bachelor,  and  again  during  four  years  for  that  of  Doctor.2 

1 Since  the  Reformation,  as  the  subject  of  the  faculty  of  Canon  Law  was  no  longer 
taught,  degrees  in  that  faculty  were  very  properly  by  Royal  order  discontinued  (that 
faculty  and  its  degrees  being  formally  abolished  by  Henry  VIII.  in  the  Universities); 
though  the  Canon  Law  has  continued  still  to  reign,  and  the  papal  abuses  to  prevail 
in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  of  justice  to  the  present  hour.  But  why,  it  may  be  asked, 
are  degrees  still  suffered  to  continue  in  the  other  faculties,  when  the  relative  instruc- 
tion is  no  longer  afforded  1 

2 Of  several  other  chairs  subsequently  established,  we  make  no  mention,  as  these  were 
never  constituted  into  necessary  parts  of  the  academical  system. 


392 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. 


The  Professors  are  bound  to  lecture  during  term,  with  excep- 
tion of  Lent,  i.  e.  for  about  six  months  annually,  twice  a-week, 
and  for  two  full  hours and  penalties  are  incurred  by  teacher 
and  student  for  any  negligence  in  the  performance  of  their  several 
duties.  Among  other  useful  regulations,  it  was  here,  as  in  other 
ancient  Universities,  enjoined,  “ that  after  lecture,  the  Professors 
should  tarry  for  some  time  in  the  schools  ; and  if  any  scholar  or 
auditor  may  wish  to  argue  against  what  has  been  delivered  from 
the  chair,  or  may  otherwise  have  any  dubiety  to  resolve,  that 
they  should  listen  to  him  kindly,  and  satisfy  his  difficulties  and 
doubts.” 

But  though  a body  of  Professors  was  thus  established  as  the 
special  organ  through  which  the  University  effected  the  purposes 
of  its  institution,  the  right  was  not  withdrawn,  nay,  is  expressly 
declared  to  remain  inviolate,  which  every  Master  and  Doctor 
possessed  in  virtue  of  his  degree,  of  opening  in  the  public  schools 
a course  of  lectures  on  any  of  the  subjects  within  the  compass  of 
his  faculty.  (Corp.  St.  T.  iv.  k 1.) 

But  besides  the  public  and  principal  means  of  instruction  af- 
forded by  the  Professors  and  other  Regents  in  the  University,  the 
student  was  subjected  until  his  first  degree,  or  during  the  first 
four  years  of  his  academical  life,  to  the  subsidiary  and  private 
discipline  of  a Tutor  in  the  Hall  or  College  to  which  he  belonged. 

This  regulation  was  rendered  peculiarly  expedient  by  circum- 
stances which  no  longer  exist.  Prior  to  the  period  of  the  Laudian 
digest,  it  was  customary  to  enter  the  University  at  a very  early 
age  ; and  the  student  of  those  times,  when  he  obtained  the  rank 
of  Master,  was  frequently  not  older  than  the  student  of  the  pre- 
sent when  he  matriculates.  It  was  of  course  found  useful  to 
place  these  academical  boys  under  the  special  guardianship  of  a 
tutor  during  the  earlier  years  of  their  residence  in  the  University ; 
as  it  was  also  expedient  to  counteract  the  influence  of  Popish 
tutors.  With  this,  however,  as  a merely  private  concern,  the 
University  did  not  interfere ; and  we  doubt,  whether  before  the 
chancellorship  of  the  puritanical  Leicester,  any  attempt  was  made 
to  regulate  by  academical  authority,  the  character  of  those  who 
might  officiate  in  this  capacity,  or  before  the  chancellorship  of 
Laud,  to  render  imperative  the  entering  under  a tutor  at  all, 

1 Previously  to  Laud’s  statutes,  the  professors  in  general  were  bound  to  lecture  daily , 
and  all,  if  we  recollect,  at  least  four  limes  a-week.  The  change  was  absurd.  It  was 
standing  which  should  have  been  shortened. 


ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  SUPERINTENDENCE.  393 

and  a tutor  resident  in  the  same  house  with  the  pupil.  (Com- 
pare Wood’s  Annals,  a.  1581,  and  Corp.  Stat.  T.  iii.  § 2.)  Be  this, 
however,  as  it  may,  the  tutorial  office  was  viewed  as  one  of  very 
subordinate  importance  in  the  statutory  system.  To  commence 
tutor , it  was  only  necessary  for  a student  to  have  the  lowest 
degree  in  arts,  and  that  his  learning,  his  moral  and  religious 
character,  should  he  approved  of  by  the  head  of  the  house  in 
which  he  resided,  or,  in  the  event  of  controversy  on  this  point,  by 
the  vice-chancellor.  All  that  was  expected  of  him  was,  “ to  im- 
bue his  pupils  with  good  principles,  and  institute  them  in  approved 
authors  ; but  above  all,  in  the  rudiments  of  religion,  and  the  doc- 
trine erf  the  Thirty-nine  Articles ; and  that  he  should  do  all  that 
in  him  lay  to  render  them  conformable  to  the  Church  of  England.” 
“ It  is  also  his  duty  to  contain  his  pupils  within  statutory  regu- 
lations in  matters  of  external  appearance,  such  as  their  clothes, 
boots,  and  hair ; which,  if  the  pupils  are  found  to  transgress,  the 
tutor  for  the  first,  second,  and  third  offense,  shall  forfeit  six  and 
eightpence,  and  for  the  fourth,  shall  be  interdicted  from  his  tuto- 
rial function  by  the  vice-chancellor.”  (T.  iii.  § 2.) — Who  could 
have  anticipated  from  this  statute  what  the  tutor  was  ultimately 
to  become  ? 

The  preceding  outline  is  sufficient  to  show  that  by  statute  the 
University  of  Oxford  proposes  an  end  not  less  comprehensive  than 
other  universities,  and  attempts  to  accomplish  that  end  by  the 
same  machinery  which  they  employ.  It  proposes  as  its  ade- 
quate end,  the  education  of  youth  in  the  four  faculties  of  arts, 
theology,  law,  and  medicine ; and  for  accomplishment  of  this,  a 
body  of  public  lecturers  constitute  the  instrument  which  it  prin- 
cipally, if  not  exclusively,  employs.  But  as  the  University  of 
Oxford  only  executes  its  purpose,  and  therefore  only  realizes  its 
existence,  through  the  agency  of  its  professorial  system ; conse- 
quently, whatever  limits,  weakens,  or  destroys  the  efficiency  of 
that  system,  limits,  weakens,  and  destroys  the  university  itself. 
With  the  qualities  of  this  system,  as  organized  in  Oxford,  we  have 
at  present  no  concern.  We  may,  however,  observe,  that  if  not 
perfect,  it  was  perfectible ; and  at  the  date  of  its  establishment, 
there  were  few  universities  in  Europe  which  could  boast  of  an 
organization  of  its  public  instructors  more  complete,  and  none 
perhaps  in  which  that  organization  was  so  easily  susceptible  of  sc 
high  an  improvement. 

In  the  system  die  facto  all  is  changed.  The  University  is  in 


394 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


abeyance ; — “ St  at  magni  nominis  umbra In  none  of  the 
faculties  is  it  supposed  that  the  Professors  any  longer  furnish  the 
instruction  necessary  for  a degree.  Some  chairs  are  even  nomi- 
nally extinct  where  an  endowment  has  not  perpetuated  the  sine- 
cure ; and  the  others  betray,  in  general,  their  existence  only 
through  the  Calendar.  If  the  silence  of  .“the  schools”  be  occa- 
sionally broken  by  a formal  lecture,  or  if  on  some  popular  sub- 
jects (fees  being  now  permitted)  a short  course  be  usually  deliv- 
ered ; attendance  on  these  is  not  more  required  or  expected,  than 
attendance  in  the  music-room.  For  every  degree  in  every  faculty 
above  Bachelor  of  Arts,  standing  on  the  College  books,  is  allowed 
to  count  for  residence  in  the  University,  and  attendance  on  the 
public  courses ; and  though,  under  these  circumstances,  exami- 
nations be  more  imperatively  necessary,  an  examination  only 
exists  for  the  elementary  degree,  of  which  residence  is  also  a con- 
dition. 

It  is  thus  not  even  pretended  that  Oxford  now  supplies  more 
than  the  preliminary  of  an  academical  education.  Even  this  is 
not  afforded  by  the  University,  but  abandoned  to  the  Colleges  and 
Halls  ; and  the  Academy  of  Oxford  is  therefore  not  one  public 
University , but  merely  a collection  of  private  schools.  The  Uni- 
versity, in  fact,  exists  only  in  semblance,  for  the  behoof  of  the 
unauthorized  seminaries  by  which  it  has  been  replaced,  and  which 
have  contrived,  under  covert  of  its  name,  to  slip  into  possession 
of  its  public  privileges.1 

1 How  completely  the  University  is  annihilated — how  completely  even  all  memory  of 
its  history,  all  knowledge  of  its  constitution,  have  perished  in  Oxford,  is  significantly 
shown  in  the  following  passage,  written  not  many  years  ago  by  a very  able  defender 
of  things  as  they  now  are  in  that  seminary.  “ There  are,  moreover,”  says  Bishop 
Copplestone,  “ some  points  in  the  constitution  of  this  place,  which  are  carefully  kept 
out  of  sight  by  our  revilers,  but  which  ought  to  be  known  and  well  considered,  before 
any  comparison  is  made  between  what  we  are,  and  what  we  ought  to  be.  The  Uni- 
versity of  Oxford  is  not  a National  Foundation.  It  is  a congeries  of  foundations, 
originating  some  in  royal  munificence,  but  more  in  private  piety  and  bounty.  They 
are  moulded  indeed  into  one  corporation ; but  each  one  of  our  twenty  Colleges  is  a cor- 
poration by  itself,  and  has  its  own  peculiar  statutes,  not  only  regulating  its  internal 
affairs,  but  confining  its  benefits  by  a great  variety  of  limitations.”  {Reply  to  the 
Calumnies  of  the  Edinburgh  Review,  p.  183).  In  refutation  of  this  uncontradicted 
assertion,  which  is  not  simply'’  wrong,  but  diametrically  opposed  to  the  truth,  we  shall 
content  ourselves  with  merely  quoting  a sentence  from  the  “ Abstract  of  divers  Privi- 
leges and  Rights  of  the  University  of  Oxford,”  by  the  celebrated  Dr.  Wallis,  the  least 
of  whose  merits  was  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  history  and  constitution  of  the 
establishment  of  which  he  was  Registrar.  “ The  rights  or  privileges  (whatever  they 
be)  [are]  not  granted  or  belonging  to  Scholars  as  living  in  Colleges,  c fc.  but  to  Colleges 
&c.,  as  houses  inhabited  by  Scholars,  the  Colleges  which  we  now  have  being  accidental 
to  the  corporation  of  the  University,  and  the  confining  of  Scholars  now  to  a certain  num- 
ber of  Colleges  and  Halls  being  extrinsical  to  the  University,  and  by  a law  of  their  own 


SYSTEM  DE  FACTO — FELLOW-TUTORS. 


395 


But  as  academical  education  was  usurped  by  the  Tutors  from 
the  Professors — so  all  tutorial  education  was  usurped  by  the  Fel- 
lows from  the  other  graduates.  The  fellows  exclusively  teach  all 
that  Oxford  now  deems  necessary  to  be  taught ; and  as  every 
tutor  is  singly  vicarious  of  the  whole  ancient  body  of  professors, 
— avpp  ttoWojv  dvTaftos  ciXkojv — the  present  capacity  of  the  Uni- 
versity to  effect  the  purposes  of  its  establishment  must,  conse- 
quently, be  determined  by  the  capacity  of  each  felloiv-tutor  to 
compass  the  cyclopaedia  of  academical  instruction.  If  Oxford 
accomplishes  the  ends  of  a University  even  in  its  lowest  faculty, 
every  fellow-tutor  must  be  a second  “ Doctor  Universalis ,” 

“ Qui  tria,  qui  septem,  quitotum  scibile  scivit.” 

But  while  thus  resting  her  success  on  the  most  extraordinary 
ability  of  her  teachers,  we  shall  see  that  she  makes  no  provision 
even  for  their  most  ordinary  competence. 

As  the  fellowships  were  not  founded  for  the  purposes  of  teach- 
ing, so  the  qualifications  that  constitute  a fellow  are  not  those 
that  constitute  an  instructor.  The  Colleges  owe  their  establish- 
ment to  the  capricious  bounty  of  individuals  ; and  the  fellow 
rarely  owes  his  eligibility  to  merit  alone,  but  in  the  immense 
majority  of  cases  to  fortuitous  circumstances.* 1  The  fellowships 
in  Oxford  are,  with  few  exceptions,  limited  to  founder’s  kin — to 
founder’s  kin,  born  in  particular  counties,  or  educated  at  particu- 
lar schools — to  the  scholars  of  certain  schools,  without  restriction, 
or  narrowed  by  some  additional  circumstance  of  age  or  locality 
of  birth — to  the  natives  of  certain  dioceses,  archdeaconries,  isl- 


making , each  College  (but  not  the  Halls)  being  a distinct  corporation  from  that  of  the 
University.” 

1 This  is  candidly  acknowledged  by  the  intelligent  apologist  just  quoted.  “ In  most 
Colleges  the  fellowships  are  appropriated  to  certain  schools,  dioceses,  counties,  and  in 
some  cases  even  to  parishes,  with  a preference  given  to  the  founder’s  kindred  forever. 
Many  qualifications,  quite  foreign  to  intellectual  talents  and  learning,  are  thus  en- 
joined by  the  founders  ; and  in  very  few  instances  is  a free  choice  of  candidates 
allowed  to  the  fellows  of  a College,  upon  any  vacancy  in  their  number.  Merit  there- 
fore has  not  such  ■provision  made  as  the  extent  of  the  endowments  might  seem  to 
promise.  Now  it  is  certain  that  each  of  these  various  institutions  is  not  the  best. 
The  best  of  them  perhaps  are  those  [in  only  two  Colleges]  where  an  unrestrained 
choice  is  left  among  all  candidates  who  have  taken  one  degree.  The  worst  are  those 
which  are  appropriated  to  schools,  from  which  boys  of  sixteen  or  seventeen  are  for- 
warded to  a fixed  station  and  emolument,  which  nothing  can  forfeit  but  flagrant  mis- 
conduct, and  which  no  exertion  can  render  more  valuable.”  ( Reply  to  the  Calumnies, 
&c.  p.  183.)  We  may  add,  that  even  where  “ a free  choice  of  candidates  is  allowed,” 
the  electors  are  not  always  animated  by  the  spirit  which  has  latterly  prevailed  in  the 
Colleges — of  Balliol  and  Oriel,  Oxford,  of  Trinity,  Cambridge. 


396 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


ands,  counties,  towns,  parishes,  or  manors,  under  every  variety 
of  arbitrary  condition.  In  some  cases,  the  candidate  must  he  a 
graduate  of  a certain  standing,  in  others  he  must  not ; in  some 
he  must  be  in  orders,  perhaps  priest’s,  in  others  he  is  only  bound 
to  enter  the  church  within  a definite  time.  In  some  cases,  the 
fellow  may  freely  choose  his  profession ; in  general  he  is  limited 
o theology,  and  in  a few  instances  must  proceed  in  law  or  medi- 
cine. The  nomination  is  sometimes  committed  to  an  individual, 
sometimes  to  a body  of  men,  and  these  either  within  or  without 
the  College  and  University  ; but  in  general  it  belongs  to  the  fel- 
lows. The  elective  power  is  rarely,  however,  deposited  in  worthy 
hands ; and  even  when  circumstances  permit  any  liberty  of  choice, 
desert  has  too  seldom  a chance  in  competition  with  favor.  With 
one  unimportant  exception,  the  fellowships  are  perpetual ; but 
they  are  vacated  by  marriage,  and  by  acceptance  of  a living  in 
the  Church  above  a limited  amount.  They  vary  greatly  in  emol- 
ument in  different  Colleges  ; and  in  the  same  Colleges  the  differ- 
ence is  often  considerable  between  those  on  different  foundations, 
and  on  the  same  foundations  between  the  senior  and  the  junior 
fellowships.  Some  do  not  even  afford  the  necessaries  of  life ; 
others  are  more  than  competent  to  its  superfluities.  Residence 
is  now  universally  dispensed  with  ; though  in  some  cases  certain 
advantages  are  only  to  be  enjoyed  on  the  spot.  In  the  Church, 
the  Colleges  possess  considerable  patronage ; the  livings  as  they 
fall  vacant  are  at  the  option  of  the  fellows  in  the  order  of  senior- 
ity ; and  the  advantage  of  a fellowship  depends  often  less  on  the 
amount  of  salary  which  it  immediately  affords,  than  on  the  value 
of  the  preferment  to  which  it  may  ultimately  lead. 

But  while,  as  a body,  the  fellows  can  thus  hardly  be  supposed 
to  rise  above  the  vulgar  average  of  intelligence  and  acquire- 
ment: so,  of  the  fellows,  it  is  not  those  best  competent  to  its 
discharge  who  are  generally  found  engaged  in  the  business  of 
tuition. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  power  of  adequate  selection,  were 
there  even  sufficient  materials  from  which  to  choose.  The  head, 
himself,  of  the  same  leaven  with  the  fellows,  can  not  be  presumed 
greatly  to  transcend  their  level ; and  he  is  peculiarly  exposed  to 
the  influence  of  that  party  spirit  by  which  collegial  bodies  are  so 
frequently  distracted.  Were  his  approbation  of  tutors,  therefore, 
free,  we  could  have  no  security  for  the  wisdom  and  impartiality 
of  his  choice.  But  in  point  of  fact  he  can  only  legally  refuse  his 


SYSTEM  DE  EACTO — FELLOW- TUTORS. 


397 


sanction  on  the  odious  grounds  of  ignorance,  vice,  or  irreligion. 
The  tutors  are  thus  virtually  self-appointed. 

But  in  the  second  place,  a fellow  constitutes  himself  a tutor, 
not  because  he  suits  the  office,  but  because  the  office  is  conve- 
nient to  him.  The  standard  of  tutorial  capacity  and  of  tutorial 
performance  is  in  Oxford  too  low  to  frighten  even  the  diffident 
or  lazy.  The  advantages  of  the  situation  in  point  either  of  profit 
or  reputation,  are  not  sufficient  to  tempt  ambitious  talent ; and 
distinguished  ability  is  sure  soon  to  he  withdrawn  from  the  voca- 
tion— if  marriage  does  not  precipitate  a retreat.1  The  fellow  who 
in  general  undertakes  the  office,  and  continues  the  longest  to  dis- 
charge it,  is  a clerical  expectant  whose  hopes  are  hounded  by  a 
College  living  ; and  who,  until  the  wheel  of  promotion  has  moved 
round,  is  content  to  relieve  the  tedium  of  a leisure  life  by  the 
interest  of  an  occupation,  and  to  improve  his  income  by  its  emol- 
uments. Thus  it  is  that  tuition  is  not  solemnly  engaged  in  as 
an  important,  arduous,  responsible,  and  permanent  occupation ; 
hut  lightly  viewed  and  undertaken  as  a matter  of  convenience,  a 
business  by  the  by,  a state  of  transition,  a stepping-stone  to  some- 
thing else  ; in  a word,  as  a pass-time. 

But  in  the  third  place,  were  the  tutors  not  the  creatures  of 
accident,  did  merit  exclusively  determine  their  appointment,  and 
did  the  situation  tempt  the  services  of  the  highest  talent,  still  it 
would  be  impossible  to  find  a complement  of  able  men  equal  in 
number  to  the  cloud  of  tutors  whom  Oxford  actually  employs. 

This  general  demonstration  of  what  the  fellow-tutors  of  Oxford 
must  he , is  more  than  confirmed  by  a view  of  what  they  actually 
are. — It  is  not  contended  that  the  system  excludes  men  of  merit, 
hut  that  merit  is  in  general  the  accident,  not  the  principle,  of 
their  appointment.  We  might,  therefore,  always  expect,  on  the 
common  doctrine  of  probabilities,  that  among  the  multitude  of 
college  tutors,  there  should  he  a few  known  to  the  world  for 
ability  and  erudition.  But  we  assert,  without  fear  of  contradic- 
tion, that,  on  the  average,  there  is  to  be  found  among  those  to 
ivhom  Oxford  confides  the  business  of  education , an  infinitely 
smaller  proportion  of  men  of  literary  reputation , than  among  the 

1 “ So  far  from  a College  being  a drain  upon  the  world,  the  world  drains  Colleges 
of  their  most  efficient  members;  and  although  the  University  thus  becomes  a more  ef- 
fectual engine  of  education  [ ! howl]  it  loses  much  of  that  characteristic  feature  it  once 
had,  as  a residence  of  learned  leisure,  and  an  emporium  of  literature.” — Reply  to  the 
Calumnies,  dj-c.  p.  185. — [Adam  Smith,  who  was  himself  of  Oxford,  has  some  good 
observationsupon  this  rapid  drainage  and  its  effect  in  sinking  the  University.] 


398 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


actual  instructors  of  any  other  University  in  the  world.  For 
example : the  second  work  at  the  head  of  this  article  exhibits  the 
names  of  above  forty  fellow-tutors ; yet  among  these  we  have 
not  encountered  a single  individual  of  whose  literary  existence 
the  public  is  aware.  This  may  be  an  unfavorable  accident ; but 
where  is  the  University,  out  of  Britain,  of  which  so  little  could 
at  any  time  be  said  of  its  instructors  ? 

We  at  present  consider  the  system  de  facto  in  itself,  and  with- 
out reference  to  its  effects  ; and  say  nothing  of  its  qualities,  except 
in  so  far  as  these  are  involved  in  the  bare  statement  of  its  organ- 
ization. So  much,  however,  is  notorious ; either  the  great  Uni- 
versity of  Oxford  does  not  now  attempt  to  accomplish  what  it  ivas 
established  to  effect , and  what  every,  even  the  meanest,  Univer- 
sity proposes ; or  it  attempts  this  by  means  inversely  proportioned 
to  the  end , and  thus  ludicrously  fails  in  the  endeavor.  That  there 
is  much  of  good,  much  worthy  of  imitation  by  other  Universities, 
in  the  present  spirit  and  present  economy  of  Oxford,  we  are 
happy  to  acknowledge,  and  may  at  another  time  endeavor  to 
demonstrate.  But  this  good  is  occasioned , not  effected;  it  exists, 
not  in  consequence  of  any  excellence  in  the  instructors — and  is 
only  favored  in  so  far  as  it  is  compatible  with  the  interest  of 
those  private  corporations  who  administer  the  University  exclu- 
sively for  their  own  benefit.  As  at  present  organized , it  is  a 
doubtful  problem  whether  the  tutorial  system  ought  not  to  be 
abated  as  a nuisance.  For  if  some  tutors  may  afford  assistance 
to  some  pupils,  to  other  pupils  other  tutors  prove  equally  an  im- 
pediment. We  are  no  enemies  of  collegial  residence,  no  enemies 
of  a tutorial  discipline,  even  now  when  its  former  necessity  has 
in  a great  measure  been  superseded.  To  vindicate  its  utility 
under  present  circumstances,  it  must,  however,  be  raised  not 
merely  from  its  actual  corruption,  but  even  to  a higher  excel- 
lence than  it  possessed  by  its  original  constitution.  A tutorial 
system  in  subordination  to  a professorial  (which  Oxford  formerly 
enjoyed)  we  regard  as  affording  the  condition  of  an  absolutely 
perfect  University.  But  the  tutorial  system  as  now  dominant  in 
Oxford,  is  vicious  : 1°,  in  its  application —as  usurping  the  place 
of  the  professorial,  whose  function,  under  any  circumstances,  it 
is  inadequate  to  discharge ; 2°,  in  its  constitution — the  tutors  as 
now  fortuitously  appointed,  being,  as  a body,  incompetent  even 
to  the  duties  of  subsidiary  instruction. 

II.  We  come  now  to  our  second  subject  of  consideration  : — To 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  399 

inquire  by  what  causes  and  for  what  ends  this  revolution  was 
accomplished ; how  the  English  Universities,  and  in  particular 
Oxford,  passed  from  a legal  to  an  illegal  state,  and  from  public 
Universities  were  degraded  into  private  schools  ? — The  answer  is 
precise  : This  ivas  effected  solely  by  the  influence , and  exclusively 
for  the  advantage , of  the  Colleges.  But  it  requires  some  illus- 
tration to  understand,  how  the  interest  of  these  private  corpora- 
tions was  opposed  to  that  of  the  public  institution,  of  which  they 
were  the  accidents ; and  how  their  domestic  tuition  was  able 
gradually  to  undermine,  and  ultimately  to  supersede,  the  system 
of  academical  lectures  in  aid  of  which  it  was  established. 

Though  Colleges  be  unessential  accessories  to  a University, 
yet  common  circumstances  occasioned,  throughout  all  the  older 
Universities,  the  foundation  of  conventual  establishments  for  the 
habitation,  support,  and  subsidiary  discipline  of  the  student;  and 
the  date  of  the  earliest  Colleges  is  not  long  posterior  to  the  date 
of  the  most  ancient  Universities.  Establishments  of  this  nature 
are  thus  not  peculiar  to  England  ; and  like  the  greater  number 
of  her  institutions,  they  were  borrowed  by  Oxford  from  the  mother 
University  of  Paris — but  with  peculiar  and  important  modifica- 
tions. A sketch  of  the  Collegial  system  as  variously  organized, 
and  as  variously  affecting  the  academical  constitution  in  foreign 
Universities,  will  afford  a clearer  conception  of  the  distinctive 
character  of  that  system  in  those  of  England,  and  of  the  para- 
mount and  unexampled  influence  it  has  exerted  in  determining 
their  corruption. 

The  causes  which  originally  promoted  the  establishment  of 
Colleges,  were  very  different  from  those  which  subsequently  occa- 
sioned their  increase,  and  are  to  be  found  in  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  earliest  Universities  sprang  up.  The  great  con- 
course of  the  studious,  counted  by  tens  of  thousands,  and  from 
every  country  of  Europe,  to  the  illustrious  teachers  of  Law, 
Medicine,  and  Philosophy,  who  in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  cen- 
turies delivered  their  prelections  in  Bologna,  Salerno,  and  Paris, 
necessarily  occasioned,  in  these  cities,  a scarcity  of  lodgings,  and 
an  exorbitant  demand  for  rent.  Various  means  were  adopted  to 
alleviate  this  inconvenience,  but  with  inadequate  effect ; and  the 
hardships  to  which  the  poorer  students  were  frequently  exposed, 
moved  compassionate  individuals  to  provide  houses,  in  which  a 
certain  number  of  indigent  scholars  might  be  accommodated  with 
free  lodging  during  the  progress  of  their  studies.  The  manners, 


400 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. 


also,  of  the  cities  in  which  the  early  Universities  arose,  were,  for 
obvious  reasons,  more  than  usually  corrupt ; and  even  attendance 
on  the  public  teachers  forced  the  student  into  dangerous  and 
degrading  associations.1  Piety  thus  concurred  with  benevolence, 
in  supplying  houses  in  which  poor  scholars  might  be  harbored 
without  cost,  and  youth,  removed  from  perilous  temptation,  be 
placed  under  the  control  of  an  overseer  ; and  an  example  was 
afforded  for  imitation  in  the  Hospitia  which  the  religious  orders 
established  in  the  University  towns  for  those  of  their  members 
who  were  now  attracted,  as  teachers  and  learners,  to  these  places 
of  literary  resort.2  Free  board  was  soon  added  to  free  lodging ; 
and  a small  bursary  or  stipend  generally  completed  the  endow- 
ment. With  moral  superintendence  was  conjoined  literary  disci- 
pline, but  still  in  subservience  to  the  public  exercises  and  lec- 
tures : opportunity  was  thus  obtained  of  constant  disputation  to 
which  the  greatest  importance  was  wisely  attributed , through  all 
the  scholastic  ages ; while  books,  which  only  affluent  individuals 
could  then  afford  to  purchase,  were  supplied  for  the  general  use 
of  the  indigent  community. 

But  as  Paris  was  the  University  in  which  collegial  establish- 
ments were  first  founded,  so  Paris  was  the  University  in  which 
they  soonest  obtained  the  last  and  most  important  extension  of 
their  purposes.  Regents  were  occasionally  taken  from  the  public 
schools,  and  placed  as  regular  lecturers  within  the  Colleges. 
Sometimes  nominated,  always  controlled,  and  only  degraded  by 
their  Faculty,  these  lecturers  were  recognized  as  among  its  regu- 
lar teachers ; and  the  same  privileges  accorded  to  the  attendance 

1 “Tunc  autem,”  says  the  Cardinal  de  Vitry,  who  wrote  in  the  first  half  of  the 
thirteenth  century,  in  speaking  of  the  state  of  Paris — “ tunc  autem  amplius  in  Clero 
quam  in  alio  populo  dissoluta  (Lutetia  sc.),  tamquam  capra  scabiosa  et  ovis  morbida, 
pernicioso  exemplo  multos  hospites  suos  undique  ad  earn  affluentes  corrumpebat,  ha- 
bitatores  suos  devorans  et  in  profundum  demergens,  simplicem  fornicationem  nullum 
peccatum  reputabat.  Meretrices  public®,  ubique  per  vicos  et  plateas  civitatis,  passim 
ad  lupanaria  sua  clericos  transeuntes  quasi  per  violentiam  pertrahebant.  Quod  si 
forte  ingredi  recusarent,  confestim  eos  ‘ Sodomitas ,’  post  ipsos  conclamentes,  dicebant. 
In  una  autem.  ul  eadem  domo,  scliola  erant  superius,  prostibula  inferius.  In  parte  su- 
periori  magistri  legebant,  in  inferiori  meretrices  officia  turpitudinis  exercebant.  Ex  una 
parte,  meretrices  inter  se  et  cum  Cenonibus  [ lenonibus ] litigabant ; ex  aha  parte,  dispu- 
tantes  et  contentiose  agenles  clerici proclamabant." — (Jacobi  de  Vitriaco  Hist.  Occident, 
cap.  vii.) — It  thus  appears,  that  the  Schools  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts  were  not  as  yet 
established  in  the  Rue  de  la  Fouarre.  At  this  date  in  Paris,  as  originally  also  in  Ox- 
ford, the  lectures  and  disputations  were  conducted  by  the  masters  in  their  private 
habitations. 

2 [In  Italy  the  Colleges  seem  never  to  have  gone  beyond  this.  See  Facciolati  Syn- 
tagma x.] 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  401 

on  their  College  courses,  as  to  those  delivered  hy  other  gradu- 
ates in  the  common  schools  of  the  University.  Different  Colleges 
thus  afforded  the  means  of  academical  education  in  certain  de- 
partments of  a faculty — in  a whole  faculty — or  in  several  facul- 
ties ; and  so  far  they  constituted  particular  incorporations  of 
teachers  and  learners,  apart  from,  and,  in  some  degree,  independ- 
ent of,  the  general  body  of  the  University.  They  formed,  in 
fact,  so  many  petty  Universities,  or  so  many  fragments  of  a Uni- 
versity. Into  the  Colleges,  thus  furnished  with  professors,  there 
were  soon  admitted  to  hoard  and  education  pensioners,  or  schol- 
ars, not  on  the  foundation ; and  nothing  more  was  wanting  to 
supersede  the  lecturer  in  the  public  schools,  than  to  throw  open 
these  domestic  classes  to  the  members  of  the  other  Colleges,  and 
to  the  martinets  or  scholars  of  the  University  not  belonging  to 
Colleges  at  all.  In  the  course  of  the  fifteenth  century  this  was 
done ; and  the  University  and  Colleges  were  thus  intimately 
united.  The  College  Regents,  selected  for  talent,  and  recom- 
mended to  favor  by  their  nomination,  soon  diverted  the  students 
from  the  unguaranteed  courses  of  the  lecturers  in  the  University 
schools.  The  prime  faculties  of  Theology  and  Arts  became  at 
last  exclusively  collegial.  "With  the  exception  of  two  courses  in 
the  great  College  of  Navarre , the  lectures,  disputations,  and 
acts  of  the  Theological  Faculty  were  confined  to  the  college  of 
the  S orhonne;  and  the  Sorbonne  thus  became  convertible  with 
the  Theological  Faculty  of  Paris.  During  the  latter  half  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  the  11  famous  Colleges ,”  or  those  11  of  complete 
exercise ” (cc.  magna,  celebria,  famosa,  famata,  de  plein  exercise), 
in  the  Faculty  of  Arts , amounted  to  eighteen — a number  which, 
before  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth,  had  been  reduced  to  ten. 
About  eighty  others  (cc.  parva,  non  celebria),  of  which  above  a 
half  still  subsisted  in  the  eighteenth  century,  taught  either  only 
the  subordinate  branches  of  the  faculty  (grammar  and  rhetoric), 
and  this  only  to  those  on  the  foundation,  or  merely  afforded  habi- 
tation and  stipend  to  their  bursars,  now  admitted  to  education  in 
all  the  larger  colleges,  with  the  illustrious  exception  of  Navarre. 
The  Rue  de  la  Fouarre  (vicus  stramineus),  which  contained  the 
schools  belonging  to  the  different  Nations  of  the  Faculty,  and  to 
which  the  lectures  in  philosophy  had  been  once  exclusively  con- 
fined, became  less  and  less  frequented  ; until  at  last  the  public 
chair  of  Ethics,  long  perpetuated  by  an  endowment,  alone  remain- 
ed ; and  “ The  Street ” would  have  been  wholly  abandoned  by 

C c 


402 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


the  university,  had  not  the  acts  of  Determination , the  forms  of 
Incept  or  ship , and  the  Examinations  of  some  of  the  Nations,  still 
connected  the  Faculty  of  Arts  with  this  venerable  site.  The 
colleges  of  full  exercise  in  this  faculty,  continued  to  combine  the 
objects  of  a classical  school  and  university  : for,  besides  the  art 
of  grammar  taught  in  six  or  seven  consecutive  classes  of  human- 
ity or  ancient  literature,  they  supplied  courses  of  rhetoric , logic, 
metaphysics,  physics,  mathematics,  and  morals;  the  several  sub- 
jects, taught  by  different  professors.  A free  competition  was 
thus  maintained  between  the  Colleges ; the  principals  had  every 
inducement  to  appoint  only  the  most  able  teachers  ; and  the 
emoluments  of  the  rival  professors  (who  were  not  astricted  to 
celibacy)  depended  mainly  on  their  fees.  A blind  munificence 
quenched  this  useful  emulation.  In  the  year  1719,  fixed  salaries 
and  retiring  pensions  were  assigned  by  the  crown  to  the  College 
Regents  ; the  lieges  at  large  now  obtained  the  gratuitous  instruc- 
tion which  the  poor  had  always  enjoyed,  but  the  University  grad- 
ually declined. 

After  Paris,  no  continental  University  was  more  affected  in  its 
fundamental  faculty  by  the  collegial  system  than  Louvain.  Ori- 
ginally, as  in  Paris,  and  the  other  Universities  of  the  Parisian 
model,  the  lectures  in  the  Faculty  of  Arts  were  exclusively  deliv- 
ered by  the  regents  in  vico,  or  in  the  general  schools,  to  each  of 
whom  a certain  subject  of  philosophy,  and  a certain  hour  of  teach- 
ing, was  assigned.  Colleges  were  founded ; and  in  some  of  these, 
during  the  fifteenth  century,  particular  schools  were  established. 
The  regents  in  these  colleges  were  not  disowned  by  the  faculty, 
to  whose  control  they  were  subjected.  Here,  as  in  Paris,  the 
lectures  by  the  regents  in  vico  gradually  declined,  till  at  last  the 
three  public  professorships  of  Ethics,  Rhetoric,  and  Mathematics, 
perpetuated  by  endowment,  were  in  the  seventeenth  century  the 
only  classes  that  remained  open  in  the  halls  of  the  Faculty  of 
Arts,  in  which,  besides  other  exercises,  the  Quodlibetic  Disputa- 
tions were  still  annually  performed.  The  general  tuition  of  that 
faculty  was  conducted  in  four  rival  colleges  of  full  exercise,  or 
Pcedagogia,  as  they  were  denominated,  in  contradistinction  to 
the  other  colleges,  which  were  intended  less  for  the  education, 
than  for  the  habitation  and  aliment  of  youth,  during  their  studies. 
These  last,  which  amounted  to  above  thirty,  sent  their  bursars  for 
education  to  the  four  privileged  Colleges  of  the  Faculty  ; to  one 
or  other  of  which  these  minor  establishments  were  in  general 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC. 


403 


astricted.  In  the  P^dagogia  (with  the  single  exception  of  the 
Collegium  Porci),  Philosophy  alone  was  taught,  and  this  under 
the  fourfold  division  of  Logic , Physics , Metaphysics , and  Morals , 
hy  four  ordinary  professors  and  a principal.  Instruction  in  the 
Litlerce  Humaniores,  was,  in  the  seventeenth  century,  discontin- 
ued in  the  other  three  ( cc . Castri,  Lilii,  Falconis)  ; — the  earlier 
institution  in  this  department  being  afforded  hy  the  oppidan 
schools  then  every  where  established  ; the  higher  hy  the  Colle- 
gium Gandense ; and  the  highest  by  the  three  professors  of 
Latin,  Greek,  and  Hebrew  literature,  in  the  Collegium  Tri- 
lingue , founded  in  1517,  by  Hieronymus  Buslidius — a memora- 
ble institution,  imitated  by  Francis  I.  in  Paris,  by  Fox  and  Wolsey 
in  Oxford,  and  by  Ximenes  in  Alcala  de  Henares.  In  the  Pseda- 
gogia  the  discipline  was  rigorous  ; the  diligence  of  the  teachers 
admirably  sustained  by  the  rivalry  of  the  different  Houses  ; and 
the  emulation  of  the  students,  roused  by  daily  competition  in 
their  several  classes  and  colleges,  was  powerfully  directed  toward 
the  great  general  contest,  in  which  all  the  candidates  for  a degree 
in  arts  from  the  different  Psedagogia  were  brought  into  concourse 
— publicly  and  minutely  tried  by  sworn  examinators — and  finally 
arranged  with  rigorous  impartiality  in  the  strict  order  of  merit 
This  competition  for  academical  honors , long  the  peculiar  glory 
of  Louvain , is  only  to  be  paralleled  by  the  present  examinations 
in  the  English  Universities ; 1 we  may  explain  the  former  when 
we  come  to  speak  of  the  latter. — [See  Reid’s  Works,  p.  721  sq.] 

In  Germany  collegial  establishments  did  not  obtain  the  same 
preponderance  as  in  the  Netherlands  and  France.  In  the  older 
universities  of  the  empire,  the  academical  system  was  not  essen- 
tially modified  by  these  institutions : and  in  the  universities 
founded  after  the  commencement  of  the  sixteenth  century,  they 
were  rarely  called  into  existence.  In  Prague,  Yienna,  Heidelberg, 
Cologne,  Erfurth,  Leipsic,  Rostoch,  Ingolstadt,  Tubingen,  &c., 
we  find  conventual  establishments  for  the  habitation,  aliment, 
and  superintendence  of  youth ; but  these,  always  subsidiary  to 
the  public  system,  were  rarely  able,  after  the  revival  of  letters, 
to  maintain  their  importance  even  in  this  subordinate  capacity. 

In  G-ermany,  the  name  of  College  was  usually  applied  to 

1 We  suspect  that  the  present  Cambridge  scheme  of  examination  and  honors  was 
a direct  imitation  of  that  of  Louvain.  The  similarity  in  certain  points  seems  too  pre- 
cise to  be  accidental.  The  deplorable  limitation  of  the  former,  is  of  course  quite 
original.' — [See  Appendix  iii.]  [The  previous  suspicion  is,  I am  now  convinced, 
unfounded. — Author's  Addend,  to  Eng.  Ed.] 


404 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. 


foundations  destined  principally  for  the  residence  and  support  of 
the  academical  teachers ; the  name  of  Bursa  was  given  to  houses 
inhabited  by  students,  under  the  superintendence  of  a graduate 
in  arts.  In  the  colleges,  which  were  comparatively  rare,  if  schol- 
ars were  admitted  at  all,  they  received  free  lodging  or  free  hoard, 
hut  not  free  domestic  tuition ; they  were  hound  to  he  diligent  in 
attendance  on  the  lectures  of  the  public  readers  in  the  University ; 
and  the  governors  of  the  house  were  enjoined  to  see  that  this 
obligation  was  faithfully  performed.  The  Bursae,  which  corre- 
sponded to  the  ancient  Halls  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  prevailed 
in  all  the  older  Universities  of  Grermany.  They  were  either 
benevolent  foundations  for  the  reception  of  a certain  class  of 
favored  students,  who  had  sometimes  also  a small  exhibition  for 
their  support  (bb.  privates) : or  houses  licensed  by  the  Faculty  of 
Arts,  to  whom  they  exclusively  belonged,  in  which  the  students 
admitted  were  bound  to  a certain  stated  contribution  ( positio ) to 
a common  exchequer  ( bursa — hence  the  name),  and  to  obedience 
to  the  laws  by  which  the  discipline  of  the  establishment  was  reg- 
ulated (bb.  communes).  Of  these  varieties,  the  second  was  in 
general  engrafted  on  the  first.  Every  bursa  was  governed  by  a 
graduate  (rector  conventor ;)  and  in  the  larger  institutions,  under 
him,  by  his  delegate  ( conrector ) or  assistants  ( magistri  conven- 
tores).  In  most  Universities  it  was  enjoined  that  every  regular- 
student  in  the  Faculty  of  Arts  should  enrol  himself  of  a burse  ; 
but  the  burse  was  also  frequently  inhabited  by  masters  engaged 
in  public  lecturing  in  their  own,  or  in  following  the  courses  of  a 
higher  faculty.  To  the  duty  of  Rector  belonged  a general  super- 
intendence of  the  diligence  and  moral  conduct  of  the  inferior 
members,  and  (in  the  larger  bursae,  with  the  aid  of  a procurator 
or  ccconomus)  the  management  of  the  funds  destined  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  house.  As  in  the  colleges  of  France  and  England, 
he  could  enforce  discipline  by  the  infliction  of  corporeal  punish- 
ment. Domestic  instruction  was  generally  introduced  into  these 
establishments,  but,  as  we  said,  only  in  subservience  to  the  pub- 
lic. The  rector,  either  by  himself  or  deputies,  repeated  with  his 
bursars  their  public  lessons,  resolved  difficulties  they  might  pro- 
pose, supplied  deficiencies  in  their  knowledge,  and  moderated  at 
the  performance  of  their  private  disputations. 

The  philosophical  controversies  which,  during  the  Middle  Ages, 
divided  the  universities  of  Europe  into  hostile  parties,  were  waged 
with  peculiar  activity  among  a people,  like  the  Hermans,  actu- 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  405 

ated,  more  than  any  other,  by  speculative  opinion,  and  the  spirit 
of  sect.  The  famous  question  touching  the  nature  of  Universals, 
which  created  a schism  in  the  University  of  Prague,  and  thus 
founded  the  University  of  Leipsic ; which  formally  separated 
into  two,  the  faculty  of  arts  (called  severally  the  via  antiqua  or 
realist,  and  the  via  modernci  or  nominalist),  in  Ingolstadt,  Tu- 
bingen, Heidelberg,  &c. ; and  occasioned  a ceaseless  warfare  in 
the  other  schools  of  philosophy  throughout  the  empire : — this 
question  modified  the  G-erman  bursae  in  a far  more  decisive  man- 
ner than  it  affected  the  colleges  in  the  other  countries  of  Europe. 
The  Nominalists  and  Realists  withdrew  themselves  into  different 
bursae ; whence,  as  from  opposite  castles,  they  daily  descended 
to  renew  their  clamorous,  and  not  always  bloodless  contests,  in 
the  arena  of  the  public  schools.  In  this  manner  the  bursae  of 
Ingolstadt,  Tubingen,  Heidelberg,  Erfurth,  and  other  universities, 
were  divided  between  the  partisans  of  the  Via  Antiquorum , and 
the  partisans  of  the  Via  Modernorum  ; and  in  some  of  the  greater 
schools  the  several  sects  of  Realism — as  the  Albertists,  Thomists, 
Scotists — had  bursae  of  their  u peculiar  process.” — [Thus  in  Co- 
logne.] 

The  effect  of  this  was  to  place  these  institutions  more  abso- 
lutely under  that  scholastic  influence  which  swayed  the  faculties 
of  arts  and  theology ; and  however  adverse  were  the  different 
sects,  when  a common  enemy  was  at  a distance,  no  sooner  was 
the  reign  of  scholasticism  threatened  by  the  revival  of  polite  let- 
ters, than  their  particular  dissensions  were  merged  in  a general 
syncretism  to  resist  the  novelty  equally  obnoxious  to  all — a re- 
sistance which,  if  it  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  the  absolute 
proscription  of  humane  literature  in  the  Universities,  succeeded, 
at  least,  in  excluding  it  from  the  course  prescribed  for  the  degree 
in  arts,  and  from  the  studies  authorized  in  the  bur  see,  of  which 
that  faculty  had  universally  the  control.1  In  their  relations  to 
the  revival  of  ancient  learning,  the  bursse  of  Germany,  and  the 
Colleges  of  France  and  England,  were  directly  opposed  ; and  to 
this  contrast  is,  in  part,  to  be  attributed  the  difference  of  their 
fate.  The  colleges,  indeed,  mainly  owed  their  stability — in  En- 
gland to  their  wealth — in  France  to  their  coalition  with  the  Uni- 
versity. But  in  harboring  the  rising  literature,  and  rendering 
themselves  instrumental  to  its  progress,  the  colleges  seemed 


f1  See  the  article  on  the  Epistola  Obscurorum  Virornm.~\ 


406 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


anew  to  vindicate  their  utility,  and  remained,  during  the  revolu- 
tionary crisis  at  lea'st,  in  unison  with  the  spirit  of  the  age.  The 
burscc,  on  the  contrary,  fell  at  once  into  contempt  with  the  anti- 
quated learning  which  they  so  fondly  defended ; and  before  they 
were  disposed  to  transfer  their  allegiance  to  the  dominant  litera- 
ture, other  instruments  had  been  organized,  and  circumstances 
had  superseded  their  necessity.  The  philosophical  faculty  to 
which  they  belonged,  had  lost,  by  its  opposition  to  the  admission 
of  humane  letters  into  its  course,  the  consideration  it  formerly 
obtained  ; and  in  the  Protestant  Universities  of  the  Empire  a 
degree  in  Arts  was  no  longer  required  as  a necessary  passport  to 
the  other  faculties.  The  Grymnasia,  established  or  multiplied  on 
the  Reformation  throughout  Protestant  Grennany,  sent  the  youth 
to  the  universities  with  sounder  studies,  and  at  a maturer  age  ; 
and  the  public  prelections,  no  longer  intrusted  to  the  fortuitous 
competence  of  the  graduates,  were  discharged,  in  chief,  by  Pro- 
fessors carefully  selected  for  their  merit — rewarded  in  exact  pro- 
portion to  their  individual  value  in  the  literary  market — and 
stimulated  to  exertion  by  a competition  unexampled  in  the  aca- 
demical arrangements  of  any  other  country.  The  discipline  of 
the  bursae  was  now  found  less  useful  in  aid  of  the  University; 
and  the  student  less  disposed  to  submit  to  their  restraint.  No 
wealthy  foundations  perpetuated  their  existence  independently  of 
use ; and  their  services  being  found  too  small  to  warrant  their 
maintenance  by  compulsory  regulations,  they  were  soon  generally 
abandoned. — [The  name  Bur  sell  (student)  alone  survives.] 

In  the  English  Universities,  the  history  of  the  collegial  element 
has  been  very  different.  Nowhere  did  it  deserve  to  exercise  so 
small  an  influence ; nowhere  has  it  exercised  so  great.  The  col- 
leges of  the  continental  Universities  were  no  hospitals  for  drones  ; 
their  foundations  were  exclusively  in  favor  of  teachers  and  learn- 
ers; the  former,  whose  number  was  determined  by  their  necessity, 
enjoyed  their  stipend  under  the  condition  of  instruction  ; and  the 
latter,  only  during  the  period  of  their  academical  studies.  In  the* 
English  colleges,  on  the  contrary,  the  fellowships,  with  hardly  an 
exception,  are  perpetual,  not  burdened  with  tuition,  and  indefinite 
in  number.  In  the  foreign  colleges,  the  instructors  were  chosen 
from  competence.  In  those  of  England,  but  especially  in  Oxford, 
the  fellows  in  general  owe  their  election  to  chance.  Abroad,  as 
the  colleges  were  visited,  superintended,  regulated,  and  reformed 
by  their  faculty,  their  lectures  were  acknowledged  by  the  Univer- 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  407 

sity  as  public  courses,  and  the  lecturers  themselves  at  last  recog- 
nized as  its  privileged  professors.  In  England,  as  the  University 
did  not  exercise  the  right  of  visitation  over  the  colleges,  their 
discipline  was  viewed  as  private  and  subsidiary;  while  the  fellow 
was  never  recognized  as  a public  character  at  all,  far  less  as  a 
privileged  instructor.  In  Paris  and  Louvain,  the  college  discipline 
superseded  only  the  precarious  lectures  of  the  graduates  at  large.1 
In  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  it  was  an  improved  and  improvable 
system  of  professorial  education  that  the  tutorial  extinguished. 
In  the  foreign  Universities,  the  right  of  academical  instruction 
was  deputed  to  a limited  number  of  “ famous  colleges,”  and  in 
these  only  to  a full  body  of  co-operative  teachers.  In  Oxford,  all 
academical  education  is  usurped,  not  only  by  every  house,  but  by 
every  fellow-tutor  it  contains.  The  alliance  between  the  Colleges 
and  University  in  Paris  and  Louvain  was,  in  the  circumstances, 
perhaps  a rational  improvement ; the  dethronement  of  the  Uni- 
versity by  the  Colleges  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  without  doubt, 
a preposterous,  as  an  illegal,  revolution. 

It  was  the  very  peculiarity  in  the  constitution  of  the  English 
colleges  which  disqualified  them,  above  all  similar  incorporations , 
even  for  the  lower  offices  of  academical  instruction , that  enabled 
them  in  the  end  to  engross  the  very  highest;  and  it  only  requires 
an  acquaintance  with  the  history  of  the  two  Universities,  to 
explain  how  a revolution  so  improbable  in  itself,  and  so  disas- 
trous in  its  effects,  was  by  the  accident  of  circumstances,  and 
the  influence  of  private  interest,  accomplished.  “ Reduce,”  says 
Bacon,  “ things  to  their  first  institution,  and  observe  how  they 
have  degenerated.”  This  explanation,  limited  to  Oxford,  will  be 
given  by  showing : — 1°,  How  the  students,  once  distributed  in 
numerous  small  societies  through  the  halls,  were  at  length  col- 
lected into  a few  large  communities  within  the  colleges ; 2°,  How 
in  the  colleges,  thus  the  penfolds  of  the  academical  flock,  the 


1 In  Paris  (1562)  the  celebrated  Ramus  proposed  a judicious  plan  of  reform  for  the 
Faculty  of  Arts.  He  disapproved  of  the  lectures  on  philosophy  established  in  the 
colleges  ; and  was  desirous  of  restoring  these  to  the  footing  of  the  public  course's  de- 
livered for  so  many  centuries  in  the  Rue  de  la.  Fouarre,  and  only  suspended  a few 
years  previously.  He  proposed,  that  eight  accredited  professors  should  there  teach 
the  different  branches  of  mathematics,  physics,  and  morals ; while  the  colleges  should 
retain  only  instruction  in  grammar,  rhetoric,  and  logic.  This  was  to  bring  matters 
toward  the  very  statutory  constitution  subverted  in  the  English  Universities  by  the 
colleges,  and  which,  with  all  its  imperfections,  was  even  more  complete  than  that 
proposed  by  Ramus,  as  an  improvement  on  a collegial  mechanism  of  tuition,  perfec 
tion  itself,  in  comparison  to  the  intrusive  system  of  Oxford. 


408 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


fellows  frustrated  the  common  right  of  graduates  to  the  office  of 
tutor  ; and  3°,  How  the  fellow-tutors  supplanted  the  professors 
— how  the  colleges  superseded  the  University. 

1.  In  the  mode  of  teaching — in  the  subjects  taught — in  the 
forms  of  graduation — and  in  the  general  mechanism  of  the  facul- 
ties, no  Universities,  for  a long  time,  resembled  each  other  more 
closely  than  the  “ first  and  second  schools  of  the  church,”  Paris 
and  Oxford;  but  in  the  constitution  and  civil  polity  of  the  bodies, 
there  were  from  the  first  considerable  differences. — In  Oxford, 
the  University  was  not  originally  established  on  the  distinction 
of  Nations ; though,  in  the  sequel,  the  great  national  schism  of 
the  Northern  and  Southern  men  had  almost  determined  a division 
similar  to  that  which  prevailed  from  the  first  in  the  other  ancient 
Universities.1 — In  Oxford,  the  Chancellor  and  his  deputy  com- 
bined the  powers  of  the  Rector  and  the  two  Chancellors  in  Paris ; 
and  the  inspection  and  control,  chiefly  exercised  in  the  latter, 
through  the  distribution  of  the  scholars  of  the  University  into 
Nations  and  Tribes,  under  the  government  of  Rector,  Procura- 
tors, and  Deans,  was  in  the  former  more  especially  accomplished 
by  collecting  the  students  into  certain  privileged  Houses,  under 
the  control  of  a Principal  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  mem- 
bers. This  subordination  was  not  indeed  established  at  once ; 
and  the  scholars  at  first  lodged,  without  domestic  superintendence, 
in  the  houses  of  the  citizens.  In  the  year  1231,  we  find  it  only 
ordained,  by  royal  mandate,  “that  every  clerk  or  scholar  resident 
in  Oxford  or  Cambridge,  must  subject  himself  to  the  discipline 
and  tuition  of  some  Master  of  the  Schools ,2  i.  e.,  we  presume, 
enter  himself  as  the  peculiar  disciple  of  one  or  other  of  the  actual 
Regents.  (Wood  and  Fuller’s  Annals,  a.  c.) — In  the  same  year 
Taxators  are  established  in  both  universities.  (See  Fuller,  who 
gives  that  document  at  length.) — By  the  commencement  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  it  appears,  however,  to  have  become  established 
law,  that  all  scholars  should  be  members  of  some  College,  Hall, 
or  Entry,  under  a responsible  head  (Wood,  a.  1408;)  and  in  the 
subsequent  history  of  the  university,  we  find  more  frequent  and 

1 Matters  went  so  far,  that  as,  in  Paris,  each  of  the  four  Nations  elected  its  own 
Procurator,  so,  in  Oxford  (what  is  not  mentioned  by  Wood),  the  two  Proctors  (procu- 
ratores)  were  necessarily  chosen,  one  from  the  Northern,  the  other  from  the  Southern 
men;  also  the  two  Scrutators,  anciently  distinct  (1)  from  tile  Proctors. — [For  Cam- 
bridge, see  Peacock,  pp.  28,  111.] 

2 [Fuller  has  magistro  scholarium,  in  which  case  it  should  be  translated  master  oj 
scholars.  Compare  Bulaus,  ii.  63.] 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  409 

decisive  measures  taken  in  Oxford  against  the  Chamberdekyns , 
or  scholars  haunting  the  schools,  but  of  no  authorized  house, 
than  in  Paris  were  ever  employed  against  the  Martinets. — 
(Wood,  aa.  1413,  1422,  1512,  &c.) — In  the  foreign  Universities 
it  was  never  incumbent  on  any,  beside  the  students  of  the  Fac- 
ulty of  Arts,  to  be  under  collegial  or  bursal  superintendence ; in 
the  English  Universities,  the  graduates  and  undergraduates  of 
every  faculty  were  equally  required  to  be  members  of  a privileged 
house. 

By  this  regulation,  the  students  were  compelled  to  collect 
themselves  into  houses  of  community,  variously  denominated 
Halls,  Inns,  Hostles,  Entries,  Chambers  (Aulae,  Hospitia,  Intro- 
itus,  Camerae).  These  Halls  were  governed  by  peculiar  statutes 
established  by  the  University,  by  whom  they  were  also  visited 
and  reformed ; and  administered  by  a Principal,  elected  by  the 
scholars  themselves,  but  admitted  to  his  office  by  the  chancellor 
or  his  deputy,  on  finding  caution  for  payment  of  the  rent.  The 
halls  were  in  general  held  only  on  lease ; but  by  a privilege  com- 
mon to  most  Universities,  houses  once  occupied  by  clerks  or  stu- 
dents could  not  again  be  resumed  by  the  proprietor,  or  taken  from 
the  gown,  if  the  rent  were  punctually  discharged,  the  rate  of 
which  was  quinquennially  fixed  by  the  academical  taxators.  The 
great  majority  of  the  scholars  who  inhabited  these  halls  lived  at 
their  own  expense ; but  the  benevolent  motives  which,  in  other 
countries,  determined  the  establishment  of  colleges  and  private 
bursae,  nowhere  operated  more  powerfully  than  in  England.1  In 
a few  houses,  foundations  were  made  for  the  support  of  a certain 
number  of  indigent  scholars,  who  were  incorporated  as  fellows  (or 
joint  participators  in  the  endowment),  under  the  government  of 
a head.  But  with  an  unenlightened  liberality,  these  benefactions 
were  not,  as  elsewhere,  exclusively  limited  to  learners,  during 
their  academical  studies,  and  to  instructors ; they  were  not  even 
limited  to  merit ; while  the  subjection  of  the  Colleges  to  private 
statutes,  and  their  emancipation  from  the  control  of  the  academ- 
ical authorities,  gave  them  interests  apart  from  those  of  the  pub- 

1 Lipsius,  after  speaking  of  the  Poadagogia  of  Louvain,  where  he  was  Professor  : — 
“ Pergamus  ; nam  et  aliud  Collegiorum  genus  est,  ubi  non  tarn  docetur  quam  alitur 
juventus,  et  subsidia  studiorum  in  certos  annos  habet.  Pulchrum  inventum,  et  quod 
in  Anglia  magnifice  usurpatur ; neque  enim  in  orbe  terrarum  simile  esse,  addam  et 
fuisse.  Magnae  illic  opes  et  vectigalia  : verbo  vobis  dicam  1 Unum  Oxoniense  colle- 
gium (rem  inquisivi)  superet  vel  decern  nostra.”  ( Lovanium , 1.  iii.  c.  5. — See  also 
Polydori  Virgilii  Angl.  Hist.  1.  v.  p.  107,  edit.  Basil.) 


410 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


lie,  and  not  only  disqualified  them  from  co-operating  toward  the 
general  ends  of  the  University,  hut  rendered  them,  instead  of 
powerful  aids,  the  worst  impediments  to  its  utility. 

The  Colleges,  into  which  commoners,  or  members  not  on  the 
foundation,  were,  until  a comparatively  modern  date,  rarely 
admitted  (and  this  admission,  he  it  noted,  is  to  the  present  hour 
wholly  optional),  remained  also  for  many  centuries  few  in  compa- 
rison with  the  Halls.  The  latter  were  counted  by  hundreds  ; the 
former,  in  Oxford,  even  at  the  present  day,  extend  only  to  nine- 
teen. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  fourteenth  century,  the  number 
of  the  halls  was  about  three  hundred  (Wood,  a.  1307) — the  num- 
ber of  the  secular  colleges,  at  the  highest,  only  three. — At  the 
commencement  of  the  fifteenth  century,  when  the  colleges  had 
risen  to  seven , a Fellow  of  Queen’s  laments,  that  the  students 
had  diminished  as  the  foundations  had  increased.  (Ullerston, 
Defensorium,  Sfc.  written  1401.) — [John  Major,  who  was  incor- 
porated, at  least,  in  Cambridge,  in  his  curious  picture  of  the  En- 
glish Universities,  records,  that,  at  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury, there  were  “ in  each,  from  four  to  five  thousand  scholars, 
all  grown  up,  carrying  swords  and  bows,  and,  in  great  part,  gen- 
try y ( De  Gesiis  Scotorum,  L.  i.  c.  5.)] — At  the  commencement 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  number  of  halls  had  fallen  to  fifty- 
five  (Wood,  a.  1503),  while  the  secular  colleges  had,  before  1516, 
been  multiplied  to  tivelve. — The  causes  which  had  hitherto  occa- 
sioned this  diminution  in  the  number  of  scholars,  and  in  the 
number  of  the  houses  destined  for  their  accommodation,  were, 
among  others,  the  plagues,  by  which  Oxford  was  so  frequently 
desolated,  and  the  members  of  the  University  dispersed — the  civil 
wars  of  York  and  Lancaster — the  rise  of  other  rival  Universities 
in  Great  Britain  and  on  the  Continent — and,  finally,  the  sinking 
consideration  of  the  scholastic  philosophy.1  The  character  which 
the  Reformation  assumed  in  England,  co-operated,  however,  still 
more  powerfully  to  the  same  result.  Of  itself,  the  schism  in 
religion  must  necessarily  have  diminished  the  resort  of  students 
to  the  University,  by  banishing  those  who  did  not  acquiesce  in 
the  new  opinions  there  inculcated  by  law ; while  among  the  re- 
formed themselves,  there  arose  an  influential  party,  who  viewed 
the  academical  exercises  as  sophistical,  and  many  who  oven 

1 The  same  decline  was,  at  this  period,  experienced  in  the  continental  Universities. 
See  the  article  on  the  Epist.  Ots.  Vir.  pp.  207,  208,  of  this  volume,  Note 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC. 


411 


regarded  degrees  as  Antichristian.  But  in  England  the  Reform- 
ation incidentally  operated  in  a more  peculiar  manner.  Unlike 
its  fate  in  other  countries,  this  religious  revolution  was  absolutely 
governed  hy  the  fancies  of  the  royal  despot  for  the  time ; and  so 
uncertain  was  the  caprice  of  Henry,  so  contradictory  the  policy 
of  his  three  immediate  successors,  that  for  a long  time  it  was 
difficult  to  know  what  was  the  religion  by  law  established  for  the 
current  year,  far  less  possible  to  calculate,  with  assurance,  on 
what  would  be  the  statutory  orthodoxy  for  the  ensuing.  At  the 
same  time,  the  dissolution  of  the  monastic  orders  dried  up  one 
great  source  of  academical  prosperity ; while  the  confiscation  of 
monastic  property,  which  was  generally  regarded  as  only  a fore- 
taste of  what  awaited  the  endowments  of  the  Universities,  and 
the  superfluous  revenues  of  the  clergy,  rendered  literature  and 
the  church,  during  this  crisis,  uninviting  professions,  either  for 
an  ambitious,  or  (if  disinclined  to  martyrdom)  for  a conscientious 
man.  The  effect  was  but  too  apparent ; for  many  years  the 
Universities  were  almost  literally  deserted .' 


1 In  the  year  1539,  the  House  of  Convocation  complains,  in  a letter  addressed  to 
Secretary  Cromwell,  that  “ the  University,  within  the  last  five  years,  is  greatly  im- 
paired, and  the  number  of  students  diminished  by  one  half.” — In  a memorable  epistle, 
some  ten  years  previous,  to  Sir  Thomas  More,  the  same  complaint  had  been  still 
more  strenuously  urged  : — “ Pauperes  enim  sumus.  Olim  singuli  nostrum  annuum 
stipendium  habuimus,  aliqui  a Nobilibus,  nonnulli  ab  his  qui  Monasteriis  prresunt,  plu- 
rimi  a Presbyteris  quibus  ruri  sunt  sacerdotia.  Nunc  vero  tantum  abest  ut  in  hoc 
perstemus,  ut  illi  quibus  debeant  solitum  stipendium  dare  recusant.  Abbates  enim 
suos  Monachos  domum  accersunt,  Nobiles  suos  liberos,  Presbyteri  suos  consanguineos : 
sic  minuitur  scholasticorum  numerus,  sic  ruunt  Aula,  nostra,  sic  frigescunt  ornnes 
liberales  discipline.  Collegia  solum  pcrscverant ; qus  si  quid  solvere  cogantur,  cum 
solum  habeant  quantum  sufficit  in  victum  suo  scholasticorum  numero,  necesse  erit, 
aut  ipsa  una  labi,  aut,  socios  aliquot  ejici.  Vides  jam,  More,  quod  nobis  omnibus  im- 
mineat  periculum.  Vides  ex  Academia  futuram  non  Academiam,  nisi  tu  cautius  nos- 
tram  causam  egeris.”  (Wood,  a.  1539,  1540.) — In  1546,  in  which  year  the  number 
of  graduations  had  fallen  so  low  as  thirteen,  the  inhabited  halls  amounted  only  to  eight, 
and  even  of  these  several  were  nearly  empty.  (Wood,  a.  1546.) — About  the  same 
time,  the  celebrated  Walter  Haddon  laments,  that  in  Cambridge  “the  schools  were 
never  more  solitary  than  at  present ; so  notably  few  indeed  are  the  students,  that  for 
every  master  that  reads  in  them  there  is  hardly  left  an  auditor  to  listen.”  ( Luculra - 
tiones,  p.  12,  edit.  1567.) — “ In  1551,”  says  the  Oxford  Antiquary,  “the  colleges,  and 
especially  the  ancient  halls,  lay  either  waste,  or  were  become  the  receptacles  of  poor 
religious  people  turned  out  of  their  cloisters.  The  present  halls,  especially  St.  Ed- 
mund’s and  New  Inn,  were  void  of  students.”  (a.  1551.) — And  again  : “ The  truth 
is,  though  the  whole  number  of  students  were  now  a thousand  and  fifteen,  that  had 
names  in  the  buttery  books  of  each  house  of  learning,  yet  the  greater  part  were  absent, 
and  had  taken  their  last  farewell.”  (a.  1552.) — The  two  wells  of  learning,”  says 
Dr.  Bernard  Gilpin  in  1552 — “ the  two  wells  of  learning,  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  are 
dried  up,  students  decayed,  of  which  scarce  an  hundred  are  left  of  a thousand  ; and 
if  in  seven  years  more  they  should  decay  so  fast,  there  would  be  almost  none  at  all ; 
so  that  the  devil  would  make  a triumph,  while  there  were  none  learned  to  whom  to 


412 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


The  Halls , whose  existence  solely  depended  on  the  confluence 
of  students,  thus  fell ; and  none,  it  is  probable,  would  have  sur- 
vived the  crisis,  had  not  several  chanced  to  be  the  property  of 
certain  colleges,  which  had  thus  an  interest  in  their  support. 
The  Halls  of  St.  Alban,  St.  Edmund,  St.  Mary,  New  Inn,  Mag- 
dalen, severally  belonged  to  Merton,  Queen’s,  Oriel,  New,  and 
Magdalen  Colleges;  and  Broadgates  Hall,  now  Pembroke  Col- 
lege, Gloucester  Hall,  now  Worcester  College,  and  Hert  Hall, 
subsequently  Hertford  College,  owed  their  salvation  to  their 
dependence  on  the  foundations  of  Christ  Church,  St.  John’s,  and 
Exeter. — [In  Cambridge  the  Ilostlcs  ended  in  1540  (Fuller). 
Halls  are  there  Colleges.] 

The  circumstances  which  occasioned  the  ruin  of  the  halls,  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  cloisters  and  colleges  of  the  monastic  orders 
in  Oxford,  not  only  gave  to  the  secular  colleges,  which  all  re- 
mained, a preponderant  weight  in  the  University  for  the  junc- 
ture ; but  allowed  them  so  to  extend  their  circuit  and  to  increase 
their  numbers,  that  they  were  subsequently  enabled  to  compre- 
hend within  their  walls  nearly  the  whole  of  the  academical  popu- 
lation, though  previously  to  the  sixteenth  century,  they  appear 
to  have  rarely,  if  ever,  admitted  independent  members  at  all.1 
As  the  students  fell  off,  the  rents  of  the  halls  were  taxed  at  a 
lower  rate ; and  they  became,  at  last,  of  so  insignificant  a value 
to  the  landlords,  who  could  not  apply  it  to  other  than  academical 
purposes,  that  they  were  always  willing  to  dispose  of  this  fallen 
and  falling  property  for  the  most  trifling  consideration.  In 
Oxford,  land  and  houses  became  a drug.  The  old  colleges  thus 
extended  their  limits,  by  easy  purchase,  from  the  impoverished 
burghers  ; and  the  new  colleges,  of  which  there  were  four  estab- 
lished within  half  a century  subsequent  to  the  Reformation,  and 
altogether  six  during  the  sixteenth  century,  were  built  on  sites 
either  obtained  gratuitously  or  for  an  insignificant  price.  After 
this  period  only  one  college  was  founded — in  1610  ; and  three  of 
the  eight  halls  transmuted  into  colleges,  in  1610,  1702,  and  1740; 
but  of  these  one  is  now  extinct. 

These  circumstances  explain  how  the  halls  declined  and  fell ; 


commit  the  flock.”  (Sermons  preached  at  Court,  edit.  1630,  p.  23.)— See  also  Wood, 
aa.  1561,  1563. — [Fuller’s  Cambridge,  Todd’s  Life  of  Cranmer,  Peacock’s  Statutes, 
&c.] 

1 See  statute  of  1489,  quoted  in  Dr.  Newton’s  University  Education,  p.  9,  from 
Darrel's  transcript  of  the  ancient  statutes,  preserved  in  the  Bodleian. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGES,  ETC.  413 

it  remains  to  explain,  why,  in  the  most  crowded  state  of  the 
University,  not  one  subsequently  was  ever  restored. — Before  the 
era  of  their  downfall,  the  establishment  of  a hall  was  easy.  It 
required  only,  that  a few  scholars  should  hire  a house,  find  cau- 
tion for  a year’s  rent,  and  choose  for  Principal  a graduate  of 
respectable  character.  The  Chancellor,  or  his  Deputy,  could 
not  refuse  to  sanction  the  establishment.  An  act  of  usurpation 
abolished  this  facility.  *The  general  right  of  nomination  to  the 
Principality,  and  consequently  to  the  institution,  of  halls,  was, 
“ through  the  absolute  potency  he  had,”  procured  by  the  Earl 
of  Leicester,  Chancellor  of  the  University,  about  1570 ; and  it 
is  now,  by  statute,  vested  in  his  successors.1  In  surrendering 
this  privilege  to  the  Chancellor,  the  Colleges  were  not  blind  to 
their  peculiar  interest.  From  his  situation,  that  magistrate  was 
sure  to  be  guided  by  their  heads ; no  hall  has  since  arisen  to 
interfere  with  their  monopoly ; and  the  collegial  interest,  thus 
left  without  a counterpoise,  and  concentrated  in  a few  hands, 
was  soon  able  to  establish  an  absolute  supremacy  in  the  Univer- 
sity. 

2.  By  statute,  the  office  of  Tutor  is  open  to  all  graduates.  This 
was,  however,  no  barrier  against  the  encroachment  of  the  fellows ; 
and  the  simple  graduate,  who  should  attempt  to  make  good  his 
right — how  could  he  succeed  ? 

As  the  colleges  only  received  as  members  those  not  on  the 
foundation,  for  their  own  convenience,  they  could  either  exclude 
them  altogether,  or  admit  them  under  whatever  limitations  they 
might  choose  to  impose.  By  University  law,  graduates  were  not 
compelled  to  lodge  in  college ; they  were  therefore  excluded  as 
unprofitable  members,  to  make  room  for  under-graduates,  who 
paid  tutor’s  fees,  and  as  dangerous  competitors,  to  prevent  them 
from  becoming  tutors  themselves.  This  exclusion,  or  the  possi- 
bility of  this  exclusion,  of  itself  prevented  any  graduate  from 
commencing  tutor,  in  opposition  to  the  interest  of  the  foundation 
members.  Independently  of  this,  there  were  other  circumstances 
which  would  have  frustrated  all  interference  with  monopoly  by 
the  fellows ; but  these  we  need  not  enumerate. 

3.  Collegial  tuition  engrossed  by  the  fellows,  a more  import- 
ant step  was  to  raise  this  collegial  tuition  from  a subsidiary  to 


1 Wood’s  Hist,  et  Antiq.  TJniv.  lib.  ii.  p.  339.  Hist,  and  Antiq.  of  Coll,  and  Halls, 
p.  655.  Statuta  Aularia,  sect.  v. 


114 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


a principal.1  Could  the  professorial  system  on  which  the  Univer- 
sity rested  be  abolished,  the  tutorial  system  would  remain  the 
one  organ  of  academical  instruction ; could  the  University  he 
silently  annihilated,  the  colleges  would  succeed  to  its  name,  its 
privileges,  and  its  place.  This  momentous — this  deplorable  sub- 
version was  consummated.  We  do  not  affirm  that  the  end  was 
ever  clearly  proposed,  or  a line  of  policy  for  its  attainment  ever 
systematically  followed  out.  But  circumstances  concurred,  and 
that  instinct  of  self-interest  which  actuates  bodies  of  men  with 
the  certainty  of  a natural  law,  determined,  in  the  course  of 
generations,  a result,  such  as  no  sagacity  would  have  anti- 
cipated as  possible.  After  the  accomplishment,  however,  a re- 
trospect of  its  causes  shows  the  event  to  have  been  natural,  if 
not  necessary. 

The  subversion  of  the  University  is  to  be  traced  to  that  very 
code  of  laws  on  which  its  constitution  was  finally  established. 
The  academical  body  is  composed  of  graduates  and  under-gradu- 
ates in  the  four  faculties  of  Arts,  Theology,  Law,  and  Medicine ; 
and  the  government  of  the  University  was  of  old  exclusively 
committed  to  the  Masters  and  Doctors  assembled  in  Congregation 
and  Convocation;  Heads  of  houses  and  college  Fellows  shared  in 
the  academical  government  only  as  they  were  full  graduates,  and 
as  they  were  regents.  The  statutes  ratified  under  the  chancel- 
lorship of  Laud,  and  by  which  the  legal  constitution  of  the  Uni- 
versity is  still  determined,  changed  this  republican  polity  into  ar. 
oligarchical.  The  legislation  and  the  supreme  government  were 
still  left  with  the  full  graduates,  the  Masters  and  Doctors,  and  the 
character  of  Fellow  remained  always  unprivileged  by  law.  But 
the  Heads  of  Houses,  if  not  now  first  raised  to  the  rank  of  a pub- 
lic body,  were  now  first  clothed  with  an  authority  such  as  render- 
ed them  henceforward  the  principal — in  fact,  the  sole  administra- 
tors of  the  University  weal.2  And  whereas  in  foreign  Universities, 

1 This  third  step  in  the  revolution,  which  from  its  more  important  character  we 
consider  last,  was,  however,  accomplishing  simultaneously  with  the  second,  of  which 
it  was,  in  fact,  almost  a condition. 

2 Anciently  the  right  of  previous  discussion  belonged  to  the  House  of  Regency  or 
Congregation.  The  omnipotent  Earl  of  Leicester,  to  confirm  his  hold  over  the  Uni- 
versity, and  in  spite  of  considerable  opposition,  constrained  the  Masters  to  surrender 
this  function  to  a more  limited  and  manageable  body,  composed  of  the  Vice-chancellor, 
Doctors , Heads  (for  the  first  time  recognized  as  a public  body),  and  Proctors  (Wood, 
a.  1569).  [It  does  not  appear  that  the  Heads  and  Doctors  hereby  obtained  the  abso- 
lute initiative.  They,  as  previously  the  Congregation,  had  only  the  right  of  prior 
deliberation,  but  not  the  right  of  preventing  the  introduction  of  a measure  into  the 
academical  legislature.  (Wood,  ii.  p.  167,  sq.)]  Laud,  desirous  of  still  farther  con- 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— FELLOW-TUTORS.  415 

the  University  governed  the  Colleges — in  Oxford  the  Colleges 
were  enthroned  the  governors  of  the  University.  The  Vice- 
chancellor  (now  also  necessarily  a College  Head),  the  Heads  of 
Houses,  and  the  two  Proctors,  were  constituted  into  a body,  and 
the  members  constrained  to  regular  attendance  on  an  ordinary 
weekly  meeting.  To  this  body  was  committed,  as  their  especial 
duly , the  care  of  “ inquiring  into , and  taking  counsel  for , the 
observance  of  the  statutes  and  customs  of  the  University  ; and  if 
there  be  aught  touching  the  good  government,  the  scholastic  im- 
provement, the  honor  and  usefulness  of  the  University,  which  a 
majority  of  them  may  think  worthy  of  deliberation,  let  them  have 
power  to  deliberate  thereupon,  to  the  end  that,  after  this  their 
deliberation,  the  same  may  be  proposed  more  advisedly  in  the 
Venerable  House  of  Congregation,  and  then  with  mature  counsel 
ratified  in  the  Venerable  House  of  Convocation.”  (T.xiii.)  Thus, 
no  proposal  could  be  submitted  to  the  houses  of  Congregation  or 
Convocation,  unless  it  had  been  previously  discussed  and  sanc- 
tioned by  the  “ Hebdomadal  Meeting and  through  this  prelim- 
inary negative,1  the  most  absolute  control  was  accorded  to  the 
— 

centrating  the  govermnent,  and  in  order  to  exercise  himself  a more  absolute  control, 
constituted  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  of  his  very  humble  servants  the  Heads  ; and  to 
frustrate  opposition  from  the  House  of  Convocation  to  this  momentous  and  unconsti- 
tutional change  by  precluding  opposition,  he  forced  the  innovation  on  the  University 
through  royal  statute.— The  Cambridge  Caput,  whose  powers  were  virtually  first  in- 
stituted by  the  Elizabethan  statutes,  forms  a curious  pendant  to  the  Oxford  Hebdo- 
madal Meeting  ; and  in  general,  the  history  of  the  two  Universities  is  a history  of  the 
same  illegal  revolution,  accomplished  by  the  same  influence,  under  circumstances 
similar,  but  not  the  same.  [The  Caput  comprises  six  members,  to  wit,  the  Vice-chan- 
cellor, the  representatives  of  the  three  higher  faculties  of  Theology,  Civil  Law,  and 
Physic,  and  of  the  two  Houses,  the  Regent  and  Non-Regent.  It  originates  nothino-, 
but  each  member  has  a veto  effectual  during  the  academical  year.  “ There  is  no  part 
of  the  constitution  of  the  University”  (says  Dr.  Peacock,  in  his  Observations  on  the 
Cambridge  Statutes,  1841,  p.  48)  “ so  useful  and  necessary  for  many  purposes,  which 
has  operated  more  injuriously  to  its  interests,  by  the  discouragements  and  obstacles 
which  it  has  opposed  to  the  consideration  and  enactment  of  measures  of  rational  improve- 
ment.'’ Again  (says  the  same  able  and  candid  writer,  p.  23)  “ the  statutes  of  Eliza- 
beth, by  making  the  existence  of  the  authority  of  this  body  permanent  (during  an 
entire  academical  year),  and  by  the  mode  of  its  appointment,  placed  the  whole  legisla- 
tive powers  of  the  University  under  the  control  of  the  Heads  of  Houses .”  How  then  can 
Dr.  Whewell  ( Cambridge  Education,  l)  382)  state,  that  “the  Heads  of  Colleges  have 
no  special  share  in  the  legislation  of  the  University,  except  as  advisers  of  the  Vice- 
chancellor  1”  Nor  can  this  be  reconciled  with  the  authority  recognized  as  belonging 
to  the  Interpretations  and  Decrees  of  the  Heads  of  Colleges  ; these  are  regarded  as  of 
statutory  obligation,  and  sworn  to  as  such.  See  the  learned  Sergeant  Miller’s  Account 
of  the  University  of  Cambridge  (cc.  3,  4,  6),  who  commemorates  these  “ benign  inter- 
pretations" of  the  Reverend  Heads  by  which  white  is  coolly  expounded  to  mean  black, 
•&c.] 

1 And  as  if  this  preliminary  negative  were  not  enough,  there  was  conceded  by  the 


416 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


Heads  of  Houses  over  the  proceedings  of  the  University.  By  their 
permission,  every  statute  might  he  violated,  and  every  custom  fall 
into  desuetude : without  their  permission,  no  measure  of  reform, 
or  improvement,  or  discipline,  however  necessary,  could  he  initi- 
ated, or  even  mentioned. 

A body  constituted  and  authorized  like  the  Hebdomadal  Meet- 
ing, could  only  be  rationally  expected  to  discharge  its  trust : 1°, 
if  its  members  were  subjected  to  a direct  and  concentrated  respons- 
ibility; and  2°,  if  their  public  duties  were  identical  with  their 
private  interests.  The  Hebdomadal  Meeting  acted  under  neither 
of  these  conditions. 

In  regard  to  the  first , this  body  was  placed  under  the  review 
of  no  superior  authority  either  for  what  it  did,  or  for  what  it  did 
not,  perform  ; and  the  responsibility  to  public  opinion  was  distri- 
buted among  too  many  to  have  any  influence  on  their  collective 
acts.  “ Corporations  never  blush.” 

In  regard  to  the  second , so  far  were  the  interests  and  duties  of 
the  heads  from  being  coincident,  that  they  were  diametrically 
opposed.  Their  public  obligations  bound  them  to  maintain  and 
improve  the  system  of  University  education,  of  which  the  profes- 
sors were  the  organs  ; but  this  system  their  private  advantage, 
both  as  individuals  and  as  representing  the  collegial  interest, 
prompted  them  to  deteriorate  and  undermine. 

When  the  Corpus  Statutorum  was  ratified,  there  existed  two 
opposite  influences  in  the  University,  either  of  which  might  have 
pretended  to  the  chief  magistracy — the  Heads  of  Houses  and  the 
Professors.  The  establishment  of  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  by 
Laud,  gave  the  former  a decisive  advantage,  which  they  were 
not  slack  in  employing  against  their  rivals. 

In  their  individual  capacity,  the  Heads,  samples  of  the  same 
bran  with  the  Fellows,  from  whom  and  by  whom  they  were  elected 
owed  in  general  their  elevation  to  accidental  circumstances  ; and 
their  influence,  or  rather  that  of  their  situation,  was  confined  to 
the  members  of  their  private  communities.  The  Professors,  the 
elite  of  the  University,  and  even  (of  old)  not  unfrequently  called 
for  their  celebrity  from  other  schools  and  countries,  were  profess- 
edly chosen  exclusively  from  merit;  and  their  position  enabled 


same  statutes  to  the  single  college  head  who  holds  for  the  time  the  office  of  Vice- 
chancellor,  an  absolute  veto  upon  all  proceedings  in  the  houses  of  congregation  and 
convocation  themselves.  In  Cambridge  a preliminary  veto  is  enjoyed  by  every  member 
of  the  Caput — Caput  Senatus. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  417 


them  to  establish,  by  ability  and  zeal,  a paramount  ascendency 
over  the  whole  academical  youth. 

As  men,  in  general,  of  merely  ordinary  acquirements — holding 
in  their  collegial  capacity  only  an  accidental  character  in  the 
University — and  elevated,  simply  in  quality  of  that  character,  by 
an  act  of  arbitrary  power  to  an  unconstitutional  pre-eminence ; 
the  Heads  were,  not  unnaturally,  jealous  of  the  contrast  exhibited 
to  themselves  by  a body  like  the  Professors,  who,  as  the  principal 
organs,  deserved  to  constitute  in  Oxford,  what  in  other  Univer- 
sities they  actually  did,  its  representatives  and  governors.  Their 
only  hope  was  in  the  weakness  of  their  rivals.  It  was  easily  per- 
ceived, that  in  proportion  as  the  professorial  system  of  instruction 
was  improved,  the  influence  of  the  professorial  body  would  be  in- 
creased ; and  the  heads  were  conscious,  that  if  that  system  were 
ever  organized  as  it  ought  to  be,  it  would  no  longer  be  possible 
for  them  to  maintain  their  own  factitious  and  absurd  omnipotence 
in  the  academical  polity. 

Another  consideration  also  co-operated.  A temporary  decline 
in  the  University  had  occasioned  the  desertion  of  the  Halls ; a 
few  houses  had  succeeded  in  collecting  within  their  walls  the 
whole  academical  population ; and  the  heads  of  these  few  houses 
had  now  obtained  a preponderant  influence  in  the  University. 
Power  is  sweet ; and  its  depositaries  were  naturally  averse  from 
any  measure  which  threatened  to  diminish  their  consequence, 
by  multiplying  their  numbers.  The  existing  Colleges  and  Halls 
could  afford  accommodation  to  a very  limited  complement  of 
students.  The  exclusive  privileges  attached  in  England  to  an 
Oxford  or  Cambridge  degree  in  law,  in  medicine,  and  above  all, 
in  the  church,  filled  the  colleges,  independently  of  any  merit  in 
the  academical  teachers.  But  were  the  University  restored  to 
its  ancient  fame— did  students  again  flock  to  Oxford,  as  they 
flocked  to  Leyden  and  Padua,  the  Halls  must  again  be  called  into 
existence,  or  the  system  of  domestic  superintendence  be  aban- 
doned or  relaxed.  The  interests  of  the  Heads  was  thus  directly 
opposed  to  the  celebrity  of  the  professorial  body,  both  in  itself, 
and  in  its  consequences.  The  University  must  not  at  most  tran- 
scend the  standard  of  a decent  mediocrity.  Every  thing,  in  fact, 
that  tended  to  keep  the  confluence  of  students  within  the  existing 
means  of  accommodation,  found  favor  with  these  oligarchs.  Sub- 
scription to  the  Thirty-nine  Articles  even  at  matriculation  im- 
posed by  the  Calvinistic  Leicester,  was  among  the  few  statutes 

Dd 


418 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. 


not  subsequently  violated  by  the  Arminian  Heads  ; the  numbers 
of  poor  scholars  formerly  supported  in  all  the  Colleges  were  grad- 
ually discarded  the  expenses  incident  on  a University  education 
kept  graduated  to  the  convenient  pitch  ; and  residence  after  the 
first  degree,  for  this  and  other  reasons,  dispensed  with. 

At  the  same  time,  as  representatives  of  the  collegial  interest, 
the  Heads  were  naturally  indisposed  to  discharge  their  duty 
toward  the  University.  In  proportion  as  the  public  or  professorial 
education  was  improved,  would  it  be  difficult  for  the  private  or 
tutorial  to  maintain  its  relative  importance  as  a subsidiary.  The 
collegial  tuition  must  either  keep  pace  with  the  University  pre- 
lections, or  it  must  fall  into  contempt  and  desuetude.  The 
student  accustomed  to  a high  standard  in  “the  schools,”  would 
pay  little  deference  to  a low  standard  in  the  college.  It  would 
now  be  necessary  to  admit  tutors  exclusively  from  merit ; the 
fellows  no  longer  able  to  vindicate  their  monopoly  against  the  other 
graduates,  would,  in  a general  competition,  sink  to  their  proper 
level,  even  in  their  own  houses ; while,  in  the  University,  the 
collegial  influence  in  general  would  be  degraded  from  the  arbi- 
trary pre-eminence  to  which  accident  had  raised  it. 

In  these  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  quite  as  reasonable 
to  expect  that  the  Heads  of  Colleges  should  commit  suicide  to 
humor  their  enemies,  as  that  they  should  prove  the  faithful  guard- 
ians and  the  zealous  promoters  of  the  professorial  system.  On  the 
contrary,  by  confiding  this  duty  to  that  interest,  it  was  in  fact 
decreed,  that  the  professorial  system  should,  by  its  appointed 
guardians,  be  discouraged — corrupted — depressed — and,  if  not 
utterly  extinguished,  reduced  to  such  a state  of  inefficiency  and 
contempt,  as  would  leave  it  only  useful  as  a foil  to  relieve  the 
imperfections  of  the  tutorial.  And  so  it  happened.  The  profes- 
sorial system,  though  still  imperfect,  could  without  difficulty  have 
been  carried  to  unlimited  perfection;  but  the  Heads,  far  from 
consenting  to  its  melioration,  fostered  its  defects  in  order  to  pre- 
cipitate its  fall. 

1 Before  the  decline  of  the  Halls,  academical  education  cost  nothing,  and  the  poor 
student  could  select  a society  and  house  proportioned  to  his  means,  down  even  to  the 
begging  Logicians  of  Aristotle’s  Hall.  The  Colleges  could  hardly  have  prevented  the 
restoration  of  the  Halls,  had  they  not  for  a considerable  time  supplied  that  accommo- 
dation to  the  indigent  scholars  to  which  the  country  had  been  accustomed.  From  the 
“ Exact  Account  of  the  whole  Number  of  Scholars  and  Students  in  the  University  of 
Oxford,  taken  anno  1612,”  it  appears  that  about  four  hundred  and  fifty  poor  scholars 
and  servitors  then  received  gratuitous,  or  almost  gratuitous,  education  and  support  in 
the  Colleges.  How  many  do  so  now  i 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  419 


111  Oxford,  as  originally  in  all  other  Universities,  salaried 
teachers  or  Professors  were  bound  to  deliver  their  prelections 
gratis.  But  it  was  always  found  that,  under  this  arrangement, 
the  professor  did  as  little  as  possible,  and  the  student  undervalued 
what  cost  him  nothing.  “ Gratis  et  frustra .”  Universities  in 
general,  therefore,  corrected  this  defect.  The  interest  of  the  Pro- 
fessor was  made  subservient  to  his  diligence,  by  sanctioning,  or 
winking  at,  his  acceptance  of  voluntary  gifts  or  honoraria  from  his 
auditors ; which,  in  most  Universities,  were  at  length  converted 
into  exigible  fees.  In  Oxford,  this  simple  expedient  was  not  of 
course  permitted  by  the  Heads ; and  what  were  the  consequences  ? 
The  Hebdomadal  Meeting  had  the  charge  of  watching  over  the 
due  observance  of  the  statutes.  By  statute  and  under  penalty, 
the  Professors  were  bound  to  a regular  delivery  of  their  courses ; 
by  statute  and  under  penalty,  the  Students  were  bound  to  a regu- 
lar attendance  in  the  public  classes ; and  by  statute  and  by  oath, 
but  not  under  penalty,  the  Heads  were  bound  to  see  that  both 
parties  duly  performed  their  several  obligations.  It  is  evident, 
that  the  Heads  were  here  the  keystone  of  the  arch.  If  they 
relaxed  in  their  censorship,  the  Professors,  finding  it  no  longer 
necessary  to  lecture  regularly,  and  no  longer  certain  of  a regular 
audience,  would,  erelong,  desist  from  lecturing  at  all ; 1 while  the 
Students,  finding  attendance  in  their  classes  no  longer  compulsory, 
and  no  longer  sure  of  a lecture  when  they  did  attend,  would  soon 
cease  to  frequent  the  schools  altogether.  The  Heads  had  only  to 
violate  their  duties,  by  neglecting  the  charge  especially  intrusted 
to  them,  and  the  downfall  of  the  obnoxious  system  was  inevitable. 
And  this  they  did. 

At  the  same  time,  other  accidental  defects  in  the  professorial 
system,  as  constituted  in  Oxford — the  continuance  of  which  was 
guaranteed  by  the  body  sworn  “to  the  scholastic  improvement 
of  the  University” — co-operated  also  to  the  same  result. 

Fees  not  permitted,  the  salaries  which  made  up  the  whole 
emoluments  attached  to  the  different  chairs  were  commonly  too 
small  to  afford  an  independent,  far  less  an  honorable  livelihood. 
They  could  therefore  only  be  objects  of  ambition,  as  honorary  ap- 
pointments, or  supplemental  aids.  This  limited  the  candidates  to 
those  who  had  otherwise  a competent  income  ; and  consequently 

1 How  well  disposed  the  salaried  readers  always  were  to  convert  their  chairs  into 
sinecures,  may  be  seen  in  Wood,  aa.  1581,  1582,  1584,  1589,  1590,  1594,  1596, 
1608,  &c. 


420 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


threw  them,  in  general,  into  the  hands  of  the  members  of  the 
collegial  foundations,  i.  c.  of  a class  of  men  on  whose  capacity  or 
good  intention  to  render  the  professorships  efficient,  there  could  be 
no  rational  dependence. 

Some,  also,  of  the  public  lectureships  were  temporary ; these 
were  certain  to  be  negligently  filled,  and  negligently  taught. 

Another  circumstance  likewise  concurred  in  reducing  the  stand- 
ard of  professorial  competence.  The  power  of  election,  never  per- 
haps intrusted  to  the  safest  hands,  was  in  general  even  confided 
to  those  interested  in  frustrating  its  end.  The  appointment  was 
often  directly,  and  almost  always  indirectly,  determined  by  college 
influence.  In  exclusive  possession  of  the  tutorial  office,  and  non- 
residence as  yet  only  permitted  to  independent  graduates,  the 
fellows,  in  conjunction  with  the  heads,  came  to  constitute  the 
great  proportion  of  the  resident  members  of  Convocation  and 
Congregation  ; and  therefore,  except  in  cases  of  general  interest, 
the  elections  belonging  to  the  public  bodies  were  sure  to  be  decided 
by  them.1 

Nor  was  it  possible  to  raise  the  tutorial  system  from  its  state 
of  relative  subordination,  without  an  absolute  subversion  of  the 
professorial.  The  tutor  could  not  extend  his  discipline  over  the 
bachelor  in  arts,  for  every  bachelor  was  by  law  entitled  to  com- 
mence tutor  himself.  But  the  colleges  could  not  succeed  in  vindi- 
cating their  monopoly  even  of  the  inferior  branches  of  education, 


1 Since  writing  the  above,  we  notice  a curious  confirmation  in  Terra-Films.  This 
work  appeared  in  1721,  at  the  very  crisis  when  the  collegial  interest  was  accomplish- 
ing its  victory.  The  statements  it  contains  were  never,  we  believe,  contradicted ; and 
though  the  following  representation  may  be  in  some  points  exaggerated,  the  reader  can 
easily  recognize  its  substantial  truth.  Speaking  of  the  Professors  : “ I have  known  a 
profligate  debauchee  chosen  professor  of  moral  philosophy  ; and  a fellow,  who  never 
looked  upon  the  stars  soberly  in  his  life,  professor  of  astronomy  : we  have  had  history 
professors,  who  never  read  any  thing  to  qualify  them  for  it,  but  Tom  Thumb,  Jack  the 
Giant-killer,  Don  Bellianis  of  Greece,  and  such  like  records  : we  have  had  likewise 
numberless  professors  of  Greek,  Hebrew,  and  Arabic,  who  scarce  understood  their 
mother  tongue  ; and  not  long  ago,  a famous  gamester  and  stock-jobber  was  elected 
Margaret  Professor  of  Divinity  ; so  great,  it  seems,  is  the  analogy  between  dusting 
cushions  and  shaking  of  elbows,  or  between  squandering  away  of  estates  and  saving 
of  souls.”  And  in  a letter,  from  an  under-graduate  of  Wadham  : — “Now,  it  is  mon- 
strous, that  notwithstanding  these  public  lectures  are  so  much  neglected,  we  are  all  of 
us,  when  we  take  our  degrees,  charged  with  and  punished  for  non-appearance  at  the 
reading  of  many  of  them ; a formal  dispensation  is  read  by  our  respective  deans,  at  the 
time  our  grace  is  proposed,  for  our  non-appearance  at  these  lectures,  [N.  B.]  and  it  is 
with  difficulty  that  some  grave  ones  of  the  congregation  arc  induced  to  grant  it.  Strange 
order ! that  each  lecturer  should  have  his  fifty,  his  hundred,  or  two  hundred  pounds  a 
year  for  doing  nothing  ; and  that  we  (the  young  fry)  should  be  obliged  to  pay  money  for 
not  hearing  such  lectures  as  were  never  read,  nor  ever  composed.”  (No.  X.) 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  42V 


unless  they  were  able  also  to  incapacitate  the  University  from 
affording  instruction  in  the  superior.  For  if  the  public  lectures 
were  allowed  to  continue  in  the  higher  faculties,  and  in  the  higher 
department  of  the  lowest,  it  would  he  found  impossible  to  justify 
their  suppression  in  that  particular  department,  which  alone  the 
college  fellows  could  pretend  to  teach.  At  the  same  time,  if 
attendance  on  the  professorial  courses  remained  necessary  for 
degrees  above  bachelor  in  arts,  a multitude  of  graduates,  all  com- 
petent to  the  tutorial  office,  would  in  consequence  continue  domi- 
ciled in  the  University,  and  the  fellow’s  usurpation  of  that  function 
it  would  be  found  impossible  to  maintain.  With  the  colleges  and 
fellows  it  was,  therefore,  all  or  nothing;.  If  they  were  not  to 
continue,  as  they  had  been,  mere  accessories  to  the  University, 
it  behooved  to  quash  the  whole  public  lectures,  and  to  dispense 
with  residence  after  the  elementary  degree.  This  the  Heads  of 
Houses  easily  effected.  As  the  irresponsible  guardians  of  the 
University  statutes,  they  violated  their  trust,  by  allowing  the 
professors  to  neglect  their  statutory  duty , and  empty  standing  to 
he  taken  in  lieu  of  the  course  of  academical  study,  which  it  legally 
implied. 

The  Professorial  system  was  thus  from  the  principal  and  neces- 
sary, degraded  into  the  subordinate  and  superfluous  ; the  tutorial 
elevated,  with  all  its  additional  imperfections,  from  the  subsidiary , 
into  the  one  exclusive  instrument  of  education.  In  establishing 
the  ascendency  of  the  collegial  bodies,  it  mattered  not  that  the 
extensive  cycle  of  academical  instruction  was  contracted  to  the 
narrow  capacity  of  a fellow-tutor ; — that  the  University  was  anni- 
hilated, or  reduced  to  half  a faculty — of  one  teachership — which 
every  “ graduated  dunce”  might  confidently  undertake.  The 
great  interests  of  the  nation,  the  church,  and  the  professions,  were 
sacrificed  to  the  paltry  ends  of  a few  contemptible  corporations  ; 
and  the  privileges  by  law  accorded  to  the  public  University  of 
Oxford,  as  the  authorized  organ  of  national  education,  were  by 
its  perfidious  governors  furtively  transferred  to  the  unauthorized 
absurdities  of  their  private — of  their  college  discipline. 

That  the  representatives  of  the  collegial  bodies,  as  constituting 
the  Hebdomadal  Meeting,  were  the  authors  of  this  radical  subver- 
sion of  the  establishment  of  which  they  were  the  protectors — 
that  the  greatest  importance  was  attached  by  them  to  its  accom- 
plishment— and,  at  the  same  time,  that  they  were  fully  conscious 
of  sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  University  and  public  to  a private 


422 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


job  ; — all  this  is  manifested  by  the  fact,  that  the  Heads  of  Houses, 
rather  than  expose  the  college  usurpations  to  a discussion  by  the 
academical  and  civil  legislatures,  not  only  submitted  to  the  dis- 
grace of  leaving  their  smuggled  system  of  education  without  a 
legal  sanction,  but  actually  tolerated  the  reproach  of  thus  con- 
verting the  great  seminary  of  the  English  Church  into  a school  of 
perjury , without,  as  far  as  we  know,  an  effort  either  at  vindication 
or  amendment.  This  grevious  charge,  though  frequently  advanced 
both  by  the  friends  and  enemies  of  the  establishment,  we  mention 
with  regret;  we  do  not  see  how  it  can  be  rebutted,  but  shall  be 
truly  gratified  if  it  can.  Let  us  inquire. 

At  matriculation,  every  member  of  the  University  of  Oxford 
solemnly  swears  to  an  observance  of  the  academical  statutes,  of 
which  he  receives  a copy  of  the  Excerpta,  that  he  may  be  unable 
to  urge  the  plea  of  ignorance  for  their  violation ; and  at  every 
successive  step  of  graduation,  the  candidate  not  only  repeats  this 
comprehensive  oath,  but  after  hearing  read,  by  the  senior  Proctor, 
a statutory  recapitulation  of  the  statutes  which  prescribe  the 
various  public  courses  to  be  attended,  and  the  various  public  exer- 
cises to  be  performed,  as  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  degree, 
specially  makes  oath,  “ that  having  heard  what  was  thus  read, 
and  having,  within  three  days,  diligently  read  or  heard  read  [the 
other  statutes  having  reference  to  the  degree  he  is  about  to  take], 
moreover  the  seventh  section  of  the  sixth  title,  that  he  has  per- 
formed all  that  they  require , those  particulars  excepted  for  ivliich 
he  has  received  a dispensation!1'1  (Stat.  T.  ii.  § 3,  T.  ix.  S.  vi.  h 
1-3.)  The  words  in  brackets  are  omitted  in  the  re-enactment 
of  1808.  (Add.  T.  ix.  h 3.) 

Now,  in  these  circumstances,  does  it  not  follow  that  every 
member  of  the  University  commits  perjury,  who  either  does  not 
observe  the  statutory  enactments,  or  does  not  receive  a dispensa- 
tion for  their  non-observance  ? 

Under  the  former  alternative,  false  swearing  is  manifestly  in- 
evitable. Of  the  University  laws,  it  is  much  easier  to  enumerate 
those  which  are  not  violated  than  those  which  are;  and  the  u Ex- 
cerpta Statutorum ,”  which  the  intrant  receives  at  matriculation, 
far  from  enabling  him  to  prove  faithful  to  his  oath,  serves  only  to 
show  him  the  extent  of  the  perjury,  which  if  he  does  not  fly  the 
University,  he  must  unavoidably  incur.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that 
almost  the  only  statutes  now  observed,  are  those  which  regulate 
matters  wholly  accidental  to  the  essential  ends  of  the  institution — 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  423 

as  the  civil  polity  of  the  corporation,  or  circumstances  of  mere  form 
and  ceremonial.  The  whole  statutes,  on  the  contrary,  that  con- 
stitute the  being  and  the  well-being  of  the  University,  as  an 
establishment  of  education  in  general,  and  in  particular,  of  educa- 
tion in  the  three  learned  professions — these  fundamental  statutes 
are,  one  and  all,  absolutely  reduced  to  a dead  letter.  And  why  ? 
Because  they  establish  the  University  on  the  system  of  profes- 
sorial instruction.  The  fact  is  too  notorious  to  be  contradicted, 
that  while  every  statute  which  comports  with  the  private  inter- 
est of  the  college  corporations  is  religiously  enforced,  every  statute 
intended  to  insure  the  public  utility  of  the  University,  but  in- 
compatible with  their  monopoly,  is  unscrupulously  violated. 

The  latter  alternative  remains ; but  does  dispensation  afford 
a postern  of  escape  ? — The  statutes  bestow  this  power  exclusively 
on  the  Houses  of  Congregation  and  Convocation,  and  the  limits 
of  “ Dispensable ” and  “ Indispensable  Matter'1’’  are  anxiously  and 
minutely  determined.  Of  itself,  the  very  fact  that  there  was 
aught  indispensable  in  the  system  at  all,  might  satisfy  us,  with- 
out farther  inquiry,  that  at  least  the  one  essential  part  of  its 
organization,  through  which  the  University,  by  law,  accomplishes 
the  purposes  of  its  institution,  could  not  be  dispensed  with ; for 
this  would  be  nothing  else  then  a dispensation  of  the  University 
itself.  But  let  us  inquire  further  : 

The  original  statute  (Corp.  St.  T.  ix.  S.  iv.  § 2),  determining 
the  Dispensable  Matter  competent  to  the  House  of  Congregation, 
was  re-enacted,  with  some  unimportant  omissions,  in  1801  and 
1808.  (Add.  p.  136,  188).  By  these  statutes,  there  is  allowed 
to  that  House  the  power  of  dispensation  in  twenty-three  specified 
cases  of  which  the  fourth — 11  Pro  minus  diligenti  publicorum 
Lectorum  auditione’1’1 — need  alone  be  mentioned,  as  showing,  by 
the  only  case  in  point,  how  limited  is  the  power  committed  to 
Congregation,  of  dispensing  with  the  essential  business  of  the 
University.  The  students  were  unconditionally  bound,  by  oath 
and  statute,  to  a regular  attendance  on  the  different  classes  ; and 
a dispensation  for  the  cause  of  11  a just  impediment ,”  is  here  al- 
lowed to  qualify,  on  equitable  grounds,  the  rigor  of  the  law.  It 
will  not  be  contended,  that  a power  of  dispensation  allowed  for 
the  not  altogether  diligent  attendance  on  the  public  readers,  was 
meant  by  the  legislature  to  concede  a power  of  dispensing  with 
all  attendance  on  the  professorial  courses  ; nay,  of  absolutely  dis- 
pensing with  these  courses  themselves. 


424 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


There  has  been  no  subsequent  enactment,  modifying  the  Lau- 
dian  statutes  touching  the  dispensing  power  of  Convocation. 
This  house,  though  possessing  the  right  of  rescinding  old  and  of 
ratifying  new  laws,  felt  it  necessary  to  restrict  its  prerogative  of 
lightly  suspending  their  application  in  particular  cases,  in  order 
to  terminate  “ the  too  great  license  of  dispensation , which  had 
heretofore  wrought  grievous  detriment  to  the  University .”  (Corp. 
St.  T.  x.  ii.  § 5).  Accordingly,  under  the  head  of  Dispensable 
Matter,  there  is  to  be  found  nothing  to  warrant  the  supposition 
that  power  is  left  with  Convocation  of  dispensing  with  the  regular 
lectures  of  all  or  any  of  its  professors,  or  with  attendance  on  these 
lectures  by  all  or  any  of  its  scholars.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  only 
permitted,  at  the  utmost,  to  give  dispensation  to  an  ordinary  (or 
public)  reader,  who  had  been  forced  by  necessity  to  deliver  his 
lecture,  through  a substitute,  without  the  regular  authorization. 
(T.  x.  S.  ii.  § 4.) — Again,  under  the  head  of  Indispensable  Matter , 
those  cases  are  enumerated  in  which  the  indulgence  had  formerly 
been  abused.  All  defect  of  standing  (standing  at  that  time  meant 
length  of  attendance  on  the  professorial  lectures ),  all  non-perform- 
ance of  exercise,  either  before  or  after  graduation,  are  declared 
henceforward  indispensable.  But  if  the  less  important  requisites 
for  a degree,  and  in  which  a relaxation  had  previously  been  some- 
times tolerated,  are  now  rendered  imperative  ; multo  majus,  must 
the  conditions  of  paramount  importance,  such  as  delivery  of,  and 
attendance  on,  the  public  courses,  he  held  as  such — conditions,  a 
dispensation  for  which  having  never  heretofore  been  asked,  or 
granted,  or  conceived  possible,  a prospective  prohibition  of  such 
abuse  could  never,  by  the  legislature,  be  imagined  necessary.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  declared,  that  hereafter  no  alteration  is  to  be 
attempted  of  the  rules,  by  which  founders,  with  consent  of  the 
University,  had  determined  the  duties  of  the  chairs  by  them  en- 
dowed ; and  these  rules,  as  thus  modified  and  confirmed,  consti- 
tute a great  proportion  of  the  statutes'  by  which  the  system  of 
public  lectures  is  regulated.  (T.  x.  S.  ii.  § 5.) — Under  both  heads, 
a general  power  is,  indeed,  left  to  the  Chancellor,  of  allowing  the 
Hebdomadal  Meeting  to  propose  a dispensation;  but  this  only 
u from  some  necessary  and  very  urgent  cause f and  “in  cases 
which  are  not  repugnant  to  academical  discipline We  do  not 
happen  to  know,  and  can  not  at  the  moment  obtain  the  informa- 
tion, whether  there  now  is,  or  is  not,  a form  of  dispensation  passed 
in  convocation  for  the  non-delivery  of  their  lectures  by  the  public 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  425 

readers,  and  for  the  non-attendance  on  these  lectures  by  the 
students.  Nor  is  the  fact  of  the  smallest  consequence  to  the 
question.  For  either  the  statutes  are  violated  without  a dispen- 
sation, or  a dispensation  is  obtained  in  violation  of  the  statutes. 
[See  next  following  article.] 

But  as  there  is  nothing  in  the  terms  of  these  statutes,  however 
casuistically  interpreted,  to  afford  a color  for  the  monstrous  sup- 
position, that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  leave  to 
either  house  the  power  of  arbitrarily  suspending  the  whole 
mechanism  of  education  established  by  law,  that  is,  of  dispensing 
with  the  University  itself,  whereas  their  whole  tenor  is  only  sig- 
nificant as  proving  the  reverse  ; let  us  now  look  at  the  “ Epi no- 
mis,  or  explanation  of  the  oath  taken  by  all , to  observe  the  stat- 
utes of  the  University , as  to  ivhat  extent  it  is  to  be  held  binding 
in  which  the  intention  of  the  legislature,  in  relation  to  the  mat- 
ter at  issue,  is  unequivocally  declared.  This  important  article, 
intended  to  guard  against  all  sophistical  misconstruction  of  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  obligation  incurred  by  this  oath,  though 
it  has  completely  failed  in  preventing  its  violation,  renders,  at 
least,  all  palliation  impossible. 

It  is  here  declared,  that  all  are  forsworn  who  wrest  the  terms 
of  the  statutes  to  a sense  different  from  that  intended  by  the 
legislature,  or  take  the  oath  under  any  mental  reservation.  Con- 
sequently, those  are  perjured  : 1°,  who  aver  they  have  performed, 
or  do  believe,  ivhat  they  have  not  performed,  or  do  not  believe ; 
2°,  they  who,  violating  a statute,  do  not  submit  to  the  penalty 
attached  to  that  violation  ; 3°,  they  who  proceed  in  their  degrees 
without  a dispensation  for  the  non-performance  of  dispensable 
conditions,  but  much  more  they  who  thus  proceed  without  actually 
performing  those  prerequisites  which  are  indispensable.  As  to 
other  delicts”  (we  translate  literally),  “if  there  be  no  contempt, 
no  gross  and  obstinate  negligence  of  the  statutes  and  their  penal- 
ties ; and  if  the  delinquents  have  submitted  to  the  penalties  sanc- 
tioned by  the  statutes,  they  are  not  to  he  held  guilty  of  violating 
the  religious  obligation  of  their  oath.  Finally,  as  the  reverence 
due  to  their  character  exempts  the  Magistrates  of  the  Univer- 
sity from  the  common  penalties  of  other  transgressors,  so  on 
them  there  is  incumbent  a stronger  conscientious  obligation : in- 
asmuch as  they  are  hound  not  only  to  the  faithful  discharge  of 
their  own  duties,  hut  likewise  diligently  to  take  care  that  all 
others  in  like  manner  perform  theirs.  Not,  however,  that  it  is 


426 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


intended  that  every  failure  in  their  duties  should  at  once  involve 
them  in  the  crime  of  perjury.  But  since  the  keeping  and  guard- 
ianship of  the  Statutes  is  intrusted  to  their  fidelity,  if  [may  it 
never  happen !)  through  their  negligence  or  sloth,  they  suffer 
any  statutes  whatever  to  fall  into  desuetude,  and  silently,  as  it 
were , to  be  abrogated,  in  that  event  we  decree  them  guilty  op 
broken  faith  and  of  perjury.”  What  would  these  legislators 
have  said,  could  they  have  foreseen  that  these  “Reverend  Magis- 
trates of  the  University”  should  “silently  abrogate”  every  funda- 
mental statute  in  the  code  of  which  they  were  the  appointed — 
the  sworn  guardians  ? 

It  must,  as  we  observed,  have  been  powerful  motives  which 
could  induce  the  Heads  of  Houses,  originally  to  incur,  or  subse- 
quently to  tolerate,  such  opprobrium  for  themselves  and  the  Uni- 
versity ; nor  can  any  conceivable  motive  be  assigned  for  either, 
except  that  these  representatives  of  the  collegial  interest  were 
fully  aware  that  the  intrusive  system  was  not  one  for  which  a 
sanction  could  be  hoped  from  the  academical  and  civil  legislatures, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  it  was  too  advantageous  for  themselves 
not  to  be  quietly  perpetuated,  even  at  such  a price. 

We  do  not  see  how  the  Heads  could  throw  off  the  charge  of 
“broken  faith  and  perjury,”  incurred  by  their  “silent  abroga- 
tion” of  the  University  statutes,  even  allowing  them  the  plea 
which  some  low  moralists  have  advanced  in  extenuation  of  the 
perjury  committed  by  the  non-observance  of  certain  College 
statutes.1 

For,  in  the  first  place,  this  plea  supposes  that  the  observance 
of  the  violated  statute  is  manifestly  inconsistent  with  the  end  of 
the  institution,  toward  which  it  only  constituted  a mean.  Here, 
however,  it  can  not  be  alleged  that  the  statutory,  or  professorial 
system,  is  manifestly  inconsistent  with  the  ends  of  a University  ; 
seeing  that  all  Universities,  except  the  English,  employ  that 
instrument  exclusively,  and  as  the  best ; and  that  Oxford,  under 
her  new  tutorial  dispensation,  has  never  manifestly  been  the  ex- 
emplar of  academical  institutions. 

In  the  second  place,  even  admitting  the  professorial  system  to 
be  notoriously  inconvenient,  still  the  plea  supposes  that  the  in- 
convenience has  arisen  from  a change  of  circumstances  unknown 

1 Paley,  Principlex  of  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy,  b.  ii.  c.  21.  His  arguments 
would  justify  a repeal  of  such  statutes  by  public  authority,  never  their  violation  by 
private  and  interested  parties,  after  swearing  to  their  observance. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  427 


to  the  lawgiver,  and  subsequent  to  the  enactment.  But  in  the 
present  case,  the  only  change  (from  the  maturer  age  of  the  stu- 
dent) has  been  to  enhance  the  importance  of  the  professorial 
method,  and  to  diminish  the  expediency  of  the  tutorial. 

But  in  the  third  place,  such  a plea  is,  in  the  present  instance, 
incompetent  altogether.  This  is  not  the  case  of  a private  foun- 
dation, where  the  lawgiver  is  defunct.  Here  the  institution  is 
public — the  lawgiver  perpetual  ; and  he  might  at  every  moment 
have  been  interrogated  concerning  the  repeal  or  observance  of 
his  statutes.  That  lawgiver  is  the  House  of  Convocation.  The 
heads  in  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  are  constituted  the  special 
guardians  of  the  academical  statutes  and  their  observance  ; and, 
as  we  formerly  explained,  except  through  them,  no  measure  can 
he  proposed  in  Convocation  for  instituting  new  laws,  or  for  render- 
ing old  laws  available.  They  have  a ministerial,  but  no  legisla- 
tive function.  Now  the  statutory  system  of  public  teaching  fell 
into  desuetude,  either  in  opposition  to  their  ivishes  and  endeavors , 
or  ivitli  their  concurrence. 

The  former  alternative  is  impossible.  Supposing  even  the 
means  of  enforcing  the  observance  of  the  statutes  to  have  been 
found  incompetent,  it  was  their  duty  both  to  the  University  and 
to  themselves,  to  have  applied  to  the  legislative  body  for  power 
sufficient  to  enable  them  to  discharge  their  trust,  or  to  be  relieved 
of  its  responsibility.  By  law,  they  are  declared  morally  and  relig- 
iously responsible  for  the  due  observance  of  the  statutes.  No 
body  of  men  would,  without  inducement,  sit  down  under  the 
brand  of  “violated  faith  and  perjury.”  Now  this  inducement 
must  have  been  either  a public , or  a private  advantage.  Public 
it  could  not  have  been.  There  is  no  imaginable  reason,  if  the 
professorial  system  were  found  absolutely  or  comparatively  use- 
less, why  its  abolition  or  degradation  should  not  have  been  openly 
moved  in  Convocation ; and  why,  if  the  tutorial  system  were 
calculated  to  accomplish  all  the  ends  of  academical  instruction, 
it  should  either  at  first  have  crept  to  its  ascendency  through  per- 
jury and  treason,  or  after  approving  its  sufficiency,  have  still 
only  enjoyed  its  monopoly  by  precarious  toleration,  and  never 
demanded  its  ratification  on  the  ground  of  public  utility.  If  the 
new  system  were  superior  to  the  old,  why  hesitate  to  proclaim 
that  the  academical  instruments  were  changed  ? If  Oxford  were 
now  singular  in  perfection,  why  delusively  pretend  that  her  me- 
thods were  still  those  of  Universities  in  general  ? It  was  only 


428  " 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. 


necessary  that  the  heads  either  brought  themselves,  or  allowed  to 
be  brought  by  others,  a measure  into  Convocation  to  repeal  the 
obsolete  and  rude,  and  to  legitimate  the  actual  and  improved. 

But  as  the  heads  never  consented  that  this  anomalous  state  of 
gratuitous  perjury  and  idle  imposition  should  cease,  we  are  driven 
to  the  other  alternative  of  supposing,  that  in  the  transition  from 
fhe  statutory  to  the  illegal,  the  change  was  originally  determined, 
and  subsequently  maintained,  not  because  the  surreptitious  sys- 
tem was  conducive  to  the  public  ends  of  the  University,  but 
because  it  was  expedient  for  the  interest  of  those  private  corpo- 
rations, by  whom  this  venerable  establishment  has  been  so  long 
latterly  administered.  The  collegial  bodies  and  their  heads  were 
not  ignorant  of  its  imperfections,  and  too  prudent  to  hazard  their 
discussion.  They  were  not  to  be  informed  that  their  policy  was 
to  enjoy  what  they  had  obtained,  in  thankfulness  and  silence ; 
not  to  risk  the  loss  of  the  possession  by  an  attempt  to  found  it 
upon  right.  They  could  not  but  be  conscious,  that  should  they 
even  succeed  in  obtaining — what  was  hardly  to  be  expected — a 
ratification  of  their  usurpations  from  an  academical  legislature, 
educated  under  their  auspices,  and  strongly  biassed  by  their  in- 
fluence, they  need  never  expect  that  the  State  would  tolerate, 
that  those  exclusive  privileges  conceded  to  her  graduates , when 
Oxford  was  a University  in  which  cdl  the  faculties  to  ere  fully 
and  competently  taught , should  he  continued  to  her  graduates , 
when  Oxford  no  longer  afforded  the  public  instruction  necessary 
for  a degree  in  any  faculty  at  all.  The  very  agitation  of  the 
subject  would  have  been  a signal  for  the  horrors  of  a Visitation. 

The  strictures,  which  a conviction  of  their  truth,  and  our  in- 
terest in  the  honor  and  utility  of  this  venerable  school,  have  con- 
strained us  to  make  on  the  conduct  of  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting, 
we  mainly  apply  to  the  heads  of  houses  of  a former  generation, 
and  even  to  them  solely  in  their  corporative  capacity.  Of  the 
late  and  present  members  of  this  body,  we  are  happy  to  acknowl- 
edge, that,  during  the  last  twenty-five  years,  so  great  an  im- 
provement has  been  effected  through  their  influence,  that  in  some 
essential  points  Oxford  may,  not  unworthily,  be  proposed  as  a 
pattern  to  most  other  Universities.  But  this  improvement,  though 
important,  is  partial,  and  can  only  receive  its  adequate  develop- 
ment by  a return  to  the  statutory  combination  of  the  professorial 
and  tutorial  systems.  That  this  combination  is  implied  in  the 
constitution  of  a perfect  University,  is  even  acknowledged  by  the 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CORRUPTION— COLLEGIAL  INTEREST.  429 

most  intelligent  individuals  of  the  collegial  interest — by  the  ablest 
champions  of  the  tutorial  discipline  d such  an  opinion  can  not, 
however,  he  expected  to  induce  a majority  of  the  collegial  bodies 
voluntarily  to  surrender  the  monopoly  they  have  so  long  enjoyed, 
and  to  descend  to  a subordinate  situation,  after  having  occupied 
a principal.  All  experience  proves,  that  Universities,  like  other 
corporations,  can  only  be  reformed  from  without.  “ Voila,”  says 
Crevier,  speaking  of  the  last  attempt  at  a reform  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Paris  by  itself — “voila  a quoi  aboutirent  tant  de  projets, 
tant  de  deliberations  : et  cette  nouvelle  tentative,  aussi  infruc- 
tueuse  que  les  precedentes,  rend  de  plus  en  plus  visible  la  maxime 
claire  en  soi , que  les  campagnies  ne  se  reforment  point  elles- 
memes , et  qu’une  entreprise  de  reforme  oil  nHntervient  point  une 
autorite  superieure,  est  une  entreprise  manquee 2 A Committee 
of  Visitation  has  lately  terminated  its  labors  on  the  Scottish  Uni- 
versities : we  should  anticipate  a more  important  result  from  a 
similar,  and  far  more  necessary,  inquiry  into  the  corruptions  of 
those  of  England. 


1 Copplestone’s  Reply  to  the  Calumnies,  &c.  p.  146. 

2 Histoire  de  I’Universite  de  Paris,  t.  vi.  p.  370. 


Y.-ON  THE  STATE  OF  THE  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES, 
WITH  MORE  ESPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  OXFORD. 
(SUPPLEMENTAL.) 


(December,  1831.) 

The  Legality  of  the  present  Academical  System  of  the  University 
of  Oxford , asserted  against  the  new  Calumnies  of  the  Edin- 
burgh Revieiu.  By  a Member  of  Convocation.  8vo.  Oxford  ; 
1831. 

In  a recent  Number  we  took  occasion  to  signalize  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  abuses  upon  record.  We  allude  to  our  article 
on  the  English  Universities.  Even  in  this  country,  hitherto  the 
paradise  of  jobs,  the  lawless  usurpation  of  which  these  venerable 
establishments  have  been  the  victims,  from  the  magnitude  of  the 
evil,  and  the  whole  character  of  the  circumstances  under  which 
it  was  consummated,  stands  pre-eminent  and  alone.  With  more 
immediate  reference  to  Oxford  (though  Cambridge  is  not  behind 
hand  in  the  delict),  it  is  distinguished,  at  once,  for  the  extent  to 
which  the  most  important  interests  of  the  public  have  been  sacri- 
ficed to  private  advantage — for  the  unhallowed  disregard,  shown 
in  its  accomplishment,  of  every  moral  and  religious  bond — for 
the  sacred  character  of  the  agents  through  whom  the  unholy 
treason  was  perpetrated — for  the  systematic  perjury  which  it 
has  naturalized  in  this  great  seminary  of  religious  education — 
for  the  apathy,  wherewith  the  injustice  has  been  tolerated  by  the 
State,  the  impiety  by  the  Church' — nay,  even  for  the  unacquaint- 


1 The  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  possesses,  jure  mctropolitico,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
inferior  diocesans,  the  right  of  ordinary  visitation  of  the  two  Universities,  in  all  mat- 
ters of  heresy,  schism,  and,  in  general,  of  religious  concernment.  English  Bishops 
have  been  always  anti-reformers  ; and  in  the  present  instance  they  may  have  closed 


OCCASION  OF  WRITING— STATE  OF  THE  QUESTION.  431 

ance,  so  universally  manifested,  with  so  flagrant  a corruption. 
The  history  of  the  University  of  Oxford  demonstrates  "by  a mem- 
orable example  : — That  bodies  of  men  will  unscrupulously  carry 
through,  what  individuals  would  blush  even  to  attempt ; and  that 
the  clerical  profession,  the  obligation  of  a trust,  the  sanctity  of 
oaths,  afford  no  security  for  the  integrity  of  functionaries,  able 
with  impunity  to  violate  their  public  duty,  and  with  a private 
interest  in  its  violation. 

In  being  the  first  to  denounce  the  illegality  of  the  state  of  this 
great  national  school,  and,  in  particular,  to  expose  the  heads  of 
the  Collegial  interest  as  those  by  whom,  and  for  whose  ends,  this 
calamitous  revolution  was  effected,  we  were  profoundly  conscious 
of  the  gravity  of  the  charge,  and  of  the  responsibility  which  we 
incurred  in  making  it.  Nothing,  indeed,  could  have  engaged  us 
in  the  cause,  but  the  firmest  conviction  of  the  punctual  accuracy 
of  our  statement — and  the  strong,  bujt  disinterested,  wish  to  co- 
operate in  restoring  this  noble  University  to  its  natural  pre-emi- 
nence, by  relieving  it  from  the  vampire  oppression,  under  which 
it  has  pined  so  long  in  almost  lifeless  exhaustion. 

But  though  without  anxiety  about  attack,  we  should  certainly 
have  been  surprised  had  there  been  no  attempt  at  refutation. 
It  is  the  remark  of  Hobbes  : — “ If  this  proposition — the  three 
angles  of  a triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles — ha’d  been 
opposed  to  the  advantage  of  those  in  authority,  it  would  long  ago 
have  been  denounced  as  heresy  or  high  treason.”  The  opinions 
of  men  in  general  are  only  the  lackeys  of  their  interest : and  with 
so  many  so  deeply  interested  in  its  support,  the  present  profitable 
system  of  corruption  could  not,  in  Oxford,  find  any  scarcity  of, 
at  least,  willing  champions.  At  the  same  time  it  is  always  bet- 
ter, in  speaking  to  the  many,  to  say  something,  should  it  signify 
nothing,  than  to  he  found  to  say  nothing  at  all.  Add  to  this, 
that  the  partisans  of  the  actual  system  had  of  late  years  shown 
themselves  so  prompt  in  repelling  the  most  trivial  objurgations, 
that  silence,  when  the  authors  of  that  system  were  accused  of  the 
weightiest  offenses,  and  the  system  itself  articulately  displayed 
as  one  glaring  scheme  of  usurpation  and  absurdity,  would  have 
been  tantamount  to  an  overt  confession  of  the  allegation  itself. 
If  our  incidental  repetition  of  the  old  bye-word  of  “ Oxonian 

their  eyes  on  its  perjury,  by  finding  that  the  illegal  system,  in  bestowing  on  the  Col- 
lege Fellows  the  monopoly  of  education,  bestowed  it  exclusively  on  the  Church. 
Before  this  usurpation  the  clergy  only  had  their  share  of  the  University. 


432 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 


Latin,'’'1'  brought  down  on  us  more  than  one  indignant  refutation 
of  the  “ calumny our  formal  charge  of  Illegality,  Treason, 
Perjury,  and  Corruption  could  not  remain  unanswered,  unless 
those  who  yesterday  were  so  sensitive  to  the  literary  glory  of 
Oxford,  were  to-day  wholly  careless  not  only  of  that,  but  even  of 
its  moral  and  religious  respectability ; — “ Diligentius  studentes 
loqui  quam  vivere.” 

But  how  was  an  answer  to  be  made  ? This  was  either  easy 
or  impossible.  If  our  statements  were  false,  they  could  be  at 
once  triumphantly  refuted,  by  contrasting  them  with  a few  short 
extracts  from  the  Statutes ; and  the  favorable  opinion  of  a 
respectable  Lawyer  would  have  carried  as  general  a persuasion 
of  the  legality  of  the  actual  system,  as  the  want  of  it  is  sure  to 
carry  of  its  illegality.  In  these  circumstances,  satisfied  that  no 
lawyer  could  be  found  to  pledge  his  reputation  in  support  of  the 
legality  of  so  unambiguous  a violation  of  every  statute,  and  that, 
without  such  a professional  opinion,  every  attempt,  even  at  a 
plausible  reply,  would  be  necessarily  futile ; we  hardly  hoped 
that  the  advocates  of  the  present  order  of  things  would  be  so  ill- 
advised  as  to  attempt  a defense,  which  could  only  terminate  in 
corroborating  the  charge.  We  attributed  to  them  a more  wily 
tactic.  The  sequel  of  our  discussion  (in  which  we  proposed  to 
consider  in  detail  the  comparative  merits  of  the  statutory  and 
illegal  systems,  and  to  suggest  some  means  of  again  elevating  the 
University  to  what  it  ought  to  be),  might  be  expected  to  afford 
a wider  field  for  controversy ; and  we  anticipated,  that  the  objec- 
tion of  illegality,  now  allowed  to  pass,  would  be  ultimately  slurred 
over,  a reply  to  our  whole  argument  being  pretended  under  covert 
of  answering  a part. 

We  were  agreeably  mistaken.  The  bulky  pamphlet  at  the 
head  of  this  article  has  recently  appeared  ; and  we  have  to  ten- 
der our  best  acknowledgments  to  its  author,  for  the  aid  he  has  so 
effectually  afforded  against  the  cause  he  intentionally  supports. 

1 Julius  C^sar  Scaliger  Be  Subtilitate,  Exerc.  xvi.  2 — “ Loquar  ergo  meo  more, 
barlarc  et  ab  Oxoniog  and  honest  Anthony  admits  that  “ Oxonicnsis  loquendi  mos'’ 
was  thus  proverbially  used. — Speaking  of  Scaliger  and  Oxford,  we  may  notice  that, 
from  a passage  in  the  same  work  (Exerc.  xeix.),  it  clearly  appears  that  this  transcend- 
ent genius  may  be  claimed  by  Oxford,  as  among  her  sons.  “Lutetise  aut  Oxonii, 
modica  induti  togula,  hyemes  non  solum  ferre,  sed  etiam  frangere  didicimus .”  The 
importance  of  this  curious  discovery,  unsuspected  by  Scioppius,  and  contradictory  of 
what  Joseph  Scaliger  and  all  others  have  asserted  and  believed  of  the  early  life  of  his 
father,  will  be  appreciated  by  those  interested  in  the  mysterious  biography  of  this 
( prince  or  impostor)  illustrious  philosopher  and  critic. 


OCCASION  OP  WRITING— STATE  OP  THE  QUESTION. 


433 


This  “ Assertion  (the  word  is  happily  appropriate  !)  of  the  Legal- 
ity of  the  present  academical  system  of  Oxford ” manifests  two 
things : — How  unanswerable  are  our  statements,  when  the  oppo- 
nent, who  comes  forward  professing  to  refute  the  “ new  and 
unheard-of  calumny,”  never  once  ventures  to  look  them  in  the 
face ; and,  How  intensely  felt  by  the  Collegial  interest  must  he 
the  necessity  of  a reply — a reply  at  all  hazards — when  a Mem- 
ber of  the  Venerable  House  of  Convocation  could  stoop  to  such 
an  attempt  at  delusion,  as  the  present  semblance  of  an  answer 
exhibits. 

It  may  sound  like  paradox  to  say,  that  this  pamphlet  is  no 
answer  to  our  paper,  and  yet,  that  we  are  hound  to  accord  it  a 
reply.  But  so  it  is.  Considered  merely  in  reference  to  the 
points  maintained  by  us,  we  have  no  interest  in  disproving  its 
statements  : for  it  is,  in  truth,  no  more  a rejoinder  to  our  reason- 
ing, than  to  the  Principia  of  Newton.  Nay  less.  For,  in  fact, 
our  whole  proof  of  the  illegality  of  the  present  order  of  things  in 
Oxford,  and  of  the  treachery  of  the  College  Heads,  would  he 
invalidated,  were  the  single  proposition,  which  our  pretended 
antagonist  so  ostentatiously  vindicates  against  us,  not  accurately 
true.  Ve  admit,  that  if  we  held  what  he  refutes  as  ours,  our 
positions  would  he  not  only  false,  hut  foolish  ; nay,  that  if  we 
had  not  established  the  very  converse,  as  the  beginning,  middle, 
and  end  of  our  whole  argument,  this  argument  would  not  only  he 
unworthy  of  an  elaborate  answer,  but  of  any  serious  considera- 
tion at  all.  It  is  a vulgar  artifice  to  misrepresent  an  adversary, 
to  gain  the  appearance  of  refuting  him  ; but  never  was  this  con- 
temptible manoeuvre  so  impudently  and  systematically  practiced. 
In  so  far  as  it  has  any  reference  to  our  reasoning,  the  whole 
pamphlet  is  from  first  to  last,  just  a deliberate  reversal  of  all  our 
statements.  Its  sophistry  (the  word  is  too  respectable)  is  not  an 
ignoratio , hut  a mulatto,  elenclii ; of  which  the  lofty  aim  is  to 
impose  on  the  simplicity  of  those  readers  who  may  rely  on  the 
veracity  of  “A  Member  of  Convocation,”  and  are  unacquainted 
with  the  paper,  the  arguments  of  which  he  professes  to  state  and 
to  refute.  Under  so  creditable  a name,  never  was  there  a more 
discreditable  performance  ; for  we  are  unable  even  to  compliment 
the  author’s  intentions  at  the  expense  of  his  talent.  The  plain 
scope  of  the  publication  is  to  defend  perjury  by  imposture ; and 
its  contents  are  one  tissue  of  disingenuous  concealments,  false 
assertions,  forged  quotations,  and  infuriate  railing.  In  its  way, 

E E 


434  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

certainly,  it  is  unique  ; and  we  can  safely  recommend  it  to  the 
curious  as  a bibliographical  singularity,  being  perhaps  the  only 
example  of  a work,  in  which,  from  the  first  page  to  the  last,  it  is 
impossible  to  find  a sentence,  not  either  irrelevant  or  untrue. 

But  though  a reply  on  our  part  would  thus  be — not  a Refuta- 
tion but  an  Exposure;  a reply,  for  that  very  reason,  we  consider 
imperative.  It  forms  a principal  feature  of  the  Assertor’s  scheme 
of  delusion  to  accuse  us  of  deceit  (and  deceit,  amounting  to 
knavery,  must  certainly  adhere  to  one  party  or  the  other)  ; yet, 
though  he  has  failed  in  convicting  us  even  of  the  most  unim- 
portant error,  many  readers,  we  are  aware,  might  be  found  to 
accord  credence  to  averments  so  positively  made,  to  set  down  to 
honest  indignation  the  virulence  of  his  abuse,  and  to  mistake  his 
effrontery  for  good  faith.  Were  it  also  matter  of  reasoning  in 
which  the  fallacy  was  attempted,  we  might  leave  its  detection  to 
the  sagacity  of  the  reader ; but  it  is  in  matter  of  fact , of  which 
we  may  well  presume  him  ignorant.  Aggressors,  too,  in  the 
attack,  the  present  is  not  a controversy  in  which  we  can  silently 
allow  our  accuracy,  far  less  our  intentions,  to  be  impugned  by 
any.  To  establish,  likewise,  the  illegality  and  self-admitted  in- 
competence of  the  present  academical  system,  is  to  establish  the 
preliminary  of  all  improvement — the  necessity  of  change.  While 
happy,  therefore,  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  occasion  in  adding  to 
our  former  demonstration  of  this  all-important  point ; we  are  not, 
of  course,  averse  from  manifesting  how  impotent,  at  once,  and 
desperate,  are  the  efforts  which  have  been  made  to  invalidate  its 
conclusions.  These  considerations  have  moved  us  to  bestow  on 
the  matter  of  this  pamphlet  an  attention  we  should  not  assuredly 
have  accorded  to  its  merits.  And  as  our  reply  is  nothing  but  a 
manifestation  of  the  contrast  between  the  statements  actually 
made  by  us,  and  those  refuted,  as  ours,  by  our  opponent;  we 
are  thus  compelled  to  recapitulate  the  principal  momenta  of  our 
argument,  of  which  we  must  not  presume  that  our  readers 
retain  an  adequate  recollection.  Necessity  must,  therefore,  be 
our  excuse  for  again  returning  on  a discussion,  not  less  irksome 
to  ourselves  than  others ; but  we  are  reconciled  to  it  by  the  con- 
sideration, that  though  we  have  no  errors  to  correct,  we  have  thus 
the  opportunity  of  supplying,  on  this  important  subject,  some  not 
unimportant  omissions. 

Our  former  paper  was  intended  to  prove  three  great  proposi- 
tions.— I.  That  the  present  academical  system  of  Oxford  is  ille- 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION— ILLEGALITY. 


435 


gal.  II.  That  it  was  surreptitiously  intruded  into  the  Univer- 
sity, by  the  heads  of  the  collegial  interest , for  private  ends.  III. 
That  it  is  virtually  acknowledged  to  be  wholly  inadequate  to 
accomplish  the  purposes  of  a University , even  by  members  of  that 
interest,  through  whose  influence,  and  for  whose  advantage,  it  is 
maintained. 

I.  In  illustration  of  the  first  proposition,  we  showed  that  the 
University  of  Oxford  is  a public  instrument,  privileged  by  the 
nation  for  the  accomplishment  of  certain  public  purposes ; and 
that,  for  the  more  secure  and  appropriate  performance  of  its  func- 
tions, a power  of  self-legislation  is  delegated  to  the  great  body 
of  its  graduates,  composing  the  House  of  Convocation.  The 
resolutions  of  this  assembly  alone,  or  with  concurrence  of  the 
Crown,  form  the  Academical  Statutes,  and  the  statutes  exclusive- 
ly determine  the  legal  constitution  of  the  University.  The  whole 
academical  statutes  now  in  force  (with  one  or  two  passed,  we 
believe,  since  1826),  are  collected  and  published  in  the  Corpus 
Statutorum  with  its  Appendix,  and  in  its  Addenda;  the  subse- 
quent statute  of  courses,  explaining,  modifying,  or  rescinding  the 
antecedent. 

Looking,  therefore,  to  the  Statutes,  and  the  whole  statutes,1  we 
showed,  that  there  were  tivo  academical  systems  to  he  distin- 
guished in  Oxford — a legal  and  an  illegal ; and  that  no  two 
systems  could  he  more  universally  and  diametrically  opposed. 

In  the  former , the  end , for  the  sake  of  which  the  University  is 
privileged  by  the  nation,  and  that  consequently  imperatively  pre- 
scribed by  the  statutes,  is  to  afford  public  education  in  the  facul- 
ties of  Theology,  Law,  Medicine,  and  Arts  (to  say  nothing  of  the 
science  of  Music),  and  to  certify,  by  the  grant  of  a degree — that 

1 As  not  sanctioned  by  Convocation,  the  illegality  of  the  present  system  is  fla- 
grant. But  had  it  been  so  sanctioned,  it  would  still  be  fundamentally  illegal ; as  that 
body  would  have  thus  transcended  its  powers,  by  frustrating  the  ends,  for  the-  sake  of 
which  alone  it  was  clothed  with  legislative  authority  at  all.  The  public  privileges 
accorded  (by  'King  or  Parliament,  it  matters  not)  to  the  education  and  degrees  of  a 
University,  are  not  granted  for  the  private  behoof  of  the  individuals  in  whom  the  Uni- 
versity is  realized.  They  are  granted  solely,  for  the  public  good,  to  the  instruction 
of  certain  bodies  organized  under  public  authority,  and  to  their  certificate  of  proficien- 
cy, under  conditions  by  that  authority  prescribed.  If  these  bodies  have  obtained,  to 
any  extent,  the  right  of  self-legislation,  it  is  only  as  delegates  of  the  state  ; and  this 
right  could  only  be  constitutionally  exercised  by  them  in  subservience  to  the  public 
good,  for  the  interest  of  which  alone  the  University  was  constituted  and  privileged, 
and  this  power  of  legislation  itself  delegated  to  its  members.  If  an  academical  legis- 
lature abolish  academical  education,  and  academical  trials  of  proficiency  in  the  differ- 
ent faculties,  it  commits  suicide,  and  as  such,  the  act  is  ipso  facto,  illegal.  In  the 
case  of  Oxford,  Convocation  has  not  been  thus  felo  de  se. 


436  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL). 

this  education  had  in  any  of  these  faculties  been  effectually  re- 
ceived.— In  the  latter , degrees  are  still  ostensibly  accorded  in  all 
the  faculties,  but  they  are  now  empty,  or  rather  delusive,  dis- 
tinctions ; for  the  only  education  at  present  requisite  for  all  de- 
grees, is  the  private  tuition  afforded  by  the  colleges  in  the  ele- 
mentary department  of  the  lowest  faculty  alone.  Of  ten  degrees 
still  granted  in  Oxford,  all  are  given  contrary  to  statute,  and  nine 
are  in  law  and  reason  utterly  worthless. 

In  the  former,  it  is,  of  course,  involved  as  a condition , that  the 
candidate  for  a degree  shall  have  spent  an  adequate  time  in  the 
university  in  prosecution  of  his  public  studies  in  that  faculty  in 
which  he  proposes  to  graduate. — In  the  latter , when  the  statutory 
education  in  the  higher  faculties,  and  the  higher  department  of 
the  lowest,  was  no  longer  afforded,  this  relative  condition,  though 
indispensable  by  law,  is  converted  into  empty  standing. 

The  former,  as  its  principal  mean , employs  in  every  faculty  a 
co-operative  body  of  select  Professors,  publicly  teaching  in  con- 
formity to  statutory  regulation. — The  latter  (in  which  the  wretched 
remnant  of  professorial  instruction  is  a mere  hors  d?  oeuvre)  aban- 
dons the  petty  fragment  of  private  education  it  precariously 
affords,  as  a perquisite,  to  the  incapacity  of  an  individual,  Fellow 
by  chance,  and  Tutor  by  usurpation. 

To  conceive  the  full  extent  of  the  absurdity  thus  occasioned,  it 
must  be  remembered,  that  no  universities  are  so  highly  privileged 
by  any  country  as  the  English ; and  that  no  country  is  now  so 
completely  defrauded  of  the  benefits,  for  the  sake  of  which  aca- 
demical privileges  were  ever  granted,  as  England.  England  is 
the  only  Christian  country  where  the  Parson,  if  he  reach  the  uni- 
versity at  all,  receives  only  the  same  minimum  of  Theological 
tuition  as  the  Squire ; — the  only  civilized  country,  where  the 
degree,  which  confers  on  the  Jurist  a strict  monopoly  of  practice 
is  conferred  without  either  instruction  or  examination  ; — the  only 
country  in  the  world,  where  the  Physician  is  turned  loose  upon 
society,  with  extraordinary  and  odious  privileges,  but  without 
professional  education,  or  even  the  slightest  guarantee  for  his 
skill.”  1 

II.  In  proof  of  the  second  proposition  we  showed — how,  in 


1 We  doubt  extremely,  whether  the  Fellows  of  the  London  College  of  Physicians 
could  make  good  their  privileges,  if  opposed  on  the  ground  that,  by  the  statutes  of  the 
universities  themselves,  not  one  of  them  has  legal  right  to  a degree.  A word  to  the 
wise. 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION — COLLEGES. 


437 


subordination  to  the  University,  the  Collegial  interest  arose ; — 
how  it  became  possessed  of  the  means  of  superseding  the  organ 
of  which  it  was  the  accident ; — and  what  advantage  it  obtained 
in  accomplishing  this  usurpation. 

We  traced  how  Colleges  in  general,  as  establishments  for  habi- 
tation, aliment,  and  subsidiary  instruction,  sprang  up  in  connec- 
tion with  almost  all  the  older  Universities  throughout  Europe. 
The  continental  colleges  were  either  so  constituted,  as  to  form, 
at  last,  an  advantageous  alliance  with  the  University,  under  the 
control  of  which  the  whole  system  of  collegial  instruction  always 
remained ; or  they  declined  and  fell,  so  soon  as  they  proved  no 
longer  useful  in  their  subsidiary  capacity.  The  English  Colleges 
on  the  other  hand,  were  founded  less  for  education  than  aliment; 
were  not  subjected  to  the  regulation  of  the  university,  with  which 
they  were  never  able,  and  latterly  unwilling,  to  co-operate  effectu- 
ally ; and  their  fellowships  were  bestowed  without  the  obligation 
of  instructing,  and  for  causes  which  had  seldom  a relation  to 
literary  desert.  We  showed  how  the  colleges  of  Oxford,  few  in 
numbers,  and  limited  in  accommodation,  for  many  centuries  ad- 
mitted only  those  who  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  their  foundations ; 
while  the  great  majority  of  the  academical  youth  inhabited  the 
Halls  (houses  privileged  and  visited  by  the  university),  under  the 
superintendence  of  principals  elected  by  their  own  members. 

The  crisis  of  the  Reformation  occasioned  a temporary  decline 
of  the  University,  and  a consequent  suspension  of  the  Halls  ; the 
Colleges,  multiplied  in  numbers,  were  enabled  to  extend  their 
circuit ; though  not  the  intention  of  the  act,  the  restoration  of  the 
halls  was  frustrated  by  an  arbitrary  stretch  of  power  ; the  Col- 
leges succeeded  in  collecting  nearly  the  whole  scholars  of  the 
University  within  their  walls  ; and  the  Fellows,  in  usurping  from 
the  other  graduates  the  new,  and  then  insignificant,  office  of 
Tutor.  At  the  same  time,  through  the  personal  ambition  of  two 
all-powerful  statesmen  the  Chancellors  Leicester  and  Laud  (with 
the  view  of  subjecting  the  university  to  a body  easily  governed 
by  themselves),  the  Heads  of  Houses  were  elevated  to  a new  and 
unconstitutional  pre-eminence.  By  the  former,  in  spite  of  every 
legitimate  opposition,  these  creatures  of  accident  and  private  favor 
were  raised  to  the  rank  of  a public  academical  body ; and,  along 
with  the  Doctors  of  the  three  higher  faculties,  and  the  two  Proc- 
tors, constituted  into  an  assembly,  to  which  the  prior  discussion 
was  conceded  of  all  measures  to  be  proposed  in  Convocation.  By 


438  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

the  latter,  an  absolute  initiative,  with  other  important  powers,  was, 
by  the  exclusion  of  the  Doctors,  given  and  limited  to  the  Heads 
and  Proctors , a body  which,  from  its  weekly  diets,  has  obtained 
the  name  of  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting' ; and  to  obviate  resistance 
to  this  arbitrary  subjection  of  the  University  to  this  upstart  and 
anomalous  authority,  the  measure  was  virtually  forced  upon  the 
House  of  Convocation  by  royal  statute.  The  College  Heads  were 
now  the  masters  of  the  University.  They  were  sworn , indeed,  to 
guarantee  the  observance  of  the  laws,  and  to  provide  for  their 
progressive  melioration.  But,  if  content  to  violate  their  obliga- 
tions, with  their  acquiescence  every  statute  might  be  abrogated 
by  neglect,  and  without  their  consent  no  reform  or  improvement 
could  be  attempted. 

Such  a body  was  incapable  of  fulfilling — was  even  incapable 
of  not  violating — its  public  trust.  Raised,  in  general,  by  accident 
to  their  situation,  the  Heads,  as  a body,  had  neither  the  lofty 
motives,  nor  the  comprehensive  views,  which  could  enable  them 
adequately  to  discharge  their  arduous  duty  to  the  University. 
They  were  irresponsible  for  their  inability  or  bad  faith — for  what 
they  did  or  for  what  they  did  not  perform ; while  public  opinion 
was  long  too  feeble  to  control  so  numerous  a body,  and  too  unen- 
lightened to  take  cognizance  of  their  unobtrusive  usurpations. 
At  the  same  time,  their  interests  were  placed  in  strong  and  direct 
hostility  to  their  obligations. — Personally  they  were  interested 
in  allowing  nobody  in  the  University  to  transcend  the  level  of 
their  own  mediocrity  ; and  a body  of  able  and  efficient  Professors 
would  have  at  once  mortified  their  self-importance,  and  occasioned 
their  inevitable  degradation  from  the  unnatural  eminence  to  which 
accident  had  raised  them.  Conceive  the  Oxford  Heads  predomi- 
nating over  a senate  of  professors  like  those  of  Gfoettingen  or 
Berlin  ! — Add  to  this,  that  the  efficiency  of  the  public  instructors 
would  have  again  occasioned  a concourse  of  students  far  beyond 
the  means  of  accommodation  afforded  by  the  Colleges  ; and  either 
the  Halls  must  be  revived,  and  the  authority  of  the  Heads  divided, 
or  the  principle  of  domestic  superintendence  must  be  relaxed,  on 
which,  however,  their  whole  influence  depended. — As  representa- 
tives of  the  collegial  interest , they  were  also  naturally  hostile  to 
the  system  of  public  instruction.  If  the  standard  of  professorial 
competence  were  high  in  the  faculty  of  Arts,  the  standard  of 
tutorial  competence  could  never  be  reduced  to  the  average  capacity 
of  the  fellows  ; whose  monopoly  even  of  subsidiary  education 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION— COLLEGES. 


439 


would  thus  he  frustrated  in  the  colleges.  And  if  the  professorial 
system  remained  effective  in  the  Higher  Faculties,  it  would  he 
impossible  to  supersede  it  in  the  lower  department  of  the  lowest, 
in  which  alone  the  tutorial  discipline  could  supply  its  place  ; and 
the  attempt  of  the  Colleges  to  raise  their  education  from  a sub- 
sidiary to  a principal  in  the  University,  would  thus  be  baffled. — 
Again,  if  the  University  remained  effective,  and  residence  in  all 
the  faculties  enforced,  the  colleges  would  be  filled  by  a crowd  of 
Graduates,  not  only  emancipated  from  tutorial  discipline,  but 
rivals  even  of  the  fellows  in  the  office  of  tutor  ; while,  at  the  same 
time,  the  restoration  of  the  Halls  could,  in  these  circumstances, 
hardly  be  evaded. — All  these  inconveniences  and  dangers  would 
however  be  obviated,  and  profitably  obviated,  if  standing  on  the 
College  books  were  allowed  to  count  for  statutory  residence  in  the 
University.  By  this  expedient,  not  only  could  the  professorships 
in  all  the  faculties  be  converted  into  sinecures — the  Colleges  filled 
exclusively  by  students  paying  tutors1  fees  to  the  fellows — and 
the  academical  population  reduced  to  the  accommodation  furnished 
by  the  existing  houses ; but  (what  we  have  failed  formerly  to 
notice)  a revenue  of  indefinite  amount  might  be  realized  to  the 
Colleges,  by  taxing  standing  on  their  books  with  the  dues  exigible 
from  actual  residence.1 

Through  the  agency  of  its  Heads,  the  collegial  interest  accom- 
plished its  usurpation.  Public  education  in  the  Four  Faculties 
was  reduced  to  private  instruction  in  the  loiver  department  of  the 
lowest ; and  this,  again,  brought  dozen  to  the  individual  incapa- 
city of  every  Fellow-Tutor. — The  following  we  state  in  supple- 
ment of  our  more  general  exposition. 

In  th q first  place,  this  was  effected  by  converting  the  professo- 
rial system  of  instruction , through  which,  as  its  necessary  mean, 
the  University  legally  accomplishes  the  ends  prescribed  to  it  by 
law,  into  an  unimportant  accident  in  the  academical  constitution. 

To  this  end,  the  professorial  system  was  mutilated. — Public 
instruction  was  more  particularly  obnoxious  to  the  collegial  inter - 

f The  last  Oxford  Calendar  is  before  us.  The  number  of  under-graduates  is  not 
given,  and  we  have  not  patience  to  count  them  ; but  we  shall  be  considerably  above 
the  mark  in  estimating  them  at  1548,  i.  e.  the  number  given  by  the  matriculations  for 
the  year  multiplied  by  4.  The  whole  members  on  the  books  amount  to  5258.  Deduct- 
ing the  former  from  the  latter,-  there  remain  of  members  not  astricted  to  residence, 
3710.  Averaging  the  Battel  dues  paid  by  each  at  thirty  shillings,  there  results  an 
annual  income  from  this  source  alone  of  £5565  (and  it  is  much  more),  to  be  distri- 
buted among  the  houses,  for  the  improvement  of  headships,  fellowships,  the  purchase 
of  livings,  &c. 


440  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 


est  in  the  Faculty  of  Arts  ; and  four  chairs,  established  by  the 
University  in  that  Faculty,  were,  without  the  consent  of  the 
University  asked  or  obtained,  abolished  by  the  Hebdomadal  Meet- 
ing. The  salaries  of  the  Professorships  of  Grammar,  Rhetoric, 
Logic,  and  Metaphysic,  thus  illegally  suppressed,  were  paid  by 
the  Proctors  out  of  certain  statutory  exactions  ; and  we  shall  state 
our  reasons  for  suspecting  that  their  acquiescence  in  this  and 
other  similar  acts,  was  purchased  by  their  colleagues,  the  Heads 
of  Houses,  allowing  these  functionaries  to  appropriate  the  salaries 
to  themselves.  The  Proctors  hung  more  loosely  on  the  collegial 
interest  than  the  other  members  of  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting ; 1 
and  as  their  advantage  was  less  immediately  involved  in  the  sup- 
pression of  the  professorial  system,  it  required,  we  may  suppose, 
some  positive  inducement  to  secure  their  thorough-going  subser- 
vience to  the  crooked  policy  of  the  Heads.  We  know  too,  that 
the  emolument  of  their  office,  allowed  by  law,  is  just  three  pounds 
six  shillings,  sterling  money ; while  we  also  know,  that  its  emol- 
ument, though  not  revealed  in  the  calendar,  is,  in  reality,  sufficient 
to  call  up  a wealthy  incumbent  from  the  country  to  the  perform- 
ance of  its  irksome  duties.  We  have  also  the  analogy  of  another 
chair  which  was  certainly  sequestrated  for  their  profit.  The 
history  of  this  job  is  edifying.  The  Professorship  of  Moral  Philos- 
ophy was,  in  1621,  endowed  by  Dr.  Thomas  White,  under  strict 
conditions  for  securing  the  efficiency  of  the  chair  ; these  were 
ratified  by  Convocation,  and  declared  by  law  to  be  inviolable. 
And  “ that  individuals  every  way  competent  (viros  undequaque 
pares)  to  this  readership  may  always  be  appointed,”  he  intrusted 
(fond  man  !)  the  election  to  these  members  of  the  (future)  Heb- 
domadal Meeting,  the  Vice-Chancellor,  the  Dean  of  Christ- 
Church,  the  Presidents  of  Magdalen  and  St.  John’s,  and  the 
Proctors  (under  the  old  system).  What  happened  ? The  chair 


1 Before  the  Caroline  statute  of  1628,  the  Proctors  were  elected  by,  and  out  of,  the 
whole  body  of  full  graduates  in  all  the  faculties  of  the  University.  The  office  was  an 
object  of  the  highest  ambition  ; men  only  of  some  mark  and  talent  had  any  chance  of 
obtaining  it ; and  its  duties  were  paid,  not  by  money,  but  distinction.  By  this  statute 
all  was  changed  ; and  another  mean  of  accomplishing  its  usurpation  bestowed  on  the 
collegial  interest.  The  election  was  given,  in  a certain  rotation,  to  one  of  the  Colleges 
(the  Halls  being  excluded) ; and  in  the  elective  college,  eligibility  was  confined  to  the 
masters,  and  the  masters  between  four  and  ten  years’  standing.  The  office  was  now 
filled  only  by  persons  more  or  less  attached  to  the  collegial  interest,  and  these  appoint- 
ed in  a groat  measure  by  accident ; while,  as  it  afforded  no  honors,  its  labors  must  be 
remunerated  by  emolument.  And  let  the  Proctors  be  adequately  paid,  only  let  this 
be  done  in  an  open  and  legal  manner. 


AMPLIFIED  RE  CAPITULATION — COLLE  GE  S. 


441 


was  converted  into  a sinecure  ; and  one  or  other  of  the  Proctors, 
by  the  very  act  of  self-appointment,  approved  undequaque  par 
to  inculcate  Morality  by  example,  installed  professor  on  every 
quinquennial  vacancy.1  What  arrangement  was  made  about 
the  salary  (d£100),  we  know  not. — Five  out  of  eleven  odious 
chairs  were  thus  disposed  of;  and  the  co-operation  of  the  Proc- 
tors secured. 

To  the  same  end,  the  remnant  of  the  professorial  system,  not 
abolished,  was  paralyzed.  In  our  former  paper,  we  showed  how 
this  system,  as  constituted  by  the  Laudian  statutes,  though  easily 
capable  of  high  improvement,  was  extremely  defective ; partly 
from  the  incompetency  or  ill  intention  of  the  elective  bodies  ; 
partly  from  the  temporary  nature  of  several  of  the  chairs  ; but, 
above  all,  from  the  non-identity  which  subsisted  between  the  in- 
terest of  the  Professor  and  his  duty.  The  Heads,  though  sworn 
to  the  scholastic  improvement  of  the  University,  not  only  proposed 
no  remedy  for  these  defects ; they  positively  withheld  the  cor- 
rectives they  were  bound  to  apply  ; and  even  did  all  that  in 
them  lay  to  enhance  the  evil.  Through  collegial  influence,  per- 
sons wholly  incompetent  were  nominated  Professors  ; and  every 
provision,  by  which  the  University  anxiously  attempted  to  insure 
the  diligence  of  the  public  teacher,  was,  by  the  academical  exe- 
cutive, sedulously  frustrated.  The  Professors,  now  also  most 
exclusively  members  of  the  collegial  interest,  were  allowed  to 
convert  their  chairs  into  sinecures  ; or  to  teach,  if  they  ultro- 
neously  lectured,  what,  when,  where,  how,  how  long,  to  whom, 
and  under  what  conditions,  they  chose.  The  consummation 
devoutly  wished  was  soon  realized.  The  shreds  of  the  professo- 
rial system  are  now  little  more  than  curious  vestiges  of  antiq- 
uity ; and  the  one  essential  mean  of  education  in  the  legal  sys- 
tem of  Oxford,  as  in  the  practice  of  all  other  Universities,  is  of 
no  more  necessity,  in  the  actual  system,  than  if  it  were  not,  and 
had  never  been. 

1 This  continued  from  1673  till  1829.  The  patriotic  exertions  of  the  present  Lord 
Chancellor,  in  the  exposure  of  similar  abuses  in  other  public  seminaries,  had  alarmed 
the  Heads,  and  probably  disposed  them  to  listen  to  the  suggestions  of  the  more  liberal 
members  of  their  body.  The  job,  too  flagrant  to  escape  notice  or  admit  of  justification, 
was  discontinued.  The  Rev.  Mr.  Mills,  Fellow  of  Magdalen,  was  nominated  Profes- 
sor ; and  he  has  honorably  signalized  the  reform,  by  continuing  to  deliver  a course  of 
lectures,  which,  we  understand,  have  been  (for  Oxford)  numerously  attended.  His 
introductory  lecture,  On  the  Theory  of  Moral  Obligation , which  is  published,  shows 
with  what  ability  he  could  discharge  its  important  duties,  were  the  chair  restored  to 
that  place  in  the  academical  system  which  it  has  a right  to  hold. 


442  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

As  to  the  lectures  of  the  graduates  at  large,  these  were  soon 
so  entirely  quashed,  that  the  right  of  lecturing  itself — nay,  the 
very  meaning  of  the  terms  Regent  and  Non-Regent,  was  at  last 
wholly  forgotten  in  the  English  Universities.1 

This  grand  object  of  their  policy,  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting 
was  constrained  to  carry  through,  without  even  the  pretext  of 
law.  There  is  neither  statute  nor  dispensation  to  allege  for  the 
conduct  of  the  Heads,  or  the  conduct  of  the  Professors. 

In  the  second  place,  the  obligation  of  attendance  on  the  public 
lectures  was  no  longer  enforced.  This  violation  of  the  statutes 
was  correlative  of  the  last ; hut  in  the  present  instance,  it  would 
appear,  that  the  illegality  has  been  committed  under  the  sem- 
blance of  a legal  act. 

In  our  former  article,  as  then  uncertain  touching  the  point  of 
actual  practice,  we  could  only  in  general  demonstrate,  that  no 
universal  dispensation  of  attendance  on  the  public  lectures  is  con- 
ceded by  statute,  and  that  none  such,  therefore,  could  legally  be 
passed  either  by  Congregation  or  Convocation.  We  have  since 
ascertained,  that  a dispensation  is  pretended  for  this  non-observ- 
ance as  obtained  from  Congregation,  under  the  dispensing  power 
conceded  to  that  house,  “ Pro  minus  diligenti  publi corum  Lecto- 
rum  auditione  at  least,  such  a dispensation  is  passed  for  all 

1 So  long  ago  as  the  commencement  of  the  last  centuiy,  Sergeant  Miller,  the  antag- 
onist of  Bentley,  and  who  is  praised  by  Dr.  Monk  for  his  profound  knowledge  of  aca- 
demical affairs,  once  and  again,  in  his  Account  of  the  University  of  Cambridge  (pp.  21, 
80),  assures  us,  that  the  terms  “ Regent”  and  “ Non-Regent”  were  then  not  understood ; 
and  the  same  ignorance  at  the  present  day  is  admitted  by  the  recent  historian  of  that 
University,  Mr.  Dyer.  ( Privileges , &c.  ii.  p.  cxxiii.)  Before  our  late  article  appear- 
ed, we  do  not  believe  there  was  a member  of  either  English  University  who  could 
have  explained  the  principle  of  this  distinction,  on  which,  however,  the  constitution 
of  these  academical  corporations  fundamentally  rests  ; or  who  was  aware  that  every 
full  graduate  possesses  in  virtue  of  his  degree,  the  right  of  lecturing  on  any  subject 
of  his  faculty  in  the  public  schools  of  the  University. — On  this  right,  it  may  be  proper 
to  add  a few  words  in  addition  to  what  we  formerly  stated.  It  is  certain,  that,  before 
the  Laudian  Corpus,  graduation  both  conferred  the  right,  and  imposed  the  obligation, 
of  public  teaching ; the  one  for  ever,  the  other  during  a certain  time. — In  regard  to 
the  former,  nothing  was  altered  by  this  code.  The  form  of  a Bachelor’s  degree  is,  in 
fact,  to  this  moment,  that  of  a license  to  lecture  on  certain  books  within  his  faculty ; 
and  that  of  a Master’s  and  Doctor’s,  a license  to  commence  (incipere — hence  Occam’s 
title  of  Venerabilis  Inceptor ) all  those  solemn  acts  of  teaching,  disputation,  &c.,  which 
belong  to,  and  are  required  of,  a perfect  graduate  (T.  ix.). — In  regard  to  the  latter, 
the  obligation  of  public  teaching  is  declared  not  repealed  (T.  iv.  <j  1);  and  if  the  obli- 
gation could  still  be  enforced,  a majore,  the  right  could  still  be  exercised.  It  is  only 
permitted  to  Congregation  to  dispense  with  the  “ necessary  regency,"  if  they,  on  the 
one  hand,  for  a reasonable  cause,  think  fit,  and  if  the  inceptor,  on  the  other,  choose  to 
pay  for  this  indulgence.  (T.  ix.  S.  iv.  ( ) 2.  21.)  In  point  of  fact,  this  right  of  lectur- 
ing continued  to  be  exercised  by  the  graduates  for  a considerable  time  after  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Corpus  Statutorum. 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION— COLLEGES. 


443 


candidates,  while  no  other  relative  to  the  observance  in  question 
is  conceded.  It  will  here  he  proper  to  prove  more  particularly, 
that  the  dispensation,  in  the  present  instance,  actually  accorded, 
and  the  dispensation  necessarily  required,  have  no  mutual  propor- 
tion. The  dispensation  required , in  order  to  cover  the  violation, 
is  one  : — 1°,  for  an  absolute  non-attendance  ; 2°,  without  the 
excuse  of  an  unavoidable  impediment ; and  3°,  to  all  candidates 
indifferently.  The  dispensation  which  Congregation  can  concede 
— the  dispensation  therefore  actually  conceded,  is,  1°,  not  grant- 
ed for  non-attendance  absolutely,  but  only  for  the  negation  of  its 
highest  quality — a not  altogether  diligent  attendance ; 2°,  not 
granted  without  just  reason  shown  ; and  3°,  consequently  not 
granted  to  all,  but  only  to  certain  individuals.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, that  every  candidate  for  graduation  is  unconditionally 
bound  by  statute  to  have  “ diligently  heard  (diligenter  audivisse) 
the  public  lectures ” relative  to  his  degree : while  the  fulfillment 
of  this  condition,  in  the  same  terms , is  sworn  to  in  the  oath  he 
makes  to  the  senior  Proctor  ; and  forms  part  of  his  supplication 
for  a grace  to  the  House  of  Congregation.  But  as  no  one  could 
strictly  aver  that  he  had  “ diligently  heard”  these  lectures  who 
was  absent  from  their  delivery,  however  seldom  (and  the  framers 
of  the  statutes  were  as  rigid  in  their  notions  of  perjury  as  the 
administrators  have  subsequently  been  lax),  while  at  the  same 
« time  it  would  have  been  unjust  to  deprive  a candidate  of  his 
degree  for  every  slight  and  unavoidable  non-performance  of  this 
condition ; it  was  therefore  thought  equitable  and  expedient  to 
qualify  the  oath  to  the  extent  of  allowing,  “ occasionally ,”  to 
“ certain  persons ,”  for  the  reason  of  a 11  just  hinder  ancef  a dis- 
pensation “ for  the  non-fulfillment  of  every  particular,  in  the  mode 
and  form  required  by  statute,”  and  in  special  “ for  the  not  com- 
pletely regular  (minus  diligenti)  attendance  on  the  public  readers.” 
The  words  are  : — “ Cum  just  a quandoque  impedimenta  interveni- 
ant,  quo  minus  ea  omnia , quae  ad  G-radus  et  alia  exercitia  Univer- 
sitatis  requiruntur,  modo  et  forma  per  Statuta  requisitis,  rite 
peragantur ; consuevit  Congregatio  Regentium  in  hujusmodi 
causis  cum  personis  aliquibus  in  materia  dispensabili  aliquolies 
gratiose  dispensare.”  (Corp.  Stat.  T.  ix.  S.  4,  § 1,  Add.  p.  135.) 
— After  this  preamble,  and  governed  by  it,  there  follows  the  list 
of  “ Dispensable  Matters,”  permitted  to  Congregation , of  which 
the  one  in  question,  and  already  quoted,  is  the  fourth. 

It  is  a general  rule  that  all  statutes  and  oaths  are  to  be  inter- 


444  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

preted,  “ ad  animum  imponentis and  the  Oxford  legislators 
expressly  declare,  that  the  academical  statutes  and  oaths  are  vio- 
lated if  interpreted  or  taken  in  a sense  different  from  that  in 
which  they  were  intended  by  them,  and  if  against  the  interests 
of  education  (Epinomis).  Now,  that  it  was  intended  by  Convo- 
cation to  convey  to  Congregation , by  this  clause,  a general  power 
of  absolving  all  candidates  from  the  performance  of  the  one  para- 
mount condition  of  their  degree , no  honest  man  in  his  senses  will 
venture  to  maintain.  The  supposition  involves  every  imaginable 
absurdity.  It  is  contrary  to  the  plain  meaning  of  the  clause, 
considered  either  in  itself  or  in  reference  to  the  obligation  which 
it  modifies  ; and  contrary  to  its  meaning,  as  shown  by  the  prac- 
tice of  the  University,  at  the  period  of  its  ratification,  and  long 
subsequent.  It  would  stultify  the  whole  purport  of  the  academ- 
ical laws — make  the  University  commit  suicide  (for  the  Univer- 
sity exists  only  through  its  public  education) — and  suicide  with- 
out a motive.  It  would  suppose  a statute  ratified  only  to  he 
repealed ; and  a dispensation  intended  to  be  co-extensive  with  a 
law.  It  would  make  the  legislative  House  of  Convocation  to 
concede  to  the  inferior  House  of  Congregation,  a power  of  dis- 
pensing with  a performance  infinitely  more  important  than  the 
most  important  of  those  in  which  it  expressly  prohibits  this  in- 
dulgence to  itself ; and  all  this,  too,  by  a clause  of  six  words, 
shuffled  in  among  a score  of  other  dispensations  too  insignificant 
for  mention. 

The  non-attendance  of  candidates  on  the  public  courses , as  per- 
mitted by  the  Heads,  is  thus  illegal ; and  perjury  is  the  price 
that  must  be  paid  by  all  for  a degree. 

In  the  third  place,  the  residence  in  the  University  required  by 
statute  to  qualify  for  all  degrees  above  Bachelor  of  Arts  was  not 
enforced.  This  violation  is  also  a corollary  of  the  two  former  ; 
and  here  likewise,  hut  without  success,  it  is  attempted  to  evade 
the  illegality. 

The  House  of  Convocation , i.  e.,  the  graduates,  regent  and  non- 
regent, of  the  University,  though  fully  possessing  the  powers  of 
legislation,  found  it  necessary  to  limit  their  own  capacity  of  sus- 
pending, in  particular  cases,  the  ordinary  application  of  their 
statutes.  If  such  a dispensing  power  were  not  strictly  limited, 
the  consequences  are  manifest.  The  project  of  an  academical 
law,  as  a matter  of  general  interest,  solemnly  announced,  obtains 
a grave  deliberation,  with  a full  attendance  both  of  the  advocates 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION — COLLEGES. 


445 


and  opponents  of  the  measure  ; and  it  is  passed  under  the  con- 
sciousness that  it  goes  forth  to  the  world  to  he  canvassed  at  the 
bar  of  public  opinion,  if  not  to  be  reviewed  by  a higher  positive 
tribunal.  The  risk,  therefore,  is  comparatively  small,  that  a 
statute  will  be  ratified,  glaringly  contrary  either  to  the  aggregate 
interests  of  those  who  constitute  the  University,  or  to  the  public 
ends  which  the  University,  as  an  instrument  privileged  for  the 
sake  of  the  community,  necessarily  proposes  to  accomplish.  All 
is  different  with  a dispensation.  Here  the  matter,  as  private  and 
particular,  and  without  any  previous  announcement,  attracts,  in 
all  likelihood,  only  those  in  favor  of  its  concession  ; is  treated 
lightly,  as  exciting  no  attention ; or  passed,  as  never  to  be 
known,  or  if  known,  only  to  be  forgot.  The  experience  also  of 
past  abuses,  had  taught  the  academical  legislators  to  limit  strict- 
ly the  license  of  dispensation  permitted  to  themselves  : — “ Q,uia 
ex  nimia  dispensandi  licentia  grave  incommodum  Universitati 
aniehac  obortum  est  (nec  aliter  fieri  potuit) ; statuit  et  decrevit 
Universitas,  we,  in  posterum,  dispensations  ullatenus  proponan- 
tur  in  casibus  sequentibus.”  (Corp.  Stat.  T.  x.  S.  2,  h 5.)  A list 
of  matters  is  then  given  (described  in  our  last  paper,  p.  428  sq.) 
with  which  Convocation  can  not  dispense  ; the  most  important 
of  which  are,  however,  in  actual  practice  violated  without  a 
dispensation.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  notice,  that  the  matters 
declared  indispensable  (those  particulars,  namely,  in  which  this 
indulgence  had  formerly  been  abused),  to  say  nothing  of  the  others 
declared  dispensable , are  the  merest  trifles  compared  ivith  that 
under  discussion.  Under  the  heads,  both  of  Dispensable  and  of 
Indispensable  Matter,  a general  power  is  indeed  cautiously  left 
to  the  Chancellor,  of  allowing  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  to  pro- 
pose a dispensation ; but  this  only  “ from  some  necessary  and 
very  urgent  cause  (ex  necessaria  et  perurgente  aliqua  causa),  and 
moreover  under  the  former  head,  only  “ in  cases  which  are  not 
repugnant  to  academical  discipline  (qui  disciplin*  Academicse 
non  repugnant).”  The  legislature  did  not  foresee  that  the  very 
precautions  thus  anxiously  adopted,  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  dis- 
pensation in  time  to  come,  without  altogether  surrendering  its 
conveniences,  were  soon  to  be  employed  as  the  especial  means  of 
carrying  this  abuse  to  an  extent , compared  ivith  which  all  former 
abuses  were  as  nothing.  They  did  not  foresee  that  the  Chancel- 
lor was  soon  to  become  a passive  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the 
Hebdomadal  Meeting  ; that  these  appointed  guardians  of  the  law 


446  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

were  soon  themselves  to  become  its  betrayers  ; that  the  Collegial 
bodies  were  soon  to  cherish  interests  at  variance  with  those  of 
the  University ; that  nearly  the  whole  resident  graduates  were 
soon  to  be  exclusively  of  that  interest,  and  soon,  therefore,  to 
constitute,  almost  alone,  the  ordinary  meetings  of  the  two  Houses ; 
and  that  in  these  ordinary  meetings,  under  the  illegal  covert  of 
Dispensations,  were  all  the  fundamental  Statutes  of  the  Univer- 
sity to  be  soon  absolutely  annulled , in  pursuance  of  the  private 
policy  of  the  Colleges. 

Under  the  extraordinary  dispensing  power  thus  cautiously  left 
to  the  Chancellor,  Heads,  and  Convocation,  a legal  remission  of 
the  residence  required  by  statute  is  now  attempted ; but  in 
vain. 

From  his  situation,  the  Chancellor  is  only  the  organ  of  the 
Collegial  Heads.  His  acts  are  therefore  to  be  considered  as 
theirs.  Chancellor’s  Letters  are  applied  for  and  furnished,  ready 
made,  by  the  University  Registrar,  to  all  proceeding  to  degrees 
above  Bachelor  of  Arts,  permitting  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  to 
propose  in  Convocation  a dispensation  in  their  favor  for  the  resi- 
dence required  by  statute.  The  dispensation  is  proposed,  and,  as 
a matter  of  routine,  conceded  by  the  members  of  the  collegial 
interest  met  in  an  ordinary  Convocation. — But  is  this  legal?  Is 
this  what  was  intended  by  the  legislature  ? Manifestly  not  ? The 
contingency  in  the  eye  of  law,  for  which  it  permits  a dispensa- 
tion, and  the  case  for  which,  under  this  permission,  a dispensation 
is  actually  obtained,  are  not  only  different,  but  contrary.  We 
shall  not  stop  to  argue  that  the  dispensation  obtained  is  illegal, 
because  “ repugnant  to  academical  discipline for  it  is  mani- 
festly, as  far  as  it  goes,  the  very  negation  of  academical  disci- 
pline altogether.  We  shall  take  it  upon  the  lowest  ground. — A. 
dispensation  of  its  very  nature  is  relative  to  particular  cases ; and 
in  allowing  it  to  Convocation,  the  law  contemplated  a particular 
emergency  arising  from  “ some  necessary  and  very  urgent  cause  f 
not  to  be  anticipated  by  statute,  and  for  which,  therefore,  it  pro- 
vides a sudden  and  extraordinary  remedy.  But  who  will  pretend 
that  a perpetual  remission  of  attendance  to  all  could  be  compre- 
hended under  this  category  ? Such  a dispensation  is  universal, 
and  therefore  tantamount  to  a negation  of  the  law.  It  thus  violates 
the  very  notion  of  a dispensation.— Then,  it  does  not  come  under 
the  conditions  by  which  all  dispensations,  thus  competent  to  Con- 
vocation, are  governed.  It  is  neither  “ necessary ” nor  “ very 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION— PRESENT  ILLEGALITY.  447 


urgent .”  Not,  certainly,  at  the  commencement  of  the  practice ; 
for  how,  on  any  day,  week,  month,  or  year,  could  there  have 
arisen  a necessity , an  urgency , for  abolishing  the  term  of  residence 
quietly  tolerated  during  five  centuries,  so  imperative  and  sudden 
that  the  matter  could  not  be  delayed  (if  a short  delay  were  un- 
avoidable) until  brought  into  Convocation,  and  approved  or  rejected 
as  a general  measure?  But  if  the  “ cause”  of  dispensation  were, 
in  this  case,  so  “necessary”  and  so  “very  urgent,”  at  first,  that 
it  could  not  brook  the  delay  even  of  a week  or  month,  how  has 
this  necessity  and  urgency  been  protracted  for  above  a century  ? 
The  present  is  not  one  of  those  particular  and  unimportant  cases, 
with  which,  it  might  be  said,  that  the  statutes  should  not  be  en- 
cumbered, and  which  are  therefore  left  to  be  quietly  dealt  with 
by  dispensation.  The  case  in  question  is  of  universal  application, 
and  of  paramount  importance  ; one,  of  all  others,  which  it  was  the 
appointed  duty  of  the  Heads  to  have  submitted  without  delay  to 
the  academical  legislature,  as  the  project  of  a law  to  he  by  Con- 
vocation rejected  or  approved.  (Tit.  xiii.) 

The  dispensation  of  residence  is  thus  palpably  illegal. 

III.  In  evidence  of  the  third  proposition,  we  showed,  as  already 
proved — that  the  present  academical  system  is  illegal,  being  one 
universal  violation  of  another  system,  exclusively  established  by 
the  statutes  of  the  University  ; — that  this  illegal  system  is  for 
the  private  behoof  of  the  Colleges  that  this  system,  profitable 
to  the  Colleges,  was  intruded  into  the  University  by  their  Heads, 
who  for  this  end  violated,  or  permitted  to  be  violated,  the  whole 
fundamental  statutes  they  were  appointed  to  protect : — that  this 
conflict  between  a legal  system  suspended  in  fact,  and  an  actual 
system  non-existent  in  law,  had  been  maintained  solely  by  the 
Heads,  who,  while  possessing  the  initiative  of  all  statutes,  have, 
however,  hitherto  declined  submitting  the  actual  system  to  Con- 
vocation, in  order  to  obtain  for  it  a legal  authorization : — But  all 
members  of  the  University  make  oath  to  the  faithful  observance 
of  the  academical  statutes  ; and  the  Heads,  specially  sworn  to  see 
that  these  are  by  all  faithfully  observed,  are  by  statute  branded 
as  pre-eminently  guilty  of  “ broken  trust  and  perjury,”  if  even 
“ by  their  negligence,  any  [unrepealed]  statute  whatever  is  allowed 
to  fall  into  disuse — Consequently,  the  Heads  have,  for  them- 
selves, voluntary  incurred  the  crime  of  “broken  trust  and  per- 
jury,” in  a degree  infinitely  higher  than  was  ever  anticipated  as 
possible  by  the  legislature  ; and,  for  others,  have,  for  their  inter- 


448  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

ested  purposes,  necessitated  the  violation  of  their  oaths  by  all 
members  of  the  University.1 

Now,  taking  it  for  granted  that,  without  a motive , no  body  of 
magistrates  would  live,  and  make  others  live,  in  a systematic 
disregard  of  law — that  no  body  of  moral  censors  would  exhibit 
the  spectacle  of  their  own  betrayal  of  a great  public  trust — and 
that  no  body  of  religious  guardians  would  hazard  their  own  sal- 
vation, and  the  salvation  of  those  confided  to  their  care : 2 — on 
this  ground  we  showed,  that  while  every  motive  was  manifestly 
against,  no  motive  could  possibly  be  assigned  for,  the  conduct  of 
the  Heads,  in  so  long  exclusively  maintaining  their  intrusive 
system,  and  never  asking  for  it  a legal  sanction  ; except  their 
consciousness,  that  it  was  too  bad  to  hope  for  the  solemn  approval 
of  a House  of  Convocation , albeit  composed  of  members  of  the 
collegial  interest , and  too  profitable  not  to  be  continued  at  every 
sacrifice. 

Rather  indeed,  we  may  now  add,  than  hazard  the  continuance 
of  this  profitable  system,  by  allowing  its  merits  to  be  canvassed 
even  by  a body  interested  in  its  support,  the  Heads  have  violated 
not  only  their  moral  and  religious  obligations  to  the  University 
and  country,  but,  in  a particular  manner,  their  duty  to  the  Church 
of  England.  By  law,  Oxford  is  not  merely  an  establishment  for 
the  benefit  of  the  English  nation  ; it  is  an  establishment  for  the 
benefit  of  those  only  in  community  with  the  English  Church. 
But  the  Heads  well  knew  that  the  man  will  subscribe  thirty-nine 
articles  which  he  can  not  believe,  who  swears  to  do  and  to  have 
done  a hundred  articles  which  he  can  not,  or  does  not,  perform  ? 3 
In  this  respect,  private  usurpation  was  for  once  more  (perversely) 
liberal  than  public  law.  Under  the  illegal  system,  Oxford  has 
ceased  to  be  the  seminary  of  a particular  sect ; its  governors 
impartially  excluding  all  religionists  or  none.  Nor  is  this  all. 
The  natural  tendency  of  the  academical  ordeal  was  to  sear  the 

1 “He  is  guilty  of  perjury,  who  promiseth  upon  oath,  what  he  is  not  morally  and 
reasonably  certain  he  shall  be  able  to  perform.” — (Tillotson,  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  248. 
Sermon  on  the  Lawfulness  and  Obligations  of  Oaths.) 

2 “ Ille  qui  hominem  provocat  ad  jurationem,  et  scit  eum  falsum  juraturum  esse, 
vicit  homicidam  : quia  homicida  corpus  occisurus  est,  ille  animam,  immo  duas  animas; 
et  ejus  animam  quem  jurare  provocavit,  et  suam.” — (Augustinus  in  Decollat.  S.  Joan- 
nis  Baptistae  et  hah.  22.  quaest.  5.  Ille  qui.) 

3 Nay,  the  oath  for  observance  of  the  Statutes  is,  by  the  academical  legislature,  held 
a matter  of  far  more  serious  obligation  than  the  subscription  of  the  Thirty-nine  Articles. 
For  by  Statute  (T.  II.  3),  the  intrant  is  not  allowed  to  take  the  oath  until  he  reach 
the  age  of  sixteen ; whereas  the  subscription  is  lightly  required  even  of  boys  matriculat- 
ing at  the  tender  age  of  twelve.  [Of  this  more  again.] 


AMPLIFIED  RECAPITULATION— PRESENT  ILLEGALITY.  449 


cousr, fence  of  the  patient  to  every  pious  scruple  and  the  example 
of  the  accursed  thing”  thus  committed  and  enforced  by  “ the 
Priests  in  the  high  places,”  extended  its  pernicious  influence,  from 
the  Universities,  throughout  the  land.  England  became  the 
country  in  Europe  proverbial  for  a disregard  of  oaths;1 2  and  the 
English  Church,  in  particular,  was  abandoned,  as  a peculiar  prey 
to  the  cupidity  of  men  allured  by  its  endowments,  and  educated 
to  a contempt  of  all  religious  tests.3  As  Butler  has  it : 

“ They  swore  so  many  lies  before, 

That  now,  without  remorse, 

They  take  all  oaths  that  can  be  made, 

As  only  things  of  course.”4 

No  one  will  doubt  the  profound  anxiety  of  the  Pleads  to  avert 
these  lamentable  consequences,  and  to  withdraw  themselves  from 
a responsibility  so  appalling.  We  may  therefore  estimate  at  once 
the  intensity  of  their  attachment  to  the  illegal  system,  as  a private 
source  of  emolument  and  power,  and  the  strength  of  their  con- 
viction of  its  utter  worthlessness,  as  a public  instrument  for  ac- 
complishing the  purposes  of  an  University.  Not  only  will  the 
system,  when  examined,  be  found  absurd  ; it  is  already  admitted 
to  be  so  : and  all  attempt  at  an  apology  by  any  individual,  by  any 
subordinate,  member  of  the  collegial  interest,  would  be  necessarily 
vain,  while  we  can  oppose  to  it  “the  deep  damnation”  reluctantly 
pronounced  on  their  own  act  and  deed  by  so  many  generations 
of  the  College  Heads  themselves. 

It  thus  appears,  that  the  downfall  of  the  University  has  been 
the  result,  and  the  necessary  result,  of  subjecting  it  to  an  influence 
jealous  of  its  utility,  and,  though  incompetent  to  its  functions, 
ambitious  to  usurp  its  place.  The  College  Heads  have  been,  and 


1 “ Dico  vobis  non  jurare  omnino  ; ne  scilicet  jurando  ad  facilitatem  jurandi  veniatur, 
de  facilitate  ad  consuetudinem,  de  consuetudine  ad  perjurium  decidatur.” — (Augus- 
tinus De  Meiulacio.)  “In  Novo  Testamento  dictum  est,  Ne  omnino  juremus  : quod 
mihi  quidem  propterea  dictum  esse  videtur,  non  quia  jurare  peccatum  est,  sed  quia 
pejerare  irnmane  peccatum  est,  a quo  longe  nos  esse  voluit,  qui  omnino  ne  juremus 
commovit.”- — (Idem  in  Epist.  ad  Publicolam,  et  kab.  22.  qu.  1.  in  novo.) 

2 [See  the  reflections  of  Bishops  Sanderson  and  Berkeley  on  this  national  opprobrium 
quoted  in  the  seventh  article  of  this  series.] 

3 [This  melancholy  consequence  came  out  more  obtrusively,  after  the  observation  in 
the  text  was  written.  See  the  same  article.] 

4 Another  annoying  consequence  of  the  illegal  state  of  the  English  Universities  may 
be  mentioned.  The  Heads  either  durst  not,  under  present  circumstances,  attempt,  or 
would  be  inevitably  baffled  in  attempting,  to  resist  the  communication  to  other  semina- 
ries of  those  academical  privileges  which  they  themselves  have  so  disgracefully  abused. 
The  truth  of  this  observation  will  probably  soon  be  manifested  by  the  event.  [And 
has  been.] 


450  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

will  always  be,  the  bane  of  the  University,  so  long  as  they  are 
suffered  to  retain  the  power  of  paralyzing  its  efficiency  : at  least, 
if  a radical  reconstruction  of  the  whole  collegial  system  do  not 
identify  the  interests  of  the  public  and  of  the  private  corporations, 
and  infuse  into  the  common  governors  of  both  a higher  spirit  and 
a more  general  intelligence.  We  regret  that  our  charges  against 
the  Heads  have  been  so  heavy ; and  would  repeat,  that  our 
strictures  have  been  applied  to  them  not  as  individuals,  but  exclu- 
sively in  their  corporate  capacity.  We  are  even  disposed  alto- 
gether to  exempt  the  recent  members  of  this  body  from  a reproach 
more  serious  than  that  of  ignorance  as  to  the  nature  and  extent 
of  their  duty  to  the  University  ; 1 while  we  freely  acknowledge 
that  they  have  inadequately  felt  the  want,  and  partially  com- 
menced the  work,  of  reformation,  which  we  trust  they  may  long 
live  to  see  completed.  We  should  be  sorry  indeed  not  to  believe, 
that,  among  the  present  Heads,  there  are  individuals  fully  aware 
that  Oxford  is  not  what  it  ought  to  be,  and  prepared  cordially  to 
co-operate  in  restoring  the  University  to  its  utility  and  rights. 
But  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  individuals  to  persuade  a body  of 
men  in  opposition  to  their  interests : and  even  if  the  whole  actual 
members  of  the  Hebdomadal  Meeting  were  satisfied  of  the  dis- 
honest character  of  the  policy  hitherto  pursued,  and  personally 
anxious  to  reverse  it ; we  can  easily  conceive  that  they  might 
find  it  invidious  to  take  upon  themselves  to  condemn  so  deeply  so 
many  generations  of  their  predecessors,  and  a matter  of  delicacy 
to  surrender,  on  behalf  of  the  collegial  interest,  but  in  opposition 
to  its  wishes,  the  valuable  monopoly  it  has  so  long  been  permitted 
without  molestation  to  enjoy.  In  this  conflict  of  delicacy,  interest 
and  duty,  the  Heads  themselves  ought  to  desire — ought  to  invoke, 
the  interposition  of  a higher  authority.  A Royal  or  Parliament- 
ary Visitation  is  the  easy  and  appropriate  mode  of  solving  the 
difficulty  ; — a difficulty  which,  in  fact,  only  arose  from  the  inter- 
mission, for  above  the  last  century  and  a half,  of  that  corrective, 
which,  since  the  subjection  of  the  University  to  the  Colleges,  re- 
mained the  only  remedy  for  abuses,  and  abuses  determined  by 
that  subjection  itself.  Previous  to  that  event,  though  the  Crown 
occasionally  interposed  to  the  same  salutary  end,  still  the  Univer- 

1 Any  degree  of  such  ignorance  in  the  present  Heads  we  can  imagine  possible,  after 
that  recently  shown  by  the  most  intelligent  individuals  in  Oxford  of  the  relation  sub- 
sisting between  the  public  and  the  private  corporations.  As  we  noticed  in  our  last  paper 
the  parasitic  Fungus  is  there  mistaken  for  the  Oak ; the  Colleges  are  viewed  as  con- 
stituting the  University. 


WHENCE  A EERORMATION  ? 


451 


sity  possessed  within  itself  the  ordinary  means  of  reform  ; Convo- 
cation frequently  appointing  delegates  to  inquire  into  abuses,  and 
to  take  counsel  for  the  welfare  and  melioration  of  the  establish- 
ment. But  by  bestowing  on  a private  body,  like  the  Heads,  the 
exclusive  guardianship  of  the  statutes,  and  the  initiative  of  every 
legal  measure,  Convocation  was  deprived  of  the  power  of  active 
interference,  and  condemned  to  he  the  passive  spectator  of  all  that 
the  want  of  wisdom,  all  that  the  self-seeking  of  the  academical 
executive  might  do,  or  leave  undone. 

Through  the  influence,  and  for  the  personal  aggrandizement  of 
an  ambitious  statesman,  the  Crown  delivered  over  the  reluctant 
University,  bound  hand  and  foot,  into  the  custody  of  a private 
and  irresponsible  body,  actuated  by  peculiar  and  counter  inter- 
ests ; and,  to  consummate  the  absurdity,  it  never  afterward 
interfered,  as  heretofore,  to  alleviate  the  disastrous  consequences 
of  this  its  own  imprudent  act.  And  had  the  Heads  met,  had 
they  expected  to  meet,  the  occasional  check  of  a disinterested 
and  wiser  body,  they  would  probably  never  have  even  thought 
of  attempting  the  collegial  monopoly  of  education  which  they 
have  succeeded  in  establishing  on  the  ruin  of  all  the  faculties  of 
the  University.  This  neglect  was  unfair,  even  to  the  Heads 
themselves,  who  were  thus  exposed  to  a temptation,  which,  as  a 
body,  it  was  not  in  their  nature  to  resist.  “ Ovem  lupo  commi- 
sisti.”  But  it  is  not  the  wolf,  who  acts  only  after  kind,  it  is  they 
who  confide  the  flock  to  his  charge,  who  are  hound  to  answer  for 
the  sheep.  To  the  administrators  of  the  State,  rather  than  to  the 
administrators  of  the  University,  are  thus  primarily  to  he  attrib- 
uted the  corruptions  of  Oxford.  To  them,  likewise,  must  we 
look  for  their  removal.  The  Crown  is,  in  fact,  hound,  in  justice 
to  the  nation,  to  restore  the  University  against  the  consequences 
of  its  own  imprudence  and  neglect.  And  as  it  ought,  so  it  is 
alone  able — to  expect,  in  opposition  to  all  principle  and  all  ex- 
perience, that  a body,  like  the  Heads — that  a body  even  like  the 
present  House  of  Convocation — either  could  conceive  the  plan  of 
an  adequate  improvement,  or  would  will  its  execution,  is  the  very 
climax  of  folly.  It  is  from  the  State  only,  and  the  Crown  in  par- 
ticular, that  we  can  reasonably  hope  for  an  academical  reforma- 
tion worthy  of  the  name. 

“Et  spes  et  ratio  studiorum  in  Csesare  tantum.” 

But  with  a patriot  King,  a reforming  Ministry,  and  a reformed 


452  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

Parliament,  we  are  confident  that  our  expectations  will  not  he 
vain.  A general  scholastic  reform  will  he,  in  fact,  one  of  the 
greatest  blessings  of  the  political  renovation,  and,  perhaps,  the 
surest  test  of  its  value. 

And  on  this  great  subject,  could  we  presume  personally  to 
address  his  Majesty,  as  supreme  Visitor  of  the  Universities,  we 
should  humbly  repeat  to  William  the  Fourth,  in  the  present,  the 
counsel  which  Locke , in  the  last  great  crisis  of  the  constitution, 
solemnly  tendered  to  William  the  Third : — “ Sire,  you  have  made 
a most  glorious  and  happy  Revolution  ; but  the  good  effects  of 
it  will  soon  be  lost , if  no  care  is  taken  to  regulate  the  Univer- 
sities 

On  the  other  hand,  were  we  to  address  the  Senators  of  En- 
gland, as  the  reformers  of  all  abuses  both  in  church  and  state ; 
though  it  needs,  certainly,  no  wizard  to  expose  the  folly  of  wait- 
ing for  our  reformation  of  the  English  Universities  from  the  very 
parties  interested  in  their  corruption ; it  would  he  impossible  to 
do  so  in  weightier  or  more  appropriate  words,  than  those  in 
which  Agrippa — “ the  wise  Cornelius” — exhorts  the  Senators  of 
Cologne,  to  take  the  work  of  reforming  the  venerable  University 
of  that  city  exclusively  into  their  own  hands  : — “ Dicetis  forte, 
quis  nostrum  ista  faciet , si  ipsi  scholarum  Rectores  et  Prcesides 
id  non  faciunt  ? — Certe  si  illis  permittitis  reformationis  hujus 
negotium,  in  eodern  semper  luto  haerehitis ; cum  unusquisque 
illorum  talem  gestiat  formare  Acctdemiam,  in  qua  ipse  maxime 
in  pretio  sit  futurus , ut  hactenus  asinus  inter  asinos,  porcus  inter 
porcos.  Vestra  est  Universitas  ; vestri  in  ilia  prsecipue  erudiun- 
tur  filii ; vestrum  negotium  agitur.  Vestrum  ergo  est  omnia 
recte  ordinare,  prudenter  statuere,  sapienter  disponere,  sancte 
reformare,  ut  vestrae  civitatis  honor  et  utilitas  suadent ; nisi  forte 
vultis  filiis  vestris  ignavos,  potius,  quam  eruditos,  praeesse  Magis- 
tros,  atque  in  civitatem  vestram  competat,  quod  olim  in  Ephe- 
sios  ; — ‘ Nemo  apud  nos  fit  frugi  ; si  quis  extiterit , in  alio  loco 
et  apud  alios  fit  ille .’  Q,uod  si  filios  vestros,  quos  Reipublicae 


1 This  anecdote  is  told  by  Sergeant  Miller,  in  his  Account  of  the  University  of 
Cambridge,  published  in  1717  (p.  188).  It  is  unknown,  so  far  as  we  recollect,  to  all 
the  biographers  of  Locke.  But  William  probably  thought,  like  Dr.  Parr,  “ that  the 
English  Universities  stood  in  need  of  a thorough  reformation  ; only,  as  seminaries  of 
the  church,  it  was  [selfishly]  the  wisest  thing  for  [King  and]  Parliament  to  let  them 
alone,  and  not  raise  a nest  of  hornets  about  their  ears.” — [The  Universities  are  not, 
however,  now  so  strong  ; public  opinion  is  not  now  so  weak ; while  the  nation  at 
length  seems  roused  from  its  apathy,  urgent  and  earnest  for  a reform.] 


WHENCE  A REFORMATION  ? — ASSERTORY S PAMPHLET.  453 

vestrse  profuturos  genuistis,  ton  arum  literarum  gratia  ad  externas 
urbes  et  Universitates  peregre  mittitis  erudiendos,  cur  in  vestra 
urbe  illos  his  studiis  fraudatis  ? Cur  artes  et  literas  non  recipitis 
peregrinas,  qui  filios  vestros  illarum  gratia  emittitis  ad  peregrinos  ? 
— — — Quod  si  nunc  prisci  illi  urbis  vestrae  Senatores 

sepulchris  suis  exirent,  quid  putatis  illos  dicturos,  quod  tam  cele- 
brem  olim  Universitatem  vestram , magnis  sumptibus , laboribus 
et  precibus  ab  ipsis  huic  urbi  comparatam , vos  taliter  cum  obte- 
nebrciri  patimini , turn  funditus  extingui  sustineatis  ? Nemo 
certe  negare  potest,  urbem  vestram  civesque  vestros  omnibus 
Germanise  civitatibus  rerum  atque  morum  magnificentia  ante- 
ponendam,  si  unus  ille  bonarum  literarum  splendor  vobis  non 
deesset.  Polletis  enim  omnibus  fortunse  bonis  et  divitiis,  nullius, 
ad  vitse  et  magnificentise  usum  egetis  ; sed  hsec  omnia  apud  vos 
mortua  sunt,  et  velut  in  pariete  picta ; quoniam  quibus  hsec  vivi- 
ficari  et  animari  debeant,  anima  caretis,  hoc  est,  bonis  Uteris  non 
polletis , in  quibus  solis  honor,  dignitas,  et  immortalis  in  longse- 
vam  posteritatem  gloria  continetur.”1 

The  preceding  statement  will  enable  us  to  make  brief  work 
with  the  Assertor. — His  whole  argument  turns  on  two  cardinal 
propositions  : the  one  of  which,  as  maintained  by  us,  he  refutes ; 
the  other,  as  admitted  by  us,  he  assumes.  Unfortunately,  how- 
ever, we  maintain,  as  the  very  foundation  of  our  case,  the  con- 
verse of  the  proposition  he  refutes  as  ours  ; and  our  case  itself 
is  the  formal  refutation  of  the  very  proposition  he  assumes  as 
conceded. 

The  proposition  professedly  refuted  is — That  the  legitimate 
constitution  of  the  University  of  Oxford  teas  finally  and  exclu- 
sively determined  by  the  Laudian  Code , and  that  all  change  in 
that  constitution , by  subsequent  statute , is  illegal. 

The  proposition  assumed  is — That  the  present  academical  sys- 
tem, though  different  from  that  established  by  the  Laudian  Code, 
is,  however,  ratified  by  subsequent  statute. 

(This  refutation  and  assumption,  taken  together,  imply  the 
conclusion — Thai  the  present  system  is  legal.) 

The  former  proposition,  as  we  said,  is  not  ours ; we  not  only 
never  conceiving  that  so  extravagant  an  absurdity  could  be  main- 
tained, but  expressly  stating  or  notoriously  assuming  the  reverse 
in  almost  every  page,  nay  establishing  it  even  as  the  principal 


Epistolarum,  L.  vii.  ep.  26.  Opera.  II.  p.  1042. 


454  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— OXFORD.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

basis  of  our  argument.  If  this  proposition  were  true,  our  whole 
demonstration  of  the  interested  policy  of  the  Heads  would  have 
been  impossible.  How  could  we  have  shown,  that  the  changes 
introduced  by  them  were  only  for  the  advantage  of  themselves 
and  of  the  collegial  interest  in  general,  unless  we  had  been  able 
to  show,  that  there  existed  in  the  University,  a capacity  of  legal 
change , and  that  the  preference  of  illegal  change  by  the  Heads, 
argued  that  their  novelties  were  such  as,  they  themselves  were 
satisfied,  did  not  deserve  the  countenance  of  Convocation,  that  is, 
of  the  body  legislating  for  the  utility  and  honor  of  the  Univer- 
sity ? If  all  change  had  been  illegal,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
change  (as  must  be  granted)  unavoidable  and  expedient ; thr 
conduct  of  the  Heads  would  have  found  an  ample  cloak  in  the 
folly — in  the  impossibility  of  the  law. — Yet  the  Venerable  and 
Veracious  Member  coolly  “asserts,”  that  this,  as  the  position 
which  we  maintain,  is  the  position  which  he  writes  his  pamphlet 
to  refute.  With  an  effrontery,  indeed,  ludicrous  from  its  extra- 
vagance, he  even  exults  over  our  “ luckless  admission” — “ that 
Convocation  possesses  the  right  of  rescinding  old,  and  of  ratifying 
new,  laws”  (p.  25) ; and  (on  the  hypothesis,  always,  that  we, 
like  himself,  had  an  intention  of  deceiving),  actually  charges  it 
as  “ one  of  our  greatest  blunders” — a blunder  betraying  a total 
want  of  “ common  sense” — “ to  have  referred  to  the  Appendix 
and  Addenda  to  the  Statute-book”  (p.  86),  i.  e.  to  the  work  we 
reviewed,  to  the  documents  on  which  our  argument  was  immedi- 
ately and  principally  founded  I1 

1 It  may  amuse  our  readers  to  hear  how  our  ingenuous  disputant  lays  out  his  pam- 
phlet, alias,  his  refutation  of  “ the  Medish  immutability  of  the  Laudian  digest.”  This 
immutability  he  refutes  by  arguing  : 

“ From  the  general  principles  of  jurisprudence,  as  they  relate  to  the  mutability  of 
human  laws.  (Sect.  II.) — From  the  particular  principles  of  municipal  incorporation, 
as  they  relate  to  the  making  of  by-laws.  (Sect.  III.) — From  the  express  words  of  the 
Corpus  Statutorum.  (Sect.  IV.) — From  immemorial  usage,  that  is,  the  constant 
practice  of  the  University  from  1234  to  1831.  (Sect.  V.)— From  the  principle  of 
adaptation  upon  which  the  statutes  of  1636  were  compiled  and  digested.  (Sect.  VI.) 
— From  Archbishop  Laud’s  own  declarations  in  respect  of  those  statutes.  (Sect.  VII.) 
— From  his  instructions  to  Dr.  Frewin,  in  1638,  to  submit  to  Convocation  some 
amendments  of  the  statute-book,  after  it  had  been  finally  ratified  and  confirmed. 
(Sect.  VIII.) — From  the  alterations  made  in  the  statute-book  after  the  death  of  the 
Archbishop,  but  during  the  lives  of  those  who  were  his  confidential  friends,  and  had 
been  his  coadjutors  in  the  work  of  reforming  it.  (Sect.  IX.) — From  the  alterations 
made  in  the  statute-book  from  time  to  time,  since  the  death  of  the  Archbishop’s  coad- 
jutors to  the  present  day.  (Sect.  X.) — From  the  opinion  of  counsel  upon  the  legality 
of  making  and  altering  statutes,  as  delivered  to  the  Vice-Chancellor,  June  2,  1759. 
(Sect.  XI.) — p.  16. — This  elaborate  parade  of  argument  (the  pamphlet  extends  to  a 
hundred  and  fifty  mortal  pages)  is  literally  answered  in  two  words — Quis  dubilavitV' 


ASSERTOR’8  PAMPHLET. 


455 


In  regard  to  the  latter  proposition,  it  is  quite  true  that  if  the 
former  academical  system  had  been  repealed , and  the  present 
ratified  by  Convocation,  the  actual  order  of  things  in  Oxford  is 
legal,  and  the  Heads  stand  guiltless  in  the  sight  of  God  and 
man.  But,  as  this  is  just  the  matter  in  question,  and  as  instead 
of  the  affirmative  being  granted  by  us,  the  whole  nisus  of  our 
reasoning  was  to  demonstrate  the  negative ; we  must  hold,  that 
since  the  Assertor  has  adduced  nothing  to  invalidate  our  state- 
ments on  this  point,  he  has  left  the  controversy  exactly  as  he  found 
it.  To  take  a single  instance : — Has  he  shown,  or  attempted  to 
show,  that  by  any  subsequent  act  of  Convocation  those  fundament- 
al statutes  which  constitute  and  regulate  the  Professorial  system, 
as  the  one  essential  organ  of  all  academical  education,  have  been 
repealed  ? — nay,  that  the  statutes  of  the  present  century  do  not 
on  this  point  recognize  and  enforce  those  of  those  preceding  ? — 
(Add.  p.  129-133,  pp.  187,  188,  et  passim.)  If  not,  how  on  his 
own  doctrine  of  the  academic  oath  (in  which  we  fully  coincide ), 
does  he  exempt  the  guardians  of  its  statutes,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  other  members  of  the  University,  from  perjury? — (Major.) 
“It”  (the  academic  oath)  “is,  and  will  always  be,  taken  and  kept 
with  a safe  conscience,  as  long  as  the  taker  shall  faithfully  observe 
the  academic  oath,  in  all  its  fundamental  ordinances , and  accord- 
ing to  their  true  meaning  and  intent.  And  with  respect  to  other 
matters,  it  is  safely  taken,  if  taken  according  to  the  will  of  those 
ivho  made  the  law , and  who  have  the  power  to  make  or  unmake, 
to  dispense  with  or  repeal,  any,  or  any  parts  of  any,  laws  edu- 
cational of  the  University,  and  to  sanction  the  administration  of 
the  oath  with  larger  or  more  limited  relations  [i.  e.  ?]  according 
to  what  Convocation  may  deem  best  and  fittest  for  the  ends  it  has 
to  accomplish.'’'1 — (P.  132.) — (Minor.)  In  the  case  adduced,  the 
unobserved  professorial  system  is  a “ fundamental  ordinance,”  is 
exclusively  “according  to  the  will  of  those  who  made,  make,  and 
unmake  the  law,”  exclusively  “according  to  what  Convocation 
deems  the  best  and  fittest.”1 — (Conclusion .)  Consequently,  &c. 

1 See  Sanderson  De  Juramenti  Obligatione,  Prael.  III.  18. — too  long  to  extract. 
— The  Assertor  avers,  but  without  quoting  any  authority,  that  Sanderson  wrote  the 
Epinomis  of  the  Corpus  Statutorum.  If  true,  which  we  do  not  believe,  the  fact  would 
be  curious.  It  is  unnoticed  by  Wood,  in  his  Historia,  Annals,  or  Athena : — is  unknown 
to  Walton,  or  to  any  indeed  of  Sanderson’s  biographers.  It  is  also  otherwise  improbable. 
Sanderson  left  the  University  in  1619,  when  he  surrendered  his  fellowship,  and  only 
returned  in  1642,  when  made  Regius  Professor  of  Divinity.  The  Statutes  were  com- 
piled in  the  interval ; and  why  should  the  Epinomis  be  written  by  any  other  than  the 
delegates  l We  see  the  motive  for  the  fiction  ; — it  is  too  silly  to  bo  worth  mentioning. 


456  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — OXFORD. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

In  confuting  the  propositions  we  have  now  considered,  the  As- 
sertor’s  whole  pamphlet  is  confuted. — We  shall  however  notice 
(what  we  can  not  condescend  to  disprove)  a few  of  the  subaltern 
statements  which,  with  equal  audacity,  he  holds  out  as  maintain- 
ed by  us,  and  some  of  which  he  even  goes  so  far  as  to  support  by 
fabricated  quotations. — Of  these,  one  class  contains  assertions, 
not  simply  false,  hut  precisely  the  reverse  of  the  statements  really 
made  by  us.  Such  for  instance  : — That  we  extolled  the  academic 
system  of  the  Laudian  code  as  perfect  (pp.  95,  96,  144,  &c.); — 
That  we  admitted  the  actual  system  to  he  not  inexpedient  or  in- 
sufficient (p.  95) ; and,  That  this  system  was  introduced  in  use- 
ful accommodation  to  the  changing  circumstances  of  the  age 
(p.  95.) — Another  class  includes  those  assertions  that  are  simply 
false.  For  example  : — That  we  expressed  a general  approbation 
of  the  methods  of  the  ancient  University,  and  of  the  scholastic 
exercises  and  studies,  beyond  an  incidental  recognition  of  the 
utility  of  Disputation,  and  that  too  [though  far  from  undervaluing 
its  advantages  even  now],  in  the  circumstances  of  the  middle 
ages  ; and  we  may  state,  that  the  quotation  repeatedly  alleged 
in  support  of  this  assertion  is  a coinage  of  his  own  (pp.  6,  11,  83, 
96,  97,  138,  139) ; — That  we  reviled  Oxford  for  merely  deviating 
from  her  ancient  institutions  (pp.  5,  11,  12,  95,  &c.) ; — That  we 
said  a single  word  in  delineation  of  the  Chamberdeckyn  at  all, 
far  less  (what  is  pronounced  “ one  of  the  cleverest  sleights  of 
hand  ever  practiced  in  the  whole  history  of  literary  legerdemain”) 
“ transformed  him  into  an  amiable  and  interesting  young  gentle- 
man, poor  indeed  in  pocket,  hut  abundantly  rich  in  intellectual 
energies,  and  in  every  principle  that  adorns  and  dignifies  human 
nature!”  (p.  113.) — Regarding  as  we  do  the  Assertor  only  as  a 
curious  psychological  monstrosity,  we  do  not  affect  to  feel  toward 
him  the  indignation,  with  which,  coming  from  any  other  quarter 
we  should  repel  the  false  and  unsupported  charges  of  “depraving, 
corrupting,  and  mutilating  our  cited  passages”  (p.  24) ; — of  “mak- 
ing fraudulent  use  of  the  names  and  authorities  of  Dr.  Newton 
and  Dr.  Wallis,  of  Lipsius,  Crevier,  and  Du  Boullay”  (p.  142); 
and  to  obtain  the  weight  of  his  authority,  of  fathering  on  Lord 
Bacon  an  apophthegm  of  our  own,  though  only  alleging,  without 
reference,  one  of  the  most  familiar  sentences  of  his  most  popular 
work.  (p.  7.) — To  complete  our  cursory  dissection  of  this  moral 
Lusus  Naturse,  we  shall  only  add  that  he  quotes  us  just  thirteen 
times  ; that  of  these  quotations  one  is  authentic  ; six  are  more  or 


ASSESSOR'S  PAMPHLET. 


457 


less  altered  ; one  is  garbled,  half  a sentence  being  adduced  to  sup- 
port what  the  whole  would  have  overthrown  (p.  20) ; and  five 
are  fabrications  to  countenance  opinions  which  the  fabricator 
finds  it  convenient  to  impute  to  us  (pp.  9,  10,  11,  110,  141). 

We  might  add  much  more,  but  enough  has  now  been  said. — 
We  have  proved  that  our  positions  stand  unconfuted — uncontro- 
verted— untouched ; 1 that  to  seem  even  to  answer,  our  opponent 
has  been  constrained  to  reverse  the  very  argument  he  attacked ; 
and  that  the  perfidious  spirit  in  which  he  has  conducted  the  con- 
troversy, significantly  manifests  his  own  consciousness  of  the 
hopeless  futility  of  his  cause. 


[And  what  was  true  twenty  years  ago,  is,  in  every  respect,  true  now.] 


VI.— ON  THE  RIGHT  OF  DISSENTERS  TO  ADMISSION  INTO 
THE  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES. 


(October,  1834.) 

A Bill  to  remove  certain  Disabilities  which  prevent  some  classes 
of  his  Majesty's  Subjects  from  resorting  to  the  Universities  of 
England , and  proceeding  to  Degrees  therein.  21  April , 1834. 

The  whole  difficulty  of  the  question,  in  regard  to  the  admission 
of  Dissenters  into  the  English  Universities,  lies  in  the  present 
anomalous  state — we  do  not  say  constitution — of  these  establish- 
ments. In  them  the  University , properly  so  called,  i.  e.  the 
necessary  national  establishment  for  general  education,  is  at 
present  illegally  suspended,  and  its  function  usurped,  hut  not 
performed,  by  a number  of  private  institutions  which  have  sprung 
up  in  accidental  connection  with  it,  named  Colleges. 

Now,  the  Claim  of  the  Dissenters  to  admission  into  the  public 
University  can  not  justly  he  refused ; nor,  were  the  University 
in  fact,  what  it  ought  legally  to  he,  would  the  slightest  difficulty 
or  inconvenience  he  experienced  in  rendering  that  right  available. 
But  the  University  has  been  allowed  to  disappear — the  Colleges 
have  been  allowed  to  occupy  its  place : and,  while  the  actual, 
that  is  the  present , right  of  the  Colleges,  as  private  establish- 
ments, to  close  their  gates  on  all  but  members  of  their  own 
foundations,  can  not  be  denied ; independently  of  this  right,  the 
expediency  is  worse  than  doubtful,  either,  on  the  one  hand,  of 
forcing  a College  to  receive  inmates,  not  bound  to  accommodate 
themselves  to  its  religious  observances,  or,  on  the  other,  of  exact- 
ing from  those  entitled  to  admission,  conformity  to  religious 
observances,  in  opposition  to  their  faith.  Now,  neither  in  the 
bill  itself,  nor  in  any  of  the  pamphlets  and  speeches  in  favor  of 
the  Dissenters,  or  against  them,  is  there  any  attempt  made  to 


EEAL  QUESTION  AT  ISSUE. 


459 


grapple  with,  the  real  difficulties  of  the  question;  and  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  measure  are  thus  left  to  triumph  on  untenable 
ground,  in  objections  which  might  be  retorted  with  tenfold  effect 
upon  themselves. 

The  sum  of  all  the  arguments  for  exclusion  amounts  to  this  : 
— The  admission  of  the  Dissenters  is  inexpedient , as  inconsistent 
with  the  present  state  of  education  in  the  Universities,  which  is 
assumed  to  be  all  that  it  ought  to  be  ; and  unjust , as  tending  to 
deprive  those  of  their  influence,  who  are  assumed  to  have  most 
worthily  discharged  their  trust. — In  reply,  it  has  been  only  feebly 
attempted,  admitting  the  assumptions,  to  evade  the  right,  and  to 
palliate  the  inconveniences.  Instead  of  this,  it  ought  to  have 
been  boldly  contended  : — in  the  first  place,  that  the  actual  state 
of  education  in  these  schools  is  entitled  to  no  respect,  as  contrary 
at  once  to  law  and  to  reason ; and  that  all  inconveniences  disap- 
pear the  moment  that  the  Universities  are  in  the  state  to  which 
law  and  reason  demand  that  they  be  restored ; in  the  second , 
that  so  far  from  unjustly  degrading  upright  and  able  trustees, 
these  trustees  have,  for  their  proper  interest,  violated  their  public 
duty ; and,  for  the  petty  ends  of  their  own  private  institutions, 
abolished  the  great  national  establishment,  of  whose  progressive 
improvement  they  had  solemnly  vowed  to  be  the  faithful  guard- 
ians. 

In  attempting  any  reform  of  an  ancient  institution  like  the 
English  Universities,  it  should  be  laid  down  as  a fundamental 
principle,  that  the  changes  introduced  be,  as  far  as  possible,  in 
conformity  with  the  spirit  and  even  the  mechanism  of  these  in- 
stitutions themselves.  The  English  Universities,  as  spontaneously 
developed  and  as  legally  established,  consist  of  tioo  elements ; 
and  the  separate  perfection,  and  mutual  co-operation  and  coun- 
terpoise of  these  elements,  determine  the  perfection  of  the  consti- 
tuted whole.  The  one  of  these,  principal  and  necessary,  is  the 
public  instruction  and  examination  in  the  several  faculties  af- 
forded by  the  University  Proper ; the  other,  subordinate  and 
accidental,  is  the  private  superintendence  exercised  in  the  Li- 
censed House,  which  the  under-graduate  must  inhabit,  and  the 
private  tuition  afforded  by  the  Licensed  Tutor,  under  whose 
guidance  he  must  place  himself.  We  are  no  enemies  to  this 
constitution.  On  the  contrary,  we  hold  that  it  affords  the  condi- 
tion of  an  absolutely  perfect  University.  The  English  Universi- 
ties, however,  afford  a melancholy  illustration  of  the  axiom, 


460 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


“ Corrupt io  optimi  pessima .”  In  them  the  principles  of  health 
are  converted  into  the  causes  of  disease. 

In  two  preceding  articles  [the  two  last],  we  have  shown  (espe- 
cially in  regard  to  Oxford,  but  in  all  essential  circumstances  our 
statements  apply  equally  to  Cambridge),  that  in  the  English  Uni- 
versities there  is  organized,  by  Statute,  an  extensive  system  of 
Public  instruction,  through  a competent  body  of  Professors  con- 
stantly Lecturing  in  all  the  Faculties ; but  that,  de  facto,  this 
statutory  system  has  now  no  practical  existence.  We  have 
shown  that,  besides  this  original  and  principal  system — through 
which,  in  fact,  alone  other  Universities  accomplish  their  end — 
the  English  Universities  came  subsequently  to  employ  two  other 
subordinate  means — means  intended  more  to  insure  order  than 
to  bestow  instruction.  In  the  first  place,  they  required,  from  a 
remote  period,  that  every  member  of  the  University  should  belong 
to  some  house  governed  by  a graduate,  licensed  by  the  academical 
authorities,  and  responsible  to  them  for  the  conduct  of  the  other 
members  of  the  establishment ; and  in  the  second,  they  have,  for 
above  two  centuries,  enjoined  that  all  under-graduates,  who  were 
then  generally  four  years  younger  than  at  present,  should  be  like- 
wise under  the  special  discipline  of  a tutor , whose  principal  office 
it  was,  privately  to  do  what  the  University  could  not  constitu- 
tionally, in  its  lay  Faculty  of  Arts,1  publicly  attempt — “ institute 
his  pupil  in  the  rudiments  of  religion  and  the  doctrine  of  the 
Thirty-nine  Articles but  so  little  was  expected  from  this  sub- 
sidiary instructor,  that  by  statute  any  one  is  competent  to  the 
office  who  has  proceeded  to  his  Bachelors’  degree  in  Arts  (a  de- 
gree formerly  taken  by  the  age  at  which  the  University  is  now 
entered),  and  whose  moral  and  religious  character  is  approved  by 
the  head  of  the  house  to  which  he  belongs,2  or  in  the  event  of  a 
dispute  on  this  point,  by  the  Vice-Chancellor.  We  also  showed 
how  all  these  parts  of  the  public  academical  constitution  had 
been  illegally  annihilated,  or  perverted  by  the  influence  and  for 
the  behoof  of  a private  interest  in  the  University.  This  interest 


1 [It  has  been  ignorantly  contended  against  this,  that  the  Faculty  of  Arts  in  the 
older  Universities  was  not  lay  hit  clerical ; and  this  on  the  ground  that  the  learners  and 
teachers  of  that  faculty  are  frequently  called  clcrici.  But  those  who  know  any  thing 
of  medieval  language  are  aware,  that  clcricus  necessarily  means  nothing  more  than 
gownsman,  scholaris.  Even  the  expression  benefit  of  clergy  in  the  English  law  might 
have  prevented  the  mistake.] 

2 It  does  not  appear  from  the  statutes  that  the  tutor  must  be  of  the  same  house  with 
the  pupil. 


REAL  QUESTION  AT  ISSUE— ADMISSIONS. 


461 


was  the  collegial.  "We  traced  how,  through  the  unconstitutional 
elevation  (by  Laud)  of  the  College  Heads  to  a public  academical 
body,  intrusted  with  the  exclusive  guardianship  of  the  statutes, 
and  the  initiative  of  every  legislative  measure,  the  collegial  in- 
terest had  contrived,  through  “ the  broken  faith  and  perjury”  of 
its  heads,  to  effect  the  following  exploits  : — 1.  To  obtain  the  mo- 
nopoly of  board  and  lodging,  by  frustrating  the  former  easy  es- 
tablishment of  Halls  (authorized,  but  unincorporated  houses) ; 
and  by  preventing,  through  every  disastrous  mean,  an  influx  of 
students  to  the  University  beyond  their  own  limits  of  accommo- 
dation. 2.  To  usurp  the  monopoly  of  the  tutorial  office  for  their 
fellows,  although  fellowships  are  in  few  instances  (especially  in 
Oxford)  the  rewards  of  merit,  but  usually  the  gifts  of  accident 
and  caprice.  3.  To  abolish  the  whole  statutory  system  of  public 
or  professorial  instruction  in  all  the  faculties  ; and  thus  to  render 
the  wretched  scantling  of  preliminary  instruction  afforded  by  the 
college  fellows,  the  sum  of  necessary  education  for  all  professions 
which  the  University  was  permitted  to  supply. — We  have  reca- 
pitulated these  things,  because,  in  considering  the  consequences 
of  the  proposed  measure,  it  is  requisite  to  bear  in  mind,  not  only 
what  is  the  actual,  but  what  is  the  legal  system  of  these  institu- 
tions. 

With  the  view  of  simplifying  the  question,  and  removing  all 
unnecessary  confusion,  we  shall  make  at  once  certain  preliminary 
admissions. 

In  the  first  place,  we  admit  that  the  colleges  are  foundations 
private  to  their  incorporated  members ; that  their  admission  of 
extranei  or  independent  members,  is  wholly  optional ; and  that, 
as  they  may  exclude  all,  they  consequently  may  exclude  any. 
The  legislature,  can  not,  therefore,  without  a change  of  their 
constitution,  deprive  them  of  this  fundamental  right. 

In  the  second  place,  we  admit  that,  whether  the  religious  ob- 
servances of  the  colleges  be  imposed  by  their  statutes  or  by  the 
members  themselves  of  the  foundation,  that  it  would  be  an  un- 
warrantable exercise  of  legislative  interference,  either  on  the  one 
hand  to  compel  them  to  accommodate  these  observances  to  the 
taste  of  those  intruded  into  their  society ; or,  on  the  other,  to 
subvert  the  discipline  of  the  house,  by  emancipating  any  part  of 
its  inmates  from  the  rules  established  for  the  conduct  of  the 
whole. 

In  the  third  place,  we  admit,  that  compelling  the  college  to 


462  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


receive  dissenters,  it  would  be  wholly  impossible  to  compel,  for  a 
continuance  at  least,  the  dissenters  to  the  religious  observances 
of  the  college. 

We  admit,  in  the  fourth  place,  that  if  to  the  colleges  were  left 
the  right  of  optional  exclusion,  few  dissenters,  in  the  present  state 
of  the  Universities,  would  either  condescend  to  enter,  or  be  able, 
if  so  inclined,  to  accomplish  their  desire. — On  the  one  side,  the 
dissenter  would  be  thus  exposed  to  the  humiliation  of  refusal ; 
constrained,  if  admitted,  to  compliance  with  religious  exercises  to 
which  he  is  adverse ; and  exposed  to  all  the  indignities  through 
which  a baffled  bigotry  might  delight  to  avenge  itself. — On  the 
other  hand,  the  accommodation  in  the  colleges,  even  at  pres- 
ent, is  quite  inadequate  to  the  demand  for  admission ; the  col- 
leges can  not,  therefore,  hereafter  be  expected  to  exclude  their 
brethren  of  the  church  to  admit  their  cousins  of  the  meeting- 
house— supposing  even  the  irritation  to  have  subsided,  which 
the  victory  of  the  dissenters  would  at  first,  at  least,  inevitably 
occasion. 

In  the  fifth  place,  we  admit  that,  as  they  are  now  operative , 
the  English  Universities  exist  only  in  and  through  the  Colleges ; 
that  as  the  Colleges  are  private  foundations,  the  Universities,  in 
their  actual  stale , are  not  national  establishments ; and  that  as 
it  would  be  unjust  to  force  the  dissenters  on  the  Colleges,  conse- 
quently it  would  be  either  unjust  or  idle,  as  things  at  present 
stand , to  bestow  on  dissenters  the  right  of  entering  the  Univer- 
sities. 

These  admissions,  though  the  points  mainly  contended  for  by 
the  opponents  of  the  bill,  do  not,  however,  determine  the  ques- 
tion. On  the  contrary,  they  only  manifest  the  present  preposter- 
ous state  of  the  Universities,  and  the  utter  ignorance  that  prevails 
in  regard  to  their  normal  condition. — It  is  certainly  true,  that  if 
in  Oxford  and  Cambridge  the  Colleges  constitute  the  University, 
the  dissenters  have  no  claim  to  admission ; because  in  that  case 
the  University  is  not  a national  foundation.  But,  that  the  Uni- 
versity exists  only  through  the  colleges,  the  former  being  a great 
incorporation,  of  which  the  latter  form  the  constituent  parts,  is  a 
proposition  so  utterly  false,  and  is  founded  on  so  radical  an  igno- 
rance of  the  history  and  constitution  of  the  schools  in  question, 
that  we  should  have  deemed  it  wholly  unworthy  of  refutation, 
were  it  not  maintained  by  so  respectable  an  authority  as  Bishop 
Copplestone ; and  assumed  with  impunity,  nay,  general  acqui- 


HEAL  QUESTION  AT  ISSUE— OBJECTIONS. 


46s 


escence — as  a basis  for  their  argument,  by  Mr.  G-oulburn  and  Sir 
Robert  Inglis,  the  representatives  of  either  English  University, 
in  the  recent  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  upon  the  ques- 
tion. Mr.  G-oulburn,  in  his  speech  against  the  bill,  and  Mr. 
Baynes,  in  his  speech  in  favor  of  it,  both  asserted,  that  when 
Edward  I.  visited  Cambridge,  Peter-House,  being  then  the  only 
college  in  existence,  alone  constituted  the  University.  “ Peter- 
House  College1'1  (interrupts  the  latter)  “ ivas  at  that  time  the 
xvhole  University  P “ I knoio  it  teas ,”  resumes  the  learned  rep- 
resentative of  the  University,  of  whose  history  he  is  so  well  in- 
formed. At  the  date  in  question,  the  scholars  of  the  University 
of  Cambridge  were  certainly  above  five  thousand — the  inmates 
of  Peter-House  probably  under  fifty  ! We  had  formerly  occasion 
(p.  394,  note)  to  animadvert  on  this  mistake  ; and  shall  at  present 
only  say,  that  the  Universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge  were 
incorporated  and  privileged  before,  in  either  place,  there  was  a 
college  in  existence  ; that  they  flourished  as  general  studies  long 
before  a single  College  was  established ; and  that  they  owe  their 
downfall  in  these  latter  ages  to  the  corrupt  and  unconstitutional 
subjection  of  the  Academical  Legislature  to  the  control  or  influ- 
ence of  the  College  Heads.  To  say,  in  fact,  that  the  English 
Universities  are  national  foundations,  is  saying  far  too  little. 
Those  at  all  acquainted  with  the  rise  of  the  more  ancient  Uni- 
versities, and  in  particular  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge  know  that 
they  were  literally  cosmopolite  corporations  ; and  if  in  their  priv- 
ileges a preference  were  betrayed  at  all,  it  was  not  generally  in 
favor  of  the  native. 

But  admitting  (what  can  not  be  denied)  the  natural  right  of 
the  Dissenters  to  the  privileges  of  the  Public  University,  and  on 
the  hypothesis,  that  special  grounds  can  not  be  alleged  to  warrant 
its  suspension ; — How,  it  may  be  asked,  can  they  make  their 
right  available  ? 

In  the  first  place,  in  whatsoever  manner  it  has  been  brought 
about,  the  result  is  unfortunately  certain : — Neither  University 
now  affords  any  public  education  worthy  of  the  name.  If,  there- 
fore, it  may  be  said,  the  dissenters  obtain  a right  of  entrance  to 
the  University,  without  also  obtaining  a right  of  admission  to  the 
Colleges,  they  icill  be  foiled  of  all  benefit  from  the  concession. — 
To  this  we  answer,  that  the  dissenters  and  all  other  citizens 
are  entitled  to  demand , that  the  Universities  be  restored  to  an 
efficient — to  a legal  state  ; and  that  the  guardianship  of  the  re- 


464  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


formed  school  be  confided  to  worthier  trustees  than  those  who 
have  hitherto  employed  their  authority  only  to  frustrate  its  end. 
— We  gladly  join  issue  with  the  Bishop  of  Exeter  and  Sir  Robert 
Inglis  on  this  point. 

In  the  second  place,  it  may  be  said : — You  admit  that  Dissen- 
ters have  no  title  to  demand  admission  to  the  Colleges ; the  Uni- 
versity requires  that  all  students  should  belong  to  a privileged 
house ; there  are  no  privileged  houses  but  the  Colleges  and  their 
dependent  halls ; the  only  gates  to  the  University  are  therefore 
closed — how  are  they  to  get  in  ? — To  this  we  say,  various  expedi- 
ents may  be  proposed.  But  before  attempting  an  answer,  let  us 
take  a review  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  system  of  domestic 
superintendence  in  the  Universities ; and  we  shall  avail  ourselves 
of  the  observations  on  this  subject  made  in  a former  article,  to 
which  for  proof  and  details  we  must  refer.  [P.  401,  sg\] 

During  the  middle  ages,  the  vast  concourse  of  students  of  every 
country  to  the  greater  Universities  made  it  necessary  to  employ 
various  methods  of  academical  police.  In  the  English  Univer- 
sities, the  Chancellor  and  his  deputy  combined  the  powers  of  the 
rector  and  the  two  Chancellors  in  Paris ; and  the  inspection  and 
control,  chiefly  exercised  in  the  latter,  through  the  distribution  of 
the  scholars  of  the  University  into  nations  and  tribes,  under  the 
government  of  rector,  procurators,  and  deans,  was,  in  the  former, 
more  especially  accomplished  by  collecting  the  students  into 
certain  privileged  houses,  under  the  control  of  a principal,  re- 
sponsible for  the  conduct  of  the  members.  This  subordination 
was  not  indeed  established  at  once ; and  the  scholars  at  first 
lodged,  without  domestic  superintendence,  in  the  houses  of  the 
citizens.  In  the  year  1231,  we  find  it  only  ordained,  by  royal 
edict,  “ that  every  clerk  or  scholar  [resident  in  Oxford  or  Cam- 
bridge] should  subject  himself  to  the  discipline  and  tuition  of 
some  master  of  the  schools or,  on  a different  reading,  “ some 
master  of  scholars i.  e.  we  presume,  enter  himself  as  the  pe- 
culiar disciple  of  one  or  other  of  the  actual  regents.  And  in  the 
same  year,  the  academical  taxers  are  instituted,  in  imitation  of 
the  foreign  Universities,  in  order  to  check  the  exorbitant  charge 
for  lodging  usually  practiced  on  the  part  of  the  townsmen. — By 
the  commencement  of  the  fifteenth  century,  it  appears,  however, 
to  have  become  established  law,  that  all  scholars  should  be  mem- 
bers of  some  College,  hall,  or  entry,  under  a responsible  head. 
In  the  subsequent  history  of  the  University  we  find  more  frequent 


HISTORY  OF  DOMESTIC  SUPERINTENDENCE. 


465 


and  decisive  measures  taken  in  Oxford  against  the  Chamber- 
dekyns , or  scholars  haunting  the  public  lectures,  but  of  no  author- 
ized house,  than  in  Paris  were  ever  employed  against  the  Marti- 
nets. And  while  in  the  foreign  Universities  none  but  students 
of  the  faculty  of  arts  were  subjected  to  collegial  or  bursal  super- 
intendence ; in  the  English  Universities,  the  graduates  and  under- 
graduates of  every  faculty  were  equally  required  to  be  members 
of  a privileged  house. 

By  this  regulation,  the  students  were  compelled  to  collect 
themselves  into  houses  of  community,  variously  denominated 
Halls,  Hostels,  Inns,  Entries,  Chambers  ( Aulae , Hospitia,  Intro- 
itus,  Camerae).  These  Hails  were  governed  by  peculiar  statutes, 
established  by  the  University,  by  whom  they  were  also  visited 
and  reformed  ; and  they  were  administered  by  a principal,  elected 
by  the  scholars  themselves,  but  admitted  to  his  office  by  the 
chancellor  or  his  deputy,  on  finding  caution  for  payment  of  the 
rent.  The  Halls  were  in  general  held  only  on  lease ; but  by  a 
privilege  common  to  most  Universities,  houses  once  occupied  by 
clerks  or  students  could  not  again  be  taken  from  the  gown,  if  the 
rent  were  punctually  discharged  ; the  rate  of  which  was  quin- 
quennially  fixed  by  the  academical  taxators.  The  great  majority 
of  the  scholars  who  inhabited  these  Halls  lived  at  their  own  ex- 
pense ; but  the  benevolent  motives  which,  in  other  countries, 
determined  the  establishment  of  Colleges  and  private  bursce,  no- 
where operated  more  powerfully  than  in  England.  In  a few 
houses,  foundations  were  made  for  the  support  of  a certain  num- 
ber of  indigent  scholars,  who  were  incorporated  as  fellows  (or 
joint  participators  in  the  endowment),  under  the  government  of  a 
head.  But  with  an  unenlightened  liberality,  these  benefactions 
were  not,  as  eleswhere,  exclusively  limited  to  learners , during 
their  academical  studies,  and  to  instructors ; and  while  merit 
was  not  often  the  condition  on  which  their  members  were  elected, 
the  subjection  of  the  Colleges  to  private  statutes,  with  their 
emancipation  from  the  control  of  the  academical  authorities,  gave 
them  interests  apart  from  those  of  the  public,  and  not  only  dis- 
qualified them  from  co-operating  toward  the  general  ends  of  the 
University,  but  rendered  them,  instead  of  powerful  aids,  the 
worst  impediments  to  its  utility. 

The  Colleges,  into  which  commoners,  or  members  not  on  the 
foundation,  were,  until  a comparatively  modern  date,  rarely 
admitted,  remained  also  for  many  centuries  few  in  comparison 

Go 


466  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


with  the  Halls.  The  latter  were  counted  by  hundreds ; the  former, 
even  at  the  present  day,  extend  only  to  nineteen. 

In  Oxford,  at  the  commencement,  of  the  fourteenth  century, 
the  number  of  the  Halls  was  about  three  hundred — the  num- 
ber of  the  secular  Colleges  at  the  highest,  only  three.  At  the 
commencement  of  the  fifteenth  century,  when  the  Colleges  had 
risen  to  seven , it  appears,  that  the  students  had  diminished  as 
the  foundations  had  increased.  At  the  commencement  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  the  number  of  Halls  had  fallen  to  fifty-jive , 
while  the  secular  Colleges  had,  before  1516,  been  multiplied  to 
twelve. 

From  causes,  which,  in  our  former  article  we  fully  stated,  the 
Universities  during  the  period  of  the  Reformation  were  almost 
literally  deserted.  The  Halls,  whose  existence  solely  depended 
on  the  confluence  of  students,  thus  fell ; and  none,  it  is  probable 
would  have  survived  the  crisis,  had  not  several  chanced  to  be  the 
property  of  certain  Colleges,  which  had  thus  an  interest  in  their 
support. 

The  circumstances  which  occasioned  the  ruin  of  the  Halls,  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  Cloisters  and  Colleges  of  the  monastic  orders 
in  Oxford,  not  only  gave  to  the  secular  Colleges,  which  all  re- 
mained, a preponderant  weight  in  the  University  for  the  juncture, 
but  allowed  them  so  to  extend  their  circuit  and  to  increase  their 
numbers,  that  they  were  subsequently  enabled  to  comprehend 
within  their  walls  nearly  the  whole  of  the  academical  population: 
though,  previously  to  the  sixteenth  century,  they  appear  to  have 
rarely,  if  ever,  admitted  independent  members  at  all.  As  the 
students  fell  off,  the  rents  of  the  Flails,  which  could  not  be  alien- 
ated from  academical  purposes,  were  taxed  always  at  a lower 
rate  ; and  they  became,  at  last,  of  so  insignificant  a value  to  the 
landlords,  that  they  were  always  willing  to  dispose  of  this  fallen 
and  falling  property  for  a trifling  consideration.  In  Oxford,  land 
and  houses  became  a drug.  The  old  colleges  thus  extended  their 
limits,  by  easy  purchase,  from  the  impoverished  burghers ; and 
the  new  colleges,  of  which  there  were  four  established  within 
half  a century  subsequent  to  the  Reformation,  and  altogether  six 
during  the  sixteenth  century,  were  built  on  sites  either  obtained 
gratuitously  or  for  an  insignificant  price.  After  this  period  only 
one  College  was  founded — in  1610  ; and  three  of  the  eight  Halls 
transmuted  into  Colleges,  in  1610,  1702,  and  1740 ; but  of  these 
one  is  now  extinct. 


HISTORY  OF  DOMESTIC  SUPERINTENDENCE.  467 

These  circumstances  explain  in  what  manner  the  Halls  declined ; 
it  remains  to  tell,  why,  in  the  most  crowded  state  of  the  Univer- 
sity, not  one  has  been  subsequently  restored. — Before  the  era  of 
their  downfall,  the  establishment  of  a Hall  was  easy.  It  required 
only  that  a few  scholars  should  hire  a house,  find  caution  for  a 
year’s  rent,  and  choose  for  principal  a graduate  of  respectable 
character.  The  chancellor,  or  his  deputy,  could  not  refuse  to 
sanction  the  establishment.  An  act  of  usurpation  abolished  this 
facility.  The  general  right  of  nomination  to  the  principality, 
and  consequently  to  the  institution  of  Halls,  was,  “ through  the 
absolute  potency  he  had,  procured  by  the  Earl  of  Leicester,” 
Chancellor  of  the  University,  about  1570  ; and  it  is  now,  by  stat- 
ute, vested  in  his  successors.  In  surrendering  this  privilege  to 
the  chancellor,  the  Colleges  were  not  blind  to  their  peculiar  inter- 
est. From  his  situation,  that  magistrate  was  sure  to  be  guided 
by  their  Heads  : no  Hall  has  since  arisen  to  interfere  with  their 
monopoly ; and  the  collegial  interest,  thus  left  without  a coun- 
terpoise, and  concentrated  in  a few  hands,  was  soon  able  to 
establish  an  absolute  supremacy  in  the  University. 

Having  thus,  in  obedience  to  Bacon’s  precept,  “reduced  things 
to  their  first  institution,  and  observed  how  they  had  degenerated 
we  are  in  a condition  “ to  take  counsel  of  both  times — of  the 
ancienter  time  what  is  best,  and  of  the  later  time  what  is  fittest ; 
to  reform  without  bravery  or  scandal  of  former  ages  ; but  yet,  to 
set  it  down  to  ourselves  as  well  to  create  good  precedents  as  to 
follow  them.” 

Were  the  system  of  public  education  in  the  English  Universi- 
ties recalled  into  being,  raised  to  the  perfection  which  it  ought  to 
obtain,  and  access  to  its  benefits  again  opened  to  all ; — a greatly 
increased  resort  to  Oxford,  and  Cambridge  would  be  the  inevitable 
result.  The  Colleges  and  Halls  hardly  suffice  at  present ; — how 
then  can  additional  numbers,  without  detriment,  if  not  with  ad- 
vantage, to  the  established  discipline,  be  accommodated  ? — Now, 
in  answering  this  question,  we  may  do  so  either  generally — or  in 
special  reference  to  the  Dissenters.  But  it  is  evident,  that  an 
expedient  mode  of  solving  the  problem,  is,  if  possible,  to  be  de- 
vised, without  taking  religious  differences  into  account. 

The  only  plan  that  has  been  proposed  to  obviate  the  difficulties 
which  the  actual,  though  illegal,  merging  of  the  public  Univer- 
sity in  the  private  Colleges  presents  to  the  admission  of  Dissenters, 
is  to  allow  them  to  found  a College  or  Colleges  for  themselves. — 


468 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OE  DISSENTERS. 


We  strongly  deprecate  this  plan.  We  do  not,  of  course,  question 
the  right  of  the  Dissenters,  if  admitted  to  the  University,  of 
founding  and  endowing  Colleges,  nay  of  imposing  what  religious 
conditions  they  may  choose,  either  on  a participation  in  the  en- 
dowments or  on  admission  within  the  walls.  But  we  regard  the 
exercise  of  this  right  as  inexpedient — even  as  detrimental,  in  the 
highest  degree.  To  say  nothing  of  its  expense,  and  supposing 
always  that  such  a measure  might  he  carried  into  effect  with  far 
better  means  of  furthering  the  ends  of  education  than  the  old 
foundations,  through  their  fellows,  generally  supply ; still  it  would 
accomplish  nothing  which  may  not  he  effected  by  much  easier 
methods  ; while  it  would  contribute  to  entail  a continuance  of 
that  sectarian  bigotry  and  intolerance  which,  in  this  country,  at 
present,  equally  disgraces  the  established  and  dissenting  divisions 
of  our  common  faith.  By  this  proceeding,  the  exclusive  spirit  of 
the  present  colleges  would  he  imitated,  justified,  exacerbated,  and 
perpetuated  ; and  in  the  old  Colleges  and  the  new  together,  the 
Universities  would  become  the  nurseries  and  camps  and  battle 
fields  of  a ferocious  and  contemptible  polemic : whereas,  left  to 
themselves,  and  to  the  influence  of  a more  enlightened  spirit, 
there  is  no  doubt,  but  the  ancient  foundations  will  be  gradually 
won  over  by  the  liberality  of  the  age,  and  the  charities  of  a 
common  Christianity.  We  are  confident,  their  disabilities  being- 
removed,  and  the  means  offered  to  the  Dissenters  of  a University 
education,  without  any  forced  religious  compliances,  that  they 
would  never  think  of  establishing  for  themselves  collegiate  foun- 
dations of  a sectarian  character ; and  we  are  equally  confident, 
that  if  this  were  not  attempted  by  them,  and  did  the  accommoda- 
tion in  the  authorized  houses  of  the  University  once  exceed  in  a 
degree  the  demand  for  admission,  that  the  Colleges  would  be 
equally  patent  to  such  Dissenters  as  were  not  averse  from  their 
observances,  as  to  members  of  the  Established  Church.  And  that 
such  means  may  be  easily  afforded,  without  violating  the  consti- 
tutional discipline  of  the  Universities,  is  manifest  from  the  history 
we  have  previously  given  of  the  system  of  their  domestic  super- 
intendence. 

Without,  therefore,  proposing  to  dispense  with  domestic  super- 
intendence altogether,  as  was  originally  the  case  in  Oxford  and 
Cambridge,  and  as  has  been  always  generally  practiced  in  other 
Universities  ; and  without  supposing  the  necessity  of  any  ex- 
pensive foundations,  or  even  of  establishments  that  will  not  easily 


OBJECTION  FROM  RELIGIOUS  DISCIPLINE. 


469 


support  themselves  ; we  think  the  difficulty  may  be  overcome, 
by  simply  returning  to  the  ancient  practice  of  the  English  Uni- 
versities,* in  regard  to  the  easy  establishment  of  Halls  or  Hostels ; 
under  any  new  restrictions,  however,  that  may  be  found  proper 
to  enhance  their  character  and  utility. — These  Halls  may  he 
established  under  a double  form.  Either  the  Hall  shall  consist, 
only  of  a single  house,  in  which  its  head  or  principal  (necessarily 
a graduate)  resides  ; or  of  a number  of  separate  houses,  each 
under  the  care  of  an  inferior  officer,  hound  to  report  to  the  prin- 
cipal all  violatic&is  of  rule.  The  advantage  of  the  latter  form 
would  he  its  more  moderate  expense.  The  great  benefits  which 
this  return  to  the  natural  system  of  the  University  would  afford, 
in  breaking  the  detestable  monopoly  of  the  fellow-tutors — in 
presenting  to  merit  a free  and  honorable  field  of  competition — 
in  retaining  in  the  Universities  men  of  distinguished  learning  and 
ability — in  determining  an  improvement  both  of  the  public  and 
private  education — and  in  raising  to  a high  pitch  the  standard  of 
aoademic  accomplishment ; these,  and  other  advantages,  we  may 
probably  take  a more  fitting  opportunity  of  discussing.  In  refer- 
ence to  our  present  question,  this  restoration  of  the  Halls  would, 
we  think,  obviate  all  difficulties  in  regard  to  the  Dissenters,  were 
the  routine  of  morning  and  evening  prayers,  in  conformity  to  the 
Liturgy,  simply  not  rendered  imperative  in  the  new  establish- 
ments ; of  which,  indeed,  for  the  sake  of  religion  itself,  the  old 
ought,  perhaps,  to  be  relieved. — But  on  details  we  can  not  now 
enter ; and  hasten  to  consider  the  other  objections  by  which  the 
measure  for  the  admission  of  Dissenters  has  been  principally 
opposed. 

1°,  It  is  objected,  that  Universities  in  general,  and  the  English 
Universities  in  particular,  are  not  more  places  of  literary  and 
scientific  instruction  than  places  of  religious  education;  that 
religion  can  be  only  taught  on  the  doctrine  of  a single  sect ; that 
the  dominant  sect  in  the  state  must  remain  the  dominant  sect 
in  the  University  ; consequently,  Universities,  and  especially  the 
English  Universities,  are  not  places  into  which  Dissenters  from 
the  established  faith  ought  either  to  wish,  or  should  be  allowed, 
to  enter. 

This  objection  is  of  any  cogency  only  from  the  miserable  con- 
fusion in  which  it  is  involved.  We  must  make  two  distinctions: 
— distinguish,  firstly,  the  religious  education  given  in  the  Public 
University  from  the  religious  education  afforded  in  the  Private 


470  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

Colleges  ; and,  secondly,  in  the  former,  the  professional  instruc- 
tion in  religion  given  to  the  future  divine  in  the  faculty  of  Theo- 
logy, from  the  liberal  instruction  in  religion  which  miy*be  given 
to  all  in  the  preliminary  or  general  faculty  of  Arts. 

In  so  far  as  regards  the  University  Proper,  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty whatever.  We  shall  suppose  this  restored  to  life — to  he  as 
it  has  been,  and  ought  to  he.  It  will  not  he  contended  that, 
either  in  the  English  Universities,  or  in  any  University  whatever, 
it  was  ever  required  or  expected,  if  indeed  allowed,  that  persons 
admitted  for  general  education  in  arts,  or  for  professional  educa- 
tion in  law  or  medicine,  should  attend  the  professional  lectures 
delivered  in  the  theological  faculty.  The  theological  faculty  will 
always  teach  the  doctrine  of  the  establishment  ; hut  n6ne  need 
attend  its  instruction  besides  those  destined  for  the  church  : — nay, 
to  the  ineffable  disgrace  of  the  establishment  and  Universities,  so 
far  are  Oxford  and  Cambridge  from  being  pre-eminently  relig- 
ious schools,  that  the  Anglican  is  the  one  example  in  Christen- 
dom of  a church , whose  members  are  not  prepared  for  their  holy 
calling , by  an  academical  course  of  education  in  the  different 
branches  of  theology ; and  the  English  are  the  only  Universi- 
ties in  the  ivorld,  hi  which  such  a course  can  not  actually  be  ob- 
tained. The  English  clergyman  is  perhaps  destitute  of  academ- 
ical education  altogether ; but  if  he  enjoys  this  advantage,  “ one 
fortnight”  (to  use  the  words  of  Professor  Pusey),  comprises 
the  beginning  and  end  of  all  the  public  instruction  which  any 
candidate  for  holy  orders  is  required  to  attend,  previously  to 
entering  upon  his  profession.”  Yet,  though  the  London  Univer- 
sity only  omits,  what  the  Church  of  England  does  not  think  it 
necessary  to  require  of  its  ministers — a course  of  professional 
education  in  divinity — and  though  the  London  University  ac- 
tually teaches  what  Oxford  and  Cambridge  teach  only  in  stat- 
ute ; yet  the  members  of  that  church  and  of  these  Universities 
clamor  against  the  incorporation  of  the  London  University , be- 
cause, forsooth,  it  does  not  fulfill  the  conditions  which  its  name 
implies  ! 

We  may  take  this  opportunity,  by  way  of  parenthesis,  of  say- 
ing a few  words  in  exposition  of  the  very  general  mistake  in 
regard  to  the  name  and  nature  of  a University ; — a mistake 
which  threatens  to  become  of  serious  practical  importance,  from 
the  consequences  that  are  now  in  the  course  of  being  deduced 
from  it.  University , in  its  academical  application,  is  supposed 


MUST  A UNIVERSITY  COMPRISE  THEOLOGY? 


471 


to  mean  a University  of  sciences  or  faculties  ( scientiarum , facul- 
tatum  universitas). 

Pleased  as  we  are  with  the  candor  of  Mr.  Sewell’s  confessions 
— “that  the  University  of  Oxford  is  not  an  enlightened  body” — 
“that  we  (its  members)  have  little  liberality  in  religion” — and 
“ study  logic  in  a very  humble  way we  should  hardly  have 
been  moved  to  a refutation  of  his  opinion  (founded  on  this  inter- 
pretation of  the  word),  that  the  “ University  of  London,”  as  ex- 
cluding theology  from  its  course  of  studies,  is  unentitled  to  the 
name  it  has  usurped.  But  when  it  has  been  seriously  argued 
before  the  Privy  Council  by  Sir  Charles  Wetherell,  on  behalf  of 
the  English  Universities,  as  a ground  for  denying  a charter  to 
this  institution,  that  the  simple  fact  of  the  Crown  incorporating 
an  academy  under  the  name  of  University,  necessarily,  and  in 
spite  of  reservations,  concedes  to  that  academy  the  right  of  grant- 
ing all  possible  degrees ; nay,  when  (as  we  are  informed)  the 
case  itself  has  actually  occurred — the  Durham  University,  in- 
advertently, it  seems,  incorporated  under  that  title,  being  in  the 
course  of  claiming  the  exercise  of  this  very  privilege  as  a right, 
necessarily  involved  in  the  public  recognition  of  the  name : — in 
these  circumstances,  we  shall  be  pardoned  a short  excursus,  in 
order  to  expose  the  futility  of  the  basis  on  which  this  mighty  edi- 
fice is  erected. 

Sir  Charles  Wetherell,  after  quoting  the  argument  of  Mr.  At- 
torney-General Yorke,  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Bentley — (“  The  power 
of  granting  degrees  flows  from  the  Crown.  If  the  Crown  erects 
a University,  the  power  of  conferring  degrees  is  incident  to  the 
grant.  Some  old  degrees  the  Universities  have  abrogated,  some 
new  they  have  erected,”  &c.)  inter  alia,  contends : — “ The  second 
point  stated  in  Mr.  Yorke’s  argument  is  equally  material  to  be 
kept  in  view ; namely,  that  the  power  of  conferring  degrees  is 
incident  to  a University,  and  some  particular  remarks  must  be 
borrowed  from  it.  Allusion  was  made  the  other  day  by  Dr. 
Lushington  to  a passage  stated  in  the  Oxford  petition,  importing 
that  they  had  been  advised  that  it  was  matter  of  great  doubt, 
whether  a proviso  in  the  charter,  restricting  this  institution  from 
conferring  degrees  in  divinity,  would  be  binding  and  effectual, 
and  some  surprise  was  expressed  at  it.  That  advice  I gave,  and 
I considered  Mr.  Attorney-General  Yorke  as  my  coadjutor  in 
giving  it,  for  it  is  founded  upon  his  opinion.  I understand  that 
a charter  is  now  asked  for,  to  make  a University,  who  are  not  to 


472  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OE  DISSENTERS. 

grant  theological  degrees.  There  is  something  very  whimsical 
in  this : for  theological  learning  is,  beyond  all  doubt,  one  of  the 
main  purposes  and  characteristics  of  a University.  But,  say 
these  gentlemen  (and  their  friends  and  advocates,  at  the  Com- 
mon-Council at  Guildhall,  said  the  same  thing),  to  he  sure  it  will 
be  too  bad  to  have  a University  pretending  to  give  degrees  in 
theology,  for  we  have  neither  0eo?  in  the  place,  nor  MoXo?.  The 
Deity  and  Revelation  we  intend  not  ourselves  to  recognize — we 
shall  ask  only  for  degrees  in  arts,  law,  surgery,  and  medicine. 
But  even  the  surgical  or  medicinal  degree  is  likely  to  be  ampu- 
tated ; at  present,  at  least,  they  have  no  means  to  confer  it.  In 
this  state  of  things  (independently  of  the  general  legal  argument 
with  which  I have  troubled  your  Lordships,  to  show  that  theol- 
ogy, according  to  the  doctrines  of  the  Church  of  England,  must 
form  a part  of  the  instruction  given  in  an  institution  which  is  to 
be  established  as  a University),  this  question  of  law  arises  : — 
How  can  this  anomalous  and  strange  body  be  constituted  in  the 
manner  professed  ? It  is  to  be  a ‘ University ,’  but  degrees  in 
theology  it  is  not  to  give.  But  Mr.  Attorney-General  Yorke  tells 
us,  that  the  power  of  giving  degrees  is  incidental  to  the  grant. 
If  this  be  law,  is  not  the  power  of  conferring  theological  degrees 
equally  incident  to  the  grant,  as  other  degrees ; and  if  this  be  so, 
how  can  you  constitute  a University  without  the  power  of  giving 
‘ all ’ degrees  ? The  general  rule  of  law  undoubtedly  is,  that 
where  a subject-matter  is  granted  which  has  legal  incidents  be- 
longing to  it,  the  incidents  must  follow  the  subject  granted;  and 
this  is  the  general  rule  as  to  corporations ; and  it  has  been  de- 
cided upon  that  principle,  that  as  a corporation,  as  an  incident  to 
its  corporate  character,  has  a right  to  dispose  of  its  property,  a 
proviso  against  alienation  is  void.” 1 

We  entertain  great  respect  for  the  professional  authority  of  Mr. 
Yorke  and  of  Sir  Charles  Wetherell ; and  should  not  certainly 
have  ventured  to  controvert  that  authority  on  any  question  of 
English  law.  But  this  is  no  such  question.  Here  the  cardinal 
point  is  the  meaning  of  the  word  universitas , in  its  academical 
signification.  But  as  the  word  was  originally  not  of  English  but 
of  European  consuetude  ; and  as  it  will  not  be  pretended  that  of 
old  it  had  a different  meaning  as  applied  to  Oxford  and  Cambridge 

1 “ Substance  of  the  speech  of  Sir  Charles  Wetherell  before  the  Lords  of  the 
Privy  Council,  on  the  subject  of  incorporating  the  London  University.”  London: 
1834,  pp.  79-81. 


UNIVERSITY— MEANING  OE  THE  TERM. 


473 


(in  which  sense,  the  Crown  in  this  country  must  be  supposed  in 
any  new  erection  to  employ  the  word),  from  what  it  expressed  as 
applied  to  Paris  or  Bologna : consequently,  the  whole  question 
resolves  itself  into  one,  to  be  determined,  not  by  English  law  (for 
there  can  be  neither  rule  nor  recent  precedent  in  the  case),  but 
by  the  analogies  to  he  drawn  from  the  history  and  charters  of  the 
ancient  European  Universities.  And  without  research,  dipping 
only  into  the  academical  documents  nearest  at  hand,  we  shall  find 
no  difficulty  in  proving  that  University , in  its  proper  and  original 
meaning,  denotes  simply  the  whole  members  of  a body  (generally 
incorporated  body)  of  persons  teaching  and  learning  one  or  more 
departments  of  knowledge  ; and  not  an  institution  privileged  to 
teach  a determinate  circle  of  sciences,  and  to  grant  certificates 
of  proficiency  (degrees)  in  any  fixed  and  certain  departments  of 
that  circle  (faculties). 

The  oldest  word  for  an  unexclusive  institution  of  higher  edu- 
cation was  Studium,  and  Studium  generale — terms  employed  in 
the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries,  and  retained  in  those  which 
followed. — The  word  universitas,  in  the  common  language  of 
Rome,  is  equally  applicable  to  persons  and  to  things.  In  the 
technical  language  of  the  civil  law,  it  was,  in  like  manner,  ap- 
plied to  both.  In  the  former  signification  (convertible  with  col- 
legium), it  denoted  a plurality  of  persons  associated  for  a con- 
tinued purpose,  and  may  be  inadequately  rendered  by  society, 
company,  corporation ; in  the  latter,  it  denoted  a certain  totality 
of  individual  things,  constituted  either  by  their  mutual  relation 
to  a certain  common  end  ( universitas  facti ),  or  by  a mere  legal 
fiction  [universitas  juris). — In  the  language  of  the  middle  ages, 
it  was  applied  either  loosely  to  any  understood  class  of  persons ; 1 
or  strictly  (in  the  acceptation  of  the  Roman  law)  to  a public  in- 
corporation, more  especially  (as  equivalent  with  communitas)  to 
the  members  of  a municipality,2 3  or  to  the  members  of  “a  general 
study.”  In  this  last  application  it  was,  however,  not  uniformly 
of  the  same  amount ; and  its  meaning  was,  for  a considerable 


1 For  instance,  in  1212,  universitas  veslra,  applied  by  municipality  of  Oxford  to 
“ omnibus  Christi  fidelibus  and  four  years  after,  by  the  Papal  Legate,  to  “ omnibus 
Magistris  et  Scholaribus  Oxonii  commorantibus.”  In  1276,  universitas  vestra,  ap- 
plied, in  same  deed,  by  Bishop  of  Ely,  to  “ universis  Christi  fidelibus,”  and  universitas, 

used  as  convertible  with  “ universitas  Regentium  et  Scholarium  studentium  Canta- 
brigiae.” 

3 See  Du  Cange  and  Carpentier  in  voce  ; add  Bulaeus,  iv.,  p.  27.  Fattorini,  ii.  p. 
57-58.  It  was  freouently  applied  to  the  college  of  Canons  in  a cathedral. 


474 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OE  DISSENTERS. 


period,  determined  by  the  words  with  which  it  was  connected. 
Thus,  it  was  used  to  denote  either  (and  this  was  its  more  usual 
meaning)  the  whole  body  of  teachers  and  learners,1  or  the  whole 
body  of  learners,2  or  the  whole  body  of  teachers  and  learners, 
divided  either  by  faculty3  or  by  country,4 5  or  by  both  together.6 
But  no  one  instance  can,  we  are  confident,  be  adduced,  in  which 
(we  mean  until  its  original  and  proper  signification  had  been  for- 
gotten0) it  is  employed  for  a school  teaching,  or  privileged  to  teach, 
and  grant  degrees,  in  all  the  faculties.  As  “ communitas,”  which 
originally  was  employed  only  with  the  addition  of  “ incolarum 
civitatis,”  or  the  like,  came  latterly,  absolutely  and  by  itself,  to 
denote  the  whole  members  of  a civic  incorporation ; — so  univer- 
sitas,  at  first  currently  employed  as  a convertible  expression  for 
“ communitas,”  and  in  its  academic  application,  always  joined 
with  “ magistrorum  et  scholarium,”  or  some  such  complementary 
term,  came,  during  the  fourteenth  century,  to  be  less  frequently 
employed  in  the  former  signification;  and  in  the  latter  meaning, 
to  be  used  either  simply  by  itself,  or,  for  a time,  frequently  in 
combination  with  “studium,”  or  “ studium  generate  ;”7  the  other, 
and  more  ancient  denomination — as,  universitas  studii  Oxonien- 
sis,  Parisiensis,  &c.8 — The  oldest  Universities  arose  spontaneously 


1 Paris.  Bull,  in  1209,  Doctorum  et  Scholarium  Universitas ; Bull,  1218,  Doctorum 
et  discipulorum  U. ; University  itself,  1221,  U.  Magistrorum  et  Scholarium-,  Henry 
III.  of  England,  U.  Scholarium;  a history,  1225,  U.  Scholarium. — So  Thoulouse  in 
1233;  Montpellier,  1289;  Lisbon,  1290;  Bologna,  1235. — Oxford.  Matthew  Paris, 
c.  1250,  U.  Scholarium , and  passim;  Royal  Charter,  1255,  U.  Scholarium;  Royal 
Letter,  1255,  same  ; Royal  Letters,  1286,  same  ; Bull,  1300,  U.  Magistrorum , Doc- 
torum et  Scholarium  ; University  itself,  1312,  U.  Magistrorum  et  Scholarium. — Cam- 
bridge. Royal  Letter,  1268,  U.  Scholarium;  Decree,  1276,  U.  Regentium  et  Schol- 
arium. Universitas  Studentium,  occurs  in  Ross,  c.  1486. 

2 In  Bologna  and  Padua,  the  whole  body  of  students  were  styled  U.  Scholarium 
(though  at  an  ancient  date,  the  term  scholaris  includes  both  teacher  and  learner). 

3 In  Bologna  and  Padua  the  students,  according  to  faculty,  were  divided  into  the 
17.  Juristarum,  and  U.  Artistarum.  We  have  before  us  the  Statuta  Almae  Universi- 
tatis  Juristarum  Patavinorum.  4,  1550. 

4 In  Bologna  and  Padua,  the  students,  according  to  nations,  were  divided  into  U. 
Ultramontanorum,  and  U.  Cismontanorum. 

5 In  Padua,  we  have  U.  Juristarum  Ultramontanorum,  and  17.  Juristarum  Cismon- 
tanorum; the  U.  Artistarum  Ultramontanorum,  and  U.  Artistarum  Cismontanorum. 

6 Thus  Halle  (founded  1694)  was  styled  Studiorum  Universitas,  a phrase  equally 
erroneous  as  that  applied  to  the  new  University  of  Frankfort — Publica  Universitas. 

7 For  example  : — Paris.  Bull,  1358  ; the  University  itself,  in  a letter,  1406. — 
Vienna.  Charter,  1366;  Bull,  1384.. — Prague.  Bull,  1347,  and  1398. — Oxford. 
Bull,  1300. — Louvain.  Bull,  1425. — Aberdeen.  Bull,  1526,  universitas  studii  gen- 
eralis. 

8 The  term,  studium  generale,  in  like  manner,  did  not  mean  originally,  that  all 
was  taught,  but  that  what  was  taught,  was  taught  to  all.  Oxford  and  Cambridge 
will  thus  only,  by  the  abolition  of  the  test,  be  restored  to  the  rank  of  Universities 


UNIVERSITY— MEANING  OF  THE  TERM. 


475 


during  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries.  The  mighty  crowds 
drawn  from  every  country  of  Europe  by  an  Irnerius  to  Bologna, 
or  by  an  Abelard  or  a Lombardus  to  Paris,  received  at  first  local 
immunities,  in  order  to  fix  the  teachers  and  students  in  the 
towns,  which  well  appreciated  the  advantages  of  this  great  resort; 
and  the  papal  and  royal  privileges  subsequently  conceded,  did  not 
create  the  faculties  which  they  then  publicly  protected.  But  by 
this  public  protection,  the  Universities  became  from  that  moment 
integral  parts  of  the  Church  and  State ; and,  consequently  could 
not,  of  their  own  authority,  organize  new  faculties,* 1  not  in  exist- 
ence at  the  date  of  their  privileges. 

The  University  of  Paris,  like  those  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge, 
at  first  existed  only  in  the  lay  Faculty  of  Arts.  On  this  faculty, 
these  great  Universities  are  founded,  as  in  it  alone  they  once 
existed  ; and  in  the  two  latter,  the  higher  faculties  never,  in  fact, 
were  separated,  as  in  the  continental  schools,  into  independent 
corporations.  In  Paris,  the  faculties  of  Divinity,  Canon  Law,  and 
Medicine  subsequently  arose  ; but  there  was  no  faculty  of  Civil 
Law  when  Paris  received  its  privileges ; and  it  consequently 
neither  could  of  itself  create  that  faculty,  nor,  for  certain  reasons, 
was  it  able  to  obtain  papal  authorization  so  to  do.  But  Paris, 
though  thus  without  a principal  faculty,  was  acknowledged  over 


“ Studia  generalia”  (says  a great  jurist  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  dean  of  the  juri- 
dical faculties  in  three  Universities) — “ Studia  generalia,  hodie,  seu  publica  dicuntur, 
scholae,  in  quibus  publice  ex  privilegio  pontificis  summi  vel  principis,  vel  antiqua 
consuetudine,  cujus  initii  non  extat  memoria,  studium  est  privilegiatum,  et  permissa 
societas  et  concursus  scholasticorum  et  docentium  ; continens  pro  contento.  Potest 
dici  studium  generals  et  universitas  ratione  eadem,  quod  studia  quae  ibi  tractantur 
universis  proposita  sint  et  sint  publica,  et  gratis,  volentibus  discere,  proponantur  ab 
institutis  preceptoribus,  sintque  privilegia  universis  studentibus  concessa.  Neque 
ideo  minus  studia  generalia  dicentur  aut  universitates,  quod  non  omnes  scientiae  ibi,  sed 
certae  tantum  tractentur  et  doceantur.  Nam  generalitas  ad  universitalem  non  pertinet 
scientiarum,  sed  ad  publicam  causam  docendi : prout  enim  placuit  iis  qui  instituerunt 
et  erexerunt  et  privilegiarunt  studia,  scientiae  et  artes  ibidem  legi  publice-  tantum  de- 
bent, et  si  aliae  legantur,  non  utuntur  privilegiis  quibus  praescriptae  docendae,  et 
earum  doctores  et  auditores  utuntur  et  potiuntur.  Non  enim  actus  agentium  operan- 
tur  ultra  illorum  intentionem.  ( L . non  omnis  numeratio,  de  reb.  credit.  P.)”  Petrus 
Gregorius  Tholosanus  De  Republica,  Lib.  xviii.  c.  1,  ()  87. 

1 To  understand  the  meaning  of  the  word  Faculty,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
originally,  in  all  the  older  Universities,  a Degree  conferred  the  right,  nay,  imposed 
the  obligation,  of  teaching ; and  a faculty  was,  after  Universities  had  become  public, 
the  body  of  teachers  or  graduates,  who  not  only  had  the  privilege  of  lecturing  on  a 
certain  department  of  knowledge,  of  examining  and  admitting  candidates  for  degrees 
into  their  body,  but  also  the  right  of  making  statutes,  choosing  officers,  employing  a 
seal,  and  of  doing  all  that  pertains  to  a privileged  corporation. — In  the  Italian  Uni- 
versities, the  faculty  was  composed  of  the  teachers  and  students  together.  There, 
indeed,  the  students  were  originally  all  in  all. 


476  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

Europe,  not  only  as  a University , or  general  study,  but  the  school 
above  all  others  entitled  to  the  name.  Its  title  was,  “ the  First 
School  of  the  Church and  so  little  did  the  term  universitas 
imply  an  academical  encyclopaedia,  and  a full  complement  of 
faculties,  that  several  of  the  most  venerable  Universities  possessed, 
while  in  the  zenith  of  their  European  fame,  only  a single  faculty 
— as  Salerno,  the  single  faculty  of  medicine. 

Mr.  Yorke  is  mistaken  when  he  says — “ Some  old  degrees  the 
Universities  (of  Oxford  and  Cambridge)  have  abrogated,  some 
neiv  they  have  erected.”  The  former  clause  of  the  sentence  is 
true,  in  so  far  as  these  seminaries  have  allowed  some  ( e . g-.,  the 
minor  degrees  in  grammar  and  logic)  to  fall  into  desuetude ; and 
the  degrees  in  canon  law,  by  command  of  the  Crown,  were  dis- 
continued at  the  Reformation ; but  no  new  degree  have  they 
introduced,  or  attempted  to  introduce.  The  precedent  thus  al- 
leged, in  confirmation  of  his  principle,  in  fact  disproves  it. 

In  like  manner,  in  all  the  Universities  throughout  Europe, 
which  were  not  merely  privileged,  but  created  by  bull  and  char- 
ter, every  liberty  conferred  was  conferred  not  as  an  incident , 
through  implication,  but  by  express  concession.  And  this  in  two 
ways  : — For  a University  was  empowered,  either  by  an  explicit 
grant  of  certain  enumerated  rights,  or  by  bestowing  on  it  im- 
plicitly the  known  privileges  enjoyed  by  certain  other  pattern 
Universities.  These  modes  were  frequently  conjoined ; but  we 
make  bold  to  say,  that  there  is  not  to  be  found,  throughout 
Europe,  one  example  of  a University  erected  without  the  grant 
of  determinate  privileges — far  less  of  a University,  thus  erected, 
enjoying,  through  this  omission,  privileges  of  any,  far  less  of  every 
other. — In  particular,  the  right  of  granting  degrees,  and  that  in 
how  many  faculties,  must  (in  either  way)  be  expressly  conferred. 
The  number  of  the  faculties  themselves  is  extremely  indeterm- 
inate ; and,  to  many  Universities  and  faculties,  the  right  of  con- 
ferring certain  special  degrees  has  been  allowed,  the  possessors  of 
which  did  not  constitute  a faculty  at  all.  For  example,  the 
degrees  in  Grammar,  Logic,  Poetry,  Music,  &c.  It  was  the  com- 
mon custom  to  erect  a University  in  only  certain  faculties ; and 
not  unfrequently  a concession  of  the  others  was  subsequently 
added.  Thus — 

During  the  thirteenth  century,  Innocent  IV.  founded  in,  and 
migratory  with,  the  court  of  Rome,  a University  of  only  two 
faculties — Theology,  and  the  Laws,  in  one  faculty — but  with  all 


UNIVERSITY— MEANING  OF  THE  TERM. 


477 


the  privileges  of  a “Studium  Grenerale.”  This  was  amplified 
during  the  fourteenth  century,  with  professorships  of  Hebrew, 
Chaldee,  and  Arabic ; and,  finally,  Eugenius  TV.  bestowed  on  it 
a complement  of  all  the  faculties.  For  this  case  we  rely  on 
Tholosanus. 

Pope  Martin  Y.  erected,  in  1425,  the  great  University  of  Lou- 
vain, as  a “ Studium  Grenerale,”  or  “ Universitas  Studii,”  in  the 
faculties  of  Arts,  the  Canon  and  Civil  Laws  (forming  two  facul- 
ties), and  Medicine  ; nor  was  it  until  some  years  thereafter  (1431) 
that  Eugenius  IY.  conceded  to  it  the  privilege  of  a fifth  or  Theo- 
logical faculty  and  promotions.  This  case  we  take  from  the 
Diplomata  themselves. 

Altdorf  was,  in  1578,  erected  by  the  Emperor,  in  favor  of  the 
free  city  of  Nuremberg,  into  an  academy  of  one  faculty,  that  of 
Arts  or  Philosophy,  with  the  right  to  that  faculty  of  conferring 
its  ordinary  degrees  of  Bachelor  and  Master,  but  without  the 
general  rights  and  privileges  of  a University.  In  1622,  the 
Faculties  of  Law  and  Medicine  were  conceded,  with  all  privileges ; 
and  the  faculty  of  Arts  also  received  the  right  almost  peculiar 
to  the  University  of  Vienna  of  creating  Poets  Laureate.  (The 
right  of  laureation  conceded  to  the  University  of  Vienna  by  Max- 
imilian I.  in  fact  constituted  what  may  be  held  a distinct  faculty 
— a Collegium  Poeticum.) 

Altdorf  was  now  a privileged  University  (Academia  Universa- 
lis, Studium  Universale),  and  her  graduates  endowed  with  all  the 
rights  enjoyed  by  those  of  other  Universities  ; Cologne,  Vienna, 
Tubingen,  Freiburg,  Ingold  stadt,  and  Strasburg,  are  specially 
referred  to.  Her  new  diploma  spoke  only  of  promotions  in  the 
Medical  and  Juridical  faculties ; but  it  did  not  prohibit  them  in 
Divinity.  The  notion,  however,  that  the  Senate  of  Nuremberg 
could,  on  such  a charter,  authorize  a theological  faculty  in  their 
University,  was  found  “ wholly  groundless ; as  no  state  of  the 
empire”  (we  quote  the  historian  of  the  school)  “was  entitled  to 
stretch  the  imperial  privileges  beyond  the  clear  letter  of  the  deed 
of  incorporation,  and  its  immediate  and  necessary  consequences.” 
— Accordingly,  it  was  not  until  1697,  that  the  Senate  succeeded 
in  obtaining  from  the  Emperor  a confirmation  of  the  privileges 
previously  conceded,  and  their  extension  to  a Theological  faculty. 

Without  entering  on  details,  we  may  also  add,  that  Rostoch 
was  founded  only  in  three  faculties,  the  Juridical,  Medical,  and 
Philosophical ; while  Heidelberg,  Prague,  and,  in  general,  the 


478 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


older  Universities  of  Germany,  had,  like  Paris  and  Alcala,  no 
faculty  of  Civil  Law,  a faculty  which  was  afterward  granted  by 
the  competent  authority.  In  like  manner,  Bamberg  and  Gratz 
had  only  two  faculties,  the  Philosophical  and  Theological,  until 
1739  and  1788,  respectively ; when  the  Medical  and  Juridical 
were  conceded ; and  Duisburg  has  never,  we  believe,  possessed 
more  than  the  two  former.  A slight  research  would  accumulate 
many  additional  examples  [were  it  requisite,  to  refute  an  opinion 
which  is  disproved  -by  the  history  of  almost  every  University  in 
Europe.  It  would,  in  fact,  be  idle  to  contend  in  this  country,  and 
at  the  present  time,  what  seminary  has  or  has  not.  the  privilege 
of  granting  degrees ; when  degrees,  as  granted  by  most  of  the 
privileged  seminaries  themselves,  are  now  so  justly  the  objects  of 
a rational  contempt.] 

But  to  return  from  our  digression : — The  religion  taught  in  its 
Professional  Faculty  can  not  thus  interfere  with  the  Dissenters ; 
but  in  the  faculty  of  Arts  or  of  Philosophy — in  that  fundamental 
facujty  in  which  the  individual,  as  an  end  unto  himself,  is  liber- 
ally educated  to  the  general  development  of  his  various  capacities, 
as  man  and  gentleman , and  not  as  in  the  others,  viewed  as  a mean, 
merely  toward  an  end,  ulterior  to  himself,  and  trained  to  certain 
special  dexterities  as  a professional  man ; — in  this  fundamental 
faculty  is  there  no  religion  taught? — We  are  far  from  holding, 
that  if  this  were  possible,  it  ought  not  to  be  accomplished ; but  we 
assert,  and  fear  no  contradiction,  that  by  no  University  has  it  ever 
yet  been  attempted.  After  all  the  bigoted,  hypocritical  railing 
against  the  London  University,  for  omitting  religion  in  its  course 
of  general  education ; in  point  of  fact,  that  school  omits  only 
from  necessity,  what  all  Universities  had  previously  omitted  with- 
out. Let  those  who  stand  astounded  at  this  assertion,  adduce  a 
single  instance  of  any  University,  in  which  religious  information 
constituted,  or  constitutes,  an  essential  element  of  its  course  of 
instruction  in  the  faculty  of  Arts.  We  are  certain  that  such  an 
instance  out  of  England  will  not  be  found.  The  slightest  acquaint- 
ance with  the  constitution  and  history  of  the  European  schools 
supplies  the  reason.  At  present,  wc  are  satisfied  with  merely 
stating  the  fact.  And  as  the  sphere  of  examination  for  its  de- 
grees is  necessarily  correlative  to  the  sphere  of  instruction  by  a 
faculty ; so,  in  no  European  faculty  of  Arts  was  Theology  a 
subject  on  which  its  examinators  had  a right  to  question  the  can- 
didate. The  only  apparent  exception  is  afforded  by  the  English 


THE  FACULTY  OE  ARTS  DOES  NOT  TEACH  THEOLOGY.  479 


Universities.  And  what  is  that  ? It  is  an  exception  hut  of  yes- 
terday ; after  the  constitution  of  the  University  Proper  had  been 
subverted ; its  public  instruction  quashed ; and  the  one  private 
tutor  left  to  supply  the  place  of  the  professorial  body.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  revolution,  some  thirty  years  ago,  candidates  for 
the  first  degree  were,  in  Oxford,  subjected  to  an  examination  in 
the  rudiments  of  religion  and  the  contents  of  the  Thirty-nine 
Articles ; and  we  believe  that  in  Cambridge  a certain  acquaint- 
ance is  required  with  Paley’s  Evidences  and  Butler’s  Analogy. 
Though  contrary  to  all  academical  precedent,  we  have  certainly 
no  objection  to  the  innovation.  And  when  Dissenters  are  admitted, 
the  only  change  required  will  he,  not  to  make  the  Thirty-nine 
Articles  a necessary  subject  of  examination  in  Oxford. 

In  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  University  Proper  and  its  public 
instruction  are  concerned,  the  objection  does  not  apply ; if  it  he 
relevant  at  all,  it  has  reference  only  to  the  domestic  education  in 
the  Colleges.  And  in  this  application,  wp  are  not  disposed  to 
deny  it  force.  Estimated  indeed,  by  any  but  the  lowest  standard, 
the  religious  discipline  afforded  in  the  Colleges  of  either  Univer- 
sity is  scanty  and  superficial  in  the  extreme  ; and  the  men,  who, 
from  their  acquaintance  with  the  theology  of  foreign  Universi- 
ties, are  the  best  qualified  to  estimate  at  its  proper  value  what 
is  accomplished  in  their  own,  are  precisely  those  (we  refer  to  Mr, 
Thirlwali  and  Mr.  Pusey)  who  speak  of  it  with  the  most  contempt. 
But  insignificant  as  it  now  is,  we  are  confident  that  a forcible 
introduction  of  the  Dissenters  would  not  only  prevent  its  improve- 
ment, but  tend  to  annihilate  it  altogether. 

But  again,  it  is  clamored  : — By  the  removal  of  academic  tests , 
the  most  influential  situations  in  the  Universities  may  he  filled 
with  men , enemies  not  only  of  the  established  religion.,  hut  of  re- 
ligion altogether. 

Look  to  the  Universities  of  Germany : there  we  have  “ the 
practical  effects ” (says  the  Christian  Advocate  of  Cambridge, 
who,  not  merely  in  honor  of  his  office,  must  he  allowed  to  lead 
the  battle1) — “ the  practical  effects  of  the  system,  where  relig- 

1 “ The  Danger  of  Abrogating  the  Religious  Tests  and  Subscriptions  which  are  at 
present  required  from  persons  proceeding  to  Degrees  in  the  Universities,  considered, 
in  a Letter  to  His  Royal  Highness  the  Duke  of  Gloucester,  K.G.,  Chancellor  of  the 
University  of  Cambridge.  By  George  Pearson,  B.D.,  Christian  Advocate  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Cambridge.  Cambridge : 1834.” — The  same  argument  forms  the  principal 
staple  of  the  pamphlet  entitled,  “ The  Cambridge  Petition  Examined ; or  Reasons 
against  admitting  the  Dissenters  to  Graduate  in  the  Universities  : With  remarks  on 


480  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

ious  tests  have  been  either  virtually  or  actually  abolished,  or 
dispensed  with  altogether.” — “In  these  learned  institutions,  I am 
not  aware  that  any  religious  test  is  exacted  before  admission  to 
degrees  and  professorships  ; and  before  admission  to  holy  orders 
and  degrees  in  divinity,  nothing  more  is  required  than  a subscrip- 
tion to  what  are  called  the  symbolical  books  of  the  Lutheran 
Church,  and  even  to  these,  with  this  convenient  qualification,  as 
far  as  they  agree  with  Holy  Scripture ; 1 a qualification,’  as 
it  has  been  observed,  ‘ which  obviously  bestows  on  the  ministry 
the  most  perfect  liberty  of  believing  or  teaching  whatever  their 
own  fancy  may  suggest.’  And  the  consequences  of  this  latitude 
have  been  most  fatal  in  their  influence  on  the  Grerman  Univer- 
sities and  the  Lutheran  Church.  Opinions  have  not  only  been 
maintained  by  the  most  eminent  persons  in  these  learned  bodies, 
but  have  been  openly  propounded  even  from  the  Professorial 
chairs , which  are  entirely  at  variance  with  our  belief  of  the  in- 
spiration of  the  Holy  Scriptures.” 

Now,  does  Mr.  Pearson,  or  his  informant,  Mr.  Rose,  imagine 
that  subscription  to  the  Symbolical  Books  (never,  by  the  by, 
generally,  received  even  in  Lutheran  Ofermany)  was  proposed 
“ with  this  convenient  qualification”  of  a quatenus , &c.  ? This  is 
merely  the  sense  in  which  acquiescence  to  their  doctrine  is  under- 
stood by  the  person  subscribing ; — a sense  which,  it  is  contended 
by  the  most  pious  and  orthodox  divines,  must  by  its  very  nature 
be  involved  in  every  Protestant  obligation  to  religious  conform- 
ity. We  need  only  mention  two — Spener  the  Pietist,  and 
Reinhard,  the  most  powerful  champion  of  Supernaturalism. 
Melanchthon,  himself  the  author  of  the  two  principal  Symbolical 
Books,  professes,  as  he  practiced,  that  “ articles  of  faith  should 
be  frequently  changed,  in  conformity  to  times  and  circumstances.” 
The  Grerman  doctrine  of  Protestant  subscription  is  not  less  appli- 
cable to  the  Thirty-nine  Articles  than  to  the  Symbolical  Books ; 
and  what  is  universal  in  the  one  country,  may  soon  become  no 
less  prevalent  in  the  other.  This  of  itself  is  a powerful  argument 
for  the  abolition  of  so  frail  a barrier — were  that  barrier  in  itself 
expedient. — Nay,  in  point  of  fact,  this  theory  of  subscription  is 
the  one  virtually  maintained  by  the  most  distinguished  divines 

Clerical  subscription,  and  the  necessity  of  a Church  Establishment.  London:  1834.” 
— This  argument  also  was  strongly  insisted  on,  among  others,  by  the  Earl  of  Caer- 
narvon and  Mr.  Goulburn,  in  their  speeches  on  the  question  in  the  several  Houses 
of  Parliament. 


1)0  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  ENSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS?  481 

of  the  English  Church  and  Universities.  We  shall  quote  only 
one  Anglican  authority,  hut  that  one,  on  the  question,  worth  a 
host  of  others. — Bishop  Marsh,  the  learned  Margaret  Professor  of 
Divinity  in  the  University  of  Cambridge,  and  whom  no  one 
assuredly  will  suspect  of  aught  hut  ultra  reverence  to  the  Church 
of  England  and  her  Articles,  thus  expounds  the  obligation  of 
those  who  have  not  only  subscribed  these  articles,  hut  devoted 
themselves  to  minister  at  the  altar  : — “ As  our  Liturgy  and  Arti- 
cles are  avowedly  founded  on  the  Bible  it  is  the  special  duty  of 
those,  who  are  set  apart  for  the  ministry,  to  compare  them  with 
the  Bible,  and  see  that  their  pretensions  are  icell  founded.  But 
then  our  interpretation  of  the  Bible  must  he  conducted  independ- 
ently of  that,  of  which  the  truth  is  to  he  ascertained  by  it.  Our 
interpretation  of  the  Bible,  therefore,  must  not  he  determined  by 
religious  system : and  we  must  follow  the  example  of  our  re- 
formers, who  supplied  the  place  of  Tradition  by  Reason  and 
Learning.'1'’  The  italics  are  not  ours. 

But  to  return  to  Mr.  Pearson : — “ For  instance,”  says  he, 
“ Rosenmiiller  in  the  first  edition  of  his  ‘ Commentary  on  the 
Old  Testament,’  the  most  valuable  in  existence,  perhaps,  consid- 
ered as  a critical  and  philological  commentary  on  the  Hebrew 
text,  speaks  of  the  Creation,  the  Fall,  and  the  Deluge,  as  Fables.” 
[Fable  is  a most  unfair  or  a most  ignorant  conversion  of  Mythus. 
Mr.  P.  goes  on)  : — “ He  (Rosenmiiller)  describes  the  history  of 
Jonah  to  be  a mere  repetition  of  the  Mythus  of  Hercules,  swal- 
lowed by  a sea-serpent ; and  he  says  that  it  was  not  written  by 
Jonah,  but  by  some  one  contemporary  with  Jeremiah  ; and  he 
considers  the  prophecy  of  Isaiah  as  made  up  by  one  writer  out  of 
the  minor  works  of  several  others.  Gesenius,  the  Professor  of 
Theology  at  Halle,  maintains  after  Paulus,  Professor  at  WYirtz- 
burg,  that  the  Pentateuch  was  composed  after  the  time  of  Solo- 
mon, out  of  different  fragments  which  were  collected  together.” 
[Not  Paulus , hut  Yater  and  De  Wette,  were,  among  the  modern 
Gferman  critics,  the  first  and  contemporaneous  promulgators  of 
the  theory  in  regard  to  the  compilation  of  the  Pentateuch  subse- 
quently to  the  kings  of  Israel;  and  Eichhorn,  after  Astruc,  was 
the  first  to  maintain  (what  even  Catholic  divines,  e.  g.  Jahn,  ad- 
mit that  he  has  made  out)  the  fragmentary  composition  of  Gene- 
sis, &c.  Mr.  P.  goes  on)  : — “ Bauer,  in  his  introduction  to  the 
Old  Testament,  has  a chapter  on  what  he  calls  the  Mythi  or 
fables  [fables  again]  of  the  Old  Testament.”  (Bauer  has  not  only 

H H 


482  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

a Chapter , but  a famous  Book  in  two  volumes,  now  more  than 
thirty  years  old,  entitled,  “ Hebrew  Mythology  of  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments,”  &c.  Mr.  P.  proceeds) : — “ Bretschneider  re- 
jects the  Gospel  of  St.  John,  as  the  work  of  a Gentile  Christian 
of  the  second  century.”  (Bretschneider  did  not  reject,  but  only 
proposed  for  discussion,  Probabilia  against  it ; and  he  has  since 
candidly  admitted  his  tentative  to  have  been  satisfactorily  refut- 
ed. Mr.  P.  concludes) : — “ Eichhorn  pronounces  the  Revelations 
to  be  a drama  representing  the  fall  of  Judaism  and  Paganism  ; 
while  Sender  condemned  it  entirely  as  the  work  of  a fanatic.” 

Our  present  argument  does  not  require  us  to  enter  on  the 
merits  or  demerits  of  the  German  Theology  ; on  his  knowledge 
of  which  we,  certainly,  can  not  compliment  the  Christian  Advo- 
cate of  Cambridge.  But  we  have  no  objection  whatever  that  he 
should  make  his  bugbear  look  as  black  and  grisly  as  he  can  ; we 
shall  even  hold  it  to  be  a veritable  Goblin.  Still,  admitting  his 
premises,  we  shall  show  that  there  is  no  consequence  in  his  con- 
clusion. 

In  the  first  place,  Mr.  Pearson  assumes  the  whole  matter  in 
dispute,  and  that  not  only  without,  but  against  experience. — 
Admitting  all  that  he  asserts  in  regard  to  the  character  of  Ger- 
man theology,  yet  to  render  this  admission  available  to  him,  he 
was  bound  to  show  that  this  character  was  the  natural,  at  least 
ordinary,  consequence  of  the  removal  of  academic  tests  ; by 
proving — 1°,  that  there  was  no  other  cause  in  the  circumstances 
of  Germany  which  might  account  for  the  phenomenon ; and  2°, 
that  the  same  phenomenon  had  occurred  in  all  other  countries 
where  the  same  academic  liberty  had  been  permitted.  He  at- 
tempts to  prove  neither,  but  assumes  both. — Yet  in  regard  to 
the  first,  it  could  easily  be  established,  by  demonstrating  the  real 
causes  of  the  theological  revolution  in  Protestant  Germany — 
that  the  relaxation  of  academic  tests  had  no  influence  whatever 
in  its  production. — And  in  regard  to  the  second,  it  is  sufficient  to 
say,  that  no  Universities,  except  the  English,  have  ever  denied 
their  education  and  degrees  to  the  members  of  every  sect ; and 
that  in  many,  even  of  Catholic  and  Italian  Universities,  professor- 
ships in  all  the  faculties,  except  the  theological,  were  open  to  the 
partisans  of  different  •faiths ; and  this  too  for  centuries  before 
such  liberality  was  even  dreamt  of  in  the  ultramontane  and  Ger- 
man Universities.  But  did  the  alleged  consequence  ensue  ? That, 
no  one  can  maintain.  Indeed,  the  exclusive  reference  to  the  Ger- 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


433 


man  Universities,"  is  of  itself  an  implicit  admission,  that  the  expe- 
rience of  the  other  European  Universities,  equally  emancipated 
from  religious  restrictions,  is  in  contradiction  to  the  line  of  argu- 
ment attempted.  We  may  mention,  that  so  little  has  Holland, 
a country  at  once  intelligent  and  orthodox,  heen  convinced  of  the 
evil  consequence  of  academic  freedom,  that  it  has  recently  dis- 
pensed with  the  signature  of  the  Confession  of  Dordrecht,  to 
which  all  public  teachers  were  hitherto  obliged ; and  Leyden 
now  actually  boasts  of  Catholic  Professors  as  ornaments  of  her 
Calvinist  School. 

In  the  second  place,  all  the  examples  of  dangerous  doctrine 
which  Mr.  Pearson  alleges  are  from  the  works  of  members  of  the 
theological  faculty  in  the  Herman  Universities  ; but  admission 
into  that  faculty  was  never  proposed,  nor  dreamt  of,  in  the  English 
Universities,  without  the  former  test.  The  instances  have,  there- 
fore, no  relevancy.  In  point  of  fact,  those  who  know  any  thing 
of  the  progress  of  philosophy  and  theology  in  Hermany,  know 
this  : — that  the  rationalism  of  the  theologians  has  been  not  a lit- 
tle checked  and  scandalized  by  the  supernaturalism  of  the  philos- 
ophers.1 W ere  we  logicians  like  the  Advocate,  we  might,  from  this 
phenomenon  contend,  that  religious  tests  are  the  means  of  causing 
infidelity  ; the  Herman  theologians  being  alone  compelled  to  sub- 
scribe to  the  confessions  of  the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  churches. 

But,  in  the  third  place,  to  bear  upon  the  question,  it  is,  and 
must  be,  presumed,  that  the  alleged  licentious  speculation  is  the 
effect  of  the  removal  of  all  imposed  fetters  on  the  full  exercise  of 
religious  inquiry.  Yet  that  this  is  the  natural  result  of  a vigor- 
ous and  unimpeded  Protestantism,  Mr.  Pearson  does  not  admit. 
“ Such  opinions  as  these  are  not  the  natural  produce  of  the 
Herman  Universities — the  cradle  of  the  Reformation — spots  con- 
secrated by  the  recollections  of  men,  1 whose  praise  is  in  all  the 
churches,’  and  whose  names  live  in  the  pages  of  history  among 
the  greatest  benefactors  of  mankind ! But  in  these  very  places 
have  we  seen  opinions  advanced,  which  are  opposed  to  the  funda- 
mental doctrines  of  the  revealed  will  of  Hod  !” — In  a subsequent 
page,  he  actually  makes  it  a weighty  matter  of  reproach  against 


1 [See  (instar  omnium)  the  treatise  “ De  Miraculis  enchiridion,”  &c.  The  author, 
Christian  Frederic  Boehme.  is  or  was  a distinguished  theologian,  latterly  Pastor  and 
Inspector  of  Luckau.  He  maintains,  that  miracles  are  impossible,  are  not  even  con- 
ceivable ; and  though,  otherwise,  a Kantian,  impugns  Kant,  Fichte,  and  the  German 
philosophers,  for  assorting  a more  orthodox  doctrine.] 


484  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

the  London  University,  that  Professor  Muehlenfels,  in  an  11  Intro- 
duction to  a Course  of  Herman  Literature ,”  should  “ speak  of 
(Luther)  the  champion  of  our  faith , merely  as  an  historical  and 
literary  personage.’’'1 

We  are  afraid,  however,  that  the  Christian  Advocate  is  hardly 
better  versed  in  the  works  of  the  “ champion  of  our  faith,”  than 
in  those  of  the  men  whom  he  boldly  represents  as  its  most  for- 
midable antagonists.  We  can  easily  show,  even  to  Mr.  Pearson’s 
own  contentment,  that  there  is  hardly  an  obnoxious  doctrine  to 
be  found  among  the  modern  Lutherans,  'which  has  not  its  war- 
rant and  example  in  the  writings  of  Luther  himself ; and  admit- 
ting this,  even  the  Advocate,  we  think,  would  deem  it  idle  to 
explain,  by  so  far-fetched  and  inadequate  an  hypothesis  as  the 
want  of  academic  tests,  what  is  nothing  more  than  the  natural 
exercise  of  that  license,  vindicated,  not  surely  to  himself  exclu- 
sively, by  the  “ great  champion  of  our  faith.”  “ Idemne  licuit,” 
says  Tertullian,  “ Yalentinianis  quod  Valentino;  idemne  Marci- 
onitis  quod  Marcioni : — de  arbitrio  suo  fidem  innovare  ?”  The 
following  hasty  anthology  of  some  of  Luther’s  opinions,  and,  in 
his  own  words,  literally  translated,  may  render  it  doubtful, 
whether  the  heresies  of  his  followers  are  to  be  traced  no  higher 
than  to  the  relaxation  (not  a century  old)  of  religious  tests.  [We 
must  not,  however,  set  down  Luther  for  a rationalist,  howbeit 
the  rationalists  may  adduce  Luther’s  practice  as  the  precedent  of 
their  own.  For,  while  far  from  erring  through  any  overweening 
reliance  on  the  powers  of  human  reason  in  general,  still  Luther 
was  betrayed  into  corresponding  extravagancies  by  an  assurance 
of  his  personal  inspiration,  of  which  he  was,  indeed,  no  less  con- 
fident than  of  his  ability  to  perform  miracles.  He  disclaimed 
the  Pope,  he  spurned  the  Church,  but  varying  in  almost  all  else, 
he  never  doubted  of  his  own  infallibility.  He  thus  piously  re- 
garded himself,  as  the  authoritative  judge,  both  of  the  meaning, 
and  of  the  authenticity,  of  Scripture. — And  though  it  is  our  duty, 
in  refuting  an  untenable  hypothesis,  to  allege  various  untenable 
opinions  of  the  great  reformer ; so  far  from  entertaining  any  dis- 
like of  Luther,  we  admire  him,  with  all  his  aberrations,  as  one 
of  the  ablest  and  best  of  mankind.  Only,  in  renouncing,  with 
Luther,  the  Pope,  we  are  certainly  not  willing  to  make  a Pope 
of  Luther.]1 

1 [In  stating  the  truth  regarding  Luther,  I should  regret  to  be  thought  by  any,  to 

Stter  aught  in  disparagement  of  Protestantism.  Protestantism  is  not  the  doctrine  of 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


485 


Speculative  Theology .’  “ G-od  pleaseth  yon  when  he  crowns 

the  unworthy  ; he  ought  not  to  displease  you  when  he  damns  the 
innocent.”  [Jena  Latin,  iii.  f.  207.] — “All  things  take  place  by 


this  or  that  individual  Protestant  ; and  with  reference  even  to  the  man  Luther,  I am 
sorry  that  it  is  here  incumbent  on  me,  to  notice  his  faults  without  dwelling  on  his 
virtues.  That  what  is  now  to  be  alleged,  should  not  long  ago  have  been  familiar  to 
all,  only  shows  that  Church  History  has  not  yet  been  written  as  alone  written  it  ought 
to  be— with  truth,  knowledge,  and  impartiality.  Church  History,  falsely  written,  is 
a school  of  vain  glory,  hatred,  and  uncharitableness  ; truly  written,  it  is  a discipline 
of  humility,  of  charity,  of  mutual  love.  Written  in  a veracious  and  unsectarian  spirit, 
every  religious  community  is  herein  taught,  that  it  has  cause  enough  to  blush  for  its 
adherents, 

(“  Iliacos  intra  muros  peccatur  et  extra  ;”) 

and  that  others,  though  none  be  perfect,  are  all  entitled  to  respect,  as  all  reflections, 
though  partial  reflections,  of  the  truth.  Ecclesiastical  History,  indeed,  may  and  ought 
to  be  the  one  best,  as  the  one  unexclusive  application,  of  religious  principle  to  practice 
— at  once  Catholic  and  Protestant  and  Christian  : vindicating  for  the  Church  at  large 
its  inheritance  of  authority  ; manifesting  the  fallibility  of  all  human  agents,  and  not 
substituting  merely  one  papacy  for  another;  while  yielding  “Christ  the  truth,”  as  its 
last  and  dominant  result.] 

1 [In  regard  to  the  testimonies  from  Luther  under  this  first  head  I must  make  a 
confession.  There  are  few  things  to  which  I feel  a greater  repugnance,  than  relying 
upon  quotations  at  second  hand.  Now,  those  under  this  head  were  not  taken  imme- 
diately from  Luther's  treatise  Do  Servo  Arbitrio.  I had,  indeed,  more  than  once  read 
that  remarkable  work,  and  once  attentively,  marking,  as  is  my  wont,  the  more  import- 
ant passages  ; but  at  the  time  of  writing  this  article,  my  copy  was  out  of  immediate 
reach,  and  the  press  being  urgent,  I had  no  leisure  for  a reperusal.  In  these  circum- 
stances, finding  that  the  extracts  in  Thcoduls  Gastmahl  corresponded,  so  far  as  they 
went,  with  those  given  by  Bossuet,  and  as,  from  my  own  recollection  (and  the  testi- 
mony, I think,  of  Werdermann),  they  fairly  represented  Luther’s  doctrine;  I literally 
translated  the  passages,  even  in  their  order,  as  given  by  Von  Stark  (and  in  Dr.  Kent- 
singer’s  French  version).  Stark,  I indeed  now  think,  had  Bossuet  in  his  eye.  I deem 
it  right  to  make  this  avowal,  and  to  acknowledge,  that  I did  what  I account  wrong. — 
But  again  I have  no  hesitation,  in  now  deliberately  saying,  that  I think  Luther’s  doc 
trine  of  the  Will  is  not  misrepresented  in  these  extracts  ; nor  is  the  impression  which 
they  leave,  harsher  than  that  made  by  a fair  summary  of  the  work  in  question,  even 
by  zealous  Lutheran  divines.  The  following  is  taken  from  a Consilium  of  the  Theo- 
logical Faculty  of  Rostock,  addressed  (in  1595)  to  the  Theological  Faculty  of  Wittem- 
berg,  and  given  by  Walch  in  his  works  of  Luther  (xviii.  130).  The  learned  Divine, 
Plistorian  and  Philosopher,  David  Chytrams,  was  the  penman. 

“You  are  aware,  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  religious  Reformation,  and  in 
your  own  ecclesiastical  metropolis  of  Wittemberg,  established  by  Luther  some  seventy 
years  ago,  when  the  Liberty  of  the  human  Will  was  strenuously  attacked,  there  were 
many  points  of  this  very  doctrine  of  Predestination  made  matter  of  revolting  contro- 
versy and  assertion.  To  wit : — That  the  divine  predestination  is  the  denial  of  all 
liberty  of  will  to  man,  both  in  external  operation  and  in  internal  thought ; — That  all 
things  take  place  by  necessity,  and  an  absolute  necessity,  so  that  as  the  poet  speaks 
— 1 certa  stant  omnia  lege  ;’ — That  there  is  no  contingency  in  human  affairs  ; — That 
whatever  God  foresees,  that  he  wills  ; — That  Pharaoh  was  hardened,  not  by  the  per- 
mission, but  by  the  efficacious  action  of  God.  Through  six  consecutive  pages  it  is 
maintained,  that  the  declaration — ‘ I have  no  pleasure  in  the  death  of  the  wicked,  but 
that  the  wicked  may  turn  from  his  way  and  live,’  is  the  voice  of  the  revealed  God  ; 
but  that  there  is  another  judgment  of  the  concealed  God,  who  wills  that  Pharaoh  should 
perish.” — To  the  same  effect,  Walch  gives  various  quotations  from  Calixtus,  the 
greatest  perhaps  of  all  Lutheran  divines  ; and  if  Luther  (what  I think  he  did)  did  not 


486  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

the  eternal  and  invariable  will  of  God,  who  [which]  blasts  and 
shatters  in  pieces  the  freedom  of  the  will.”  [F.  165.] — “ God 
creates  in  ns  the  evil,  in  like  manner  as  the  good.”  [F.  170,  f. 


explicitly  abandon  his  older  doctrine  on  the  point,  this  was  at  least  openly  done,  in 
Luther’s  lifetime,  and  without  Luther’s  reclamation,  by  Melanchthon. 

Though  I refrain  from  here  enlarging  on  the  subject,  I shall  add  one  passage  of 
Luther  himself,  which,  in  a few  words,  significantly  expresses  the  Manichean  charac- 
ter of  his  doctrine  of  the  human  will  and  its  relations,  as  maintained  in  his  treatise 
De  Servo  Arbitrio. 

“ Thus  the  human  will  rests  indifferent  between  the  contending  parties.  Like  a 
hackney,  if  mounted  by  God,  it  wills  and  wends  whithersoever  God  may  will ; if  mount- 
ed by  Satan,  it  wills  and  wends  whithersoever  Satan  may  will : neither  hath  it  any  lib- 
erty of  choice  to  which  of  the  two  riders  it  shall  run,  which  it  shall  affect ; but  the 
riders  themselves  contend  for  its  acquisition  and  possession.”  (Jena  Latin,  iii.  f.  171.) 

In  this  note,  I have  spoken  of  Bossuet,  signifying  my  reliance  on  the  accuracy  of 
his  quotations  ; and  I am  as  fully  convinced  of  his  learning  as  a theologian,  as  of  the 
greatness  of  his  genius.  Archdeacon  Hare  (who  has  done  me  the  honor  to  devote 
seventy-five  ample  pages  of  an  excursus  appended  to  his  Mission  of  the  Comforter,  in 
refutation  of  my  statements  touching  Luther,  a refutation  which,  as  far  as  necessary, 
I shall  consider  in  the  sequel) — Mr.  Hare  never  loses  an  opportunity  of  attacking, 
after  his  fashion,  “the  eagle  of  Meaux  — “ impar  congressus  Achilli.”  Indeed,  to 
speak  more  accurately,  our  assailant  usually  combats  only  a phantom  of  his  own  ; the 
Archdeacon  rarely  understands  the  Bishop.  An  excellent  example  of  this  is  exhibited, 
when  Mr.  Hare  makes  his  first  and  principal  attack  on  Bossuet  (p.  664,  sq.) ; and  here, 
in  place  of  the  triumph  which  he  so  loudly  sounds,  from  a total  unacquaintance  with 
Luther’s  great  doctrine  of  Assurance,  Mr.  Hare  only  shows  how  utterly  he  miscon- 
ceives the  import  of  Bossuet's  criticism  of  the  Reformer.  As  this  is  an  important, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  an  ill  understood  matter,  I may  be  allowed  a few  words  in  ex- 
planation. 

Assurance,  personal  assurance  (the  feeling  of  certainty  that  God  is  propitious  to 
me — that  my  sins  are  forgiven,  Fiducia,  Plcrophoria  fidei),  was  long  universally  held 
in  the  Protestant  communities  to  be  the  criterion  and  condition  of  a true  or  saving 
Faith.  Luther  declares,  that  he  who  hath  not  assurance  spews  faith  out ; and  Melanch- 
thon makes  assurance  the  discriminating  line  of  Christianity  from  heathenism.  It 
was  maintained  by  Calvin,  nay  even  by  Arminius  ; and  is  part  and  parcel  of  all  the 
Confessions  of  all  the  Churches  of  the  Reformation  down  to  the  Westminster  Assem- 
bly. In  that  Synod  Assurance  was,  in  Protestantism,  for  the  first  time  declared,  not 
to  be  of  the  essence  of  Faith:  and  accordingly,  the  Scottish  General  Assembly  has, 
subsequently,  once  and  again,  condemned  and  deposed  the  holders  of  this,  the  doc- 
trine of  Luther,  of  Calvin,  and  of  the  older  Scottish  Church  itself.  In  the  English, 
and,  more  articulately,  in  the  Irish,  Establishment,  it  still  stands  a necessary  tenet  of 
belief.  Assurance  is  now,  however,  disavowed,  when  apprehended,  by  Anglican 
Churchmen  high  and  low  ; but  of  these  many,  like  Mr.  Hare,  are  blessfully  incogni- 
zant of  the  opinion,  its  import,  its  history,  and  even  its  name. 

This  dogma,  with  its  fortune,  past  and  present,  affords  indeed  a series  of  the  most 
curious  contrasts.  It  is  curious,  that  this  cardinal  point  of  Luther’s  doctrine  should, 
without  exception,  have  been  constituted  into  the  fundamental  principle  of  all  the 
Churches  of  the  Reformation,  and  as  their  common  and  uncatholic  doctrine,  have  been 
explicitly  condemned  at  Trent.  It  is  curious,  that  this  common  doctrine  of  the 
Churches  of  the  Reformation,  should  now  be  abandoned  virtually  in,  or  formally  by, 
all  these  Churches  themselves.  It  is  curious,  that  Protestants  should  now  generally 
profess  the  counter  doctrine,  asserted  at  Trent  in  the  condemnation  of  their  own  prin- 
ciple. It  is  curious,  that  this  the  most  important  variation  in  the  faith  of  Protestants, 
as,  in  fact,  a gravitation  of  Protestantism  back  toward  Catholicity,  should  have  been 
overlooked,  as  indeed  in  his  days  undeveloped,  by  the  keen-eyed  author  of  “ The  his- 


t 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS?  487 

216.] — “ The  high  perfection  of  faith,  is  to  believe  that  Gfod  is 
just,  notwithstanding  that,  by  his  will  he  renders  us  necessarily 
damnable,  and  seemeth  to  find  pleasure  in  the  torments  of  the 
miserable.”  [F.  171. — All  from  the  treatise  De  Servo  Arbi- 
trio .]*  1 

tory  of  the  Variations  of  the  Protestant  Churches.”  Finally,  it  is  curious,  that,  though 
now  fully  developed,  this  central  approximation  of  Protestantism  to  Catholicity  should 
not,  as  far  as  I know,  have  been  signalized  by  any  theologian,  Protestant  or  Catholic ; 
while  the  Protestant  symbol  ( Fid.es  sola  justijicat,  Faith  alone  justifies),  though  now 
eviscerated  of  its  real  import,  and  now  only  manifesting  a difference  of  expression,  is 
still  supposed  to  discriminate  the  two  religious  denominations.  For  both  agree,  that 
the  three  heavenly  virtues  must  all  concur  to  salvation  ; and  they  only  differ,  whether 
Faith,  as  a word , does  or  does  not  involve  Hope  and  Charity.  This  misprision  would 
have  been  avoided  had  Luther  and  Calvin  only  said — Fiducia  sola  justijicat,  Assurance 
alone  justifies  ; for  on  their  doctrine,  Assurance  was  convertible  with  true  Faith,  and 
true  Faith  implied  the  other  Christian  graces.  But  this  primary  and  peculiar  doc- 
trine of  the  Reformation  is  now  harmoniously  condemned  by  Catholics  and  Protestants 
together. 

As  to  the  Archdeacon,  he  only  adds  to  this  curious  series.  For  it  is  curious,  that 
Mr.  Hare  should  reprehend  Bossuet  for  “ grossly  misrepresenting”  Luther,  while  Mi- 
Hare,  misunderstanding,  only  “ grossly  misrepresents”  Bossuet.  And  it  is  curious, 
that  Mr.  Hare  should  reproach  Bossuet,  for  attributing  to  Luther,  what  is,  in  fact,  the 
very  cardinal  point  of  Luther's  doctrine. — Such  is  the  first  of  the  Archdeacon’s  polem- 
ical exploits,  and  the  sequel  of  his  warfare  is  not  out  of  keeping  with  the  commence- 
ment.] 

1 [Mr.  Hare’s  observations  under  this  head  of  Speculative  Theology  (p.  807-812), 
exhibit  curious  specimens  of  inconsistency,  bad  faith,  and  exquisite  error.  I shall 
adduce  instances  of  each. 

Inconsistency. — There  are  several  others,  but  to  take  only  a single  example.  Mr. 
Hare,  on  the  one  hand,  thus  concludes  his  observations  upon  this  head  : — “ What  a 
testimony  is  it  to  the  soundness  of  Luther’s  doctrines,  that  this  knot  of  garbled  sen- 
tences. thus  twisted  and  strained  from  their  meaning,  are  all  that  so  unscrupulous  an 
enemy  (!)  has  been  able  to  scrape  together  against  him,  under  the  head  of  Speculative 
Theology !”  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  page  immediately  preceding,  Mr.  Hare  as- 
serts, that  this  “ so  unscrupulous  enemy”  had  “ never  set  eyes  on  the  original  Latin 
of  any  one  of  these  four  sentences” — all  that  he  had  been  able  to  scrape  together” 
being  copied  from  “ one  page  of  Bossuet.”  Mr.  Hare  apparently  does  not  think  with 
the  more  logical  Schiller — 

“ Self-contradiction  is  the  sin  of  sins.” 

Bad  faith. — Mr.  Hare  states,  that  the  passages  in  question  are  taken  from  Bossuet ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  he  parades  his  own  familiarity  with  the  works  of  Luther,  in 
the  discovery  of  these  hidden  fragments  in  the  writings  of  the  reformer.  “ We  may 
guess,”  he  says,  “ that  the  quotation  comes  from  the  Treatise  De  Servo  Arbitrio,”  be- 
cause, &c. ; and  after  stating  that,  the  sentences  of  the  quotation  “ seem  to  form  one 
continuous  passage,”  he  adds — “ but  when  we  look  through  that  treatise,  ice  discover, 
to  our  surprise,  that  they  are  culled  from  various  parts  of  it,”  &c.  : then  he  charitably 
admits — “ I dare  say  the  Reviewer  himself  did  not  know  this  and  finally  concludes 
by  informing  the  “ perhaps  thankful ” Reviewer  of  the  different  pages  of  the  third  vol- 
ume of  the  Jena  [Latin]  edition,  on  which  “ he  will  find ” them.  Now,  can  it  be  be- 
lieved that  there  could  have  been  no  11  guessing”  in  the  case,  no  “ discovery ,”  and  no 
“ surprise  that  the  Venerable  Archdeacon  could  not  have  thought,  whatever  he  may 
“ say,  that  the  Reviewer  did  not  know  this,”  and  would  be  “ thankful ” for  the  inform- 
ation so  graciously  vouchsafed  toward  “ finding ” and  “ seeing  the  originals  of  his  quo- 
tation 1”  Instead  of  the  active  development  of  erudition  and  ingenuity,  which  he  here 
pretends,  the  Archdeacon,  in  truth,  only  passively  followed,  though  industriously  con- 


488  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

cealing,  the  references  of  Bossuet.  Bossuet  states  the  treatise,  and  articulately  marks, 
for  each  several  quotation,  the  page  and  volume  of  the  Wittemberg  Latin  edition  of 
Luther’s  works  ; and  this,  being  given,  the  corresponding  page  of  every  other  edition 
is  at  once  shown  by  Walch’s  comparative  table  ; — a table  of  which  Mr.  Hare  acknowl- 
edges the  possession.  On  the  other  hand,  where  Bossuet,  on  one  occasion,  forgets  a 
reference,  there  we  forthwith  find  the  Archdeacon  at  fault.  In  point  of  fact,  our 
champion  of  Luther  exhibits  on  this,  as  indeed  on  every  occasion,  his  ignorance, 
among  others,  of  Luther's,  perhaps,  greatest  work,  his  knowledge  of  it  being  confined 
to  a dipping  into  this  or  that  passage  by  the  aid  of  references,  which  he  thinks  it  not 
improper  carefully  to  suppress.  And  yet  this  Venerable  and  veracious  Churchman 
does  not  scruple  to  accuse  of  “ falsehood those  who  wmuld  deem  themselves  disgraced, 
had  they  been  guilty,  even  in  thought,  of  a similar  disingenuousnass,  howbeit  not  in 
danger  of  being  ignominiously  plucked  for  so  contemptible  a daw-dressing. 

Elaborate  error. — The  whole  tenor  of  Mr.  Hare’s  criticism  shows,  not  only  that  he 
is,  specially,  unacquainted  with  the  contents  and  purport  of  the  book  on  the  Bondage 
of  the  Will,  but  that  lie  is,  generally,  incapable  of  following  and  accepting  truth,  for 
its  own  sake.  He  is  only  a one-sided  advocate — an  advocate  from  personal  feelings ; 
and,  as  such,  his  arguments  are  weak  as  they  are  wordy.  I can  afford  to  give  only  a 
single  specimen  of  this,  and  I select  the  shortest.. — Luther  says: — “Hie  est  fidei 

summus  gradus,  credere  ilium  esse justum,  qui  sita  voluntatc  nos  ncccssario 

damnabilcs  facit."  These  words  might  be  supposed  plain  enough  ; but  the  following 

is  Mr.  Hare’s  version  : “ This  is  the  highest  pitch  of  faith to  believe  in  the 

justice  of  God,  who  by  His  will  creates  us,  though  by  the  necessity  of  our  fallen  na- 
ture wc  become  inevitably  subject  to  condemnation,  without  the  special  help  of  His 
Spirit.”  Here  it  is  evident  that  Luther’s  meaning  is  wholly  changed — the  purport  of 
his  statement  being,  in  fact,  reversed.  Luther  says,  and  intended  to  say,  that  “ God 
by  His  w'ill  makes  us  necessarily  damnable  that  is,  that  the  quality  of  damnability 
in  us  is  necessary,  and  necessary  through  the  agency  of  His  will.  This  meaning,  I 
make  bold  to  say,  no  one  but  Mr.  Hare  ever  thought  of  disallowing ; and  this  alone  is 
the  meaning  in  conformity  with  the  whole  analogy  of  Luther’s  treatise.  And  so  ac- 
cordingly Bossuet  converts  the  clause — “ quoiqu’il  nous  rende  necessairement  dam- 
nablcs  par  sa  volonte.”  This  Mr.  Hare  declares  a “ mistranslation,1''  by  which  he 
charitably  admits  that  “ Bossuet  may  relieve  the  Reviewer  from  a part  of  his  guilt  !” 
But  in  this  guilt  all  the  world,  with  exception  of  the  Archdeacon,  is  participant.  Let 
us  look  into  any  version  of  this  work  of  Luther — and  the  two  at  hand  chance  to  be 
of  these  the  first  and  the  last. — The  first  is  that  of  Justus  Jonas,  the  friend  and  coad- 
jutor of  Luther,  a version  published  almost  immediately  after  the  original  And  he 
is  guilty.  The  opinion  of  Jonas  upon  the  subject  is,  indeed,  expressed  in  the  very 
title  of  his  translation  : — “ Dass  der  freye  Wille  nichts  say ” (“  That  free  will  is  a nul- 
lity.1') His  rendering  of  the  clause  in  question  is  as  follows  : — “glauben,  dass  der 
Gott  gleichwol  der  gerechteste  sey,  dess  Wille  also  stehet,  dass  ctliche  muessen  ver- 
dammt  werden .”  The  last  is  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  Vaughan,  who,  like  Mr.  Hare  himself, 
was  “ sometime  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  Cambridge,”  and  he  thus  guiltily  translates 
the  clause  : — “ to  believe  Him  just,  who  of  his  own  will  makes  as  necessary  objects  of 
damnation."  And  the  relative  note,  Mr.  Vaughan  saj's  : “ This  necessity  is  not  blind 
fate,  but  arises  out  of  the  appointments,  arrangements,  and  operations  of  God's  coun- 
seled will.”  Finally — though  this  be  wholly  superfluous — to  refer  to  the  German 
theological  philosophers,  they  also  are  guilty.  Werdermann,  who  may  represent  all, 
states  it  in  his  Theodicee  {the  guilty  criminal!)  as  Luther’s  doctrine: — “Faith  can 
and  must  hold  God,  not  only  for  just  but  merciful,  were  He  even  to  damn  all  men 
without  exception  and  : — “ God’s  prescience  and  man’s  free  will  are  mutual  con- 
traries, like  fire  and  water.”  (iii.  138.) 

Such  is  a sample  of  the  laborious  blundering,  by  which  “the  Megalander”  is  to  be 
clipped  down  to  the  shape  and  dimensions  of  Mr.  Flare’s  model  of  propriety.  The 
Reformer,  here  as  elsewhere,  is  made  to  say  one  thing  (so  understood  by  all),  to  mean, 
and  to  mean  to  say,  another  (so  understood  by  Mr.  Hare  alone).  But,  was  Luther  an 
idiot  1 — weaker  than  a dotard  in  thought,  weaker  than  an  infant  in  expression?  Lu- 
ther, than  whom  no  one  ever  thought  more  clearly,  no  one  ever  expressed  his  thought 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


489 


Practical  Theology — “We,”  (Martin  Luther , Philippus  Me- 
lanchthon,  Martin  Bucer , Dionysius  Melander , John  Lening , 


less  ambiguously  or  with  greater  force  1 — The  Reformer  is,  assuredly,  not  fortunate 
in  his  defender  ; and  unhappily  for  Mr.  Hare  himself,  his  Christian  charity  does  not 
redeem  the  defects  of  his  logic  and  his  learning. 

I must  not,  however,  here  forget  to  acknowledge  an  error,  or  rather  an  inadvertence 
of  mine,  which  has  afforded  a ground  for  Mr.  Hare  to  make,  as  usual,  a futile  charge 
against  Bossuet.  In  the  second  of  the  above  extracts,  not  having  Luther’s  original 
before  me,  I had  referred  the  relative  pronoun  to  “ God,"  whereas  it  should  have  been 
to  “the  will  of  God."  In  the  versions  of  Stark  and  Bossuet,  from  the  nature  of  their 
vernacular,  it  is  ambiguous,  and  I applied  it  wrongly.  The  matter  is  of  the  smallest; 
but  as  Mr.  Hare  has  dealt  with  it  as  of  consequence,  he  should  not  have  asserted  that 
Bossuet  was  in  meaning  (and  intentionally)  different  from  Luther  ] 

1 [On  this  head  I can  not  here  enter ; nor  is  there  need.  In  his  fifty  pages  of 
dense  typography  and  “ prolix  garrulity,”  though  Mr.  Hare  has  not  been  able  to 
shake  (for  he  has  not  touched)  even  one  of  my  statements  ; he  has  succeeded  admir- 
ably in  manifesting  his  own — not  singular,  but  common — ignorance  of  the  whole  mat- 
ter. Yet  in  the  presumption  of  this  common  ignorance,  Mr.  Hare  has  not  hesitated 
to  scatter  reproaches  and  insinuate  calumnies,  of  which,  by  a righteous  retribution, 
he  has,  in  fact,  been  doomed  to  feel  the  injustice  himself. — In  a moral  relation,  per- 
haps, more  than  in  any  other,  the  history  of  Luther  and  the  Reformation  has  been 
written,  only  as  a conventional  romance  ; and  I know  not,  whether  Catholics  or 
Protestants  have  wandered  the  widest  from  the  line  of  truth.  Of  the  following  gen- 
eral facts  I hold  superfluous  proof. 

1°,  That  after  the  religious  revolution  in  Protestant  Germany,  there  began  and 
long  prevailed  a fearful  dissolution  of  morals.  The  burthen  of  Luther’s  lamentation 
is  : “ Under  the  Papacy,  we  were  bad,  but  under  the  Gospel,  we  are  seven — yea  more 
than  seven  times  worse.” 

2°,  That  of  this  moral  corruption  there  were  two  principal  foci — Wittemberg  and 
Hesse. — Shortly  before  his  death,  Luther  abandoning,  calls  Wittemberg  “ a Sodom 
and  not  long  after  it,  Wittemberg  is  publicly  branded  by  Simon  Musaeus,  the  Pro- 
fessor of  Theology  and  Superintendent  of  Jena,  as  “ foetida  cloaca  Diaboli.” — Touch- 
ing Hesse,  the  celebrated  Walther,  writing  to  Bullinger,  before  the  middle  of  the 
century,  says  of  its  centre  of  learning  and  religious  education  : “ In  Marburg  the  rule 
of  morals  is  such,  as  Bacchus  would  prescribe  to  his  Maenads,  and  Venus  to  her 
Cupids  while  from  Marburg  and  the  chief  chair  of  Theology  in  that  University,  the 
immorality  of  the  natives  had  previously  determined  the  pious  Lambert  of  Avignon  to 
fly,  his  flight  being  only  arrested  by  his  sudden  death. 

3°,  The  caude  of  this  demoralization  is  not  to  be  sought  for  in  the  religious  revolu- 
tion itself ; for  in  Switzerland  and  other  countries  the  religious  revolution  resulted  in 
an  increased  sobriety  and  continence.  In  Protestant  Germany,  and  particularly  in 
Saxony,  we  need  look  no  farther  than  to  the  moral  doctrine  of  the  divines  ; 

“ Hoc  fonte  derivata  clades 

In  patriam  populumque  fluxit 

but  in  Hesse,  beside  that  influence,  we  must  take  into  account  the  pattern  of  manners 
set  to  his  subjects  by  the  prince  ; 

“ Regis  ad  exemplum  totus  componitur  orbis.” 

4°,  As  to  Polygamy  in  particular,  which  not  only  Luther,  Melanchthon,  and  Bucer, 
the  three  leaders  of  the  German  Reformation,  speculatively  adopted — but  to  which 
above  a dozen  distinguished  divines  among  the  Reformers  stood  formally  committed  ; 
there  were  two  principal  causes  which  disinclined  the  theologians  to  a practical  ap- 
plication of  the  theory. — The  first  of  these,  which  operated  more  especially  on  Luther 
and  Melanchthon,  was  the  opposition  it  was  sure  of  encountering  from  the  Princes 
of  both  branches  of  the  house  of  Saxony. — The  second,  that  the  doctrine  itself  was 
taken  up  and  carried  out  to  every  extreme  by  odious  sects  and  odious  divines ; in  a 
word,  it  became  fly-blown.  The  Sacramentarian  Carlstadt’s  public  adoption  of  it. 


490  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 

Antonius  Corvinus , Adam  Kraft , or  of  Fulda , Justus  Winther, 


tended  principally  to  disgust  Luther,  and  in  a less  degree  Melanchthon  ; for  Carlstadt’s 
doctrines  were,  in  the  mass,  an  abomination  to  these  two  reformers  ; but  the  polyga- 
mist excesses  of  the  hated  Anabaptists,  in  the  last  season  of  their  reign  in  Munster, 
revolted  all  rational  minds  ; and,  as  I said  (what  Mr.  Hare  strangely  misunderstands), 
homoeopathically  broke  the  force  of  the  epidemic  throughout  Germany  and  Europe. 

Specially  : the  Landgrave’s  bigamy  has  been  mistaken  in  its  more  essential  circum- 
stances, from  a want  of  the  requisite  information,  both  by  Protestant  and  Catholic 
writers  ; and  by  none  more  than  by  the  recent  editor  of  the  Corpus  Reformatorum, 
Dr.  Bretschneider.  Touching  this  transaction,  I shall  now  state  in  general  a few  of 
the  more  necessary  facts  ; of  which,  however  startling,  I have  irrecusable  proof — 
proof  which,  before  long,  I hope  fully  to  detail,  as  indeed  I ought  ere  this  to  have 
done. 

The  sanction  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon  to  the  Landgrave’s  second  marriage  was 
compelled.  Prudentially,  and  for  special  reasons  which  I shall  not  now  enumerate, 
they  were  strongly  averse  from  this  proceeding,  on  the  part  of  that  Prince  ; but  on 
principle,  they,  unfortunately,  could  not  oppose  it.  They  had  both  promulgated 
opinions  in  favor  of  polygamy,  to  the  extent  of  vindicating  to  the  spiritual  minister  a 
right  of  private  dispensation , and  to  the  temporal  magistrate  the  right  of  establishing  the 
practice,  if  he  chose,  by  public  law.  They  had  even  tendered  (what  is  unknown  to 
all  English  historians),  their  counsel  to  Henry  VIII.,  advising  him,  in  his  own  case, 
to  a plurality  of  wives.  Without,  however,  showing  at  present  how  the  screw  was 
actually  applied,  I may  notice  generally,  that  their  acquiescence  was  extorted,  through 
Martin  Bucer,  a reformer  and  man  of  genius  only  inferior  to  themselves ; while  the 
proceeding  of  the  Landgrave  was  principally  encouraged,  and  the  scruples  of  the 
second  Landgravine  overcome,  by  the  two  court  preachers,  the  two  courtly  chaplains, 
Dionysius  Melander  and  John  Lening.  These  three  divines,  apart  from  the  Prince, 
were  the  prime  movers  in  this  scandalous  affair ; and  in  contrast  to  them,  Luther  and 
Melanchthon  certainly  show  in  favorable  relief. 

Bucer,  who  had  previously  merited  from  Luther  the  character  of  “ lying  varlet," 
consistently  displays  himself  in  the  sequel  of  this  business  as  guilty  of  mendacity  in 
every  possible  degree. 

Melander  did  not  belie  his  name  of  Dionysius ; for  though  an  eloquent  preacher, 
and  “ the  Reformer  of  Frankfort,”  he  was  as  worthy  a minister  of  Bacchus,  as  an  un- 
worthy minister  of  Christ,  professing  as  he  did,  that  he  lived  and  wished  to  live  only 
for  the  taste  of  wine.  Neither  shall  we  marvel  how  a Protestant  Bishop,  Super- 
intendent, Inspector,  like  Melander,  could  bestow  the  spiritual  benediction  on  his 
master’s  bigamy  ; when  aware  of  the  still  higher  marvel  that  Melander,  the  Inspector, 
Superintendent,  Protestant  Metropolitan  of  Hesse,  was,  at  and  before  the  time,  him- 
self a trigamist,  that  is,  to  avoid  all  possible  ambiguity,  the  husband  of  three  wives  at 
once.  The  Prince  thus  followed  at  a distance,  not  only  the  precept,  but  the  example 
of  the  Pastor. 

Lening,  or  Leno  Lening,  as  he  was  called,  seems,  with  both  learning  and  ability, 
to  have  been  a Pandarus  and  Caliban  in  one  ; so  that  the  epithets  of  “ monster,”  &c. 
applied  to  him  by  Luther  and  Melanchthon,  suited  indifferently  his  deformities  both 
of  mind  and  body.  The  Pastor  of  Melsingen,  who,  as  Melanchthon  informs  us,  was, 
like  his  Prince,  a syphilitic  saint,  undertook  the  congenial  task  of  converting  Margaret 
von  der  Sahl  to  the  faith  of  polygamy  ; and  the  precious  book  which,  on  the  occasion, 
he  composed  and  sanctimoniously  addressed  to  that  “virtuous  Lady  and  beloved  sister 
in  Christ,”  is  still  extant.  If  an  adulterer,  Lening  does  not  appear,  like  his  fellow- 
laborer  Melander,  to  have  been,  in  practice,  at  least,  a simultaneous  polygamist ; but 
when  left  a veteran  widower,  of  more  than  seventy,  the  “ Carthusian  monster”  incon- 
tinently married  a nursery  girl  from  the  household  of  his  pervert,  the  “left  Land- 
gravine,” and  keeper  of  her  eighth  child. 

With  such  precept  and  such  example,  we  shall  not  be  surprised,  that  the  Hessian 
morals  became  soon  notoriously  the  most  corrupt  in  Germany,  I ought,  perhaps,  to 
say,  in  Christendom.] 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


491 


Balthasar  Raida,1)  “ can  not  advise  that  the  license  of  marrying 
more  wives  than  one  be  publicly  introduced,  and,  as  it  were, 
ratified  by  law.  If  any  thing  were  allowed  to  get  into  print  on 
this  head,  your  Highness”  (Philip,  Landgrave  of  Plesse,  champion 
of  the  Reformation,  who,  having  lost,  as  he  pleads,  conceit  of  his 
wife,  being  touched  with  scruples  of  conscience  at  his  adultery, 
but  which  he  [thrice]  admits  that  “ he  does  not  wish  to  abstain 
from,'1'1  and  “ knowing,”  as  he  tells  themselves,  “ of  Luther  and 
Melanchthon  having  exhorted  the  King  of  England  not  to  divorce 
his  first  queen,  but  to  marry  a second  over  and  above,” — had  ap- 
plied to  the  leading  doctors  of  the  Reformation  for  license  to  have 
another  wife) — “your  Highness  easily  comprehends  that  it  would 
be  understood  and  received  as  a precept,  whence  much  scandal 
and  many  difficulties  would  arise. — Your  Highness  should  be 
pleased  to  consider  the  excessive  scandal ; that  the  enemies  of  the 
Gospel  would  exclaim,  that  we,  like  the  Anabaptists,  have  adopted 
the  practice  of  polygamy,  that  the  Evangelicals,  as  the  Turks, 

allow  themselves  the  license  of  a plurality  of  wives 

But  in  certain  cases  there  is  room  for  dispensation.  If  any  one 
(for  example)  detained  captive  in  a foreign  country,  should  there 
take  unto  himself  a second  wife  for  the  good  of  his  body  and 
health,  &c.  ...  in  these  cases,  we  know  not  by  what  reason 

a man  could  be  condemned,  who  marries  an  additional  wife,  with 
the  advice  of  his  pastor,  not  for  the  purpose  of  introducing  a new 
law,  but  of  satisfying  his  own  necessity.  . • . In  fine,  if 
your  Highness  be  fully  and  finally  resolved  to  marry  yet  another 
wife ; we  judge,  that  this  ought  to  be  done  secretly,  as  has  been 
said  above,  in  speaking  of  the  dispensation,  so  that  it  be  known 
only  to  your  Highness,  to  the  Lady,  and  to  a few  faithful  persons 
obliged  to  silence,  under  the  seal  of  confession ; hence  no  attacks 
or  scandal  of  any  moment  would  ensue.  For  there  is  nothing 
unusual  in  princes  keeping  concubines  ; and  although  the  lower 
orders  may  not  perceive  the  excuses  of  the  thing,  the  more  intel- 
ligent know  how  to  make  allowance.”  2 

1 [The  list  of  the  divines  who  concurred  in  the  Landgrave’s  bigamy  is  here  given 
more  fully  and  accurately  than  in  the  Review  ; more  fully  and  accurately  even  (though 
without  the  synonymes)  than  in  any  other  publication.  The  Consilium  was  drawn 
up  by  Luther  and  Melanchthon  at  Wittemberg,  19th  December,  1539.  It  was  then 
signed  by  Bucer ; and  afterward,  in  Hesse,  by  the  other  six  divines,  who  were  all 
subjects  of  the  Landgrave.] 

2 The  nuptials  were  performed  in  presence  of  these  witnesses — Melanchthon,  Bucer, 
Melander  [who  officiated,]  with  others ; and  privately,  in  order,  as  the  marriage-con- 
tract bears,  “ to  avoid  scandal,  seeing  that,  in  modem  times,  it  has  been  unusual  to 


492 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


Biblical  Criticism. — (1)  “ The  hooks  of  the  Kings  are  more 
worthy  of  credit  than  the  books  of  the  Chronicles [Colloquia, 
c.  lix.  k 6.] — (2)  <!  Job  spake  not,  therefore,  as  it  stands  written 

in  his  hook,  hut  hath  had  such  cogitations It  is  a sheer 

argumenlum  fabulcc It  is  probable  that  Solomon  made 

and  wrote  this  hook.”  [Ib.]- — (3)  “ This  hook  ( Ecclesiastes ) ought 
to  have  been  more  full;  there  is  too  much  of  broken  matter  in  it; 
it  has  neither  boots  nor  spurs,  but  rides  only  in  socks,  as  I myself 
when  in  the  cloister Solomon  hath  not  therefore  written 


have  two  wives  at  once,  although  in  this  case  it  he  Christian  and  lawful.'1' — The  Land- 
grave marvelously  contrived  to  live  in  harmony  with  both  his  wives,  and  had  a large 
family  by  each.  The  date  of  the  transaction  is  the  end  of  1539.  The  relative  docu- 
ments were  published  in  1679,  by  the  Elector  Palatine,  Charles  Lewis,  and  are  said 
to  have  converted,  among  others,  a descendant  of  Philip,  Prince  Ernest  of  Hesse,  to 
the  Catholic  Church.  [It  has,  in  fact,  been  stated  by  historians,  that  the  doctrine  of 
Luther  touching  marriage,  and  the  practice  of  the  Landgrave,  were  the  obstacles 
which  prevented  the  Emperor  Ferdinand  I.  from  declaring  for  the  Reformation  : and 
some  distinguished  converts  have  openly  ascribed  their  desertion  of  Protestantism  to 
the  same  cause.]  A corresponding  opinion  of  Dr.  Henke,  late  Primarius  Professor 
of  Theology  in  Helmstadt,  would  have  figured,  had  he  known  it,  with  admirable  effect, 
in  Mr.  Pearson’s  catalogue  of  modern  Teutonic  heresies.  “Monogamy,”  (says  this 
celebrated  divine),  “ and  the  prohibition  of  extra-matrimonial  connections,  are  to  be 
viewed  as  the  remnants  of  monachism  and  of  an  uninquiring  faith.”  However  detest- 
able this  doctrine,  the  bold  avowal  of  the  rationalist  is  honorable,  when  contrasted 
with  the  skulking  compromise  of  all  professed  principle,  by  men  calling  themselves — 
The  Evangelicals.  Renouncing  the  Pope,  they  arrogate  the  power  of  the  Keys  to  an 
extent  never  pretended  to  by  any  successor  of  St.  Peter ; and  proclaiming  themselves 
to  the  world  for  the  Apostles  of  a purified  faith,  they  can  secretly,  trembling  only  at 
discover)',  authorize,  in  name  of  the  Gospel,  a dispensation  of  the  moral  law.  Com- 
pared with  Luther  [1*]  or  Cranmer,  how  respectable  is  the  character  of  Knox  ! 

[Before  1843,  I had  become  aware,  that  the  preceding  statement  was  incorrect, 
and  in  a supplemental  note  to  a pamphlet  published  by  me  in  that  year,  I made  the 
following  retractation  : “I  do  not  found  my  statement  of  the  genera]  opinion  of 
Luther  and  Melanchthon  in  favor  of  polygamy,  on  their  special  allowance  of  a second 
wife  to  Philip  the  Magnanimous,  or  on  any  expressions  contained  in  their  Consilium 
on  that  occasion.  On  the  contrary,  that  Consilium,  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  it  was  given,  may  be,  indeed  always  have  been,  adduced  to  show,  that  in  the 
case  of  the  Landgrave  they  made  a sacrifice  of  eternal  principle  to  temporary  expedi- 
ence. The  reverse  of  this  I am  able  to  prove,  in  a chronological  series  of  testimonies 
by  them  to  the  religious  legality  of  polygamy,  as  a general  institution,  consecutively 
downward  from  their  earliest  commentaries  on  the  Scriptures  and  other  purely  abstract 
treatises.  So  far,  therefore,  was  there  from  being  any  disgraceful  compromise  of 
principle  in  the  sanction  accorded  by  them  to  the  bigamy  of  the  Landgrave  of  Hesse, 
they  only,  in  that  case,  carried  their  speculative  doctrine  (held,  by  the  way,  also  by 
Milton),  into  practice  ; although  the  prudence  they  had  by  that  time  acquired,  rendered 
them,  on  worldly  grounds,  averse  from  their  sanction  being  made  publicly  known.  I 
am  the  more  anxious  to  correct  this  general  mistake  touching  the  motives  of  these 
illustrious  men,  because  I was  myself,  on  a former  occasion,  led  to  join  in  the  injus- 
tice.”— (Be  not  Schismatics,  &c.  p.  59,  3d  ed.) 

Mr.  Hare  indeed,  in  reference  to  this,  denies  the  existence  of  such  a “ series  of 
testimonies  but  the  value  of  his  denial  must  depend  upon  his  knowledge  ; and  while 
he  admits  that  he  knows  little  of  Melanchthon,  proof  is  here  given,  that  he  knows 
hardly  more  of  Luther.  The  series  I /ia»c.] 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS?  493 


this  book,  which  hath  been  made  in  the  days  of  the  Maccabees  by 
Sirach.  It  is  like  a Talmud  compiled  from  many  hooks,  perhaps 
in  Egypt,  from  the  Library  of  King  Ptolemy  Euergetes.1 — (4)  So 
also  have  the  Proverbs  of  Solomon  been  collected  by  others 
[caught  up  from  the  King’s  mouth,  when  he  spake  them  at  table 
or  elsewhere : and  those  are  well  marked,  wherein  the  royal 
majesty  and  wisdom  shine  conspicuous.”2  (Ib. )] — (5)  “The book 

of  Esther , I toss  into  the  Elbe.”3  [Ib.] — [“  And  when  the  Doc- 

1 [I  now  doubt  not  that  Luther  used  the  word  Ecclcsiasticus,  which  the  reporter 
heard  as  Ecclesiastes,  appending  afterward  the  translation  of  The  Preacher ; for  the 
quotation  is  from  the  Table  Talk.  I think  no  one  will  dispute  this  who  compares, 
inter  alia,  Luther’s  “ Preface  to  the  Book  of  Jesus  Sirach,”  to  be  found,  as  all  the 
others,  in  Walch’s  edition  of  his  works,  (xiv.  91.)  It  is  lucky,  that  Mr.  Hare  did 
not  discover  this  ; for  it  would  have  afforded  him  a text  on  which  to  hang  some  pages 
of  his  usual  vituperation.  On  this  passage  he  indeed  makes  no  remark.  The  mis- 
take has  also,  I see,  escaped  Dr.  Bindseil,  in  his  conclusion  of  Foerstemann’s  late 
elaborate,  though  by  no  means  adequate,  edition  of  the  Colloquia.] 

2 [This  is  illustrated  by  what  Luther  says  in  the  Standing  Preface  on  the  Preacher 
of  Solomon,  which  dates  from  1524.  “This  book,  also,  of  the  Proverbs  of  Solomon, 
has  been  pieced  together  by  others  : and  among  his,  have  been  inserted  the  doctrine 
and  sayings  of  sundry  wise  men. — Item,  the  Song  of  Solomon  appears,  in  like  man- 
ner, as  a pieced  book,  taken  by  others  out  of  Solomon’s  mouth.” — I shall  not  imitate 
Mr.  Hare’s  language  ; but  simply  remark,  that  in  his  translation  of  the  addition  in  the 
text,  besides  interpolating,  he  wholly  misrepresents  what  Luther  says,  in  as  much  as 
his  version  would  limit  the  collection  to  the  sayings  of  Solomon  alone. — It  is  in  unison 
with  such  a proceeding,  to  assert  that  I cited  the  sentence  originally  extracted,  “ as 
an  example  of  licentious  criticism  on  the  Scriptures,  of  such  criticism  as  proves  Luther 
to  have  furnished  warrants  and  precedents  for  all  that  is  most  ‘ obnoxious'  in  modern 
rationalism.”  For,  though  the  correlative  passages,  which  Mr.  Hare  has  now  com- 
pelled me  to  adduce,  may  be  held  to  warrant  the  worst  license  of  modem  criticism  ; I 
manifestly  meant  only,  in  the  several  testimonies  cited,  to  show  that  Luther  affords  a 
precedent  for  some  one  or  other  of  the  various  degrees  of  rationalist  audacity,  and  not, 
as  Mr.  Hare  chooses  to  misrepresent  it,  that  each  was  alleged  as  an  example  and 
parallel  of  the  very  highest. — But,  as  to  Luther’s  doctrine  in  these  passages  : — Does 
Mr.  Hare  venture  to  maintain— that  the  opinion  of  biblical  books  being  a compilation 
by  unknown  collectors,  and,  in  part,  from  unknown  and  uninspired  authorities,  is  an 
orthodox  opinion — an  opinion  consistent  with  any  admissible  doctrine  of  revelation  1 
Will  he  even  hesitate  to  confess — that  this  doctrine  of  Luther  would,  in  a modern 
critic,  be  justly  stigmatized  as  licentiously  rationalistic  1] 

3 [Soon  after  the  publication  of  this  article,  I became  aware,  that  Esther  was  a 
mistake  for  Esdras  ; and  this  by  the  verse  quoted.  The  error  stands  in  all  Aurifaber’s 
editions  of  the  Table  Talk,  and  from  him  is  copied  by  Walch,  from  whom  again  I 
translated.  It  is  corrected,  however,  in  the  recensions  by  Stangwald  and  Selneccer, 
and,  of  course,  in  the  new  edition  by  Bindseil.  It  was  therefore  without  surprise, 
that  I found  Mr.  Hare  for  once  to  be  not  wrong  in  finding  me  not  right.  In  excuse,  I 
can  only  say,  that  at  the  time  of  writing  the  article,  not  only  was  I compelled  to  make 
the  extracts  without  any  leisure  for  deliberation ; but  I recollected,  though  the  book 
was  not  at  hand,  that  Luther,  in  his  work  on  the  Bondage  of  the  Will,  had  declared 
that  Esther  ought  to  be  extruded  from  the  canon — a judgment  indeed  familiar  to  every 
tyro  even  in  biblical  criticism.  His  concluding  words  are: — “ dignior  omnibus,  me 
judice,  qni  extra  Canonem  haberetur.”  (Jena  Latin,  iii.  182.)  Esther,  I thus  knew, 
was  repudiated  by  Luther,  and  among  his  formulae  of  dismissal  the  preceding  recom- 
mended itself  as  at  once  the  most  characteristic  and  the  shortest.  Mr.  Hare  speaks 
of  Luther  as  “a  dear  friend.”  But  it  appears  from  his  general  unacquaintance  with 


494 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS. 


tor  was  correcting  the  second  book  of  the  Maccabees,  he  said : — ] 
I am  so  an  enemy  to  the  book  of  Esther , that  I would  it  did  not 
exist ; for  it  Judaizes  too  much,  and  hath  in  it  a great  deal  of 
heathenish  naughtiness.  [Then  said  Magister  Foerster,”  (the 
great  Hebrew  professor) : — “ The  Jews  rate  the  book  of  Esther 
at  more  than  any  of  the  prophets  ; the  prophets  Daniel  and  Isaiah 
they  absolutely  contemn.  Whereupon  Dr.  Martinus: — It  is  hor- 
rible that  they,  the  Jews,  should  despise  the  noblest  predictions 
of  these  two  holy  prophets ; the  one  of  whom  teaches  and  preaches 
Christ  in  all  richness  and  purity,  while  the  other  pourtrays  and 
describes,  in  the  most  certain  manner,  monarchies,  and  empires 
along  with  the  kingdom  of  Christ.”* 1  (Ib.)] — (6)  “ Isaiah  hath 

even  this,  the  Reformer’s  favorite,  and  perhaps  most  celebrated  book,  certainly  from 
its  two  recent  translations  into  English  by  two  Anglican  clergymen,  the  book  of  his 
best  known  in  this  country — that  Luther,  instead  of  being  “ a dear  friend,”  is  almost 
an  utter  stranger  to  the  Archdeacon.  For  Mr.  Hare  knows  nothing  (even  at  second 
hand),  of  Luther’s  famous  repudiation  of  Esther,  in  his  most  famous  work.— As  for 
myself,  I relied  also  on  the  following  testimony  ; and  which,  had  we  nothing  else, 
would  be  alone  decisive  in  regard  to  Luther's  rejection  of  Esther.] 

1 [On  this  Mr.  Hare,  inter  alia , remarks  : “ The  combination  of  the  book  with  that 
of  the  Maccabees — which  the  Reviewer  ought  not  to  have  omitted — as  well  as  For- 
ster’s remarks,  leaves  no  doubt  that  Luther  spoke  of  the  book  of  Esdras.”  I have  now 
given  the  whole  relative  context ; and  had  Mr.  Hare  possessed  the  sorriest  smattering 
of  the  Rabbinic  lore  which  he  affects — had  he,  in  fact,  not  been  unread  even  in  the 
most  notorious  modern  works  on  biblical  criticism,  he  would  certainly  have  had  “ no 
doubt,”  but  no  doubt  that  Luther  spoke,  and  could  speak  only  of  the  book  of  Esther. 

I shall  simply  quote  the  one  highest  Jewish  authority  in  regard  to  the  comparative 
estimation  among  the  Jews,  of  Esther  and  the  Prophets  ; while,  as  for  Christian  testi- 
monies, I may  refer  to  almost  every  competent  inquiry  into  the  canonicity  of  the  books 
of  the  Old  Testament.  Let  us  listen  then  to  the  “ Rabbi  of  Rabbis,”  Rambam,  Moses 
Ben  Maimon,  Moses  Maimonides ; to  him  whom  the  learned  Hebrews  delight  to  honor 
with  every  title  of  Oriental  admiration  ; and  who,  by  the  confession  of  the  two  great- 
est among  Christian  scholars, 

“ Solus  nugari  Judaeos  desiit  inter.” 

“All  the  Prophetic  books,  and  all  the  [ Hagiographic ] Writings  are  of  the  things 
to  be  abolished  in  the  days  of  the  Messiah,  saving  alone  the  roll  of  Esther.  For,  lo, 
this  endureth,  like  the  Law  of  Pentateuch  and  the  Oral  Law  [Talmud] ; and  these, 
they  shall  not  cease,  even  unto  eternity.  For  howbeit.  the  memory  of  all  other  persecu- 
tions shall  die  out ; . . . . yet,  as  it  is  written,  1 the  days  of  Purim  shall  not  fail  from 
among  the  Jews,  nor  the  memorial  of  them  perish  from  their  seed.  [ Esther , ix. 
28.”]  (Yad  Chasaka,  B.  iii.  tr.  x.,  Hilchot  Meghilla,  c.  2,  18  ; and  passages  to  the 
same  effect  are  to  be  found  in  his  Ikkarim  Compare  also  the  Midrasch  Meghilla ; 
and  the  margin  of  the  Jerusalem  Talmud,  where,  among  the  commentators,  the  Rabbi 
Jochanan  and  the  Rabbi  Resell- Lakisch,  from  the  texts,  of  Dcut.  v.  22  ; and  Esth.  ix. 
28,  deduce  the  same  result,  by  a marvelous  and  truly  Jewish  reasoning.)  On  the 
other  hand,  who  has  ever  heard,  as  Mr.  Hare  assumes,  and  would  have  it  understood, 
that  Esdras  was,  at  any  time,  not  to  say  always,  held,  even  as  a prophet,  in  any  spe- 
cial estimation  among  the  Israelites'!  Besides  these,  there  are  sundry  elementary 
errors  in  Mr.  Hare’s  relative  observations  on  this  book  ; but  these,  as  they  do  not  di- 
rectly concern  the  question,  may  pass.  Traveled  in  the  Ghemara,  and  stumbling  on 
his  own  Church’s  threshold  !] 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


495 


borrowed  his  whole  art  and  knowledge  from  David  out  of  the 
Psalter.”1  [Ib.  c.  lx.  $ 10.] — (7)  “ The  history  of  Jonah  is  so 
monstrous,  that  it  is  absolutely  incredible.”2  [Ib.] — (8)  “ That 
the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  is  not  by  Saint  Paul ; nor  indeed  by 
any  apostle,  is  shown  by  chap.  ii.  3 It  is  by  an  excellently 


1 [Luther  also  (Ib.  (j  23)  says  : “ Moses  and  David  are  the  two  highest  prophets 
What  Isaiah  hath,  that  he  takes  out  of  David,  and  the  other  prophets  do  in  like  man- 
ner.” This  I presume  to  think  inconsistent  with  a true  doctrine  of  revelation.  In- 
spiration borrowing  ! — Inspiration  imitating  ! I did  not,  however,  suppose  that,  re- 
prehensible as  might  be  the  expression,  Luther  denied  the  prophetic  gift  of  Isaiah. 
Mr.  Hare  mistakes  the  passage  translated  in  the  text ; and,  otherwise,  says  nothing 
to  the  point.] 

2 [I  quoted  these  words  of  Luther  to  show  in  how  irreverent  a manner  he  thought 
himself  privileged  to  speak  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Mr.  Hare  is  of  n different  opin- 
ion, which  he  is  entitled  to  hold,  if  de  gustibus  71011  est  disputandum.  But  in  his  trans- 
lation of  the  relative  context  (here  as  elsewhere),  he  certainly  has  no  right  to  make 
Luther  speak  as  he  would  wish  him  to  have  spoken,  far  less  to  found  on  what  he 
gives  as  Luther’s,  and  not  on  Luther’s  veritable  expressions.  But  this  he  does  ; and 
doing  this  while  he  ostensibly  defends,  he  really  gives  up  the  Reformer  as  indefensi- 
ble. Only,  he  ought,  in  candor,  to  have  said  so,  instead  of  saying  the  reverse.  For 
example:  Luther,  in  reference  to  the  history  of  Jonah,  says:  “ Es  gehet  auch  eben 
nacrriscli  zu."  (“  It  passes,  moreover,  even  into  the  foolish.”)  This  Mr.  Hare  renders 
by— “And  how  oddly  it  turns  out."  Fidus  interpres  ! Of  Mr.  Hare's  style  of  trans- 
lation, indeed,  I may  here  (instar  omnium)  give  one  other  sample  ; where,  as  neither 
in  the  preceding,  does  he  enable  his  reader  to  detect  the  inconsistency  by  quoting, 
as  he  does  on  less  important  occasions,  the  original.  Melanchthon  had  fallen  ill  at 
Weimar,  from  contrition  and  fear  for  the  part  he  had  been  led  to  take  in  the  Land- 
grave’s polygamy  ; his  life  was  even  in  danger.  Luther  came  ; and  Melanchthon  is 
one  of  the  three  persons  whom  the  Reformer  afterward  boasts  of  having  raised  mira- 
culously from  the  dead.  At  present  we  have  only  to  do  with  Mr.  Hare’s  translation 
of  the  account  given  by  Luther  of  the  operation.  “Allda  (saget  Lutherus)  musste 
mir  unser  Herr  Gott  lierhalten.  Denn  ich  warf  ihm  den  Sack  fuer  die  Thuere,  und 
rieb  ihm  die  Ohren  mit  alien  promissionibus  exaudiendarum,  die  ich  in  der  heilige 
Schrift  zu  erzaehlen  wusste,  dass  er  mich  musste  erhoeren,  wo  ich  anders  seinen 
Verheissungen  trauen  sollte.”  May  I venture,  indeed,  to  translate  this  1 (“Then 
and  there  (said  Luther),  I made  our  Lord  God  to  smart  for  it.  For  I threw  him  down 
the  sack  before  the  door,  and  rubbed  his  ears  with  all  his  promises  of  hearing  prayer 
which  I knew  how  to  recapitulate  from  Holy  Writ,  so  that  he  could  not  but  listen  to 
me,  should  I ever  again  place  any  reliance  on  his  promises.”)  This  Mr.  Hare  thus 
professedly  translates  : “Then,  said  Luther,  Our  Lord  God  could  not  but  hear  me;  for 
I threw  my  sack  before  His  door,  and  wearied  His  ears  with  all  His  promises  of  hear  ■ 
ing  prayers,  which  I could  repeat  out  of  Holy  Writ ; so  that  He  could  not  but  hear 
me  if  I were  ever  to  trust  in  His  promises.”  Mr.  Hare’s  translation  is  not  only  not 
a version,  as  it  pretends  to  be,  of  Luther’s  fearful  expressions  in  the  preceding  pass- 
age, and  is  thus  in  reality  a condemnation ; but  is  out  of  harmony  with  the  reformer’s 
whole  theory  in  regard  to  the  efficacy  of  prayer  in  general,  and  particularly  in  regard 
to  the  mighty — the  almighty  power  of  his  own.  For  Luther  believed,  that  nothing 
could  be  refused  to  his  earnest  supplication  ; and  accordingly  he  declares,  that  it  re- 
quired only  that  he  should  sincerely  ask  for  the  destruction  of  the  world,  to  precipi- 
tate the  advent  of  the  last  day.  This  doctrine  was  carried  to  every  its  most  absurd 
extreme  by  the  other  reformers  ; and  even  the  trigamist  prelate  of  Cassel,  the  wine- 
bibbing  Melander,  exhorted  his  clergy  to  pray  for  a plentiful  hop-harvest,  that  (as  his 
son  or  grandson  records),  though  himself  abominating  beer,  there  might  thus  be  a less 
demand  for  wine,  and  he,  accordingly,  allowed  to  indulge  more  cheaply  in  the  juice 
of  the  grape.] 


496 


ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES — ADMISSION  OF  DISSENTERS 


learned  man,  a disciple  of  the  Apostles It  should  be  no 

stumbling-block  if  there  be  found  in  it  a mixture  of  wood,  straw, 
hay.”  [Standing  Preface  in  Luther’s  Version.] — (9)  “ The  Epistle 
of  James,  I account  the  writing  of  no  apostle.”  [Standing  Pref- 
ace.] “ St.  James's  Epistle  is  truly  an  Epistle  of  straw  [in  con- 
trast to  them,”  (“the  right  and  noblest  books  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment”) “ for  it  hath  in  it  no  evangelical  character.”1  (Fragmen- 
tary Preface  to  the  New  Testament,  1524.)] — (10)  “ The  Epistle 

of  Jude  is  an  abstract  or  copy  of  St.  Peter’s  second  ; and 

allegeth  sayings  and  stories  which  have  no  place  in  Scripture.” 
[Standing  Preface,  &c.] — (11)  “ In  the  Revelation  of  John  much 

is  wanting  to  let  me  deem  it  either  prophetic  or  apostolical 

I can  discover  no  trace  that  it  is  established  by  the  Holy  Spirit.” 
[Preface  of  1522. ]2 — Ilavpa  pev,  dWa  pdXa  Xtyeto^. 

As  to  this  last,  how  could  Mr.  Pearson  make  any  opinion  touch- 
ing the  Apocalypse  matter  of  crimination  against  Semler  and 
Eichhorn  ? Is  the  Christian  Advocate  unaware,  that  the  most 
learned  and  intelligent  of  Protestant — of  Calvinist  divines  have 
almost  all  doubted  or  denied  the  canonicity  of  the  Revelation  ? 
The  following  rise  the  first  to  our  recollection.  Erasmus — who 

1 [In  various  of  his  works,  and  from  an  early  to  the  latest  period,  Luther  denied 
the  canonicity  of  St.  James's  Epistle.  In  1519,  in  the  seventh  Thesis  against  Eck, 
he  declares  it  “wholly  inferior  to  the  apostolic  majesty  and  in  the  following  year, 
in  the  Chapter  on  Sacraments,  of  his  Babylonish  Captivity,  “unworthy  of  an  apos- 
tolic spirit.”  In  1522,  in  a conclusion,  afterward  omitted,  of  the  Standing  Preface, 
he  excludes  it  “ from  the  list  of  canonical  books  an  exclusion,  however,  contained 
in  the  standing  Preface  itself,  in  addition  to  the  testimony  quoted  from  it  in  the  text. 
We  find  in  the  Church  Postills,  which  were  frequently  republished,  Luther  asserting : 
“ This  Epistle  was  written  by  no  Apostle  ; nowhere  indeed  is  it  fully  conformable  to 
the  true  apostolic  character  and  manner,  and  to  pure  doctrine.”  (Walch,  xii.  769.) 
Finally,  it  is  rejected,  as  in  doctrine  contradictory  of  St.  Paul,  in  the  Table-Talk.  (C. 
lxix.  1)  4.)  Of  all  this  Mr.  Hare  seems  ignorant ; nor  does  he  translate  the  passage 
in  the  text  without  interpolating  a modification  of  his  own.  His  observations  are 
otherwise  of  no  import.] 

2 [I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  quote  any  thing  in  confirmation  or  supple- 
ment of  the  extracts  from  Luther,  relative  to  the  biblical  books,  except  in  those  cases 
in  which  Mr.  Hare  has  hazarded  his  strictures.  On  more  than  half  of  my  examples 
of  Luther’s  temerarious  criticism,  he  has  been  silent.  He  has  ventured  no  remark  in 
regard  to  the  books  of — (1)  Kings  and  Chronicles,  (2)  Job,  (3)  Ecclesiastes,  (8)  Epis- 
tle to  the  Hebrews,  (10)  Epistle  of  Jude,  (11)  Apocalypse.  The  half  of  these  likewise, 
be  it  remarked,  are  attacked  by  Luther,  regularly  and  in  writings  formally  expound- 
ing his  last  and  most  matured  opinions.  So  that  even  if  Mr.  Hare  had  been  as  suc- 
cessful, as  he  is  unfortunate,  in  his  counter-criticism — were,  in  fact,  all  the  extracts 
expunged,  in  regard  to  which  he  has  thought  it  possible  to  make  a single  objection  ; 
nevertheless  my  conclusion  would  still  stand  untouched — that  Luther,  though  person- 
ally no  rationalist,  affords  a warrant  to  the  most  audacious  of  rationalistic  assaults 
For,  as  observed,  he  could  not  vindicate  this  as  a right  peculiar  to  himself — as  a right 
not  common  to  all.  And  so  Wegscheider  dedicates  his  “ Institutiones” — “Piis  Ma- 
nibus  Imtheri .”] 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


49 


may,  in  part,  be  claimed  by  the  Reformation,  doubted  its  authen- 
ticity. Calvin  and  Beza  denounced  the  book  as  unintelligible  ; 
and  prohibited  the  pastors  of  Geneva  from  all  attempt  at  interpre- 
tation ; for  which  they  were  applauded  by  Joseph  Scaliger,  Isaac 
Casaubon,  and  our  countryman,  Morus,  to  say  nothing  of  Bodinus, 
&c.  Joseph  Scaliger,  of  the  learned  the  most  learned,  rejecting 
also  the  Epistle  of  St.  James,  did  not  believe  the  Apocalypse  to  be 
the  writing  of  St.  John — and  allowed  only  two  chapters  to  be 
comprehensible ; while  Dr.  South,  a great  Anglican  authority, 
scrupled  not  to  pronounce  it  a book  (we  quote  from  memory),  that 
either  found  a man  mad  or  left  him  so. 

But  in  the  fourth  place,  if  there  were  any  connection  between 
the  antecedent  of  this  argument  and  its  consequent,  we  ought 
unquestionably  to  find,  that  in  this  country,  religious  tests  in 
question  do  effectually  accomplish  the  intent  for  which  they  were 
imposed ; that  the  dangerous  neology  so  deprecated  in  the  Ger- 
man divines,  should  with  us  be  found,  if  found  at  all,  exclusively 
among  those  who  had  not  formally  surrendered  their  Protestant 
privilege  of  free  and  unprejudiced  inquiry.  But  not  only  is  this 
not  the  case,  the  very  contrary  is  notoriously  true ; the  attempt 
at  fettering  opinion,  rousing  apparently  in  the  captive  a perilous 
spirit  of  revolt.  In  fact,  the  nearest  approximation  to  the  learned 
freedom  of  the  German  divines,  and  the  most  enthusiastic  enco- 
miasts of  their  writings,  have  been  found  among  the  English 
clergy,  and  in  that  clergy,  among  the  teachers  and  dignitaries  of 
the  English  Universities.  Were  we,  indeed,  required  to  look 
around  in  this  country  for  the  one  centre,  in  which  a spirit  of 
theological  inquiry,  analogous  to  that  of  the  Protestant  Universi- 
ties of  the  empire,  has  been  most  boldly,  most  conspicuously 
manifested ; we  should  find  it,  assuredly,  not  in  any  independent 
seminary,  not  in  any  dissenting  academy,  but  in  the  venerable 
school  itself,  of  which  the  Christian  Advocate  is  an  ornament — 
fenced  as  he  fondly  contends  it  to  be,  against  the  entrance  of 
heresy  and  schism.  Mainly  to  the  latitudinary  divines  of  Cam- 
bridge, do  the  Germans  themselves  trace  the  determination  which, 
in  its  result,  occasioned  in  the  Lutheran  Church,  the  memorable 
— the  melancholy  revolution  in  theological  opinion.  Conyers 
Middleton,  Doctor  of  Divinity,  Professor  and  Public  Librarian  of 
Cambridge,  was,  a century  ago,  the  express  abstract  of  a German 
ultra-rationalist  of  the  present  day.  Tests  were  unavailing  against 
the  open  Arianism  of  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  against  the  unobtrusive 

Ii 


498  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES— ADMISSION  OE  DISSENTERS. 

Socinianism  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton.  Professor  Porson  ejected,  after 
Newton,  the  text  of  the  three  Heavenly  Witnesses,  as  an  human 
interpolation;  and  his  decision  has  been  all  but  universally  ad- 
mitted— at  least  in  Cambridge.  Was  this  attempt  to  purge  the 
Scripture  of  a spurious  verse,  a commendable  act  of  Protestant 
criticism  ? Still  more  commendable  will  be  every  honest  attempt 
to  purge  it  of  a spurious  chapter  or  book  ; and  the  Herman  critics 
must  thus  be  honorably  absolved.  Was  it,  on  the  contrary,  a 
culpable  act  of  skeptical  curiosity  ? Then  are  academic  tests  of 
no  security  against  the  inroads  of  a restless  exegesis. — On  either 
alternative,  the  Advocate’s  argument  is  null. 

Again,  the  Herman  Divines  are  denounced  by  him  for  main- 
taining “ that  the  Pentateuch  was  composed  out  of  different  frag- 
ments which  were  collected  together.”  He  can  not  surely  be 
unaware  that  Dr.  Marsh,  Bishop  of  Peterborough,  and  present 
Margaret  Professor  of  Divinity  in  Cambridge,  maintains,  after 
Eichhorn,  that  the  three  first  Hospels  “are  composed  of  fragments 
which  were  collected  together.”  In  both  cases  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling  such  an  hypothesis  with  an  orthodox  theory  of  inspi- 
ration is  identical ; but  how  different  in  religious  importance  are 
the  two  series  of  books  ! — The  dilemma  is  manifest ; and  on  either 
horn  the  Advocate  is  equally  impaled. 

It  is  known  to  all  who  know  any  thing  of  modern  divinity,  that 
the  theological  writings  of  Eichhorn,  especially  his  Introductions, 
concentrate  in  the  highest  degree  all  that  is  peculiar  and  most 
obnoxious  in  the  Herman  school  of  biblical  criticism — of  which, 
in  fact,  he  was,  while  living,  the  genuine  representative,  and  dis- 
tinguished leader.  Now,  Lloyd,  late  Professor  of  Hebrew  in 
Cambridge,  circulated  proposals  for  translating  the  boldest  of 
Eichhorn’s  Introductions — that  to  the  Old  Testament;  and  Bishop 
Marsh,  in  his  Lectures  on  Divinity,  addressed  to  the  rising  clergy 
-of  the  University,  once  and  again  recommends,  in  the  strongest 
terms,  the  same  work  to  their  study ; nor,  throughout  his  whole 
course,  does  he  think  it  necessary  to  utter  a single  word  of  warn- 
ing against  the  irreligious  tendency  of  this,  or,  as  far  as  we 
remember,  of  any  other  production  of  the  Herman  divines.  And, 
be  it  considered,  that,  while  he  peculiarly  affects  an  ultra  An- 
glican orthodoxy,  the  Bishop’s  knowledge  of  Herman  theology  is 
of  a very  different  character  from  that  of  those  who  have  been 
recently  so  busy  in  giving  us  the  measure  of  their  modicum  of 
knowledge  and  understanding  on  this  important  and  difficult  sub- 


DO  RELIGIOUS  TESTS  INSURE  RELIGIOUS  TEACHERS? 


499 


ject.  Indeed,  with  the  exception  of  Mr.  Thirlwall’s  excellent 
Introduction  to  his  translation  of  Schleiermacher  on  St.  Luke, 
(he  might  have  chosen,  we  think,  a fitter  work),  and  some  parts 
of  Mr.  Pusey’s  hook,  the  public  had,  in  every  point  of  view,  far 
better  be  without  all  that  has  recently  appeared  in  this  country, 
in  regard  to  the  result  of  Protestantism  in  Germany.  But  in 
reference  to  our  argument : — If  men  in  the  situations,  and  with 
*the  authority  of  Lloyd  and  Marsh,  endeavored  thus  to  promote  the 
study  of  Eichhorn  and  his  school  among  the  academic  youth ; 
either  the  opinions  of  the  German  Divines  are  not  such  as  the 
Advocate  and  others  have  found  it  convenient  to  represent  them ; 
or  ( quod  absit !)  these  opinions  are  already  throned  in  the  high 
places  of  the  English  Universities  and  Church,  in  spite  of  the 
very  oaths  and  subscriptions  which  it  is  argued  are  necessary  in 
order  to  exclude  them.1 

1 [But  of  the  value  of  Oath  and  Subscription  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  I have  else- 
where spoken  in  the  previous  and  ensuing  articles.] 


VII.  -ON  THE  RIGHT  OF  DISSENTERS  TO  ADMISSION  INTO# 
THE  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES. 

(SUPPLEMENTAL.) 


(January,  1835.) 

1.  Speech  of  Henry,  Lord  Bishop  of  Exeter,  on  occasion  of  a 
Petition  from  certain  Members  of  the  Senate  of  Cambridge, 
presented  to  the  House  of  Lords  on  Monduy,  April  21,  1834. 
8vo.  London : 1834. 

2.  Substance  of  a Speech  delivered  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  Wednesday,  March  26,  1834,  by  Sir  Robert  Harry  Inglis, 
Bart.,  in  reference  to  a Petition  from  certain  Members  of  the 
Senate  of  the  University  of  Cambridge.  8vo.  London : 1834. 

The  opponents  and  supporters  of  the  recent  measures  for  re- 
storing the  English  Universities  to  their  proper  character  of  un- 
exclusive schools,  may  pretend  indifferently  to  the  honor  of  having 
argued  their  cases  in  the  worst  possible  manner  ; and  in  the  cloud 
of  pamphlets  (we  have  seen  nearly  thirty),  and  throughout  the 
protracted  discussions  in  Parliament,  which  this  question  has 
drawn  forth,  the  reasons  most  confidently  urged  by  the  former, 
are  precisely  those  which,  as  suicidal,  they  ought  especially  to 
have  eschewed ; and  these  same  reasons,  though  cautiously 
avoided,  as  unanswerable,  by  the  latter,  are  the  very  grounds  on 
which  the  necessity  not  only  of  this,  hut  of  far  more  important 
measures  of  academical  reform,  were  to  be  triumphantly  estab- 
lished. So  curious  in  fact  was  the  game  at  cross  purposes,  that 
the  official  defenders  of  things  as  they  are  in  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge do,  on  the  principle  of  their  own  objection  to  this  partial 
restoration  of  the  ancient  academic  order,  call  out  for  a sweeping 
overthrow  of  the  actual  administration  of  these  establishments ; 


ARGUMENT  BY  THE  OXFORD  ADVOCATES. 


SOI 


and  we  are  confident  of  proving  before  the  conclusion  of  the  pre- 
sent article,  that,  unless  apostates  not  only  from  their  reasoning 
on  this  question,  hut  from  their  professions  of  moral  and  religious 
duty,  we  have  a right  to  press  into  the  service,  as  partisans  of  a 
radical  reform  in  Oxford  (besides  the  Chancellor  of  that  Univer- 
sity, his  Cfrace  of  "Wellington),  the  Bishop  of  Exeter,  and  Sir 
Robert  Inglis  themselves.  From  the  general  tenor  of  their  poli- 
tics, but  in  particular  from  their  personal  relations  to  this  Univer- 
sity (the  one  its  representative,  the  other  long  a member  of  its 
collegial  interest),  these  eminent  individuals  were  the  natural, 
and  on  the  late  occasion,  the  strenuous,  champions  in  Parliament 
of  the  party  now  dominant  in  Oxford  ; — indeed  so  satisfied  do 
they  appear  with  their  own  achievements  in  the  debate,  that  they, 
and  they  only,  have  deemed  their  principal  speeches,  in  opposition 
to  the  Dissenters’  claim,  of  sufficient  consequence  to  merit  publi- 
cation in  a separate  form. 

In  the  article  on  this  subject  in  our  last  Number,  we  were 
compelled  to  omit  or  hurry  over  many  important  matters. — One 
portentous  error,  common  to  both  sides,  we  indeed  (for  the  second 
time)  exposed — that  the  English  Universities  are  the  complement 
or  general  incorporation  of  the  Colleges  ; — an  assumption  and 
admission,  from  which  the  partisans  of  exclusion  were  able  legi- 
timately to  infer — that,  as  the  constituent  parts  were  private  or 
exclusive  foundations,  the  constituted  ivhole  could  not  be  a national 
or  unexclusive  establishment. — There  was,  however,  another  not 
less  important  error,  on  which  we  could  only  touch ; and  in  regard 
to  the  argument  attempted  to  be  drawn  from  the  injustice  of  in- 
terfering with  trustees  in  the  faithful  exercise  of  their  duty , so 
confidently  advanced  by  Dr.  Philpotts  and  Sir  Robert  Inglis,  we 
merely  stated,  in  passing,  how  gladly  we  joined  issue  with  them 
on  the  principle  ; and  now  proceed,  in  supplement  of  our  previous 
paper,  to  show,  that,  when  fully  and  fairly  applied,  this  principle 
affords  a result  the  very  converse  of  that  anticipated  either  by 
those  who  so  rashly  brought  it  to  bear  upon  the  question,  or  by 
those  who  allowed  it  to  pass  without  even  an  attempt  at  rejoinder. 
—The  following  is  the  argument  as  pointed  by  the  two  Oxford 
advocates : 

The  Bishop  of  Exeter. — “ My  Lords,  it  is,  I apprehend,  an  admitted 
principle,  that  where  a corporation  has  received  its  charter  for  a specific 
purpose,  the  law  of  England  repels,  and  the  legislature  of  England  has 
hitherto  repelled,  every  attempt  to  break  in  upon  that  corporation,  except 
on  an  allegation  either  that  its  members  have  omitted  to  perform  the  duties 


502  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

for  which  they  were  incorporated , or  that  the  purposes  for  which  they 
were  incorporated  were  originally,  or  have  been  declared  by  subsequent 
enactments  to  be  illegal,  immoral,  or  superstitious. 

“ Such,  I will  venture  to  say,  is  the  principle  of  the  law  of  England  in 
respect  to  corporations ; and  even  if  a lawyer  could  devise  any  plea  in 
derogation  of  it,  I am  quite  sure  that  there  is  no  Englishman  of  plain  un- 
derstanding who  would  not  proclaim  his  assent  to  the  reasonableness  of  that 
principle.  Noiv,  is  it,  can  it  be  alleged,  that  either  of  the  Universities,  or 
that  any  of  the  Colleges  within  them,  have  violated  the  duties  of  their  cor- 
porate character,  or  that  they  have  abused  the  poivers  intrusted  to  them 
for  the  performance  of  those  duties,  or  that  the  purposes  and  object  of 
their  incorporation  are  illegal,  immoral,  superstitious,  or  otherwise  con- 
demnable  ? My  Lords,  no  man  has  ventured,  nor  icill  any  man  venture 
to  say  any  of  these  things.  On  what  pretense,  then,  could  Parliament  dare 
— (forgive  the  word,  my  Lords ; when  a man  feels  strongly,  he  will  not 
scruple  to  speak  strongly,  but  your  Lordships  will  not,  I am  sure,  think 
the  word  needs  an  apology,  for  you  would  not  dare  to  do  what  is  wrong;) 
— on  what  pretense,  then,  I ask,  would  Parliament  dare  to  set  a prece- 
dent, which  would  destroy  every  thing  like  the  principle  of  property  as 
connected  with  corporations,  and  would  violate  all  the  sacredness  that 
belongs  to  oaths — ay,  my  Lords,  the  sacredness  of  oaths  ? I say  this,  be- 
cause it  must  not  be  forgotten,  that  the  members  of  the  University  of  Oxford 
have  siuorn  that  they  will  obey  their  statutes,  and  I doubt  7iot  they  mill 
keep  that  oath  inviolate.  Parliament  may  have  the  power  to  destroy 
these  bodies,  but  Parliament  has  not  the  power — and,  if  such  a thing  shall 
be  attempted,  Parliament  will  find  that  it  has  not  the  power — to  make 
these  illustrious  bodies  faithless  to  the  sacred  duties  7vliich  they  have 
sworn  to  discharge.  My  Lords,  the  University  of  Oxford  I know  well — 
many  of  my  happiest  years  have  been  passed  within  it — and  from  that 
knowledge  of  it  I speak,  when  I proclaim  my  firm  conviction,  that  if  both 
houses  of  Parliament  shall  pass  the  bill  which  has  been  brought  into  the 
other  house,  and  if  his  Majesty  shall,  unhappily,  be  advised,  and  shall 
yield  to  the  advice,  to  give  to  it  the  royal  assent — you  will  not  at  Oxford 
find  a man — certainly  very,  very  few  men — who  would  not  submit  to  be 
pennyless  and  homeless,  to  be  outcasts  on  the  world,  rather  than  do  that 
which  they  now,  it  seems,  are  to  be  required  to  do — to  be  parties  to  the 
desecration  of  what  they  hold  to  be  most  sacred,  and  to  the  destruction  of 
what  they  deem  to  be  most  valuable  in  this  life,  because  it  is  connected 
with  the  interests  of  the  life  to  come.” — (Speech,  &c.,  p.  11,  &c.) 

Sir  Robert  Inglis. — “ The  honorable  and  learned  member  for  Dublin 
contends,  that  as  the  legislature  interfered  once  with  the  Universities,  it 
has  a right  to  interfere  again ; but  I put  it  upon  the  score  of  common 
honesty  and  honor,  whether  any  gentleman  in  private  life  would  sanction 
the  principle  of  taking  back  a gift  because  you  happened  to  bestow  it  ? 
Tell  me,  if  you  please,  that  the  gift  was  a trust,  and  that  the  trust  has 
been  abused,  and  then  I can  understand  you.  Until  it  can  be  proved, 
however,  that  the  tivo  Universities  have  betrayed  their  trust,  you  can  not 
in  good  faith  or  common  honesty  require  us  to  restore  the  boon  which  you 
gave I do  not  consider  the  question  to  be,  whether  the  Univer- 

sity was  founded  by  Catholics  or  Dissenters.  The  present  possession  has 
lasted  600  years  ; and  unless  [which  in  his  speech  of  the  26th  March  Sir 
Robert  says,  ‘ is  7iot  even  alleged’]  it  can  be  proved  that  the  trust  has  been 


ARGUMENT  BY  THE  OXFORD  ADVOCATES. 


503 


abused , I contend  that  it  ought  not  to  he  disturbed.  Is  the  House  pre- 
pared to  take  away  the  rights  and  privileges  of  this  University  ivithout 
any  proof  of  delinquency  ?” — (March  21,  1834,  Mirror  of  Parliament, 
vol.  ii.  p.  983.) 

— “ I know  how  unpopular  the  practice  is  in  this  House  of  even  refer- 
ring to  the  oaths  which  any  honorable  member  has  taken  ; hut  I will  not 
shrink  from  that  duty,  whether  the  individuals  who  have  taken  these 
oaths  he  members  of  the  Church  of  Home,  or  members  of  the  Protestant 
Church  of  England.  Many  there  are  sitting  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
House,  and  who,  I almost  fear,  are  prepared  to  vote  for  the  second  reading 
of  this  bill,  who  are  bound  in  the  strongest  manner,  by  solemn  oaths,  to 
uphold  the  tico  Universities.  I call  upon  the  House,  and  upon  these  hon- 
orable members,  to  listen  while  I venture  to  read  to  them  the  oaths  which 
they  took  when  they  were  admitted  into  the  Universities.  1 take  the  oath 
of  matriculation  at  Cambridge,  which  the  members  of  the  opposite  bench 

have  taken The  words  of  the  oath,  on  proceeding  to  a degree,  go 

even  farther,  and  bind  the  party  to  maintain,  not  only  the  honor  and  dig- 
nity of  the  University — which  he  might  contend  he  consults  by  admitting 
Dissenters — but  even  the  statutes,  and  ordinances,  and  customs,  which 
he  can  not  deceive  himself  in  supposing  that  this  bill  upholds.  The  words 
on  this  occasion,  addressed  by  the  Vice-Chancellor  to  the  party,  are — 
“ Jurabis  quod  statuta  nostra,  ordinationes,  et  consuetudines  approbatas 
observabis.”  I ask  the  honorable  member  for  Wiltshire,  and  every  other 
honorable  member  who  has  had  the  advantage  of  a University  education, 
to  consider  the  nature  of  the  oath  which  they  so  solemnly  took.  If  there 
be  faith  in  man — if  there  be  any  use  in  religious  instruction,  I ask  hon- 
orable members  to  pause  before  they  vote  in  favor  of  the  measure  now 
before  us.  I do  assure  the  noble  Lord  that  I do  not  quote  these  oaths  in 
any  other  spirit  than  that  in  which  I would  wish  him  to  address  me,  if 
he  believed  that  on  any  occasion  I teas  incurring  the  risk  of  violating 
any  such  engagement .” — (June  20,  1834,  Mirror  of  Parliament,  vol.  iii. 
p.  2354.) 

The  whole  reasoning  in  these  quotations,  is  drawn  from  two 
places  : the  one,  the  Rights  of  public  Trustees ; the  other,  the 
Obligation  of  the  Academic  Oaths. 

I.  The  reasoning  from  the  former  place — the  Rights  of  public 
Trustees — is  as  follows  : — Trustees  created  by  and  for  the  public, 
who  have  continued  faithfully  to  discharge  their  duty,  ought  not 
(what  the  admission  of  the  dissenters,  it  is  assumed,  will  actually 
occasion)  to  be  superseded  or  compelled  to  resign ; — The  govern- 
ors and  instructors  of  the  English  Universities  are,  and  are  ad- 
mitted to  be,  such  trustees  ; — Therefore,  &c. 

We  have  already  stated,  that  we  cordially  join  issue  with  our 
opponents  in  the  principle  of  their  argument ; and  our  line  of 
reasoning  does  not  require  that  we  should  correct  the  terms  in 
which  their  major  proposition  is  expressed.  We  may,  however, 
notice,  that,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  inapplicable,  inasmuch  as  the 


504  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

assumption  through  which  it  is  connected  with  the  minor — that 
the  opening  of  the  Universities  to  the  Dissenters  would  virtually 
compel  the  present  trustees  to  resign — will  be  shown,  in  treating 
of  the  reasoning  from  the  latter  place,  to  he  unfounded : and,  in 
the  second , that  though  true,  as  far  as  it  goes,  it  requires  for 
absolute  truth  an  extension  also  to  insufficiency  ; seeing,  that  a 
public  trust  (saving  always  the  interest  of  incumbents  and  inde- 
pendent of  all  private  rights  of  property)  may  justly,  without 
any  allegation  of  dishonesty  or  negligence  in  the  trustee,  be  re- 
organized, or  placed  under  a different  management,  the  moment 
that  the  welfare  of  the  public  renders  such  a measure  expedient. 
A trustee,  qua  trustee,  has,  against  his  truster,  duties  but  not 
rights.  His  only  claim  of  continuance,  is  his  superior  or  equal 
competency  to  discharge  the  office.  A University  is  a trust  con- 
fided by  the  state  to  certain  hands  for  the  common  interest  of  the 
nation  ; nor  has  it  ever  heretofore  been  denied,  that  a University 
may,  and  ought,  by  the  state  to  he  from  time  to  time  corrected, 
reformed,  or  recast,  in  conformity  to  accidental  changes  of  rela- 
tion, and  looking  toward  an  improved  accomplishment  of  its 
essential  ends.  Under  this  extension  the  Dissenters  would  be 
safe.  But  waving  all  this,  and  taking  the  proposition  simply  as 
it  stands,  it  is  evident  that  if  it  he  assumed  by  our  opponents — 
That  public  trustees  ought  not  to  be  superseded  ivithout  a proof 
of  negligence  or  abuse;  multo  magis,  must  it  be  admitted  by 
them,  as  implied  in  their  own  assumption,  and  by  all  as  a propo- 
sition unconditionally  true — That  public  trustees , on  a proof  of 
negligence  or  abuse , ought  to  be  superseded.  On  the  hypothesis, 
therefore,  of  our  proving,  that  the  governors  of  either  University 
have  not  only  neglected  or  partially  abused,  but  betrayed  and 
systematically  frustrated  their  whole  great  trust,  these  doughty 
champions  of  the  collegial  interest'must,  on  their  own  principle, 
he,  presto , metamorphosed  into  its  assailants.  Nor  is  such  a 
proof  to  seek  ; it  is  already  on  record.  To  Oxford  we  limit  our 
consideration,  not  that  an  equal  malversation  might  not  be  estab- 
lished against  Cambridge,  but  because  we  have  only,  as  yet, 
proved  our  allegations  of  illegality  and  breach  of  trust,  in  relation 
to  the  former. 

The  Bishop  of  Exeter  and  Sir  Robert  Inglis,  not  only  assert 
that  no  abuse  of  trust  can  justly  he  alleged  against  the  Univer- 
sities (meaning  of  course  in  reference  to  Oxford,  the  Heads  of 
Houses,  who  are  by  law  solely  bound,  and  exclusively  competent. 


RIGHTS  OF  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


505 


to  prevent,  and  who,  consequently,  have  alone  the  power  to  tole- 
rate and  perpetuate  abuses),  but  that  no  one  has  ever  dared  to 
hazard  such  an  allegation.  “ Is  it”  (says  the  former),  “ can  it 
be  alleged,  that  either  of  the  Universities,  or  that  any  of  the 
Colleges  within  them,  have  violated  tbe  duties  of  their  corporate 
character,  or  that  they  have  abused  the  powers  intrusted  to  them 
for  the  performance  of  those  duties  ? My  Lords,  no  man  has 
ventured , nor  loill  any  man  venture  to  say  any  of  these  things .” 
And  with  equal  confidence  the  latter  avers  that  such  abuse  “ is 
not  even  alleged.’’'1  Defiance  like  this,  from  such  a quarter,  was 
alone  wanted  to  carry  to  its  climax  the  history  of  that  official 
treason  of  which  the  University  of  Oxford  has  been  the  prey ; for 
not  only  has  the  abuse  of  trust  in  this  venerable  school  been  de- 
nounced by  us  as  unparalleled  in  the  annals  of  any  other  Chris- 
tian institution , but  our  exposure  of  it  has  been  so  complete  that 
those  interested  in  its  continuance — those  on  whom  defense  was 
a necessity,  moral  and  religious,  have  been  unable  to  allege  a 
single  word  in  vindication.1 

It  is  now  above  three  years  and  a half  since  we  published  a 
principal,  and  above  three  years  since  we  subjoined  a supplemen- 
tary, article  on  the  subject.  [Nos.  iv.  v.  of  this  series.] 

In  these  we  stated,  that  though  Great  Britain,  from  the  con- 
stituency of  its  unreformed  Parliament,  was  by  nature  the  happy 
paradise  of  jobs  ; yet  that  in  that  country  the  lawless  usurpation 
of  which  the  two  great  national  Universities  of  England  had  been 
the  victims’  (from  the  magnitude  of  the  public  evil,  and  the  sin- 
gular character  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  accom- 
plished), stands  pre-eminent  and  alone.  With  more  immediate 
reference  to  Oxford,  we  showed  that  it  was  at  once  conspicuous 
for  the  extent  to  which  the  most  important  interests  of  the  public 
had  been  sacrificed  to  private  ends — for  the  unholy  disregard  dis- 
played in  its  consummation  of  every  moral  and  religious  tie — 


1 In  deference  to  the  common  sense  and  common  honesty  of  the  collegial  interest, 
we  shall  not  consider  two  unparalleled  pamphlets,  published  (by  one  of  its  Fellows, 
we  presume)  under  the  name  of  “ A Member  of  Convocation,”  as  representing  more 
than  the  moral  eccentricities  of  an  individual.  Our  exposure  is  not  to  be  refuted,  by 
regularly  quoting,  as  from  us,  particular  passages  we  never  wrote,  and  by  systemat- 
ically combating,  as  our  argument,  the  very  converse  of  every  general  position  we 
actually  maintained. 

We  are,  however,  pleased  to  see  that  the  Quarterly  Review  has  been  driven  to  a 
similar  tactic,  in  attempting  to  say  something  in  answer  to  our  recent  article  on  the 
present  subject,  in  its  last  Number.  But  we  have  no  room  at  present  to  expose  its 
misrepresentations. 


506  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

for  the  sacred  character  of  the  agents  through  whom  the  unholy 
treason  has  been  perpetrated — for  the  systematic  perjury  it  has 
naturalized  in  this  great  seminary  of  religious  education — for  the 
apathy  with  which  the  public  detriment  has  been  tolerated  by 
the  State,  the  impiety  by  the  Church — and,  last  not  least,  for 
the  unacquaintance  so  universally  manifested  with  so  flagrant  a 
corruption. 

1.  We  showed  in  the  first  place,  that  a great  breach  of  trust 
had  been  committed. — That  there  were  two  systems  of  education 
to  be  distinguished  in  the  English  Universities ; a legal , non- 
existent in  fact,  and  an  actual,  non-existent  in  law  ; and  that  in 
Oxford  no  two  systems  could  be  imagined  more  universally  and 
diametrically  opposed — in  ends — in  conditions — in  means. 

In  the  Legal  system,  the  end,  for  the  sake  of  which  the  Uni- 
versity is  privileged  by  the  nation,  and  that  consequently  imper- 
atively prescribed  by  the  statutes,  is  to  afford  public  education 
in  the  faculties  of  Theology,  Law,  Medicine,  and  Arts,  and  to 
certify — by  the  testimony  of  a degree — that  this  education  had 
in  one  or  other  of  these  faculties  been  effectually  received. — In 
the  Illegal,  degrees  are  still  ostensibly  accorded  in  all  the  facul- 
ties : but  they  are  now  empty,  or  rather  delusive,  distinctions ; 
for  the  only  education  at  present  requisite  for  all  degrees,  is  the 
private  tuition  afforded  by  the  Colleges  in  the  elementary  depart- 
ment of  the  lowest  faculty  alone.  Of  ten  degrees  still  granted  in 
Oxford,  all  are  given  without  the  statutory  conditions ; and  nine 
are,  except  for  the  privileges  not  withdrawn  from  them,  utterly 
worthless. 

In  the  Legal  system,  it  is,  of  course,  involved  as  conditions , 
that  the  candidate  for  a degree  shall  have  spent  a sufficient  time 
in  the  University,  and  this  in  attendance  on  the  public  courses  of 
that  faculty  in  which  he  purposes  to  graduate. — In  the  Illegal, 
when  the  statutory  education  in  the  higher  faculties,  and  the 
higher  department  of  the  lowest,  was  no  longer  afforded,  these 
relative  conditions,  were,  though  indispensable  by  statute,  re- 
placed, in  practice,  by  empty  standing. 

The  Legal  system,  as  its  necessary  mean,  employs  in  every 
faculty  a co-operative  body  of  select  Professors,  publicly  teaching 
in  conformity  to  statutory  regulation. — The  Illegal  (in  which  the 
mutilated  remnant  of  professorial  instruction  is  little  more  than 
a nominal  appendage),  abandons  the  petty  fragment  of  private 
education  it  precariously  affords,  as  a perquisite,  to  the  inca- 


RIGHTS  OF  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


507 


pacity  of  an  individual,  Fellow  by  chance,  and  Tutor  by  usurpa- 
tion. ' 

England  is  thus  the  only  Christian  country,  where  the  Parson, 
if  he  reach  the  University  at  all,  receives  only  the  same  minimum 
of  theological  tuition  as  the  Squire  ; — the  only  civilized  country, 
where  the  degree,  which  confers  on  the  Jurist  a strict  monopoly 
of  practice,  is  conferred  without  either  instruction  or  examina- 
tion ; — the  only  country  in  the  world,  where  the  Physician  is 
turned  loose  upon  society  with  extraordinary  privileges,  but  with- 
out professional  education  or  even  the  slightest  guarantee  for  his 
skill. 

2.  We  showed,  in  the  second  place,  by  whom  the  breach  of 
trust  had  been  committed. — The  perfidious  trustees  were  the 
Heads  of  the  private  corporations  or  colleges  in  connection  with 
the  University.  The  Colleges,  though  endowments  limited  to 
the  members,  are  wholly  extraneous  to  the  corporation,  of  the 
University.  Their  Fellows , who,  in  general,  obtain  the  situation 
from  any  other  qualification  than  literary  merit,  far  less  from 
their  capacity  for  instruction,  are  unknown  even  by  name  in  the 
academical  charters  and  statutes ; and  it  is  only  at  a recent  date, 
and  for  private  ends,  that,  by  a royal  ordinance,  the  Heads  of 
these  private  corporations  were  unconstitutionally  elevated  into 
the  incapable  and  faithless  rulers  of  the  public  corporation,  to 
which,  qua  college  heads,  they  were  and  are  wholly  foreign.  The 
Caroline  statute,  procured  by  the  influence  of  Laud,  bestowed  on 
the  Heads  of  Houses,  1°,  the  guardianship  of  the  statutes,  and, 
2°,  with  the  duty  of  watching  over  the  improvement  of  the  Uni- 
versity, the  initiative  of  every  new  law ; the  legislative  power 
remaining  always  with  the  Convocation,  i.  e.  the  assembly  of  all 
the  full  graduates  in  connection  with  the  University.  The  aca- 
demic Legislature,  however,  declare,  that  as  the  Heads  and  Chan- 
cellor are  emancipated  from  the  penalties  of  ordinary  transgress- 
ors, “ so  on  them  there  is  laid  a weightier  obligation  of  conscience 
and  “ seeing  that  to  their  fidelity  is  intrusted  the  keeping  and 
guardianship  of  the  statutes,  if,  (may  it  never  happen !)  through 
their  negligence  or  inactivity,  they  suffer  any  statutes  whatever 
to  fall  into  desuetude,  and  to  be,  as  it  were,  silently  abrogated, 

IN  THAT  EVENT  WE  DECREE  THEM  GUILTY  OF  VIOLATED  TRUST  AND 
PERJURY.” 

3.  In  the  third  place,  we  exposed  the  interested  motives  and 
the  paltry  means  which  determined,  and  the  circumstances  which 


603  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

rendered  possible,  the  universal  frustration  of  the  constitutive 
statutes,  and  consequent  suspension  of  the  University ; for  a 
University  only  exists  as  a privileged  instrument  of  public  edu- 
cation. 

4.  In  the  fourth  place,  we  proved,  that  the  Collegial  Heads 
themselves  ivere  fully  conscious , that  the  change  from  the  stat- 
utory to  the  illegal  system  is  at  once  greatly  for  their  private 
advantage , and  greatly  for  the  disadvantage  of  the  University 
and  nation.  For,  rather  than  allow  its  merits  to  be  canvassed, 
by  venturing  to  ask  for  the  actual  system  a legal  sanction,  even 
from  a friendly  house  of  Convocation,  these  betrayers  of  their 
public  trust  have  gone  on  from  generation  to  generation  volun- 
tarily perjuring  themselves,  and  denying  the  privileges  of  the 
University  to  all  who  would  not  be  constrained  to  follow  their 
flagitious  example. 

Such  was  the  burden  of  the  accusation.  The  accused  were 
the  collegial  interest  and  its  heads — the  reverend  governors  of 
the  University — a class  of  churchmen  who  now  resist  the  natural 
right  of  the  Dissenters  to  education  in  the  national  seminaries, 
on  the  plea,  that  Oxford  is,  in  their  hands,  less  a school  of  learn- 
ing than  of  pious  orthodoxy,  and  who,  heretofore  pugnaciously 
alive  on  every  trivial  disparagement  of  their  literary  estimation, 
were  now  called  forth  by  honor  and  by  sacred  duty  to  vindicate 
even  their  moral  and  religious  respectability.  In  such  circum- 
stances, where  silence  was  tantamount  to  confession,  confession 
to  disgrace,  what  does  such  unwonted,  such  unnatural  torpidity 
proclaim  ? 

“ Pudet  hce.c  opprobria  nobis 

Et  did  potuisse,  ct  non  potuisse  refelli." 

This  alone  can  explain  or  excuse  their  quiescence.  Yet  listen  to 
the  advocates  of  these  self-confessing  culprits.  “ My  Lords,  no 
man  has  ventured,  nor  will  any  man  venture  to  say,  either  that 
they  have  omitted  to  perform  the  duties  for  which  they  were 
incorporated,  or  that  they  have  abused  the  powers  intrusted  to 
them  for  the  performance  of  their  duties.”  “ Nemo,  Hercule, 
nemo  ?” 

“ For  who  dare  deem  that  Lais  is  unchaste  I” 

But  in  thus  ignoring  (in  ignorance  we  are  bound  to  believe) 
before  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament,  not  only  the  delinquency, 
but  its  exposure,  the  advocates  of  the  collegial  interest  did  not, 
we  must  admit,  transcend  the  general  unacquaintance  of  the 


RIGHTS  OH  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


509 


Legislature  with  all  that  appertained  to  the  constitution  and  his- 
tory, the  rights  and  interests  of  the  Universities.  Not  a single 
voice  was  raised  in  either  House  to  signalize  the  misstatement 
and  to  retort  the  argument.  Indeed  the  most  elementary  igno- 
rance of  academical  relations  was  manifested  in  the  bill,  and  per- 
vaded the  whole  course  of  the  subsequent  debates.  The  bill  was 
preposterous  (we  use  the  word  in  its  proper  signification),  and 
confounded  what  ought  to  have  been,  not  only  distinguished  but 
contrasted.  The  Dissenters  could  only  claim  admission  into  the 
Universities  as  national  schools;  but  as  national  schools  they 
had  been  suspended,  and  an  intrusive  private  tuition  allowed  to 
usurp  the  place  of  the  public  education  organized  and  privileged 
by  law.  But  instead  of  first  simply  demanding,  ivhat  could  not 
possibly  have  been  refused , the  restoration  of  the  Universities  to 
their  public  and  statutory  existence,  and  with  which  restoration 
the  universal  admissibility  of  the  lieges  would  have  followed  as  a 
corollary  ; the  Bill  and  its  supporters  first  recognized  the  conver- 
sion of  the  national  Universities  into  a complement  of  private 
corporations,  and  then , of  course,  were  fairly  defeated  in  their 
summary  attempt,  to  deal  with  these  private  and  sectarian  Col- 
leges as  with  cosmopolite  and  Christian  schools.  It  may,  indeed 
it  must,  before  long  become  a question  how  far  the  Colleges  of 
Oxford  and  Cambridge  should  remain  exclusive  foundations. 
This  question  is,  however,  one  of  complicated  difficulties,  from 
the  confliction,  in  every  form  and  degree,  of  public  expediency 
and  private  rights ; — difficulties,  which  can  hardly  admit  of  an 
equitable  solution  by  any  general  measure,  but  would  require  a 
special  adjustment  and  compromise  in  the  case  of  almost  every 
separate  corporation.  In  some  Colleges  the  fellowships  could, 
without  injustice,  be  at  once  thrown  open,  and  unconditionally 
presented  as  the  rewards  of  academical  distinction ; in  others 
this  could  not  be  effected  perhaps  at  all,  or  not  without  an  ade- 
quate compensation.  But  the  University  and  its  education  are 
not  in  the  very  least  dependent  on  the  Colleges ; and,  in  so  far 
as  these  may  be  desirous  of  constituting  a part  of  the  general 
academical  system,  they  were  completely  under  the  control  of  the 
University  and  State.  The  Colleges,  as  strictly  limited  to  the 
members  of  their  own  foundations,  are,  indeed,  governed  by  their 
private  statutes  and  emancipated  from  the  visitation  of  the  Uni- 
versity ; but  as  licensed  houses  of  superintendence  and  tuition  for 
the  academical  youth  in  general , they  can  either,  by  the  Univer- 


510  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

sity  and  nation,  be  deprived  of  their  license  altogether,  or  this 
conceded  to  them  under  any  conditions  which  the  public  corpo- 
ration or  the  state  may  find  it  expedient  for  the  general  advant- 
age to  impose.  In  so  far  as  Colleges  have,  latterly,  been  opened 
to  independent  members,  they  are  tantamount  to  Halls ; and 
Halls  were  always  subject  to  the  regulations  of  the  University. 
In  our  last  article,  we  were  wrong  in  not  taking  this  distinction ; 
and  in  admitting  that,  as  the  Colleges  would  not  be  compelled  to 
receive  any  independent  members  at  all,  they  could  not  be  pre- 
vented from  making  a selection  if  they  did.  But  the  University 
has  a right  to  say : The  Houses  which  we  privilege  to  receive 
students,  these  we  authorize  every  student  to  enter  ; the  Colleges 
must  therefore  admit  all  willing  to  conform  to  their  economy,  or 
none.  And  considering  them  as  incorporations,  if  their  fellow- 
ships were  thrown  open  as  prizes  of  literary  merit,  they  would  of 
course  contribute  powerfully  to  the  prosperity  of  the  University  ; 
but  if,  as  at  present,  they  continued  only  to  crowd  the  hive  with 
drones,  it  would  still  be  the  fault  of  the  University  were  they 
suffered  any  longer  to  operate  as  a direct  impediment  to  its  util- 
ity, by  usurping,  for  their  fellows,  functions  which  they  are  rarely 
competent  to  perform. 

But  to  return  to  our  argument : To  complicate  questions  of  so 
clear  and  simple  a solution  as  the  right  of  Dissenters  to  admission 
into  the  national  Universities,  and  the  proper  mode  of  rendering 
that  right  available,  with  the  difficult  and  raveled  problems 
touching  the  various  collegiate  foundations  of  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge, is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  in  every  point  of  view,  highly 
inexpedient.  It  is  often  easy  to  drive  a wedge  where  it  is  impos- 
sible to  pass  a needle.  The  great  measure  of  a restoration  of  the 
University,  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  to  legal  existence  and  un- 
exclusive nationality  could  not  be  resisted ; while  the  compara- 
tively petty  measure  of  opening,  brevi  manu,  the  English  Col- 
leges to  the  Dissenters  was  successfully  opposed.  A restoration 
of  the  University  is,  in  fact,  the  only  mode  through  which  the 
Dissenters  ought  to  condescend  to  accept  admission — into  Oxford 
at  least.  They  were  plainly  told  by  a member  of  that  University, 
an  active  supporter  of  their  rights  in  Parliament  (Mr.  Vernon 
Smith),  that  a hunted  cur,  with  a kettle  at  his  tail,  was  but  a 
type  of  the  manner  in  which  a Dissenter  would  be  baited  in  an 
Oxford  College,  under  the  spirit  of  the  present  system.  Let  that 
system  be  changed.  Let  the  Tutorial  instruction  be  elevated, 


EIGHTS  OF  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


511 


the  Professorial  re-established  and  improved.  Let  the  youth  of 
the  University  no  longer  imbibe  only  the  small  prejudices  of  small 
men.  Let  them  be  again  presented  with  a high  standard  of  eru- 
dition and  ability.  Let  the  public  schools  once  more  daily  collect 
them  in  numerous  classes  to  hear  the  words  of  wisdom  and  libe- 
rality, and  to  merge  in  a generous,  sustained,  and  universal  emu- 
lation, the  paltry  passions  and  contemptible  distinctions  which 
the  isolation  of  the  College  coteries  now  breeds  and  fosters.  Then 
will  a Dissenter  be  as  sure  of  civility  and  respect  in  Oxford,  as 
in  Leyden,  Gottingen,  Edinburgh,  or  even  Cambridge.  But  in 
point  of  fact,  if  that  be  worthy  of  the  attempt,  the  surest  way  of 
conquering  an  entrance  into  the  Colleges  is  to  make  the  Univer- 
sity accessible — and  not  through  them.  Let  the  University  again 
be  patent  to  every  sect,  with  the  Halls  in  the  course  of  restora- 
tion ; and,  like  a sulky  Boniface,  with  the  fear  of  a rival  hostelry 
before  his  eyes,  every  Head  of  every  College  will,  cap  in  hand, 
be  fain  to  waylay  the  Dissenters  at  its  gate,  with  bows  and 
smiles,  and  a “ Walk  in,  gentlemen  ! — Pray,  walk  in !”  Decided 
symptoms,  indeed,  of  this  spasmodic  complaisance  have  already 
been  manifested. 

It  would  be  a sign  of  marvelous  simplicity  to  believe,  that  the 
opposition  of  the  Collegial  interest  to  the  admission  of  Dissenters 
is  principally,  if  at  all,  determined  by  religious  differences  and 
religious  motives.  If  this  admission  were  for  the  temporal  ad- 
vantage of  the  present  usurpers  of  the  University,  we  should  hear 
no  hypocritical  clamor  about  their  spiritual  obligations.  Their 
conscience  is  merely  a stalking-horse,  moved  by  their  interest, 
and  to  conceal  it.  We  make  no  allegations  which  we  can  not 
prove.  They  protest,  with  tragic  emphasis,  against  the  admission 
of  Dissenters  ; because,  they  say,  they  are  bound  by  their  aca- 
demic oaths  and  statutes  to  exclude  them.  We  are  soon  to  show, 
that  these  statutes  can  be  modified  or  rescinded  by  the  state,  and 
consequently  the  oath  relieved.  Their  clamor  is,  therefore,  idle. 
But  we  shall  admit  their  hypothesis,  and  prove  their  hypocrisy 
notwithstanding.  Suppose  a legislature  to  impose  two  obliga- 
tions ; one  comparatively  strong,  one  comparatively  weak.  If,  in 
these  circumstances,  a man  can  habitually  violate  the  former,  how 
shall  he  he  designated  should  he  vociferate  against  the  constitu- 
tional repeal  of  the  latter  as  an  outrage  on  his  conscience  ? — But 
this  is  not  so  strong  as  the  case  under  consideration.  The  aca- 
demic legislature  of  Oxford  imnoses  two  such  obligations.  The 


512  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

stronger , that,  to  observance  of  its  Statutes,  is  established  on  a 
solemn  oath,  which  is  allowed  only  to  be  deliberately  taken  by 
members  after  attaining  the  age  of  sixteen.  The  weaker , that, 
to  a belief  in  the  Thirty-nine  Articles,  is  established  only  on  sub- 
scription; and  so  slight  is  the  obligation  held  to  be,  by  the  very 
authority  imposing  it,  that  this  subscription  is  lightly  required 
(not  merely  of  young  men  of  sixteen,  as  marvelously  stated  by 
the  Bishop  of  Exeter  and  all  others  in  Parliament,  but)  of  chil- 
dren entering  the  University,  at  the  tender  age  of  twelve.  Now, 
with  what  face  can  the  very  men  who  have  done  two  things : — 
in  the  first  place,  systematically  outraged  the  stronger  and  more 
sacred  obligation  of  the  academic  oath  ; and,  in  the  second , done 
all  in  their  power  to  attenuate  to  zero  the  weaker  and  less  sacred 
obligation  of  the  academic  subscription : — with  what  face  can 
they,  when  it  is  proposed  by  the  state,  to  repeal  this  subscription , 
gravely  call  out  against  that  measure  as  “ a persecution” — as  a 
compelling  them  “ to  be  parties  to  the  desecration  of  what  they 
hold  to  be  most  sacred,  and  to  the  destruction  of  what  they  deem 
to  be  the  most  valuable  in  this  life,  because  it  is  connected  with 
the  interests  of  the  life  to  come  ?” — ( Bishop  of  Exeter's  Speech , 
pp.  9,  10,  13.) — Have  they  not  done  the  former?  Has  the  colle- 
gial interest  not  frustrated  every  fundamental  Statute  of  the  Uni- 
versity— every  statute  opposed  to  its  own  usurpation  of  every 
necessary  academic  function  ? Have  its  Heads  not  themselves 
“desecrated”  and  compelled  all  others  “to  be  parties  to  the  dese- 
cration of  what  they  hold  [or  ought  to  hold]  to  be  most  sacred, 
and  to  the  destruction  of  what  they  deem  [or  ought  to  deem]  most 
valuable  in  this  life,  because  it  is  connected  with  the  interests  of 
the  life  to  come” — their  solemn  oaths  ? — They  have  equally  done 
the  latter.  As  we  formerly  observed — and  that  previous  to  the 
agitation  of  the  present  question  of  the  Dissenter’s  claim — the 
Heads  have  violated  not  only  their  moral  and  religious  obligations 
to  the  University  and  the  country,  but  in  a particular  manner 
their  duty  to  the  Church  of  England.  By  law,  Oxford  is  not  now 
unconditionally  an  establishment  for  the  benefit  of  the  English 
nation ; it  has  been  for  centuries  an  establishment  only  for  the 
benefit  of  those  in  community  with  the  English  Church.  But 
the  Heads  well  knew,  that  the  man  will  subscribe  thirty-nine 
articles  which  he  can  not  believe,  who  swears  to  do  and  to  have 
done  a hundred  articles  which  he  can  not,  or  does  not,  perform. 
In  this  respect,  private  usurpation  was  for  once  more  (perversely) 


RIGHTS  OF  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


513 


liberal  than  public  law.  Under  the  illegal  system,  Oxford  has 
virtually  ceased  to  be  the  seminary  of  a particular  sect ; its  gov- 
ernors impartially  excluding  all  religionists  or  none.  Nor  is  this 
all.  The  natural  tendency  of  the  academical  ordeal  was  to  sear 
the  conscience  of  the  patient  to  every  pious  scruple ; and  the  ex- 
ample of  “the  accursed  thing”  committed  and  enforced  by  “the 
priests  in  the  high  places,”  extended  its  pernicious  influence  from 
the  Universities,  throughout  the  land.  England  became  the 
country  in  Europe  proverbial  for  a disregard  of  oaths ; and  the 
English  Church,  in  particular,  was  abandoned,  as  a peculiar  prey, 
to  the  cupidity  of  men  allured  by  its  endowments,  and  educated 
to  a contempt  of  all  religious  tests.1 

We  are  thus  convinced  that  the  Collegial  interest  in  Oxford 
have  scruples,  few  and  lightly  overcome,  to  the  admission  of  Dis- 
senters, viewed  as  a measure  per  se.  The  consequences  of  that 
measure  alone  affright  them. — In  the  first  place,  the  Heads  could 
not  expect  to  find  in  the  religionists  of  other  sects,  patients  equal- 
ly submissive  in  swallowing  their  catholicon  of  false  swearing  as 
members  of  the  church  in  which  they  themselves  stand  high  in 
station  and  authority  ; and  any  controversy  on  this  point  would 
inevitably  determine  a public  inquiry  into  their  stewardship, 
which  they  might  be  conscious  it  could  not  endure.  Farewell 
then  to  the  suspension  of  the  University,  and  the  usurpation  of 
Tuition  by  the  College  Fellows.  In  the  second  place,  an  increas- 
ed resort  to  the  University  would  necessarily  occasion  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  privileged  Houses  ; and  consequently  either 
divide  the  unconstitutional  authority  of  the  Heads,  or  (what  is 
more  probable)  accelerate  its  end.  The  collegial  interest,  from 
sordid  motives,  is  thus  naturally  opposed  to  the  admission  of  the 
Dissenters  ; but  if  that  admission  can  not  be  avoided,  the  same 
sordid  motives  will  influence  their  conduct  under  that  alternative. 
Be  sure,  there  will  be  no  strike,  for  conscience  sake,  of  the  Fel- 
low-Tutors, and  the  College  Heads,  as  threatened  by  the  Bishop 
of  Exeter  and  Sir  Robert  Inglis.  The  interlopers  will  be  found 


1 [A  signal  proof  of  the  accuracy  of  this  deduction  was  manifested  in  Oxford,  not 
long  after  the  publication  of  this  paper.  I refer  to  the  doctrine  there  promulgated 
touching  the  subscription  of  religious  articles  in  a non-natural  sense.  This  doctrine 
professedly  holds,  that  such  articles  need  not  be  believed  by  the  subscriber,  as  intend 
ed  by  the  imposer  of  the  obligation,  but  may  be  taken  in  any  meaning  in  which  he, 
the  subscriber,  may  choose  to  understand  them.  “ Non-natural  subscription”  is,  in 
deed,  the  natural,  result  of  the  illegal  system,  so  long  tolerated  in  the  English  Univer 
sities  ; but  I had  hardly  expected  that  this  result  would  be  thus  openly  avowed.] 

K K 


514  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

to  stick  to  their  job  and  wages,  till  turned  out  to  make  room  for 
the  regular  workmen  they  have  illegally  expelled.  In  fact,  the 
Heads  have  already  left  their  two  parliamentary  champions  in 
the  lurch.  We  showed,  in  our  last  Number,  how  admission  into 
an  English  University  did  not  constitutionally  depend  on  admis- 
sion into  a College ; and  thus  obviated  all  rational  objection  to 
the  Dissenters’  claim.  But  as  the  restoration  of  the  University 
and  Halls  was  of  more  immediate  danger  to  their  interest  than 
the  admission  of  Dissenters  to  the  Colleges  (the  latter  being 
mainly  opposed  only  as  a mean  toward  the  former) ; and  as  the 
possibility  of  absolute  exclusion,  under  circumstances,  could  no 
longer  be  expected  ; the  Heads,  throwing  to  the  winds  every 
dread  vaticination  of  their  parliamentary  organs,  prudently  de- 
termined to  choose  of  two  evils  the  least,  and  had  actually  agreed 
to  propose  in  Convocation  a repeal  of  the  Academic  Test.  But 
lest  it  might  ever  possibly  be  imagined  that  this  change  of  meas- 
ures was  determined  by  any  new  light  thrown  upon  their  duty, 
it  curiously  happened,  that  hardly  had  the  project  of  repeal  been 
by  them  resolved  on,  than  the  reforming  Whigs  were  dismissed, 
and  the  Tory  conservatives  recalled  to  power.  Forthwith,  their 
resolution  was  rescinded  ! 

But  to  return  : — Will  Dr.  Philpotts  and  Sir  Robert  Inglis  con- 
scientiously deny,  that  a public  trust  was  confided  to  the  Oxford 
Heads,  and  that  this  trust  has  been  by  them  betrayed  ? If  they 
can  not,  they  must  either  desert  their  principles,  or  join  with  us 
in  calling  for  a deprivation  of  these  unfaithful  stewards. 

II.  The  reasoning  from  the  second  place — the  Obligation  of 
the  Academic  Oath — is  to  the  following  purport : — All  members 
of  the  English  Universities  are  bound  by  the  most  solemn  oaths 
to  maintain  and  observe  the  academical  statutes : — These  statutes 
prohibit  the  admission  of  Dissenters  ; — Therefore,  in  the  first 
place,  the  passing  of  the  Dissenters’  Bill  in  Parliament,  by  caus- 
ing a confliction  between  the  law  of  the  state  and  the  law  of  the 
University,  would  constrain  the  administrators  and  teachers  of 
Oxford  and  Cambridge,  either  to  violate  their  spiritual  obligations, 
or  to  sacrifice  their  temporal  interests;  while,  in  the  second, 
members  of  either  House  of  Parliament  who  are,  or  have  been, 
members  of  either  University,  would,  by  supporting  or  not  oppo- 
sing the  claim  of  the  Dissenters,  incur  the  guilt  of  perjury. 

This  reasoning,  though  allowed  to  pass  in  Parliament,  has  every 
vice  of  which  reasoning  is  capable. — It  is,  in  the  first  place,  harm- 


THE  OBLIGATION  OF  THE  ACADEMIC  OATHS.  515 

less  to  those  against  whom  it  is  directed ; and,  in  the  second , fatal, 
not  only  to  the  special  case  in  question,  hut  to  the  general  cause 
of  those  by  whom  it  is  employed.  We  shall  consider  it  in  this 
twofold  relation  : — 1°,  As  an  argument  against  the  Dissenters  ; 2°, 
As  an  argument  by  the  Collegial  interest. 

1.  As  an  Argument  against  the  Dissenters. — The  validity  of 
this  argument  supposes  the  truth  of  one  or  other  of  two  assump- 
tions, both  of  which  are  utterly,  and  even  notoriously  false.  It 
supposes,  either  that  the  sovereign  legislature  has  not  the  right  of 
making  and  unmaking  the  statutes  of  the  national  schools,  or  that 
a competent  authority  having  once  imposed  an  oath  to  the  observ- 
ance of  certain  laws,  the  same  authority  can  not  afterward  re- 
lieve from  that  obligation,  when  it  abrogates  the  very  laws  to 
which  that  oath  is  relative.  Of  these  assumptions,  the  latter  is 
sufficiently  refuted  by  the  very  terms  of  its  statement,  and  the 
former  requires  only  a removal  of  the  grossest  ignorance  to  make 
its  absurdity  equally  palpable. 

It  will  not  be  contended  that  the  King,  Lords,  and  Commons, 
can  not  do  that  to  which  the  King  singly  is  competent.  If,  there- 
fore, it  can  be  shown  that  the  Crown,  alone,  has  the  right  either 
of  sole  or  paramount  legislation  in  the  English  Universities,  it  will 
not  be  maintained  that  this  right  is  null,  when  exercised  by  the 
Crown,  plus  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament.  Again : it  will  not 
be  pretended  that  Universities  have  in  themselves  any  native 
right  of  legislation,  or  that  they  can  exercise  such  right  other- 
wise than  as  a power  delegated  to  them  for  public  purposes  by 
the  supreme  authority  in  the  state.  But  if  the  supreme  authority 
can  delegate,  it  can  consequently  perform  a function  ; and,  there- 
fore, all  academical  legislation,  however  absolutely  devolved,  is  of 
its  very  nature  subordinate  to,  and  controllable  by,  the  authority 
on  which  it  is  dependent  for  existence.  But,  in  regard  to  the 
English  Universities,  the  case  is  far  weaker ; there  has,  in  fact, 
to  them  been  either  no  delegation  at  all,  or  this  delegation  has 
been  only  partial  and  precarious. 

In  regard  to  Cambridge — and  to  the  oaths  taken  in  that  Uni- 
versity in  observance  of  its  statutes,  Sir  Robert  Inglis  confines 
himself1 — there  can  be  no  doubt  or  difficulty  whatever.  The 


1 [ Why  has  the  Member  for  Oxford  confined  himself  to  the  University  of  Cambridge  ? 
Perjury  can  be  rebutted,  as  it  can  be  established,  more  easily  and  conclusively,  where, 
as  in  Oxford,  the  Statutes  have  been  fully  and  authoritatively  published,  than  where,  as 
in  Cambridge,  they  have  not.] 


516  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

Crown  lias  there  never  delegated,  except  in  mere  matters  of 
detail,  the  power  of  legislation  to  any  academical  hody.  The 
whole  organic  laws  of  that  University  flow  immediately  from  the 
King  ; and  the  King  may  at  any  moment  withdraw  all  or  any 
of  the  statutes,  and  relieve  from  all  or  any  of  the  oaths,  which  it 
has  pleased  him  to  impose.  The  Royal  Statutes  minutely  de- 
termine the  academic  constitution,  the  organization  of  teachers, 
the  mode  and  the  conditions  of  instruction  and  exercise ; while 
there  is  only  permitted  to  the  Chancellor  and  a majority  of  the 
Heads  of  Houses  the  interpretation  of  what  in  these  statutes  may 
be  found  doubtful  or  ambiguous1  ( Stat.  Eliz.  cap.  50) ; and  to 
the  Chancellor  and  whole  University  the  privilege  of  ratifying 
new  laws  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  institution,  but  this 
only  in  so  far  as  these  Graces  do  not  derogate  from,  nor  prejudice, 
the  statutes  established  by  the  Crown  (Stat.  Eliz.  cap.  42).  Not 
that  the  actual  state  of  that  University  is  legal,  or  the  oaths  taken 
by  all  for  observance  of  the  statutes  are  not  there,  as  in  Oxford, 
broken  by  all,  for  the  private  advantage  of  the  academical  rulers. 
But,  speaking  of  Cambridge,  as  existing  not  in  reality  but  in 
law:  in  that  seminary,  the  Crown  has  only  to  remove  the  im- 
pediment which  it  originally  placed  to  the  admission  of  Dissenters ; 
and  the  University  will  be  at  once  restored  to  its  natural  state, 
of  a national,  of  a European  school.  It  may,  however,  be  noticed, 
as  characteristic  of  the  opposition  now  made  to  the  Dissenters, 
that  the  very  men  who,  in  Cambridge,  coolly  take  and  deliberately 
violate  every  solemn  oath  to  the  observance  of  the  established 
statutes,  when  contrary  to  their  petty  interests,  do,  when  these 
petty  interests  persuade,  vociferate  before  (xod  and  man,  that  they 
are  to  be  robbed  either  of  their  salvation  or  subsistence ; because, 
forsooth,  perjury  would  be  imposed  on  them  by  the  non-enforce- 
ment of  a non-existent  law ! Strange,  that  the  throats  which  thus 
pleasantly  can  bolt  a camel,  should  be  so  painfully  constricted  at 
the  prospective  phantom  of  a gnat ! 

In  Oxford , although  the  Crown  has  permitted  to  Convocation 
a greater  measure  of  legislative  power  than  in  Cambridge  to  the 
Senate  ; it  has  done  this  only  in  conjunction  with,  and  in  subor- 
dination to  itself.  The  King  has  here  always  continued  to  exert, 
both  the  power  of  original  legislation,  and  the  power  of  control- 

1 [“  The  benign  interpretations”  (to  use  Sergeant  Miller’s  expression)  of  the  Cam- 
bridge Heads,  have,  however,  in  the  teeth  of  oath  and  statute,  been  perverted  into  an 
actual  legislation  See  above,  p.  414,  415,  note  ] 


THE  OBLIGATION  OF  THE  ACADEMIC  OATHS.  517 

ling  the  acts  of  the  academical  body  to  which  it  has  pleased  him 
to  depute  the  partial  and  subordinate  exercise  of  this  power. 
The  deplorable  ordinance  by  which  the  ancient  and  natural  con- 
stitution of  the  University  was  subverted,  and  its  efficiency  there- 
after gradually  annihilated — (we  mean  the  Caroline  statute,  which 
conferred  on  the  Heads  of  Houses  the  guardianship  of  the  old  and 
the  initiative  of  the  new  laws — i.  e.,  abandoned  the  welfare  of  the 
national  school  to  the  perfidy  of  a private  body  incompetent  to  its 
maintenance,  and  directly  interested  in  its  ruin) — is  an  example 
of  a royal  statute,  which,  we  trust,  will,  before  long,  by  another 
royal  statute,  be  repealed.  The  history  of  the  University  does 
not  afford  a single  instance  of  the  subordinate  legislature  (the 
House  of  Convocation)  venturing  to  reject  a statute  prescribed  by 
the  paramount  lawgiver  (the  King) ; while  all  enactments  of  any 
general  importance,  as,  for  example,  the  ratification  of  the  code 
of  statutes,  were  not  only  rendered  valid  by  the  royal  confirma- 
tion, but  these,  though  formally  originating  in  the  University, 
were  usually,  in  fact,  enjoined  to  the  academical  legislature  by 
the  Sovereign.  But  not  only  does  the  academical  legislature  of 
Oxford  enjoy  no  rights  available  against  the  state ; in  point  of 
fact,  the  body  to  which  alone  the  legislative  power  was  originally 
intrusted,  does  not  now  exist ; the  delegation  is  consequently  at 
an  end.  The  country,  the  King,  and  the  University,  confided  the 
right  of  subordinate  legislation  in  the  national  school  of  Oxford  to 
a body  of  men  notoriously  qualified  to  this  important  function,  by 
a certain  known  and  statutory  course  of  public  instruction,  exer- 
cise, and  examination.  That  necessary,  that  privileged  course  of 
education  is  no  longer  given ; with  the  qualifying  condition,  the 
qualified  body  is  virtually  at  an  end ; and,  with  the  actual  sus- 
pension of  the  University  education,  the  right  of  University  legis- 
lation ought  likewise  to  be  suspended.  The  pretended  rights  of 
that  perjured  interest  which  now  usurps  the  place  of  the  Univer- 
sity, and  of  the  instruments  through  whom  it  ostensibly  carries 
on  the  acts  of  what,  in  law  and  reason,  no  longer  exists,  are 
treated  with  too  much  deference,  when  treated  with  derision. 

Thus  to  the  Crown  alone — ex  abundantia , to  the  Crown  and  the 
two  Houses  of  Parliament  in  conjunction,  does  the  supreme  right 
belong  of  repealing,  as  of  ratifying,  the  statutes  of  either  Univer- 
sity. What  then  becomes  of  the  argument,  that  the  repeal  of  the 
academic  tests  by  King,  Lords,  and  Commons,  as  it  could  not 
alter  the  academic  statutes  to  which  the  members  of  the  two 


518  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

Universities  are  sworn,  would  consequently  reduce  the  academical 
authorities  to  the  alternative  of  perjury  or  resignation  ? 

2.  As  an  argument  by  the  Collegial  interest. — But  as  the  prin- 
ciple (which  no  moral  intelligence  can  dispute),  that  the  State 
should  by  no  act  occasion,  countenance,  or  permit  the  crime  of 
perjury  among  its  subjects,  is  found  wholly  irrelevant,  as  applied 
by  the  advocates  of  the  interloping  interest  in  the  Universities, 
against  the  Dissenters ; let  us  try  how  the  same  principle  will 
work,  when  retorted  against  the  very  party  in  whose  hands  it  has 
proved  so  ineffectual  a wreapon. 

In  the  first  place,  it  will  he  admitted,  that  it  is  the  common 
duty  of  every  member  of  the  national  legislature  to  do  all  that  in 
him  lies  to  obviate  the  causes,  and  to,  quell  the  perpetration  of 
so  grievous  a sin  in  any  class  or  department  of  the  community ; 
and  that  the  obligation  of  this  duty  rises,  in  proportion  as  the 
atrocity  of  the  crime,  and  its  contagious  virulence,  are  enhanced 
by  the  social  rank  and  sacred  character  of  the  perjurers.  But 
when  a violation,  the  most  aggravated,  of  the  religious  bond 
itself,  is  committed  in  the  act  of  sacrificing  the  greatest  of  all 
public  trusts  on  the  altar  of  a private  interest ; the  sufferance  of 
the  perjury  and  malversation  by  the  national  legislature  for  one 
unnecessary  moment  after  its  exposure,  becomes  a reproach  to 
every  representative  of  the  country  who  hesitates  to  raise  his 
voice  against  the  abomination. 

Of  all  nations  in  the  world,  past  or  present,  Pagan  or  Christ- 
ian, the  English  is  the  one  infamous  for  a contempt  of  religious 
obligations  ; and  if  on  any  national  wickedness  the  wrath  of  God 
is  to  be  visited,  we  may  soon  have  reason  to  lament  with  Jere- 
miah, that  “because  of  swearing  the  land  mourneth.”  Confining 
ourselves  to  Episcopal  authorities : — Bishop  Sanderson  (in  his 
Prelections  on  the  Obligations  of  an  Oath,  delivered  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Oxford,  nearly  two  centuries  ago)  warns  his  country- 
men, that  “ as  the  harvest  of  universal  perjury  is  already  white 
and  ready  for  the  sickle,  so  perfidious  and  profane  a people  ought 
to  dread  an  utter  extirpation  at  the  hands  of  the  divine  justice 
and  he  mainly  attributes  the  grievous  calamities  of  his  generation 
to  the  endemic  crimes  of  useless  swearing  and  hypocritical  per- 
jury. Bishop  Berkeley,  in  his  Essay  toward,  preventing  the 
Ruin  of  Great  Britain,  near  a century  thereafter,  enumerates, 
among  the  principal  causes  of  our  decline,  false  swearing: — “a 
national  guilt  which  we  possess  in  a very  eminent  degree ; there 


THE  OBLIGATION  OE  THE  ACADEMIC  OATHS. 


519 


being  no  nation  under  the  sun,  where  solemn  perjury  is  so  com- 
mon ; — in  so  much  that  men  nowadays  break  their  fast  and  a 
custom-house  oath  with  the  same  peace  of  mind.”  He  then  calls 
on  the  legislature  to  adopt  means  toward  its  prevention;  “for 
whatever  measures  are  taken,  so  long  as  we  lie  under  such  a load 
of  guilt  as  national  perjury  and  national  bribery,  it  is  impossible 
we  can  prosper.” 

But  if  the  perjury  of  England  stand  pre-eminent  in  the  world, 
the  perjury  of  the  English  Universities,  and  of  Oxford  in  particu- 
lar, stands  pre-eminent  in  England. 

In  Oxford,  not  only  is  the  nation  defrauded  of  nearly  all  the 
benefits,  for  the  sake  of  which  this  the  most  important  of  all 
national  corporations  was  specially  organized  and  exclusively  priv- 
ileged ; but  the  moral  and  religious  well-being  of  the  people  sus- 
tains an  injury,  for  which  the  sorry  instruction  still  attempted  in 
the  place  affords  but  a slender  compensation.  The  exclusive  priv- 
ileges which  Oxford  and  Cambridge  still  retain,  render  them  the 
necessary  or  the  favored  portals  through  which,  in  England,  the 
church  and  the  professions  must  be  entered  ; and  thus  the  En- 
glish Universities  continue  by  these  privileges  to  be  thronged, 
when  the  conditions  on  which  they  were  conceded  are  no  longer 
fulfilled.  Compared  with  Oxford  as  it  is,  there  is  not  a European 
University,  out  of  England,  where  the  circle  of  academical  instruc- 
tion attempted  is  so  small ; and  where  the  little  taught  is  (in  gen- 
eral) taught  by  so  inadequate  a teacher.  But  if  the  youth  of 
England  can,  in  Oxford,  learn  less  of  speculative  knowledge  than 
in  any  other  Christian  University,  they  have,  however,  here  a 
school  of  practical  morality  and  religion,  such  as  no  Christian 
University,  out  of  England,  is  competent  to  supply.  Oxford  is 
now  a national  school  of  perjury.  The  Intrant  is  made  to  swear 
that  he  will  do,  what  he  subsequently  finds  he  is  not  allowed  to 
perform.  The  Candidate  for  a degree  swears  that  he  has  done, 
what  he  has  been  unable  to  attempt ; and  perjures  himself,  by- 
accepting,  from  a perjured  Congregation,  an  illegal  dispensation 
of  performances  indispensable  by  law.  The  Professor  swears  to 
lecture  as  the  statutes  prescribe,  and  he  does  not.  The  reverend 
Heads  of  Houses,  the  academical  executive,  swear  to  see  that  the 
laws  remain  inviolate,  and  the  laws  are  violated  under  their 
sanction ; they  swear  to  be  vigilant  for  the  improvement  of  the 
University,  and  in  their  hands  the  University  is  extinguished ; 
they  swear  to  prevent  all  false  oaths,  and,  for  their  own  ends, 


520  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS. — (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

they  deliberately  incur  the  guilt  of  perjury  themselves,  and  anx- 
iously perpetuate  the  universal  perjury  of  all  under  their  con- 
trol. The  academic  youth  have  thus  the  benefit  of  early  prac- 
tice and  of  high  example.  They  here  behold  at  what  account 
religious  obligations  are  held  by  the  very  guardians  of  the  sanc- 
tuary ; and  how  lightly  their  spiritual  guides  sacrifice  to  tempo- 
ral advantage  their  own  eternal  interests,  and  those  of  all  confided 
to  their  care.  Is  it  marvelous  that  England  is  a by- word  among 
the  nations,  when  the  fountains  of  English  morality  and  religion 
are  thus  poisoned  at  their  source  ? How  long  is  this  to  be  en- 
dured ? 

But,  in  the  second  place,  it  is  not  only  the  common  duty  of 
every  national  representative,  to  see  that  no  perjury  he  tolerated 
in  any  quarter,  and  least  of  all,  in  the  very  well-springs  of  public 
religion  and  morality,  the  privileged  national  schools  ; it  is  in  a 
still  higher  degree,  the  especial  duty  of  those  members  of  the 
Legislature , who  are  also  members  of  either  University , to  take 
care  that  every  thing  he  done  by  Parliament  toward  upholding 
the  statutes  of  these  establishments,  which  they  themselves  have 
solemnly  sworn  to  observe.  On  this  ground,  Sir  Robert  Inglis 
called,  in  the  most  emphatic  language,  on  those  members  of  the 
House  of  Commons  who  had  taken  the  academic  oaths,  to  oppose, 
on  the  alternative  of  perjury,  the  passing  of  the  Dissenters’  Bill; 
and  this  on  the  hypothesis,  that  by  no  act  of  the  national  Legis- 
lature could  a University  statute  be  repealed,  and  those  relieved 
of  their  obligation  who  had  sworn  to  its  observance.  We  have 
already  shown,  that  such  an  hypothesis  is  null ; and  shall  not 
attribute  to  Sir  Robert  the  absurdity  of  holding,  that  oaths  to 
obey  a code  of  laws  preclude  the  swearer  from  ever  co-operating 
toward  its  improvement,  by  the  modification  or  repeal  of  inexpe- 
dient enactments. — But  if  ineffectual  against  others,  is  Sir 
Robert’s  argument  inconclusive  against  himself?  He  certainly 
challenges  the  retort.  “I  know,”  he  says,  “how  unpopular  the 
practice  is  in  this  House  of  ever  referring  to  the  oaths  which  any 
honorable  member  has  taken,  but  I will  not  shrink  from  that 
duty  and  after  adjuring  them  by  their  religious  obligations, 
he  assures  his  opponents  “ that  I do  not  quote  these  oaths  in  any 
other  spirit  than  that  in  which  I would  wish  them  to  address 
me,  if  they  believed  that  on  any  occasion  I was  incurring  the 
risk  of  violating  any  such  engagement.”  We  shall  put  him  to 
the  test. 


THE  OBLIGATION  OE  THE  ACADEMIC  OATHS.  521 

Sir  Robert  has  solemnly  made  oath  in  Oxford,  once  at  matric- 
ulation, and  thrice  at  least  at  the  various  steps  of  graduation, 
“ ad  observandum  omnia  statuta,  privilegia , consuetudines  ei 
libertates  Iwjus  Universitatis  ;”  and  this  oath  he  himself  explains 
as  obligating,  not  merely  to  a passive  compliance  with  the  statu- 
tory enactments,  but  to  an  active  maintenance  of  their  authority. 
“ It  binds,”  he  says,  “ the  party  to  maintain,  not  only  the  honor 
and  dignity  of  the  University,  but  even  the  statutes  and  ordi- 
nances.'1'1 

Now,  Sir  Robert  is  far  more  than  a man  of  sense  and  honor ; 
yet  as  a mere  man  of  sense  and  honor,  and  referring  him  for 
proof  to  our  two  articles  onihe  English  Universities  [Nos.  iv.  v.] 
we  know  and  assert  that  he  can  not,  and  will  not  deny,  the  fol- 
lowing propositions  : — 1°,  That  Oxford  de  facto , and  Oxford  de 
jure , are  fundamentally  different — nay,  diametrically  opposite. 
2°,  That  all  members  of  the  University  are  sworn  to  the  observ- 
ance of  the  statutes  thus  violated  and  reversed.  3°,  That  those 
proceeding  to  a degree  without  fulfilling  all  indispensable  condi- 
tions, are  declared  perjured  by  statute,  and  no  graduate  now  ful- 
fills even  the  most  important  of  these.  4°,  That  the  Heads  of 
Houses  are  appointed  to  watch  over  the  faithful  observance  of  the 
statutes,  and  “decreed  guilty  of  violated  trust  and  perjury,  if  by 
their  negligence  or  sloth  any  statute  whatever  be  allowed  to  fall 
into  desuetude,”  and  through  them  every  fundamental  statute  is 
suspended.  5°,  That  the  Heads  of  Houses  possess  the  initiative 
of  every  legislative  enactment,  and  have  yet  neither  brought,  nor 
allowed  to  be  brought,  into  Convocation,  any  measure  tending  to 
put  an  end  to  this  state  of  illegality  and  universal  perjury. — These 
facts  (of  which  we  have  fully  explained  the  how  and  why)  Sir 
Robert  Inglis  will  not,  we  are  assured,  as  an  honorable , not  to 
say  religious , man,  deny ; for  disprove  them,  we  know,  he  can  not. 
We  call  on  him  therefore,  to  fulfill  his  professions — “to  uphold  the 
Universities,  and  maintain  their  Statutes,  as  bound  in  the  strong- 
est manner  by  solemn  oaths.”  “ We  ask”  (his  own  words)  “ the 
honorable  member  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  oath  which  he  so 
solemnly  took.  If  there  be  faith  in  man — if  there  be  any  use  in 
religious  instruction,”  any  confidence  in  religious  profession,  we 
conjure  the  representative  of  Oxford  University  to  lend  the  valu- 
able aid  of  his  character  and  talents  in  restoring  that  venerable 
seminary  to  a state  of  law  and  usefufiiess — to  raise  it  at  least 
from  religious  opprobrium  to  religious  respectability. 


522  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 

In  like  manner,  and  on  the  same  hypothesis — if  the  Bishop  of 
Exeter  would  not  prove  a traitor  to  his  sacred  character — if,  as 
he  says,  he  would  “ keep  inviolate  his  academic  oath,”  and  not 
“become  a party  to  the  desecration  of  what  he  holds  to  be  most 
sacred,  and  to  the  destruction  of  what  he  deems  to  he  most  valu- 
able in  this  life,  because  it  is  connected  with  the  interests  of  the 
life  to  come,”  he  will  actively  co-operate  to  the  same  hallowed 
end. 

But  there  is  another  and  a more  important  ally  who  is  bound 
by  the  most  transcendent  duty  to  lend  his  aid  to  the  cause — we 
mean  the  Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Oxford,  the  Duke  of 
Wellington.  On  his  installation  in  that  distinguished  office,  he 
made  public  and  solemn  oath  to  “ defend  and  to  keep  entire  (tueri 
et  conservare)  all  and  each  of  the  statutes , liberties,  customs,  rights, 
and  privileges  of  that  University  without  partiality,  well,  and 
faithfully,  to  the  best  of  his  ability , and  in  so  far  as  they  should 
be  brought  to  his  knowledge .”  The  Chancellor  is  the  supreme 
magistrate  of  the  public  corporation  of  the  University ; not  of 
the  private  corporations  of  the  Colleges.  His  oath  binds  him  to 
maintain  the  legal  integrity  of  the  University,  and  University 
alone  ; he  is  clothed  with  power  to  prevent  the  breach  or  frustra- 
tion of  any  of  its  statutes  ; which,  if  he  knowingly  permit,  he  is 
proclaimed  by  academic  law  “a  perjured  violator  of  his  trust,” 
and  the  pedestal  of  his  dignity  is  converted  into  the  pillory  of  his 
shame.  But  we  have  better  hopes  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington. 
He  is  not  the  man  to  compromise  the  interests  of  his  glory  to  the 
paltry  ends  of  any  ; nor  will  he  allow  himself,  we  are  assured,  to 
be  played  as  their  puppet — there  ame  damnee — by  such  a body 
as  the  Oxford  Heads.  His  speeches  on  the  Dissenters’  Admission 
Bill  show  him  to  have  been  grossly  misled  in  regard  to  the  nature 
of  the  academic  oath ; but  his  error  was  then  excusable.  It  is, 
however,  his  duty  not  to  remain  obstinate  in  ignorance.  This 
excuse  may  have  been  competent  to  former  Chancellors  ; it  is  not 
to  the  present ; and  let  him  study  the  subject  for  himself,  or  let 
him  obtain  the  opinion  of  any  respectable  lawyer,  and,  sure  we 
are,  the  present  Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Oxford  will  not  be 
on  the  list  of  its  perjured  betrayers. 

But,  we  have  heard  it  said,  that,  admitting  the  truth  of  our 
allegations,  it  is  for  the  interest  of  religion  to  cloak  the  offenses 
of  its  ministers,  while  the  terms,  “perjured  violators  of  their 
trust,”  &c.,  though  appropriate  to  the  offense,  and  not  unsuitable 


THE  OBLIGATION  OF  THE  ACADEMIC  OATES. 


523 


to  ordinary  offenders,  are,  at  the  best,  harsh  and  unseemly  when 
applied  to  a class  of  dignified  divines.  To  this,  we  answer : 

In  the  first  place,  these,  the  severest  epithets  we  use,  are  those 
of  the  Statutes  themselves , which  confer  upon  the  Heads  of  Houses 
a public  authority  to  abuse ; and  are  by  them  prospectively 
affixed  to  the  very  lowest  degree  of  that  abuse,  of  which  we  have 
been  obliged  to  characterize  the  very  highest.  The  statutes 
apply  them  to  the  only  breach  of  trust  which  the  legislature 
contemplated  as  possible,  the  less  careful  enforcement  of  some 
unessential  enactment ; we,  to  the  deliberate  and  interested  frus- 
tration of  every  fundamental  law.  In  fact,  if  the  thing  is  to  be 
said  at  all,  unless 

“ Oaths  are  but  words,  and  words  but  wind,” 

it  can  be  said  in  no  other,  no  milder  terms. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  blasphemous  to  hold  that  religion  is 
to  be  promoted  by  veiling  the  vices  of  its  ministers  ; and  foolish 
not  to  see  that  these  vices  are  directly  fostered  by  concealment 
and  toleration. 

In  the  third  place,  so  far  is  the  sacred  profession  of  the  offen- 
ders from  claiming  for  them  a more  lenient  handling  of  their 
offense,  it  imperiously  calls  down  upon  their  heads  only  a severer 
castigation.  The  holier  the  character  of  the  criminal,  the  more 
heinous  the  aggravation  of  the  crime.  The  lesion  of  moral  and 
religious  principle  in  the  delinquent  himself,  and  the  baneful 
influence  of  his  example  on  society,  are  in  the  present  instance 
carried  to  their  climax  by  the  very  circumstance  that  the  “ per- 
jured violators  of  their  trust”  had  clothed  themselves  with  the 
character  of  religious  teachers  ; and  in  virtue  of  that  character 
alone  were  enabled  to  manifest  to  the  world  a detestable  proof  of 
how  diametrically  opposite  might  be  the  practice  and  the  precept 
of  a priesthood.  It  is  not  that  one  man  forswears  himself  in  a 
smock  frock,  another  in  a cassock  and  lawn  sleeves — it  is  not 
that  an  illiterate  layman  commits  in  ignorance  a single  act,  and 
a graduated  churchman  perpetrates  half  a lifetime  of  perjury, 
with  full  consciousness  of  the  transgression  and  its  atrocity — it 
is  not  that  the  former  gains  a dinner  and  contempt,  by  cheating 
government  of  a few  pounds,  the  latter  wealth  and  consideration 
by  violating  his  public  trust,  and  defrauding  the  church,  the 
professions,  the  country,  of  their  education — it  is  not  that  the 
one  offender  may  grace  the  pillory,  the  other  the  pulpit  and  the 
House  of  Peers  ; — these  are  not  surely  circumstances  that  can 


524  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES  AND  DISSENTERS.— (SUPPLEMENTAL.) 


reverse  the  real  magnitude  of  the  two  crimes,  either  in  the  esti- 
mation of  God,  or  in  the  eyes  of  reasonable  men.  Why,  then, 
repress  the  moral  indignation  that  such  delinquency  arouses  ? 
Why  stifle  the  expression  in  which  that  indignation  clothes  itself? 
But  though  there  be  no  call  for  such  restraint,  we  have  imposed 
it.  We  have  spoken  plainly,  as  in  duty  bound,  but  without  ex- 
aggeration as  without  reserve. 

“ Dicenda  pictis  res  phaleris  sine, 

Et  absque  palpo.  Discite  strenuum 
Audire  Verum.  Me  sciente 
Fabula  non  peragetur  ulla. 

“ Non  est  meum  descendere  ad  oscula 
Impura  Famse  et  fingere  bracteas  ; 

Lavisque  luctari  superbis, 

Aut  nimias  acuisse  laudeis.” 

Nor  do  we  hazard  our  imputations,  if  unfounded,  with  impunity 
We  do  not  venture  an  attack,  either  agreeable  in  itself,  or  where 
defeat  would  be  only  fatal  to  the  defender.  We  deeply  feel,  that 
the  accusation  of  a betrayal  of  trust,  self-seeking  and  perjury,  to 
whomsoever  applied,  is  of  the  most  odious  complexion ; and  that 
the  accuser,  if  he  fail  in  establishing  his  proof,  receives,  and  ought 
to  receive,  from  public  indignation,  an  almost  equal  measure  of 
disgrace  with  that  reserved  for  the  accused,  if  unable  to  repel  the 
charge.  But  when  this  charge  is  preferred  against  a body  of  men, 
the  presumption  of  whose  integrity  is  founded  on  their  sacred 
character  as  clergymen,  on  their  hallowed  obligations  as  the 
guides,  patterns,  instructors  of  youth,  and  on  their  elevated  sta- 
tion as  administrators  of  the  once  most  venerable  school  of  religion, 
literature  and  science  in  the  world  ; what  must  be  our  conviction 
of  its  importance,  of  its  truth  and  evidence,  when  we  have  not 
been  deterred  from  the  painful  duty  of  such  an  accusation,  by  the 
dread  of  so  tremendous  a recoil ! 

And  in  reference  to  the  actual  Heads,  it  is  now  nearly  four 
years  since  we  first  exposed  the  fact  and  the  illegality  of  the 
present  suspension  of  the  University,  with  the  treason  and  perjury 
through  which  that  suspension  was  effected,  and  is  maintained. 
In  our  exposition  we  were,  however,  anxious  to  spare,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  living  guardians  of  the  University  and  its  laws,  and 
to  attribute  rather  to  an  extreme,  an  incredible,  ignorance  of  their 
duty,  what  would  otherwise  resolve  into  a conscious  outrage  of  the 
most  sacred  obligations.  But  since  that  period  the  benefit  of  this 
excuse  has  been  withdrawn.  The  Heads  can  not  invalidate  the 


THE  OBLIGATION  OF  THE  ACADEMIC  OATHS. 


525 


truth  of  our  statements  or  the  necessity  of  our  inferences ; they 
have,  therefore,  in  continuing  knowingly,  and  without  necessity, 
to  hold  on  their  former  lawless  course,  overtly  renounced  the  plea 
of  ignorance  and  bona  fides,  and  thus  authorized  every  executioner 
of  public  justice  to  stamp  the  mark,  wherewith  the  laws,  by  which 
they  are  constituted  and  under  which  they  act,  decree  them  as  a 
body — as  a body , to  be  branded.1 

1 [On  the  false  swearing  practiced  and  imposed  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  I may  refer 
(besides  Dr.  Peacock’s  Observations,  ch.  ii.),  to  Mr.  F.  W.  Newman’s  edifying  Note 
99,  appended  to  the  translation  (from  another  hand)  of  “ The  English  Universities,”  by 
Professor  Huber  of  Marburg,  published  in  the  year  1843.  The  annotation,  here  as  in 
many  other  places,  justly  bristles  against  the  text.  Indeed,  with  reference  to  the 
original,  I may  remark,  that  the  work  was  hardly  worthy  of  a version,  replete  as  it  is 
with  erroneous  statements,  in  consequence,  principally,  of  the  author’s  want,  not  only 
of  personal  experience,  but  of  the  most  indispensable  sources  of  special  information, 
besides  his  deficient  acquaintance  with  academical  history  in  general.  He  was  con- 
fessedly without  the  great  work  on  the  subject,  Wood’s  “ History  and  Antiquities  of 
the  University  of  Oxford,”  &c.,  possessing  only  that  author’s  mutilated  “ Historia  et 
Antiquitates,”  &c. ; nor  does  he  seem  even  to  have  had  access  to  the  “ Corpus  Statutorum 
Universitatis  Oxoniensis.”  Dipping  merely  into  the  work,  among  other  mistakes  : — 
in  Oxford,  Huber  confounds  Schools  and  Halls,  and  knows  nothing  of  “ The  Street ,” 
which,  however,  was  even  more  celebrated  in  that  University  than  in  Paris  and  Lou- 
vain (f)  227) ; he  puzzles  himself  about  the  difference  of  Congregation  and  Convocation, 
or  the  Great  Congregation  (§  230,  note  56) ; he  wholly  mistakes  the  office  and  consti- 
tution of  the  Black  Congregation  (§  257,  notes  72,  80) ; he  misrepresents  the  age  of 
admission  into  the  University,  and  the  statutoiy  commencement  of  attendance  on  the 
statutory  public  courses  ((m)  299,  301,  note  74);  &c.  &c. 

Since  the  above  was  written,  I have  seen  the  “ Oxford  University  Statutes,  trans- 
lated by  G.  R.  M.  Ward,  Esq.  M.A.,  Late  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  and  Deputy  High 
Steward  of  the  University  of  Oxford;”  1845.  I am  happy  to  find,  that  all  the  most 
important  of  my  statements  in  regard  to  the  University  of  Oxford  are  confirmed  by  the 
high  official  authority  of  Mr.  Ward  ; and  not  one  of  them  gainsaid.  See  his  able  and 
candid  Preface,  throughout.] 


VIII.— COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS.1 


(July,  1833.) 

1.  Rapport  sur  Petat  de  V Instruction  Publique  dans  quelques  pays 
de  V AUcmagne,  et  parti culierement  en  Prusse.  Par  M.  Victor 
Cousin,  Conseiller  d’Etat,  Professeur  de  Philosophie,  Membre 
de  l’Institut  et  du  Conseil  Royal  de  l’Instruction  Publique. 
8vo.  Nouvelle  edition.  Paris : 1833. 

2.  Expose  des  Motifs  et  Projet  de  Loi  sur  V Instruction  primaire, 
vresentes  a la  Chambre  des  Deputes , par  M.  le  Ministre  Secre- 
taire d’Etat  de  l’Instruction  Publique.  Seance  du  2 Janvier, 
1833. 

The  perusal  of  these  documents  has  afforded  us  the  highest 
gratification.  We  regard  them  as  marking  an  epoch  in  the 
progress  of  national  education,  and  directly  conducive  to  results 
important  not  to  France  only,  but  to  Europe  The  institutions 
of  Germany  for  public  instruction  we  have  long  known  and  ad- 
mired. We  saw  these  institutions  accomplishing  their  end  to  an 
extent  and  in  a degree  elsewhere  unexampled ; and  were  con- 
vinced that  if  other  nations  attempted  an  improvement  of  their 
educational  policy,  this  could  only  be  accomplished  rapidly,  sure- 
ly, and  effectually,  by  adopting,  as  far  as  circumstances  would 
permit,  a system  thus  approved  by  an  extensive  experience,  and 
the  most  memorable  success.  Our  hopes,  however,  that  the  ex- 
ample of  Germany  could  be  turned  to  the  advantage  of  England, 
are  but  recent.  What  could  be  expected  from  a Parliament,  which, 
as  it  did  not  represent  the  general  interests,  was  naturally  hostile 

1 [This  article  was,  I believe,  the  first  publication  in  this  country,  which  called  at- 
tention to  what  was  doing  in  France,  and  had  long  been  done  in  Germany,  for  the 
education  of  the  people.  We  are  indebted  to  Mrs.  Austin  (among  her  other  admirable 
translations)  for  versions  of  this  and  subsequent  Reports  by  her  celebrated  friend  M. 
Cousin,  on  national  education.] 


NECESSITY  FOE  EDUCATING  THE  PEOPLE. 


527 


to  the  general  intelligence,  of  the  people  ? What  could  he  ex- 
pected from  a Church  which  dreaded,  in  the  diffusion  of  knowl- 
edge, a reform  of  its  own  profitable  abuses  ? But,  though  unaid- 
ed by  Church  or  State,  the  progress  of  popular  intelligence,  if 
slow  and  partial,  was  unremitted.  The  nation  became  at  length 
conscious  of  its  rights  : the  reign  of  partial  interests  was  at  an 
end.  A measure  of  political  power  was  bestowed  upon  the  peo- 
ple, which  demanded  a still  larger  measure  of  knowledge ; and 
the  public  welfare  is  henceforward  directly  interested  in  the  mor- 
al and  intellectual  improvement  of  the  great  body  of  the  nation. 
The  education  of  the  people,  as  an  affair  of  public  concernment, 
is  thus,  we  think,  determined.  As  the  State  can  now  only  be  ad- 
ministered for  the  benefit  of  all,  Education,  as  the  essential  con- 
dition of  the  social  and  individual  well-being  of  the  people,  can 
not  fail  of  commanding  the  immediate  attention  of  the  Legislature. 
Otherwise,  indeed,  the  recent  boon  to  the  lower  orders  of  political 
power,  would  be  a worthless,  perhaps  a dangerous  gift.  Intelli- 
gence is  the  condition  of  freedom ; and  unless  an  Education  Bill 
extend  to  the  enfranchised  million  an  ability  to  exercise  with 
judgment  the  rights  the  Reform  Bill  has  conceded,  the  people 
must  still,  we  fear,  remain  as  they  have  been,  the  instruments, 
the  dupes,  the  victims  of  presumptuous  or  unprincipled  ambition. 
“ A man”  (says  Dr.  Adam  Smith,  who  in  this  only  echoes  other 
political  philosophers) — “ a man,  without  the  proper  use  of  the 
intellectual  faculties  of  a man,  is,  if  possible,  more  contemptible 
than  even  a coward,  and  seems  to  be  mutilated  and  deformed  in 
a still  more  essential  part  of  the  character  of  human  nature. 
Though  the  State  was  to  derive  no  advantage  from  the  instruction 
of  the  inferior  ranks  of  the  people,  it  would  still  deserve  its  atten- 
tion, that  they  should  not  be  altogether  uninstructed.  The  State, 
however,  derives  no  inconsiderable  advantage  from  their  instruc- 
tion. The  more  they  are  instructed,  the  less  liable  they  are  to 
the  delusions  of  enthusiasm  and  superstition,  which,  among  igno- 
rant nations,  frequently  occasion  the  most  dreadful  disorders. 
An  instructed  and  intelligent  people,  besides,  are  always  more 
decent  and  orderly  than  an  ignorant  and  stupid  one.1  They  feel 


1 The  following  paragraph  we  translate  from  an  Austrian  newspaper  (Observer), 
of  November,  1820.  The  writer  is  speaking  of  the  disturbances  which  were  then  ex- 
cited in  many  of  the  German  towns  against  the  Jews,  but  from  which  the  provinces 
of  Austria  remained  wholly  exempt.  “ In  all  that  regards  the  education  of  the  lower 
orders  of  the  people,  through  national  establishments  of  instruction,  there  is  hardly  a 


528 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


themselves,  each  individually,  more  respectable,  and  more  likely 
to  obtain  the  respect  of  their  lawful  superiors,  and  they  are  there- 
fore more  disposed  to  respect  those  superiors.  They  are  more 
disposed  to  examine,  and  more  capable  of  seeing  through,  the 
interested  complaints  of  faction  and  sedition  ; and  they  are,  upon 
that  account,  less  apt  to  be  misled  into  any  wanton  or  unneces- 
sary opposition  to  the  measures  of  Government.  In  free  coun- 
tries, where  the  safety  of  Government  depends  very  much  upon 
the  favorable  judgment  which  the  people  may  form  of  its  con- 
duct, it  must  surely  be  of  the  highest  importance  that  they  should 
not  be  disposed  to  judge  rashly  or  capriciously  concerning  it.” 
( Wealth  of  Nations,  B.  v.  c.  1.  Art.  2.) 

Those  (if  there  are  now  any)  who  argue  against  the  expediency 
of  universal  education,  are  not  deserving  of  an  answer. — Those 
who,  admitting  this,  maintain  that  the  supply  of  education  should, 
like  other  articles  of  industry,  be  left  to  follow  the  demand,  for- 
get that  here  demand  and  supply  are  necessarily  co-existent  and 
co-extensive ; — that  it  is  education  which  creates  the  want  which 
education  only  can  satisfy. — Those  again  who,  conceding  all  this, 
contend  that  the  creation  and  supply  of  this  demand  should  be 
abandoned  by  the  State  to  private  intelligence  and  philanthropy, 
are  contradicted  both  by  reasoning  and  fact. — This  opinion,  in- 
deed, has  been  rarely  advanced  in  all  its  comprehension.  Even 
those  (as  Dr.  Adam  Smith)  who  argue  that  the  instruction  of  the 
higher  orders  should  be  left  free  to  private  competition,  still  admit 
that  the  interference  of  the  State  is  necessary  to  insure  the  edu- 
cation of  the  lower.  All  experience  demonstrates  this.  No  coun- 
tries present  a more  remarkable  contrast  in  this  respect  than  En- 
gland and  Germany.  In  the  former,  the  State  has  done  nothing 
for  the  education  of  the  people,  and  private  benevolence  more 
than  has  been  attempted  elsewhere ; in  the  latter,  the  Govern- 


country  in  Europe  that,  in  this  respect,  has  the  advantage  of  the  Austrian  States. 
The  peasant  in  the  country,  the  artisan  in  the  town,  must,  throughout  these  domin- 
ions, have  given  due  attendance  at  school.  Without  the  certificate  of  education  and 
adequate  proficiency,  no  apprentice  is  declared  free  of  his  craft ; and  without  exami- 
nation on  the  more  important  doctrines  of  religion,  no  marriage  is  solemnized.  Even 
the  military  receive  all  competent  instruction  in  the  elementary  branches  of  knowledge, 
through  masters  who,  for  this  purpose,  are  trained  to  the  business  of  teaching  in  the 
normal  schools.  But  in  proportion  as  education  is  diffused,  is  the  possibility  dimin- 
ished of  the  outbreakings  of  a rude  ferocity  ; the  more  universal  the  instruction  of  the 
lower  orders,  the  more  harmless  becomes  the  influence  which  the  ill-educated  can 
exert  upon  the  sound  judgment  of  those  who  thus  virtually  cease  to  be  any  longer  a 
part  of  the  populace." 


NECESSITY  FOU  EDUCATING  THE  PEOPLE,  529 

ment  has  done  every  thing,  and  left  to  private  benevolence  almost 
nothing  to  effect.  The  English  people  are,  however,  the  lowest, 
the  German  people  the  highest,  in  the  scale  of  knowledge.  All 
that  Scotland  enjoys  of  popular  education  above  the  other  king- 
doms of  the  British  Empire,  she  owes  to  the  State ; and  among 
the  principalities  of  Germany,  from  Prussia  down  to  Hesse-Cassel, 
education  is  uniformly  found  tc  prosper  exactly  in  proportion  to 
the  extent  of  interference,  and  to  the  unremitted  watchfulness  of 
Government.  The  general  conclusion  against  the  expediency  of 
all  public  regulation  of  the  higher  instruction,  is  wholly  drawn 
from  particular  instances  of  this  regulation  having  been  inexpe- 
diently applied.  Even  of  these,  the  greater  number  are  cases  in 
which  the  State,  having  once  conceded  exclusive  privileges  under 
well-considered  laws,  never  afterward  interposed  to  see  that  these 
laws  were  duly  executed,  and  from  time  to  time  reformed,  in 
accommodation  to  a change  of  circumstances.  The  English  Uni- 
versities, it  is  admitted,  do  not,  as  actually  administered,  merit 
their  monopoly.  But,  from  this  example,  we  would  not  conclude, 
with  Smith,  that  all  privileged  seminaries  are  detrimental.  On 
the  contrary,  by  showing  that  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge  the  stat- 
utory constitution  has  been  silently  subverted,  we  should  argue 
that  their  corruption  does  not  originate  in  the  law,  hut  in  its  vio- 
lation ; and  from  the  fact  that,  while  now  abandoned  by  the  State 
to  private  abuse,  they  accomplish  nothing  in  proportion  to  ‘then- 
mighty  means,  we  should  only  maintain  more  strong^'  the  neces- 
sity of  public  regulation  and  superintendence  to  enable  them  to 
accomplish  every  thing.  The  interference  of  the  Government 
may  sometimes,  we  acknowledge,  he  directly  detrimental ; and 
indirectly  detrimental,  we  hold  that  it  will  always  he,  unless 
constant  and  systematic.  The  State  may  wisely  establish,  pro- 
tect, and  regulate  ; hut  unless  it  continue  a watchful  inspection, 
the  protected  establishment  will  soon  degenerate  into  a public 
nuisance — a monopoly  for  merely  private  advantage.  The  expe- 
rience of  the  last  half  century  in  Germany,  has  indeed  completely 
set  at  rest  the  question.  For  thirty  years,  no  German  has  been 
found  to  maintain  the  doctrine  of  Smith.  In  their  generous  ri- 
valry. the  Governments  of  that  country  have  practically  shown 
what  a benevolent  and  prudent  policy  co-uld  effect  for  the  Uni- 
versity as  for  the  school ; and  knowing  what  they  have  done, 
who  is  there  now  to  maintain — that  for  Education  as  for  Trade, 
the  State  can  prevent  evil,  but  can  not  originate  good  ? 

Ll 


530 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


There  are  two  countries  in  Europe  which  have  excited  the 
special  wonder  and  commiseration  of  the  honest  Germans  ; — won- 
der at  the  neglect  of  the  government — commiseration  for  the 
ignorance  of  the  people.  These  countries  are  France  and  En- 
gland. The  following  is  the  last  sample  we  have  encountered 
of  these  feelings  : 

“ Things  incredible  in  Christendom. 

“ England,  in  which  country  alone  there  are  annually  executed 
more  human  beings  than  in  several  other  countries  taken  together, 
suffers  two  millions  of  her  people  to  walk  about  in  utter  ignorance, 
and  abandons  education  to  speculation  and  chance  as  a matter 
of  merely  private  concernment;  we  mean  the  elementary  instruc- 
tion of  the  lower  orders,  for  learning  there  possesses  as  extensive 
wealthy,  noble,  [and  malackninistered]  establishments  as  are  any 
where  to  be  found  upon  the  globe.  According  to  the  documents 
before  us,  it  appears  that  out  of  a population  of  nine  millions  and 
a half,  there  are  above  tic  a millions,  without  schools  for  their 
children.  In  London,  according  to  an  accurate  estimate,  one- 
fourth  of  the  inhabitants  are  thus  destitute.  No  wonder  assured- 
ly that  crime  is  rife  ! — In  France,  likewise,  of  forty-four  thousand 
communes , twenty-five  thousand  (more  than  a half)  are  without 
schools  ; since  the  restoration  of  the  King,  above  four  hundred 
cloisters  have  been  re-established  ; but  schools — What  a blessed 
contrast  is  presented  to  us  by  our  German  fatherland  !”1 

Of  these  two  partners  in  disgrace,  France,  which,  even  after 
the  decline  of  popular  schools  consequent  on  the  first  revolution, 
remained  far  ahead  of  England  in  the  education  of  the  lower 
orders — France  has  been  the  first  to  throw  off  the  national  oppro- 
brium, and  has  made  a glorious  start  in  the  career  of  improve- 
ment. The  revolution  of  July  gave  the  signal.  Almost  the  first 
act  of  the  liberated  State  was  an  attempt  to  meliorate  the  system 
of  public  education,  of  which  the  education  of  the  people  consti- 
tutes the  foundation  ; and  the  enterprise  has  been  continued  with 
a perseverance  fully  equal  to  its  promptitude.  To  show  how 
much  has  been  accomplished  in  so  short  a period,  we  quote  the 
concluding  paragraph  of  M.  Cousin’s  Expose. 

“ In  fact,  gentlemen,  experience  is  our  guide.  This  alone  have  we  been 
anxious  to  follow,  and  this  alone  have  we  constantly  pursued.  There  is  not 
in  this  law  to  be  found  a single  hypothesis.  The  principles  and  the  pro- 


Literaturzeitung  fuer  Deutschlands  Volksschullehrcr,  1824,  Qu.  4.  p.  40. 


M.  COUSIN  HIMSELF. 


531 


cedures  there  employed  have  been  supplied  to  us  by  facts  ; it  does  not  em- 
brace a single  organic  measure  which  has  not  been  already  successfully 
realized  in  practice.  In  the  matter  of  public  education,  we  are  convinced, 
that  it  is  of  far  greater  importance  to  regularize  and  meliorate  what  exists, 
than  to  destroy,  in  order  to  invent  and  renovate  on  the  faith  of  hazardous 
theories.  It  has  been  by  laboring  in  conformity  to  these  maxims,  but  by 
laboring  without  intermission,  that  the  present  administration  has  been 
able  to  bestow  on  this  important  part  of  the  public  service  a progressive 
movement  so  vigorous  and  regular.  But  we  may  affirm,  without  any  ex- 
aggeration, that  there  has  been  more  done  for  primary  education  by  the 
Government  of  July,  during  the  last  two  years,  than  by  all  the  other  Gov- 
ernments during  the  preceding  forty.  The  first  Revolution  was  prodigal 
in  promises,  but  took  no  care  of  their  fulfillment.  The  Empire  exhausted 
its  efforts  in  the  regeneration  of  secondary  instruction,  and  did  nothing  for 
the  education  of  the  people.  The  Restoration,  until  the  year  1828,  annu- 
ally devoted  50,000  francs  (£2083)  to  primary  instruction.  The  Minister 
of  1828  obtained  from  the  Chambers  300,000  francs  (£12,500).  The 
Revolution  of  July  has  given  us  annually  a million  (£43,330);  that  is,  more 
in  two,  than  the  Restoration  in  fifteen  years.  Such  were  the  means  ; at- 
tend now  to  the  results.  You  are  aware,  gentlemen,  that  primary  instruc- 
tion is  wholly  dependent  on  the  primary  normal  schools.1  Its  progress  is 
correspondent  to  that  of  these  establishments.  The  Empire,  under  which 
the  name  of  primary  normal  school  was  first  pronounced,  left  but  one.  The 
Restoration  added  five  or  six.  We,  gentlemen,  in  two  years,  have  not  only 
perfected  those  previously  existing,  of  which  some  were  only  in  their  in- 
fancy, but  have  established  more  than  thirty,  of  which  twenty  are  in  full 
exercise — forming  in  each  department  a great  focus  of  illumination  for  the 
people.  While  Government  was  carrying  roads  through  the  departments 
of  the  West,  we  there  disseminated  schools  : we  were  cautious  in  meddling 
with  those  dear  to  the  habits  of  the  country  ; but  have  founded  in  the 
heart  of  Brittany  the  great  normal  school  of  Rennes,  which  will  be  soon 
productive,  and  surrounded  it  with  similar  establishments  of  different  kinds 
— at  Angers,  at  Nantes,  at  Poictiers.  The  South  has  at  present  more  than 
five  great  primary  normal  schools,  of  which  some  are  already,  and  others 
will  be  soon,  at  work.  In  fine,  gentlemen,  we  believe  ourselves  on  the 
road  to  good.  May  your  prudence  appreciate  ours  ; may  your  confidence 
sustain  and  encourage  us  ; and  the  time  is  not  distant  when  we  shall  be 
able  to  declare  together — ministers,  deputies,  departments,  communes — 
that  we  have  accomplished,  in  so  far  as  in  us  lay,  the  promises  of  the 
Revolution  of  July,  and  of  the  charter  of  1830,  in  all  that  more  imme- 
diately relates  to  the  education  and  true  happiness  of  the  people.’' — (P.  17.) 

Such  was  the  memorable  progress  made  previous  to  the  com- 
mencement of  the  present  year,  when  the  important  Law  on 
Primary  Instruction  was  ratified.  But  this  progress  and  this 
law  were  professedly  the  offspring  of  experience.  Of  what  expe- 
rience ? Not  of  the  experience  of  France — of  the  very  country 
whose  whole  educational  system  stood  in  need  of  creation  or  re- 
form— but  of  that  country  whose  institutions  for  instruction  were, 

1 Seminaries  for  training  primary  schoolmasters.  [A  name  now  familiar. 1 


« 


532  COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 

by  all  competent  to  an  opinion,  acknowledged  to  afford  the  high- 
est model  of  perfection.  In  resolving  to  profit  by  the  experience 
of  the  German  states,  and  in  particular  of  Prussia,  we  can  not 
too  highly  applaud  the  wisdom  of  the  French  government.  Nor 
could  a wiser  choice  have  been  made  of  an  individual  to  examine 
the  nature  of  the  pattern  institutions,  and  to  report  in  regard  to 
the  mode  of  carrying  their  accommodation  into  effect.  M.  Cousin, 
by  whose  counsel  it  is  probable  that  the  plan  was  originally  re- 
commended, was,  in  the  summer  of  1831,  commissioned  to  pro- 
ceed to  Germany ; and  his  observations  on  the  state  of  educa- 
tion in  that  country,  transmitted  from  time  to  time  to  the  Minis 
ter  of  Public  Instruction,  constitute  the  present  Report.  No  one 
could  certainly  have  been  found  better  qualified  to  judge  ; no  one 
from  whom  there  was  less  cause  to  apprehend  a partial  judgment. 
A profound  and  original  thinker,  a lucid  and  eloquent  writer,  a 
scholar  equally  at  home  in  ancient  and  in  modern  learning,  a 
philosopher  superior  to  all  prejudices  of  age  or  country,  party  or 
profession,  and  whose  lofty  eclecticism,  seeking  truth  under  every 
form  of  opinion,  traces  its  unity  even  through  the  most  hostile 
systems  ; — M.  Cousin  was,  from  his  universality  both  of  thought 
and  acquirement,  the  man  in  France  able  adequately  to  determine 
what  a scheme  of  national  education  ought  in  theory  to  accom- 
plish ; and  from  his  familiarity  with  German  literature  and  phil- 
osophy, prepared  to  appreciate  in  all  its  bearings  what  the  Ger- 
man national  education  actually  performs.  Without  wavering 
in  our  admiration  of  M.  Cousin’s  character  and  genius,  we  freely 
expressed  on  a former  occasion  our  dissent  from  certain  principles 
of  his  philosophy  ; and  with  the  same  sincerity,  we  now  declare, 
that  from  the  first  page  of  his  Report  to  the  last,  there  is  not  a 
statement  nor  opinion  of  any  moment  in  Avhich  we  do  not  fully  and 
cordially  agree.  This  work,  indeed,  recommends  itself  as  one  of 
the  most  unbiassed  wisdom.  Once  persecuted  by  the  priests,  M. 
Cousin  now  fearlessly  encounters  the  derision  of  another  party, 
as  the  advocate  of  religious  education ; nor  does  the  memory  of 
national  calamity  and  of  personal  wrong  withhold  him  from  pro- 
nouncing the  Prussian  government  to  be  the  most  enlightened  in 
Europe.  He  makes  no  attempt  to  soothe  the  vanity  of  his  coun- 
trymen at  the  expense  of  truth ; and  his  work  is,  throughout,  a 
disinterested  sacrifice  of  self  to  the  importance  of  its  subject. 
His  ingenuity  never  tempts  him  into  unnecessary  speculation ; 
practice,  already  approved  by  its  result,  is  alone  anxiously  pro- 


COUSIN’S  REPORT. 


533 


posed  for  imitation — relative  and  gradual ; and  the  strongest 
metaphysician  of  France  traces  the  failure  of  the  educational  laws 
of  his  country  to  their  metaphysical  character.  The  Report  is 
precisely  what  it  ought  to  he — a work  of  details ; hut  of  details 
so  admirably  arranged,  that  they  converge  naturally  of  themselves 
into  general  views  ; while  the  reflections  by  which  they  are  ac- 
companied, though  never  superficial,  are  of  such  transparent 
evidence  as  to  command  instant  and  absolute  assent.  This  is, 
indeed,  shown  in  the  result.  The  Report  was  published.  In 
defiance  of  national  self-love  and  the  strongest  national  antipa- 
thies, it  carried  conviction  throughout  France  ; a bill  framed  by 
its  author  for  primary  education,  and  founded  on  its  conclusions, 
was  almost  immediately  passed  into  a law ; and  M.  Cousin  him- 
self (now  a peer  of  France),  appointed  to  watch  over  and  direct 
its  execution.  Nor  could  the  philosopher  have  been  intrusted 
with  a more  congenial  office ; for,  in  the  language  of  his  own 
Plato — £<  Man  can  not  propose  a higher  and  holier  object  for  his 
study,  than  education,  and  all  that  appertains  to  education.” 
And  M.  Cousin’s  exertions,  we  are  confident,  will  be  crowned 
with  the  success  and  honor  to  which  they  are  so  well  entitled.  The 
benefit  of  his  legislation  can  not,  indeed,  be  limited  to  France  : a 
great  example  has  there  been  set,  which  must  be  elsewhere  fol- 
lowed ; and  other  nations  than  his  own  will  bless  the  philosopher 
for  their  intelligent  existence.  (<  Juventutem  recte  formare,”  says 
Melanchthon,  “ paulo  plus  est  quam  expugnare  Trojam and  to 
carry  back  the  education  of  Prussia  into  France,  affords  a nobler 
(if  a bloodless)  triumph  than  the  trophies  of  Austerlitz  and  Jena. 

The  Report  of  M.  Cousin  consists  of  two  parts.  The  former, 
extending  to  about  one-fourth  of  the  volume,  contains  a cursory 
view  of  German  education  from  the  elementary  schools  up  to 
the  Universities,  as  observed  during  a day’s  stay  at  Frankfort, 
and  a five  days’  journey  through  the  states  of  Saxony.  The  latter 
is  solely  devoted  to  a detailed  exposition  of  Prussian  education, 
which  the  author  enjoyed  the  most  favorable  opportunities  of 
studying,  in  all  its  departments,  during  a month’s  residence  at 
Berlin.  This  part  is,  however,  not  yet  fully  published.  Of  the 
four  heads  which  M.  Cousin  promises  to  treat  (viz.  1.  The  general 
organization  of  public  instruction  ; 2.  The  primary  instruction  ; 
3.  Instruction  of  the  second  degree,  or  the  gymnasia ; 4.  The 
higher  instruction,  or  the  Universities),  the  two  first  alone  appear. 
We  anxiously  hope  that  nothing  may  occur  to  prevent  the  speedy 


534 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


publication  of  the  last  two.  If  we  found  fault,  indeed,  with  the 
Report  at  all,  it  would  he,  not  for  what  it  contains,  but  for  what 
it  does  not.  We  certainly  regret  that  it  was  impossible  for  M. 
Cousin  to  extend  his  observations  to  some  other  countries  of  Ger- 
many.  Bavaria  would  have  afforded  an  edifying  field  of  study ; 
and  the  primary  schools  of  Nassau  are  justly  the  theme  of  general 
admiration.  In  the  present  Article  we  must  limit  our  considera- 
tion to  the  second  Report ; and  taking  advantage  of  M.  Cousin’s 
labors,  and  with  his  principal  authorities  before  us,  we  shall  en- 
deavor to  exhibit,  in  its  more  important  features,  a view  of  the 
organization  of  Primary  Instruction  in  Prussia;  reserving  the 
higher  and  highest  education — the  Gymnasia  and  Universities — 
of  Germany,  for  the  subject  of  a future  Article. 

Before  entering  on  the  matter  of  primary  education,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  premise  an  account  of  the  general  organization  of  Public 
Instruction  in  Prussia. — The  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction  and 
Worship  there  forms  a distinct  department  of  administration.  It 
is  composed  of  a minister  and  a council  divided  into  three  sec- 
tions— for  Worship — for  Education — for  Medicine;  each  consist- 
ing of  a certain  number  of  Counselors  and  a Director.  Of  the 
first,  the  counselors  are  principally  ecclesiastics ; and  of  the  sec- 
ond, principally  laymen.  The  mode  in  which  the  minister  and 
his  council  govern  all  the  branches  of  public  instruction  through- 
out the  monarchy,  is  thus  luminously  explained  by  M.  Cousin. 

“Prussia  is  divided  into  ten  Provinces ; viz.,  East  Prussia,  West  Prus- 
sia, Posen,  Pomerania,  Brandenburg,  Silesia,  Saxony,  Westphalia,  Cleves, 
and  the  Lower  Rhine. 

“ Each  of  these  provinces  is  subdivided  into  Departments  ( Regierungs - 
bezirlcc)  comprehending  a territory  more  or  less  extensive.  Each  of  these 
departments  is  divided  into  Circles  ( Kreise ),  less  than  our  arrondissements, 
and  larger  than  our  cantons  ; and  each  of  these  circles  is  again  subdivided 
into  Communes  ( Gemeinde ).  Each  department  has  a kind  of  council  of 
prefecture  called  the  Regency  ( Regierung ),  which  has  its  President, 
nearly  correspondent  to  our  prefect,  with  this  difference,  that  the  president 
of  a Prussian  Regency  has  much  less  power  over  his  council  than  our 
prefect  over  his  ; for,  in  Prussia,  all  affairs  belong  to  the  regency,  and  are 
determined  by  the  majority  of  voices.  As  each  department  has  its  presi- 
dent, so  every  province  has  its  Supreme  President  ( Oberpraesidcnt ). 

“ All  the  degrees  of  public  instruction  are  correlative  to  the  different 
degrees  of  this  administrative  hierarchy.  Almost  every  province  has  its 
University.  East  and  West  Prussia,  with  the  Duchy  of  Posen,  which  are 
conterminous,  have  the  University  of  Koenigsberg ; Pomerania,  the  Univer- 
sity  of  Greifswald ; Silesia,  that  of  Breslau  ; Saxony,  that  of  Halle ; Bran- 
denburg, that  of  Berlin;  Westphalia,  the  imperfect  University  (called  the 
Academy)  of  Munster  ; the  Rhenish  provinces  that  of  Bonn.  Each  of 


PRUSSIAN  REGULATION  OF  INSTRUCTION  IN  GENERAL.  535 


these  Universities  has  authorities  appointed  by  itself,  under  the  superin- 
tendence of  a Royal  Commissioner , named  by  the  Minister  of  Public  In- 
struction. with  whom  he  directly  corresponds  ; a functionary  answering  to 
the  Curator  of  the  older  German  Universities.  This  office  is  always  in- 
trusted to  some  person  of  consideration  in  the  province  : it  is  substantially 
an  honcrrary  appointment;  but  there  is  always  attached  to  it  a certain 
emolument,  for  it  belongs  to  the  spirit  of  the  Prussian  government  to  em- 
ploy very  few  unpaid  functionaries.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  aristocratic 
governments  to  have  many  offices  without  salary,  as  is  seen  in  England  : 
but  such  a system  is  unsuitable  to  governments  at  once  popular  and  mon- 
archical, like  Prussia  and  France ; and  were  it  carried  to  any  length  in 
either  country,  nothing  less  would  ensue  than  a change  in  the  form  of  the 
government.  It  would  be  in  vain  to  expect  that  gratuitous  duties  would 
be  performed  by  all  the  citizens  adequate  to  their  discharge  ; those  of  small 
fortunes  would  soon  tire  of  them ; they  would  gradually  be  confided  to 
those  of  large  fortunes,  who,  at  last  would  govern  alone.  In  Prussia  all 
functionaries  are  paid  ; and  as  no  office  is  obtained  till  after  rigid  exami- 
nations, all  are  enlightened  ; and  moreover,  as  they  are  taken  from  every 
class,  they  carry  into  the  discharge  of  their  duties  the  general  spirit  of  the 
country,  at  the  same  time  that  they  contract  the  habits  of  the  government. 
Here  is  manifested  the  system  of  the  Imperial  government  with  us  ; it  is 
that  of  every  popular  monarchy.  A Eoyal  Commissioner  has  duties  which 
he  is  compelled  to  fulfill ; whatever  may  be  his  consideration  in  other  re- 
spects, in  this  he  is  a ministerial  officer,  accountable  to  the  Minister.  The 
Eoyal  Commissioners  are  alone  intermediate  between  the  Universities  and 
the  Ministry.  The  Universities  thus  hold  almost  immediately  of  the  Min- 
istry. No  provincial  authority,  civil  or  ecclesiastical,  has  the  right  of  in- 
terfering in  their  affairs  ; they  belong  only  to  the  state  ; this  is  their  priv- 
ilege and  their  guarantee.  I will  speak  to  you  again  in  detail  of  their 
internal  organization  ; it  is  enough,  at  present,  to  mark  the  relation  which 
they  hold  to  the  central  administration  in  the  general  economy. 

“ If  the  Universities  belong  exclusively  to  the  state,  the  same  is  not  the 
case  with  the  schools  of  secondary  instruction.  In  Prussia  these  are  con- 
sidered as  in  a great  measure  provincial.  In  every  province  of  the  mon- 
archy, under  the  Supreme  President  of  the  province,  there  is  an  institution 
holding  of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Instruction,  and  in  a certain  sort  repre 
senting  it  in  its  internal  organization  ; this  institution  is  called  the  Pro- 
vincial Consistory  {Provincial- Consistorntm).  As  the  Ministry  is  divid- 
ed into  three  sections,  in  like  manner  the  Provincial  Consistory : the  first, 
for  ecclesiastical  affairs,  or  Consistory  properly  so  called  ( Consist  or  ium) : 
the  second,  for  public  instruction,  the  School  Board  {Schul- Collegium): 
the  third,  for  matters  relative  to  public  health,  the  Medical  Board  {Me- 
dicinal- Collegium).  This  Provincial  Consistoiy  is  salaried  : all  the  mem- 
bers are  nominated  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  and  Worship  , 
but  at  its  head,  and  at  the  head  of  its  sections,  stands  the  Supreme  Presi- 
dent of  the  Province,  to  whom  exclusively  belongs  the  duty  of  correspond- 
ence, and  who  in  this  capacity  corresponds  with  the  Minister  of  Public 
Instruction,  who  is  not,  however,  his  natural  minister ; but  in  his  quality 
of  Supreme  President,  he  corresponds  with  various  ministers  on  matters 
relative  to  his  province,  although  he  himself  holds  directly  of  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior.  This  official  correspondence  of  the  President  of  the  prov- 
ince with  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  is  only  formal,  and  for  the 


0 36 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


sake  of  concentrating  the  provincial  administration.  In.  reality,  all  author- 
ity is  in  the  hands  of  the  Consistory,  of  which  each  section  deliberates 
separately,  and  decides  on  all  subjects  by  a majority  of  voices. — I shall 
here  speak  only  of  that  section  which  is  occupied  with  public  education, 
viz.,  the  School-Board. 

“ I must  first  call  your  attention  to  an  essential  difference  between  the 
character  of  the  public  instruction,  in  Prussia,  and  that  which  it  presents 
in  the  other  states  of  Germany  through  which  I passed.  In  these,  at  the 
centre,  under  a director  or  a minister,  stands  a Consistory,  in  a great  meas- 
ure ecclesiastical;  in  Prussia,  beside  the  minister,  in  place  of  a Consistory, 
there  is  a Council,  divided  into  three  parts,  one  of  which  only  is  clerical, 
while  the  other  two  are  lay  and  scientific.  This  council  has,  therefore,  no 
ecclesiastical  character  ; the  sacerdotal  spirit  is  here  replaced  by  the  spirit 
of  the  government ; the  idea  of  the  state  predominant  over  all  others.  In 
like  manner,  in  each  province,  if  the  composition  of  the  Provincial  Con- 
sistory be  again  too  ecclesiastical,  its  separation  into  three  sections,  like 
the  Ministry  of  Berlin,  leaves  to  this  body  nothing  clerical  but  the  name. 
No  doubt,  the  intimate  relations  of  the  School-Board  with  the  Consistory 
proper,  and  its  peculiar  duties,  render  it  essentially  religious  ; but  it  is 
principally  composed  of  lay  members,  and  completely  free  in  its  action. 

“ Its  special  domain  is  secondary  education,  the  Gymnasia,  and  those 
establishments  intermediate  between  the  schools  of  primary  and  secondary 
instruction,  called  Progymnasia  and  Superior  Burgher  Schools  ( Pro - 
gymnasien,  hoehere  Buergerschulen).  It  is  necessary  to  observe,  that 
the  seminaries  for  training  teachers  of  the  primary  schools  ( Seminarien 
filer  Schullehrer ) our  primary  normal  schools,  are  likewise  within  its 
province,  and  that  in  general  it  interposes  on  all  the  higher  questions 
touching  primary  education. 

“ Along  with  the  School-Board,  there  is  a Commission  of  Examina- 
tion ( wissenschaftlichc  Pruefungs- Commission),  usually  composed  of  the 
professors  of  the  University  belonging  to  the  province.  This  commission 
has  two  objects: — 1.  To  examine  the  pupils  of  the  gymnasia  who  are 
desirous  of  passing  to  the  University,  or  to  revise  the  examen  ad  hoc,  which 
these  young  persons  sometimes  undergo  at  the  gymnasium  itself  ( Abituri - 
enten- Examen),  by  a review  of  the  minutes  and  documents  of  this  trial 
(it  corresponds  to  our  examination  for  Bachelor  of  Letters,  without  which 
no  matriculation  is  competent  in  the  Faculties);  2.  To  examine  those 
who  come  forward  as  teachers  in  the  gymnasia ; and  here  there  are  dif- 
ferent examinations  for  the  different  gradations  of  instruction — one  for 
masters  of  the  lower  classes  ( Lchrer ) — another  for  masters  of  the  higher 
classes  ( Oberlehrer ) — a third,  in  fine,  for  rectors  (correspondent  to  our  pro- 
visors) who  are  always  intrusted  with  the  more  important  instruction. 
The  first  examination  for  simple  masters  ( Lchrer ) is  the  fundamental. 
The  Commission  of  Examination  is  the  board  that  connects  the  secondary 
instruction  with  the  higher,  as  the  School-Board  connects  the  public  in- 
struction in  the  provinces  with  the  central  ministry  of  Berlin. 

“ The  following  is,  in  few  words,  the  mechanism  of  the  administration 
of  popular  education  : — 

“ If  the  Universities  belong  exclusively  to  the  state,  and  the  schools  of 
secondary  instruction  to  the  province,  those  of  primary  instruction  pertain 
principally  to  the  department  and  to  the  commune. 

Every  commune  ought  to  have  a school,  even  by  the  law  of  the  state ; 


PRUSSIAN  PLEGULATION  OP  INSTRUCTION  IN  GENERAL.  537 


the  pastor  of  the  place  is  the  natural  inspector  of  this  school,  along  with 
a communal  committee  of  administration  and  superintendence,  called 
Schidvor  stand. 

“ In  urban  communes,  where  there  are  several  schools,  and  establish- 
ments for  primary  education  of  a higher  pitch  than  the  common  country 
schools,  the  magistrates  constitute,  over  the  particular  committees  of  the 
several  schools,  a superior  committee,  which  superintends  all  these,  and 
forms  them  into  a harmonic  system.  This  committee  is  named  Sclml- 
deputcition,  or  Schulcommission. 

“ There  is,  moreover,  at  the  principal  place  of  the  circle  ( Kreis ) ano- 
ther inspector,  whose  sphere  comprehends  all  the  schools  of  the  circle,  and 
who  corresponds  with  the  local  inspectors  and  committees.  This  new  in- 
spector, whose  j urisdiction  is  more  extensive,  is  likewise  almost  always  an 
ecclesiastic.  Among  the  Catholics  it  is  the  dean.  He  has  the  title  of 
School- Inspector  of  the  Circle  [Kreis- Schul- Inspector). 

“ Thus  the  two  first  degrees  of  authority  in  the  organization  of  primary 
instruction  are,  in  Prussia  as  in  the  whole  of  Germany,  ecclesiastical ; but 
with  these  degrees  the  influence  wholly  terminates,  and  the  administrative 
commences.  The  inspector  of  each  circle  corresponds  with  the  regency  of 
each  department,  through  its  president.  This  regency,  or  council  of  de- 
partment, has  within  it  departmental-counselors  ( Regierungsraethe ) 
charged  with  different  functions,  and  among  others  a special  counselor 
for  the  primary  schools,  styled  Schulrath  ; a functionary,  salaried  like  all 
his  colleagues,  and  who  forms  the  link  of  the  public  instruction,  with  the 
ordinary  departmental  administration,  inasmuch  as,  on  the  one  side,  he  is 
nominated  on  the  presentation  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,  and 
as,  on  the  other,  immediately  on  his  appointment,  he  forms,  in  his  quality 
of  Schulrath,  part  of  the  council  of  regency,  and  thereby  comes  into  con- 
nection with  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  Schulrath  reports  to  the 
council,  which  decides  by  a majority.  He  thus  inspects  the  schools,  ani- 
mates and  maintains  the  zeal  of  the  Schulinspectoren,  of  the  Sclmlvor- 
staende,  and  of  the  schoolmasters  ; the  whole  correspondence  of  the  com- 
munal inspectors,  and  of  the  superior  inspectors,  is  addressed  to  him  ; and 
it  is  he  who  conducts  all  correspondence  relative  to  the  schools,  in  name 
of  the  regency  and  through  the  president,  with  the  provincial  consistories 
and  the  school-board,  as  well  as  with  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  : 
in  a word,  the  Schulrath  is  the  real  director  of  primary  education  in  each 
regency. 

“ I do  not  here  descend  into  any  detail ; I am  only  desirous  of  making 
you  aware  of  the  general  mechanism  of  public  instruction  in  Prussia.  In 
recapitulation  : — Primary  instruction  is  communal  and  departmental,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  holds  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  ; a double 
character,  derived,  in  my  opinion,  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  which 
requires  equally  the  intervention  of  local  authorities,  and  that  of  a higher 
hand,  to  vivify  and  animate  the  whole.  This  double  character  is  repre- 
sented in  the  Schidrath,  who  makes  part  of  the  Council  of  Department, 
and  belongs  at  once  to  the  ministry  of  the  Interior,  and  to  that  of  Public 
Instruction.  Viewed  on  another  side,  all  secondary  instruction  is  depend- 
ent on  the  School  Board,  which  makes  part  of  the  Provincial  Consistory, 
and  is  nominated  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction.  All  higher  edu- 
cation, that  of  the  Universities,  depends  on  the  Royal  Commissioner,  who 
acts  under  the  immediate  authority  of  the  minister.  Nothing  thus  escapes 


538 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


the  ministerial  agency ; and  at  the  same  time,  every  sphere  of  public  in- 
struction has  in  itself  a sufficient  liberty  of  operation.  The  Universities 
elect  their  authorities.  The  School-Board  proposes  and  superintends  the 
professors  of  the  gymnasia,  and  is  informed  on  all  the  matters  of  any  con- 
sequence regarding  primary  instruction.  The  Scliulrath,  with  the  Coun- 
cil of  Regency,  or  rather  the  Council  of  Regency  on  the  report  of  the  Schul- 
rath,  and  after  considering  the  correspondence  of  the  inspectors  and  the 
committees,  decides  the  greater  part  of  the  affairs  of  the  inferior  instruc- 
tion. The  minister,  without  involving  himself  in  the  endless  details  of 
popular  education,  makes  himself  master  of  the  results,  directs  the  whole 
by  instructions  emanating  from  the  centre,  and  extending  to  every  quarter 
the  national  unity.  He  does  not  continually  intermeddle  with  the  concerns 
of  secondary  instruction ; but  nothing  is  done  without  his  confirmation, 
and  he  proceeds  always  on  accurate  and  complete  reports.  It  is  the  same 
with  the  Universities  ; they  govern  themselves,  but  according  to  the  laws 
which  they  receive.  The  professors  elect  their  Deans  and  their  Rectors  ; 
but  they  themselves  are  appointed  by  the  minister.  In  the  last  analysis, 
the  aim  of  the  whole  organization  of  public  instruction  in  Prussia  is  to 
leave  details  to  the  local  authorities,  and  to  reserve  to  the  minister  and  his 
council  the  direction  and  impulsion  of  the  whole.” 

The  state  of  primary  education  in  Prussia,  M.  Cousin  exhibits 
under  the  two  heads  of  the  Law  and  its  Results,  i.e. : 

I.  The  organization  of  primary  instruction,  and  the  legislative 
enactments  by  which  it  is  governed  ; and, 

II.  What  these  legislative  enactments  have  accomplished,  or 
the  statistics  of  primary  instruction. 

We  must  limit  our  consideration  to  the  former  head  alone; 
where  M.  Cousin  gives  in  his  own  arrangement  that  portion  of 
the  law  of  1819 — the  educational  digest  of  Prussia — which  relates 
to  the  primary  instruction.  We  shall  endeavor  to  afford  a some- 
what detailed  view  of  this  important  section  of  the  Report.  The 
more  interesting  provisions  of  the  law  we  shall  give  at  large  ; the 
others  abbreviate  or  omit. 

I. — Duty  of  Parents  to  send  their  Children  to  School. 

(Schulpflichtigkeit.) 

n Prussia,  as  in  other  states  of  Germany,  this  duty  has  been 
long  enforced  by  law.  The  only  title  of  exemption  is  the  proof 
that  a competent  education  is  furnished  to  the  child  in  private. 
The  obligation  commences  at  the  end  of  the  fifth  (though  not 
strictly  enforced  till  the  beginning  of  the  seventh),  and  terminates 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  fourteenth  year.  None  are  admitted  or 
dismissed  from  school  before  these  ages,  unless  on  examination, 
and  by  special  permission  of  the  committee  of  superintendence. 
During  this  interval,  no  child  can  remain  away  from  school  unless 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  EDUCATION. 


539 


for  sufficient  reasons,  and  by  permission  of  the  civil  and  ecclesias- 
tical authority  ; and  a regular  census,  at  Easter  and  Michaelmas, 
is  taken  by  the  committees  and  municipal  authorities,  of  all  the 
children  competent  to  school.  Parents,  tutors,  and  masters  of 
apprentices,  are  bound  to  see  that  due  attendance  is  given  by 
the  children  under  their  care ; and  the  schoolmasters  must,  in  a 
prescribed  form,  keep  lists  of  attendance,  to  be  delivered  every 
fortnight  to  the  committees  of  superintendence.  Not  wholly  to 
deprive  parents,  &c.,  of  the  labors  of  their  children,  the  school 
hours  are  so  arranged  that  a certain  time  each  day  is  left  free 
for  their  employment  at  home.  Do  parents,  &c.,  neglect  their 
responsibility  in  sending  their  children  punctually  to  school? — 
counsel,  remonstrance,  punishments,  always  rising  in  severity, 
are  applied ; and  if  every  means  be  ineffectual,  a special  tutor  or 
co-tutor  is  assigned  to  watch  over  the  education  of  the  children. 
Jewish  parents  who  thus  offend,  are  deprived  of  their  civil  privi- 
leges. To  the  same  end,  the  clergy,  Protestant  and  Catholic,  are 
enjoined  to  use  their  influence,  to  the  extent  and  in  the  manner 
they  may  judge  expedient ; their  sermons,  on  the  opening  of  the 
schools,  ought  to  inculcate  the  duty  of  parents  to  afford  their 
children  education,  and  to  watch  over  their  regular  attendance, 
and  may  even  contain  allusion  to  the  most  flagrant  examples  of 
these  obligations  neglected ; and  they  shall  not  admit  any  child 
to  the  conferences  previous  to  confirmation  and  communion,  with- 
out production  of  the  certificates  of  education. 

In  the  case  of  necessitous  parents,  means  are  to  be  taken  to 
enable  them  to  send  their  children  to  school,  by  supplying  them 
with  clothing,  books,  and  other  materials  of  instruction. 

II. — Duty  of  each  Commune  ( Gemeinde ')  to  maintain , at  its 
expense , a Primary  School. 

Every  commune,  however  small,  must  maintain  an  elementary 
school , complete  or  incomplete  ; that  is  to  say,  either  fulfilling  the 
whole  complement  of  instruction  pescribed  by  law,  or  its  most 
essential  parts.  Every  town  must  support  burgher  schools,  one 
or  more,  according  to  its  population.  Petty  towns  of  less  than 
fifteen  hundred  inhabitants,  and  inadequate  to  the  expense  of  a 
burgher  school,  are  bound  to  have  at  least  complete  elementary 
schools.  In  case  a town  can  not  maintain  separately,  and  in 
different  tenements,  an  elementary  and  a burgher  school,  it  is 

1 Gemeinde,  commune,  may,  with  some  inaccuracy,  be  translated  parish 


540 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


permitted  to  employ  the  lower  classes  of  the  burgher  as  an  ele- 
mentary school ; in  like  manner,  but  only  in  case  of  manifest 
necessity,  it  is  allowed  to  use,  as  a burgher  school,  the  lower 
classes  of  the  gymnasium.  In  towns,  the  Jews  may  establish 
schools  at  their  own  expense,  if  organized,  superintended,  and 
administered  by  them  in  conformity  to  the  legal  provisions  ; they 
are  likewise  permitted  to  send  their  children  to  the  Christian 
schools,  but  can  have  no  share  in  their  administration.1 

The  first  concern  is  to  provide  the  elementary  schools  required 
in  the  country.  When  possible,  incomplete  schools  are  every 
where  to  be  changed  into  complete ; and  this  is  imperative  where 
two  masters  are  required.  To  this  end,  the  inhabitants  of  every 
rural  commune  are,  under  the  direction  of  the  public  authorities, 
constituted  into  a Country -school -union  ( Landschulverein ).  This 

union  is  composed  of  all  landed  proprietors  with  or  without 
children,  and  of  all  fathers  of  families  domiciled  within  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  commune,  with  or  without  local  property.  Every 
village,  with  the  adjacent  farms,  should  have  its  school-union 
and  its  school ; but  in  exception  to  this  rule,  but  only  as  a tem- 
porary arrangement,  two  or  more  villages  may  unite ; if,  firstly, 
one  commune  be  too  poor  to  provide  a school ; if,  secondly,  none 
of  the  associated  villages  be  distant  from  the  common  school 
more  than  two  (English)  miles  in  champaign,  and  one  mile  in 
hilly  districts ; if,  thirdly,  there  be  no  intervening  swamps  or 
rivers  at  any  season  difficult  of  passage;  and,  fourthly,  if  the 
whole  children  do  not  exceed  a hundred.  If  a village,  by  reason 
of  population  or  difference  of  religion,  has  already  two  schools 
for  which  it  can  provide,  these  are  not  to  be  united  ; especially 
if  they  belong  to  different  persuasions.  Circumstances  permit- 
ting, separate  schools  are  to  be  encouraged.  Mere  difference  of 
religion  should  form  no  obstacle  to  the  formation  of  a school 
union ; but,  in  forming  such  an  association  of  Catholics  and 
Protestants,  regard  must  be  had  to  the  numerical  proportion  of 
the  inhabitants  of  each  persuasion.  The  principal  master  should 
profess  the  faith  of  the  majority,  the  subordinate  master  that  of 

1 From  the  statistical  information  subsequently  given  by  our  author,  it  appears  that, 
in  1825,  Prussia  contained  of  inhabitants  12,256,725  ; — of  public  elementary  schools 
for  both  sexes,  20,887 ; — of  public  burgher  or  middle  schools  for  boys,  458  ; for  girls, 
278;  in  all,  21,623  schools  for  primary  education.  In  these  were  employed  22,261 
masters ; 704  mistresses ; and  2024  under  masters  and  under  mistresses ; primary 
teachers,  in  all  25,000  ; — affording  public  primary  instruction  to  871,246  boys,  792,972 
girls  ; in  all,  to  1,664,218  children.  Since  that,  the  improvement  has  been  rapid. 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  EDUCATION. 


54] 


the  minority.  Jews  enjoy  the  advantages,  hut  are  not  permitted 
to  interfere  in  the  administration  of  these  schools.  If,  in  certain 
situations,  the  junction  of  schools  belonging  to  different  persua- 
sions be  found  expedient,  this  must  take  place  by  consent  of  the 
two  parties.  Care  must,  however,  he  taken,  in  case  of  junction, 
that  each  sect  has  the  means  necessary  for  the  religious  educa- 
tion of  its  scholars.  That  neither  party  may  have  cause  of  anxiety, 
and  that  whatever  it  contributes  to  the  partnership  may  he  secured 
in  case  of  separation,  the  respective  rights  of  the  parties  shall  be 
articulately  set  forth,  and  ratified  in  a legal  document. 

The  law  having  ordained  the  universal  establishment  of  pri- 
mary schools,  goes  on  to  provide  for  their  support.  This  support 
consists  in  securing : 1.  A suitable  salary  for  the  schoolmasters 
and  schoolmistresses,  and  a retiring  allowance  when  unable  to 
discharge  their  functions ; 2.  A school-house,  with  appertainances, 
well  laid  out,  maintained  in  good  order,  and  properly  heated  ; 
3.  The  furniture,  books,  pictures,  instruments,  and  means  requi- 
site for  instruction  and  exercise  ; 4.  The  aid  to  be  given  to  needy 
scholars. — The  first  provision  is  solemnly  recognized  as  of  all  the 
most  important.  The  local  authorities  are  enjoined  to  raise  the 
schoolmaster’s  salary  as  high  as  possible.  Though  a general  rule 
rating  the  amount  of  emolument  necessarily  accruing  to  the 
office  can  not  be  established  for  the  whole  monarchy,  a mini- 
mum, relative  to  the  prosperity  of  each  province,  is  to  be  fixed, 
and  from  time  to  time  reviewed,  by  the  provincial  consistories. — 
In  regard  to  the  second — school-houses  are  to  be  in  a healthy  situ- 
ation, of  sufficient  size,  well  aired,  &c. ; hereafter,  all  to  be  built 
and  repaired  in  conformity  to  general  models.  Attached,  must 
be  a garden  of  suitable  size,  &c.,  and  applicable  to  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  pupils  ; and,  where  possible,  before  the  school-house, 
a graveled  play-ground,  and  place  for  gymnastic  exercises. — 

1 This  liberality  is  general  throughout  Germany.  If  we  are  ever  to  enjoy  the  bless- 
ings of  a national  education  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  same  principle  must  be  uni- 
versally applied.  An  established  church  becomes  a nuisance,  when  (as  hitherto  in 
England  and  Ireland)  it  interposes  an  obstacle  to  the  universal  diffusion  of  religion  and 
intelligence.  We  trust  that  the  boon  conceded  by  our  late  monarch  to  his  German 
dominions,  may  be  extended,  under  his  successor,  to  the  British  Empire.  By  ordinance 
of  George  IV.  dated  Carlton  House,  25th  June,  1822,  in  reference  to  education  in  the 
county  of  Lingen,  it  is  decreed  (although  the  Protestant  be  the  established  religion), 
that  in  all  places  where  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  are  Catholic,  the  principal 
schoolmaster  shall  be  of  their  persuasion.  The  Lutheran  schools  to  be  under  inspec- 
tion of  the  Superintendent ; the  Catholic  under  that  of  the  Archpriest : — both  bound  to 
visit  the  schools  regularly,  to  examine  schoolmaster  and  scholar,  and  to  report  to  their 
respective  consistories.  ( Weingart's  Journal.  1822.  Heft.  4.  p.  21.) 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


542 

The  third  provision  comprises  a complement  of  books  for  the 
use  of  master  and  scholar;  according  to  the  degree  of  the  school, 
a collection  of  maps,  and  geographical  instruments,  models  for 
drawing  and  writing,  music,  &c.,  instruments  and  collections 
for  natural  history  and  mathematics,  the  apparatus  for  gymnas- 
tic exercises,  and,  where  this  is  taught,  the  tools  and  machines 
requisite  for  technological  instruction. — In  regard  to  the  fourth , 
if  there  be  no  charity-school  specially  provided,  every  public 
school  is  bound  to  afford  to  the  poor  instruction,  wholly  or  in 
part  gratuitous  ; as  likewise  the  books  and  other  necessaries  of 
education. 

But,  as  considerable  funds  are  required  for  the  maintenance  of 
a school  established  on  such  extensive  bases,  it  is  necessary  to 
employ  all  the  means  which  place  and  circumstances  afford.  We 
can  not  attempt  to  follow  M.  Cousin  through  this  part  of  the  law, 
however  important  and  wisely  calculated  are  its  regulations.  We 
shall  state  only  in  general,  that  it  is  recognized  as  a principle, 
that  as  the  gymnasia  and  other  establishments  of  public  educa- 
tion of  the  same  rank,  are  principally  supported  at  the  cost  of  the 
general  funds  of  the  state  or  province;  so  the  inferior  schools 
are  primarily,  and,  as  far  as  possible,  solely,  maintained  at  the 
expense  of  the  towns,  and  of  the  country-school  unions.  The 
support  of  these  schools  is  of  the  highest  civil  obligation.  In  the 
towns  it  can  be  postponed  to  no  other  communal  want ; and  in 
the  country  all  landholders,  tenants,  fathers  of  families,  must 
contribute  in  proportion  to  the  rent  of  their  property  within  the 
territory  of  the  school-union,  or  to  the  produce  of  their  industry  ; 
this  either  in  money  or  kind.  Over  and  above  these  general  con- 
tributions, fees  also  ( Schulgeld)  regulated  by  the  departmental 
authorities,  are  paid  by  the  scholars,  but  not  levied  by  the  school- 
master ; unless  under  particular  circumstances  it  be  deemed  ex- 
pedient to  commute  this  special  payment  into  an  augmentation 
of  the  general  contribution. 

III. — General  Objects  and  different  Degrees  of  Primary 
Education. 

Two  degrees  of  primary  instruction  are  distinguished  by  the 
law  ; the  Elementary  schools  and  the  Burgher  schools.  The  ele- 
mentary schools  ( Elementarschulen ) propose  the  development  of 
the  human  faculties,  through  an  instruction  in  those  common 
branches  of  knowledge  which  are  indispensable  to  the  lower 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  EDUCATION. 


543 


orders,  both  of  town  and  country.  The  burgher  schools  ( Buer- 
ger sclmlen,  Stcidtschulen)'  carry  on  the  child  till  he  is  capable  of 
manifesting  his  inclination  for  a classical  education,  or  for  this 
or  that  particular  profession.  The  gymnasia  continue  this  edu- 
cation until  the  youth  is  prepared,  either  to  commence  his  practi- 
cal studies  in  common  life,  or  his  higher  and  special  scientific 
studies  in  the  University. 

These  different  gradations  coincide  in  forming,  so  to  speak,  a 
great  establishment  of  national  education,  one  in  system,  and  of 
which  the  parts,  though  each  accomplishing  a special  end,  are  all 
mutually  correlative.  The  primary  education  of  which  we  speak, 
though  divided  into  two  degrees,  has  its  peculiar  unity  and  gene- 
ral laws ; it  admits  of  accommodation,  however,  to  the  sex,  lan- 
guage, religion,  and  future  destination  of  the  pupils.  1.  Separate 
establishments  for  girls  should  he  formed,  wherever  possible,  cor- 
responding to  the  elementary  and  larger  schools  for  hoys.  2.  In 
those  provinces  of  the  monarchy  (as  the  Polish)  where  a foreign 
language  is  spoken,  besides  lessons  in  the  native  idiom,  the  chil- 
dren shall  receive  complete  instruction  in  German,  which  is  also 
to  he  employed  as  the  ordinary  language  of  the  school.  3.  Differ- 
ence of  religion  in  Christian  schools  necessarily  determines  differ- 
ences in  religious  instruction.  This  instruction  shall  always  he 
accommodated  to  the  spirit  and  doctrines  of  the  persuasion  to 
which  the  school  belongs.  But,  as  in  every  school  of  a Christian 
state,  the  dominant  spirit  (common  to  all  creeds)  should  he  piety, 
and  a profound  reverence  of  the  Deity,  every  Christian  school 
may  receive  the  children  of  every  sect.  The  masters  and  super- 
intendents ought  to  avoid,  with  scrupulous  care,  every  shadow 
of  religious  constraint  or  annoyance.  No  school  should  he  abused 
to  any  purposes  of  proselytism  ; and  the  children  of  a worship 
different  from  that  of  the  school,  shall  not  he  obliged,  contrary 
to  the  wish  of  their  parents  or  their  own,  to  attend  its  religious 
instruction  and  exercises.  Special  masters  of  their  owTn  persua- 
sion shall  have  the  care  of  their  religious  education  ; and,  should 
it  he  impossible  to  have  as  many  masters  as  confessions,  the 
parents  should  endeavor,  with  so  much  the  greater  solicitude, 
to  discharge  this  duty  themselves,  if  disinclined  to  allow  their 
children  to  attend  the  religious  lessons  of  the  school.  Christian 

1 Called  likewise  Mittelschulen,  middle  schools,  and  Realschulen,  real  schools ; the 
last,  because  they  are  less  occupied  with  the  study  of  languages  ( Verbalia ) than  with 
the  knowledge  of  things  ( Realia ). 


544 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


schools  may  admit  Jewish  children,  hut  not  Jewish  schools 
Christian  children.  The  primitive  destination  of  every  school, 
says  the  law,  is  to  train  youth,  that,  with  a knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  man  to  God,  it  may  foster  in  them  the  desire  of  rul- 
ing their  life  by  the  spirit  and  principles  of  Christianity.  The 
school  shall,  therefore,  betimes  second  and  complete  the  first 
domestic  training  of  the  child  to  piety.  Prayer  and  edifying 
reflections  shall  commence  and  terminate  the  day ; and  the 
master  must  beware  that  this  moral  exercise  do  never  degener- 
ate into  a matter  of  routine.  He  must  also  see  that  the  chil- 
dren are  constant  in  their  attendance  on  divine  service — (with 
other  regulations  to  a similar  effect).  Obedience  to  the  laws, 
loyalty,  and  patriotism,  to  be  inculcated.  No  humiliating  or  in- 
decent castigation  allowed  ; and  corporal  punishment,  in  general, 
to  be  applied  only  in  cases  of  necessity.  Scholars  found  wholly 
incorrigible,  in  order  to  obviate  bad  example,  to  be  at  length 
dismissed.  The  pupils  as  they  advance  in  age,  to  be  employed 
in  the  maintenance  of  good  order  in  the  school,  and  thus  betimes 
habituated  to  regard  themselves  as  active  and  useful  members  of 
society. 

The  primary  education  has  for  its  scope  the  development  of 
the  diff'erent  faculties,  intellectual  and  moral,  mental  and  bodily. 
Every  complete  Elementary  school  necessarily  embraces  the 
nine  following  branches  : — 1.  Religion — morality  established  on 
the  positive  truths  of  Christianity  ; — 2.  The  German  tongue,  and 
in  the  Polish  provinces,  the  vernacular  language  ; — 3.  The  ele- 
ments of  geometry  and  general  principles  of  drawing  ; — 4.  Calcu- 
lation and  applied  arithmetic  ; — 5.  The  elements  of  physics,  of 
general  history,  and  of  the  history  of  Prussia  ; — 6.  Singing  ; — 7. 
Writing; — 8.  Gymnastic  exercises  : — 9.  The  more  simple  manual 
labors,  and  some  instruction  in  the  relative  country  occupations. 
— Every  Burgher  school  must  teach  the  ten  following  branches; 
1.  Religion  and  morals.  2.  The  German  language,  and  the  ver- 
nacular idiom  of  the  province,  reading,  composition,  exercises  of 
style,  exercises  of  talent,  and  the  study  of  the  national  classics. 
In  the  countries  of  the  German  tongue,  the  modern  foreign  lan- 
guages are  the  objects  of  an  accessory  study.  3.  Latin  to  a cer- 
tain extent.1  4.  The  elements  of  mathematics,  and  in  particular 
a thorough  knowledge  of  practical  arithmetic.  5.  Physics,  and 


1 This,  we  believe,  is  not  universally  enforced. 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  EDUCATION. 


545 


natural  history  to  explain  the  more  important  phenomena  of 
nature.  6.  Geography,  and  general  history  combined  ; Prussia, 
its  history,  laws,  and  constitution,  form  the  object  of  a particular 
study.  7.  The  principles  of  design;  to  be  taught  with  the  in- 
struction given  in  physics,  natural  history,  and  geometry.  8. 
The  penmanship  should  he  watched,  and  the  hand  exercised  to 
write  with  neatness  and  ease.  9.  Singing,  in  order  to  develop 
the  voice,  to  afford  a knowledge  of  the  art,  and  to  enable  the 
scholars  to  assist  in  the  solemnities  of  the  church.  10.  Gymnas- 
tic exercises  accommodated  to  the  age  and  strength  of  the  scholar. 
— Such  is  the  minimum  of  education  to  be  afforded  by  a burgher 
school.  If  its  means  enable  it  to  attempt  a higher  instruction, 
so  as  to  prepare  the  scholar,  destined  to  a learned  profession,  for 
an  immediate  entrance  into  the  gymnasium,  the  school  then  takes 
the  name  of  Higher  Town  School , or  Progymnasium  ( hoeliere 
Stadtschule,  Progymnasium).1 

Every  pupil,  on  leaving  school,  should  receive  from  his  masters 
and  the  committee  of  superintendence,  a certificate  of  his  capacity, 
and  of  his  moral  and  religious  dispositions.  These  certificates  to 
he  always  produced  on  approaching  the  communion,  and  on  en- 
tering into  apprenticeship  or  service.  They  are  given  only  at 
the  period  of  departure,  and  in  the  burgher  schools,  as  in  the 
gymnasia,  they  form  the  occasion  of  a great  solemnity. 

Every  half-year  pupils  are  admitted ; promoted  from  class  to 
class  ; and  absolved  at  the  conclusion  of  their  studies. 

A special  order  will  determine  the  number  of  lessons  to  he 
given  daily  and  weekly  upon  each  subject,  and  in  every  degree. 
No  particular  hooks  are  specified  for  the  different  branches  in  the 
primary  schools  ; they  are  left  free  to  adopt  the  best  as  they  ap- 
pear. For  religious  instruction  in  the  Protestant  schools,  the 
Bible  and  Catechisms.  The  younger  scholars  to  have  the  Gos- 
pels and  New  Testament ; the  older  the  whole  Scriptures.  Books 
of  study  to  he  carefully  chosen  by  the  committees,  with  concur- 
rence of  the  superior  authorities,  the  ecclesiastical  being  specially 
consulted  in  regard  to  those  of  a religious  nature.  For  the  Cath- 
olic schools,  the  Bishops,  in  concert  with  the  provincial  consis- 


1 We  prefer  in  this,  and  some  other  respects,  the  order  of  the  Bavarian  schools. 
The  boy  is  there  prepared  for  the  Gymnasium , which  he  enters  at  fourteen,  in  the 
“ Latin  School ,”  which  he  enters  at  eleven.  This  is  an  establishment  distinct  from 
the  burgher  school.  Of  the  history  of  education  in  Bavaria,  we  may,  perhaps,  take 
an  opportunity  of  speaking. 

M M 


546 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


tories,  to  select  the  devotional  hooks ; and  in  case  of  any  difference 
of  opinion,  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  shall  decide. 

Schoolmasters  are  to  adopt  the  methods  best  accommodated  to 
the  natural  development  of  the  human  mind  ; — methods  which 
keep  the  intellectual  powers  in  constant,  general,  and  spontaneous 
exercise,  and  are  not  limited  to  the  infusion  of  a mechanical 
knowledge.1  The  committees  are  to  watch  over  the  methods  of 
the  master,  and  to  aid  him  by  their  council ; never  to  tolerate  a 
vicious  method,  and  to  report  to  the  higher  authorities  should 
their  admonitions  he  neglected.  Parents  and  guardians  have  a 
right  to  scrutinize  the  system  of  education  by  which  their  child- 
ren are  taught ; and  to  address  their  complaints  to  the  higher 
authorities,  who  are  hound  to  have  them  carefully  investigated. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  are  hound  to  co-operate  with  their  pri- 
vate influence  in  aid  of  the  public  discipline : nor  is  it  permitted 
that  they  should  withdraw  a scholar  from  any  branch  of  educa- 
tion taught  in  the  school  as  necessary. 

As  a national  establishment,  every  school  should  court  the 
greatest  publicity.  In  those  for  boys,  besides  the  special  half- 
yearly  examinations,  for  the  promotion  from  one  class  to  another, 
there  shall  annually  take  place  public  examinations,  in  order  to 
exhibit  the  spirit  of  the  instruction,  and  the  proficiency  of  the 
scholars.  On  this  solemnity,  the  director,  or  one  of  the  masters, 
in  an  official  programme,  is  to  render  an  account  of  the  condition 
and  progress  of  the  school.  In  fine,  from  time  to  time,  there  shall 
be  published  a general  report  of  the  state  of  education  in  each 
province.  In  schools  for  females,  the  examinations  to  take  place 


1 The  Bavarian  Lehrplan  fuer  die  Volksclyulen  is  excellent  on  this  point ; and  so,  in- 
deed, are  all  the  German  writers  on  education.  The  prevalent  ignorance  in  our  own 
country,  even  of  the  one  fundamental  principle  of  instruction — “that  every  scholar 
must  be. his  own  teacher,  or  he  will  learn  nothing in  other  words,  that  the  develop- 
ment is  precisely  in  proportion  to  the  exertion  of  the  faculty — has  been  signally  ex- 
posed, both  through  example  and  precept,  by  our  townsman,  Mr.  Wood  ; — a gentle- 
man whose  generous  and  enlightened  devotion  to  the  improvement  of  education 
entitles  him  to  the  warmest  gratitude  of  his  country.  We  have  the  high  authority 
of  Professor  Pillans  for  stating,  that  in  the  parochial  schools  of  Scotland,  “ the  prin- 
ciple, “ That  a child,  in  being  taught  to  read  should  he  taught  at  the  same  time  to  under- 
stand what  he  reads,  is  so  far  from  being  generally  received,  that  the  very  opposite,  if 
not  openly  avowed,  is  at  least  invariably  acted  on!”  It  can  not,  we  trust,  be  now 
long  before  the  Scottish  schoolmaster  be  sent  himself  to  school.  Scotland  is,  however, 
as  far  superior  to  England  in  her  popular  education,  as  inferior  to  Germany.  And, 
considering  in  what  a barbarous  manner  our  schoolmasters  are  educated,  examined, 
appointed,  paid,  and  superintended,  they  have  accomplished  far  more  than  could 
reasonably  have  been  expected. 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  INSTRUCTORS. 


547 


in  presence  of  the  parents  and  masters,  without  any  general  in- 
vitation. 

But  if  the  public  instructors  are  bound  to  a faithful  perform- 
ance of  their  duties,  they  have  a right,  in  return,  to  the  gratitude 
and  respect  due  to  the  zealous  laborer  in  the  sacred  work  of  edu- 
cation. The  school  is  entitled  to  claim  universal  countenance 
and  aid,  even  from  those  who  do  not  confide  to  it  their  children. 
All  public  authorities,  each  in  its  sphere,  are  enjoined  to  promote 
the  public  schools,  and  to  lend  support  to  the'  masters  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  office,  as  to  any  other  functionaries  of  the  state. 
In  all  the  communes  of  the  monarchy,  the  clergy  of  all  Christian 
persuasions,  whether  in  the  church,  in  their  school  visitations,  or 
in  their  sermons  on  the  opening  of  the  classes,  shall  omit  no  op- 
portunity of  recalling  to  the  schools  their  high  mission,  and  to 
the  people  their  duties  to  these  establishments.  The  civil  author- 
ities, the  clergy,  and  the  masters,  shall  every  where  co-operate  in 
tightening  the  bonds  of  respect  and  attachment  between  the  peo- 
ple and  the  school ; so  that  the  nation  may  be  more  and  more 
habituated  to  consider  education  as  a primary  condition  of  civil 
existence,  and  daily  to  take  a deeper  interest  in  its  advancement. 

IV. — On  the  Training — Appointment — Promotion — Punishment 
of  Primary  Instructors 

The  best  plans  of  education  can  only  be  carried  into  effect  by 
good  teachers ; and  the  State  has  done  nothing  for  the  instruction 
of  the  people,  unless  it  take  care  that  the  schoolmasters  have 
been  well  prepared,  are  encouraged  and  guided  in  their  duty  of 
self-improvement,  and  finally  promoted  and  recompensed  accord- 
ing to  their  progress,  or  punished  in  proportion  to  their  faults. 
To  fulfill  his  duties,  a schoolmaster  should  be  pious  and  wise, 
impressed  with  the  importance  of  his  high  and  holy  calling,  well 
acquainted  with  its  duties,  and  possessing  the  art  of  teaching  and 
directing  the  young,  &c. 

Their  Training. — To  provide  the  schools  gradually  with  such 
masters,  their  education  must  not  be  abandoned  to  chance  ; it  is 
necessary  to  continue  establishing,  in  sufficient  numbers,  Semi- 
naries for  primary  instructors  ( SchuUehrer-Seminarien )d  The 

1 In  Austria,  where  the  name,  we  believe,  w-as  first  applied,  and  in  France,  such 
establishments  are  termed  Normal  Schools.  This  expression,  however,  is  ambiguous  ; 
it,  indeed,  properly  denotes  the  pattern  school  ( Master schnle ),  to  which  a seminary  for 
schoolmasters  is  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  attached. 


548 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


cost  of  these  establishments  is  to  he  borne  in  part  by  the  public 
treasury  of  the  State,  in  part  by  the  departmental  school  ex- 
chequers. Every  department  should  possess  such  a seminary, 
annually  turning  out  a complement  of  young  men,  prepared  and 
approved  competent  to  their  destination  ( Canclidaten ),  equal  in 
number  to  the  average  annual  loss  of  schoolmasters  in  the  depart- 
ment.1 The  following  regulations  are  to  be  attended  to  in  these 
establishments. 

1.  No  seminary  for  primary  instructors  to  admit  more  than 
from  sixty  to  seventy  alumni  ( Praeparanden ). 

2.  In  departments  where  Protestants  and  Catholics  are  nearly 
equal,  and  where  funds  and  other  circumstances  permit,  there 
shall  be  established  a seminary  of  this  kind,  for  each  religion. 
But  where  there  is  a great  preponderance  of  either,  the  schools 
of  the  less  numerous  persuasion  shall  be  provided  with  masters 
from  a seminary  of  the  same  creed,  in  some  neighboring  depart- 
ment, or  from  a small  establishment  of  the  kind  annexed  to  a 
simple  primary  school.  Seminaries  common  to  Protestants  and 
Catholics  are  sanctioned,  provided  the  Sieves  receive  religious  in- 
struction in  conformity  to  their  belief. 

3.  These  seminaries  are  to  be  established,  as  far  as  possible, 
in  towns  of  a middling  size  : — not  in  large,  to  remove  the  young 
men  from  the  seductions  of  a great  city  ; — not  in  small,  to  allow 
them  to  profit  by  the  vicinity  of  schools  of  different  degrees. 

4.  To  enable  them  to  recruit  their  numbers  with  the  most 
likely  subjects,  and  to  educate,  these  themselves,  they  shall,  as 
frequently  as  possible,  be  in  connection  with  orphan  hospitals 
and  charity  schools,  &c.  &c. 

5.  It  is  not  necessary  to  have  two  kinds  of  seminaries  for  pri- 
mary instructors,  &c.  &c. 

6.  The  studies  of  the  primary  seminaries  are  not  the  same  as 
the  studies  of  the  primary  schools  themselves.  Admission  into 
the  seminary  supposes  a complete  course  of  primary  instruction, 
and  the  main  scope  of  the  institution  is  to  add,  to  the  knowledge 
previously  acquired,  accurate  and  comprehensive  notions  of  the 
art  of  teaching,  and  of  the  education  of  children,  in  general  and 


1 This  in  1819.  At  present  there  is  not  a department  of  the  Prussian  monarchy 
without  its  great  primary  seminary,  and  frequently,  over  and  above,  several  smaller 
subsidiary  institutions  of  the  same  kind.  Of  the  Great  Primary  Seminaries,  there 
existed  in  1806,  only  fourteen  ; in  1826,  twenty-eight,  i.  e.  one  for  each  department ; 
in  1831,  thirty -four. 


PRUSSIAN  PRIMARY  INSTRUCTORS. 


549 


in  detail,  in  theory  and  in  practice.1  But  as  it  may  not  always 
be  possible  to  obtain  subjects  fully  prepared,  it  is  permitted  to 
receive,  as  seminarists,  those  who  are  not  yet  perfect  in  the  higher 
departments  of  their  previous  studies.  The  age  of  admission  is 
from  sixteen  to  eighteen. 

7.  The  principal  aim  of  the  primary  seminaries  is  to  form  their 
pupils  to  health  of  body  and  mind  ; to  inspire  them  with  religious 
sentiment,  and  the  kindred  pedagogical  spirit.  The  instruction 
and  exercises  in  the  seminary  to  be  coextensive  with  the  branches 
of  education  in  the  primary  schools.  In  regard  to  methods,  it 
should  be  less  attempted  to  communicate  theories,  than,  by  en- 
lightened observation  and  personal  experience,  to  lead  the  pupil 
to  clear  and  simple  principles  ; and  to  this  end,  schools  should  be 
attached  to  all  the  seminaries,  in  which  the  alumni  may  be  ex- 
ercised to  practice. 

8.  The  course  of  preparation  to  last  three  years.  The  first 
in  supplement  of  the  previous  primary  education ; the  second 
devoted  to  special  instruction  of  a higher  order ; and  the  third 
to  practical  exercises  in  the  annexed  primary  school,  and  other 
establishments  of  the  place.  For  those  who  require  no  supple- 
mentary instruction,  a course  of  two  years  may  suffice. 

9.  Small  stipends  allowed  to  a certain  number  of  poor  and 
promising  seminarists. 

10.  All  who  receive  such  a gratuity,  are  obliged  at  the  end  of 
their  course,  to  accept  any  vacancy  to  which  they  may  be  nomi- 
nated by  the  provincial  consistories — with  the  prospect  of  a more 
lucrative  appointment  if  their  conduct  merit  promotion. 

11.  The  regulations  of  every  seminary  to  be  ratified  by  the 
minister  of  public  instruction  ; immediate  superintendence  to  be 
exercised  by  the  provincial  consistories,  and,  in  respect  to  the 
religious  instruction  of  the  several  seminaries,  by  the  clerical 
authorities. 

But  the  preparation  of  primary  schoolmasters  is  not  exclusive- 

1 We  may  here  state,  that  the  branches  of  instruction,  in  the  Prussian  primary 
seminaries,  are  in  general : — 1 . Religion  ; Biblical  history,  study  of  the  Bible,  an 
Introduction  to  the  sacred  books,  Christian  doctrine  and  morals. — 2.  German  language 
etymologically  considered,  grammar,  the  communication  of  thought  in  speech  and 
writing. — 3.  Mathematics  ; mental  arithmetic,  ciphering,  geometry. — 4.  History. — 
5.  Geography  and  geology. — 6.  Natural  history,  physics. — 7.  Music  ; singing,  theory 
of  music,  general  bass,  execution  on  the  violin  and  organ. — 8.  Drawing. — 9.  Pen- 
manship.— 10.  Paedagogic  and  didactic  (i.  c.  art  of  moral  education,  and  art  of  intel- 
lectual instruction)  theory  to  be  constantly  conjoined  with  practice. — 11.  Church 
service. — 12.  Elements  of  horticulture. — 13.  Gymnastic  exercises. 


550 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


ly  limited  to  such  seminaries.  Large  primary  schools,  clergy- 
men, and  able  schoolmasters,  may,  at  the  discretion  of  the  pro- 
vincial consistories,  be  allowed  to  attempt  this  ; their  pupils,  if 
deficient,  to  be  sent  to  a seminary  to  complete  their  qualification. 
The  superintendence  of  these  petty  establishments  may  be  con- 
fided to  the  inspectors  of  the  circle.  When  joined  to  a girls’ 
school,  these  minor  establishments  may  educate  schoolmistresses? 

Their  appointment. — Every  man,  foreigner  or  native,  of  ma- 
ture age,  irreproachable  in  his  moral  and  religious  character, 
and  approved,  by  examination,  competent  to  its  duties,  is  eligi- 
ble to  the  office  of  public  instructor.  But  this  appointment  be- 
longs, by  preference,  to  the  seminarists,  wrho,  after  a full  course 
of  preparation,  have  been  regularly  examined,  and  found  duly 
qualified  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  all  the  various  branches 
of  primary  instruction.  These  (half-yearly  and  annual)  exami- 
nations are  conducted  by  a commission  of  four  competent  indi- 
viduals : two  of  its  members  being  lay,  two  clerical.  The  cleri- 
cal members,  for  the  examination  of  Protestant  instructors,  are 
appointed  by  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  of  the  province  ; those 
for  Catholic,  by  the  bishop  of  the  diocese.  The  lay  members  are 
nominated  by  the  provincial  consistory.  These  appointments  are 
not  for  life,  but  renewable  every  three  years.  Religion*  and  the 
other  branches,  form  the  subject  of  two  separate  examinations. 
For  Catholic  teachers,  the  religious  examination  takes  place  under 
the  presidency  of  a church  dignitary  delegated  by  the  bishop ; 
for  Protestant,  under  the  presidency  of  a clergyman.  The  ex- 
aminations on  temporal  matters  are  conducted  under  the  presi- 
dency of  a lay  counselor  of  the  provincial  consistory.  Both  parts 
of  the  examination,  though  distinct,  are  viewed  as  constituting 
but  a single  whole ; all  the  members  of  the  commission  are 
always  present,  and  the  result,  if  favorable,  is  expressed  in  the 
same  certificate.  This  certificate,  besides  the  moral  character 
of  the  candidate,  states  the  comparative  degree  of  his  qualifica- 
tion— eminently  capable,  sufficiently  capable , just  capable  ; and 
also  specifies  his  adaptation  to  the  higher  or  the  lower  department 
of  primary  instruction.  Those  found  incompetent,  are  either 
declared  wholly  incapable,  or  are  remitted  to  their  studies.  The 
others,  with  indication  of  the  degree  of  their  certificate,  are 
placed  on  the  list  of  candidates  of  each  department,  and  have  a 
claim  to  be  appointed ; but  to  accelerate  this,  the  names  of  those 
worthy  of  choice  are  published  twice  a year  in  the  official  papers 


PRIMARY  INSTRUCTORS. 


551 


of  the  departments,  where  the  order  of  their  classification  is  that  of 
their  certificates.  Schoolmistresses,  also,  are  approved  competent 
through  examinations  regulated  by  the  provincial  consistories. 

Incentives  to  Improvement — Promotion. — It  is  the  duty  of  the 
clergy  and  of  the  enlightened  men  to  whom  the  superintendence 
and  inspection  of  schools  are  confided,  to  watch  over  the  progres- 
sive improvement  of  the  masters.  In  particular,  it  is  incumbent 
on  the  directors  and  rectors  of  gymnasia  and  town-schools  to  take 
an  active  interest  in  the  younger  masters,  to  afford  them  advice, 
to  point  out  their  errors,  and  to  stimulate  them  to  improve  them- 
selves by  attending  the  lessons  of  more  experienced  teachers,  by 
cultivating  their  society,  by  forming  school  conferences  or  other 
associations  of  instructors,  and  by  studying  the  best  works  on  ed- 
ucation. The  provincial  consistories,  in  electing  able  and  zealous 
masters  of  the  popular  schools,  should  engage  them  to  organize 
extensive  associations  among  the  schoolmasters  of  town  and 
country,  in  order  to  foster  the  spirit  of  their  calling,  and  to  pro- 
mote their  improvement  by  regular  meetings,  by  consultations, 
conversations,  practical  experiments,  written  essays,  the  study  of 
particular  branches  of  instruction,  reading  in  common  well-chosen 
works,  and  by  the  discussions  to  which  these  give  rise.  The 
directors  of  such  associations  merit  encouragement  and  support, 
in  proportion  to  their  application  and  success.  By  degrees,  every 
circle  to  have  a society  of  schoolmasters.1  Distinguished  masters, 
and  those  destined  to  the  direction  of  primary  seminaries,  should 
likewise,  with  the  approbation,  or  on  the  suggestion  of  the  minis- 
ter, be  enabled,  at  the  public  expense,  to  travel  in  the  interior  of 
the  country  or  abroad,  in  order  to  obtain  information  touching 
the  organization,  and  wants  of  the  primary  schools.2 3  Zeal  and 

1 These  associations,  among  other  institutions,  are  at  once  cause  and  effect  of  the 
pedagogical  spirit  prevalent  throughout  the  empire — a spirit  which,  unfortunately,  has 
no  parallel  in  any  other  country.  How  large  a share  of  active  intellect  is,  in  Germany, 
occupied  with  education,  may  be  estimated  from  the  number  of  works  on  that  science 
which  annually  appear.  Pedagogy  forms  one  of  the  most  extensive  departments  of 

German  literature.  Taking  the  last  three  years,  we  find,  from  Thon’s  catalogues,  that 
in  1830,  there  were  published  501 — in  1831,  452 — in  1832,  526  new  works  of  this 
class.  Of  these,  twenty  were  journals,  maintained  exclusively  by  their  natural  circu- 
lation. Does  Britain,  or  France,  thus  support  even  one! 

3 This  regulation  has  proved  of  the  highest  advantage.  But  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment has  done  much  more.  Not  only  have  intelligent  schoolmasters  been  sent  abroad 
to  study  the  institutions  of  other  countries,  as  those  of  Graser,  Poehlman,  Pestalozzi, 
Fellenberg,  &c.,  but  almost  every  foreign  educational  method  of  any  celebrity  has  been 
fully  and  fairly  tried  by  experiment  at  home.  In  this  way  the  Prussian  public  educa- 
tion has  been  always  up  to  every  improvement  of  the  age,  and  obviated  any  tendency 
to  a partial  and  one-sided  development. 


o52 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


ability  in  the  master  to  be  rewarded  by  promotion  to  situations 
of  a higher  order,  and  even  in  particular  cases,  by  extraordinary 
recompenses.  The  provincial  consistories  to  prepare  tables  of  the 
different  places  of  schoolmasters,  classed  according  to  their  emolu- 
ment ; and  to  take  care  that  the  promotion  be  in  general  made 
in  conformity  to  these  lists.  No  term  of  service  affords  of  itself 
a valid  claim  to  promotion ; when  a place  is  solicited  superior  to 
that  for  which  the  petitioner  has  received  a certificate,  an  exami- 
nation of  promotion  must  take  place  before  the  same  authorities, 
to  whom  the  examination  for  appointment  is  intrusted.  Where 
the  competency  is  notorious,  examination  may,  by  the  ratifying 
power,  be  dispensed  with.  The  departmental  authority  must,  at 
the  end  of  each  year,  transmit  to  the  ministry  a list  of  all  masters 
newly  placed  or  promoted,  with  a statement  of  the  value  of  the 
several  appointments ; and  this  authority  is  never  excusable  if  it 
leave  personal  merit  without  employment  and  recompense,  or  the 
smallest  service  unacknowledged.  (The  regulations  touching  the 
degradation  and  dismissal  of  incapable,  negligent,  immoral  mas- 
ters, we  must  wholly  omit.) 

Y. — Of  the  Direction  of  the  Schools  of  Primary  Instruction. 

Such  is  the  internal  organization  of  the  primary  education. 
But  this  organization  would  not  work  of  itself;  it  requires  an 
external  force  and  intelligence  to  impel  at  once  and  guide  it — in 
other  words,  a governing  power.  The  fundamental  principle  of 
this  government  is,  that  the  ancient  union  of  popular  instruction 
with  Christianity  and  the  Church  should  be  maintained  ; always, 
however,  under  the  supreme  direction  of  the  ministerial  authority. 

Communal  Authorities ■ — General  rule. — That  as  each  com- 
mune, urban  or  rural,  has  its  primary  school  or  schools,  so  it 
must  have  its  special  Superintending  School  Committee , ( Schul- 
vor  stand.) 

Primary  Country  Schools. — Where  the  church  contributes  to 
their  support,  this  committee  is  composed  of  the  patron  and  cler- 
gyman of  the  parish,  of  the  magistrates  of  the  commune,  and  of 
several  fathers  of  families,  members  of  the  school-union ; and 
where  all  are  not  of  one  faith,  the  proportion  of  the  sects  among 
the  members  of  the  union  must  be  represented  by  the  proportion 
of  the  sects  among  the  fathers  of  families  in  the  committee.  The 
fixed  members  of  the  committee  form  its  Committee  of  Adminis- 
tration (■ verwaltende  Sclmlvorstand) ; the  others  are  elected  (for 


DIRECTION  OF  PRIMARY  SCHOOLS. 


553 


four  years,  and  capable  of  re-election)  by  the  school-union,  and 
confirmed  by  the  provincial  consistory.  No  one  allowed  to  decline 
this  duty,  unless  burdened  with  another  communal  office.  In 
schools  exclusively  endowed  by  the  church,  the  committee  of 
administration  may  be  wholly  ecclesiastical.  However  consti- 
tuted, this  committee  takes  cognizance  of  all  that  concerns  the 
school,  within  and  without.  The  pastor,  in  particular,  who  is  the 
natural  inspector  of  the  village  school,  ought  to  be  frequent  in  his 
visits,  and  unremitted  in  his  superintendence  of  the  masters.  The 
committees  receive  all  complaints,  which  they  transmit  to  the 
superior  authorities.  Their  exertions  should  be  especially  directed 
to  see  that  all  is  conformable  to  regulation ; to  animate,  direct, 
and  counsel  the  instructors  ; and  to  excite  the  zeal  of  the  inhabi- 
tants for  education.  Articulate  directions  on  the  more  special 
duties  of  the  administrative  committees,  and  accommodated  to 
their  several  circumstances,  to  be  published  by  the  provincial 
consistories.  Services  gratuitous. 

Primary  Toivn  Schools. — In  petty  towns,  where  there  is  only 
a single  school,  the  committees  of  administration  are  composed, 
as  those  of  the  country  ; only,  if  there  be  two  or  more  clergymen, 
it  is  the  first  who  regularly  belongs  to  this  committee  ; to  which 
is  also  added  one  of  the  magistrates,  and  a representative  of  the 
citizens. 

In  towns  of  a middling  size,  which  support  several  primary 
schools,  there  is  to  be  formed,  in  like  manner,  a single  common 
administration  ( Ortschulbehoerde ),  except  only,  that  to  this  coun- 
cil is  added  a father  of  a family  of  each  school,  and  a clergyman 
of  each  sect,  if  the  schools  be  of  different  creeds.  It  will  form 
matter  of  consideration  whether  a person  specially  skilled  in 
scholastic  affairs  ( Schulmann ) should  be  introduced. 

Large  towns  are  to  be  divided  into  districts,  each  having  its 
superintending  school-committee.  There  shall,  however,  be  a 
central  point  of  superintendence  for  all  the  schools,  gymnasia 
excepted  ; this  called  the  School-commission  ( Schulcommission). 
This  properly  composed  of  the  Lutheran  Superintendent,  and 
of  the  Catholic  Arch-priest  or  Dean  of  the  place,  and  according 
to  the  size  of  the  town  and  number  of  its  schools,  of  one  or  more 
members  of  the  magistracy,  of  an  equal  number  of  representa- 
tives of  the  citizens,  and  of  one  or  two  individuals  versed  in  the 
science  of  education.  A member  of  each  committee  of  adminis- 
tration (if  special  circumstances  do  not  prevent)  is  added,  unless 


554 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


one  be  already  there,  in  a different  capacity.  These  bodies  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  provincial  consistories,  who  must  take  care  that 
only  upright,  intelligent,  and  zealous  individuals  are  admitted. 
The  members  elected  for  six  years,  with  capacity  of  re-election ; 
no  one,  however,  obliged  to  serve  longer  than  three.  Municipal 
functions  alone  afford  a plea  of  excuse.  Services  unpaid.  The 
school-commission  is  bound — to  see  that  the  town  be  provided 
with  the  necessary  schools — to  attend  to  their  wants — to  admin- 
ister the  general  school-fund — to  take  care  that  the  regulations 
prescribed  by  the  law,  the  minister,  or  the  provincial  consistories, 
are  duly  executed,  in  regard  to  school  attendance  by  the  children 
of  rich  and  poor — to  do  every  thing  for  the  internal  and  external 
prosperity  of  the  schools,  &c.  &c.  &c.  The  district  committees 
have  each  the  superintendence  of  their  schools,  in  subordination 
to  the  school-commission.  The  school-commission  and  district- 
committees  to  meet  in  ordinary  once  a month.  Their  presidents 
elected  for  three  years  by  the  members,  and  confirmed  by  the 
consistory  of  the  province.  Decisions,  by  plurality  of  voices  ; 
except  in  matters  touching  the  internal  economy  of  the  school, 
which  are  determined  by  the  opinion  of  the  clergymen,  and  those 
specially  versed  in  educational  matters.  The  committees  may 
call  in  to  assist  in  their  extraordinary  general  deliberations,  the 
clergy  and  instructors  of  the  district,  or  a part  of  them.  The 
school-commissions  annually  address  circumstantial  reports  on 
the  schools  under  their  inspection  to  the  provincial  consistories  ; 
in  the  petty  towns,  and  country  communes,  this  report  is  made 
through  the  inspectors  of  the  circle. 

Authorities  of  the  Circle. — There  is  a general  superintendence 
over  the  inferior  schools  of  a circle,  as  likewise  over  the  commit- 
tees of  administration  of  these  schools,  and  this  superintendence 
is  exercised  by  the  Inspector  of  the  Circle  ( Schul-Kreis-Auf setter, 
or  Schul-Kreis-Inspektor) . The  school  circle  is  co-extensive  with 
the  diocese  of  the  Protestant  Superintendent  and  Catholic  Bishop. 
But  if  the  diocese  be  too  large  for  one  school-inspection,  it  must 
be  divided  into  two  circles.  For  Protestant  schools,  the  superin- 
tendents are  in  general  the  inspectors  of  the  circle.  The  greatest 
care  is  therefore  to  be  taken  that  no  churchman  be  nominated 
superintendent,  who  does  not,  besides  his  merely  clerical  acquire- 
ments, possess  those  qualifications  necessary  for  the  inspection  of 
schools.  Clergymen,  not  superintendents,  may,  in  certain  spec- 
ified circumstances,  be  appointed  inspectors  ; and  even  laymen, 


DIRECTION  OF  PRIMARY  SCHOOLS. 


555 


distinguished  for  their  pedagogical  knowledge  and  activity ; 
always,  however,  with  permission  previously  obtained  from  the 
Minister  of  Public  Instruction.  For  the  Catholic  schools,  the 
inspectors  are  in  general  the  Deans.  Under  the  same  conditions 
as  for  the  Protestant  schools,  other  ecclesiastics  and  even  laymen 
permitted  to  replace  the  Deans.  The  Protestant  inspectors  are 
nominated  by  the  consistory  of  the  province,  and  confirmed  by 
the  Minister  of  Public  Instruction.  The  Catholic  inspectors  are 
proposed  by  the  bishops,  and  presented,  with  an  articulate  state- 
ment of  their  qualifications,  by  the  provincial  consistories,  to  the 
Minister  for  confirmation.  The  Minister  has  a right  to  decline 
the  confirmation,  when  well-founded  objections  can  be  alleged 
against  the  presentee,  and  to  summon  the  Bishop  to  make  a new 
proposal.  The  inspector  of  the  circle  is  charged  with  watching 
over  the  internal  management  of  schools,  the  proceedings  of  the 
committees,  and  the  conduct  of  the  instructors.  The  whole  scho- 
lastic system,  indeed,  is  subjected  to  their  revision  and  superior 
direction.  They  must  make  themselves  fully  acquainted  with 
the  state  of  all  the  schools,  by  means  of  the  half-yearly  reports 
transmitted  by  the  communal  committees,  by  attending  the  ex- 
aminations, by  unexpected  visits  as  frequently  as  may  be,  and  by 
the  solemn  revisions  to  be  made  once  a year  by  every  inspector 
in  all  the  schools  under  his  jurisdiction.  In  these  revisions,  he 
examines  the  children  assembled  together : requires  an  account 
of  the  school  administration,  internal  and  external,  from  the  ad- 
ministrative committee ; receives  the  complaints  and  wishes  of 
the  members  of  the  school-union,  and  takes  measures  to  remedy 
defects.  Pie  transmits  a full  report  of  the  revision  to  the  con- 
sistory of  the  province.  The  consistory  from  time  to  time  name 
counselors  from  its  body  to  assist  at  the  stated,  or  to  make  extra- 
ordinary, revisions. 

For  the  external  management  of  country  schools,  the  inspectors 
should  act  in  concert  with  the  counselors  of  the  circle  ( Land - 
raethe).  All  the  regulations  and  inquiries  of  the  provincial  con- 
sistories, relative  to  the  internal  affairs  of  the  schools,  are  ad- 
dressed to  the  inspectors,  as  on  the  other  hand,  the  internal  wants 
of  the  schools,  and  of  their  masters,  are  brought  by  the  inspectors 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  consistories.  The  Catholic  inspectors 
are  bound  to  furnish  to  the  bishop  the  information  required  touch- 
ing the  religious  concerns  of  the  schools  ; but  their  primary  duty 
is  to  inform  the  provincial  consistories  of  their  general  condition. 


556 


COUSIN  ON  GERMAN  SCHOOLS. 


On  the  other  hand,  they  should  communicate  to  the  bishop  the 
report  of  the  annual  revision,  addressed  to  the  consistories.  The 
Protestant  inspectors,  as  clergymen,  are  already  in  connection 
with  the  synods  ; but  they,  as  well  as  the  clerical  members  of 
the  committees  of  administration,  ought  to  inform  the  synods  of 
the  state  of  the  schools,  and  take  counsel  in  the  synodal  meetings 
in  regard  to  their  improvement.  Lay  inspectors  should  do  this 
by  writing.  Each  inspector  receives  an  annual  indemnity  for 
the  traveling  expenses  he  may  incur  in  the  discharge  of  his  du- 
ties, the  amount  to  be  rated  by  the  provincial  consistories.  The 
study  of  the  theory  and  practice  of  education  is  made  imperative 
at  the  University,  both  on  Protestant  and  Catholic  students  of 
theology ; and  no  one  shall  be  allowed  to  pass  the  examination 
for  holy  orders,  unless  found  conversant  with  all  matters  requisite 
for  the  administration  and  superintendence  of  schools.  The  law 
of  1819  stops  with  the  inspector  of  the  circle.  But  it  should  be 
remembered,  that  over  the  inspector  stands  the  school-counselor 
( Schulrath) ; a functionary  belonging  to  the  departmental  council 
of  regency,  and  yet  nominated  by  the  Minister  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion. The  regency  represented  by  the  school-counselor,  is  not  to 
be  confounded  with  the  consistory  of  the  province,  of  which  the 
school-board  ( Schulcollegium ) forms  part.  This  high  scholastic 
authority,  provincial,  not  departmental,  intermeddles  with  prima- 
ry instruction  only  in  certain  more  important  points  ; for  exam- 
ple, the  seminaries  for  primary  schoolmasters,  lying,  as  they  do, 
beyond  the  sphere  of  the  regency,  of  the  school-counselor,  and  of 
the  inspector  of  the  circle.  Of  these  we  have  already  spoken 
[supra,  pp.  534—537). 

YI. — Of  Private  Schools. 

In  Prussia  all  education,  but  especially  the  education  of  the 
people,  rests  on  the  public  establishments ; the  intelligence  of  the 
nation  was  too  important  a concern  to  be  abandoned  to  chance  ; 
but  though  no  dependence  is  placed  by  the  State  on  private 
schools,  these  institutions  are  not  proscribed,  but  authorized  un- 
der the  conditions  necessary  to  obviate  all  serious  detriment  to 
the  cause  of  education.  We  can  not  enter  into  any  detail  on  this 
head.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  while  the  State  on  the  one  hand, 
through  the  high  qualification  it  secures  in  those  to  whom  it  con- 
fides the  care  of  public  instruction,  raises  the  general  standard  of 
pedagogical  competency  to  a very  lofty  pitch  ; on  the  other,  it 


PRIVATE  SCHOOLS— COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


557 


takes  measures  directly  to  abate  the  nuisance,  so  prevalent 
among  ourselves,  of  unqualified  interlopers  in  this  difficult  and 
all-important  occupation.  In  Prussia,  quacks  are  tolerated  nei- 
ther in  medicine  nor  in  education.  Private  instructors  must 
produce  satisfactory  evidence  of  their  moral  and  religious  charac- 
ter ; their  capacity  is  ascertained  by  examination  ; and  the  license 
which  they  obtain,  specifies  what,  and  in  what  degree,  they  are 
found  qualified  to  teach.  Neither  are  private  establishments  of 
education  emancipated  from  public  inspection. 


We  must  subjoin  M.  Cousin’s  observations  on  this  Law,  and 
on  the  expediency  of  its  adoption.  They  are  of  high  importance  ; 
and  from  their  application  to  the  circumstances  of  our  own  coun- 
try, are  hardly  less  deserving  of  consideration  in  England  than  in 
France. 

“ The  points  of  which  I have  now  treated  comprehend  the  whole  mecha- 
nism of  primary  education  in  Prussia.  There  is  not  a single  article  hut 
is  literally  borrowed  from  the  law  of  1819.  This  law,  without  entering 
into  specialties  relative  to  the  several  provinces,  neglects  no  object  of  in- 
terest. As  a legislative  measure  regarding  primary  instruction,  it  is  the 
most  comprehensive  and  perfect  with  which  I am  acquainted. 

“ It  is,  indeed,  impossible  not  to  acknowledge  its  consummate  wisdom. 
No  inapplicable  general  principles  ; no  spirit  of  system  ; no  particular  and 
exclusive  views,  govern  the  legislator ; he  avails  himself  of  all  the  means 
conducive  to  his  end,  even  when  these  means  differ  widely  from  each 
other.  A king,  an  absolute  king,  has  given  this  law  ; an  irresponsible 
minister  has  counseled  or  digested  it ; yet  no  mistaken  spirit  of  centraliza- 
tion or  ministerial  bureaucracy  is  betrayed ; almost  every  thing  is  com- 
mitted, to  the  authorities  of  the  commune,  of  the  department,  of  the 
province  ; with  the  minister  is  left  only  the  impulsion  and  general  super- 
intendence. The  clergy  have  an  ample  share  in  the  direction  of  popular 
instruction,  and  the  fathers  of  families  are  likewise  consulted  in  the  towns 
and  in  the  villages.  In  a word,  all  the  interests  naturally  concerned  in 
the  business,  find  their  place  in  this  organization,  and  concur  each  in  its 
own  manner  to  the  common  end — the  civilization  of  the  people. 

“ This  Prussian  law  appears  to  me,  therefore,  excellent ; but  we  are 
not  to  imagine  it  the  result  of  one  man’s  wisdom.  Baron  von  Altenstein, 
by  whom  it  was  digested,  is  not  its  author ; and  it  may  be  said  to  have 
already  existed  in  a mass  of  partial  ordinances,  and  in  the  usages  and 
manners  of  the  country.  There  is  not,  perhaps,  a single  article  of  this 
long  law,  of  which  there  are  not  numerous  precedents  ; and  in  a notice 
touching  the  history  of  primary  education  in  Prussia,  in  BeckedorfFs 
Journal,  I find  enactments  of  1728  and  1736,  comprising  a large  propor- 
tion of  the  regulations  enforced  by  the  law  of  1819.  The  obligation  on 
parents  to  send  their  children  to  school  is  of  long  standing  in  Prussia. 
The  extensive  interference  of  the  Church  in  the  education  of  the  people 
ascends  to  the  origin  of  Protestantism,  to  which  it  indeed  belongs ; for  it 


5SS 


COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


is  evident  that  a revolution,  accomplished  in  the  name  of  liberty  of 
thought,  behoved,  for  its  own  defense  and  establishment,  to  work  out  the 
mental  emancipation  of  the  people,  and  the  diffusion  of  education.  The 
law  of  1819  undoubtedly  pitches  sufficiently  high,  what  is  to  he  taught 
in  the  elementary  and  burgher  schools;  but  if  this  instruction  appear  ex- 
cessive for  certain  localities,  it  must  be  stated  that  it  is  already  practiced, 
and  even  surpassed,  in  many  others.  The  boldest  measure  is  the  estab- 
lishment of  a great  seminary  for  the  education  of  primary  schoolmasters 
in  each  department ; but  there  were  already  similar  establishments  in 
most  of  the  ancient  provinces  of  the  monarchy.  In  fine,  this  law  did 
hardly  more  than  distribute  uniformly  what  existed  previously,  not  only 
in  Prussia,  but  throughout  the  whole  of  Germany.  It  is  not,  therefore,  a 
metaphysical  Utopia,  arbitrary  and  artificial,  like  the  greater  part  of  our 
laws  concerning  primary  education,  but  a measure  founded  on  experience 
and  reality.  And  herein  is  seen  the  reason  why  it  could  be  carried  into 
effect,  and  why  it  has  so  rapidly  produced  the  happiest  fruits.  Previously 
assured  that  it  was  every  where  practicable,  the  Prussian  minister  every 
where  required  its  execution,  leaving  the  details  to  the  authorities  to 
whom  they  belonged,  and  reserving  only  to  himself  the  primary  move- 
ment, the  impulsion,  and  the  verification  of  the  whole.  This  impulsion 
has  been  so  steady,  this  verification  so  severe,  and  the  communal,  depart- 
mental, and  provincial  authorities,  the  School-board  in  the  provincial 
consistories,  the  School-coionselor  in  each  council  of  department,  the  In- 
spectors in  the  circles,  the  Commissions  in  the  towns,  and  the  Committees 
in  the  urban  and  rural  communes — all  the  authorities  superintendent,  of 
the  schools,  have  exerted  a zeal  at  once  so  unremitted,  and  so  well  applied, 
that  at  present  what  the  law  prescribes  is  almost  every  where  below  what 
is  actually  performed.  For  example  : — The  law  commands  the  establish- 
ment in  each  department  of  a great  primary  Seminary;  and  there  is  now, 
not  only  one  such  in  every  department,  but  frequently,  likewise,  several 
smaller  subsidiary  seminaries  ; — a result  which,  in  a certain  sort,  guaran- 
tees all  others  ; for  such  establishments  can  only  flourish  in  proportion  as 
the  masters  whom  they  prepare  find  comfortable  appointments,  and  the 
comfortable  appointment  of  masters  says  every  thing  in  regard  to  the 
prosperity  of  primary  instruction.  The  schoolmasters  have  been  raised 
to  functionaries  of  the  state,  and  as  such  have  now  right  to  a retiring 
pension  in  their  old  age  ; and  there  is  formed  in  every  department  a fund 
for  the  widows  and  orphans  of  schoolmasters,  which  the  law  has  recom- 
mended rather  than  enforced The  greatest  difficulty  was  to 

obtain,  in  the  new  provinces,  and  particularly  those  of  the  Rhine,  the 
execution  of  that  article  of  the  law  which,  under  rigorous  penalties,  im- 
poses on  parents  the  obligation  of  sending  their  children  to  school.  The 
minister  wisely  suspended  that  part  of  the  law  in  these  provinces,  and 
applied  himself  to  accomplish  a similar  result  by  persuasion  and  emula- 
tion ; then,  at  last,  when  he  had  disseminated  the  taste  for  education  in 
these  provinces,  and  deemed  them  sufficiently  prepared,  he,  in  1 825,  ren- 
dered the  law  obligatory,  and  thenceforward  strictly  enforced  its  execu- 
tion. .......  [Examples.]  The  law  has  been  universally  applied, 

but  with  a prudent  combination  of  mildness  and  rigor.  Thus,  &c.  ...  I 
have  thought  it  useful  to  study  the  mode  in  which  the  Government  has 
applied  the  general  law  of  1819  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Posen,  far  behind 
even  the  provinces  of  the  Rhine.  I have  under  my  eyes  a number  of 


COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


55  9 


documents,  which  prove  the  •wisdom  of  the  ministerial  measures  and  the 
progress  which  primary  instruction,  with  the  civilization  it  represents,  have 
made  in  this  Polish  portion  of  the  monarchy.  It  would  be  likewise  de- 
sirable that  there  were  published  in  French,  all  the  ministerial  and  pro- 
vincial instructions  touching  the  application  of  the  law  of  1819  to  the 
Jews,  and  to  the  dissemination  of  a taste  for  education  in  this  portion  of 
the  Prussian  population,  numerous  and  wealthy,  but  comparatively  unen- 
lightened, and  apprehensive  lest  the  faith  of  their  children  might  he 
periled  by  an  attendance  on  the  public  schools. 

“ In  the  present  state  of  things,  a law  regarding  primary  education  is, 
in  France,  assuredly  a measure  of  indispensable  necessity.  But  how  is  a 
good  law  to  be  framed  in  the  absence  of  precedents,  and  of  all  experience 
in  this  important  matter  ? The  education  of  the  people  has  been  hitherto 
so  neglected  ; the  attempts  have  been  so  few,  and  these  few  so  unsuc- 
cessful, that  we  are  totally  destitute  of  those  common  notions,  those  fore- 
closed opinions  irradicated  at  once  in  our  habits  and  judgments,  which 
constitute  the  conditions  and  bases  of  a true  legislation.  I am  anxious 
for  a law,  and  a law  I also  dread ; for  I tremble  lest  we  should  again 
commence  a course  of  visionary  legislation,  instead  of  turning  our  atten- 
tion to  what  actually  is.  God  grant  that  we  be  made  to  comprehend, 
that,  at  present,  a law  on  primary  education  can  only  be  a provisory,  not 
a definitive  measure  ; that  of  necessity  it  must  he  remodeled  some  ten 
years  hence,  and  that  the  problem  is  only  to  supply  the  more  urgent 
wants,  and  bestow  a legislative  sanction  on  some  incontestable  points. 
What  are  these  points  ? I will  attempt  to  signalize  them  from  actual 
facts. 

“ The  notion  of  compelling  parents  to  send  their  children  to  school,  is  not 
perhaps  sufficiently  prevalent  to  enable  us  at  present  to  pass  it  inconti- 
nently into  a law  ; but  all  are  at  one  in  this — that  a school  is  an  establish- 
ment necessary  in  every  commune,  and  it  is  readily  admitted  that  this 
school  should  be  maintained  at  the  expense  of  the  commune,  allowing  the 
commune,  if  too  poor,  to  have  recourse  on  the  department,  and  the  depart- 
ment on  the  state.  This  point,  then,  is  not  disputed,  and  ought  to  he 
ratified  into  a law.  The  practice  has  even  preceded  the  enactment : 
during  the  last  year  the  municipal  councils  have  been  every  where  voting 
the  highest  amount  of  funds  within  their  means  for  the  education  of  the 
people  of  their  commune.  There  remains  only  to  convert  this  almost 
general  fact  into  a legal  obligation. 

“You  are  also  aware,  sir,  that  many  councils  of  department  have  felt 
the  necessity  of  ensuring  the  supply  of  schoolmasters,  and  their  better  ed- 
ucation, by  establishing  within  their  hounds  a primary  normal  school ; 
and  we  may  affirm,  that  in  this  expenditure  there  has  been  frequently 
more  of  luxury  than  of  parsimony.  This  also  is  a valuable  indication ; 
and  the  law  would  only  confirm  and  generalize  what  at  present  takes  place 
almost  every  where,  by  decreeing  a primary  normal  school  for  each  depart- 
ment, as  a primary  school  for  every  commune  : it  being  understood  that 
this  primary  normal  school  should  be  of  greater  or  less  extent,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  resources  of  each  department. 

“Here,  then,  are  two  very  important  points  on  which  all  are  agreed  : 
Have  you  not  also  been  struck  with  the  demands  of  a great  many  towns, 
large  and  small,  for  schools  superior  to  the  common  primary  schools,  and 
in  which  the  instruction,  without  attempting  to  emulate  our  royal  and 


560 


COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


communal  colleges  in  classical  and  scientific  studies,  should  devote  a more 
particular  attention  to  objects  of  a more  general  utility,  and  indispensable 
to  that  numerous  class  of  the  population  which,  without  entering  into  the 
learned  professions,  finds,  however,  the  want  of  a more  extensive  and 
varied  culture  than  the  lower  orders,  strictly  so  called — the  peasants  and 
artisans  ? The  towns  every  where  call  out  for  such  establishments ; 
several  municipal  councils  have  voted  considerable  funds  for  this  purpose, 
and  have  addressed  themselves  to  you,  in  order  to  obtain  the  necessary 
authorization,  assistance,  and  advice.  Here  it  is  impossible  not  to  observe 
the  symptom  of  a veritable  want,  the  indication  of  an  important  chasm  in 
our  system  of  public  education.  You  are  well  aware  that  I am  a zealous 
defender  of  classical  and  scientific  studies ; not  only  do  I think  that  it  is 
expedient  to  keep  up  our  collegial  plan  of  studies,  more  especially  the 
philological  department  of  that  plan,  but  I am  convinced  that  it  ought  to 
be  strengthened  and  extended,  and  thereby,  always  maintaining  our  in- 
contestable superiority  in  the  physical  and  mathematical  sciences,  to  be 
able  to  emulate  Germany  in  the  solidity  of  our  classical  instruction.  In 
fact,  classical  studies  are,  beyond  comparison,  the  most  essential  of  all, 
conducing,  as  they  do,  to  the  knowledge  of  our  humanity,  which  they  con- 
sider under  all  its  mighty  aspects  and  relations  : here,  in  the  language 
of  literature  of  nations  who  have  left  behind  a memorable  trace  of  their 
passage  on  the  earth  ; there,  in  the  pregnant  vicissitudes  of  history  which 
continually  renovate  and  improve  society ; and  finally,  in  philosophy, 
which  reveals  to  us  the  simple  elements,  and  the  more  uniform  organi- 
zation of  that  wondrous  being,  which  history,  literature,  and  languages 
successively  clothe  in  forms  the  most  diversified,  and  yet  always  relative  to 
some  more  or  less  important  part  of  its  internal  constitution.  Classical 
studies  maintain  the  sacred  tradition  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  life  of 
our  humanity.  To  enfeeble  them  would,  in  my  eyes,  be  an  act  of  barbar- 
ism, an  attempt  against  true  civilization,  and  in  a certain  sort,  the  crime 
of  lese-humanity.  May  our  royal  colleges,  then,  and  even  a large  propor- 
tion of  our  communal,  continue  to  introduce  into  the  sanctuary  the  flower 
of  our  French  youth;  they  will  deserve  well  of  their  country.  But  the 
whole  population — can  it,  ought  it,  to  enter  our  colleges  ? In  France, 
primary  education  is  but  a scantling;  and  between  this  education  and 
that  of  our  colleges,  there  is  a blank ; hence  it  follows  that  the  father  of 
a family,  even  in  the  lower  part  of  the  bourgeoisie,  who  has  the  honorable 
desire  of  bestowing  a suitable  education  on  his  sons,  can  only  do  so  by 
sending  them  to  college.  Serious  inconveniences  are  the  result.  In  gen- 
eral, these  young  men,  who  are  not  conscious  of  a lofty  destination,  prose- 
cute their  studies  with  little  assiduity ; and  when  they  return  to  the  pro- 
fession and  habits  of  their  family,  as  nothing  in  the  routine  of  their  ordi- 
nary life  occurs  to  recall  and  keep  up  their  college  studies,  a few  years  are 
sure  to  obliterate  the  smattering  of  classical  knowledge  they  possessed. 
They  also  frequently  contract  at  college  acquaintances  and  tastes  which 
make  it  almost  impossible  to  accommodate  themselves  again  to  the  humble 
condition  of  their  parents  : hence  a race  of  restless  men,  discontented  with 
their  lot,  with  others,  and  with  themselves,  enemies  of  a social  order,  in 
which  they  do  not  feel  themselves  in  their  place,  and  ready,  with  some 
acquirements,  a talent  more  or  less  solid,  and  an  unbridled  ambition,  to 
throw  themselves  into  all  the  paths  either  of  servility  or  revolt.  Our  col- 
leges should  undoubtedly  remain  open  to  all,  but  we  ought  not  to  invite 


COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


561 


into  them,  without  discretion,  the  lower  orders ; and  this  we  do,  unless 
we  establish  institutions  intermediate  between  the  primary  schools  and  the 
colleges.  Germany,  and  Prussia  in  particular,  are  rich  in  establishments 
of  this' description.  I have  already  described  several  in  detail,  at  Frank- 
fort, Weimar,  Leipsic ; and  they  are  consecrated  by  the  Prussian  law  of 
1819.  You  are  aware  that  I speak  of  what  are  called  Burgher  schools 
( Buerger schulen ),  a word  which  accurately  contradistinguishes  them  from 
the  Learned  Schools  ( Gelehrtenschulen ),  called  in  Germany  Gymnasia, 
and  with  us  Colleges  ; a name  in  other  respects  honorable  to  the  bour- 
geoisie, who  are  not  degraded  by  attending  these  schools,  and  to  the  peo- 
ple, who  are  thus  elevated  to  the  bourgeoisie.  The  burgher  schools  con- 
stitute the  higher  degree  of  primary  instruction,  of  which  the  elementary 
schools  are  the  lower.  There  are  thus  only  two  degrees  : 1.  The  Ele- 
mentary School , which  is  the  common  basis  of  all  popular  education  in 
town  and  country ; 2.  The  Burgher-scliool,  which,  in  towns  of  even7 
size  where  there  exists  a middle  class,  affords  to  all  those  who  are  not 
destined  for  the  learned  professions,  an  education  sufficiently  extensive 
and  liberal.  The  Prussian  law,  which  fixes  a maximum  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  elementary  school,  fixes  a minimum  for  that  of  the  Burgher- 
school  ; and  there  are  two  very  different  examinations,  in  order  to  obtain 
the  license  of  primary  teachers  in  these  several  degrees.  The  Elementary 
School  ought  to  he  one  ; for  it  represents,  and  is  destined  to  foster  and 
confirm,  the  national  unity,  and,  in  general,  it  is  not  right  that  the  limit 
fixed  by  law  for  the  instruction  in  the  Elementary  School  should  be  over- 
passed ; but  the  case  is  different  in  the  Burgher-school ; as  this  is  destined 
for  a class  essentially  different,  the  middle  class ; and  it  should  naturally 
be  able  to  rise  in  accommodation  to  the  higher  circumstances  of  that  class 
in  the  more  important  towns.  Thus  it  is  that  in  Prussia  the  Burgher- 
school  has  various  gradations,  from  the  minimum  fixed  by  law,  with 
which  I have  made  you  acquainted,  up  to  that  higher  degree  where 
it  is  connected  with  the  Gymnasium,  properly  so  denominated,  and  thus 
sometimes  obtains  the  name  of  Pro gymnasium.  I transmit  you  an  in- 
struction relative  to  the  different  progymnasia  in  the  department  of  Mun- 
ster ; you  will  there  see  that  these  establishments  are,  as  the  title  indicates, 
preparatory  gymnasia,  where  the  classical  and  scientific  instruction  stops 
within  certain  limits,  but  where  the  hurgher  class  can  obtain  a truly 
liberal  education.  In  general,  the  German  burgher  schools,  somewhat 
inferior  to  our  colleges  in  classical  and  scientific  studies,  are  incomparably 
superior  to  them  in  what  is  taught  of  religion,  geography,  history,  the 
modern  languages,  music,  drawing,  and  national  literature.  In  my 
opinion,  it  is  of  the  very  highest  importance  to  establish  in  France,  by  one 
name  or  other,  burgher  schools,  under  various  modifications,  and  to  re- 
model to  this  form  a certain  number  of  our  communal  colleges.  I regard 
this,  sir,  as  an  affair  of  state.  Let  it  not  be  said  that  we  have  already 
various  degrees  of  primary  instruction  in  France,  and  that  what  I require 
has  been  already  provided.  There  is  nothing  of  the  kind  ; we  have  three 
degrees,  it  is  true,  but  ill-defined  ; the  distinction  is  therefore  naught. 
These  three  degrees  are  an  arbitrary  classification,  the  principle  of  which 
I do  not  pretend  to  comprehend,  while  the  two  degrees  determined  by  the 
Prussian  law  are  manifestly  founded  on  the  nature  of  things.  Finally, 
comprehending  these  two  degrees  within  the  circle  of  primary  education, 
it  is  not  unimportant  to  distinguish  and  characterize  them  by  different 

N N 


562 


COUSIN’S  OBSERVATIONS. 


names  ; but  these  names — schools  of  the  third,  second,  and  first  degree — 
mark  nothing  but  abstract  differences ; they  speak  not  to  the  imagination 
and  make  no  impression  on  the  intellect.  In  Prussia,  the  names,  Ele- 
mentary School  and  Burgher  school,  as  representing  the  inferior  an'd  supe- 
rior degrees  of  primary  instruction,  are  popular.  That  of  Mittelschule 
(Middle-school)  is  also  employed  in  some  parts  of  Germany — a name 
which  might,  perhaps,  be  conveniently  adopted  by  us.  That,  and  Ele- 
mentary School,  would  comprehend  the  two  essential  degrees  of  primary 
instruction ; and  our  primary  normal  schools  would  furnish  masters  equally 
for  both  degrees ; for  whom,  however,  there  behoved  to  be  two  kinds  of 
examinations,  and  two  kinds  of  licenses.  There  would  remain  for  you 
only  to  fix  a minimum  for  the  middle  school,  as  you  would  undoubtedly 
do  for  the  elementary  school,  taking  care  to  allow  the  several  departments 
gradually  to  surpass  their  minimum,  according  to  their  resources  and  their 
success. 

“ This  is  what  appears  to  me  substantially  contained  in  all  the  petitions 
addressed  to  you  by  the  towns,  whether  to  change  the  subjects  taught  in 
our  communal  colleges ; whether  to  add  to  the  classical  and  scientific  in- 
struction afforded  in  our  royal  colleges,  other  courses  of  more  general 
utility  ; whether,  in  fine,  to  be  allowed  schools  which  they  know  not  how 
to  name,  and  which  more  than  once  they  have  denominated  Industrial 
Schools,  in  contradistinction  to  our  colleges.  Care  must  be  taken  not  to 
weaken  the  classical  studies  of  our  colleges  ; on  the  contrary,  I repeat  it, 
they  ought  to  be  strengthened.  We  should  avoid  the  introduction  of  two 
descriptions  of  pupils  into  our  colleges ; this  is  contrary  to  all  good  disci- 
pline, and  would  unavoidably  enervate  the  more  difficult  studies  to  the 
profit  of  the  easier.  Neither  is  it  right  to  give  the  name  of  Industrial 
Schools  to  schools  in  which  the  pupils  are  not  supposed  to  have  any  par- 
ticular vocation.  The  people  feel  only  their  wants  ; it  belongs  to  you,  sir, 
to  make  choice  of  the  means  by  which  these  wants  are  to  be  satisfied.  A 
cry  is  raised  from  one  extremity  of  France  to  the  other,  demanding  for  three- 
fourths  of  the  French  nation  establishments  intermediate  between  the  simple 
elementary  schools  and  the  colleges.  The  prayers  are  urgent;  they  are 
almost  unanimous.  Here  again  is  a point  of  the  very  highest  importance 
on  which  it  would  be  easy  to  dilate.  The  general  prayer,  numerous  at- 
tempts more  or  less  successful,  call  out  for  a law,  and  render  it  at  once  in- 
dispensable and  easy.” 

Our  limits  compel  us  to  conclude,  leaving  much  interesting 
matter  of  the  Rapport  unnoticed,  and  the  whole  Projel  de  Lot. 
What  we  have  extracted  of  the  former,  will  afford  a sample  of 
the  exceeding  importance  of  its  contents.  Of  this  we  have  before 
us  a G-erman  translation  by  Dr.  Kroeger  of  Hamburgh,  who  has 
appended  some  valuable  notes  ; but,  though  the  work  is  of  incom- 
parably greater  importance  for  this  country,  we  have  little  expec- 
tation that  it  will  appear  in  English.  We  are  even  ignorant  of 
our  wants.  In  fact,  the  difficulty  of  all  educational  improvement 
in  Britain  lies  less  in  the  amount,  however  enormous,  of  work  to 
be  performed,  than  in  the  notion  that  not  a great  deal  is  requisite. 


CONCLUDING  REMARKS.  563 

Our  pedagogical  ignorance  is  only  equaled  by  our  pedagogical 
conceit : and  where  few  are  competent  to  understand,  all  believe 
themselves  qualified  to  decide. 

Had  our  limits  permitted,  we  should  have  said  something  of 
the  history  of  primary  education  in  Germany ; and  a word  on  the 
system  of  popular  instruction  in  some  of  the  North  American 
democracies,  which,  however  inferior,  still  approaches  nearest  to 
that  established  in  the  autocratic  monarchies  of  the  empire.  We 
should  also  have  attempted  to  show,  though  somewhat  startling 
in  its  appliance  to  ourselves,  that  Aristotle’s  criterion  of  an  honest 
and  intelligent  government  holds  universally  true.  A govern- 
ment, says  the  philosopher,  ruling  for  the  benefit  of  all,  is,  of  its 
very  nature,  anxious  for  the  education  of  all,  not  only  because 
intelligence  is  in  itself  a good,  and  the  condition  of  good,  but  even 
in  order  that  its  subjects  may  be  able  to  appreciate  the  benefits 
of  which  it  is  itself  the  source ; whereas  a government  ruling  for 
the  profit  of  its  administrators,  is  naturally  willing  to  debase  the 
mind  and  character  of  the  governed,  to  the  end  that  they  may  be 
disqualified  to  understand,  to  care  for,  and  to  assert  their  rights. 
— But  we  must  leave  these  inquiries  for  the  present ; trusting  to 
be  able,  ere  long,  to  resume  them. 


' 


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APPENDICES, 


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568 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 


Thinking  (employing  that  term  as  comprehending  all  our  cog- 
nitive energies)  is  of  two  kinds.  It  is  either  A)  Negative  or  B) 
Positive. 

A. )  Thinking  is  Negative  (in  propriety,  a negation  of  thought), 
when  Existence  is  not  attributed  to  an  object.  It  is  of  two  kinds ; 
in  as  much  as  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  conditions  of  positive 
thinking  is  violated.  In  either  case,  the  result  is  Nothing. 

I. )  If  the  condition  of  Non-contradiction  be  not  fulfilled,  there 
emerges  The  really  Impossible , what  has  been  called  in  the 
schools,  Nihil  purum. 

II.  ) If  the  condition  of  Relativity  be  not  purified,  there  results 
The  Impossible  to  thought ; that  is,  what  may  exist,  but  what 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  existing.  This  impossible,  the  schools 
have  not  contemplated  ; we  are,  therefore,  compelled,  for  the  sake 
of  symmetry  and  precision,  to  give  it  a scholastic  appellation  in 
the  Nihil  cogitabile. 

B. )  Thinking  is  Positive  (and  this  in  propriety  is  the  only 
real  thought),  when  Existence  is  predicated  of  an  object.  By 
existence  is  not,  however,  here  meant  real  or  objective  existence, 
but  only  existence  subjective  or  ideal.  Thus  imagining  a Cen- 
taur or  a Hippogryph,  we  do  not  suppose  that  the  phantasm  has 
any  being  beyond  our  imagination;  but  still  we  attribute  to  it 
an  actual  existence  in  thought.  Nay,  we  attribute  to  it  a possi- 
ble existence  in  creation ; for  we  can  represent  nothing,  which 
we  do  not  think,  as  within  the  limits  of  Almighty  power  to  real- 
ize.— Positive  thinking  can  be  brought  to  bear  only  under  two 
conditions  ; the  condition  of  I.)  Non-contradiction,  and  the  condi- 
tion of  II.)  Relativity.  If  both  are  fulfilled,  we  think  Something. 

I.)  Non-contradiction.  This  condition  is  insuperable.  We 
think  it,  not  only  as  a law  of  thought,  but  as  a law  of  things  ; 
and  while  we  suppose  its  violation  to  determine  an  absolute  im- 
possibility, we  suppose  its  fulfillment  to  afford  only  the  Not-impos- 
sible.  Thought  is,  under  this  condition,  merely  explicative  or 
analytic  ; and  the  condition  itself  is  brought  to  bear  under  three 
phases,  constituting  three  laws  : i.) — the  law  of  Identity  ; ii.) — 
the  law  of  Contradiction ; iii.) — the  law  of  Excluded  Middle. 
The  science  of  these  laws  is  Logic ; and  as  the  laws  are  only  ex- 
plicative, Logic  is  only  formal.  (The  principle  of  Sufficient  Rea- 
son should  be  excluded  from  Logic.  For,  in  as  much  as  this 
principle  is  not  material  (material=non-formal)  it  is  only  a deri- 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  THINKABLE. 


569 


vation  of  the  three  formal  laws  ; and  in  as  much  as  it  is  material, 
it  coincides  with  the  principle  of  Causality,  and  is  extra-logical). 

Though  necessary  to  state  the  condition  of  Non-contradiction, 
there  is  no  dispute  about  its  effect,  no  danger  of  its  violation. 
When  I,  therefore,  speak  of  the  Conditioned , I use  the  term 
in  special  reference  to  Relativity.  By  existence  conditioned,  is 
meant,  emphatically,  existence  relative,  existence  thought  under 
relation.  Relation  may  thus  be  understood  to  contain  all  the 
categories  and  forms  of  positive  thought. 

II.)  Relativity.  This  condition  (by  which,  be  it  observed,  is 
meant  the  relatively  or  conditionally  relative , and,  therefore,  not 
even  the  relative,  absolutely  or  infinitely) — this  condition  is  not 
insuperable.  We  should  not  think  it  as  a law  of  things,  but 
merely  as  a law  of  thought ; for  we  find  that  there  are  contradictory 
opposites,  one  of  which,  by  the  rule  of  Excluded  Middle,  must 
be  true,  but  neither  of  which  can  by  us  be  positively  thought,  as 
possible. — Thinking,  under  this  condition,  is  ampliative  or  syn- 
thetic. Its  science  Metaphysic  (using  that  term  in  a comprehen- 
sive meaning),  is  therefore  material , in  the  sense  of  non- formal. 
The  condition  of  Relativity,  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary , is  brought 
to  bear  under  three  principal  relations  ; the  first  of  which  springs 
from  the  subject  of  knowledge — the  mind  thinking  (the  relation  of 
Knowledge ) ; the  second  and  third  from  the  object  of  knowledge 
— the  thing  thought  about  (the  relations  of  Existence.) 

(Besides  these  necessary  and  original  relations,  of  which  alone 
it  is  requisite  to  speak  in  an  alphabet  of  human  thought,  there 
are  many  relations,  contingent  and  derivative,  which  we  fre- 
quently employ  in  the  actual  applications  of  our  cognitive  ener- 
gies. Such  for  example  (without  arrangement)  as — True  and 
False,  Good  and  Bad,  Perfect  and  Imperfect,  Easy  and  Difficult, 
Desire  and  Aversion,  Simple  and  Complex,  Uniform  and  Various, 
Singular  and  Universal,  Whole  and  Part,  Similar  and  Dissimilar, 
Congruent  and  Incongruent,  Equal  and  Unequal,  Orderly  and 
Disorderly,  Beautiful  and  Deformed,  Material  and  Immaterial, 
Natural  and  Artificial,  Organized  and  Inorganized,  Young  and 
Old,  Male  and  Female,  Parent  and  Child,  &c.  &c.  These  admit 
of  classification  from  different  points  of  view ; but  to  attempt 
their  arrangement  at  all,  far  less  on  any  exclusive  principle,  would 
here  be  manifestly  out  of  place). 

i.)  The  relations  of  Knowledge  are  those  which  arise  from  the 
reciprocal  dependence  of  the  subject  and  of  the  object  of  thought, 


570  APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 

Self  and  Not-self  (Ego  and  Non-ego — Subjective  and  Object- 
ive.) Whatever  comes  into  consciousness,  is  thought  by  us,  either 
as  belonging  to  the  mental  self,  exclusively  (subjeotivo-subjective), 
or  as  belonging  to  the  not-self,  exclusively  (objectivo-objective), 
or  as  belonging  partly  to  both  (subjectivo-objective.)  It  is  diffi- 
cult, however,  to  find  words  to  express  precisely  all  the  complex 
correlations  of  knowledge.  For  in  cognizing  a mere  affection  of 
self,  we  objectify  it;  it  forms  a subject-objector  subjective  object, 
or  subjectivo-subjective  object : and  how  shall  we  name  and  dis- 
criminate a mode  of  mind,  representative  of  and  relative  to  a mode 
of  matter?  This  difficulty  is,  however,  strictly  psychological.  In 
so  far  as  we  are  at  present  concerned,  it  is  manifest  that  all  these 
cognitions  exist  for  us,  only  as  terms  of  a correlation. 

The  relations  of  Existence , arising  from  the  object  of  knowledge, 
are  twofold;  in  as  much  as  the  relation  is  either  Intrinsic  or 
Extrinsic. 

ii.)  As  the  relation  of  Existence  is  Intrinsic , it  is  that  of  Sub- 
stance and  Quality  (form,  accident,  property,  mode,  affection, 
phenomenon,  appearance,  attribute,  predicate,  &c.)  It  may  be 
called  qualitative. 

Substance  and  Quality  are,  manifestly,  only  thought  as  mu- 
tual relatives.  We  can  not  think  a quality  existing  absolutely, 
in  or  of  itself.  We  are  constrained  to  think  it,  as  inhering  in 
some  basis,  substratum,  hypostasis,  or  substance ; but  this  sub- 
stance can  not  be  conceived  by  us,  except  negatively,  that  is,  as 
the  unapparent — the  inconceivable  correlative  of  certain  appear- 
ing qualities.  If  we  attempt  to  think  it  positively,  we  can  think 
it  only  by  transforming  it  into  a quality  or  bundle  of  qualities, 
which,  again,  we  are  compelled  to  refer  to  an  unknown  substance, 
now  supposed  for  their  incogitable  basis.  Every  thing,  in  fact, 
may  be  conceived  as  the  quality,  or  as  the  substance  of  some- 
thing else.  But  absolute  substance  and  absolute  quality,  these 
are  both  inconceivable,  as  more  than  negations  of  the  conceivable. 
It  is  hardly  requisite  to  observe,  that  the  term  Substance  is  vul- 
garly applied,  in  the  abusive  signification,  to  a congeries  of  quali- 
ties, denoting  those  especially  which  are  more  permanent,  in  con- 
trast to  those  which  are  more  transitory.  (See  the  treatise  De 
Mundo,  attributed  to  Aristotle,  c.  iv.) 

What  has  now  been  said,  applies  equally  to  Mind  and  Matter. 

As  the  relation  of  Existence  is  Extrinsic , it  is  threefold ; and 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  THINKABLE. 


571 


as  constituted  by  three  species  of  quantity,  it  may  be  called  quan- 
titative: It  is  realized  in  or  by : 1°.  Protensive  quantity,  Pro- 

tension, or  Time;  2°.  Extensive  quantity,  Extension  or  Space ; 
3°.  Intensive  quantity,  Intension  or  Degree.  These  quantities 
may  be  all  considered,  either  as  Continuous  or  as  Discrete  ; and 
they  constitute  the  three  last  great  relations  which  we  have  here 
to  signalize. 

iii.)  Time,  Protension  or  protensive  quantity,  called  likewise 
Duration,  is  a necessary  condition  of  thought.  It  may  he  con- 
sidered both  in  itself  and  in  the  things  which  it  contains. 

Considered  in  itself. — Time  is  positively  inconceivable,  if  we 
attempt  to  construe  it  in  thought ; — either,  on  the  one  hand,  as 
absolutely  commencing  or  absolutely  terminating,  or  on  the  other, 
as  infinite  or  eternal,  whether  ab  ante  or  a post ; and  it  is  no  less 
inconceivable,  if  we  attempt  to  fix  an  absolute  minimum  or  to 
follow  out  an  infinite  division.  It  is  positively  conceivable ; if 
conceived  as  an  indefinite  past,  present  or  future ; and  as  an  in- 
determinate mean  between  the  two  unthinkable  extremes  of  an 
absolute  least  and  an  infinite  divisibility.  For  thus  it  is  relative. 

In  regard  to  Time  Past  and  Time  Future  there  is  comparative- 
ly no  difficulty,  because  these  are  positively  thought  as  protensive 
quantities.  But  Time  Present,  when  we  attempt  to  realize  it, 
seems  to  escape  us  altogether — to  vanish  into  nonentity.  The 
present  can  not  be  conceived  as  of  any  length,  of  any  quantity,  of 
any  protension,  in  short,  as  any  thing  positive.  It  is  only  con- 
ceivable as  a negation,  as  the  point  or  line  (and  these  are  only 
negations)  in  which  the  past  ends  and  the  future  begins — in 
which  they  limit  each  other. 

“ Le  moment  ou  je  parle,  est  deja  loin  de  moi.” 

In  fact,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  how  we  do  exist;  and  specula- 
tively, we  must  admit,  in  its  most  literal  acceptation — “ Victun 
semper,  vivimus  nunquam.”  The  Eleatic  Zeno’s  demonstration 
of  the  impossibility  of  Motion,  is  not  more  insoluble  than  could 
be  framed  a proof,  that  the  Present  has  no  reality ; for  however 
certain  we  may  be  of  both,  we  can  positively  think  neither.  So 
true  is  it  as  said  by  St.  Augustin : “ What  is  Time — if  not  asked, 
I know ; but  attempting  to  explain,  I know  not.” 

Things  in  Time  are  either  co-inclusive  or  co-exclusive.  Things 
co-inclusive — if  of  the  same  time  are,  pro  tanto , identical,  appar- 
ently and  in  thought ; if  of  different  times  (as  causes  and  effect, 


572 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 


causcc  et  causatum ),  they  appear  as  different,  but  are  thought  as 
identical.  Things  co-exclusive  are  mutually,  either  prior  and 
posterior,  or  contemporaneous. 

The  impossibility  we  experience  of  thinking  negatively  or  as 
non-existent,  non-existent,  consequently  in  time  (either  past  or 
future)  aught,  which  we  have  conceived  positively  or  as  existent 
— this  impossibility  affords  the  principle  of  Causality , &c.  (Spe- 
cially developed  in  the  sequel.) 

Time  applies  to  both  Substance  and  Quality ; and  includes  the 
other  quantities,  Space  and  Degree. 

iv.)  Space,  Extension  or  extensive  quantity  is,  in  like  manner, 
a necessary  condition  of  thought ; and  may  also  be  considered, 
both  in  itself,  and  in  the  things  which  it  contains. 

Considered  in  itself. — Space  is  positively  inconceivable  : — as  a 
whole,  either  infinitely  unbounded,  or  absolutely  bounded ; as  a 
part,  either  infinitely  divisible,  or  absolutely  indivisible.  Space 
is  positively  conceivable  : — as  a mean  between  these  extremes  ; in 
other  words,  we  can  think  it  either  as  an  indefinite  whole,  or  as 
an  indefinite  part.  For  thus  it  is  relative. 

The  things  contained  in  Space  may  be  considered,  either  in 
relation  to  this  form,  or  in  relation  to  each  other. — In  relation  to 
Space : the  extension  occupied  by  a thing  is  called  its  place ; and 
a thing  changing  its  place,  gives  the  relation  of  motion  in  space, 
space  itself  being  always  conceived  as  immovable, 

“ stabilisque  manens  dat  cuncta  moveri.” 

t 

— Considered  in  relation  to  each  other.  Things,  spacially,  are 
either  inclusive,  thus  originating  the  relation  of  containing  and 
contained  ; or  co-exclusive,  thus  determining  the  relation  of  posi- 
tion or  situation — of  here  and  there. 

Space  applies,  proximately,  to  things  considered  as  Substance ; 
for  the  qualities  of  substances,  though  they  are  in,  may  not  occu- 
py, space.  In  fact,  it  is  by  a merely  modern  abuse  of  the  term, 
that  the  affections  of  Extension  have  been  styled  Qualities.  It 
is  extremely  difficult  for  the  human  mind  to  admit  the  possibil- 
ity of  unextended  substance.  Extension,  being  a condition  of 
positive  thinking,  clings  to  all  our  conceptions ; and  it  is  one 
merit  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,  that  it  proves  space 
to  be  only  a law  of  thought,  and  not  a law  of  things.  The  diffi- 
culty of  thinking,  or  rather  of  admitting  as  possible,  the  immate- 
riality of  the  soul,  is  shown  by  the  tardy  and  timorous  manner  in 


CONDITIONS  OF  THE  THINKABLE. 


573 


which  the  inextension  of  the  thinking  subject  was  recognized  in 
the  Christian  Church.  Some  of  the  early  Councils  and  most  of 
the  Fathers  maintained  the  extended,  while  denying  the  corporeal, 
nature  of  the  spiritual  principle ; and,  though  I can  not  allow, 
that  Descartes  was  the  first  by  whom  the  immateriality  of  mind 
was  fully  acknowledged,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  that  an  assertion 
of  the  inextension  and  illocality  of  the  soul,  was  long  and  very 
generally  eschewed,  as  tantamount  to  the  assertion,  that  it  was  a 
mere  nothing. 

On  space  are  dependent  what  are  called  the  Primary  Qualities 
of  body,  strictly  so  denominated,  and  Space  combined  with  Degree 
affords,  of  body,  the  Sec  undo-primary  Qualities.  (On  this  dis- 
tinction, see  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  845-853.) 

Our  inability  to  conceive  an  absolute  elimination  from  space  of 
aught,  which  we  have  conceived  to  occupy  space,  gives  the  law  of 
what  I have  called  Ultimate  Incompressibility , &c.  (Ib.  p.  847.) 

v.)  Degree,  Intension  or  intensive  quantity  is  not,  like  Time 
and  Space,  an  absolute  condition  of  thought.  Existences  are  not 
necessarily  thought  under  it ; it  does  not  apply  to  Substance,  but 
to  Quality,  and  that  in  the  more  limited  acceptation  of  the  word. 
For  it  does  not  apply  to  what  have  (abusively)  been  called  by 
modern  philosophers  the  Primary  Qualities  of  body  ; these  being 
merely  evolutions  of  Extension,  which,  again,  is  not  thought 
under  Degree.  (Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  846,  sq.)  Degree  may, 
therefore,  be  thought  as  null,  or  as  existing  only  potentially.  But 
thinking  it  to  be,  we  must  think  it  as  a quantity ; and,  as  a 
quantity,  it  is  positively  both  inconceivable  and  conceivable. — It 
is  positively  inconceivable  : absolutely,  either  as  least  or  as  great- 
est ; infinitely,  as  without  limit,  either  in  increase  or  in  diminu- 
tion.— On  the  contrary,  it  is  positively  conceivable ; as  indefinite- 
ly high  or  higher,  as  indefinitely  low  or  lower.— The  things  thought 
under  it ; if  of  the  same  intension  are  correlatively  uniform,  if  of 
a different  degree,  are  correlatively  higher  or  lower. 

Degree  affords  the  relations  of  Actuality  and  Potentiality — of 
Action  and  Passion — of  Power  active , and  Power  passive,  &c. 

Degree  is,  likewise,  developed  into  what,  in  propriety,  are 
called  the  Secondary  Qualities  of  body ; and  combined  with 
Space,  into  the  Secundo-primary . (Ib.  p.  853,  p.  848,  sq.) 

So  much  for  the  Conditions  of  Thinking,  in  detail. 

If  the  general  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned  be  correct,  it  yields 


574 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A). 


as  a corollary,  that  Judgment , that  Comparison  is  implied  in 
every  act  of  apprehension ; and  the  fact,  that  consciousness  can 
not  he  realized  without  an  energy  of  judgment,  is,  again,  a proof 
of  the  correctness  of  the  theory,  asserting  the  Relativity  of 
Thought. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  even  from  the  preceding 
outline,  is,  it  will  be  seen,  the  express  converse  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Absolute — at  least,  as  this  system  has  been  latterly  evolved 
in  Grermany.  For  this  asserts  to  man  a knowledge  of  the  Uncon- 
ditioned— of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite ; while  that  denies  to  him 
a knowledge  of  either,  and  maintains,  all  which  we  immediately 
know,  or  can  know,  to  be  only  the  Conditioned,  the  Relative,  the 
Phenomenal,  the  Finite.  The  one  supposing  knowledge  to  be 
only  of  existence  in  itself,  and  existence  in  itself  to  be  appre- 
hended, and  even  understood,  proclaims — “Understand  that  you 
may  believe.”  (“Intellige  ut  credas”);  the  other,  supposing  that 
existence,  in  itself,  is  unknown,  that  apprehension  is  only  of 
phenomena,  and  that  these  are  received  only  upon  trust,  as  in- 
comprehensibly revealed  facts,  proclaims  with  the  Prophet — “ Be- 
lieve that  ye  may  understand,”  (“  Crede  ut  intelligas.”  Is.  vii. 
9,  sec.  lxx.) — But  extremes  meet.  In  one  respect,  both  coincide; 
for  both  agree,  that  the  knowledge  of  Nothing  is  the  principle  or 
result  of  all  true  philosophy  : 

“ Scire  Nihil — studium,  quo  nos  Istamur  utrique.” 

But  the  one  doctrine,  openly  maintaining  that  the  Nothing 
must  yield  every  thing,  is  a philosophic  omniscience ; whereas 
the  other,  holding  that  Nothing  can  yield  nothing,  is  a philoso- 
phic nescience.  In  other  words: — the  doctrine  of  the  Uncondi- 
tioned is  a philosophy  confessing  relative  ignorance,  but  professing 
absolute  knowledge ; while  the  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned  is  a 
philosophy  professing  relative  knowledge,  but  confessing  absolute 
ignorance.  Thus,  touching  the  Absolute : the  watchword  of  the 
one  is — “Noscendo  cognoscitur,  ignorando  ignoratur;”  the  watch- 
word of  the  other  is — “ Noscendo  ignoratur,  ignorando  cognosci- 
tur.” 

But  which  is  true  ? — To  answer  this,  we  need  only  to  examine 
our  own  consciousness ; there  shall  we  recognize  the  limited  “ex- 
tent of  our  tether.” 

“ Tecum  habita,  et  noris  quam  sit  tibi  curta  supellex.” 


CAUSALITY. 


575 


But  this  one  requisite  is  fulfilled  (alas !)  by  few ; and  the  same 
philosophic  poet  has  to  lament : 

“ Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descendere — nemo  ; 

Sed  prsecedenti  spectatur  mantica  tergo  !” 

To  manifest  the  utility  of  introducing  the  principle  of  the  Con- 
ditioned into  our  metaphysical  speculations,  I shall  (always  in 
outline)  give  one  only,  hut  a signal  illustration  of  its  importance. 
— Of  all  questions  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  that  concerning 
the  origin  of  our  judgment  of  Cause  and  Effect  is,  perhaps,  the 
most  celebrated ; hut,  strange  to  say,  there  is  not,  so  far  as  I am 
aware,  to  be  found  a comprehensive  view  of  the  various  theories, 
proposed  in  explanation,  not  to  say,  among  these,  any  satisfactory 
explanation  of  the  phenomenon  itself. 

The  phenomenon  is  this  : — When  aware  of  a new  appearance, 
we  are  unable  to  conceive  that  therein  has  originated  any  new 
existence,  and  are,  therefore,  constrained  to  think,  that  what  now 
appears  to  us  under  a new  form,  had  previously  an  existence 
under  others.  These  others  (for  they  are  always  plural)  are 
called  its  cause ; and  a cause  (or  more  properly  causes)  we  can 
not  hut  suppose  ; for  a cause  is  simply  every  thing  without  which 
the  effect  would  not  result,  and  all  such  concurring,  the  effect 
can  not  but  result.  We  are  utterly  unable  to  construe  it  in 
thought  as  possible,  that  the  complement  of  existence  has  been 
either  increased  or  diminished.  We  can  not  conceive,  either,  on 
the  one  hand,  nothing  becoming  something,  or,  on  the  other,  some- 
thing becoming  nothing.  When  (rod  is  said  to  create  the  uni- 
verse out  of  nothing,  we  think  this,  by  supposing,  that  he  evolves 
the  universe  out  of  himself;  and,  in  like  manner,  we  conceive 
annihilation,  only  by  conceiving  the  creator  to  withdraw  his  crea- 
tion from  actuality  into  power. 

“ Nil  posse  creari 

De  Nihilo,  neque  quod  genitu  ’st  ad  Nil  revocari;” 

“ Gigni 

De  Nihilo  Nihil,  in  Nihilum  Nil  posse  reverti — 

— these  lines  of  Lucretius  and  Persius  enounce  a physical  axiom 
of  antiquity ; which,  when  interpreted  by  the  doctrine  of  the 
Conditioned,  is  itself  at  once  recalled  to  harmony  with  revealed 
truth,  and  expressing,  in  its  purest  form,  the  conditions  of  human 
thought,  expresses  also,  implicitly,  the  whole  intellectual  phe- 
nomenon of  causality. 

The  mind  is  thus  compelled  to  recognize  an  absolute  identity 


576 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A) 


of  existence  in  the  effect  and  in  the  complement  of  its  causes- — 
between  the  causatum  and  the  causa.  We  think  the  causes  to 
contain  all  that  is  contained  in  the  effect ; the  effect  to  contain 
nothing  but  what  is  contained  in  the  causes.  Each  is  the  sum  of 
the  other.  “ Omnia  mutantur , nihil  intent”  is  what  we  think, 
what  we  must  think  ; nor  can  the  change  itself  be  thought  with- 
out a cause.  Our  judgment  of  causality  simply  is  : — We  neces- 
sarily deny  in  thought,  that  the  object  which  we  apprehend  as 
beginning  to  he,  really  so  begins  ; hut,  on  the  contrary,  affirm,  as 
we  must,  the  identity  of  its  present  sum  of  being,  with  the  sum 
of  its  past  existence. — And  here,  it  is  not  requisite  for  us  to  know, 
under  what  form,  under  what  combination  this  quantum  previ- 
ously existed  ; in  other  words,  it  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  recog- 
nize the  particular  causes  of  this  particular  effect.  A discovery 
of  the  determinate  antecedents  into  which  a determinate  conse- 
quent may  he  refunded,  is  merely  contingent — merely  the  result 
of  experience  ; hut  the  judgment,  that  every  event  should  have 
its  causes,  is  necessary,  and  imposed  on  us,  as  a condition  of  our 
human  intelligence  itself.  This  necessity  of  so  thinking,  is  the 
only  phenomenon  to  he  explained. 

Now,  throwing  out  of  account  the  philosophers  who,  like  Dr. 
Thomas  Brown,1  quietly  eviscerate  the  problem  of  its  sole  diffi- 
culty, and  enumerating  only  the  theories  which  do  not  accom- 
modate the  phenomenon  to  he  explained  to  their  attempts  at 
explanation — these  are,  in  all,  seven. 

1°, — And,  in  the  first  place,  they  fall  into  two  supreme  classes. 
The  one  (A)  comprehends  those  theories  which  consider  the  causal 
judgment  as  adventitious , empirical,  or  a posteriori , that  is,  as 
derived  from  experience  ; the  other  (B)  comprehends  those  which 
view  it  as  native , pure,  or  a priori , that  is,  as  a condition  of  in- 
telligence itself. — The  two  primary  genera  are,  however,  severally 
subdivided  into  various  species. 

2°, — The  former  class  (A)  falls  into  two  subordinates  ; in  as 
much  as  the  judgment  is  viewed  as  founded  either  on  an  original 
(a)  or  on  a derivative  (b)  cognition. 

3°, — Each  of  these  is  finally  distributed  into  two ; according 
as  the  judgment  is  supposed  to  have  an  objective  or  a subjective 
origin.  In  the  former  case  (a)  it  is  objective,  perhaps  objectivo- 

1 The  fundamental  vice  of  Dr.  Brown’s  theory  has  been,  with  great  acuteness,  ex 
posed  by  his  successor,  Professor  Wilson.  (See  Blackwood’s  Magazine,  July  1836 
vol.  xl.  p.  122,  sq.) 


CAUSALITY. 


577 


objective  (1)  when  held  to  consist  in  an  immediate  apprehension 
of  the  efficiency  of  causes  in  the  external  and  internal  icorlds  ; 
and  subjective,  or  rather  subjectivo-objective,  (2)  when  viewed  as 
given  through  a self-consciousness  alone  of  the  efficiency  of  our 
own  volitions. — In  the  latter  case  (b)  it  is  regarded,  if  objective 

(3) ,  as  a product  of  induction  and  generalization ; if  subjective 

(4) ,  as  a result  of  association  and  custom. 

4°, — In  like  manner,  the  latter  supreme  class  (B)  is  divided 
into  two,  according  as  the  opinions  under  it,  view  in  the  causal 
judgment,  a law  of  thought : — either  ultimate , primary  (c) ; or 
secondary , derived  (d). 

5°, — It  is  a corollary  of  the  former  doctrine  (c)  (which  is  not 
subdivided),  that  the  judgment  is  a positive  act , an  affirmative 
deliverance  of  intelligence  (5). — The  latter  doctrine  (d),  on  the 
other  hand,  considers  the  judgment  as  of  a negative  character ; 
and  is  subdivided  into  two.  For  some  maintain  that  the  principle 
of  causality  may  be  resolved  into  the  principle  of  Contradiction , 
or,  more  properly,  non-contradiction  (6) ; while,  though  not  pre- 
viously attempted,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  judgment  of  caus- 
ality is  a derivation  from  the  Condition  of  Relativity  in  Time  (7). 

First  and  Second  theories. — Of  these  seven  opinions,  the  first 
has  always  been  held  in  combination  with  the  second ; whereas, 
the  second  has  been  frequently  held  by  those  who  abandon  the 
first.  Considering  them  together,  that  j*‘;  as  the  opinion,  that  we 
immediately  apprehend  the  efficiency  of  causes  external  or  inter- 
nal ; — this  is  obnoxious  to  two  fatal  objections. 

The  first  is — that  we  have  no  such  apprehension,  no  such  ex- 
perience. It  is  now,  indeed,  universally  admitted,  that  we  have 
no  perception  of  the  causal  nexus  in  the  material  world.  Hume 
it  was,  who  decided  the  opinion  of  philosophers  upon  this  point. 
But  though  he  advances  his  refutation  of  the  vulgar  doctrine  as 
original,  he  was  in  fact,  herein  only  the  last  of  a long  series  of 
metaphysicians,  some  of  whom  had  even  maintained  their  thesis 
not  less  lucidly  than  the  Scottish  skeptic.  I can  not  indeed  be- 
lieve, that  Hume  could  have  been  ignorant  of  the  anticipation. — 
But  while  surrendering  the  first,  there  are  many  philosophers 
who  still  adhere  to  the  second  opinion  ; — a theory  which  has  been 
best  stated  and  most  strenuously  supported  by  the  late  M.  Maine 
de  Biran,  one  of  the  acutest  metaphysicians  of  France.  I will 
to  move  my  arm,  and  I move  it.  When  we  analyze  this  phe- 
nomenon, says  De  Biran,  the  following  are  the  results : — 1°,  the 

Oo 


578  APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 

consciousness  of  an  act  of  will ; 2°,  the  consciousness  of  a motion 
produced ; 3°,  the  consciousness  of  a relation  of  the  motion  to 
the  volition.  And  what  is  this  relation  ? Not  one  of  simple 
succession.  The  will  is  not  for  us  an  act  without  efficiency ; it 
is  a productive  energy  ; so  that,  in  a volition,  there  is  given  to 
us  the  notion  of  cause ; and  this  notion  we  subsequently  project 
out  from  our  internal  activities  into  the  changes  of  the  external 
world. — But  the  empirical  fact,  here  asserted,  is  incorrect.  For 
between  the  overt  fact  of  corporeal  movement,  which  we  perceive, 
and  the  internal  act  of  the  will  to  move,  of  which  we  are  self- 
conscious,  there  intervenes  a series  of  intermediate  agencies,  of 
which  we  are  wholly  unaware ; consequently,  we  can  have  no 
consciousness,  as  this  hypothesis  maintains,  of  any  causal  con- 
nection between  the  extreme  links  of  this  chain,  that  is,  between 
the  volition  to  move  and  the  arm  moving.  (See  Dissertations  on 
Reid,  p.  866.) 

But  independently  of  this,  the  second  objection  is  fatal  to  the 
theory  which  would  found  the  judgment  of  causality  on  any 
empirical  apprehension  whether  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  or 
of  the  phenomena  of  matter.  Admitting  the  causal  efficiency  to 
be  cognizable,  and  perception  with  self-consciousness  to  be  com- 
petent for  its  apprehension,  still  as  these  faculties  can  inform  us 
only  of  individual  causations,  the  quality  of  necessity  and  conse- 
quent universality  by  which  this  judgment  is  characterized  re- 
mains wholly  unexplained.  (See  Cousin  on  Locke.)  So  much 
for  the  two  theories  at  the  head  of  our  enumeration. 

As  the  first  and  second  opinions  have  been  usually  associated, 
so  also  have  been  the  third  and  fourth. 

Third  theory. — In  regard  to  the  third  opinion,  it  is  manifest, 
that  the  observation  of  certain  phenomena  succeeding  certain 
other  phenomena,  and  the  generalization,  consequent  thereon, 
that  these  are  reciprocally  causes  and  effect — it  is  manifest  that 
this  could  never  of  itself  have  engendered,  not  only  the  strong, 
but  the  irresistible,  conviction,  that  every  event  must  have  its 
causes.  Bach  of  these  observations  is  contingent,  and  any  num- 
ber of  observed  contingencies  will  never  impose  upon  us  the  con- 
sciousness of  necessity,  that  is  the  consciousness  of  an  inability 
to  think  the  opposite.  This  theory  is  thus  logically  absurd.  For 
it  would  infer  as  a conclusion,  the  universal  necessity  of  the 
causal  judgment,  from  a certain  number  of  actual  consecutions  ; 
that  is,  it  would  collect  that  all  must  be,  because  some  are.  Log- 


CAUSALITY. 


579 


ically  absurd,  it  is  also  psychologically  false.  For  we  find  no 
difficulty  in  conceiving  the  converse  of  one  or  of  all  observed 
consecutions ; and  yet,  the  causal  judgment  which,  ex-hypothesi, 
is  only  the  result  of  these  observations,  we  can  not  possibly  think, 
as  possibly  unreal.  We  have  always  seen  a stone  returning  to 
the  ground  when  thrown  into  the  air ; but  we  find  no  difficulty 
in  representing  to  ourselves  some  or  all  stones  rising  from  the 
earth  ; nay,  we  can  easily  suppose  even  gravitation  itself  to  be 
reversed.  Only,  we  are  unable  to  conceive  the  possibility  of 
this  or  of  any  other  event — without  a cause. 

Fourth  opinion. — Nor  does  the  fourth  theory  afford  a better 
solution.  -The  necessity  of  so  thinking,  can  not  be  derived  from  a 
custom  of  so  thinking.  The  force  of  custom,  influential  as  it  may 
be,  is  still  always  limited  to  the  customary ; and  the  customary 
never  reaches,  never  even  approaches,  to  the  necessary.  Associa- 
tion may  explain  a strong  and  special,  but  it  can  never  explain  a 
universal  and  absolutely  irresistible  belief. — On  this  theory,  also, 
when  association  is  recent,  the  causal  judgment  should  be  weak, 
and  rise  only  gradually  into  full  force,  as  custom  becomes  invet- 
erate. But  we  do  not  find  that  this  judgment  is  feebler  in  the 
young,  stronger  in  the  old.  In  neither  case,  is  there  less  and 
more  ; in  both  cases  the  necessity  is  complete. — Mr.  Hume  patron- 
ized the  opinion,  that  the  causal  judgment  is  an  offspring  of 
experience  engendered  upon  custom.  But  those  have  a sorry  in- 
sight into  the  philosophy  of  that  great  thinker  who  suppose,  like 
Brown,  that  this  was  a dogmatic  theory  of  his  own,  or  one  con- 
sidered satisfactory  by  himself.  On  the  contrary,  in  his  hands  it 
was  a reduction  of  the  prevalent  dogmatism  to  palpable  absurdity, 
by  showing  out  the  inconsistency  of  its  results.  To  the  Lockian 
sensualism,  Hume  proposed  the  problem — to  account  for  the 
phenomenon  of  necessity  in  our  thought  of  the  causal  nexus. 
That  philosophy  afforded  no  other  principle  than  the  custom  of 
experience,  through  which  even  the  attempt  at  a solution  could 
be  made ; and  the  principle  of  custom  Hume  shows  could  never 
account  for  the  product  of  any  real  necessity.  The  alternative 
was  plain.  Either  the  doctrine  of  sensualism  is  false ; or  our 
nature  is  a delusion.  Shallow  thinkers  admitted  the  latter  alter- 
native, and  were  lost ; profound  thinkers,  on  the  contrary,  were 
determined  to  build  philosophy  on  a deeper  foundation  than  that 
of  the  superficial  edifice  of  Locke  : and  thus  it  is,  that  Hume  has, 
immediately  or  mediately,  been  the  cause  or  the  occasion  of  what- 


580  APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A). 

ever  is  of  principal  value  in  the  subsequent  speculations  of  Scot- 
land, Germany,  and  France. 

Fifth  theory. — In  regard  to  the  second  supreme  genus  (B),  the 
first  of  the  three  opinions  which  it  contains  (the  fifth  in  general), 
maintains  that  the  causal  judgment  is  a primary  datum,  a posi- 
tive revelation  of  intelligence.  To  this  are  to  be  referred  the 
relative  theories  of  Leibnitz,  Reid,  Kant,  Stewart,  Cousin,  and 
the  majority  of  recent  philosophers.  To  this  class  Brown  like- 
wise belongs  ; inasmuch  as  he  idly  refers  what  remains  in  his 
hands  of  the  evacuated  phenomenon  to  an  original  belief. 

Without  descending  to  details,  it  is  manifest  in  general,  that 
against  the  assumption  of  a special  principle,  which  this  doctrine 
makes,  there  exists  a primary  presumption  of  philosophy.  This 
is  the  law  of  parsimony  ; which  prohibits,  without  a proven  ne- 
cessity, the  multiplication  of  entities,  powers,  principles  or  causes ; 
above  all,  the  postulation  of  an  unknown  force  where  a known 
impotence  can  account  for  the  phenomenon.  We  are,  therefore, 
entitled  to  apply  “ Occam’s  razor”  to  this  theory  of  causality, 
unless  it  be  proved  impossible  to  explain  the  causal  judgment  at 
a cheaper  rate,  by  deriving  it  from  a common,  and  that  a nega- 
tive, principle.  On  a doctrine  like  the  present,  is  thrown  the 
burthen  of  vindicating  its  necessity,  by  showing  that  unless  a 
special  and  positive  principle  be  assumed,  there  exists  no  compe- 
tent mode  to  save  the  phenomenon.  The  opinion  can  therefore 
only  he  admitted  provisorily  ; and  it  falls,  of  course,  if  what  it 
would  explain  can  he  explained  on  less  onerous  conditions. 

Leaving,  therefore,  this  theory,  which  certainly  does  account 
for  the  phenomenon,  to  fall  or  stand,  according  as  either  of  the 
two  remaining  opinions  he,  or  he  not,  found  sufficient,  I go  on  to 
this  consideration. 

Sixth  opinion. — Of  these,  the  former,  that  is  the  sixth  theory, 
has  been  long  exploded.  It  attempts  to  establish  the  causal  judg- 
ment upon  the  principle  of  Contradiction.  Leibnitz  was  too  acute 
a metaphysician  to  attempt  the  resolution  of  the  principle  of  Suf- 
ficient Reason  or  Causality,  which  is  ampliative  or  synthetic,  into 
the  principle  of  Contradiction,  which  is  merely  explicative  or 
analytic.  But  his  followers  were  not  so  wise.  Wolf,  Baum- 
garten,  and  many  other  Leihnitians,  paraded  demonstrations  of 
the  law  of  Sufficient  Reason  on  the  ground  of  the  law  of  Con- 
tradiction; hut  the  reasoning  always  proceeds  on  a covert  as- 
sumption of  the  very  point  in  question.  The  same  argument  is, 


CAUSALITY. 


581 


however,  at  an  earlier  date,  to  be  found  in  Locke,  while  modifica- 
tions of  it  are  also  given  by  Hobbes  and  Samuel  Clarke.  Hume, 
who  was  only  aware  of  the  demonstration,  as  proposed  by  the 
English  metaphysicians,  honors  it  with  a refutation  which  has 
obtained  even  the  full  approval  of  Reid  ; while  by  foreign  philos- 
ophers, the  inconsequence  of  the  reduction,  at  the  hands  of  the 
Wolfian  metaphysicians,  has  frequently  been  exposed.  I may 
therefore  pass  it  in  silence. 

Seventh  opinion. — The  field  is  thus  open  for  the  last  theory, 
which  would  analyze  the  judgment  of  causality  into  a form  of  the 
mental  law  of  the  Conditioned.  This  theory,  which  has  not 
hitherto  been  proposed,  comes  recommended  by  its  cheapness  and 
simplicity.  It  postulates  no  new,  no  express,  no  positive  princi- 
ple. It  merely  supposes  that  the  mind  is  limited  ; the  law  of 
limitation — the  law  of  the  Conditioned  constituting,  in  one  of  its 
applications,  the  law  of  Causality.  The  mind  is  astricted  to  think 
in  certain  forms;  and,  under  these,  thought  is  possible  only  in 
the  conditioned  interval  between  two  unconditioned  contradictory 
extremes  or  poles,  each  of  which  is  altogether  inconceivable,  but 
of  which,  on  the  principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  the  one  or  the 
other  is  necessarily  true.  In  reference  to  the  present  question, 
it  need  only  be  recapitulated,  that  we  must  think  under  the  con- 
dition of  Existence — Existence  Relative — and  Existence  Rela- 
tive in  Time.  But  what  does  existence  relative  in  time  imply  ? 
It  implies,  1°,  that  we  are  unable  to  realize  in  thought : on  the 
one  pole  of  the  irrelative,  either  an  absolute  commencement,  or 
an  absolute  termination  of  time ; as  on  the  other,  either  an  infi- 
nite non-commencement,  or  an  infinite  non-termination  of  time. 
It  implies,  2°,  That  we  can  think,  neither,  on  the  one  pole,  an 
absolute  minimum,  nor,  on  the  other,  an  infinite  divisibility  of 
time.  Yet  these  constitute  two  pairs  of  contradictory  proposi- 
tions ; which,  if  our  intelligence  be  not  all  a lie,  can  not  both  be 
true,  while,  at  the  same  time,  either  the  one  or  the  other  neces- 
sarily must.  But,  as  not  relatives,  they  are  not  cogitables. 

Now  the  phenomenon  of  causality  seems  nothing  more  than  a 
corollary  of  the  law  of  the  conditioned,  in  its  application  to  a 
thing  thought  under  the  form  or  mental  category  of  existence 
relative  in  time.  We  can  not  know,  we  can  not  think  a thing, 
except  under  the  attribute  of  existence ; we  can  not  know  or  think 
a thing  to  exist,  except  as  in  time  ; and  we  can  not  know  or  think 
a thing  to  exist  in  time,  and  think  it  absolutely  to  commence. 


582 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 


Now  this  at  once  imposes  on  us  the  judgment  of  causality.  And 
thus : — An  object  is  given  us,  either  by  our  presentative,  or  by 
our  representative,  faculty.  As  given,  we  can  not  hut  think  it 
existent,  and  existent  in  time.  But  to  say,  that  we  can  not  hut 
think  it  to  exist,  is  to  say,  that  we  are  unable  to  think  it  non- 
existent— to  think  it  away — to  annihilate  it  in  thought.  And 
this  we  can  not  do.  We  may  turn  away  from  it;  we  may  en- 
gross our  attention  with  other  objects  ; we  may,  consequently, 
exclude  it  from  our  thought.  That  we  need  not  think  a thing  is 
certain;  hut  thinking  it,  it  is  equally  certain  that  we  can  not 
think  it  not  to  exist.  So  much  will  he  at  once  admitted  of  the 
present  ; hut  it  may  prohahly  he  denied  of  the  past  and  future. 
Yet  if  we  make  the  experiment,  we  shall  find  the  mental  annihi- 
lation of  an  object,  equally  impossible  under  time  past,  and  pres- 
ent, and  future.  To  obviate,  however,  misapprehension,  a very 
simple  observation  may  be  proper.  In  saying  that  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  annihilate  an  object  in  thought,  in  other  words,  to  conceive 
as  non-existent,  what  had  been  conceived  as  existent — it  is  of 
course  not  meant,  that  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  the  object 
wholly  changed  in  form.  We  can  represent  to  ourselves  the  ele- 
ments of  which  it  is  composed,  divided,  dissipated,  modified  in 
any  way  ; we  can  imagine  any  thing  of  it,  short  of  annihilation. 
But  the  complement,  the  quantum,  of  existence,  thought  as  con- 
stituent of  an  object — that  we  can  not  represent  to  ourselves, 
either  as  increased,  without  abstraction  from  other  entities,  or  as 
diminished,  without  annexation  to  them.  In  short,  we  are  una- 
ble to  construe  it  in  thought,  that  there  can  be  an  atom  absolute- 
ly added  to,  or  absolutely  taken  away  from,  existence  in  general. 
Let  us  make  the  experiment.  Let  us  form  to  ourselves  a concept 
of  the  universe.  Now,  we  are  unable  to  think,  that  the  quantity 
of  existence,  of  which  the  universe  is  the  conceived  sum,  can 
either  be  amplified  or  diminished.  We  are  able  to  conceive,  in- 
deed, the  creation  of  a world  ; this  indeed  as  easily  as  the  crea- 
tion of  an  atom.  But  what  is  our  thought  of  creation  ? It  is 
not  a thought  of  the  mere  springing  of  nothing  into  something. 
On  the  contrary,  creation  is  conceived,  and  is  by  us  conceivable, 
only  as  the  evolution  of  existence  from  possibility  into  actuality, 
by  the  fiat  of  the  deity.  Let  us  place  ourselves  in  imagination 
at  its  very  crisis.  Now,  can  we  construe  it  to  thought,  that  the 
moment  after  the  universe  flashed  into  material  reality,  into 
manifested  being,  that  there  was  a larger  complement  of  exist- 


CAUSALITY. 


583 


ence  in  the  universe  and  its  author  together,  than,  the  moment 
before,  there  subsisted  in  the  deity  alone  ? This  we  are  unable 
to  imagine.  And  what  is  true  of  our  concept  of  creation,  holds 
of  our  concept  of  annihilation.  We  can  think  no  real  annihilation 
— no  absolute  sinking  of  something  into  nothing.  But,  as  crea- 
tion is  cogitable  by  us,  only  as  a putting  forth  of  divine  power, 
so  is  annihilation  by  us  only  conceivable,  as  a withdrawal  of  that 
same  power.  All  that  is  now  actually  existent  in  the  universe, 
this  we  think  and  must  think,  as  having,  prior  to  creation,  vir- 
tually existed  in  the  creator  ; and  in  imagining  the  universe  to 
be  annihilated,  we  can  only  conceive  this,  as  the  retractation  by 
the  deity  of  an  overt  energy  into  latent  power. — In  short,  it  is 
impossible  for  the  human  mind  to  think  what  it  thinks  existent, 
lapsing  into  non-existence,  either  in  time  past  or  in  time  future. 

Our  inability  to  think,  what  we  have  once  conceived  existent 
in  time , as  in  time  becoming  non-existent,  corresponds  with  our 
inability  to  think,  what  we  have  conceived  existent  in  space, 
as  in  space  becoming  non-existent.  We  can  not  realize  it  to 
thought,  that  a thing  should  be  extruded,  either  from  the  one 
quantity  or  from  the  other.  Hence,  under  extension,  the  law  of 
ultimate  incompressibility ; under  protension,  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect. 

I have  hitherto  spoken  only  of  one  inconceivable  pole  of  the 
conditioned,  in  its  application  to  existence  in  time,  of  the  abso- 
lute extreme,  as  absolute  commencement  and  absolute  termina- 
tion. The  counter  or  infinite  extreme,  as  infinite  regress  or  non- 
commencement, and  infinite  progress,  or  non-termination,  is 
equally  unthinkable.  With  this  latter  we  have,  however,  at 
present  nothing  to  do.  Indeed,  as  not  obtrusive,  the  Infinite  fig- 
ures far  less  in  the  theatre  of  mind,  and  exerts  a far  inferior  in- 
fluence in  the  modification  of  thought,  than  the  Absolute.  It  is, 
in  fact,  both  distant  and  delitescent ; and  in  place  of  meeting  us 
at  every  turn,  it  requires  some  exertion  on  our  part  to  seek  it 
out.  It  is  the  former  and  more  obtrusive  extreme — it  is  the  Ab- 
solute alone  which  constitutes  and  explains  the  mental  manifest- 
ation of  the  causal  judgment.  An  object  is  presented  to  our  ob- 
servation which  has  phenomenally  begun  to  be.  But  we  can  not 
construe  it  to  thought,  that  the  object,  that  is,  this  determinate 
complement  of  existence , had  really  no  being  at  any  past  moment; 
because,  in  that  case,  once  thinking  it  as  existent,  we  should 
again  think  it  as  non-existent,  which  is  for  us  impossible.  What 


584  APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 

then  can  we — must  we  do  ? That  the  phenomenon  presented  to 
us,  did,  as  a ’phenomenon , begin  to  be — this  we  know  by  expe- 
rience ; but  that  the  elements  of  its  existence  only  began,  when 
the  phenomenon  which  they  constitute  came  into  manifested 
being — this  we  are  wholly  unable  to  think.  In  these  circum- 
stances how  do  we  proceed  ? There  is  for  us  only  one  possible 
way.  We  are  compelled  to  believe,  that  the  object  (that  is  the 
certain  quale  and  quantum  of  being),  whose  phenomenal  rise  into 
existence  we  have  witnessed,  did  really  exist,  prior  to  this  rise, 
under  other  forms.  But  to  say,  that  a thing  previously  existed 
under  different  forms,  is  only  to  say,  in  other  words,  that  a thing 
had  causes.  (It  would  be  here  out  of  place  to  refute  the  error 
of  philosophers,  in  supposing  that  any  thing  can  have  a single 
cause  ; — meaning  always  by  a cause  that  without  which  the 
effect  would  not  have  been.  I speak  of  course  only  of  second 
causes,  for  of  the  divine  causation  we  can  form  no  conception). 

I must,  however,  now  cursorily  observe,  that  nothing  can  be 
more  erroneous  in  itself,  or  in  its  consequences  more  fertile  in 
delusion,  than  the  common  doctrine,  that  the  causal  judgment  is 
elicited,  only  when  we  apprehend  objects  in  conseoution,  and  uni- 
form consecution.  No  doubt,  the  observation  of  such  succession 
prompts  and  enables  us  to  assign  particular  causes  to  particular 
effects.  But  this  assignation  ought  to  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  judgment  of  causality,  absolutely.  This  consists,  not 
in  the  empirical  and  contingent  attribution  of  this  phenomenon, 
as  cause,  to  that  phenomenon,  as  effect ; but  in  the  universal 
necessity  of  which  we  are  conscious,  to  think  causes  for  every 
event,  whether  that  event  stand  isolated  by  itself,  and  be  by  us 
referrible  to  no  other,  or  whether  it  be  one  in  a series  of  succes- 
sive phenomena,  which,  as  it  were,  spontaneously  arrange  them- 
selves under  the  relation  of  effect  and  cause.  On  this,  not  sunk- 
en, rock,  Dr.  Brown  and  others  have  been  shipwrecked. 

The  preceding  doctrine  of  causality  seems  to  me  the  one  pref- 
erable, for  the  following  among  other  reasons. 

In  the  first  place,  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of  the  causal 
judgment,  it  postulates  no  new,  no  extraordinary,  no  express 
principle.  It  does  not  even  proceed  on  the  assumption  of  a posi- 
tive power  ; for  while  it  shows,  that  the  phenomenon  in  question 
is  only  one  of  a class,  it  assigns,  as  their  common  cause,  only  a 
negative  impotence.  In  this  respect  it  stands  advantageously 
contrasted  with  the  only  other  theory  which  saves  the  pheno- 


CAUSALITY. 


585 


menon,  but  which  saves  it,  only  on  the  hypothesis  of  a special 
principle,  expressly  devised  to  account  for  this  phenomenon 
alone.  But  nature  never  works  by  more,  and  more  complex, 
instruments  than  are  necessary — yyhev  7reptTT<y? : and  to  excogi- 
tate a particular  force , to  perform  what  can  be  better  explained 
on  the  ground  of  a general  imbecility , is  contrary  to  every  rule 
of  philosophizing. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  if  there  be  postulated  an  express  and 
positive  affirmation  of  intelligence,  to  account  for  the  mental  de- 
liverance— that  existence  can  not  absolutely  commence ; we  must 
equally  postulate  a counter  affirmation  of  intelligence,  positive 
and  express,  to  explain  the  counter  mental  deliverance — that 
existence  can  not  infinitely  not  commence.  The  one  necessity 
of  mind  is  equally  strong  as  the  other  ; and,  if  the  one  be  a posi- 
tive datum,  an  express  testimony  of  intelligence,  so  likewise  must 
be  the  other.  But  they  are  contradictories  ; and,  as  contradict- 
ories, they  can  not  both  be  true.  On  this  theory,  therefore,  the 
root  of  our  nature  is  a lie.  By  the  doctrine,  on  the  contrary, 
which  I propose,  these  contradictory  phenomena  are  carried  up 
into  the  common  principle  of  a limitation  of  our  faculties.  In- 
telligence is  shown  to  be  feeble,  but  not  false  ; our  nature  is, 
thus,  not  a lie,  nor  the  author  of  our  nature  a deceiver. 

In  the  third  place,  this  simpler  and  easier  doctrine,  avoids  a 
most  serious  inconvenience  which  attaches  to  the  more  difficult 
and  complex.  It  is  this.  To  suppose  a positive  and  special  prin- 
ciple of  causality,  is  to  suppose  that  there  is  expressly  revealed 
to  us,  through  intelligence,  an  affirmation  of  the  fact,  that  there 
exists  no  free  causation ; that  is,  that  there  is  no  cause  which  is 
not  itself  merely  an  effect,  existence  being  only  a series  of  deter- 
mined antecedents  and  determined  consequents.  But  this  is  an 
assertion  of  Fatalism.  Such,  however,  many  of  the  partisans  of 
that  doctrine  will  not  admit.  An  affirmation  of  absolute  neces- 
sity is,  they  are  aware,  virtually  the  negation  of  a moral  universe, 
consequently  of  the  moral  governor  of  a moral  universe.  But 
this  is  Atheism.  Fatalism  and  Atheism  are,  indeed,  convertible 
terms.  The  only  valid  arguments  for  the  existence  of  a God,  and 
for  the  immortality  of  the  human  soul,  rest  on  the  ground  of  man’s 
moral  nature  ; consequently,  if  that  moral  nature  be  annihilated, 
which  in  any  scheme  of  thoroughgoing  necessity  it  is,  every  con- 
clusion, established  on  such  a nature,  is  annihilated  likewise. 
Aware  of  this,  some  of  those  who  make  the  judgment  of  causality 


586 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 


a positive  dictate  of  intelligence,  find  themselves  compelled,  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  consequences  of  their  doctrine,  to  deny 
that  this  dictate,  though  universal  in  its  deliverance,  should  he 
allowed  to  hold  universally  true  ; and  accordingly,  they  would 
exempt  from  it  the  facts  of  volition.  Will,  they  hold  to  he  a free 
cause,  a cause  which  is  not  an  effect ; in  other  words,  they  attri- 
bute to  it  the  power  of  absolute  origination.  But  here  their  own 
principle  of  causality  is  too  strong  for  them.  They  say,  that  it 
is  unconditionally  promulgated,  as  an  express  and  positive  law 
of  intelligence,  that  every  origination  is  an  apparent  only,  not  a 
real,  commencement.  Now  to  exempt  certain  phenomena  from 
this  universal  law,  on  the  ground  of  our  moral  consciousness,  can 
not  validly  he  done. — For,  in  the  first  place,  this  would  be  an 
admission,  that  the  mind  is  a complement  of  contradictory  revela- 
tions. If  mendacity  be  admitted  of  some  of  our  mental  dictates, 
we  can  not  vindicate  veracity  to  any.  If  one  be  delusive,  so  may 
all-  “ Falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus.”  Absolute  skepticism 
is  here  the  legitimate  conclusion. — But,  in  the  second  place,  wav- 
ing this  conclusion,  what  right  have  we,  on  this  doctrine,  to  sub- 
ordinate the  positive  affirmation  of  causality  to  our  consciousness 
of  moral  liberty — what  right  have  we,  for  the  interest  of  the  lat- 
ter, to  derogate  from  the  former?  We  have  none.  If  both  be 
equally  positive,  we  are  not  entitled  to  sacrifice  the  alternative, 
which  our  wishes  prompt  us  to  abandon. 

But  the  doctrine  which  I propose  is  not  obnoxious  to  these  ob- 
jections. It  does  not  maintain,  that  the  judgment  of  causality 
is  dependent  on  a povjer  of  the  mind,  imposing,  as  necessary  in 
thought,  what  is  necessary  in  the  universe  of  existence.  On  the 
contrary,  it  resolves  this  judgment  into  a mere  mental  impotence 
— an  impotence  to  conceive  either  of  two  contradictories.  And 
as  the  one  or  the  other  of  contradictories  must  be  true,  while 
both  can  not ; it  proves,  that  there  is  no  ground  for  inferring  a 
certain  fact  to  be  impossible,  merely  from  our  inability  to  conceive 
it  possible.  At  the  same  time,  if  the  causal  judgment  be  not  an 
express  affirmation  of  mind,  but  only  an  incapacity  of  thinking 
the  opposite ; it  follows,  that  such  a negative  judgment  can  not 
counterbalance  the  express  affirmative,  the  unconditional  testi- 
mony, of  consciousness — that  we  are,  though  we  know  not  how, 
the  true  and  responsible  authors  of  our  actions,  nor  merely  the 
worthless  links  in  an  adamantine  series  of  effects  and  causes.  It 
appears  to  me,  that  it  is  only  on  such  a doctrine,  that  we  can 


CAUSALITY. 


587 


philosophically  vindicate  the  liberty  of  the  human  will — that  we 
can  rationally  assert  to  man — “ fatis  avolsa  voluntas.”  How  the 
will  can  possibly  be  free,  must  remain  to  us,  under  the  present 
limitation  of  our  faculties,  wholly  incomprehensible.  We  are 
unable  to  conceive  an  absolute  commencement ; we  can  not, 
therefore,  conceive  a free  volition.  A determination  by  motives 
can  not,  to  our  understanding,  escape  from  necessitation.  Nay, 
were  we  even  to  admit  as  true,  what  we  can  not  think  as  possi- 
ble, still  the  doctrine  of  a motiveless  volition  would  be  only 
casualism;  and  the  free  acts  of  an  indifferent,  are,  morally  and 
rationally,  as  worthless  as  the  pre-ordered  passions  of  a determ- 
ined, will.  How , therefore,  I repeat,  moral  liberty  is  possible 
in  man  or  God,  we  are  utterly  unable  speculatively  to  understand. 
But  practically,  the  fact , that  we  are  free,  is  given  to  us  in  the 
consciousness  of  an  uncompromising  law  of  duty,  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  our  moral  accountability ; and  this  fact  of  liberty 
can  not  be  redargued  on  the  ground  that  it  is  incomprehensible, 
for  the  philosophy  of  the  conditioned  proves,  against  the  necessi 
tarian,  that  things  there  are,  which  may , nay  must  be  true,  of 
which  the  understanding  is  wholly  unable  to  construe  to  itself 
the  possibility. 

But  this  philosophy  is  not  only  competent  to  defend  the  fact 
of  our  moral  liberty,  possible  though  inconceivable,  against  the 
assault  of  the  fatalist ; it  retorts  against  himself  the  very  objec- 
tion of  incomprehensibility  by  which  the  fatalist  had  thought  to 
triumph  over  the  libertarian.  It  shows,  that  the  scheme  of  free- 
dom is  not  more  inconceivable  than  the  scheme  of  necessity.  For 
while  fatalism  is  a recoil  from  the  more  obtrusive  inconceivability 
of  an  absolute  commencement,  on  the  fact  of  which  commence- 
ment the  doctrine  of  liberty  proceeds  ; the  fatalist  is  shown  to 
overlook  the  equal,  but  less  obtrusive,  inconceivability  of  an  in- 
finite non-commencement,  on  the  assertion  of  which  non-com- 
mencement his  own  doctrine  of  necessity  must  ultimately  rest. 
As  equally  unthinkable,  the  two  counter,  the  two  one-sided, 
schemes  are  thus  theoretically  balanced.  But  practically,  our 
consciousness  of  the  moral  law,  which,  without  a moral  liberty 
in  man,  would  be  a mendacious  imperative,  gives  a decisive  pre- 
ponderance to  the  doctrine  of  freedom  over  the  doctrine  of  fate 
We  are  free  in  act,  if  we  are  accountable  for  our  actions. 

Such  (cjicovavTa  avverola-Lv)  are  the  hints  of  an  undeveloped 
philosophy,  which,  I am  confident,  is  founded  upon  truth.  To 


588  APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 

this  confidence  I have  come,  not  merely  through  the  convictions 
of  my  own  consciousness,  but  by  finding  in  this  system  a centre 
and  conciliation  for  the  most  opposite  of  philosophical  opinions. 
Above  all,  however,  I am  confirmed  in  my  belief,  by  the  harmony 
between  the  doctrines  of  this  philosophy,  and  those  of  revealed 
truth.  “ Credo  equidem,  nec  vana  fides.”  The  philosophy  of  the 
Conditioned  is  indeed  pre-eminently  a discipline  of  humility ; a 
“ learned  ignorance,”  directly  opposed  to  the  false  “ knowledge 
which  pufFeth  up.”  I may  indeed  say  with  St.  Chrysostom : — 
“ The  foundation  of  our  philosophy  is  humility.” — (Homil.  de 
Perf.  Evang.)  For  it  is  professedly  a scientific  demonstration  of 
the  impossibility  of  that  “ wisdom  in  high  matters”  which  the 
Apostle  prohibits  us  even  to  attempt ; and  it  proposes,  from  the 
limitation  of  the  human  powers,  from  our  impotence  to  compre- 
hend what,  however,  we  must  admit,  to  show  articulately  why 
the  “ secret  things  of  God”  can  not  but  be  to  man  “ past  finding 
out.”  Humility  thus  becomes  the  cardinal  virtue,  not  only  of 
revelation  but  of  reason.  This  scheme  proves  moreover,  that  no 
difficulty  emerges  in  theology,  which  had  not  previously  emerged 
in  philosophy ; that,  in  fact,  if  the  divine  do  not  transcend  what 
it  has  pleased  the  Deity  to  reveal,  and  willfully  identify  the  doc- 
trine of  God’s  word  with  some  arrogant  extreme  of  human  specu- 
lation, philosophy  will  be  found  the  most  useful  auxiliary  of 
theology.  For  a word  of  false,  and  pestilent,  and  presumptuous 
reasoning,  by  which  philosophy  and  theology  are  now  equalty 
discredited,  would  be  at  once  abolished,  in  the  recognition  of  this 
rule  of  prudent  nescience  ; nor  could  it  longer  he  too  justly  said 
of  the  code  of  consciousness,  as  by  reformed  divines  it  has  been 
acknowledged  of  the  Bible  : 

“ This  is  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  seeks  ; 

And  this  the  book,  where  each  his  dogma  finds.” 

Specially ; in  its  doctrine  of  causality  this  philosophy  brings  us 
back  from  the  aberrations  of  modern  theology,  to  the  truth  and 
simplicity  of  the  more  ancient  church.  It  is  here  shown  to  be  as 
irrational  as  irreligious,  on  the  ground  of  human  understanding, 
to  deny,  either,  on  the  one  hand,  the  foreknowledge,  predestina- 
tion, and  free  grace  of  Gfod,  or,  on  the  other,  the  free  will  of  man  ; 
that  we  should  believe  both,  and  both  in  unison,  though  unable 
to  comprehend  either  even  apart.  This  philosophy  proclaims  with 
St.  Augustin,  and  Augustin  in  his  maturest  writings  : — “ If  there 
be  not  free  grace  in  God,  how  can  He  save  the  world  ? and  if 


CAUSALITY. 


589 


there  he  not  free  will  in  man,  how  can  the  world  hy  God  he 
judged?”  (Ad  Valentinum,  Epist.  214.)  Or,  as  the  same  doc- 
trine is  perhaps  expressed  even  better  hy  St.  Bernard : — “ Abolish 
free  will,  and  there  is  nothing  to  he  saved ; abolish  free  grace, 
and  there  is  nothing  wherewithal  to  save.”  (De  Gratia  et  Libero 
Arbitrio.  c.  i.)  St.  Austin  repeatedly  declares,  the  conciliation 
of  the  foreknowledge,  predestination,  and  free  grace  of  God  with 
the  free  will  of  man,  to  be  “ a most  difficult  question,  intelligible 
only  to  a few.”  Had  he  denounced  it  as  a fruitless  question,  and 
(to  understanding)  soluble  by  none,  the  world  might  have  been 
spared  a large  library  of  acrimonious  and  resultless  disputation. 
This  conciliation  is  of  the  things  to  be  believed,  not  understood. 
The  futile  attempts  to  harmonize  these  antilogies,  by  human 
reasoning  to  human  understanding,  have  originated  conflictive 
systems  of  theology,  divided  the  Church,  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
dishonored  religion.  It  must,  however,  be  admitted,  that  confes- 
sions of  the  total  inability  of  man  to  conceive  the  union,  of  what 
he  should  believe  united,  are  to  be  found  ; and  they  are  found, 
not,  perhaps,  less  frequently,  and  certainly  in  more  explicit  terms 
among  Catholic  than  among  Protestant  theologians. 

Of  the  former,  I shall  adduce  only  one  testimony,  by  a prince 
of  the  Church ; and  it  is  the  conclusion  of  what,  though  wholly 
overlooked,  appears  to  me  as  the  ablest  and  truest  criticism  of  the 
many  fruitless,  if  not  futile,  attempts  at  conciliating  “ the  ways 
of  God”  to  the  understanding  of  man,  in  the  great  articles  of 
divine  foreknowledge  and  predestination  (which  are  both  embar- 
rassed by  the  self  same  difficulties),  and  human  free  will.  It  is 
the  testimony  of  Cardinal  Cajetan , and  from  his  commentary  on 
the  Summa  Theologise  of  Aquinas.  The  criticism  itself  I may 
take  another  opportunity  of  illustrating. 

“ Thus  elevating  our  mental  eye  to  a loftier  range,  [we  may  suppose 
that]  God,  from  an  excellence  supernally  transcending  human  thought,  so 
foresees  events  and  things,  that  from  his  providence  something  higher  fol- 
lows than  evitability  or  inevitability,  and  that  his  passive  prevision  of  the 
event  does  not  determine  the  alternative  of  either  combination.  And  can 
we  do  so,  the  intellect  is  quieted  ; not  by  the  evidence  of  the  truth  known, 
but  by  the  inaccessible  heighth  of  the  truth  concealed.  And  this  to  my 
poor  intellect  seems  satisfactory  enough,  both  for  the  reason  above  stated, 
and  because,  as  Saint  Gregory  expresses  it,  ‘ The  man  has  a low  opinion 
of  God,  who  believes  of  Him  only  so  much  as  can  be  measured  by  human 
understanding.’  Not  that  we  should  deny  aught,  that  we  have  by  knowl- 
edge or  by  faith  of  the  immutability,  actuality,  certainty,  universality,  and 
similar  attributes  of  God  ; but  I suspect  that  there  is  something  here  lying 


590 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (A.) 

hid,  either  as  regards  the  relation  between  the  Deity  and  event  foreseen, 
or  as  regards  the  connection  between  the  event  itself  and  its  prevision. 
Thus,  reflecting  that  the  intelligence  of  man  [in  such  matters],  is  as  the 
eye  of  the  owl  [in  the  blaze  of  day  (he  refers  to  Aristotle),]  I find  its 
repose  in  ignorance  alone.  For  it  is  more  consistent,  both  with  Catholic 
faith  and  with  philosophy,  to  confess  our  blindness,  than  to  assert,  as  things 
evident,  what  afford  no  tranquillity  to  the  intellect ; for  evidence  is  tran- 
quillizing. Not  that  1 would,  therefore,  accuse  all  the  doctors  of  presump- 
tion ; because,  stammering,  as  they  could,  they  have  all  intended  to  in- 
sinuate, with  God’s  immutability,  the  supreme  and  eternal  efficiency  of  His 
intellect,  and  will,  and  power — through  the  infallible  relation  between  the 
Divine  election  and  whatever  comes  to  pass.  Nothing  of  all  this  is  opposed 
to  the  foresaid  suspicion — that  something  too  deep  for  us  lies  hid  herein. 
And  assuredly,  if  it  were  thus  promulgated,  no  Christian  would  err  in  the 
matter  of  Predestination,  as  no  one  errs  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  j1 
because  of  the  Trinity  the  truth  is  declared  orally  and  in  writing — that 
this  is  a mystery  concealed  from  human  intellect,  and  to  which  faith  alone 
is  competent.  Indeed,  the  best  and  most  wholesome  counsel  in  this  matter 
is  : — To  begin  with  those  things  which  we  certainly  know,  and  have  ex- 
perience of  in  ourselves  ; to  wit,  that  all  proceeding  from  our  free  will  may 
or  may  not  be  performed  by  us,  and  therefore  are  we  amenable  to  pun- 
ishment or  reward ; but  how,  this  being  saved,  there  shall  be  saved  the 
providence,  predestination,  &c.,  of  God — to  believe  what  holy  mother 
Church  believes.  P’or  it  is  written,  1 Altiora  te  ne  qusesieris’  (‘  Be  not  wise 
in  things  above  thee’);  there  being  many  things  revealed  to  man,  above 
thy  human  comprehension.  And  this  is  one  of  those.”  (Pars  I.  qu.  xxii., 
art.  4.) 

Averments  to  a similar  effect,  might  he  adduced  from  the  writ- 
ings of  Calvin;  and,  certainly,  nothing  can  he  conceived  more 
contrary  to  the  doctrine  of  that  great  divine,  than  what  has  lat- 
terly been  promulgated  as  Calvinism  (and,  in  so  far  as  I know, 
without  reclamation),  in  our  Calvinistic  Church  of  Scotland.  For 
it  has  been  here  promulgated,  as  the  dogma  of  this  Church,  by 
pious  and  distinguished  theologians,  that  man  has  no  will,  agency, 
moral  personality  of  his  own,  (rod  being  the  only  real  agent  in 
every  apparent  act  of  his  creatures ; in  short  (though  quite  the 
opposite  was  intended),  that  the  theological  scheme  of  the  absolute 
decrees  implies  fatalism,  pantheism,  the  negation  of  a moral  gov- 
ernor, and  of  a moral  world.  For  the  premises,  arbitrarily  as- 
sumed, are  atheistic ; the  conclusion,  illogically  drawn,  is  Chris- 
tian. Against  such  a view  of  Calvin’s  doctrine,  I for  one  most 
humbly  though  solemnly  protest,  as  not  only  false  in  philosophy, 
but  heterodox  and  ignorant  in  theology. 

1 This  was  written  before  1507  ; consequently  long  before  Servetus  and  Campanus 
had  introduced  their  Unitarian  heresies. 


LEARNED  IGNORANCE. 


591 


(B.)  PHILOSOPHICAL  TESTIMONIES 
TO  THE  LIMITATION  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE,  FROM 
THE  LIMITATION  OF  OUR  FACULTIES. 

These,  which  might  be  indefinitely  multiplied,  I shall  arrange 
under  three  heads.  I omit  the  Skeptics,  adducing  only  specimens 
from  the  others- 

I.  Testimonies  to  the  general  fact , that  the  highest  knowledge 
is  a consciousness  of  ignorance. 

There  are  two  sorts  of  ignorance : we  philosophize  to  escape 
ignorance,  and  the  consummation  of  our  philosophy  is  ignorance ; 
we  start  from  the  one,  we  repose  in  the  other  ; they  are  the  goals 
from  which,  and  to  which,  we  tend : and  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
is  hut  a course  between  two  ignorances,  as  human  life  is  itself 
only  a traveling  from  grave  to  grave. 

“’Ttr  /3 los  r — Ek  TvpfSoio  dopcov,  ctt'i  Tvp.(3ov  odev co.” 

The  highest  reach  of  human  science  is  the  scientific  recognition 
of  human  ignorance  ; “ Q,ui  nescit  ignorare,  ignorat  scire.”  This 
“ learned  ignorance”  is  the  rational  conviction  by  the  human 
mind  of  its  inability  to  transcend  certain  limits  ; it  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  ourselves — the  science  of  man.  This  is  accomplished  by 
a demonstration  of  the  disproportion  between  what  is  to  be  known, 
and  our  faculties  of  knowing — -the  disproportion,  to  wit,  between 
the  infinite  and  the  finite.  In  fact,  the  recognition  of  human 
ignorance,  is  not  only  the  one  highest,  but  the  one  true,  knowl- 
edge ; and  its  first  fruit,  as  has  been  said,  is  humility.  Simple 
nescience  is  not  proud  ; consummated  science  is  positively  humble 
For  this  knowledge  it  is  not,  which  “puffeth  up  but  its  oppo 
site,  the  conceit  of  false  knowledge — the  conceit,  in  truth,  as  the 
Apostle  notices,  of  an  ignorance  of  the  very  nature  of  knowledge  • 

“ Nam  nesciens  quid  scire  sit, 

Te  scire  cuncta  jactitas.” 

But  as  our  knowledge  stands  to  Ignorance,  so  stands  it  also  to 
Doubt.  Doubt  is  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  our  efforts  to 
know;  for  as  it  is  true — “ Alte  dubitat  qui  altius  credit,”  so  it  is 
likewise  true — “ Q,uo  magis  quaerimus  magis  dubitamus.” 

The  grand  result  of  human  wisdom  is  thus  only  a conscious- 
ness that  what  we  know  is  as  nothing  to  what  we  know  not 


592 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (B.) 

(“  Quantum  est  quod  nescimus  !”) — an  articulate  confession,  in 
fact,  by  our  natural  reason,  of  the  truth  declared  in  revelation — 
that  “ now  we  see  through  a glass,  darkly.” 

1.  — Democritus  (as  reported  by  Aristotle,  Cicero,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
&c.)  : — “ We  know  nothing  in  its  cause  [or  on  a conjectural  reading — in 
truth]  ; for  truth  lies  hid  from  us  in  depth  and  distance.” 

2.  — Socrates  (as  we  learn  from  Plato,  Xenophon,  Cicero,  &c.),  was 
declared  by  the  Delphic  oracle  the  wisest  of  the  Greeks ; and  why  ? 
Because  he  taught — that  all  human  knowledge  is  but  a qualified  ignorance. 

3.  — Aristotle.  (Metaphysica,  L.  ii.  c.  1). — “A  theory  of  Truth,  is  partly 
easy,  partly  difficult.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact — that  no  one  has  been 
wholly  successful,  and  no  one  wholly  unsuccessful,  in  its  acquisition  ; but, 
while  each  has  had  some  report  to  make  concerning  nature,  though  the 
contributions,  severally  considered,  are  of  little  or  no  avail,  the  whole  toge- 
ther make  up  a considerable  amount.  And  if  so  it  be,  we  may  apply  the 
proverb — ‘ Who  can  miss  the  gate  ?’  In  this  respect,  a theory  of  Truth 
is  easy. — But  our  inability  to  compass  some  Whole  and  Part  [or,  to  c.  both 
W.  and  P.]  may  evince  the  difficulty  of  the  inquiry  ; (To  d’  okov  tl  (oi't’) 
e%£in  k ai  pepoq  pi]  dvvaodai,  dqhoi  to  xahenov  avr-qq). — As  difficulty, 
however,  arises  in  two  ways  ; [in  this  case]  its  cause  may  lie,  not  in  things 
[as  the  objects  known],  but  in  us  [as  the  subjects  knowing].  For  as  the 
eye  of  the  bat  holds  to  the  light  of  day,  so  the  intellect  [ vovq , which  is,  as 
it  were  (Eth.  Nic.  i.  7)  the  eye]  of  our  soul,  holds  to  what  in  nature  are 
of  all  most  manifest.”1 

4.  — Pliny.  (Historia  Naturalis,  L ii.  c.  32.) — “ Omnia  incerta  ratione, 
et  in  naturae  maj estate  abdita.” 

5.  — Tertullian.  (AdversusHaereticos,  N.  iv.) — “ Cedatcuriositasfidei, 
cedat  gloria  saluti.  Certe,  aut  non  obstrepant,  aut  quiescant  adversus 
regulam — Niliil  scire  omnia  scire  est." — (De  Anima,  c.  1.) — “ Q,uis  reve- 
labit  quod  Deus  texit  ? Unde  scitandum  ? Guare  ignorare  tutissimum 
est.  Praestat  enim  per  Deuin  nescire  quia  non  revelaverit,  quam  per  ho- 
minem  scire  quia  ipse  praesumpserit.” 


1 In  now  translating  this  passage  for  a more  general  purpose,  I am  strongly  im- 
pressed with  the  opinion,  that  Aristotle  had  in  view  the  special  doctrine  of  the  Con- 
ditioned. For  it  is  not  easy  to  see  what  he  could  mean  by  saying,  that  “ we  are  un- 
able to  have  [compass,  realize  the  notions  of]  Whole  and  Part,”  or  of  “ some  Whole 
and  Part  except  to  say,  that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  (of  space,  or  time,  or  degree) 
a whole,  however  large,  which  is  not  conceivable  as  the  part  of  a still  greater  whole, 
or  a part,  however  small,  which  we  may  not  always  conceive  as  a whole,  divisible 
into  parts.  But  this  would  be  implicitly  the  enouncement  of  a full  doctrine  of  the 
Conditioned.  Be  this  however  as  it  may,  Aristotle’s  commentators  have  been  wholly 
unable  to  reach,  even  by  a probable  conjecture,  his  meaning  in  the  text.  Alexander 
gives  six  or  seven  possible  interpretations,  but  all  nothing  to  the  point ; while  the 
other  expositors  whom  I have  had  patience  to  look  into  (as  Averroes,  Javellus,  Fon- 
seca, Suarez.  Sonerus),  either  avoid  the  sentence  altogether,  or  show  that  they,  and 
the  authorities  whom  they  quote,  had  no  glimpse  of  a satisfactory  interpretation.  I 
have  been  unable  to  find  (on  a hurried  search)  in  the  able  and  truly  learned  “ Essay 
on  the  Metaphysics  of  Aristotle”  by  M.  Ravaisson,  a consideration  of  the  passage. 


LEARNED  IGNORANCE. 


593 


6.  — Arnobius.  (Contra  G-entes,  L.  ii.) — “ duse  nequeunt  sciri,  nescire 
nos  confiteamur  ; neque  ea  vestigare  curemus,  quse  non  posse  comprehendi 
liquidissimum  est.” 

7.  — St.  Augustin.  (Sermo  xxvii.  Benedictine  Edition,  vol.  v.) — 

“ duasris  tu  rationem,  ego  expavesco  altitudinem.  (‘  0 altitudo  divitia- 
l'um  sapientise  et  scientiae  Dei  !’)  Tu  ratiocinate,  ego  mirer ; tu  disputa, 
ego  credam  ; altitudinem  video,  ad  profundum  non  pervenio.  - - - - 

Ille  dicit,  1 Inscrutabilia  sunt  judicia  ejus  et  tu  scrutari  venisti  ? Ille 
dicit — 1 Ininvestigabiles  sunt  vise  ejus  et  tu  investigare  venisti  ? Si 
inscrutabilia  scrutari  venisti,  et  ininvestigabilia  investigare  venisti ; crede 
jam  peristi.” — (Sermo  xciii.) — “ duid  inter  nos  agebatur  ? Tu  dicebas, 
Intelligam,  ut  credam;  ego  dicebam,  Ut  intelligas,  crede.  Nata  est 
controversia,  veniamus  ad  judicem,  judicet  Propheta,  immo  vero  Deus 
judicet  per  Prophetam.  Ambo  taceamus.  duid  ambo  dixerimus,  audi- 
tum  est.  Intelligam,  inquis,  ut  credam  ; Crede,  inquam,  ut  intelligas. 
Respondeat  Propheta  : 1 Nisi  credideritis,  non  intelligetis.’  ” [Isaiah  vii. 
9,  according  to  the  Seventy.] — (Sermo  cxvii.) — “ De  Deo  loquimur,  quid 
mirum,  si  non  comprehendis  ?.  Si  enim  comprehendis,  non  est  Deus. 
Sit  pia  confessio  ignorantice  magis  quam  temeraria  professio  scientice. 
Adtingere  ali quantum  mente  Deum,  magna  beatitudo  est ; comprehendere 
autem , omnino  impossible.’ n — (Sermo  clxv.) — “ Ideo  multi  de  isto  pro- 
fundo  quserentes  reddere  rationem,  in  fabulas  vanitatis  abierunt.”  [Com- 
pare Sermo  cxxvi.  c.  i.] — (Sermo  cccii.) — “ Confessio  ignorantise,  gradus 
est  scientice.” — (Epistola  cxc.  vol.  ii.) — “ duee  nullo  sensu  carnis  explo- 
rari  possunt,  et  a nostra  experientia  longe  remota  sunt,  atque  in  abditissi- 
mis  naturae  finibus  latent,  non  erubescendum  est  homini  confiteri  se  nescire 
quod  nescit,  ne  dum  se  scire  mentitur,  nunquam  scire  mereatur.” — (Epis- 
tola cxcvii.) — “ Magis  eligo  cautam  ignorantiam  confiteri,  quam  falsam 
scientiam  profiteri.” 

8.  — St.  Chrysostom. — “ Nothing  is  wiser  than  ignorance  in  those  mat- 
ters, where  they  who  proclaim  that  they  know  nothing,  proclaim  their  para- 
mount wisdom  ; while  those  who  busy  themselves  therein,  are  the  most 
senseless  of  mankind.” 

9.  — Theodoret.  (Therapeutica,  &c.,  Curative  of  Greek  Affections, 
Sermon  1.) — “ The  beginning  of  science  is  the  science  of  nescience or 
— “ The  principle  of  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  ignorance.” 

10.  — St.  Peter  Chrysologue.  (Sermo  li.) — “Nolle  omnia  scire, 
summa  scientise  est.” 

11.  — “The  Arabian  Sage”  (I  translate  this  and  the  two  following 
from  Drusius  and  Gale)  : — “ A man  is  wise  while  in  pursuit  of  wisdom ; 
a fool,  when  he  thinks  it  to  be  mastered.” 

12.  — A Rabbi  : — “ The  wiser  a man,  the  more  ignorant  does  he  feel ; 
as  the  Preacher  has  it  [i.  18] — ‘ To  add  science  is  to  add  sorrow.’  ” 


1 A century  before  Augustin,  St.  Cyprian  had  said  : — “We  can  only  justly  conceive 
God  in  recognizing  Him  to  be  inconceivable.”  I can  not,  however,  at  the  moment, 
"efer  to  the  passage  except  from  memory. 

P P 


594 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (B.) 


13.  — A Rabbi  : — “ Who  knows  nothing,  and  thinks  that  he  knows 
something,  his  ignorance  is  twofold.”1 

14.  — Petrarch.  (De  Contemptu  Mundi,  Dial,  ii.) — “ Excute  pectus 
tuum  acriter  ; invenies  cuncta  qute  nosti,  si  ad  ignorata  referantur,  earn 
proportionem  obtinere,  quam,  collatus  oceano,  rivulus  aestivis  siccandus 
ardoribus  : quamquam  vel  multa  nosse,  quid  revelat  ?” 

15- — Cardinal  De  Cusa.  (Opera  ed.  1565;  De  Docta  Ignorantia,  L. 
i.  c.  3,  p.  3.) — “ Gfuidditas  ergo  rerum,  quae  est  entium  veritas,  in  sua 
puritate  inattingibilis  est ; et  per  omnes  Philosopbos  investigata,  sed  per 
neminem,  uti  est,  reperta ; et  quanto  in  hac  ignorantia  profundius  docti 
fuerimus,  tanto  magis  ad  ipsam  accedemus  veritatem.” — [lb.  c.  17,  p.  13.) 
— “ Sublat.a  igitur  ab  omnibus  entibus  participatione,  remanet  ipsa  simpli- 
cissima  entitas,  quae  est  essentia  omnium  entium,  et  non  conspicimus  ipsam 
talem  entitatem,  nisi  in  doctissima  ignorantia,  quoniam  cum  omnia  parti- 
cipants entitatem  ab  animo  removeo,  nihil  remanere  videtur.  Et  prop- 
terea  magnus  Dionysius  [Areopagita]  dicit,  intellectum  Dei,  magis  accedere 
ad  nihil,  quam  ad  aliquid.  Sacra  autem  ignorantia  me  instruit,  hoc  quod 
intellectui  nihil  videtur,  esse  maximum  incomprehensibile.” — (Apologia 
Doctai  Ignorantise,  p.  67.) — “ Augustinus  ait : — ‘ Deum  potius  ignorantia 
quam  scientia  attingi.’  Ignorantia  enim  abjicit,  intelligentia  colligit ; 
docta  vero  ignorantia  omnes  modos  quibus  accedi  ad  veritatem  potest,  unit. 
Ita  eleganter  dixit  Algazel  in  sua  Metaphysica,  de  Deo  : ‘ Quod  quisque 
scit  per  probationem  necessariam,  impossibilitatem  suam  apprehendendi 
eum.  Ipse  sui  est  cognitor,  et  apprehensor;  quoniam  apprehendit,  scire 
ipsum  a riullo  posse  comprehendi.  Quisquis  autem  non  potest  apprehen- 
dere,  et  nescit  necessario  esse  impossibile  eum  apprehendere,  per  probatio- 
nem prsedictam,  est  ignorans  Deum  : et  tales  sunt  omnes  homines,  excep- 
tis  dignis,  et  prophetis  et  sapientibus,  qui  sunt  profundi  in  sapientia.' 
H;ec  ille.” — See  also  : De  Beryllo,  c.  36,  p.  281  ; De  Yenatione  Sapien- 
tial, c.  12,  p.  306  ; De  Deo  Abscondito,  p.  338;  &c.  &c.2 


1 Literally  : 

“Te,  tenebris  jactum,  ligat  ignorantia  duplex; 

Scis  nihil,  et  nescis  te  modo  scire  nihil.” 

Or,  with  reference  to  our  German  evolvers  of  the  Nothing  into  the  Everything  ; and 
avoiding  the  positio  debilis  : 

“ Te,  sopliia  insanum,  terit  insipientia  triplex  ; 

Nil  sapis,  et  nil  non  te  sapuisse  doces  !” 

2 So  far,  Cusa’s  doctrine  coincides  with  what  I consider  to  be  the  true  precept  of 
a “ Learned  Ignorance.”  But  he  goes  farther  : and  we  find  his  profession  of  negative 
ignorance  converted  into  an  assumption  of  positive  knowledge  ; his  Nothing,  presto, 
becoming  every  thing  ; and  contradictions,  instead  of  standing  an  insuperable  barrier 
to  all  intellectual  cognition,  employed  in  laying  its  foundation.  In  fact,  I make  no 
doubt  that  his  speculations  have  originated  the  whole  modern  philosophy  of  the  Abso- 
lute. For  Giordano  Bruno,  as  I can  show,  was  well  acquainted  with  Cusa’s  writings  ; 
from  these  he  borrowed  his  own  celebrated  theory,  repeating  even  the  language  in 
which  its  doctrines  were  originally  expressed.  To  Cusa,  we  can  indeed,  articulately 
trace,  word  and  thing,  the  recent  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  The  term  Absolute 
(Absolutum),  in  its  precise  and  peculiar  signification,  he  every  where  employs.  The 
Intellectual  Intuition  (Intuitio  Intellectual^)  he  describes  and  names  ; nay,  we  find  in 
him,  even  the  process  of  Hegel’s  Dialectic.  His  works  are,  indeed,  instead  of  the 
neglect  to  which  they  have  been  doomed,  well  deserving  of  attentive  study  in  many 
relations  In  Astronomy,  before  Copernicus,  he  had  promulgated  the  true  theory  of 


LEARNED  IGNORANCE. 


595 


16.  — ./Eneas  Sylvius.  (Piccolomini,  Pope  Pius  II.  Ehet.  L.  ii.) — “ Cui 
plura  nosse  datum  est,  eum  majora  aubia  sequuntor.” 

17.  — Palingenius.  (Zodiacus  Vitse,  Virgo  v.  181,  sq.) 

“ Tunc  mea  Dux  tandem  pulcro  sic  incipit  ore  : — 

Simia  ccelicolum* 1  risusque  jocusque  Deorum  est 
Tunc  homo,  quum  temere  ingenio  confidit,  et  audet 
Abdita  natural  scrutari,  arcanaque  Divum, 

Cum  re  vera  ejus  crassa  imbecillaque  sit  mens. 

Si  posita  ante  pedes  nescit,  quo  juro  videbit 
Q,use  Deus  et  natura  sinu  occuluere  profundo  ? 

Omnia  se  tamen  arbitrator  noscere  ad  unguem 
Garrulus,  infelix,  csecus,  temerarius,  amens ; 

Usque  adeo  sibi  palpatur,  seseque  licetur.” 

18. — “Multa  tegit  sacro  involucro  natura,  neque  uliis 
Fas  est  scire  quidem  mortalibus  omnia  ; multa 
Admirare  modo,  nec  non  venerare  : neque  ilia 
Inquires  quas  sunt  arcanis  proxima  ; namque 
In  manibus  quse  sunt,  haec  nos  vix  scire  putandum. 

Est  prooul  a nobis  adeo  prsesentia  veri  !”2 

Full  many  a secret  in  her  sacred  vail 

Hath  Nature  folded.  She  vouchsafes  to  knowledge 

Not  every  mystery,  reserving  much, 

For  human  veneration,  not  research. 

Let  us  not,  therefore,  seek  what  God  conceals ; 

For  even  the  things  which  lie  within  our  hands — 

These,  knowing,  we  know  not. — So  far  from  us, 

In  doubtful  dimness,  gleams  the  star  of  truth  !”) 


the  heavenly  revolutions,  with  the  corollary  of  a plurality  of  worlds  ; and  in  the  science 
of  Politics,  he  was  the  first  perhaps  to  enounce  the  principles  on  which  a representa- 
tive constitution  should  be  based.  The  Germans  have,  however,  done  no  justice  to 
their  countryman.  For  Cusa’s  speculations  have  been  most  perfunctorily  noticed  by 
German  historians  of  philosophy  ; and  it  is  through  Bruno  that  he  seems  to  have  ex- 
erted an  influence  on  the  Absolutist  theories  of  the  Empire. 

1 The  comparison  of  man  as  an  ape  to  God,  is  from  Plato,  who,  while  he  repeatedly 
exhibits  human  beings  as  the  jest  of  the  immortals,  somewhere  says — “The  wisest 
man,  if  compared  with  God,  will  appear  an  ape.”  Pope,  who  was  well  read  in  the 
modern  Latin  poets,  especially  of  Italy,  and  even  published  from  them  a selection  in  two 
volumes,  abounds  in  manifest  imitations  of  their  thoughts,  wholly  unknown  to  his  com- 
mentators. In  his  line — - 

“ And  shew’d  a Newton  as  we  shew  an  ape,” 

— he  had  probably  this  passage  of  Palingenius  in  his  eye,  and  not  Plato.  Warburton 
and  his  other  scholiasts  are  aware  of  no  suggestion. 

2 I know  not  the  author  of  these  verses.  I find  them  first  quoted  by  Fernelius,  in 
his  book  “ De  Abditis  Rerum  Causis”  (L.  ii.  c.  18),  which  appeared  before  the  year 
1551.  They  may  be  his  own.  They  are  afterward  given  by  Sennertus,  in  his  Hy- 
pomnemata,  but  without  an  attribution  of  authorship.  By  him,  indeed,  they  are  undoubt- 
edly taken  from  Fernelius.  Finally,  they  are  adduced  by  the  learned  Morhof,  in  his 
Polyhistor,  who  very  unlearnedly,  however,  assigns  them  to  Lucretius.  They  are  not 
by  Palingenius,  nor  Palearius,  nor  Hospitalius,  all  of  whose  versification  they  resem- 
ble ; for  the  last,  indeed,  they  are  almost  too  early. 


o9G 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (B.) 


19.  — Julius  CJesar  Scaliger.  (De  Subtilitate,  Ex.  cclxxiv.)  11  Sapien- 
tia  est  vera,  nolle  nimis  sapere.”  (Ib.  Ex.  cccvii.  sect.  29  ; and  compare 
Ex.  ccexliv.  sect.  4.)  “ Human®  sapiential  pars  est,  quEedam  ecquo  animo 
uescire  velle.”1  (Ib.  Ex.  lii.)  “ Ubique  clamare  soleo,  nos  nihil  scire.” 

20.  — Joseph  Justus  Scaliger.  (Poemata  : Iambi  Gnomici.  xxi.) 

“ Ne  curiosus  qucere  causas  omnium. 

GtuEECunque  libris  vis  Prophetarum  indidit 
Afflata  cceIo,  plena  veraci  Deo, 

Nec  operta  sacri  supparo  silentii 
Irrumpere  aude,  sed  pudenter  prseteri. 

Ncscire  velle,  qua  magister  maximus 
Docere  non  vult,  eruclita  inscitia  est.”2 

21.  — Grotius.  (Poemata;  Epigrammata,  L.  i.) 

Erudita  Ignorantia. 

“ Q,ui  curiosus  postal  at  Totum  suas 
Patere  menti,  ferre  qui  non  sufficit 
Mediocritatis  conscientiam  sua3, 

Judex  iniquus,  aistimator  est  malus 
Suique  natuvEeque.  Nam  rerum  parens, 

Libanda  tantum  quas  venit  mortalibus, 

Nos  scire  pauca,  multa  mirari  jubet. 

Hie  primus  error  auctor  est  pejoribus. 

Nam  qui  fateri  nil  potest  incognitum, 

Falso  necesse  est  placet  ignorantiam  ; 

Umbrasque  inanes  captet  inter  nubila, 

ImaginosEB  adulter  Ixion  Dese. 

Magis  quiescet  animus,  errabit  minus, 

Contentus  eruditione  parabili, 

Nec  quEeret  illam,  siqua  quaerentem  fugit. 

Nescire  qucedam,  magna  pars  Sapientice  est.'”3 

22.  — Pascal.  (Pensees,  Partie  I.  Art.  vi.  sect.  26.) — “ Si  Thomme  c.om- 

men^oit  par  s’etudiev  lui-meme,  il  verroit  combien  il  est  incapable  de  passer 
outre.  Comment  pourroit-il  se  faire  qu’une  partie  connut  le  tout  ?”4  - - 
- - “ Qui  ne  croiroit,  a nous  voir  composer  toutes  choses  d’esprit  et  de 

corps,  que  ce  melange-la  nous  seroit  bien  comprehensible  ? C’est  nean- 
moins  la  chose  que  l’on  comprend  le  moins.  L’homme  est  a lui-meme  le 


1 I meant  (above,  p.  44)  to  quote  this  passage  of  Scaliger,  but  find  that  my  recollec- 
tion confused  this  and  the  preceding  passage,  with  perhaps,  the  similar  testimony  of 
Chrysologus  (No.  10).  Chrysologus,  indeed,  anticipates  Scaliger  in  the  most  felici- 
tous part  of  the  expression. 

2 It  is  manifest  that  Joseph,  in  these  verses,  had  in  his  eye  the  saying  of  his  father. 
But  I have  no  doubt,  that  they  were  written  on  occasion  of  the  controversy  raised  by 
Gomarus  against  Arminius. 

3 In  this  excellent  epigram,  Grotius  undoubtedly  contemplated  the  corresponding 
verses  of  his  illustrious  friend,  the  Dictator  of  the  Republic  of  Letters  ; but,  at  the 
same  time,  he,  an  Arminian,  certainly  had  in  view  the  polemic  of  the  Remonstrants 
and  anti-Remonstrants,  touching  the  Divine  Decrees.  Nor,  apparently,  was  he  igno- 
rant of  testimonies  Nos.  17,  18. 

1 This  testimony  of  Pascal  corresponds  to  what  Aristotle  says  : — “ There  is  no  pro- 
portion of  the  Infinite  to  the  Finite.”  (De  Ccelo,  L.  i.  cc.  7,  8.) 


LEARNED  IGNORANCE. 


597 


plus  prodigieux  objet  de  la  nature  ; car  il  ne  peut  concevoir  ce  que  c’est  que 
c6rps,  et  encore  moins  ce  que  c’est  qu’esprit,  et  moins  qu’aucune  clrose  com- 
ment un  corps  peut  etre  uni  avec  un  esprit.  C’est  la  le  comble  de  ses  diffi- 
culties, et  cependant  c’est  son  propre  etre  : Modus,  quo  corporibus  .adharet 
spiritus,  comprehends  ab  hominibus  non  potest;  et  hoc  tamen  homo  est.’n 

II.  Testimonies  to  the  more  special  fact,  that  all  our  knowledge, 
whether  of  Mind  or  of  Matter,  is  only  phenomenal. 

Our  whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter  is  relative — con- 
ditioned— relatively  conditioned.  Of  things  absolutely  or  in 
themselves,  be  they  external,  be  they  internal,  we  know  nothing, 
or  know  them  only  as  incognizable  ; and  we  become  aware  of 
their  incomprehensible  existence,  only  as  this  is  indirectly  and 
accidentally  revealed  to  us,  through  certain  qualities  related  to 
our  faculties  of  knowledge,  and  which  qualities,  again,  we  can  not 
think  as  unconditioned,  irrelative,  existent  in  and  of  themselves. 
All  that  we  know  is  therefore  phenomenal — phenomenal  of  the 
unknown.1 2  The  philosopher  speculating  the  worlds  of  matter 
and  of  mind,  is  thus,  in  a certain  sort,  only  an  ignorant  admirer. 
In  his  contemplation  of  the  universe,  the  philosopher,  indeed, 
resembles  iEneas  contemplating  the  adumbrations  on  his  shield ; 
as  it  may  equally  be  said  of  the  sage  and  of  the  hero — 

“ Miratur;  Rerumque  ignarus,  Imagine  gaudct.” 

Nor  is  this  denied  ; for  it  has  been  commonly  confessed,  that,  as 
substances,  we  know  not  what  is  Matter  and  are  ignorant  of  what 
is  Mind.  With  the  exception,  in  fact,  of  a few  late  Absolutist 
theorizers  in  Germany,  this  is,  perhaps  the  truth  of  all  others 
most  harmoniously  re-echoed  by  every  philosopher  of  every 
school ; and,  as  has  so  frequently  been  done,  to  attribute  any 


1 Pascal  apparently  quotes  these  words  from  memory,  and,  I have  no  doubt,  quotes 
them  from  Montaigne,  who  thus  (L.  ii.  ch.  12)  adduces  them  as  from  St.  Augustin  - 
“ Modus,  quo  corporibus  adhserent  spiritus,  omnino  mirus  est,  nec  comprehendi  ab 
homine  potest ; et  hoc  ipse  homo  est.” — Montaigne’s  commentator,  Pierre  Coste,  says 
that  these  words  are  from  Augustin,  De  Spiritu  et  Anima.  That  curious  farrago, 
which  is  certainly  not  Augustin’s,  does  not,  however,  contain  either  the  sentence  or  the 
sentiment ; and  Coste  himself,  who  elsewhere  gives  articulate  references  to  the  quota- 
tions of  his  author,  here  alleges  only  the  treatise  in  general. 

2 Hypostasis  in  Greek  (of  ovaia  I do  not  now  speak,  nor  of  hypostasis  in  its  eccle- 
siastical signification),  and  the  corresponding  term  in  Latin,  Substantia  (per  se  subsys- 
tem, or  stibstans,  i.  e.  accidentibus,  whichever  it  may  mean),  expresses  a relation — a 
relation  to  its  phenomena.  A basis  for  phenomena,  is,  in  fact,  only  supposed,  bv  a 
necessity  of  our  thought ; even  as  a relative  it  is  not  positively  known.  On  this  real 
and  verbal  relativity,  see  St.  Augustin  (De  Trinitate,  1.  vii.  cc.  4,  5,  6.) — Of  the  am- 
biguous term  Subject  {vnoneipevov)  I have  avoided  speaking. 


598 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (E). 


merit,  or  any  singularity  to  its  recognition  by  any  individual 
thinker,  more  especially  in  modern  times,  betrays  only  the  ignor- 
ance of  the  encomiasts. 

1.  — Protagoras  (as  reported  by  Plato,  Aristotle,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
Laertius,  &c.) — “ Mail  is  [for  himself]  the  measure  of  all  things.”  (See 
Bacon,  No.  14.) 

2.  — Aristotle.  (Metaphysica,  L.  vii.  c.  10.) — “ Matter  is  incognizable 
absolutely  or  in  itself.” — (De  Anima,  L.  iii.  c.  5.) — “The  intellect  knows 
itself,  only  in  knowing  its  objects.” — The  same  doctrine  is  maintained  at 
length  in  the  Metaphysics,  b.  xii.  cc.  7 and  9,  and  elsewhere. 

3.  — St.  Augustin.  (De  Trinitate,  L.  ix.  cc.  1,  2.)  The  result  is — 
“ Ab  utroque  notitia  paritur ; a cognoscente  et  cognito.” — (lb.  L.  x.  cc.  3 
-12.)  Here  he  shows  that  we  know  Mind  only  from  phenomena  of  which 
we  are  conscious ; and  that  all  the  theories,  in  regard  to  the  substance  of 
what  thinks,  are  groundless  conjectures. — (Confessionum,  L.  xii.  c.  5.) — 
Of  our  attempts  to  cognize  the  basis  of  material  qualities  he  says  ; “ hum 
sibi  haec  dicit  humana  cogitatio,  conetur  earn,  vel  nosse  ignorando,  vel  ig- 
norare  noscendo.” 

4.  — Boethius.  (De  Consolatione  Philosophise,  L.  v.  pr.  4.) — “ Omne 

quod  cognoscitur,  non  secundum  sui  vim,  sed  secundum  cognoscentium 
potius  comprehenditur  facultatem.” — (Pr.  6.) — “ Omne  quod  scitur,  non 
ex  sua,  sed  ex  comprehendentium,  natura  cognoscitur.” 

5.  — Averroes.  (In  Aristotelem  De  Anima,  L.  iii.  Text.  8.) — “ Intellec- 
tus  intelligit  seipsum  modo  accidentali.” 

6.  — Albertus  Magnus.  (Contra  Averroem  de  Unitate  Intellectus,  c.  7.) 
“ Intellectus  non  intelligit  seipsum,  nisi  per  accidens  fiat  intelligibile  ; ut 
materia  cognoscitur  per  aliquid,  cujus  ipsa  est  fundamentum.  Et  si  aliqui 
dicant  intellectual  inteliigi  per  hoc,  quia,  per  essentiam  est  prsesens  sibi 
ipsi,  hoc  tamen  secundum  philosophiam  non  potest  dici.”  (See  also  Aqui- 
nas (Summa  Theologise,  P.  i.  Q,u.  89,  Art.  2 ; De  Veritate,  Q,u.  10,  Art. 
8)  and  Ferrariensis  (Contra  Gentes,  L.  iii.  c.  46.) 

7.  — Gerson.  (De  Concordia  Metaphysical.) — “ Ens  quodlibet  dicit  pot- 
est habere  duplex  Esse  ; sumendo  Esse  valde  transcendentaliter.  Uno 
modo,  sumitur  Ens,  pro  natura  rei  in  seipsa ; alio  modo,  prout  habet  esse, 
objectale  seu  reprsesentativum,  in  ordine  ad  intellectual  creatum  vel  in- 
creatum. — Hrec  autem  distinctio  non  conficta  est  vel  nova ; sed  a doctor- 
ibus,  tarn  metaphysicis  quam  logicis  subtilibus,  introducta.  Ens  consider- 
atum  seu  relictum  prout  quid  absolution,  seu  res  quaedam  in  seipsa,  plu- 
rimum  diHert  ab  esse,  quod  habet  objectaliter  apud  intellectual.  - - - - 
Ens  reale  non  potest  constituere  scientiam  aliquam,  si  non  consideretur  in 
suo  esse  objectali,  relato  ad  ipsum  ens  reale,  sicut  ad  primarium  et  prin 
cipale  objectum.” 

8.  — Leo  Hebe.ieus.  (De  Amore,  Dial,  i.) — “ Cognita  res  a cognoscente, 
pro  viribus  ipsius  cognoscentis,  haud  pro  rei  cognitse  dignitate  recipi  solet.” 

9.  — Melanciititon.  (Erotemata  Dialectices,  L.  i.  Pr.  Substantia.) — 
“ Mens  humana,  per  accidentia,  agnoscit  substantiam.  Non  enim  cernimus 


RELATIVITY  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE. 


599 


oculis  substantias,  tectas  accidentibus,  sed  mente  eas  agnoscimus.  Cum 
videmus  aquam  manereeandem:  sive  sit  frigida,  sive  sitcalida,  ratiocinamur : 
— aliud  quiddam  esse  formas  illas  discedentes,  et  aliud  quod  eas  sustinet.” 

10.  — Julius  Cassar  Scaliger.  (De  Subtilitate,  Ex.  cccvii.  § 12.) — 

“ Nego  tibi  ullam  esse  formam  nobis  notam  plene,  et  plane  : nostrarnque 
scientiam  esse  umbram  in  sole  [contendo].  Formarum  enim  cognitio  est 
rudis,  confusa,  nec  nisi  per  nspio-doEig.  Neque  verum  est — formal  sub- 
stantial^ speciem  recipi  in  intellectum.  Non  enim  in  sensu  unquarn  fuit.” 
— (lb.  Ex.  cccvii.  § 21.) — “ Substantias  non  sua  specie  cognosci  a nobis, 
sed  per  earum  accidentia.  Q,uis  enim  me  doceat,  quid  sit  substantia,  nisi 
illis  miseris  verbis — res  subsistens  ? - - - - Q,uid  ipsa  ilia  substantia 

sit,  plane  ignoras  ; sed,  sicut  Yulpes  elusa  a Ciconia,  lambimus  vitreum  vas, 
pultem  baud  attingimus.” 

11.  — Francis  Piccolomini.  (De  Mente  Humana.  L.  i.  c.  8.) — “ Mens 
intelligit  se,  non  per  se  primo,  sed  cum  csetera  intellexerit ; ut  dicitur  in 
L.  iii.  de  Anima.  t.  8,  et  in  L.  xii.  Metaphysicse,  t.  38.” 

12.  — Giordano  Bruno.  (De  Imaginum,  Signorum  et  Idearum  Compo- 
sitione  ; Dedieatio.) — “ Q,uemadmodum,  non  nosmetipsos  in  profundo  et 
individuo  quodam  consistentes,  sed  nostri  quaedam  externa  de  superficie 
(colorem,  scilicet,  atque  figuram)  accidentia,  ut  oculi  ipsius  similitudinem 
in  speculo,  videre  possumus  ; ita  etiam,  neque  intellectus  noster  se  ipsam 
in  se  ipso,  et  res  ipsas  omnes  in  seipsis,  sed  in  exteriore  quadam  specie, 
simulacro,  imagine,  figura,  signo.  Hoc  quod  ab  Aristotele  relatum,  ab 
antiquis  prius  fuit  expressum  ; et  a neotericorum  paucis  capitur  Intelli- 
gere  nostrum  (id  est,  operationes  nostri  intellectus),  aut  est  phantasia,  aut 
non  sine  phantasia.  Rursum.  Non  intelligimus,  nisi  phantasmata  spe- 
culamur.  Hoc  est,  quod  non  in  simplicitate  quadam,  statu  et  unitate,  sed 
in  compositione,  collatione,  terminorum  pluralitate,  mediante  discursu 
atque  reflexione,  comprehendimus.”1 

13.  — Campanella.  (Metaphysica.  L.  i.  c.  1.  dub.  3,  p.  12.) — “Ergo, 
non  videntur  res  prout  sunt,  neque  videntur  extare  nisi  respectus.” 

14.  — Bacon.  (Instauratio  Magna  ; Distr.  Op.) — “ Informatio  sensus 
semper  est  ex  analogia  hominis,  non  ex  analogia  universi ; atque  magno 
prorsus  errore  asseritur,  sensurn  esse  mensuram  rerum.”  (See  Protagoras, 
n.  1.) 

15.  — Spinoza.  (Ethices,  Pars  II.  Prop,  xix.) — “ Mens  humana  ipsum 
humanum  corpus  non  cognoscit,  nec  ipsum  existere  scit,  nisi  per  ideas  affec- 
tionum  quibus  corpus  afficitur.” — (Prop,  xxiii.) — “ Mens  se  ipsam  non  cog- 
noscit, nisi  quatenus  corporis  affeetionum  ideas  percipit.”  Et  alibi. — (See 
Bruno,  n.  12.) 

16.  — Sir  Isaac  Newton.  (Principia,  Schol.  Ult.) — “Quid  sit  rei  ali- 
cujus  substantia,  minime  cognoscimus.  Yidemus  tantum  corporum  figuras 
et  colores,  audimus  tantum  sonos,  tangimus  tantum  superficies  externas, 


1 Had  Bruno  adhered  to  this  doctrine,  he  would  have  missed  martyrdom  as  an  athe- 
ist ; but  figuring  to  posterity,  neither  as  a great  fool  (if  we  believe  Adelung)  nor  as 
a great  philosopher  (if  we  believe  Sehelling).  Compare  the  parallel  testimony  of  Spi- 
noza (15)  a fellow  Pantheist,  but  on  different  grounds. 


500 


APPENDIX  I.  PHILOSOPHICAL.  (B.) 


olfacimus  odores  solos,  et  gustamus  sapores  : intimas  substantias  nullo 
sensu,  nulla  actione  reflexa,  cognoscimus.” 

17. — Kant.  (Critilc  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Yorr.) — “ In  perception  every 
thing  is  known  in  conformity  to  the  constitution  of  our  faculty.”  And  a 
hundred  testimonies  to  the  same  truth  might  be  adduced  from  the  philoso 
pher  of  Koenigsberg,  of  whose  doctrine  it  is,  in  fact,  the  foundation. 

III. — The  recognition  of  Occult  Causes. 

This  is  the  admission,  that  there  are  phenomena  which,  thougn 
unable  to  refer  to  any  known  cause  or  class,  it  would  imply  an 
irrational  ignorance  to  deny.  This  general  proposition  no  one, 
I presume,  will  he  found  to  gainsay  ; for,  in  fact,  the  causes  of  all 
phenomena  are,  at  last,  occifit.  There  has,  however,  obtained  a 
not  unnatural  presumption  against  such  causes  ; and  this  pre- 
sumption, though  often  salutary,  has  sometimes  operated  most 
disadvantageous^  to  science,  from  a blind  and  indiscriminate 
application  ; in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  it  has  induced  men 
lightly  to  admit  asserted  phenomena,  false  in  themselves,  if  only 
confidently  assigned  to  acknowledged  causes.  In  the  second  place, 
it  has  induced  them  obstinately  to  disbelieve  phenomena,  in  them- 
selves certain  and  even  manifest,  if  these  could  not  at  once  be  re- 
ferred to  already  recognized  causes,  and  did  not  easily  fall  in  with 
the  systems  prevalent  at  the  time. — An  example  of  the  former,  is 
seen  in  the  facile  credence  popularly  accorded,  in  this  country,  to 
the  asserted  facts  of  Craniology ; though  even  the  fact  of  that 
hypothesis,  first  and  fundamental — the  fact,  most  probable  in  it- 
self, and  which  can  most  easily  be  proved  or  disproved  by  the 
widest  and  most  accurate  induction,  is  diametrically  opposite  to 
the  truth  of  nature ; I mean  the  asserted  correspondence  between 
the  development  and  hypothetical  function  of  the  cerebellum,  as 
manifested  in  all  animals,  under  the  various  differences  of  age,  of 
sex,  of  season,  of  integrity  and  mutilation.  This  (among  other 
of  the  pertinaciously  asserted  facts),  I know  by  a tenfold  super- 
fluous evidence,  to  be  even  ludicrously  false. — An  example  of  the 
latter,  is  seen  in  the  difficult  credence  accorded  in  this  country  to 
the  phenomena  of  Animal  Magnetism  ; phenomena  in  themselves 
the  most  unambiguous,  which,  for  nearly  half  a century,  have 
been  recognized  generally  and  by  the  highest  scientific  authorities 
in  Germany  ; while,  for  nearly  a quarter  of  a century,  they  have 
been  verified  and  formally  confirmed  by  the  Academy  of  Medicine 
in  France. — In  either  case,  criticism  was  required,  and  awanting. 

So  true  is  the  saying  of  Cullen : — “ There  are  more  false  facts 


OCCULT  CAUSES. 


601 


current  in  the  world  than  false  theories.”  So  true  is  the  saying 
of  Hamlet : — “ There  are  more  things  in  heaven  and  earth,  Hora- 
tio, than  are  dreamt  of  in  your  philosophy.”  But  averse  from 
experiment,  and  gregariously  credulous — 

“ L’homme  est  de  glace  aux  verites  ; 

II  est  de  feu  pour  les  mensonges.” 

1.  — Julius  C/esar  Scaliger.1  In  his  commentary  on  Theophrastus 
touching  the  Causes  of  Plants,  he  repeatedly  asserts,  as  the  Aristotelic  doc- 
trine, the  admission  of  Occult  Causes.  Thus,  (L.  ii.  c.  5) — “ Hoc  dixit 
(Theophrastus),  nequis  ah  eo  nunc  exigat  occultas  illarum,  quas  subticet, 
causas.  Quasi  dicat — Sapienti  multa  licet  ignorare.”  In  like  manner, 
(L.  iv.  c.  13.) — “ Hunc  quoque  locum  simul  cum  aliis  adducere  potes  ad- 
versus  eos  qui  negant  Peripateticis  ab  occulta  proprietate  quicquam  fieri. 
Apud  hunc  philosophum  ssepe  monuimus  inveniri.  Est  autem  asylum 
humanse  imbecillitatis,  ac  simile  perfugium  illi  Periclis — slg  ra  deouraA 
This  we  may  translate — “Secret  service  money.” — The  same  he  had  also 
previously  declared  in  his  book  De  Subtilitate  ; where,  for  example  (Ex. 
ccxviii,  $ 8),  he  says  : — “ Ad  manifestas  omnia  deducere  qualitates  summa 
impudentia  est for  there  are  many  of  these,  “ quse  omnino  latent  animos 
temperatos,  illudunt  curiosis  and  he  derides  those,  “ qui  irrident  salutare 
asylum  illud,  occult®  proprietatis.” 

2.  — Alstedius.  (Physica  (1630),  Pars.  I.  c.  xiii.  reg.  4.) — “ Quod 
Augustinus  ait,  ‘Multa  cognoscendo  ignorari,  et  ignorando,  cognosci,’  hie 
imprimis  habet  locum,  ubi  agitur  de  Occultis  Qualitatibus,  quaram  investi- 
gatio  dicitur  Magia  Haturalis,  id  est,  praestantissima  naturae  indagatio 
in  qua  verbum  modestiae,  Nescio,  subinde  usurpandum  est.  Yerbum 
modesti®  dico,  non  autem  stultitiae.” 

3.  — Voltaire.  (Dictionnaire Philosophique, voce  Occultes.) — “ Qualites 
Occultes. — On  s’est  moque  fort  longtemps  des  qualites  occultes;  on  doit  se 
moquer  de  ceux  qui  n’y  croient  pas.  Repetons  cent  fois,  que  tout  principe, 
tout  premier  ressort  de  quelque  oeuvre  que  ce  puisse  etre  du  grand  Demi- 
ourgos,  est  occulte  et  cache  pour  jamais  aux  mortels.”  And  so  forth. — 
(Physique  Particuliere,  ch.  xxxiii.) — “II  y a done  certainement  des  lois 
eternelles,  inconnues,  suivant  lesquelles  tout  s’opere,  sans  qu’on  puisse  les 

expliquer  par  la  matiere  et  par  le  mouvement. II  y a dans  toutes 

les  Academies  une  chaire  vacante  pour  les  verites  inconnues,  comme 
Athenes  avait  un  autel  pour  les  dieux  ignores.”2 


1 I have  quoted  the  elder  Scaliger,  under  all  the  three  heads  of  this  article,  for  a 
truth  in  his  language  is  always  acutely  and  strikingly  enounced.  The  writings  of  no 
philosopher,  indeed,  since  those  of  Aristotle,  are  better  worthy  of  intelligent  study  ; 
and  few  services  to  philosophy  would  be  greater  than  a systematic  collection  and 
selection  of  the  enduring  and  general  views  of  this  illustrious  thinker.  For,  to  apply 
to  him  his  own  expressions,  these  “ zopyra,”  these  “ semina  setemitatis,”  lie  smothered 
and  unfruitful  in  a mass  of  matters  of  merely  personal  and  transitory  interest.  I had 
hoped  to  have  attempted  this  in  the  appendix  to  a work  “ De  vita,  genere  et  genio 
Scaligerorum  but  this  I hope  no  longer. 

2 Besides  the  few  testimonies  adduced,  I would  refer,  in  general,  for  some  excellent 
observations  on  the  point,  to  Fernelius  “De  Abditis  Rerum  Causis,”  and  to  the 
“ Hypomnemata:’  of  Sennertus. 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL. 

(A.)  OF  SYLLOGISM,  ITS  KINDS,  CANONS,  NOTATIONS,  ETC. 


Touching  the  principle  of  an  explicitly  Quantified  Predicate , 
I had  by  1833  become  convinced  of  the  necessity  to  extend  and 
correct  the  logical  doctrine  upon  this  point.  In  the  article  on 
Logic,  reprinted  above,  and  first  published  in  April,  1833,  the 
theory  of  Induction  there  maintained  proceeds  on  a thorough-going 
quantification  of  the  predicate,  in  affirmative  propositions.  (P. 
160,  sq.) 

Before  1840,  I had,  however,  become  convinced,  that  it  was 
necessary  to  extend  the  principle  equally  to  negatives ; for  I find 
by  academical  documents,  that  in  that  year,  at  latest,  I had  pub- 
licly taught  the  unexclusive  doctrine. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  “ Prospectus  of  Essay 
toward  a new  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms,”  appended  to  the  edi- 
tion of  Reid’s  Works,  published  by  me  in  1846 

“ In  the  first  place,  in  the  Essay  there  will  he  shown,  that  the  Syllogism 
proceeds,  not  as  has  hitherto,  virtually  at  least,  been  taught,  in  one,  but  in 
the  two  correlative  and  counter  ivlioles  (Metaphysical)  of  Comprehension 
and  (Logical)  of  Extension  ; — the  major  premise  in  the  one  whole,  being 
the  minor  premise  in  the  other,  &c. — Thus  is  relieved,  a radical  defect 
and  vital  inconsistency  in  the  present  logical  system. 

In  the  second  place,  the  self-evident  truth — That  we  can  only  rationally 
deal  with  what  we  already  understand,  determines  the  simple  logical  pos- 
tulate— To  state  explicitly  ivhat  is  thought  implicitly.  From  the  con- 
sistent application  of  this  postulate,  on  which  Logic  ever  insists,  but 
which  Logicians  have  never  fairly  obeyed,  it  follows  : — that,  logically,  we 
ought  to  take  into  account  the  quantity,  always  understood  in  thought, 
but  usually,  and  for  manifest  reasons,  elided  in  its  expression,  not  only  of 
the  subject,  but  also  of  the  predicate,  of  a judgment.  This  being  done, 
and  the  necessity  of  doing  it,  will  be  proved  against  Aristotle  and  his  re- 
peaters, we  obtain,  inter  alia,  the  ensuing  results  : 

1°,  That  the  preindesignate  terms  of  a proposition,  whether  subject  or 
predicate,  are  never,  on  that  account,  thought  as  indefinite  (or  indeterm- 
inate) in  quantity.  The  only  indefinite,  is  particular,  as  opposed  to 
definite,  quantity  ; and  this  last,  as  it  is  either  of  an  extensive  maximum 
undivided,  or  of  an  extensive  minimum  indivisible,  constitutes  quantity 
universal  (general),  and  quantity  singidar  (individual.)  In  fact,  definite 
and  indefinite  are  the  only  quantities  of  which  we  ought  to  hear  in  Logic  ; 


NEW  ANALYTIC  OF  LOGICAL  FORMS. 


603 


for  it  is  only  as  indefinite  that  particular,  it  is  only  as  definite  that  indi- 
vidual and  general,  quantities  have  any  (and  the  same)  logical  avail. 

2°,  The  revocation  of  the  two  Terms  of  a Proposition  to  their  true  re- 
lation;  a proposition  being  always  an  equation  of  its  subject  and  its  pre- 
dicate. 

3°,  The  consequent  reduction  of  the  Conversion  of  Propositions  from 
three  species  to  one — that  of  Simple  Conversion. 

4°,  The  reduction  of  all  the  General  Laws  of  Categorical  Syllogisms 
to  a Single  Canon. 

5°,  The  evolution  from  that  one  canon  of  all  the  Species  and  varieties 
of  Syllogism. 

6°,  The  abrogation  of  all  the  Spiecial  Laics  of  Syllogism. 

7°,  A demonstration  of  the  exclusive  possibility  of  Three  syllogistic 
Figures  ; and  (on  new  grounds)  the  scientific  and  final  abolition  of  the 
Fourth. 

8°,  A manifestation  that  Figure  is  an  unessential  variation  in  syllo- 
gistic form  ; and  the  consequent  absurdity  of  Reducing  the  syllogisms  of 
the  other  figures  to  the  first. 

9°,  An  enouncement  of  one  Organic  Principle  for  each  Figure. 

10°,  A determination  of  the  true  number  of  the  legitimate  Moods; 
with 

11°,  Their  amplification  in  number  ; 

* 12°,  Their  numerical  equality  under  all  the  figures  ; and, 

13°,  Their  relative  equivalence , or  virtual  identity,  throughout  every 
schematic  difference. 

14°,  That,  in  the  second  and  third  figures,  the  extremes,  holding  both 
the  same  relation  to  the  middle  term,  there  is  not,  as  in  the  first,  an  op- 
position and  subordination  between  a term  major  and  a term  minor , mu- 
tually containing  and  contained,  in  the  counter  tvholes  of  Extension  and 
Comprehension. 

15°,  Consequently,  in  the  second  and  third  figures,  there  is  no  determ- 
inate major  and  minor  premise,  and  there  are  two  indifferent  conclu- 
sions ; whereas,  in  the  first,  the  premises  are  determinate,  and  there  is  a 
single  prdximate  conclusion. 

16°,  That  the  third,  as  the  figure  in  which  Comprehension  is  predom- 
inant, is  more  appropriate  to  Induction. 

17°,  That  the  second,  as  the  figure  in  which  Extension  is  predominant, 
is  more  appropriate  to  Deduction. 

18°,  That  the  first,  as  the  figure  in  which  Comprehension  and  Ex- 
tension are  in  equilibrium,  is  common  to  Induction  and  Deduction  in- 
differently.” 

What  follows  was  subjoined,  as  a Note,  to  the  “ Essay  on  the 
New  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms,”  by  Mr.  Thomas  Spencer  Baynes, 
which  obtained  the  prize  proposed  in  1846,  hut  was  only  pub- 
lished in  1850.  The  foot-notes  are  now  added. 

“ The.  ensuing  note  contains  a summary  of  my  more  matured  doctrine 
of  the  Syllogism,  in  so  far  as  it  is  relative  to  the  preceding  Essay. 

All  mediate  inference  is  one — that  incorrectly  called  Categorical ; for 
the  Conjunctive  and  Disjunctive  forms  of  Hypothetical  reasoning  are 
reducible  to  immediate  inferences. 


604 


APPENDIX  II.  OF  SYLLOGISM.  (A.) 


Montally  one,  the  Categorical  Syllogism,  according  to  its  order  of 
cnouncement,  is  either  Analytic  (A)  or  Synthetic  (B).  Analytic,  if  (what 
is  inappropriately  styled)  the  conclusion  be  expressed  first,  and  (what  are 
inappropriately  styled)  the  premises  he  then  stated  as  its  reasons.  Syn- 
thetic, if  the  premises  precede,  and,  as  it  were,  effectuate  the  conclusion.1 
These  general  forms  of  the  syllogism  can  with  ease  he  distinguished  by  a 
competent  notation ; and  every  special  variety  in  the  one  has  its  corre- 
sponding variety  in  the  other. 

Taking  the  syllogism  under  the  latter  form  (B)  (which,  though  perhaps 
less  natural,2  has  been  alone  cultivated  by  logicians,  and  to  which,  there- 
fore, exclusively  all  logical  nomenclature  is  relative) — the  syllogism  is 
again  divided  into  the  tfnfigured  (a)  and  the  Figured  (b). 

The  Uniigured  Syllogism  (a)  is  that  in  which  the  terms  compared  do 
not  stand  to  each  other  in  the  reciprocal  relation  of  subject  and  predicate, 
being  in  the  same  proposition,  either  both  subjects  or  both  predicates.3 
Here  the  dependency  of  Breadth  and  Depth  (Extension  and  Intension, 
Extension  and  Comprehension,  &c.),  does  not  subsist,  and  the  order,  ac- 
cordingly, of  the  premises  is  wholly  arbitrary.  This  form  has  been  over- 
looked by  the  logicians,  though  equally  worthy  of  development  as  any 
other ; in  fact,  it  affords  a key  to  the  whole  mystery  of  Syllogism.  And 

1 [This,  in  the  first  place,  relieves  the  syllogism  of  two  one-sided  views.  The  Aris- 
totelic  syllogism  is  exclusively  synthetic  ; the  Epicurean  (or  Neoclesian)  syllogism 
was — for  it  has  been  long  forgotten — exclusively  analytic ; while  the  Hindoo  syllo- 
gism is  merely  a clumsy  agglutination  of  these  counter-forms,  being  nothing  but  an 
operose  repetition  of  the  same  reasoning,  enounced,  1°,  analytically,  2°,  synthetically. 
In  thought,  the  syllogism  is  organically  one  ; and  it  is  only  stated  in  an  analytic  or 
synthetic  form,  from  the  necessity  of  adopting  the  one  order  or  the  other,  in  accom- 
modation to  the  vehicle  of  its  expression — Language.  For  the  conditions  of  lan- 
guage require,  that  a reasoning  be  distinguished  into  parts,  and  these  detailed  before 
and  after  other.  The  analytic  and  synthetic  orders  of  enouncement  are,  thus,  only 
accidents  of  the  syllogistic  process.  This  is,  indeed,  shown  in  practice  ; for  our  best 
reasonings  proceed  indifferently  in  either  order. 

In  the  second  place,  this  central  view  vindicates  the  Syllogism  from  the  objection  of 
Petitio  Principii,  which  professing  logically  to  annul  logic,  or  at  least  to  reduce  it  to 
an  idle  tautology,  defines  syllogistic — the  art  of  avowing  in  the  conclusion  what  has 
been  already  confessed  in  the  premises.  This  objection  (which  has  at  least  an  anti- 
quity of  three  centuries  and  a half)  is  only  applicable  to  the  synthetic  or  Aristotelic 
order  of  enouncement,  which  the  objectors,  indeed,  contemplate  as  alone  possible.  It 
does  not  hold  against  the  analytic  syllogism ; it  does  not  hold  against  the  syllogism 
considered  aloof  from  the  accident  of  its  expression  ; and  being  proved  irrelevant  to 
these,  it  is  easily  shown  in  reference  to  the  synthetic  syllogism  itself,  that,  it  applies 
only  to  an  accident  of  its  external  form.] 

2 [I  say  less  natural.  For  if  it  be  asked — ‘:Is  C in  A 7”  surely  it  is  more  natural 
to  reply — Yes  (or  C is  in  A),  for  C is  in  B,  and  B in  A (or,  for  B is  in  A,  and  C in  B) ; 
than  to  reply — B is  in  A,  and  C in  B (or,  C is  in  B,  and  B in  A ),  therefore,  C is  in  A. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  analytic  syllogism  is  not  only  the  more  natural,  it  is  even  pre- 
supposed by  the  synthetic.  To  express  in  words,  we  must  first  analyze  in  thought 
the  organic  whole— the  mental  simultaneity  of  a simple  reasoning ; and  then,  we  may 
reverse  in  thought  the  process,  by  a synthetic  return.  Further,  we  may  now  enounce 
the  reasoning  in  either  order ; but,  certainly,  to  express  it  in  the  essential,  primary, 
or  analytic  order,  is  not  only  more  natural,  but  more  direct  and  simple,  than  to  ex- 
press it  in  the  accidental,  secondary,  or  synthetic.  This  also  avoids  the  objection  of 
P.  P.] 

3 [As:  Convertible  ( identical , <j-c.)  are:  All  C,  and  some  B:  as  also  all  B and  alt 
A':  therefore  all  C and  some  A. — This  may  be  variously  stated.]  ' . 

I te  tuv,,..  j /t..  ■ eJUa^l^tUi 


NEW  ANALYTIC  OF  LOGICAL  FORMS. 


606 


what  is  curious,  the  Canon  by  which  this  syllogism  is  regulated  (what 
may  he  called  that  of  logical  Analogy  or  Proportion),  has,  fun  above  live 
centuries,  been  commonly  stated  as  the  one  principle  of  reasoning,  while 
the  form  of  reasoning  itself,  to  which  it  properly  applies,  has  never  been 
generalized.  This  Canon,  which  has  been  often  erroneously,  and  never 
adequately  enounced,  in  rules  four,  three,  two,  or  one,  is  as  follows  : — In 
as  far  as  two  notions  (notions  proper  or  individuals),  either  both  agree,  or 
one  agreeing , the  other  does  not,  ivith  a common  third  notion  ; in  so  far, 
these  notions  do  or  do  not  agree  ivith  each  other. — The  propositions  of 
this  syllogism  in  no-figure  are  marked  in  the  scheme  of  pure  logical  nota- 
tion by  horizontal  lines  of  uniform  breadth. 

In  the  Figured  Syllogism  (b),  the  terms  compared  are  severally  subject 
and  predicate,  consequently,  in  reference  to  each  other,  containing  and 
contained  in  the  counter  wholes  of  Intension  and  Extension.  Its  Canon 
is  What  ivorse  relation  of  subject  and  predicate  subsists  betiveen  either 
of  tivo  terms  and  a common  third  term,  with  which  one,  at  least,  is  pos- 
itively related;  that  relation  subsists  between  the  two  terms  themselves. — 
In  the  scheme  of  pure  logical  notation  a horizontal  tapering  line  marks 
this  relation ; the  subject  standing  at  the  broad,  the  predicate  at  the 
pointed  end. 

There  are  three,  and  only  three,  Figures — the  same  as  those  of  Aris- 
totle ; and  in  each  of  these  we  may  distinguish  the  orders  of  Breadth  and 
of  Depth. 

The  First  Figure  emerges,  when  the  middle  term  is  subject  of  the  one 
extreme  and  predicate  of  the  other  ; that  is,  when  we  pass  from  the  one 
extreme  to  the  other,  through  the  middle,  in  the  order  whether  of  Exten- 
sion or  of  Intension.  In  the  notation  of  this  Figure,  we  may  of  course 
arbitrarily  make  either  of  these  orders  to  proceed  from  left  to  right,  or 
from  right  to  left ; that  is,  two  arrangements  are  competent. — There  is 
here,  determinately,  one  direct  and  one  indirect  conclusion. 

The  Second  Figure  arises,  when  the  middle  term  is  the  predicate  of 
both  extremes  ; the  order  of  Breadth  proceeding  from  middle  to  extremes, 
the  order  of  Depth  from  extremes  to  middle. 

The  Third  Figure  is  determined,  when  the  middle  term  is  the  subject 
of  both  extremes ; the  order  of  Extension  proceeding  from  extremes  to 
middle,  the  order  of  Intension  from  middle  to  extremes. 

In  the  Second  and  Third  Figures  there  is  thus  only  one  arrangement 
possible  in  logical  notation.  And  as  Extension  and  Intension  are  here  in 
equilibrium,  there  is  no  definite  major  and  minor  premise,  and  conse- 
quently no  indirect,  but  two  indifferent  conclusions.  This  is  best  marked 
by  two  crossing  lines  under  the  premises,  each  marking  the  extreme 
standing  to  the  other  as  subject  or  as  predicate. 

Of  course  each  Figure  has  its  own  Canon,  but  these  it  is  not  here  re- 
quisite to  state.1  The  First  Figure,  besides  its  more  general  canon,  has 


1 [The  several  Canons  for  the  several  Figures  may,  however,  now  he  given  They 
are  : for  the 

First  Figure. — What  worse  relation  of  determining  (predicate),  and  of  determined 
(subject),  is  held  by  either  of  two  notions  to  a third,  with  which  one  at  least  is  posi- 
tively related  ; — that  relation  do  the}'  immediately  (directly)  hold  to  each  other,  and 
indirectly  (mediately)  its  converse.” 

Second  Figure. — “ What  worse  relation  of  determined  (subject),  is  held  by  either 


i 


60(j 


APPENDIX  II.  OF  SYLLOGISM.  (A.) 


also  two  more  special — one  for  Syllogisms  in  the  order  of  Extension,  and 
one  for  Syllogisms  in  the.  order  of  Intension.  And  what  is  remarkable, 
Aristotle’s  Dictum  cle  Omni , &c.  (in  the  Prior  Analytics),  gives  that  for 
Extension,  while  his  rule — Prceclicatum  prcedicati,  &c.  (in  the  Cate- 
gories), affords  that  for  Intension,  although  this  last  order  of  Syllogism 
was  not  developed  by  him  or  the  logicians ; — both,  however,  are  inade- 
quately stated. 

In  regard  to  the  notation  of  Qttality  and  Quantity,  and  in  the  syllo- 
gisms both  Unfigured  and  Figured. — Negation  is  marked  by  a perpen- 
dicular line,  which  may  he  applied  to  the  copula,  to  the  term,  or  to  the 
quantification. — As  to  Quantity  (for  there  are  subordinate  distinctions),  it 
is  sufficient  here  to  state,  that  there  is  denoted  by  the  sign  [ , or  1 ] (for 
the  quantity  of  one  term  ought  to  face  the  other),  some; — by  the  sign  [ : ], 
all; — by  the  sign  [ . ],  a half ; — by  the  sign  [ or  I ],  more  them  a half. 
The  last  two  are  only  of  use  to  mark  the  ultra-total  distribution  of  the 
middle  term  of  a syllogism,  between  both  the  premises,  as  affording  a cer- 
tain inference,  valid,  but  of  little  utility.  This  I once  thought  had  been 
first  generalized  by  me,  but  I have  since  found  it  fully  stated  and  fairly 
appreciated  by  Lambert,1  to  say  nothing  of  Frommichen. 

Above  (p.  76  [of  Mr.  Baynes’s  Essay])  is  a detail  of  my  pure  logical 
notation,  as  applicable  to  the  thirty-six  moods  of  the  first  figure.  The 
order  there  is  not,  however,  that  which  I have  adopted.  The  following 
is  my  final  arrangement,  and  within  brackets  is  its  correspondence  with 
the  numbers  of  that  given  above  : — The  moods  are  either  A)  Balanced , 
or  B)  Unbalanced.  In  the  former  class  both  terms  and  propositions  are 
balanced,  and  it  contains  two  moods — i ; ii,  [=i ; ii  ] In  the  latter  class 
there  are  two  subdivisions.  For  either,  a)  the  terms  are  unbalanced — iii, 

iv,  [ = xi,  xii]  ; or,  b)  both  the  terms  and  propositions  are  unbalanced — 

v,  vi ; vii,  viii ; ix,  x;  xi,  xii,  [=vii,  viii ; iii,  iv ; v,  vi ; ix,  x.]  The 
following  equation  applies  to  my  table  of  moods  given  in  Mr.  Thom- 
son’s Laws  of  Thought i ; ii ; xi,  xii;  vii,  viii;  iii,  iv;  v,  vi;  ix,  x. — 
The  present  arrangement  is  also  more  minutely  determined  by  another 
principle,  but  this  it  is  not  here  requisite  to  state. 

If  we  apply  the  moods  to  any  matter  however  abstract,  say  letters, 
there  will  emerge  forty-two  syllogisms ; for  the  formal  identity  of  the 
balanced  moods  will  then  be  distinguished  by  a material  difference.  On 
the  contrary,  if  we  regard  the  mere  formal  equivalence  of  the  moods,  these 
will  be  reduced  to  twenty-one  reasonings — seven  affirmative  and  fourteen 
negative.  Of  the  balanced  moods,  i and  ii  are  converted  each  into  itself; 
of  the  unbalanced,  every  odd,  and  the  even  number  immediately  follow- 
ing, are  convertible ; and  in  negatives,  the  first  and  second  moods  («,  b) 
of  the  corresponding  syzygy  or  jugation,  is  reduced  from  or  to  the  second 
and  first  moods  ( b , a)  of  its  reciprocal. 

There  are  no  exceptions.  The  Canon  is  thorough-going.  Only  it  must 
be  observed  : 1°,  that  the  doctrine  is  wrong  which  teaches,  that  a uni- 

of  two  notions  to  a third,  with  which  one  at  least  is  positively  related  - that  relation 
do  they  hold  indifferently  to  each  other.” 

Third  Figure. — “ What  worse  relation  of  determining  (predicate),  is  held  by  either 
of  two  notions  to  a third,  with  which  one  at  least  is  positively  related  ; — that  relation 
do  they  hold  indifferently  to  each  other.”] 

1 [On  the  use  which  has  been  made  in  this  country  of  the  logical  speculations  of 
Lambert  and  Ploucquet,  it  would  be  out  of  place  here  to  say  any  thing.] 

/ 


Ju. . 


T/U  ^ 


NEW  ANALYTIC  OF  LOGICAL  FORMS. 


607 


versal  negation  is  not  a ivorse  relation  than  a particular ; 2°,  that  the 
connection  of  a negative  with  an  affirmative  mood,  is  regulated  exclusively 
by  the  identity  in  quantity  of  their  syzygy  or  antecedents.  The  Greeks, 
in  looking  to  the  conjugation  of  the  premises  alone,  are  more  accurate 
than  the  Latins,  who  regard  all  the  three  propositions  of  a syllogism  in 
the  determination  of  a mood. 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  as  the  correlation  of  the  logical  terms 
ought  to  be  known  only  from  the  expression  (ex  facie  propositionis  aut 
syllogismi),  for  all  other  knowledge  of  the  reciprocal  dependence  of  notions 
is  contingent,  material,  and  extralogical ; and  as  the  employment  of  let- 
ters, following  upon  each  other  in  alphabetical  order,  may  naturally  sug- 
gest a corresponding  subordination  in  the  concepts  which  they  denote  : I 
have  adopted  the  signs  C and  T,  which  are  each  the  third  letter  in  its 
respective  alphabet,  tor  the  extremes;  and  the  sign  M,  for  the  middle  term 
of  the  syllogism.  The  scheme  is  thus  emancipated  from  all  external  as- 
sociations, and  otherwise  left  free  in  application.  I also  transpose  the 
former  symbols  in  the  interconvertible  moods  ; so  that  whereas  in  the  one 
stand  0 M r,  in  the  other  stand  T M C.”  1 

The  notation  previously  spoken  of,  represents  every  various 
syllogism  in  all  the  accidents  of  its  external  form.  But  as  the 
number  of  Moods  in  syllogisms  Analytic  and  Synthetic,  Intensive 
and  Extensive,  Unfigured  and  Figured  (and  of  this  in  all  the 
figures),  are  the  same  ; and  as  a reasoning,  essentially  identical, 
may  be  carried  through  the  same  numerical  mood , in  every  genus 
and  species  of  syllogism  : — it  seems,  as  we  should  wish  it,  that 
there  must  he  possible  also,  a notation  precisely  manifesting  the 
modal  process,  in  all  its  essential  differences , but,  at  the  same 
time,  in  its  internal  identity , abstract  from  every  accidental  va- 
riety of  external  form.  The  anticipation  and  wish  are  realized ; 
and  realized  with  the  utmost  clearness  and  simplicity,  in  a nota- 


1 [The  following  Table  is,  in  part,  an  epitome  of  the  preceding  Note  : 


e ® 
g « 


f 

1 

Recognized, 
as  Propositional 

Immediate  ; 
of  which  some  ( 

(Various.) 

kinds  are 

r Disjunctive. 

l 

Not  recognized,  , 

Hypo- 

as Syllogistic. 

Conjunctive.  , 

thetical 

f Unfigured. 

1 

Analytic.  ^ 
1 

Mediate ; * 

Syllogism  Proper,  ■ 

Figured, 

' F.  I. 

M 

(Categorical.) 

(Intensive 

F.  II. 

k Synthetic.  J 

or  Exten- 

s sive)  in 

F.  III.  , 

> 

t. 

S- 


to 

P 


3 


O 


g 

o 

o 

Q- 

to 


608 


APPENDIX  II.  OF  SYLLOGISM.  (A.) 


tion  which  fulfills,  and  alone  fulfills  these  conditions.  This  no- 
tation I have  long  employed  ; and  the  two  following  are  speci- 
mens. Herein,  four  common  lines  are  all  the  requisites : three 
(horizontal)  to  denote  the  terms  ; one  (two  ? — perpendicular)  or 
the  want  of  it,  at  the  commencement  of  comparison,  to  express 
the  quality  of  affirmation  or  negation  ; while  quantity  is  marked 
hy  the  relative  length  of  a terminal  line  within,  and  its  indefinite 
excurrence  before,  the  limit  of  comparison.  This  notation  can 
represent  equally  total  and  ultra-total  distribution,  in  simple  syl- 
logism and  sorites ; it  shows,  at  a glance,  the  competence  or  in- 
competence of  any  conclusion  ; and  every  one  can  easily  evolve  it. 


C 

M 

r 


c 

M 

r 


Of  these:  the  former,  with  its  converse,  includes,  Darii,  Dabi- 
tis,  Datisi,  Disarms,  Dimatis,  &c. ; while  the  latter,  with  its  con- 
verse, includes  Celarent,  Cesare,  Celantes,  Camestres,  Camenes, 
&c.  But  of  these,  those  which  are  represented  by  the  same  dia- 
gram are,  though  in  different  figures,  formally,  the  same  mood. 
For  in  this  scheme,  each  of  the  thirty-six  moods  has  its  peculiar 
diagram  ; whereas,  in  all  the  other  geometrical  schemes,  hitherto 
proposed  (whether  by  lines,  angles,  triangles,  squares,  parallelo- 
grams, or  circles),  the  same  (complex)  diagram  is  necessarily 
employed,  to  represent  an  indefinite  plurality  of  moods.  These 
schemes  thus  tend,  rather  to  complicate,  than  to  explicate — rather 
to  darken  than  to  clear  up. — The  principle  of  this  notation  may 
be  realized  in  various  forms. 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL. 


(B.)  ON  AFFIRMATION  AND  NEGATION— ON  PROPOSITION- 
AL FORMS— ON  BREADTPI  AND  DEPTH— ON  SYLLOGISTIC, 

AND  SYLLOGISTIC  NOTATION,  &c. 

The  present  article  consists  of  observations  made  in  reference 
to  a memoir  by  Professor  de  Morgan,  entitled,  “ On  the  Symbols 
of  Logic,  the  Theory  of  the  Syllogism,”  &c.,  read,  in  February, 
1850,  to  the  Cambridge  Philosophical  Society,  and  published  in 
their  Transactions  (vol.  ix.)  The  author  (with  whom  I had  pre- 
viously been  involved  in  a logical  discussion,  more,  however,  of 
personal  than  of  scientific  concernment),  politely  transmitted  to 
me  a copy  of  this  paper,  during  the  following  summer ; and  the 
character  of  its  contents  induced  me,  forthwith,  to  address  the 
following  letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Athen^um.  This  letter,  I 
was  compelled  to  limit  to  a single  point,  in  consequence  of  the 
others  leading  me  into  a field  of  argument  too  extensive  : but,  as 
I now  find  that  my  observations  upon  these  were  more  fully  writ- 
ten out  than  I had  recollected — as  the  unexclusive  controversy 
involves  some  questions  of  scientific  novelty — and  tends  withal 
to  show  of  what  value  are  the  mathematical  improvements  of 
Logic,  now  proposed ; on  second  thoughts,  I here  append  the 
whole  discussion,  with  a few  verbal  amplifications,  and  two  sup- 
plementary notes.  I regret,  indeed,  that  the  necessity  of  vindi- 
cating what,  to  me,  is  the  cause  of  truth,  should  have  given  to 
these  comments  a character  so  controversial ; constraining  me  to 
combat,  from  first  to  last,  the  logical  speculations  of  one  who 
ranks  deservedly  among  the  highest  of  our  British  Mathemati- 
cians. In  fact,  if  I be  not  radically  wrong,  with  the  exception  of 
two  doctrines — which  are  themselves,  indeed,  only  borrowed — 
there  is  not,  in  the  whole  compass  of  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  “ Logical 
Systems,”  a single  logical  novelty  which  is  not  a logical  blunder. 
Of  other  errors,  I say  nothing.  This,  Mr.  de  Morgan  himself  has 
not  only  warranted,  but  called  on,  me  to  show.  For,  though 
casting  no  blame  on  the  aggressive  purport  of  his  paper,  it  will, 
at  least,  be  allowed,  that  the  attack  is  from  too  respectable  a 

Q,  Q 


610 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B). 


quarter  not,  on  my  part,  to  justify — even,  perhaps,  to  necessitate, 
a defense  : and  blame,  assuredly,  I cast  neither  on  Professor  de 
Morgan  nor  on  the  Philosophical1  Society  of  Cambridge ; for  the 
love  of  truth  is  always,  of  itself,  polemical  (“ITdAe/io?  aTravjwv, 
teal  tt}?  ’AXydeia'i,  7 rarr/p") ; while  reason  and  experience  concur 
in  showing,  that  Mathematics  and  Logic,  like  Love  and  Majesty — 

“ Haud  bene  conveniunt,  nec  in  una  sede  morantur.” 

But  it  comes  to  this  — If,  as  has  been  said,  Mr.  de  Morgan’s 
Memoir  may  represent  the"  Transactions,  the  Transactions  the 
Society,  and  the  Society  the  University  of  Cambridge,  then,  either 
is  the  knowledge  of  Logic — even  bf  “ Logic  not  its  own” — in  that 
seminary  now  absolutely  null,  or  I am  publicly  found  ignorant 
of  the  very  alphabet  of  the  science  I profess^  The  alternative  I 
am  unable  to  disown ; the  decision  I care  nor  to  avoid ; and  the 
discussion,  I hope,  may  have  its  uses. 

Edinburgh,  "7th  August , 1850. 

Sir — May  I request  the  favor  of  being  permitted,  through  your 
journal,  to  say  a few  words  on  a somewhat  abstract  subject,  and 
in  answer  to  Professor  de  Morgan’s  paper  “ On  the  Symbols  of 
Logic,”  &c.,  in  the  volume  of  the  “ Transactions  of  the  Philoso- 
phical Society  of  Cambridge,”  which  has  just  appeared.  [Wrong; 
the  volume  was  not  then  published.]  With  that  gentleman’s 
logical  theories,  in  general,  I should  not  have  thought  of  inter- 
fering ; and  even  his  errors  concerning  my  own  doctrines  I would 
have  willingly  left  to  refute  themselves.  Not  that  I entertain  a 
low  opinion  of  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  talent.  In  so  far  as  I am  quali- 
fied to  judge,  he  well  deserves  the  high  reputation  as  a mathema- 
tician which  he  enjoys.  But  as  a writer  on  the  theory  of  reason- 
ing, I can  not  think  that  he  has  done  his  talent  justice.  I am 
persuaded,  indeed,  that  had  he  studied  mathematics  as  he  has 
studied  logic,  and  were  the  members  of  the  “ Cambridge  Philoso- 
phical Society”  as  competent  judges  in  the  one  science  as  in  the 
other — his  character  as  a mathematician  would  rank  very  differ- 
ently from  what  it  does,  nor  would  their  “ Transactions”  have 

1 The  Philosophical  Society  of  Cambridge  ought  not,  however,  to  be  so  entitled, 
if  we  take  the  word  Philosophy  in  the  meaning  attached  to  it  every  where  out  of 
Britain. — (See  above,  p.  272.)  I may  add,  as  another  example,  that  the  recent  edition, 
by  the  learned  Erdmann,  of  the  “ Opera  Philosophica”  of  Leibnitz,  precisely  omits, 
as  non-philosophical,  the  matters  which  in  Cambridge  are  styled  philosophy  ; — to  wit, 
Physics  and  Mathematics.  Philosophy  is  not,  however,  formally  excluded  from  the 
“ Philosophical  Society  of  Cambridge,”  as  it  is  from  the  “ Philosophical  Society  of 
London.”  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  paper  is  an  example. 


AFFIRMATION  AND  NEGATION. 


611 


introduced  his  logical  speculations  to  the  world.  It  is  because 
Mr.  de  Morgan  has  not  merely  erred  himself,  hut  put  into  my 
mouth  his  own  rudimentary  mistakes ; and  because,  so  far  from 
these  mistakes  being  detected  when  his  paper  was  read  and  dis- 
cussed, that  paper  has  been  deemed  by  the  Philosophical  Society 
a contribution  worthy  of  publication  as  a part  of  its  proceedings  : 
— these  special  causes  now  principally  constrain  me  to  a brief 
exposition  of  the  unintentional  misrepresentations. 

The  present  comments  relate  exclusively  to  Mr.  de  Morgan’s 
strictures  on  my  abstract  notation  of  syllogistic  forms,  a specimen 
of  which  has  been  published  by  Mr.  Thomson  in  his  “ Laws  of 
Thought.”  But  though  that  fragment  contain  only  affirmations, 
and  of  these  only  the  naked  symbols,  Mr.  de  Morgan  excogitating 
the  negative  forms,  translates  them  into  concrete  language,  ac- 
cording to  his  conception  of  what  they  ought  to  express ; and  then, 
without  a word  of  explanation  makes  me  their  author. — Farther  : 
Finding  that  these  expressions,  as  those  which  he  attributes  to 
logicians  in  general,  are  repugnant  to  “ common  thought,”  to 
“ common  language” — he  might  have  fairly  added,  and  to  com- 
mon sense , he  has  swelled  a memoir  of  more  than  fifty  quarto 
pages  with  objections  to  Aristotle’s  doctrine  and  to  mine  ; hut 
radically  misapprehending  both,  the  illustration  of  his  errors,  at 
once  dispels  the  objections  themselves,  and  therewith  the  two 
novel  “ Systems”  reared  on  the  same  imaginary  foundation. 

Mr.  de  Morgan  says  : 

“ The  following  phrase  of  Sir  William  Hamilton’s  system,  ‘ All  A is 
not  some  B,’  [!]  is  very  forced,  both  in  order  and  phraseology;  one  who 
sees  it  for  the  first  time  finds  it  hard  to  make  English  or  sense  of  it.  The 
meaning  is,  ‘ Each  A is  not  any  one  among  certain  of  the  B’s,’  [!]  and 
in  its  place  in  the  system  alluded  to,  the  uncouth  expression  helps  to  pro- 
duce system,  and  the  perception  of  uniform  laws  of  inference.” — (P.  5.) 
And  again  : “ The  logician,  who  must  have  forms,  has  to  make  a choice, 
and  he  has  invented  cumular  expressions  which  do  not  suit  the  genius 
of  common  thought  or  common  language.  ‘All  man  is  not  fish,’  [!]  is 
the  form  in  which  a logician  denies  that  any  man  is  a fish.  Sir  William 
Hamilton  says,  ‘All  man  is  not  all  fish.’  [!]  Common  language  would 
deny  the  first  by  saying,  ‘No,  nor  any  part  of  him.'  Even  ‘ All  men  are 
not  fishes’  only  means,  in  common  language,  ‘some  men  are  not  fishes’ 
with  emphasis  upon  the  great  number  that  are  implied  to  he  so  ; and 
would  therefore  he  held  false.  The  predicate  of  a negative  must  he  ex- 
emplar : it  is,  ‘Every  man  is  not  any  one  fish.’  [!]  The  examination  of 
the  following  table  will  show  that  there  is  much  less  forcing  of  common 
expression  in  a list  of  nothing  hut  exemplars  than  in  a list  of  nothing  but 
cumulars.”  [!] — (P.  24.) 


612 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


This  attribution  of  certain  phrases  for  certain  forms  of  predica- 
tion to  the  logicians  and  to  me,  is  a mere  imagination  of  Mr.  de 
Morgan.  I admit,  that  had  we  thus  spoken,  we  had  spoken,  not 
only  ungrammatically,  but  nonsensically.  This,  however,  we 
have  not  done ; and  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  imagination  of  the  fact,  is 
the  result  of  a strange  oversight  on  his  part  of  the  commonest 
principle  and  practice  of  common  logic  and  of  common  language. 
For  language  is  logical  in  its  forms  ; and  a logic  which  can  not 
be  unambiguously  expressed  in  language,  is  no  logic  at  all. 
Logic,  Language,  and  Common  Sense  are  never  at  variance.  Mr. 
de  Morgan,  I say,  curiously  misunderstands  the  nature — the  con- 
trast of  Affirmation  and  Negation,  and  the  counter  expressions  in 
which  that  contrast  is  embodied  by  language.  I regret  to  tarry 
for  a moment  on  a point  so  elementary ; but,  as  the  mistake  is 
of  that  very  point,  it  is  necessary  to  state,  what  I feel  it  irksome 
not  to  suppose  known — at  least  instinctively.  Known,  however, 
scientifically  it  often  is  not ; and  as  the  principle  has  never  been 
developed,  I may,  at  once,  correct  Mr.  de  Morgan,  and  explain  it. 

Mr.  de  Morgan’s  error  is  twofold ; and  of  these  again  each  is 
compound. 

1°.  He  thinks,  that  in  universal  negation , the  logicians  employ 
the  predesignation  “ all,'1'1 — which  they  do  not ; and  do  not  em- 
ploy the  predesignation  “any” — which  they  regularly  do.  On 
this  complex  reversal  of  the  fact,  he  fancies  an  obnoxious  “ Sys- 
tem”— wars  strenuously  against  this  hostile  phantom — fathers  it 
on  others — and  finally  adjudges  it  to  righteous  condemnation,  by 
the  style  of  “ Cumular.” 

2°.  He  thinks,  that  the  predesignation  “all”  can  be  superseded, 
and  the  predesignation  “ any”  applied  to  universal  affirmation  ; — 
both  erroneously.  From  the  conjunction  of  these  two  impossi- 
bilities, the  new-born  “ System”  is  engendered,  which  he  fosters 
as  his  own,  and  fondly  baptizes  by  the  name  of  “ Exemplar.” — 
But  these  errors  must  be  further  explained. 

To  speak,  then,  of  Affirmation  and  Negation. 

In  result. — Affirmation  is  inclusion , and  universal  affirmation, 
absolute  inclusion — the  inclusion  of  a definite  this  or  all  (indivi- 
dual or  class)  ; Negation  is  exclusion , and  universal  negation, 
absolute  exclusion — the  exclusion  of  a definite  this  or  all  (indivi- 
dual or  class).  (Laying  individuals  aside)  : 

In  process. — Affirmation  proceeds  downward  or  inward,  from 
greatest  to  least,  from  the  constituted  whole  to  the  constituent 


AFFIRMATION  AND  NEGATION. 


613 


parts  ; Negation,  upward  or  outward,  from  least  to  greatest,  from 
the  constituent  parts  to  the  constituted  whole. 

The  counter  qualities  are  also  contrasted,  in  and  as  the  two 
counter  quantities. — In  proportion  : — to  Depth  or  intension,  is  af- 
firmation ; to  Breadth  or  extension,  is  negation. — At  the  maximum 
of  Breadth , there  is  predicated  : — by  Affirmation,  the  least  of  the 
most,  (that  is,  there  is  given  the  fewest  attributes  to  the  greatest 
number  of  things) ; — by  Negation,  the  most  of  the  least  (that  is, 
there  is  withdrawn  the  greatest  number  of  attributes  from  the 
fewest  things).  Hence  : — To  posit  the  Genus,  is  not  to  posit  the 
Species  and  Individual ; but  to  sublate  the  Grenus,  is  to  sublate 
the  Species  and  Individual. — At  the  maximum  of  Depth,  there  is 
predicated  : — by  Affirmation,  the  most  of  the  least,  (that  is,  there 
is  given  the  greatest  number  of  attributes  to  the  fewest  things) ; 
— by  Negation,  the  least  of  the  most  (that  is,  there  is  withdrawn 
the  fewest  attributes  from  the  greatest  number  of  things).  Hence : 
— To  posit  the  Individual,  is  to  posit  the  Species  and  Genus ; 
but  to  sublate  the  Individual,  is  not  to  sublate  the  Species  and 
Genus. — [See  Table,  p.  631.] 

Now,  from  the  higher  view  of  an  abstract  or  scientific  Notation, 
which  regards  and  states  only  the  result ; Negation  appears  as  a 
positive  and  irrespective  act — an  act  of  exclusion.  Here,  all  the 
signs  of  affirmative  and  negative  quantity  are  the  same  ; what  is 
absolutely  included  or  excluded  is  all. 

On  the  contrary,  from  the  lower  view  of  concrete  or  common 
Language,  which  is  conversant  about  the  process,  Negation 
(what  its  name  expresses)  shows  only  as  a privative  and  correla- 
tive act — as  the  undoing,  as  the  reversal  of  inclusion  or  affirma- 
tion. Here  the  predesignatory  words  for  universally  affirmative 
and  universally  negative  quantity  are  not  the  same.  In  ordinary 
speech  we  say  : — for  absolute  affirmation,  all  is,  &c. ; for  absolute 
negation,  not  any  (or  none)  is,  &c. ; thus  accomplishing  the  exclu- 
sion o/all  through  the  non-inclusion  of  any.  To  use,  in  common 
language,  the  same  verbal  predesignation  of  quantity  for  an  af- 
firmative, as  for  a negative,  universal,  would  be,  in  fact,  to  do 
nearly  the  opposite  of  what  is  intended  to  be  done.  Every 
logician  knows  explicitly,  as  every  unlearned  man  knows  implic- 
itly, that  naturally,  and  in  common  language,  the  negation  of  a 
universal  affirmative  predesignation  yields  only  a particular  nega- 
tive, as  the  negation  of  a universal  negative  predesignation  yields 
only  a particular  affirmative.  The  logician  therefore,  to  desig- 


614 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL  (B.) 


natc  a Universal  Affirmative,  familiarly  uses  “ all  is,”  “ all  are 
the  “ all ” (iras,  irdvres,  omnis,  omnes,  &c.)  containing  under  it, 
and  therefore  meaning — sometimes  collectively,  “ whole”  &c.  (0A0?, 
oKol  arras,  drravres,  avprras  avyrravres,  totus,  toti,  cunctus,  cuncti, 
universus,  universi,  &c.) — sometimes  distributively,  “ every,” 
“ each,”  “ each  several  ” &c.  (7 ra?  ti?  e/caaro 9,  eicaaros  ti?,  Tra? 
eKacrros,  rrdvres  e/caaToi,  oancrovv,  7 ra?  oar  is,  irdvres  oaoi,  quisque, 
unusquisque,  singulusquisque,  &c.):  and  for  a Universal  Negative, 
(eschewing  “ all  is  not,”  as  at  best  ambiguous),  he  employs  “wo 
or  none  (not  one)  is,”  “ not  any  is,”  “ awy  is  not,”  &o.  (ovSels, 
yySeU  ecm,  nullus,  ullus  non,  non  or  ne  aliquis,  non  quisquam, 
non  quispiam  est,  &c.)  To  quote  my  version  of  the  “ Asserit 
A,”  &c.,  a version  with  which  Mr.  de  Morgan  may  he  ac- 
quainted : 

“ A,  it  affirms  of  this,  these,  all, 

While  E denies  of  any,”  &c. 

In  this,  common  logic  and  common  language  (from  which  last 
many  curious  illustrations  might  he  given)  are  at  one.  As  a 
single  example : — the  Latin  ullus  (a  word  in  which  that  tongue 
is,  in  this  instance,  richer  than  the  Greek,  which  has  nothing,  at 
least,  better,  than  the  ambiguous  rls),  affords  a beautiful  illustra- 
tion. Ullus  (unulus),  any,  ullus  non,  nullus  (non  or  ne  ullus, 
ovSeh,  /AySeU),  not  any,  none ; nonnullus  (non  nullus),  not  none, 
some ; nullus  non,  none  not,  all.  So  nemo , (ne  homo) ; non  nemo  ; 
and  nemo  non.  So  nihil,  (ne  hilum) ; non  nihil ; and  nihil  non. 
Nor  need  there  he  an  end  of  instances  in  any  language.  The 
Hebrew  is,  in  fact,  so  far  as  I am  aware,  the  only  tongue  which 
does  not  always  discriminate  unambiguously,  and  by  verbal  con- 
trast, the  affirmative  from  the  negative  universal,  though  one 
tongue  may  certainly  do  this  more  deftly  than  another. 

Now,  the  predesignation  of  universal  negation,  which  Mr.  de 
Morgan  marvelously  makes  “ the  logician”  to  employ,  nay  even 
to  have  “ invented”  for  himself,  as  a technical  expression — this 
predesignation,  (in  his  example — “All  man  is  not  fish,”  in  mine 
— “All  men  are  not  blackamores,”)  is  in  logical,  as  in  ordinary, 
language,  not  a universal  at  all,  but  a particular  negative — a 
mere  denial  of  omnitude — tantamount,  therefore,  it  should  be,  to 
a particular  affirmative.  Ov  1 ra?  e<m  is,  indeed,  the  common 
expression  of  Aristotle  and  the  Greek  logicians  for  “some  is  not.” 
[“  Some  is”  should,  however,  have  been  held  its  direct  and  natural 
result ; for,  as  we  shall  see,  two  particulars  in  the  affirmative  and 


AFFIRMATION  AND  NEGATION. 


815 


negative  forms,  ought  to  infer  each  other.  Compare  p.  623,  sq.] 
— If  Mr.  de  Morgan,  therefore,  can  name  (as  I know  may  be 
done)  any  writer  on  logic  who  employs  the  expressions  thus 
attributed  to  all  logicians,  Mr.  de  Morgan  is  heartily  welcome  to 
treat  the  blunderer  as  he  may  deem  his  ignorance  to  deserve. — 
So  much  for  “ the  logician.” 

As  for  myself : — The  language  I use  is  that  of  the  logicians  ; 
only  the  quantity  of  the  predicate,  contained  in  thought,  is  overtly 
expressed,  whereas,  in  common  language,  followed  by  common 
logic,  that  quantity  is,  though  never  null,  usually,  merely  under- 
stood. Therefore,  reversing  the  expression  of  “ the  logician,” 
Mr.  de  Morgan  naturally  reverses  mine ; hut  the  distorted  non- 
sense which  he  lays  to  my  account  is,  I am  assured,  only  what 
he  conceived  a fair  version  of  my  abstract  notation.  As  all,  how- 
ever, that  has  been  said  of  Mr.  de  Morgan  in  relation  to  the 
logicians  in  general,  equally  applies  to  him  in  regard  to  me  in 
particular,  addition  is  superfluous. 

So  much  for  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  mistakes  about  “the  Cumular 
System,”  laid  to  the  logicians  and  myself.  I proceed  to  the 
counter  scheme,  his  own  “ Exemplar  System,”  proposed  in  sup- 
plement and  correction  of  the  other,  and  founded,  as  said,  on  the 
employment  of  the  predesignation  “ any''1  as  a universal , not  only 
in  negative,  but  also  in  affirmative , propositions. 

Our  English  “ any ” (aenig,  anig,  Ang.-Sax.)  is  of  a similar 
origin  and  signification  with  the  Latin  ‘lullusv  (unulus),  and 
means,  primarily  and  literally  (even)  one,  (even)  the  least  or 
fewest. — But  now,  to  speak  of  the  schools,  it  is  of  quodlibetic 
application,  ranging  from  least  to  greatest ; and  (to  say  nothing 
of  extra-logical  modes  of  speech,  as  interrogation,  doubt,  condi- 
tioning, extenuation,  intension,  &c.)  is  exclusively  adapted  to 
negation.  For  example.  We  can  say  as  we  can  think,  affirma- 
tively : — “ All  triangles  are  all  trilaterals ;”  this  collectively — 
“ The  whole  (or  class)  triangle  is  the  whole  (or  class)  trilateral; 
this  distributively — “ Every  (or  each  several)  triangle  is  every 
(or  each  several)  trilateral.”  Now,  let  us  try  “ any”  as  an  affirm- 
ative : — “ Any  triangle  is  any  trilateral.”  This  is  simple  non- 
sense ; for  we  should  thus  confound  every  triangle  with  every 
other,  pronouncing  them  all  to  be  identical.  Nor,  in  fact,  does 
Mr.  de  Morgan  attempt  this.  He  wisely  omits  the  form.  But 
what  an  omission ! Still,  however,  the  “ Table  of  Exemplars ,” 


616 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


which  he  does  present  (p.  25),  stands  alone,  I am  persuaded,  in 
the  history  of  science.  And  mark,  in  what  terms  it  is  ushered 
in  : — as  “ a system  of  predication  free  from  the  objections  urged 
against  the  cumular  forms,  as  far  as  contradiction  is  concerned ,” 
nor,  like  them,  “ unsuited  to  the  genius  of  common  thought  or 
common  language .”  Nay,  so  lucid  does  it  seem  to  its  inventor, 
that,  after  the  notation  is  detailed,  we  are  told,  that  it  “ needs  no 
explanation .” 

Now,  then,  let  us  take,  as  our  first  specimen  of  this  “ System,” 
the  fifth  proposition  of  the  Table — “ Some  one  X is  any  one  Y 
and  applying  this  form,  by  interpretation,  to  a concrete  matter, 
we  have — “ Some  one  figure  is  any  one  triangle” — “ Some  one 
animal  is  any  one  man.”  Here,  however,  the  proposition  is  in 
terms  absurd ; nor  does  it  even  express  what  it  is  intended  to 
mean.  For  not  any — for  not  any  one — for  no  one  figure  is  any 
or  any  one  triangle. 

Again,  as  our  second  specimen,  taking  the  first  proposition  of 
the  Table — “ Any  one  X is  any  one  Y.”  This,  we  are  told, 
“ gives”  or  is  supposed  to  mean — “ There  is  but  one  X and  one 
Y,  and  X is  Y.”  But  it  means — it  can  mean — nothing  of  the 
kind ; it  is  only  doubly  unmeaning,  or  doubly  contrary  to  all 
meaning.  For,  in  the  first,  place,  “any”  and  “any  one ” neces- 
sarily imply  that  there  are  more — more  than  one  ; and,  in  the 
second,  the  whole  proposition  becomes,  on  such  hypothesis,  absurd. 
This  “ Exemplar”  proposition  is,  however,  a favorite  with  Mr. 
de  Morgan,  who  thinks  it  to  afford  “ a conclusion  not  admissi- 
ble in  the  Cumular  form”  (p.  26).  So  long  as  the  proposition  re- 
mains void  of  sense,  this  is  true  ; not  certainly  if  interpreted  into 
meaning. 

Finally,  however,  the  inconsistency  of  the  “ Exemplar  System” 
is  sufficiently  shown  in  this — That  its  propositions,  even  when 
not  immediately  suicidal,  do  not  admit  of  any  rational  conversion. 
Thus,  the  sound  without  sense — the  proposition  first  adduced,  is 
the  verbal  converse  of  another  which,  by  chance,  is  not  self-con- 
tradictory ; to  wit — “ Any  one  Y is  some  one  X” — “ Any  one 
triangle  is  some  one  figure” — “ Any  one  man  is  some  one  animal.” 
The  reason  is  obvious.  “Any”  contains  in  it  “some,”  “some” 
contains  under  it  “ any ;”  “ some”  is  the  less  definite,  the  genus, 
“ any”  is  the  more  definite,  the  species  ; “ any”  is  always  “some,” 
some  is  not  always  “ any.” — The  absurdity  is,  however,  carried 


AFFIRMATION  AND  NEGATION. 


617 


to  a climax,  through  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  formal  limitation  of  the 
several  quantities  by  “ one.” 

But  enough ! — Mr.  de  Morgan  gravely  propounds  all  this  as 
“ sense  and  English ” — as  in  honorable  contrast  to  the  uncouth- 
ness and  violence  and  contradictions  of  the  “ Cumular  System.” 
He  certainly  does  not  mean  to  turn  logic  into  ridicule  ; hut,  as- 
suredly, if  logic  were  responsible  for  the  “ forms”  and  “ systems” 
thus  seriously  proposed,  it  would  no  longer  he  respectable  enough 
even  for  a jest. — “ This  notation,”  says  Mr.  de  Morgan,  “ needs 
no  explanation.”  Right ! 

“ Emendare  jocos,  sola  litura  potest.” 

The  more  special  objections  of  Mr.  de  Morgan — one  and  all — 
it  would  he  equally  easy  to  refute ; hut  while  the  part,  now  con- 
sidered, of  his  paper  is  a fair  specimen  of  the  whole,  I am  unwill- 
ing to  trespass  farther  on  your  indulgence,  by  discussions  of  so 
limited  an  interest. — I remain,  &c. 

W.  Hamilton.* 1 

I have  now  signalized  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  general  and  gigantic 
error,  that  on  which  is  founded  the  correction  he  proposes  of  all 
former  Logic  ; and  proceed  to  consider  his  special  criticism  of  my 
peculiar  scheme  of  syllogistic  and  propositional  forms. 

And  here  I may  subdivide  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  objections  into  two 
classes  ; — the  first  containing  those  to  the  general  principle  of  my 
scheme — the  second,  those  to  this  or  that  of  its  individual  doc- 
trines. 

I. — Under  the  former  head  there  are  two  objections.  Of 
these : 

1 To  this  Mr.  de  Morgan  made  the  following  answer  ; and  on  the  one  point  to 
which  it  is  limited,  assuredly,  he  is  as  completely  right,  as  I am  completely  wrong. 

“ There  is  but  one  of  what  I call  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s  misapprehensions  which  I shall 
notice  now — and  that  only  to  prevent  your  readers  from  making  fruitless  inquiries. 
He  states  that  a volume  of  the  ‘ Cambridge  Philosophical  Transactions’  has  recently 
appeared.  This  I am  pretty  certain  is  not  the  case.  The  copy  of  my  memoir  which 

I had  the  honor  to  forward  to  him,  was  one  of  the  extra  copies  which  the  courtesy  of 
the  Society  allows  to  its  contributors  as  soon  as  their  several  papers  are  printed.  The 
paging,  by  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  cites,  shows  that  he  used  that  copy,  or  one  of  the 
same  issue  : — this  paging,  of  course,  will  be  altered  when  the  paper  takes  its  place  in 
the  volume. 

“ The  rest  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton’s  letter  I shall  dispose  of,  so  far  as  I deem  it  neces- 
sary, if  I live  to  publish  another  edition  of  my  work  on  Logic. — I am,  &c. 

“ A.  de  Morgan. 

“University  College,  August  26,  1850.” 


618 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B). 


1.  — The  first  is  supposed — is  assumed,  without  even  an  at- 
tempt at  proof ; it  requires,  indeed,  merely  to  he  stated,  to  he 
refuted. — “ Section  iv.”  of  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  Paper  is  entitled : — 
“ On  the  Symbolic  forms  of  the  system  in  which  all  the  combina- 
tions of  quantity  are  introduced  by  Arbitrary  Invention  of  forms 
of  predication  and  it  commences  : — “ This  system  belongs  to 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  &c.” — Now,  in  applying  the  term  “ arbi- 
trary invention ” to  this  scheme,  Mr.  de  Morgan  has  either  gone 
too  far,  or  not  far  enough.  For,  if  “the  forms  of  predication” 
exist  in  thought,  then  is  their  expression  in  logic  not  an  “ arbi- 
trary invention  whereas,  if  they  do  not  exist  in  thought,  then 
is  their  expression  in  logic,  not  arbitrary , but  false.  To  have 
proved  the  latter  would,  indeed,  have  pricked  the  “punctum 
saliens”  of  my  system.  But  not  attempting  this,  Mr.  de  Mor- 
gan now  virtually  admits  his  own  thesis  to  be  absurd ; even  had 
he  not,  in  fact,  previously  recorded  his  formal  acknowledgment, 
that  the  predicate  has  its  quantity  in  thought.  Why  then  did  he 
insinuate,  what,  he  knew,  could  not  be  maintained  ? 

2.  — The  second  of  the  two  objections  under  this  head  is  to  the 
want,  or  insufficiency,  in  my  doctrine,  of  a general  Canon  of  In- 
ference ; for  the  exceptions,  it  is  argued,  are  not  regulated  by,  and 
do  not  manifest,  the  rule.  (P.  13.) — Of  all  objections,  none  can 
be  more  curiously  infelicitous  than  this.  In  the  doctrine  referred 
to,  there  is  a rule , and  no  exceptions.  The  rule  there  governs 
every  thing ; every  thing  is  governed  by  the  rule. — But,  opposed 
to  my  canon,  which,  not  having  studied,  he  does  not  understand, 
Mr.  de  Morgan  propounds  the  following: — “ Erase  the  symbols 
of  the  middle  term , the  remaining  symbols  show  the  inference .” 
(Pp.  7,  11,  18,  26,  &c.)  This  canon  Mr.  de  Morgan  ought  not 
to  have  given  as  his  own.  It  is  that  of  Ploucquet : — “ Deleatur 
in  prcemissis  medius  ; id  quod  restat  indicat  conclusionem  and 
on  this  canon  Ploucquet  established  his  “ Logical  Calculus.” — 
Calculus  and  Canon  have,  however,  long  been  rejected  by  the 
G-erman  logicians,  as  mechanical  and  useless.  Hegel  even  pro- 
nounces : — “ This,  as  a discovery  and  improvement  in  Logic,  is 
the  bitterest  libel  that  was  ever  vented  against  the  science.”  But 
worse  than  useless  and  mechanical,  it  does  not  hold  good  ; for, 
though  valid  in  the  Aristotelic  system,  it  breaks  down  in  a fourth 
part  of  the  thirty-six  moods  emerging  under  my  doctrine  of  syl- 
logism. “ Transeat  ergo”  But  has  not  Mr.  de  Morgan  con- 


PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS. 


619 


founded  the  exceptions  to  Ploucquet’s  canon,  with  the  no  excep- 
tions to  mine  ? 1 2 

II. — Under  the  second  head  there  are  six  litigious  points. 

I shall  first  consider  the  objections  to  the  propositional  forms , 
which  I have  peculiarly  adopted.  But  it  is  proper  to  premise  a 
general  enumeration  of  these ; and  in  the  following  table,  the 
Roman  numerals  distinguish  such  as  are  recognized  in  the  Aris- 
totelic  or  common  doctrine,  whereas  the  Arabic  cyphers  mark  those 
(half  of  the  whole)  which  I think  ought  likewise  to  be  recognized.3 

Affirmatives. 

1.)  Toto-total  =Afa=A11  — is  all  — . 

ii.)  Toto-partial  =Afi  =A11  — is  some — . 

3.)  Parti-total  =Ifa  =Some — is  all  — . 

iv. )  Parti-partial=lFi  =Some — is  some — . 

Negatives. 

v. )  Toto-total  =ANA=Any  — is  not  any  — . 

6.)  Toto-partial  =Ani  =Any  — is  not  some — . 

vii.)  Parti-total  =lNA=Some — is  not  any  — . 

8.)  Parti-partial = Ini  = Some — is  not  some — . 

The  preceding  eight  Propositional  Forms,  I may  also  add,  are 
illustrated  by  the  following  six  Diagrams — (if  Definitely  Indefi- 
nite, for  if  Indefinitely  Definite  (see  p.  623,  sq.)  they  require  a 
series  of  more  artificial  and  complex  lines.)  The  identity  of  Sub- 
ject and  Predicate  is  marked  and  measured  by  the  co-extension 
of  the  two  lines  below  and  above  each  other ; the  non-identity, 
by  the  converse.  The  rationale  of  the  letters  is  manifest ; and  it 
is  likewise  manifest,  that  this  principle  of  notation  may  be  carried 
out  into  Syllogistic. — Proposition  (1)  is  illustrated  by  Diagram 
(a) ; (ii)  by  (b) ; (3)  by  (c) ; (iv)  by  (d)  ; (v)  by  (e) ; and  (8)  by 
(f) : but  (6)  is  shown  by  (b  and  d) ; as  (vii) 'by  (c  and  d).  Prop- 


A) 

(I) 

(E) 

(0) 


1 Mr.  Thomson  (Laws  of  Thought,  &c.)  seems  to  have  fallen  into  a similar  inaccu- 
racy ; not  perhaps  considering,  that  the  disconformity  in  quantification  of  the  extremes, 
as  they  appear  in  the  antecedent,  and  in  the  conclusion,  is,  in  my  doctrine,  not  an  ex- 
ception to,  but  a consequent  of,  the  canon. 

2 In  the  literal  symbols,  I simplify  and  disintricate  the  scholastic  notation  ; taking 
A and  I for  universal  and  particular,  but  extending  them  to  either  quality,  marking 

affirmation  by  F,  negation  by  N,  the  two  first  consonants  of  the  verbs  affirmo  and  ncgo 
— verbs  from  which,  I have  no  doubt,  that  Petrus  Hispanus  drew,  respectively,  the 
two  first  vowels,  to  denote  his  four  complications  of  quantity  and  quality.  These  I 
have  appended. 


620 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


osition  (8),  indeed,  though  it  have  its  special  diagram  (f),  quad- 
rates with  all  the  others. 


Aff. 


a) 


D • 


Aff.  & Neg. 

i \ C 

^B 


* * 


B- 


,xO- 

U;K 


Neg. 


•if-  -v-  -v. 

'7C  *7? 


Of  the  four  propositional  forms  specially  recognized  hy  me  (1, 
3,  6,  8)  Mr.  de  Morgan  questions  only  two;  one  affirmative  and 
one  negative,  being  the  first  and  the  last — the  toto-total  affirma- 
tion, the  parti-partial  negation.1  In  quoting  Mr.  de  Morgan’s 
“ objections  to  this  system  as  promulgated  by  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton” (p.  22),  I shall  substitute  for  his  symbols  his  own  transla- 
tions of  them  into  common  language. 

1. — Toto-total  Affirmation.  To  this  form  Mr.  de  Morgan  makes 
two  objections  : the  first,  that  it  is  complex ; the  second,  depend- 
ent upon  the  first,  that  it  can  not  be  denied  hy  a simple  proposi- 
tion. Of  these  objections  in  their  order. 

First  Objection. — “ First,  the  fundamental  propositions  of  a logical  sys- 
tem should  be  independent  of  each  other,  so  that  no  one  of  them  should  be 
a compound  of  two  others.  Now  ‘ all  Xs  are  Ys,’  or  ‘X  and  Y are  iden- 
tical names'  is  really  compounded  of  lAll  Xs  are  some  Ys,’  and  1 Some 
Xs  are  all  Ys.’  If  we  once  grant  a complex  proposition,  why  this  one 
only,  when  there  are  others,  out  of  which,  as  I have  shown,  a separate 
system  of  complex  syllogism  may  be  constructed  ? — To  say  that  the  mode 
of  inventing  propositions  yields  no  other,  is  not  an  answer ; for  it  is  the 
mode  itself  which  is  attacked  in  its  results.  Every  syllogism  in  which 
‘ All  is  all’  occurs,  is  either  a strengthened  form,  or  the  resultant  of  two 
other  syllogisms.” 

The  purport  of  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  reasoning  in  this  passage  is, 
that  the  form  “ All  Xs  are  all  Ys”  is  merely  the  compound  or 
resultant  of  two  simple  or  original  forms — “All  Xs  are  some 
Ys,”  and  “ Some  Xs  are  all  Ys.”  This  is  manifestly  erroneous, 
looking  no  farther  than  to  the  text  of  Mr.  de  Morgan  himself. 

In  the  first  place  the  proposition  “All  Xs  are  all  Ys”  is  said  to 


1 Mr.  de  Morgan  and  Mr.  Thomson,  herein,  partly  agree,  partly  differ.  They  dif- 
fer in  regard  to  Toto-total  affirmation  (1),  which  the  former  denies,  while  the  latter 
allows.  They  differ  also  about  Toto-partial  negation  (6),  which  Mr.  Thomson  refuses, 
but  Mr.  de  Morgan  apparently  admits.  They  both  agree,  however,  in  rejecting  Parti- 
partial.  negation  (8).  See  p.  627. 


PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS. 


621 


be  compound,  in  contrast  to  two  other  propositions  its  constitu- 
ents. But  how  “ All  Xs  are  all  Ys”  is  a proposition  more  com- 
plex than  “ All  Xs  are  some  Ys,”  than  “ Some  Xs  are  all  Ys,”  or 
even  than  “ Some  Xs  are  some  Ys,”  I confess  myself  wholly 
unable  to  imagine.  Mr.  de  Morgan  does  not  pretend  that  the 
predicate  has  no  quantity  ; but  how  one  quantity  can  be  more 
complex  than  another — how  All  should  be  compound,  and  Some 
simple,  he  has  not  attempted  to  explain. — Nay  more.  He  form- 
ally admits,  that  a proposition  with  its  predicate  universally , and 
its  subject  particularly , quantified  is  simple  ; as,  in  like  manner 
a proposition  with  a particular  predicate  and  a universal  subject: 
and  yet,  in  the  same  breath,  he  coolly  assumes  (for  he  propounds 
neither  argument  nor  explanation),  that  a proposition  with  its 
subject  and  predicate  each  universally  quantified  is  complex  ! 
But  if  “ Some  figure  is  all  triangle”  be  a simple  proposition,  is 
it  possible  to  conceive,  that  “ All  triangle  is  all  trilateral”  should 
not  be  a simple  proposition  likewise  ? It  seems,  that  some  and 
all , all  and  some,  some  and  some,  are  each  elementary,  while  all 
and  all  is  alone  derivative ! 

But  in  the  second  place,  this  inconsistency  is  eclipsed  by  ano- 
ther ; for  Mr.  de  Morgan  not  only  maintains  that  the  proposition 
“All  Xs  are  all  Ys”  is  compound,  but,  though  itself  confessedly 
valid,  compounded  of  two  incompossible  propositions — “ All  Xs 
are  some  Ys,”  and  “ Some  Xs  are  all  Ys  ;” — in  other  words,  that 
“All  triangle  is  all  trilateral”  is  the  combined  result  of  “All 
triangle  is  some  trilateral,”  and  “ Some  triangle  is  all  tri- 
lateral.” But,  unless  some  be  identified  with  all,  if  either  of 
the  latter  propositions  is  true  the  other  must  be  false ; — nay, 
in  fact,  if  either  be  true,  the  very  proposition  which  they  are 
supposed  to  concur  in  generating  is  false  likewise.* 1  Mr.  de 
Morgan  proceeds  : 


1 See  p.  623,  sq.— In  confirmation  of  the  above,  I am  happy  to  adduce  the  follow- 
ing testimony  by  a very  able  logician  : — “ Psychologically  as  well  as  logically,  we  be- 
lieve that  Sir  William  Hamilton  is  right  in  maintaining  1 All  A is  all  B’  to  be  a single 
judgment,  in  opposition  to  Mr.  de  Morgan,  who  exhibits  it  in  the  complex  form,  ‘ All 
A is  B,  and  all  B is  A thereby  accepting  the  second  horn  of  the  above  dilemma, 
since  1 all  A is  some  B and  all  B is  some  A,”  would  be  a self-contradictory  assertion.” 
And  in  a note: — “A  curious  inconsistency  may  be  remarked  in  the  theory  of  the 
complex  proposition,  when  placed  in  antagonism  to  that  of  the  quantified  predicate. 

I can  not  assert  1 all  A is  B and  all  B is  A,’  without  having  thought  of  A and  B as  co- 
extensive, i.  e.,  without  having  made  the  judgment  ‘ all  A is  all  B.’  If  we  know  the 
quantity  of  the  predicate,  we  are  of  course  entitled  to  state  it.  The  complex  proposi- 
tion is  only  preferable  on  the  supposition  of  our  ignorance,  a supposition  which  anni- 


622 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


Second  objection. — “ Secondly,  one  object  of  formal  logic  being  to  pro- 
vide form  of  enunciation  for  all  truth,  and  form  of  denial  for  all  falsehood, 
it  is  clear  that  every  falsehood  which  can  he  enunciated  as  a truth  should 
he  deniable  within  the  forms  of  the  science.  Now  the  simple  denial  of 
‘ All  Xs  are  all  Ys'  is  the  disjunctive  assertion,  1 Either  no  Xs  are  some 
Ys,  or  sovie  Xs  are  no  Ys.’  Though  it  happen  that  I can  prove  one  of 
these  to  be  true,  without  knowing  which,  yet  the  power  of  denying  in  an 
elementary  form  the  elementary  proposition,  1 All  is  all ,’  is  refused  me. 
A philologist  asserts  the  Greek  words  A and  B to  be  identical  in  mean- 
ing : he  says  1 All  A is  all  B.'  One  passage  of  Homer,  and  one  of  Hesiod, 
both  contain  the  doubtful  word  C,  having  two  possible  explanations,  the 
first  of  which  makes  Homer  assert  that  some  As  are  not  Bs,  while  the 
second  makes  Hesiod  assert  that  some  Bs  are  not  Ms.  The  premises  being 
admitted,  the  resulting  denial  of  the  simple  proposition  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton’s  system  is  only  obtainable  by  a dilemma,  or,  as  it  were,  meta- 
syllogism .” 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  argument  in 
this  paragraph,  I must  say  a word  upon  his  language.  By 
“ denial,”  “ deniable,”  &c.,  he  must  mean  contradictory  denial, 
contradictorily  deniable,  &c.  This  opposition  alone  affords  a 
single  pair  of  propositions,  and  the  one  alternative  of  truth  or 
falsehood  ; and  he  apparently  rejects  contrary  denial.  The  word 
contrary  he  however  commonly  employs  for  contradictory . But 

contrary  opposition  emerges,  when  a plurality  of  propositions  can 
severally  deny  the  original  enouncement,  but  where  each,  though 
not  all  of  these,  may  be  false.  This  being  noted,  I go  on. 

In  the  first  place,  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  reasoning  is  inapplicable. 
An  enlarged  system  is  not,  as  he  himself  admits  (p.  20),  to  be 
criticised  by  the  laws,  far  less,  then,  by  the  accidents,  of  an  un- 
enlarged one.  It  may  be  quite  true,  that  the  four  propositional 
forms  of  the  Aristotelic  scheme  has  each  its  contradictory  oppo- 
site ; but  it  by  no  means  follows,  that  the  same  accident  should 
attend  every  legitimate  amplification  of  that  scheme.  It  is  suffi- 
cient, that  every  competent  assertion  should  have  its  competent 
denial. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  in  point  of  fact,  the  Aristotelic  contra- 
diction only  proceeds  on  a certain  arbitrary  hypothesis  of  parti- 
cularity ; to  wit,  that  “ some”  is  to  mean  only  “ some  at  least ” 
(possibly  therefore,  all  or  none),  thus  constituting,  both  in  affirm- 

hilates  the  complex  proposition  itself.  If  the  assertion,  ‘ all  A is  some  B and  all  B is 
some  A’  be  suicidal,  is  there  more  vitality  in  ‘ all  A is  (I  know  not  how  much)  B,  and 
all  B is  (I  know  not  how  much)  A I’  But  the  question,  to  be  fully  discussed,  must 
be  treated  on  psychological  as  well  as  logical  grounds.  Logic  deals  with  the  judgment 
as  already  formed  ; psychology  inquires  what  is  the  actual  process  of  the  mind  in 
forming  it.” — (North  British  Review,  Vol.  xv.  p.  116.) 


PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS. 


623 


ation  and  in  negation,  virtually  a double  proposition — a proposi- 
tion comprising,  in  effect,  two  contraries .l 

1 I have  here,  and  once  before  (p.  621)  criticised  Mr.  de  Morgan,  not  on  Aristotelic 
principles.  It  is  but  fair  that  I state  articulately  the  grounds. 

All  particularity , all  “ some”  is,  generically,  indefinite ; but  one  particularity  is  of 
one  indefinitude,  another  is  of  another.  In  short,  to  apply  the  technical  formula  of 
Specification  (p.  628)  in  its  highest  simplicity — in  its  most  repulsive  nakedness  ; — 
some  Some  is  not  some  Some.  For,  so  to  speak,  of  “ some,”  one  species  denotes  inde- 
finite definitude  ; while  another  denotes  definite  indefinitude.  And  why  1 The  former 
species  not  definitely  excluding  the  definite— the  “ all”  and  “ none,”  is  therefore,  at 
once,  in  different  respects,  indefinite  and  definite,  that  is  indefinitely  definite  ; while 
the  latter,  definitely  excluding  the  definite — the  “ all,”  the  “ none,”  is,  therefore,  at 
once,  in  different  respects,  definite  and  indefinite,  that  is,  definitely  indefinite 

1°.  In  the  sense  of  indefinite  definitude. — Affirmatively  : “ Some”  means  “some 
at  least — some  perhaps  all that  is,  “ some,”  itself  always  indefinite,  but  not  definite- 
ly exclusive  of  the  definite,  “all.” — Negatively  : “Not  some”  means  “not  some,  at 
least — not  some,  perhaps  none  that  is,  “ not  some,”  itself  always  indefinite,  but  not 
definitely  exclusive  of  the  definite  “not  any,”  or  “none” — “At  least”  is  the  watch- 
word of  this  system,  in  affirmatives  as  in  negatives. 

2°.  In  the  sense  of  definite  indefinitude. — Affirmatively  : “ Some”  means  “ some 
at  most — some  not  all — some  only;”  that  is,  “some,”  itself  always  indefinite,  but 
definitely  exclusive  of  the  definite  “all.” — Negatively : “Not  some”  means  “not 
some,  at  most — not  some  and  yet  not  none — not  some,  only;”  that  is,  “not  some,” 
itself  always  indefinite,  but  definitely  exclusive  of  the  definite,  “not  any,”  or  “none.” 
— “ At  most,”  both  in  affirmative  and  negatives,  is  the  watchword  of  this  system. 

Of  these  several  meanings  of  “ some,”  all  the  world  has  been,  at  least  implicitly, 
never  unaware  ; and  of  the  two,  the  latter  is  certainly  the  more  prominent.  This 
enhances  the  marvel,  that  the  former  only  has  been  explicitly  developed  and  formally 
generalized  by  Aristotle  ; but  what  Aristotle  failed  to  do,  has  been  left  undone  by  sub- 
sequent logicians.  The  two  different  meanings  afford,  however,  in  many  cases  two 
different  results,  as  well  in  the  relation  of  Incompossibility , as  in  the  relation  of  (imme- 
diate) Inference  : and  what  is  worse,  even  than  the  exclusive  consideration  of  a.  single 
meaning,  is,  that  Inference  and  Incompossibility  (especially  by  the  logicians  after 
Aristotle)  have,  in  that  single  meaning,  been  jumbled  together  under  the  barren  and 
ambiguous  head  of  Opposition. 

But  worst  of  all ; in  fact,  the  one  meaning  considered  exclusively  by  Aristotle  and 
the  logicians,  has,  only  improperly,  an  intralogical,  formal,  objective  significance.  It 
is  not  a necessity,  either  of  thought  or  of  things,  but  merely  an  accident  of  the  former. 
Its  peculiar  indefinitude  is  a contribution  from  the  contingency  of  our  ignorance,  and 
with  our  ignorance  would  disappear  ; for  (to  say  nothing  of  Individuals  or  Individual- 
ized Generals),  in  reality  and  in  thought,  every  quantity  is  necessarily  either  all,  or 
none,  or  some.  Of  these  the  third  presents  the  only  formal  indefinitude ; and  it  is  form- 
ally exclusive  of  the  other  two.  The  double  inadvertence,  as  I think,  of  Aristotle  (An. 
Pr.  I.  2.)  in  recognizing  the  indesignate  {abiopicrrov)  to  be  at  once  a quantity  and  an 
indefinitude  (for  the  Indesignate  is  thought,  either  precisely,  as  whole  or  as  part,  or 
vaguely,  as  the  one  or  the  other,  unknown  which,  but  the  worse  always  presumed) ; 
— this  vagueness — this  material,  subjective  and  contingent  indefinitude,  lay  at  the  root 
of  his  whole  doctrine  of  Particularity,  the  indefinitude  of  which  quantity  he  should 
have  kept  purely  formal,  objective  and  necessary,  instead  of  confounding  the  two  inde- 
finitudes  together.  Thus  by  mixing  up  the  material  with  the  formal — what  was  inde- 
finitely thought  with  what  was  thought  as  indefinite,  Aristotle  (to  say  nothing  of  other 
consequences)  annulled  all  inference  of,  what  I would  call,  Integration.  On  his  doc- 
trine we  are  not  warranted,  from  the  proposition — “ Some  dogs  are  all  barking  animals” 
(“  Quoddam  caninum  est  omne  latrans”),  to  infer  the  proposition — “ Some  dogs  do 
not  bark”  (Quoddam  caninum  est  nullum  latrans”) — But  I am  lapsing  into  discussion. 
— We  must  therefore  have  two  Tables  : one  for  Incompossibility.  another  for  Infer- 


624 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


In  the  third  place,  however,  the  proposition  is,  in  truth,  contra- 
dictorily deniable ; for  every  legitimate  affirmation  must  admit 
of  a legitimate  negation.  But  negation  and  affirmation  must  be 
contradictorily  opposed  : as  Aristotle  has  expressed  it — “ Between 
affirmation  and  negation  there  is  no  mean.”  Yet  it  does  not  fol- 
low, that  the  denial  should  rest  on  a single  alternative  case— on 
a contradictory  proposition.  For  it  may  well  be,  that  a denial  is 
supported  only  on  one  or  other  of  two  incompossible  contraries  ; 
but  it  will  be  valid  if  one  or  other  of  the  contraries  be  true.  In 
the  present  case,  the  proposition,  for  example — “All  (class,  whole, 
every,  &c.)  triangle  is  all  (class,  whole,  every,  &c.)  trilateral,” 
is  contradictorily  denied  by  the  proposition — “All  (class,  &c.) 
triangle — is  not— all  (class,  &c.)  trilateral,”  in  the  sense — “ This 
proposition,  1 All  triangle  is  all  trilateral,’  is  untrue.'1'1  And  such, 
in  the  present  form,  is  comparatively  safe ; for  there  being  here 
two  universal  predesignations,  the  negative  particle,  like  the  ass 
of  Buridanus,  is  left  in  equilibrio,  and  not  necessarily  attracted, 
by  preference,  to  either.  (Illustrations  might  be  drawn  from  in- 
dividuals and  individualized  classes.)  The  denial  is  here,  cer- 
tainly, vague  and  ambiguous  ; but  so  it  ought.  For  there  are 
five  several  cases,  any  of  which  it  may  mean ; and  of  these  any 
will  validly  support  the  negation  of  the  affirmative  proposition. 
These  are  : — 1°,  “ Not-all  triangle  is  all  trilateral,”  equivalent  to 
the  proposition — “ Some  triangle  is  all  trilateral 2°,  “ All  tri- 
angle is  not-all  trilateral,”  equivalent  to  the  proposition — “All 
triangle  is  some  trilateral ;”  these  oppositions,  overlooked  by  the 
logicians,  I call  inconsistent s.  The  following  are  contraries : — 

3°,  “All  triangle  is-not  (i.  e.  excludes)  all  trilateral,”  tantamount 
(though  ambiguously)  to  the  proposition — “Any  triangle  is  not 
(no  triangle  is)  any  trilateral;”  4°,  11  All  triangle  is  not  all  tri- 
lateral,” signifying — “Some  triangle  is  no  trilateral;”  5°,  “All 
triangle  is-not  all  trilateral,”  in  the  sense  of — “ No  triangle  is 
some  trilateral.”  The  first  and  fourth,  the  second  and  fifth,  are 
in  fact  what  I call  integrants. 

Now  Mr.  de  Morgan  misconceives  all  this. — In  the  first  place, 


enee  ; and  under  each,  we  must  distinguish  the  result  on  either  system  of  particularity. 
At  present  I can  merely  append  the  compound  Table  (see  following  page) ; and  shall 
only  say,  that  a better,  though  a more  elaborate,  plan  of  showing  the  various  corre- 
lations of  the  several  pairs  of  propositions,  as  to  write  all  the  eight  on  the  phases  of 
octagonal  diagrams,  and  then  to  connect  them  by  different  lines  (thicker,  thinner, 
waving,  broken,  dotted,  &c.)  representing,  in  the  different  systems,  their  mutual  de- 
pendencies. 


PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS, 


625 


he  does  not  perceive  that  a proposition  can  he  contradictorily  de- 
nied, though  the  denial  itself  may  rest  ultimately  only  on  a single 
contrary  or  inconsistent  proposition.  For  though  the  denegand 
he  only  contrarily  or  inconsistently  opposed  to  each  of  the  alter- 
natively supporting  propositions,  it  is  however  contradictorily 


TABLE  OF  THE  MUTUAL  RELATIONS  OF  THE  EIGHT  PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS,  ON  EITHER 
SYSTEM  OF  PARTICULARITY.  (FOR  GENEALS  ONLY".) 


1 1 M 1 1 U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 & 1 1 II  I hf 

GO  < C3  <5  GO  < _ G)  Ci  GO  < _ 05  < CD  < C5  < 

Number 

anil 

Quality. 

Common  to  I.  and  II., 
in  either  of  which 
all  Propositions  are  related. 
Of  these  their 

p p ^ 3, » » 3 g.2. 3 3 3 3 3>3'p’5rp' 

II  1 1 1 II  1 II  1 1 1 1 1 1 MINI  II  II  II 
2^3  g'g'3  g ^^3  3 ££  3 3 3 3 3 §- 

• r r-p  • • r-p  • ■ r-p  * • r-p  • • * r* 

Value. 

Doubtful,  cr. 

Contrar.  bi. 
Contrar.  un. 
Contrar.  un. 

Contrar.  un. 

Repugn,  bi.  cr. 

Contrar.  un. 
Repugn,  bi.  cr. 

Repugn,  bi.  di. 

1. 

Indefinite  Defini- 
tude. 

( Some  at  least.) 

I. 

Incompossibility 
of  Proposition  with  Proposition,  on 
the  System  of 

Incons.  un. 
Incons.  un. 

Incons.  un.  cr. 

Incons.  un. 
Incons.  un. 

Doubtful,  cr. 

Contrar.  bi. 
Contrar.  un. 
Contrar.  un. 

Contrar.  un. 

Contrar.  bi.  cr. 

Contrar.  un. 
Contrar.  bi.  cr. 

Contrar.  bi.  di. 

2. 

Definite  Indefini- 
tude. 

( Some  at  most.) 

1— iv. 

ii — iv. 

3 — iv. 

v — 6. 
v — vii. 
v— 8 

6—8. 
vii— 8. 

1—8. 
ii— G. 
ii— 8. 

3 — vii. 
3—8. 

iv — 6,  6 — iv. 
iv — vii,  vii — iv. 
iv — 8,  8 — iv. 

To  wit, 
from — to 

II. 

Inference 

from  Proposition  to  Proposition  on  the 
two  Systems. 

Resir.  bi. 

Restr.  un. 
Restr.  un. 

Restr.  un. 
Restr.  un. 
Restr.  bi. 

Restr.  un. 
Restr.  un. 

1. 

Indefinite  Defini- 
tude. 

( Some  at  least.) 

Restr.  bi. 

Restr.  un. 
Restr.  un. 

Restr.  bi. 

Restr.  un. 
Restr.  un. 

Res.  & Int.  bi. 
Integr.  un. 

Res.  & Int.  un. 

Integr.  un. 

Res.  & Int.  un. 

Res.  & lut.  un. 
Res.  & Int.  un. 
Integr.  bi. 

2. 

Definite  Indefini- 
tude. 

( Some  at  most.) 

Abbreviations  :—bi.^zbilateral;  cr .—cross;  Contrar.= Contraries ; di .—direct;  Incons. 
=Inconsistents ; Int.  or  Integr. —Integration ; Repug n.=Repugnants,  Contradictories  ; Res 
or  Restr.= Restriction,  Subaltemation ; un.=unilateral. — Blanks:  in  l.=Compossibles ; in  II 
=No  inference. — ( Unilateral , bilateral,  cross,  direct,  refer  to  the  Extremes.) 

The  preceding  Table  may  not  be  quite  accurate  in  details. 


626 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


opposed  to  them  as  a class. — In  the  second  place,  he  has  over- 
looked all  the  five  cases  on  which  the  denial  may  he  established, 
except  the  last  two. — In  the  third  place,  he  marvelously  supposes 
that  each  of  these  does  not  singly  invalidate  the  toto-total  affirma- 
tive, but  that  the  truth  of  this  can  be  only  denied  by  a disjunctive 
proposition  made  up  of  a toto-partial  and  a parti-total  negative ; 
or  (for  he  varies),  of  two  parti-total  negatives. — In  the  fourth 
place,  Mr.  de  Morgan,  thus  varying,  does  not  observe,  that  his  pre- 
cept and  his  example  are  not  at  one. — Further,  in  the  fifth  place, 
he  is  here  seen  strangely  to  confound  the  hypothetical  process  of 
thought,  prior  to  all  negation,  with  the  subsequent  categorical 
negation  itself ; and  still  more  strangely,  to  limit  the  common 
hypothetical  preliminary  to  this  form  exclusively.  Adhering  to 
the  present  form,  and  to  our  previous  example,  the  reasoner  says 
to  himself: — “ The  proposition — ‘All  triangle  is  all  trilateral,’  is 
false,  if  case  1,  or  2,  or  3,  or  4,  or  5,  one  or  more,  be  true  ; but 
case  4 alone,  or  cases  4 and  5 together,  are  true,  therefore,”  &c. 
After  this  silent  hypothetical  preliminary,  he  categorically  states 
his  contradictory  denial.  The  process  is  the  same,  where  there 
is  only  one  possible  alternative,  when,  subsequently,  the  proposi- 
tion supporting  the  denial  is  itself  directly  and  not  disjunctively 
contradictory  of  the  denegand.  We  think  antecedently  : — “ If 
‘ Aristotle  is  a philosopher,’  be  true,  then  ‘ Aristotle  is  not  a phi- 
losopher,’ must  be  false,  and  vice  versa  ; but  that  is  true  ; there- 
fore this  is  false.”  We  then  openly  state  the  negation.* 1 — Mr.  de 
Morgan  goes  on  to  the  second  form. 

2. — Parti-partial  Negation ■ To  this  Mr.  de  Morgan  makes 
the  following  objection : 

“Thirdly,  the  proposition  ‘Some  Xs  are  not  some  Ys,’  has  no  funda- 
mental proposition  which  denies  it,  and  not  even  a compound  of  other 
propositions.  It  is  then  open  to  the  above  objection  : and  to  others  pe- 
culiar to  itself.  It  is  what  I have  called  (F.  L.,  p.  153.)  a spurious  pro- 
position, as  long  as  either  of  its  names  applies  to  more  than  one  instance. 


1 In  reference  to  this  objection  of  Mr.  de  Morgan,  it  has  been  acutely  observed  by 
the  ingenious  critic  previously  quoted  : — “ The  true  contradictory  we  take  to  be, 
‘ all  A is  not  all  B,’  which,  like  the  original  proposition,  may  be  treated  collectively 
or  dislributively,  i.  e.  as  a singular  or  as  an  universal  proposition.  In  the  latter  case 
it  is  compatible  with  one  of  three  distinct  assertions,  ‘ no  A is  B,’  ‘ some  A is  not  B,’ 

1 some  B is  not  A but  the  opponent  does  not  commit  himself  to  any  one  of  the  three. 
He  denies  only  to  the  extent  in  which  the  original  proposition  was  asserted,  and  no 
further  ; and  hence,  in  proportion  as  the  affirmation  is  definite,  the  negation  will  be 
indefinite.”  (North  British  Review,  vol.  xv.  p.  116.)  This,  it  will  be  observed,  is 
in  principle  the  same  with  what  has  just  been  alleged. 


PROPOSITIONAL  FORMS. 


627 


And  the  denial  is  as  follows  : — ‘ There  is,  but  one  X,  and  but  me  Y,  and 
X is  Y.'  Unless  we  know  beforehand  that  there  is  but  one  soldier,  and 
one  animal,  and  that  soldier  the' animal,  we  can  not  deny  that 1 some  sol- 
diers are  not  some  animals'  Whenever  we  know  enough  of  X and  Y 
to  bring  forward  ‘ some  Xs  are  not  some  Ys'  as  what  coidd  be  conceived 
to  have  been  false,  we  know  more,  namely,  'No  X is  Y,’  which,  when 
X and  Y are  singular,  is  true  or  false  with  ‘ some  Xs  are  not  some  Ys.'  ” 

Here  also  Mr.  de  Morgan  wholly  misunderstands  the  nature 
and  purport  of  the  form  which  he  professes  to  criticise.  He  calls 
it  “ a spurious  proposition.”  Spurious  in  law  means  a bad  kind 
of  bastard.  This  is,  however,  not  only  a legitimate,  for  it  ex- 
presses one  of  the  eight  necessary  relations  of  propositional  terms, 
hut,  within  its  proper  sphere,  one  of  the  most  important  of  the 
forms,  which  Logic  comprehends,  and  which  logicians  have  neg- 
lected. It  may,  indeed,  and  that  easily,  he  illogically  perverted. 
It  may  he  misemployed  to  perform  the  function  which  other 
forms  are  peculiarly  adapted  more  effectually  to  discharge  ; it 
may  be  twisted  to  sever  part  of  one  notion  from  part  of  another, 
the  two  total  notions  being  already  perhaps  thought  as  distinct ; 
— and  then,  certainly,  in  this  relation , it  may  be  considered  use- 
less : — but  in  no  relation  can  it  ever  logically  be  denominated 
“ spurious For  why  ? Whatever  is  operative  in  thought,  must 
be  taken  into  account,  and  consequently  be  overtly  expressible 
in  logic  ; for  logic  must  be,  as  to  be  it  professes,  an  unexclusive 
reflex  of  thought,  and  not  merely  an  arbitrary  selection — a series 
of  elegant  extracts,  out  of  the  forms  of  thinking.  Whether  the 
form  that  it  exhibits  as  legitimate  be  stronger  or  weaker,  be  more 
or  less  frequently  applied ; — that,  as  a material  and  contingent 
consideration,  is  beyond  its  purview. — But  the  form  in  question 
is,  as  said,  not  only  legitimate — not  “ spurious,” — it  is  most  im- 
portant. 

What  then  is  the  function  which  this  form  is  peculiarly — is, 
indeed,  alone , competent  to  perform? — A parti-partial  negative 
is  the  proposition  in  which,  and  in  which  exclusively,  we  declare 
a whole  of  any  kind  to  be  divisible ■ Some  A is  not  some  A; — 
this  is  the  judgment  of  divisibility  and  of  division  ;J  the  negation 
of  this  judgment  (and  of  its  corresponding  integrant)  in  the  asser- 
tion that  A has  no  some,  no  parts,  is  the  judgment  of  indivisi- 
bility, of  unity,  of  simplicity.  This  form  is  implicitly  at  work 

1 Looking  to  the  table  of  Breadth  and  Depth  (p.  631.)  and  taking  the  highest  genus, 
we  say : “ Some  A is  not  some  A ; for  some  A is  A E,  while  some  A is  A | E and 
so  on. — See  also  above,  p.  163. 


628 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


in  all  the  sciences,  and  it  has  only  failed  in  securing  the  atten- 
tion of  logicians  as  an  abstract  form,  because,  in  actual  use,  it 
is  too  familiar  to  he  notorious,  lying,  in  fact,  unexpressed  and  la- 
tescent  in  every  concrete  application.  Even  in  Logic  itself  it  is 
indispensable.  In  that  science  it  constitutes  no  less  than  the 
peculiar  formula  of  the  great  principle  of  Specification  (and  In- 
dividualization),  that  is  the  process  by  which  a class  (genus  or 
species)  is  divided  into  its  subject  parts — the  counter  process,  to 
wit,  of  Grenerification.  And  this  great  logical  formula  is  to  be 
branded  by  logical  writers  as  “ spurious.”  ! No  doubt,  the  par- 
ticularity, as  a quantity  easily  understood,  is  very  generally  elided 
in  expression,  though  at  work  in  thought ; or  it  is  denoted  by  a 
substitute.  Meaning,  we  avoid  saying — “ Some  men  are  not 
some  men.”  This  we  change,  perhaps,  into  “ men  are  not  men,” 
or  “ how  different  are  men  from  men,”  or  “ man  from  man,”  or 
“these  from  those,”  or  “some  from  other,”  &c.  Still,  “some  is 
not  some”  lies  at  the  root ; and  when  we  oppose  “ other,”  “ some 
other,”  &c.  to  “ some,”  it  is  evident,  that  “ other”  is  itself  only 
obtained  as  the  result  of  the  negation,  which,  in  fact,  it  pleonas- 
tically  embodies.  For  “other  than”  is  only  a synonyme  for  “is 
not;”  “other  (or  some  other)  A”  is  convertible  with  “not  some 
A;”  while  there  is  implied  by  “this,”  “not  that;”  by  “that,” 
“ not  this  ;”  and  by  “ the  other,”  “ neither  this  nor  that :”  and  so 
on.  Here  we  must  not  confound,  the  logical  with  the  rhetorical, 
the  necessary  in  thought  with  the  agreeable  in  expression. 

Following  Mr.  de  Morgan  in  his  selected  example,  and  not 
even  transcending  his  more  peculiar  science  : in  the  first  place, 
as  the  instance  of  division  I borrow  his  logical  illustration  from 
the  class  “ soldier.”  Now  in  what  manner  is  this  generic  notion 
divided,  into  species?  We  say  to  ourselves: — “Some  Soldier  is 
not  some  Soldier  ; for  some  Soldier  is  (all)  Infantry,  some  Soldier 
is  (all)  Cavalry,  &c.  ; and  (any)  Infantry  is  not  (any)  Cavalry.” 
A parti-partial  negative  is  the  only  form  of  judgment  for  division, 
of  what  kind  soever  be  the  whole  ; (and  Mr.  de  Morgan  can  state 
for  it  no  other.) — Again,  in  the  second  place,  as  the  example  of 
indivisibility : “ Some  of  this  Point,  is  not  some  of  this  (same) 
Point.”  Such  a proposition,  Mr.  de  Morgan,  as  a mathematician, 
can  not  admit,  for  a mathematical  point  is,  ex  hypothesi,  without 
some — without  some  and  some — without  parts , same  and  other  ; 
it  is  indivisible.  He  says,  indeed,  that  a parti-partial  negative 
can  not  be  denied.  But  if  he  be  unable  to  admit,  he  must  be 


PARTI-PARTIAL  NEGATION. 


629 


able  to  deny ; and  it  would  be  a curious — a singular  anomaly, 
if  logic  afforded  no  competent  form  for  so  ordinary  a negation ; 
if  we  could  not  logically  deny,  that  Socrates  is  a class — that  an 
individual  is  a universal — that  the  thought  of  an  indivisible  unit 
is  the  thought  of  a divisible  plurality. 

3. — Quantities  of  Breadth  and  Depth.1 — I now  proceed  to  con- 
sider Mr.  de  Morgan’s  observations  on  these  quantities  (pp.  29, 
sq.),  constituting,  as  they  do,  the  central  doctrine  of  an  adequate 
system  of  syllogism ; but  I regret  to  be  again  obliged  to  show, 
that  he  radically  misunderstands  what  he  attempts  to  illustrate. 
These,  which  are  merely  views  of  the  same  relation  from  opposite 
points,  Mr.  de  Morgan  regards  as  things  in  themselves  different. 
The  reading  of  a proposition  in  depth,  in  contrast  to  its  reading- 
in  breadth,  “is,”  he  says,  “not  another  reading  of  the  same  pro- 
position, but  another  proposition , derived  infer ejiti ally , though 
not  syllogistically,  hy  aid  of  the  dictum  de  majore  et  minor eB 
He  endeavors  subsequently  to  prove,  “ that  a new  distinction  is 
introduced  ; and,  farther,  that  the  two  modes  of  reading  ore  not 
convertible  ; the  extensive  mode  gives  the  intensive,  but  not  vice 
versa  in  all  cases.”  This,  after  an  elaborate  detail,  he  calls:  11  an 
important  distinction.  In  the  affirmative,  any  portion  of  the 
intension  of  the  predicate  may  be  affirmed  of  the  subject ; in  the 
negative , it  is  not  true  that  any  portion  of  the  intension  of  the 
predicate  may  be  denied  of  the  subject.  Thus,  ‘ No  planet  moves 
in  a circle,’  gives  us  a right  to  deny  any  constitutive  attribute  of 
circular  motion  to  that  of  a planet,  but  not  any  attribute  ; not, 
for  instance,  the  progression  through  every  longitude.” 

This  suffices  to  show  how  completely  Mr.  de  Morgan  mistakes 
the  great  principle  : — The  predicate  of  the  predicate  is,  with  the 
predicate , affirmed  or  denied , of  the  subject.  In  both  cases,  in 


1 This  distinction,  as  limited  to  the  doctrine  of  single  notions,  was  signalized  by 
the  Port-Royal  Logicians,  under  the  name  of  Extension  and  Comprehension ; Leib- 
nitz and  his  followers  preferred  the  more  antithetic  titles  of  Extension  and  Intension, 
though  Intension  be  here  somewhat  deflected  from  its  proper  meaning — that  of  De- 
gree ; and  the  Quantitas  Ambitus  and  Quantitas  Complexus  has,  among  sundry  other 
svnonymes,  been  employed — not  exclusively,  in  modern  times,  for  Aristotle  uses 
to  ivepiexov  and  to  rrepu^opevo i/.— The  best  expression,  I think  for  the  distinction 
is  Breadth  (IlAdros,  Latitudo),  and  Depth  (Bd^os,  Profunditas).  This  nomenclature, 
which  I have  long  employed,  was  borrowed  from  certain  of  the  ancient  Greek  logi- 
cians ; but  as  their  works  have  been,  for  long,  rarely  and  perfunctorily  looked  into, 
this  neglect  may  account  for  the  oblivion  in  which  the  antiquity  of  these  terms  has 
remained,  even  after  the  distinction,  which  they  best  denominate,  had  obtained  a 
renovated  importance. 


630 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


negatives  equally  as  in  affirmatives,  the  rule  is  thoroughgoing. 
To  say  nothing  of  affirmation,  touching  which  there  is  no  dispute 
— All  that  enters  into  the  predicate  notion  is  denied  of  the  sub- 
ject, if  the  predicate  itself  be  denied.  There  is  no  exception. 
The  rule  is  absolute ; and,  in  reference  to  Breadth  and  Depth, 
there  is  no  difference  whatever  between  “constitutive”  and 
“ attributive,”  between  necessary  and  contingent,  between  pecu- 
liar and  common.  It  is  of  no  consequence,  what  has  antecedently 
been  known , what  is  newly  discovered.  These  are  merely  mate- 
rial affections.  We  have  only  to  consider  what  it  is  we  formally 
think.  In  fact,  if  this  principle  he  not  universally  right,  if  Mr. 
de  Morgan  he  not  altogether  wrong,  my  extension  of  the  doctrine 
of  Breadth  and  Depth,  in  correlation,  from  notions  to  propositions 
and  syllogisms , has  been  only  an  egregious  blunder.  I am,  there- 
fore, hound  to  do  battle  for  it,  as  pro  aris  et  focis  ; and  fortun- 
ately, its  vindication  is  of  the  easiest. 

“ Newton  is  not  Leibnitz.”  Here  the  individual,  Leibnitz,  is 
definitely,  is  contradictorily,  denied  of  the  individual,  Newton. 
Nothing  of  Leibnitz  is  declared  to  be  any  thing  of  Newton ; and 
vice  versa.  Thus,  every  attribute  comprehended  in  our  thought 
of  Leibnitz,  be  it  his  humanity,  be  it  the  wearing  of  his  wig 
awry,  is,  in  this  proposition,  virtually  denied  of  Newton. — But 
again,  we  say,  “ Leibnitz  is  a mathematician.”  Now,  in  so  far 
as  the  notion  of  mathematician  is  in  this  proposition  affirmed  to 
be  contained  in  the  thought  of  Leibnitz,  “mathematician”  is 
mediately  deniable  of  Newton.  So  much  is  certain.  But  do  we 
herefrom  infer — is  this  tantamount  to  saying — “Newton  is  not  a 
mathematician,”  as  a general  negative,  and  in  the  sense  of  no  or 
not  any  mathematician  ? Assuredly  not.  For  this  would  be  to 
deny  of  Newton  more  than  is  comprehended  in  the  notion  affirm- 
atively predicated  of  Leibnitz.  Let  us  consider  what  is  meant 
by  the  proposition — “ Leibnitz  is  a mathematician.”  “ A math- 
ematician” does  not  here  imply  all,  every,  or  even  any  mathema- 
tician, but  some  mathematician — a certain  mathematician ; and 
this  particulare — be  it  vagum,  be  it  signatum — this  some  or  cer- 
tain mathematician  which  we  affirm  of  Leibnitz,  we  do  deny  of 
Newton,  in  denying  him  to  be  Leibnitz.  To  take  Mr.  de  Morgan’s 
own  example : We  do  not  universally  deny  of  a planet  any  pro- 
gression through  every  longitude,  in  saying,  “No  planet  moves 
in  a circle ;”  but  we  deny  of  it  particularly  some  such  progres- 
sion— to  wit,  a circular.  More,  indeed,  we  could  not,  from  the 


BREADTH  AND  DEPTH. 


631 


proposition.  For  all  circular  progression  through  every  longitude 
is  only  some — is  only  a certain  kind  of,  progression  through,  &c. 
Progression,  &c.,  is  the  genus ; circular  progression,  &c.,  is  the 
species. — This,  by  the  way,  is  an  instance  of  the  necessity  in  logic 
of  a toto-partial  negative,  though,  as  shown,  such  propositional 
form  has  been  neglected  or  proscribed  by  logical  authors. 

Note. — As  others,  besides  Mr.  de  Morgan,  have  misunderstood  this  mai- 
ter.  I may  subjoin  the  following  Diagram  ; representing  Breadth  and 
Depth,  with  the  relations  of  Affirmation  and  Negation  to  these  quantities. 

Line  op  Breadth.  Aff.  Neg. 


A 

A 

A 

A 

A 

A I | A 

E 

E 

E 

E 

E 

\E  ! 

I 

I 

I 

I 

\I 

0 

0 

0 

|o 

U 

u 

1 u 

Y 

a a 

1 Y 

41' 

\ * 
S 

1—4 


Ground  of  Reality. 


In  the  preceding  Table  there  are  represented  : — by  A,  A,  &c.,  the  highest 
genus  or  widest  attribute  ; by  Y,  the  lowest  species  or  narrowest  attribute  ; 
while  the  other  four  horizontal  series  of  vowels  typify  the  subaltern  genera 
and  species,  or  the  intermediate  attributes.  The  vowels  are  reserved  ex- 
clusively for  classes,  or  common  qualities  ; whereas  the  consonants  z',  z,  z", 
(and  which  to  render  the  contrast  more  obtrusive  are  not  capitals),  repre- 
sent individuals  or  singulars.  Every  higher  class  or  more  common  attri- 
bute is  supposed  (in  conformity  with  logical  precision)  to  be  dichotomised 
— to  be  divided  into  two  by  a lower  class  or  attribute,  and  its  contradic- 
tory or  negative.  This  contradictory,  of  which  only  the  commencement 
appears,  is  marked  by  an  italic  vowel,  preceded  by  a perpendicular  line 
( | ) signifying  not  or  non,  and  analogous  to  the  minus  ( — ) of  the  mathe- 
maticians. This  being  understood,  the  table  at  once  exhibits  the  real 
identity  and  rational  differences  of  Breadth  and  Depth,  which,  though 
denominated  quantities,  are,  in  reality,  one  and  the  same  quantity,  viewed 
in  counter  relations  and  from  opposite  ends.  Nothing  is  the  one,  which 
is  not,  pro  tanto,  the  other. 

In  Breadth : the  supreme  genus  (A,  A,  &c.)  is,  as  it  appears,  absolutely 
the  greatest  whole  ; an  individual  (z)  absolutely  the  smallest  part ; whereas 
the  intermediate  classes  are  each  of  them  a relative  part  or  species  by  refer- 
ence to  the  class  and  classes  above  it ; a relative  whole  or  genus,  by  refer- 
ence to  the  class  or  classes  below  it.  In  Depth : the  individual  is  absolute- 
ly the  greatest  whole,  the  highest  genus  is  absolutely  the  smallest  part; 
while  every  relatively  lower  class  or  species,  is  relatively  a greater  whole 


632 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


than  the  class,  classes,  or  genera,  above  it. — The  two  quantities  are  thus,  as 
the  diagram  represents,  precisely  the  inverse  of  each  other.  The  greater  the 
Breadth,  the  less  the  Depth  ; the  greater  the  Depth,  the  less  the  Breadth  ; 
and  each,  within  itself,  affording  the  correlative  differences  of  whole  and 
part,  each,  therefore,  in  opposite  respects,  contains  and  is  contained.  But, 
for  distinction’s  sake,  it  is  here  convenient  to  employ  a difference,  not  alto- 
gether arbitrary,  of  expression.  We  should  say  : — “ containing  and  con- 
tained under”  for  Breadth  ; — “ containing  and  contained  in"  for  Depth. 
This  distinction,  which  has  been  taken  by  some  modern  logicians,  though 
unknown  to  many  of  them,  was  not  observed  by  Aristotle.  We  find  him 
(to  say  nothing  of  other  ancient  logicians),  using  the  expression  ev  oAw 
elvai  or  vTidpxeiv,  for  either  whole.  Though  different  in  the  order  of 
thought  ( ratione ),  the  two  quantities  are  identical  in  the  nature  of  things 
(re).  Each  supposes  the  other  ; and  Breadth  is  not  more  to  be  distinguished 
from  Depth,  than  the  relations  of  the  sides,  from  the  relations  of  the  angles, 
of  a triangle.  In  effect  it  is  precisely  the  same  reasoning,  whether  we 
argue  in  Depth — “ z'  is  (i.e.  as  subject,  contains  in  it  the  inherent  attri- 
bute) some  Y ; all  Y is  some  U ; all  U is  some  0 ; all  0 is  some  I ; all  I 
is  some  E ; all  E is  some  A ; therefore,  z'  is  some  A or  whether  we 
argue  in  Breadth — “ Some  A is  (i.  e.  as  class,  contains  under  it  the  sub- 
ject part)  all  E ; some  E is  all  I ' some  I is  all  0 ; some  0 is  all  U ; 
some  U is  all  Y ; some  Y is  z' ; — therefore,  some  A is  z'.”  The  two 
reasonings,  internally  identical,  are  externally  the  converse  of  each  other  ; 
the  premise  and  term,  which  in  Breadth  is  major,  in  Depth  is  minor.1  In 
syllogisms  also,  where  the  contrast  of  the  two  quantities  is  abolished,  there, 
with  the  difference  of  figure,  the  differences  of  major  and  minor  premise 
and  term  fall  likewise.  In  truth,  however,  common  language  in  its 
enouncement  of  propositions  is  here  perhaps  more  correct  and  philosophical 
than  the  technical  language  of  logic  itself.  For  as  it  is  only  an  equation 
— only  an  affirmation  of  identity , or  its  negation,  which  is,  in  either 
quantity,  proposed  ; therefore  the  substantive  verb  (is,  is  not),  used  in  both 
cases,  speaks  more  accurately,  than  the  expressions,  contained  (or  not  con- 
tained) in  of  the  one,  contained  (or  not  contained)  tinder  of  the  other. 
In  fact,  the  two  quantities  and  the  tiuo  quantifications  have  by  Logicians 
been  neglected  together. 

This  Table  (the  principle  of  which  becomes  more  palpably  demonstra- 
tive when  the  parts  of  the  table  are  turned  into  the  parts  of  a circular 
machine),  exhibits  all  the  mutual  relations  of  the  counter  quantities. — 1°, 
It  represents  the  classes,  as  a series  of  resemblances  thought  as  one,  (by  a 
repetition  of  the  same  letter  in  the  same  series),  but  as  really  distinct  (by 
separating  lines).  Thus,  A is  only  A,  not  A,  A,  A,  See. ; some  Animal  is 


1 Though  the  theory  of  the  syllogism  in  Depth  (far  less  in  both  quantities  conjunct- 
ly)  was  not  generalized  by  Aristotle  nor  by  any  of  the  ancient  logicians,  it  seems  to 
have  wrought  unconsciously  in  determining  the  order  of  the  premises.  Our  common 
order,  that  of  Breadth,  is  derived  from  Boethius;  and  his  influence  was  limited  to  the 
West — to  the  Latin  Schools.  The  Greeks,  Arabians,  Jews,  &c.,  generally  adhered  to 
the  order  which,  before  Boethius,  was,  with  few  exceptions,  prevalent  in  the  Latin 
world  ; — the  proposition  which  we  call  the  minor  premise  standing  first.  The  truth 
in  this  matter  has  been  simply  reversed  by  modern  scholars  and  historians  of  philoso- 
phy. To  quote  only  the  most  recent  authority:  Waitz,  in  his  late  valuable  edition  of 
the  Organon,  has,  I see,  followed  the  learned  editors  of  Apuleius,  in  this  universal 
error.  Even  the  great  John  Albert  Fabricius  is  at  fault. 


BREADTH  AND  DEPTH. 


633 


not  some  Animal ; one  class  of  Animals  is  not  all,  every,  or  any  other ; 
this  Animal  is  not  that ; Socrates  is  not  Plato;  z is  not  z'.  On  the  other 
hand,  E is  E A ; and  YisYUOIEA;  every  lower  and  higher  letter 
in  the  series  coalescing  uninterruptedly  into  a series  of  recipocral  subjects 
and  predicates,  as  shown  by  the  absence  of  all  discriminating  lines.  Thus, 
Socrates  (z'),  is  Athenian  (Y),  Greek  (U),  European  (0),  Man  (I),  Mam- 
male  (E),  Animal  (A).  Of  course  the  series  must  be  in  grammatical  and 
logical  harmony.  We  must  not  collate  notions  abstract  and  notions  con- 
crete.— 2°,  The  table  shows  the  inverse  correlation  of  the  two  quantities  in 
respect  of  amount.  For  example  : A ( i . e.  A,  A,  &c.)  the  highest  genus  is 
represented  as  having  six  times  the  Breadth  of  Y ; while  Y (i . e.  Y — A) 
the  lowest  species,  has  six  times  the  Depth  of  A. — 3°,  The  Table  mani- 
fests all  the  classes,  as  in  themselves  unreal,  subjective,  ideal ; for  these 
are  merely  fictions  or  artifices  of  the  mind,  for  the  convenience  of  thinking. 
Universals  only  exist  in  nature,  as  they  cease  to  he  universal  in  thought ; 
that  is,  as  they  are  reduced  from  general  and  abstract  attributes  to  indi- 
vidual and  concrete  qualities.  A — Y are  only  truly  objective  as  distributed 
through  z,  z',  z",  &c. ; and  in  that  case  they  are  not  universals.  As  Boe- 
thius expresses  it : — “ Onme  quod  est,  eo  quod  est,  singulare  est.” — 4°, 
The  opposition  of  class  to  class,  through  contradictory  attributes,  is  dis- 
tinguished by  lines  different  from  those  marking  the  separation  of  one  part 
of  the  same  class  from  another.  Thus,  Animal,  or  Sentiently-organized 
(A),  is  contrasted  with  Not-animal,  or  Not-sentiently-organized  ( | A),  by 
lines  thicker  than  those  which  merely  discriminate  one  Animal  (A),  from 
another  (A). — Thus  : 

Touching  Propositions : — An  affirmative  proposition  is  merely  an 
equation  of  the  quantities  of  its  Subject  and  Predicate,  in  Breadth  or  in 
Depth  indifferently,  and  the  consequent  declaration  of  the  coalescence, 
pro  tanto , of  the  two  terms  themselves  into  a single  notion ; a negative 
proposition,  on  the  contrary,  is  an  enouncement  of  the  non-equation  of  the 
quantities — of  the  non-identity  of  the  terms.  Every  proposition  may,  in 
fact,  be  cast,  be  considered,  at  will,  in  either  quantity,  or  in  neither  ; there- 
fore, if  a competent  notation  we  have,  we  must  have  one,  which  in  every 
proposition  is  able  to  represent,  at  once,  both  the  counter  quantities,  and 
even  to  sublimate  them  into  one. 

Touching  Syllogisms : — A competent  notation  of  syllogism,  must,  in  like 
manner,  avail  consistently  to  exhibit  all  the  syllogistic  figures,  as  determ- 
ined by  the  several  relations  of  the  two  quantities  to  the  middle  term  ; and 
it  must  also  be  able  of  itself  to  manifest  the  differences  of  mood,  abstract- 
ing from  the  positive  differences  of  figure  altogether.  For  of  these  differ- 
ences, the  modal  is  essential,  the  schematic  is  contingent. — Finally,  if  our 
system  of  notation  be  complete,  we  must  possess  not  only  one  notation 
capable  of  representing,  in  different,  though  analogous,  diagrams,  syllogisms 
of  every  figure  and  of  no  figure  ; but  another,  which  shall,  at  once  and  in 
the  same  diagram,  exhibit  every  syllogistic  mode,  apart  from  all  schematic 
differences , be  they  positive,  be  they  privative.  All  this  my  two  schemes 
of  notation,  in  conjunction,  profess  to  do  ; and  if  I be  not  mistaken,  all  this 
they  fully  and  simply  accomplish. 

In  regard  to  the  relation  which  the  quantities  of  Depth  and  Breadth 
bear  to  the  qualities  of  Affirmation  and  Negation,  it  is  hardly  necessary 
to  say  more  than  has  been  stated  above  (p.  613).  Affirmation  follows 
the  ascending  order,  that  of  superordination ; Negation  follows  the  de- 


634 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B). 


scending  order,  that  of  subordination.  This  is  shown  by  the  arrows.  In 
regard  to  the  horizontal  order,  that  of  co-ordination : in  the  Affirmation 
of  one  co-ordinate  (individual  or  class),  the  other,  or  others,  are  thereby 
denied ; but  from  the  Negation  of  one  co-ordinate  we  can  not  infer  the 
Affirmation  of  any  other — unless  the  subject  belong  to  the  immediately 
higher  class,  and  that  class  be  dichotomized  by  contradiction. 

I stated  above  (p.  147),  that  the  Propositional  Modes,  which  from  their 
generality,  had  been  introduced  into  Formal  Logic,  are  merely  Material 
— themselves  material  predicates  (perhaps,  subjects),  or  material  affections 
of  the  predicate  (perhaps  subject) ; — that  these  modes  stand  to  each  other 
in  the  relation  of  genus  and  species ; — and  that  they  may,  therefore,  be 
reduced  to  form  and  logical  integrity.  I may  here  briefly  explain  my 
doctrine  on  this  point. 

All  predication  is  the  predication  of  existence  ; and  the  predication  of 
existence  is  either  the  predication  of  existence  simply,  purely,  absolutely, 
or  the  predication  of  existence  not  simply,  purely,  absolutely,  but  under 
certain  limitations,  manners,  modes — modal  predication.  Now,  these 
modes  are,  in  themselves,  affections  of  this  or  that  particular  matter,  of 
which  Logic,  as  a formal  science,  can  take  no  account.  Modal  predica- 
tion is  thus,  immediately  and  in  itself,  extra-logical.  But  if  we  can  re- 
duce these  modes  to  those  relations  with  which  Logic  is  conversant ; in 
that  case,  Logic  may  mediately  deal  with  them,  as  it  deals  with  all  other 
objects ; that  is,  consider  them,  not  as  they  really  exist,  in  and  for  them- 
selves, but  as  they  come  under  the  forms  of  the  understanding — the  forms 
of  thought,  as  thought.  Such  relations  are  those  of  containing  and  con- 
tained, in  the  counter  quantities  of  Depth  and  Breadth — in  a word,  the 
relations  of  Genus,  Species,  Individual.  That  the  modes  which,  without 
such  reduction,  have,  to  the  utter  confusion  of  the  science,  been  intruded 
into  Logic,  may  be  so  reduced,  is,  I think,  possible ; and  the  following 
scheme  will  show  how  I would  realize  the  possibility.  The  whole  diffi- 
culty of  the  problem  lies  in  the  vagueness  and  ambiguity  of  language ; 
and  we  have  only  to  fix  the  meaning  of  the  words,  to  render  obvious  the 
logical  dependency  of  the  things. 

Modes. 

■ \ 

(A.)  Possible.  (|A.)  Impossible. 

(A,  E.)  Actual.  (A,  | E.)  Potential. 

* — ■ — - 

(A,  E,  I.)  Necessary.  (A,  E,  | I ) Contingent. 

(A.)  The  Possible  (to  dwarov,  possibile,  &c.),  what  can  be,=  the  not  im- 
possible. 

(|M.)  The  Impossible  (to  adwarov,  impossibile,  &c.),  what  can  not  be, 
= the  not  possible. — This  and  the  preceding  are  congenera,  con- 
tradictory of  each  other. 

(A,  E.)  The  Actual  {no  ev  evepyeia,  to  tv  kvTe\e%ecy,  afctuale,  quod  in 
actu,  in  esse,  est,  &c.),  what  is  now,— the  not  potential. 

(A,  | E.)  The  Potenticd  ( to  ev  dvvapei,  potentiale,  quod  in  posse,  in  po- 
tentia,  est,  &c.),  what  is  not  at  this,  but  may  be,  at  an  other  time, 
= the  not  actual. — This  and  that  immediately  preceding  are  con- 
species,  and  mutual  contradictories.  In  a logical  relation,  these 
have  been  overlooked  by  Aristotle  and  the  logicians ; for  the 
vnapxovoa  npoTaoig  of  the  Philosopher,  is  the  pure  or  non-modal 
proposition,  and  altogether  different  from  the  predication  of  actuality. 


BREADTH  AND  DEPTH. 


635 


(A.  E,  I.)  The  Necessary  (to  dvaynalov,  necessariura,  quod  necesse  est, 
&c.),  what  is  {now),  and  needs  must  be,=  the  not  contingent. 

(A,  E,  | I.)  The  Contingent  (to  evdexopevov,  contingens,  &c.),  what  is 
(now),  butneeds-not  be,= the  not  necessary. — This  is  a co-ordinate 
of  the  last  previous,  and  they  contradict  each  other. 

Discounting,  therefore,  some  ambiguities  of  a more  grammatical  inter- 
est (and  on  which,  in  these  hints,  I can  not  even  touch),  it  is  manifest, 
that  the  Propositional  Modes  stand  to  each  other  in  the  formal  relations 
of  Subordination,  Superordination,  Co-ordination ; and  that  following  the 
rules  of  genera  and  species,  their  predication  falls  under  common  logical 
government. 

Logicians,  in  this  affair,  have  been  guilty  of  a fivefold  abberration. — 
In  the  first  place,  they  ought  not  to  have  defiled  the  purity  of  their  formal 
science  with  a subject  of  merely  material  consideration — a subject  to  be 
by  them  discussed,  only  to  be  excluded  or  subordinated. — In  the  second 
place,  they  ought  not  to  have  dealt,  as  logical,  with  what  was  properly 
of  metaphysical,  or  merely  of  grammatical,  concernment. — In  the  third 
place,  they  ought  not  to  have  treated,  as  pertaining  to  the  copula,  what 
belongs  to  the  collated  terms. — In  the  fourth  place,  they  ought  not  to 
have  confused  their  doctrine  by  introducing  as  foreign,  special,  complex, 
and  difficult,  what  admits  of  reduction  to  logical  precept,  common,  simple, 
and  easy. — In  th e fifth  place,  in  their  enumeration  of  these  modes,  they 
ought  to  have  been  exhaustive  ; they  ought  not  to  have  omitted  the  actual 
and  its  conspeoies  the  potential. 

I should  notice,  likewise,  that  logical  authors  have  confused  themselves 
and  readers,  in  attempting  to  expound  the  mystery  of  modal  inference. 
Yet  nothing,  when  properly  evolved,  can  be  simpler  or  plainer. — De- 
termine the  mode  of  the  propositions  in  question  ; and  then  their  conse- 
cution, as  modes,  is  simply  the  consecution  of  these  modes,  as  genera  and 
species,  proceeding  (usefully,  at  least) — in  affirmation  upward  and  par- 
tially— in  negation  downward  and  totally.  See  the  Tables,  pp.  631, 
634.] 

4. — Mr.  de  Morgan  (p.  27.)  asserts  : — “ Sir  William  Hamilton 
acknowledges,  that  my  own  numerically  definite  system  contains 
his  system,”  &c. — To  this  I answer : 

In  the  first  place,  “the  system,”1  which  here  and  elsewhere 
Mr.  de  Morgan  fondly  calls  “ his  own,”  belongs  to  Lambert,  by 
whom,  if  not  first  found,  it  was  most  scientifically  and  fully  de- 


1 Mr.  de  Morgan  loves  to  talk  paternally  of  logical  “ Systems and  as  every  new 
errof  is  to  him  the  occasion  of  a new  system,  at  least  of  a new  nomenclature,  no  man 
has  misconceived,  misadopted,  and  misnamed  so  many.  In  his  present  contribution 
(I  can  hardly  claim  acquaintance  with  his  work  on  Formal  Logic),  we  have  baotized, 
or  rebaptized,  or  fathered  by  him,  in  Syllogistic  alone: — 1°,  “The  Cumular  Sys- 
tem;”^0, “the  Exemplar  System;"  3°,  the  System  of  Contraries;”  4°,  my  own 
Numerically  Definite  System.”  All  mistakes.  This  we  have  seen,  indeed,  of  the 
two  still-born,  but  not  anonymous,  monstrosities,  which  stand  first ; the  third  is  only 
the  old  doctrine  of  Infinites,  under  a new  and  marvelous  misnomer  ; while  the  fourth, 
so  far  from  being  a neglected  foundling,  to  be  dealt  with  as  his  own  by  the  first 
charitable  finder,  is  the  legitimate,  though  puny  offspring  of  an  illustrious  parentage. 


636 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


veloped  ; in  like  manner,  as  the  ingenious  though  inadequate 
canon  of  syllogism,  propounded  by  Mr.  de  Morgan,  in  his  present 
memoir  (see  p.  618),  is,  in  all  respects,  the  exclusive  property  of 
Ploucquet.  (Compare : — Lambert's  Organon  (1764),  Dianoiologie, 

§ 193,  Phsenomenologie,  §§  157,  187-190,  192,  193,  204-211, 
220,  &c. : Ploucquet' s Met.hodus  demonstrandi  Syllogismos,  ope 
unius  regulse  (1763),  pp.  2,  sq. ; his  Methodus  ealculandi  in  Lo- 
gicis  (1763),  §§  37,  sq.  ; and  (besides  his  Fundamenta  and  Insti- 
tutiones  Philosophise  Theoreticae),  his  more  matured  work,  the 
Elementa  Philosophise  Contemplativse  (1778),  H 120,  sq.)  With 
the  logical  writings  of  both  these  mathematical  philosophers,  Mr. 
de  Morgan  was  acquainted.  It  would,  indeed,  have  been  little 
short  of  a miracle,  had  he,  ignorant  even  of  the  common  princi- 
ples of  Logic,  been  able,  of  himself,  to  rise  to  generalizations  so 
lofty  and  so  accurate,  as  are  supposed  in  the  peculiar  doctrines 
of  both  the  rival  Logicians,  Lambert  and  Ploucquet — how  useless 
soever  these  may  in  practice  prove  to  be. 

In  the  second  place,  I never  “ acknowledged” — I never  dreamt 
of  “ acknowledging,”  that  “ the  numerically  definite  system,” 
(whoever  was  its  author),  “contained,”  what  may  properly  be 
called  “ my  system.”  For  such  is  not  the  case.  I certainly, 
indeed,  “ acknowledged,”  when  I became  aware  of  the  fact,  that 
the  minor  doctrine  of  the  ultra-total  quantification  of  the  middle 
term,  had  been  anticipated  by  Lambert,  though  never  designated 
by  him,  and  neglected,  not  irrationally,  by  other  logicians.  This 
doctrine,  which  was  generalized  (and  first  named)  by  me,  inde- 
pendently of  any  predecessor — which  is,  in  fact,  the  only  formal 
generalization  in  the  “ definite”  scheme  at  all,  is  not,  however, 
peculiar  to  my  views,  more  than  any  other  logical  truth. 

5. — But,  I must  not  forget : — Mr.  de  Morgan  (pp.  11-13)  has 
displayed  a scheme  of  Syllogistic  Notation,  which  he  propounds 
as  the  same,  in  principle,  with  mine — (with  the  fragment  to  wit, 
given  by  Mr.  Thomson),  but  as  an  improvement.  (As < for  me, 
however,  I discover  no  analogy,  and  willingly  waive  all  claim  to 
the  invention).  The  original  he  admits  to  be  of  the  simplest  and 
easiest,  nor  does  he  pretend,  that,  in  any  respect,  it  is  either 
erroneous  or  inadequate.  His  own  improvement,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  complexity  be  perfection,  must  be  pronounced  a chef 
d'ceuvre.  It  accomplishes  (if  it  did  accomplish)  its  purpose, 
through  the  employment  of  an  apparatus  of  a five-fold  multiplicity. 
A triad  of  ordinary  letters — a polygram  of  fourteen  lines,  of  three 


MR.  DE  MORGAN’S  NOTATIONS. 


637 


various  sorts — eked  out,  and  (it  would  be)  interpreted  by  nearly 
a dozen  arbitrary  and  unknown  signs  ; all  these  are  thrown  to- 
gether into  a kind  of  heter oolite  and  heterogeneous  circumvalla- 
tion,  the  lines  flanked,  on  one  side,  by  something  in  the  shape 
of  a chevaux-de-frise,  horrent  with  mysterious  spiculse — into  a 
kind  of  geometrico-algebraic  medley,  which  Professor  de  Morgan 
calls  “pictorial,”  but  which  paints,  describes,  typifies  nothing, 
even  imaginable  ; and  this  hybrid  and  multifarious  co-acervation 
of  near  thirty  elements,  partly  ostensive,  partly  symbolical,  is 
gravely  proposed  to  represent  a single  syllogism  in  its  simplicity 
— a syllogism,  too,  intendedly  categorical,  but  which  turns  out  to 
be,  in  reality,  disjunctive.  In  fact,  among  the  numerous  schemes 
(some  twenty-eight  I know),  of  logical  notation — nay  even  among 
his  own — none  was  ever  yet  so  decompound,  confusive,  perverse, 
not  to  say  unintelligible,  not  to  say  erroneous.  It  concentrates 
every  vice  competent  to  such  representation ; it  is  at  once  con- 
torted, operose,  and  ineffectual.  Comparing  it  with  other  schemes, 
Mr.  de  Morgan  asserts,  this  new  complexus  to  be: — “ more  con- 
venient”— it  is  beyond  human  patience,  if  not  simply  impossible  ; 
“ more  suggestive ” — it  suggests  error,  when  not  defying  compre- 
hension. We  need  hardly,  therefore,  be  surprised,  that,  in  the 
end,  Mr.  de  Morgan  should  actually  laud  the  farrago  for  express- 
ing diametrically  opposite  things  (“  the  universality  of  the  sub- 
ject,” “ the  particularity  of  the  predicate,”)  by  the  self  same 
representation.  Apart,  indeed,  from  his  general  tendency  to  mis- 
take, and  his  usual  play  at  cross  purposes  with  thought  and  lan- 
guage,1 all  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  illustrations,  whether  ostensive  or 
symbolic,  of  logical  relations,  conduce  only  to  “ darken  counsel.” 
Always  arbitrary  and  ever  complex,  these  are  ultimately  also 
various.  Each  new  book — new  edition — new  paper  is,  in  fact, 
a new  construction ; and  every  emendation  of  a former  scheme 
is  equally  unfortunate  with  the  primary  failure.  Mr.  de  Morgan 
is  a profound  mathematician,  and  otherwise  an  able  man.  But 
philosophically,  while  strong  at  complication,  his  genius  seems 
impotent  either  to  simplify  or  to  evolve.  Out  of  mathematics, 

1 Mr.  de  Morgan  professedly  identifies — universal,  affirmative,  conclusive,  possible, 
conjunctive,  convertible,  singular,  &c.,  and  particular,  negative,  inconclusive,  impos- 
sible, disjunctive,  inconvertible,  plural,  &c.  ; while,  knowingly  or  unknowingly,  he 
reverses — definite  and  indefinite,  collective  and  distributive,  contrary  and  contradictory, 
formal  and  material,  &c.  Heretofore,  he  even  confounded  terms  and  propositions, 
the  middle  and  the  conclusion  of  a syllogism.  Mr.  de  Morgan’s  “ System”  (of  Sys- 
tems) is  “ the  Witches’  caldron.” 


638 


APPENDIX  II.  LOGICAL.  (B.) 


he  can  add  but  not  subtract,  multiply  but  not  divide.  Yet  if 
wanting,  as  we  must  confess,  in  the  art  of  making  the  difficult 
easy ; no  one,  it  should  be  proclaimed,  is  a more  accomplished 
adept  in  the  counter  craft  of  making  the  easy  difficult. 

6. — Before  concluding : though  unable  to  expose  them  in  articu- 
late detail,  I must  protest,  in  general,  against  various  ignorances 
and  absurdities,  for  which  Mr.  de  Morgan  (unwittingly  always) 
makes  me  to  be  responsible.  Such  are  certain  doctrines  or  exam- 
ples laid  to  my  account  on  pages  2,  12,  20,  21,  29,  30,  35,  36, 
&c. — But  now  to  terminate  : 

Apart  from  the  exposition  of  scientific  truths  : I have  been  thus 
copious  in  refutation,  not  from  any  importance  I attach  to  these 
critical  objections  in  themselves,  or  with  reference  to  myself;  but 
mainly  from  the  great  respectability  of  the  critic  in  his  peculiar 
department,  enabling  me  to  signalize,  by  another  memorable  ex- 
ample, how  compatible  is  mathematical  talent  with  philosophical 
inaptitude,  nay,  how  adverse  even,  are  mathematical  habits  of 
thought,  to  sound  logical  thinking.  Mr.  de  Morgan  has  long 
held  highest  rank  as  a British  mathematician.  Latterly,  wish- 
ing to  be  more,  he  has  ventured  to  speculate  on  the  theory  of 
reasoning  : and  the  “ Philosophical  Society”  of  the  mathematical 
University  of  Cambridge,  giving  his  memoirs  upon  logic  an  impri- 
matur, have  deemed  them  worthy  of  publication  in  their  Trans- 
actions. Now  the  present  paper,  to  say  nothing  of  the  others, 
exhibits,  from  first  to  last,  only  the  blind  confidence  (shall  I call 
it,  or  confident  blindness?)  with  which  a mathematical  author  can 
treat  a logical  subject ; breaking  down,  though  never  conscious 
of  his  falls,  in  every,  even  the  most  rudimentary  movement : — 
Author,  Memoir,  and  Society  (curiously)  concurring  to  manifest 
anew  the  real  value  of  the  Cambridge  crotchet — that  '■'■Mathe- 
matics, are  a mean  of  forming  logical  habits , better  than  Logic 
itself This  crotchet  is,  however,  a melancholy  absurdity  ; for 
it  is  a crotchet  which  has  confessedly  turned  that  great  semi- 
nary of  education  into  a “ slaughter-house  of  intellects” — even 
of  lives.  It  has  been  said  of  old — “ There  is  no  royal  road  to 
Mathematics  ;”  and  we  have  again  authority  and  demonstration, 
that  Mathematics  are  not  a road  of  any  kind  to  Logic,  whether 
to  Logic  speculative,  or  to  Logic  practical.  A road  to  Logic, 
did  I say  ? It  is  well,  if  Mathematics,  from  the  inevitability  of 
their  process,  and  the  consequent  inertion,  combined  with  rash- 
ness, which  they  induce,  do  not  positively  ruin  the  reasoning 


MR.  DE  MORGAN’S  NOTATIONS. 


639 


habits  of  their  votary.  Some  knowledge  of  their  object-matter 
and  method  is  requisite  to  the  philosopher ; but  their  study  should 
be  followed  out  temperately  and  with  due  caution.  A mathema- 
tician in  contingent  matter  is  like  an  owl  in  daylight.  Here,  the 
wren  pecks  at  the  bird  of  Pallas  without  anxiety  for  beak  or 
talon ; and  there,  the  feeblest  reasoner  feels  no  inferiority  to  the 
strongest  calculator.  It  is  true,  no  doubt,  that  a power  of  mathe- 
matical, and  a power  of  philosophical — of  general  logic,  may , 
sometimes,  be  combined  ; but  the  individual  who  unites  both, 
reasons  well  out  of  necessary  matter,  from  a still  resisting  vigor 
of  intellect,  and  in  spite,  not  in  consequence,  of  his  geometric  or 
algebraic  dexterity.  He  is  naturally  strong  ; nor  a mere  cipherer 
— a mere  demonstrator : and  this  is  the  explanation,  why  Mr. 
de  Morgan,  among  other  mathematicians,  so  often  argues  right. 
Still,  had  Mr.  de  Morgan  been  less  of  a Mathematician,  he  might 
have  been  more  of  a philosopher.  And  be  it  remembered,  that 
mathematics  and  dram-drinking  tell,  especially,  in  the  long  run. 
For  a season,  I admit,  Toby  Philpot  may  be  the  Champion  of 
England;  and  Warburton  testifies — “It  is  a thing  notorious, 
that  the  oldest  mathematician  in  England  is  the  ivorst  reasoner 
in  it.” 

So  much  for  Mathematical  Logic  ; so  much  for  Cambridge  Phi- 
losophy. 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL. 


(A.)  ACADEMICAL  PATRONAGE  AND  REGULATION,  IN  RE- 
FERENCE TO  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  EDINBURGH. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  “ General  Report  of  the 
Commissioners  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  Municipal 
Corporations  in  Scotland,  presented  to  both  Houses  of  Parliament 
hy  command  of  his  Majesty  1835.  Coinciding,  as  I do,  with 
the  recommendations  of  this  Report,  in  so  far  as  they  go,  and,  in 
the  prevalent  unacquaintance  with  the  subject,  they  perhaps  could 
not  go  farther  ; I may  premise,  that  the  experience  of  the  sixteen 
years  which  has  since  elapsed  tends  strongly  to  confirm,  not  only 
the  expedience,  hut  the  urgent  necessity  of  a reform  in  the  Pa- 
tronage and  Regulation  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 

I add  nothing  to  what  has  been  said  above  (p.  345,  sq.),  as  to 
the  principles  and  mode  of  academical  patronage , but  a single 
observation  : — that,  while  the  removal  of  religious  disabilities  in 
the  appointment  to  lay  Professorships,  may,  in  itself,  be  a meas- 
ure both  equitable  and  advantageous,  yet  with  a board  of  patrons 
like  the  Edinburgh  Town  Council,  nothing  certainly  could  be 
anticipated  more  detrimental  than  its  operation.  In  truth,  so  far 
from  the  chairs  being  thus  thrown  open  to  merit,  apart  from  all 
sectarian  considerations,  sectarian  considerations  would  prevail 
against  merit,  far  more  perniciously  than  heretofore.  For,  in  that 
event,  the  various  religious  persuasions  would  strain  every  effort 
to  secure  an  election  to  the  Council  of  their  coreligionists  ; 
among  these  councilors  coalitions  would  be  formed  and  agree- 
ments concluded ; so  that,  in  the  end,  the  academical  body 
would  show  nothing  better  than  a heterogeneous  collection  of 
obscure  sectarian  nominees.  A repeal  of  the  present  tests  would 
thus,  either  finish  our  civic  patronage,  or  sink  our  University  still 
lower. 

In  regard  to  the  administration  of  this  University  I would 
remark. — The  legislative  and  executive  functions  (legally  or  in 
fact)  are  here  exercised  by  two  bodies — the  Town  Council  and 


REPOET  OF  THE  EOYAL  MUNICIPAL  COMMISSION.  641 

the  Senatus  Academicus.  But  these  two  bodies  are,  severally  or 
together,  incapable  of  any  due  performance  of  these  functions. — 
With  honorable  exceptions  of  individual  members,  the  Senatus 
Academicus,  as  a body,  is  too  numerous  (32)  and  too  ill  chosen, 
too  destitute  of  liberal  erudition  or  of  lofty  views,  and  where  not 
indifferent  or  hopeless,  too  generally  beset  with  private  interests 
counter  to  the  general  interests  of  the  school  and  public — to  be 
able  either  rightly  to  legislate  for  the  University,  or  (without 
intelligent  control)  even  rightly  to  administer  its  laws. — The 
Town  Council  from  its  numbers  (33),  from  its  relative  ignorance 
and  incapacity,  and  from  its  exposure  to  all  kinds  of  sinister 
influences,  among  which  not  the  least  dangerous  is  that  of  the 
party  interests  in  the  professorial  body  itself — is  not  less  incom- 
petent to  these  functions,  an  incompetence  of  which,  to  its  honor, 
it  seems  not  altogether  unconscious.  The  consequence  of  this  is, 
that  with  the  exception  of  occasional  fits  of  spasmodic  energy 
from  accidental  stimuli,  the  professorial  body  is  left  virtually  to 
make  and  to  execute  the  academical  laws.  One  result,  of  many, 
is  shown  in  the  present  state  of  the  Degrees ; which,  if  they  cer- 
tify attendance  on  certain  classes,  certify,  assuredly,  little  or  no 
proficiency  in  the  graduate.  To  complain  of  such  abuse,  or  to 
suggest  any  means  for  its  correction,  would,  in  the  absence  of  an 
intelligent  controlling  body,  be  at  present  wholly  idle.  To  those 
professors,  therefore,  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of  the 
Senatus  Academicus,  and  not  content  to  co-operate  in  what  they 
feel  obliged  to  condemn ; no  other  alternative  is,  in  my  opinion, 
left,  than  to  retire  from  any  participation  in  University  proceed- 
ings.— The  Commissioners  thus  report: 

“ The  opinion  that  the  Edinburgh  system  of  University  patronage  has 
worked  well  arises,  we  conceive,  from  the  want  of  any  tolerable  standard 
or  example  in  this  country  from  which  to  form  an  estimate  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  duty  of  patrons  of  an  University  ought  to  be  discharged. 

The  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh,  consisting  of  thirty-three  members,  is, 
in  our  opinion,  too  large  a body  to  discharge,  with  advantage,  the  duties 
of  patrons  of  literary  and  scientific  offices.  So  great  a number  can  not 
possess  that  unity  of  purpose  which  would  enable  them  to  anticipate  a 
canvass,  and  at  once  fix  on  the  most  eligible  person  to  fill  each  vacancy. 
Such  we  consider  to  be  the  duty  of  University  patrons,  and  we  esteem  the 
allowance  of  a canvass  for  an  office  in  the  University,  howrever  conducted, 
to  be  in  itself  an  evil.  In  a body  so  numerous,  divisions  are  apt  to  arise 
which  can  not  fail  to  obstruct  the  fair  estimate  of  the  merits  of  rival  can- 
didates. But,  above  all,  the  feeling  of  individual  responsibility  is  destroy- 
ed, where  a good  appointment  can  reflect  little  honor,  and  a bad  one  is 
not  felt  to  throw  disgrace  upon  any  one  elector. 

S s 


642 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 

Under  the  former  constitution  of  the  Town  Council,  a great  majority 
of  the  members  were  usually  merchants  and  tradesmen,  but  little  qualified, 
by  education,  to  be  themselves  very  competent  judges  of  the  literary  or 
scientific  qualifications  of  others.  From  that  cause  also,  as  well  as  from 
their  number,  they  were  peculiarly  open  to  the  influence  of  personal 
solicitation,  and  of  local  prejudice  and  prepossession.  Even  under  the 
present  constitution  of  the  Council,  the  qualifications  which  are  likely  to 
recommend  individuals  to  the  choice  of  their  fellow-citizens  as  Town- 
Councilors  are,  in  most  cases,  rather  those  which  would  fit  them  for 
taking  an  active  part  in  the  ordinary  business  of  life  than  such  as  are 
calculated  to  render  them  suitable  patrons  of  an  university,  and,  indeed, 
their  competency  for  the  discharge  of  that  particular  duty  will  probably 
be  little  regarded.  The  fluctuating  nature  of  the  body  is  besides  very 
unfavorable  to  the  steady  and  consistent  administration  of  this  important 
trust ; and  the  political  feelings  which  are  so  apt  to  influence  their  own 
appointment  are  but  too  likely  to  affect  the  course  of  their  conduct  in 
matters  which  ought,  of  all  others,  to  be  exempted  from  their  operation. 

Notwithstanding  the  manifest  defects  and  vices  of  the  system,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  many  men  of  distinguished  eminence  have  been  placed 
in  the  chairs  of  this  university,  and  that  it  has  acquired,  and  hitherto 
preserved,  a respectable  character  as  a seminary  of  learning  and  science. 
This,  however,  must  not  be  attributed  to  any  excellence  in  the  existing 
system  of  patronage  and  administration  ; but  is  partly  owing  to  the  state 
of  medical  education  in  the  great  universities  of  England,  partly  to  the 
exclusion  of  Dissenters  from  those  establishments,  and,  perhaps,  above  all, 
to  the  existence  of  a system  of  patronage  and  management  still  more  ob- 
jectionable in  the  other  universities  of  Scotland.  In  the  words  of  one  of 
the  gentlemen  examined,1  1 it  is  the  greatest  possible  mistake,  though  a 
very  common  one,  to  suppose  that  the  success  of  the  university  has  been 
owing  to  this  mode  of  election.  Its  chief  celebrity  has  been  during  the 
last  century;,  and  the  rise  of  Scotland,  for  the  hundred  years  that  suc- 
ceeded the  Union,  was  so  irresistible,  not  only  in  learning,  but  in  every 
thing,  that  the  greatest  abuses  might  have  existed,  and  did  exist,  and  yet 
the  country  flourished.  1 have  heard  it  stated,  by  the  highest  persons, 
and  in  the  highest  places,  that  the  agricultural  and  commercial  prosperity 
of  Scotland  was  owing  to  the  exclusion  of  the  people  from  any  share  in 
the  representation ; and  no  doubt  these  two  things,  namely,  their  exclusion 
and  their  prosperity,  did  co-exist.;  so  did  the  prosperity  of  the  university 
and  the  election  by  the  magistrates ; but  there  was  probably  no  system 
of  election  that  could  have  been  adopted,  at  that  particular  period  of  our 
history,  under  which  many  good  professors  would  not  have  arisen  in  the 
metropolis.’  ‘It  is  a much  truer  test  of  the  excellence  of  any  elective 
system  to  look  to  the  number  of  ill-qualified  persons  who  have  been  chosen, 
while  well-qualified  ones  have  been  rejected.  A single  flagrant  case  of 
this  description  shows  the  true  tendency  of  the  system  better  than  many 
right  appointments.  It  would  be  indelicate  to  illustrate  this  view  by  ex- 
amples ; but  I am  confident  that  the  facts  would  amply  illustrate  and 
condemn  the  scheme  of  placing  such  elections  in  any  body  constituted  like 
the  magistrates  of  Edinburgh.  No  one  who  has  lived  long  here  can  have 
any  difficulty  in  applying  these  observations.’ 


Mr.  Solicitor-General  (now  Lord)  Cockburn. 


REPOET  OF  THE  ROYAL  MUNICIPAL  COMMISSION. 


643 


We  have  not  thought  it  proper  to  take  evidence  with  regard  to  particu- 
lar cases  of  ill-bestowed  patronage,  as  this  could  not  be  done  without  in- 
juring the  feelings  of  individuals,  and  the  admitted  and  notorious  circum- 
stances connected  with  its  administration  have  appeared  to  us  fully  to 
warrant  the  conclusions  to  which  we  have  come. 

The  cases  are  very  few  in  which  the  patrons  have  made  offer  of  a vacant 
chair  to  any  person,  however  eminent,  who  had  not  solicited  their  support. 
In  no  case  that  has  come  to  our  knowledge  has  the  Town  Council  elected 
a foreigner,  or  an  Englishman  ; and  the  instances  are  comparatively  few 
in  which  persons,  not  previously  connected  with  Edinburgh,  have  been 
successful  in  obtaining  professorships.  Candidates,  connected  politically 
or  personally  with  a prevailing  party,  have  been  preferred  to  others  of 
superior  qualifications,  and  good  appointments  have  frequently  been  carried 
by  narrow  majorities.  By  the  junction  of  two  parties  supporting  inferior 
candidates,  the  best  qualified  person  has  been  rejected.  But  the  greatest 
evil  of  the  system  is  the  necessity  to  which  candidates  are  subjected  of 
trying  to  procure  votes  by  personal  canvass.  Nor  are  the  electors  assailed 
only  by  the  solicitation  of  the  immediate  competitors  for  the  vacant  office 
and  their  friends.  When  the  election  of  a particular  candidate  for  the 
existing  vacancy  would  throw  open  a desirable  office  previously  held  by 
him  (as  frequently  happens  in  vacancies  of  medical  professorships),  the 
influence  of  all  the  friends  of  the  expectant,  in  the  remotest  degree,  is 
brought  to  bear  in  their  favor.  The  electors  are  courted  as  if  they  were 
gratuitously  conferring  a favor,  not  exercising  a trust.  It  is  usually  found 
expedient  to  procure  the  interference  of  those  to  whom  they  are  under 
obligations  ; and  it  is  impossible  to  disguise  that  other  considerations  are 
put  forward  than  the  merits  of  the  competitors.  In  the  words  of  a learned 
professor,  whose  declaration  was  taken,  1 the  candidates  were  compelled  to 
stoop  to  the  level  of  their  electors,  and  there  has  not  been  a single  instance 
in  which,  when  a corrupt  influence  has  been  adequately  exerted,  the  most 
superlative  merit,  if  otherwise  unaided,  has  had  any  chance,  while  it  has 
often  happened  that,  where  merit  did  actually  succeed,  success  was  ob- 
tained by  the  very  narrowest  majorities,  and  only  obtained  at  all  by  em- 
ploying the  same  sinister  means  which  would  otherwise  have  been  trium- 
phant against  it.’ — And  another  professor1  has  observed,  ‘that  the  prac- 
tices resorted  to,  on  some  occasions,  to  influence  the  members  of  Council, 
are  such  as  must  offend  every  man  of  feeling  and  principle.’  - - - - 

The  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh,  as  patrons  of  the  university,  has  been 
found  to  have  the  right  of  regulating  the  rate  of  fees — of  prescribing  the 
course  of  study  required  of  candidates  for  degrees — of  creating,  subdividing, 
and  suppressing  professorships — and,  generally,  of  directing  the  internal 
economy  of  the  college.  Its  interference  in  these  matters  is  complained 
of  by  the  professors  as  injudicious  and  vexatious.  We  think  there  can  be 
little  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  injurious  effects  of  the  internal  control 
thus  exercised  by  the  Town  Council ; and,  therefore,  whether  we  be 
justified  or  not  in  concluding  that  the  higher  branch  of  patronage,  which 
consists  in  supplying  vacant  professorships,  ought  no  longer  to  be  intrusted 
to  the  Town  Council  of  Edinburgh,  we  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  there 
is  no  reason  why  they  should  continue  to  administer  this  part  of  the  duty 
of  patrons,  which  requires  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  objects  and  ne- 


1 Evidence  of  Dr.  Christison. 


C44 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


cessities  of  the  college,  and  of  the  progress  and  comparative  advancement 
of  science  and  literature  in  it  and  other  academical  institutions,  and  -which 
is  more  liable  than  even  the  higher  department  to  gross  and  frequent 
abuses. 

The  limits  of  our  Commission  have  precluded  us  from  making  any 
inquiry  or  suggestion  regarding  that  part  of  the  patronage  of  the  universi- 
ties of  Scotland  which  is  vested  in  the  Crown,  or  exercised  by  the  pro- 
fessors of  each  college  ; and  we  are  fully  aware  of  the  imperfection  of  any 
measure  which  would  affect  only  a portion  of  the  university  patronage  of 
Edinburgh,  and  should  consider  any  scheme  for  the  reformation  of  Scotch 
universities  unsatisfactory  that  did  not  extend  to  them  all. 

Our  inquiries  have,  however,  impressed  upon  us  the  urgent  necessity  of 
a change  of  system  in  the  management  of  the  university  of  Edinburgh ; 
and  as  the  delay  attendant  on  a more  extended  reformation  renders  expe- 
dient the  adoption  of  a partial  measure  which  may  not  be  inconsistent 
with  a general  system,  if  any  such  should  be  hereafter  adopted  for  regu- 
lating the  patronage  and  management  of  all  the  universities  of  Scotland, 
we  beg  leave  to  recommend — 

1.  That  a body  of  five  Curators  shall  be  constituted,  in  whom  shall  be 
vested  the  whole  patronage  and  management  of  the  university  of  Edin- 
burgh, with  all  the  pow'ers  at  present  exercised  by  the  town  council  in 
that  matter. 

2.  That  each  Curator  shall  hold  his  office  for  ten  years  from  the  date 
of  his  appointment,  and  shall  then  be  re-eligible. 

3.  That  of  these  Curators  two  shall  be  named  by  the  Crown,  two  by 
the  town  council  of  Edinburgh,  and  one  by  the  Senatus  Academicus. 

4.  That  the  Curators  shall  not  be  members  either  of  the  Senatus  Aca- 
demicus or  town  council,  and  that  they  shall  receive  no  salary  or  emolu- 
ment whatever. 

In  proposing  these  outlines  of  a plan  for  vesting  the  patronage  and 
government  of  the  university  of  Edinburgh  in  a board  of  Curators,  we  are 
aware  of  the  objections  which  may  be  urged  against  it.  Probably  no  un- 
tried measure  could  be  proposed,  to  which  some  objections  would  not  be 
urged.  We  have  had  in  view  the  system  which  has  been  found  advan- 
tageous in  the  most  distinguished  foreign  universities,  and  we  have  en- 
deavored to  adopt  so  much  of  it  as  seems  to  suit  the  institutions  and  pecu- 
liar views  of  this  country.  We  have  the  less  scruple  in  proposing  so  entire 
a change,  that  we  do  not  think  the  present  system  of  patronage  suscepti- 
ble of  any  effectual  reformation;  and  we  conceive  that  almost  any  change, 
which  should  place  it  in  the  hands  of  a small  and  responsible  body,  would 
be  of  advantage  to  the  university. 

It  may  be  worthy  of  consideration,  whether,  on  the  supplying  of  each 
vacancy  in  the  university,  the  Curators  should  not  be  bound  to  lay  before 
your  Majesty’s  Government  the  reasons  which  have  induced  them  to  pre- 
fer the  person  appointed  to  the  office.  This  has  been  suggested  to  us  as 
a useful  check  on  the  exercise  of  their  powers  : and  we  are  aware  that, 
in  the  most  successful  foreign  universities,  the  recommendation  of  the 
Curators,  supported  by  a statement  of  such  reasons,  is  the  foundation  of 
the  appointment,  which  flows  directly  from  the  Crown.  We  consider  it 
doubtful,  however,  whether  such  a precaution  is  necessary  or  expedient, 
where  the  actual  and  responsible  exercise  of  the  duty  of  patrons  is  to  re- 
main with  the  Curators.”  (P.  69,  sq.) 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


645 


The  preceding  recommendations  are  by  a Royal  Commission 
of  Municipal  Inquiry,  appointed  under  a reforming  administration ; 
but  nearly  five  years  previously,  that  is,  in  1830,  a Royal  Com- 
mission of  Visitation,  nominated  under  a conservative  cabinet, 
“ to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  Universities  and  Colleges  of 
Scotland,”  had  completed  its  elaborate  investigations,  and  made 
its  general  and  its  special  Reports.  The  opinion  of  both  Com- 
missions are  entitled  to  great  respect ; for  the  members  of  both 
were,  in  general,  persons  of  high  intelligence,  and  all  of  laudable 
intentions.  The  Commissioners  of  Visitation  were  not  specially 
authorized  to  interfere  with  the  academical  patronage , as  estab- 
lished ; certainly,  they  make  no  report  in  regard  to  the  mode  or 
modes  of  appointing  Professors.  But  in  matters  where  the  two 
Commissions  both  report,  under  external  differences  an  internal 
agreement  will  be  found.  Thus,  they  concur  in  declaring  it  in- 
expedient for  the  interests  of  education,  for  the  sake  of  which 
alone  Universities  are  instituted,  to  leave  the  power  of  legislation 
and  ultimate  control  in  the  hands  of  the  academical  teachers  ; 
and  both,  accordingly,  recommend,  that  this  function  be  intrusted 
to  a small  extra-academical  body,  “the  Board  of  Curators”  of  the 
one,  “ the  University  Court”  of  the  other.  The  recommendations 
by  the  Burgh  Commissioners  touching  the  Universities,  are  only 
incidental  to  the  object  of  their  investigations,  and  are  therefore 
necessarily  limited ; whereas  it  was  the  primary  and  special  ob- 
ject proposed  to  the  Commissioners  of  Visitation,  to  inquire  into 
and  report  concerning,  every  matter  of  academical  interest.  I 
shall  now,  therefore,  proceed  to  make  a few  extracts  from  the 
General  Report,  and  the  Report  relative  to  the  University  of  Edin- 
burgh, by  the  latter  Commission  ; and  this  on  points  which  were 
beyond  the  consideration  of  the  former. — And  first  of  a Degree 
in  Arts. 

“ It  has  appeared  to  us  to  be  essentially  necessary  that  the  examina- 
tions for  Degrees  in  Arts  should  be  conducted,  as  at  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge, by  [sworn]  Examiners  appointed  for  the  purpose,  and  not  by  the 
Professors. 

When  the  Candidates  are  examined  by  the  Professors,  there  is  always 
the  greatest  risk  that  the  Examinations  will  degenerate  into  a mere  form. 
The  qualifications  of  many  will  be  known  to  the  Professors.  The  Pro- 
fessors will  naturally  he  disposed  to  he  easily  satisfied  in  regard  to  the 
qualifications  of  those  who  acquitted  themselves  to  their  satisfaction  as 
Students  ; and  even  if  more  rigorously  conducted,  the  Examinations  will 
naturally  he  made  to  correspond  to  the  proficiency  acquired  in  the  Classes, 
and  confined  to  the  particular  topics  introduced  in  their  respective  Lee- 


C46 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


lures.  The  character  of  the  Professors  will  in  fact  be  engaged  in  the 
success  of  the  Candidate.  Each  will  be  examining  his  own  pupils.  His 
eminence  as  a teacher  will  he  interested  in  the  result ; and  the  necessary 
bias  of  the  mind  will  be  to  make  the  Degree  the  reward  of  the  exertions 
and  progress  made  in  the  class.  Higher  attainments  will  not  be  deemed 
necessary,  and  the  Degree  would  thus  soon  become  merely  a reward  for 
eminence  in  the  Classes,  without  requiring  greater  exertion,  or  encourag- 
ing greater  acquisitions  in  knowledge.  We  apprehend  that  any  approach 
to  such  a state  of  things  would  counteract  the  objects  which  we  have  in 
view,  and  that  the  Degree  would  be  so  indiscriminately  conferred  that  it 
would  never  be  an  object  of  ambition,  or  be  raised  in  public  ♦estimation. 
The  experience  which  has  already  occurred  as  to  the  Scotch  Universities 
demonstrates  the  truth  of  these  remarks,  and  affords  conclusive  reasons  for 
apprehending  that  the  value  of  the  Degree  will  not  be  raised  if  the  Ex- 
amination of  Candidates  shall  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Professors.  The 
utter  contempt  in  which  the  Degree  of  Master  of  Arts  is  held  in  Scotland, 
and  the  notorious  inefficiency  of  the  Examinations  under  the  existing  sys 
tem,  have  appeared  to  us  to  require  that  the  Examination  of  Candidates 
shall  be  conducted  on  a different  footing.  The  evidence  in  regard  to  the 
mode  of  conferring  Degrees  in  Arts  in  Edinburgh  and  Aberdeen,  exhibits 
a striking  illustration  of  the  necessity  of  such  a change  as  we  now  propose  ; 
and  we  do  not  think  that  any  impartial  observer  can  fail  to  acknowledge 
that  the  degradation  in  public  opinion  of  the  Degrees  given  by  some  of  the 
Scotch  Universities  has  been  the  result  of  the  manner  in  which  they  have 
been  hitherto  bestowed.  We  have  felt  it  to  be  our  duty,  therefore,  to 
propose  that  Examiners  shall  be  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining the  qualifications  of  Candidates  for  Degrees  in  Arts.”  (Gen. 
Rep.  43.) 

What  the  Visitors  say  of  a degree  in  Arts,  and  of  the  radical 
vice  of  the  prevalent  system  of  examination,  has  been  only  too 
fully  confirmed  by  the  experience  of  the  twenty  years  which  have 
since  elapsed.  This  degree,  they  state,  was  then  “utterly  con- 
temptible,” and  it  is  utterly  contemptible  now.  In  the  University 
of  Edinburgh,  after  a temporary  expectation  of  improvement,  and 
a sufficient  season  of  trial,  the  estimate  of  the  “ Honor”  has 
again  justly  fallen  to  the  lowest ; for,  affording  no  criterion  of 
merit,  and  lavished  upon  any  dunce  who  may  obtain  the  favor 
of  the  individual  judges,  the  “ Laurel”  is  now  again  principally 
affected  by  a few  humble  intellects  of  the  humblest  acquirements, 
especially  by  those  resident  in  England,  where  a degree  in  Arts 
is  always  of  a certain  reflected  estimation.  For  an  Oxford  or 
even  a Cambridge  pass,  though  it  certifies  not  much,  certifies 
always  something. 

The  system  of  examination  for  degrees  in  Arts,  as  realized  in 
Edinburgh,  violates  every  principle,  and  concentrates  every 
defect.  It  is  carried  on,  exclusively,  by  those  who  have  other 


EE  POET  OF  THE  EOYAL  UNIVEESITY  VISITATION. 


647 


interests  in  passing  or  rejecting,  than  the  competence  or  incom- 
petence of  the  candidate ; and  every  facility,  every  inducement 
is  afforded,  to  the  exercise  of  partiality.  For, 

1.  The  Professors  are  the  only  examiners.  2.  The  examination 
is  strictly  private,  consisting  altogether  of  written  answers  to 
questions  communicated  to  the  candidate  at  the  time  when  his 
responses  are  required.  3.  These  questions  are  not  previously 
known  to,  are  not  proposed  by,  the  Faculty,  hut  remain  at  the 
discretion  of  each  individual  examiner.  4.  The  answers  also  are 
limited  to  the  one  examiner,  who  does  not  communicate  them  to 
the  Faculty.  5.  The  questions  (for  the  minimum)  are  often,  even 
ludicrously,  beyond  what  ought  to  be  demanded.  6.  These  are 
sometimes  relative  to  fortuitous  subjects  treated  in  the  examiner’s 
last  course  of  lectures,  and  such  as  could  only  reasonably  he  pro- 
posed to  the  auditors  of  that  course.  7.  This  variation  affords 
an  unfair  advantage  to  certain  individuals,  and  is  otherwise  no 
trial  whatever  of  the  general  competence  of  candidates.  8.  It  is 
also  looked  upon  as  constraining  extra  attendance  by  candidates 
on  such  last  courses.  9.  In  general,  the  candidate  is  not  allowed 
to  approve  his  qualifications  by  his  own  choice  of  hooks  ; nor  are 
fixed  books  or  classes  of  books  proposed  to  him  for  study.  10. 
There  is  no  law,  there  are  no  measures  for  preventing  favor  or 
disfavor  ; and  any  incapable  may  he  passed,  any  respectable  can- 
didate may  he  rejected,  at  the  mere  will  of  a majority  of  any  few 
members  of  the  Faculty  who  may  happen  to  be  present  at  the 
decisive  meeting.  And  so  undeserving,  in  fact,  are  some  of  those 
who  have  actually  received  the  “ Honor,”  that  its  refusal  to  any 
becomes  thereafter  an  act  of  arbitrary  injustice. 

All  this  evinces  the  necessity  of  a radical  change  in  the  mode 
of  examination,  if  our  Degree  in  Arts  should  ever  rise  to  value,  as 
a testimony  even  of  the  lowest  proficiency.  The  plan  proposed 
by  the  Visitors  would  certainly  he  a marvelous  improvement. 
But  I am  doubtful  (in  the  circumstances)  as  to  the  expediency 
of  excluding  the  Professors  from  all  share  in  the  examination ; 
though  I have  no  doubt  that  the  judgment  of  passing  or  rejecting 
and  of  classifying  candidates,  should  he  confided  solely  to  a disin- 
terested body,  who  ought  likewise  to  he,  at  least,  joint  examiners 
with  the  Professors.  Many,  however,  of  the  worst  evils  of  the 
present  system  of  graduation  would  he  alleviated,  were  the  can- 
didates, even  apart  from  the  introduction  of  such  a body : — 1°, 
previously  tried  by  an  extra-academical  hoard,  as  to  their  mere 


648 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


fitness  to  be  taken  on  the  academical  examination ; 2°,  if  this 
examination  were  made  public,  and  consequently,  in  part  at  least, 
oral  ; 3°,  if  the  subjects  were  fixed,  and  an  adequate  preparation 
in  certain  hooks  or  classes  of  hooks  made  sufficient  to  qualify  for 
every  honor  ; 4°,  if  candidates  were  allowed  to  give  up  for  exam- 
ination as  many  hooks  as  they  could  accurately  master,  and  were 
classified  in  each  department  according  to  their  proficiency ; and 
5°,  if  every  professor,  perhaps  certain  others,  were  not  only  de- 
clared entitled  hut  invited  to  put  questions  orally  in  any  branch ; 
finally,  6°,  if  the  judges  were  made  to  act  under  the  obligation  of 
an  oath. — This  plan  would  at  least  redeem  the  Degree  in  Arts 
from  its  present  merited  contempt ; it  would  make  it  a certificate 
of  some  significance,  rendering  the  examination  also  a stimulus 
to  study,  and  an  occasion  for  the  manifestation  of  ability. 

A Degree  in  Arts  is  a luxury,  and  its  abuse  is  of  comparative- 
ly little  consequence  either  to  the  individual  or  to  the  public ; a 
Degree  in  Medicine  is  a necessity,  and  its  right  regulation  is  of 
the  highest  importance,  both  to  the  worthy  graduate’s  success, 
and  to  the  general  welfare.  To  this  therefore  I now  go  on. 

The  University  of  Edinburgh,  in  its  medical  department,  had 
been  latterly  in  a gradual  process  of  decline;  and  the  question 
which  the  Visitors  had  first  and  principally  to  determine  was — 
Whether  the  Medical  Doctorate  was  to  be  still  farther  eviscerated 
of  all  literary  qualification,  and  yet  the  Degree  issued  under  the 
same  name,  to  be  still  entitled  to  its  former  privileges  ? Were 
this  to  be  allowed,  intending  practitioners  would  be  tempted  by  a 
more  valuable  license,  at  a rate  as  low  as  any  surgeon’s  or  apoth- 
ecary’s company  could  afford.  No  doubt,  the  public  would  thus 
get  only,  under  a higher  name,  an  inferior  order  of  practitioners, 
and  be  wholly  deprived  of  its  old  accomplished  physician ; while 
the  inferior  examining  boards  would  be  injured,  the  medical  pro- 
fession in  general  degraded,  and  the  University  at  large  discred- 
ited— only,  a portion  of  its  members  reaping,  for  a time,  a person- 
al advantage  from  the  calamitous  change. — But  to  be  somewhat 
more  particular. 

Universities  in  general,  and  the  University  of  Edinburgh  in 
particular,  were  privileged  by  the  (State  to  grant,  upon  certain 
conditions,  a certain  kind  of  liberty  to  practice  Medicine.  They 
were  privileged  to  examine,  and  to  authorize  candidates  for  the 
highest  branch  of  the  profession,  that  is  as  Physicians,  but  were 
not  privileged  to  grant  licenses  for  the  lower  departments,  that 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


649 


is  as  Surgeons  and  Apothecaries.  If,  therefore,  an  University 
attempt  this,  it  attempts  what  it  has  no  right  to  perform  ; while, 
at  the  same  time,  by  the  attempt  itself,  it  not  only  derogates  from 
its  own  dignity,  but  commits  an  act  of  injustice  upon  other  cor- 
porations, by  usurping  their  peculiar  privileges.  But  worse  than 
this  : The  University  of  Edinburgh  not  only  usurps  what  does 
not  belong  to  it ; it  does  not  satisfactorily  discharge  the  function 
of  those  bodies  on  whose  province  it  encroaches.  It  is  not  merely 
superfluous.  For,  in  the  first  place,  it  does  not  execute  the  duty 
of  examination  by  those  who  have  no  interest  in  licensing  inca- 
pables,  but  by  those  who  have.  In  the  second  place,  it  dispenses 
with  those  branches  of  liberal  education  which  it  was  bound  to 
insure  that  all  its  graduates  possessed ; nay,  it  even  dispenses 
with  these,  to  an  extent  which  would  be  held  disgraceful  by  the 
inferior  incorporations  which  it  supersedes.  For  example  : a 
smaller  amount  and  an  inferior  quality  of  liberal  learning  is,  in 
Scotland,  required  to  qualify  for  the  highest  honors  and  privileges 
of  the  profession,  than  even  in  Ireland  is  deemed  necessary  for 
the  very  lowest ; so  that  the  medical  aspirant  who  finds  himself, 
from  want  of  Greek,  unable  to  rise  into  a Dublin  Apothecary,  is 
obliged  to  subside  into  an  Edinburgh  Physician.  (Ev.  I.  218, 
219.)  In  like  manner,  the  classical  acquirements  of  an  Edin- 
burgh Doctor  of  Medicine  (which  are  wisely  not  taken  upon  trust) 
would  not  enable  him  to  pass  before  the  Military,  to  say  nothing 
of  the  Naval,  Medical  Board  (Ev.  I.  458,  534,  535,  339) ; as 
these  Boards,  for  either  service,  like  the  Prussian  Government  for 
all  its  lieges,  justly  place  no  confidence  in  academical  certificates, 
but  examine  doctors  and  no-doctors,  indifferently.  Thus,  from 
want  of  an  academical  controlling  power,  acting  for  the  public 
and  University,  the  public  is,  as  said,  deprived  of  that  class  of 
approved  medical  practitioners,  to  secure  which  exclusively,  this 
and  other  Universities  were  relatively  privileged  ; while  our  Alma 
Mater,  degraded  by  her  members,  selling,  for  their  private  inter- 
est, her  highest  medical  honors,  at  a lower  literary  price  than  is 
exacted,  not  only  by  other  academical  bodies,  but  even  by  the 
inferior  licensing  incorporations,  is,  in  fact,  constrained  by  her 
own  officers  to  convert  her  “Seminary  of  Science”  into  an  “Asy- 
lum of  Ignorance,”  covering  the  country  with  her  annual  issues 
of  “graduated  dunces” — of  “Doctores  indocti.”  In  thus  reduc- 
ing the  standard  of  medical  literary  competency  far  below  the 
academical  level  of  England,  Ireland,  or  any  other  country  of 


650 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 

Christendom,  the  supine  or  interested  regulators  of  this  school 
have,  unfortunately,  been  allowed  to  accomplish  the  one  natural 
result.  Medicine  has  now  ceased  in  Scotland  to  be  a learned 
profession,  and  though,  even  in  Scotland,  learned  medical  men 
may  still  be  found,  there  is  here  no  longer  any  assurance,  not  to 
say,  of  superior  erudition,  hut  any  guarantee  against  the  lowest 
ignorance,  afforded  to  the  public  in  a medical  degree. 

Against  the  proceedings  in  this  process  of  abasement,  the 
medical  interest  predominant  in  the  Senatus,  though  peculiarly 
unqualified  to  legislate  for  a University,  was  not  left  without 
warning  in  the  reclamations  even  of  the  medical  professors.  The 
late  Nestor  of  the  Faculty,  Dr.  Duncan,  senior,  foresaw  nothing  in 
the  innovations,  but  “ Edinburgh  Degrees  being  conferred  upon 
ignorant  empirics.”  (Ev.  I.  219.)  Professor  Sir  George  Baltin- 
gall  thus  declares  : 

“ I can  not  see  the  expediency  or  propriety  of  granting  the  : highest  de- 
gree in  medicine ,’  at  such  a limited  expense  of  time  and  means,  as  will 
enable  the  holders  of  such  degree  to  undersell  or  even  to  enter  into  com- 
petition with  the  common  routiniers  of  the  country.  On  the  contrary,  it 
appears  to  me  that  it  is  only  by  elevating  the  standard  of  scientific  educa- 
tion in  all  its  branches  within  the  Universities,  that  we  can  hold  out  any 
thing  distinctive  or  desirable  in  a University  education,  or  that  we  can 
expect  to  keep  that  vantage  ground  which  these  institutions  have  hitherto 
held  in  public  esteem.”  (Ev.  I.  268.) 

Enlightened  views  in  regard  to  the  necessity  of  classical  and 
philosophical  accomplishment  in  the  medical  graduate  were  like- 
wise held  by  other  distinguished  medical  professors,  as  Dr.  John 
Thomson,  Dr.  James  Hamilton,  and  Mr.  James  Russell — to  say 
nothing  of  every  medical  and  surgical  authority  out  of  the  Uni- 
versity. (Ev.  I.  455,  sq.,  307,  308,  310,  312,  288.)  But  passing 
to  the  opinion  of  other  members  of  the  Senatus,  we  find  the 
Faculty  of  Arts  in  1824  thus  formally  reporting : 

“ No  higher  qualifications  are  expected  from  the  Physician  [who  prac- 
tices on  an  academical  degree]  than  from  the  Surgeon  [who  does  not]. 
Hence  it  has  happened,  that  the  Physician  has  sunk  in  the  scale  of  gen- 
eral estimation , tchile  the  Surgeon  has  risen  to  his  level.  The  Faculty 
can  perceive  no  other  plan  more  effectual,  none  more  generally  expected 
by  the  public,  than  by  enlarging  the  qualifications  of  the  Physician,  by 
obliging  him  to  obtain  that  literary  and  scientific  education  which  will 
give  grace  and  dignity  to  his  medical  acquirements,  and  which  appears 
essentially  necessary  to  every  one  obtaining  the  highest  honors  an  Uni- 
versity has  to  bestow.”1  (Ev.  I.  144.]) 


1 The  Faculty,  however,  annulled  all  attention  to  the  truth  which  they  thus  spoke, 
by  requesting  that  a compulsory  attendance  on  their  own  classes  in  a University  should 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


651 


What  is  thought,  and  justly  thought,  upon  the  subject  by  the 
public,  and  intelligent  English  public,  appears  from  the  plain 
spoken  evidence  of  an  able  and  well-informed  witness,  of  whom 
the  Visitors  do  not  communicate  the  name.  It  is  well  worthy 
of  the  reader’s  serious  attention ; and  the  result  is,  that  the 
Edinburgh  medical  degree  was  then  regarded  in  England  as  no- 
thing else  (alas  ?)  than  a fraud  upon  the  nation.  And  what, 
now  ? 

“It  is  argued — that  the  demand  for  the  highest  rank  in  Medicine  is 
limited,  and  that  to  many  the  possession  of  it  is  of  no  value.  Granted. 
But  is  that  a reason  for  increasing  the  supply  ? Is  that  a reason  for 
sending  forth  Doctors  by  hundreds  every  year  ? Is  it  not  unreasonabie  to 
argue — that  because  the  demand  for  medical  men  of  the  highest  rank  is 
limited,  the  University  of  Edinburgh  ought,  therefore,  to  have  the  privi- 
lege of  conferring  that  rank,  with  a facility  that  multiplies  the  number 
beyond  the  demand,  and  degrades  the  distinction  it  is  meant  to  convey? 
One  would  suppose,  from  this  line  of  argument,  that  Edinburgh  College 
had  been  so  chary  of  the  honors  it  has  to  bestow,  that,  small  as  is  the  ex- 
isting demand,  it  was  not  effectually  supplied  from  Scotland.  But  the 
case  is  precisely  the  reverse.  The  complaints  against  the  Scotch  Univer- 
sities are — that  they  supply  a greater  number  of  Doctors  than  the  w'ants 
of  society  require — that  they  manufacture  a baser  article  than  Oxford  and 
Cambridge,  affix  the  same  stamp  to  it,  and  introduce  it  in  such  quantities 
into  the  market,  that  the  whole  cargo  is  depreciated — and  when  their 
coinage  happens  to  be  of  sterling  worth,  that  its  value  is  lessened  by  the 
plated  and  Brummagem  articles  that  have  issued  from  the  same  mint. 

To  what  extent  the  demand  of  higher  qualifications  for  medical 

honors  at  Edinburgh  College  might  affect  the  pecuniary  interests  of  its 
Professors,  I am  not  prepared  to  say ; but  I am  sure  it  would  raise  the 
value  of  their  Diplomas,  and  settle  beyond  a doubt  the  real  merit  of  their 
School  of  Medicine.  I am  far  from  wishing  to  underrate  the  Edinburgh 
Professors ; but  1 must  be  permitted  to  remark,  that  under  their  present 
system  of  conferring  degrees,  the  number  of  students  that  flock  to  them  for 
instruction,  is  no  more  a test  of  the  value  of  their  lectures,  than  the  resort 
of  young  couples  to  Gretna  Green  is  a proof  of  the  piety  of  the  Blacksmith 

who  gives  them  his  nuptial  benediction. But  though  some  men  go 

to  Edinburgh  in  order  to  obtain  a rank  in  their  profession,  which  they  could 
not  otherwise  acquire,  and  to  which  from  the  deficiencies  of  their  education, 
and  the  mediocrity  of  their  attainments,  they  have  no  right  to  pretend,  the 
great  majority  of  students  go  to  learn  their  profession  ; and  where  they  are 


be  the  test  of  the  literary  competence  “ indispensable”  in  the  medical  graduate.  They 
open  their  petition  by  saying  : — “ They  feel  it  to  be  a duty  they  owe  to  the  University 
and  the  public,  not  to  allow  the  present  occasion  to  pass  without  endeavoring  to  render 
the  degree  more  respectable  and  more  dignified  than  it  has  hitherto  been  ; and  now  that 
the  Senatus,  in  their  boundless  liberality,  have  agreed  to  accept  of  certificates  of  attend- 
ance on  self-constituted  teachers,  they  will  not,  it  is  presumed,  be  less  indulgent  to  the 
radical  professors  in  Universities,  who  were  originally  constituted  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  general  knowledge,  and  to  prepare  the  youth  for  all  the  learned  and  liberal 
professions,”  &c.,  &c.  (Ev.  I.  145.]) 


662 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


well  taught,  there  they  will  go,  whether  they  expect  to  he  decorated  with 
degrees  or  not.  If  the  Edinburgh  Professors  do  their  duty,  and  in  compari- 
son with  other  teachers  are  duly  qualified  to  afford  instruction,  they  may 

lose  graduates,  but  they  will  not  lose  students  by  the  change. On 

the  supposition  that  a higher  and  better  educated  class  of  medical  practi- 
tioners is  wanted,  to  a certain  but  to  a limited  extent,  we  are  asked — How 
is  that  class  to  be  supplied  ? What  sort  of  education  is  to  be  required  from 
those  who  aspire  to  it  ? Ought  there  to  be  a different  standard  in  Scotland 
from  that  which  is  used  in  England  ; ought,  in  short,  the  Scotch  Profess- 
ors to  suffered  at  their  discretion,  to  enrol  natives  of  Lilliput  and  Brob- 
dignag  in  the  same  regiment,  and  send  them  with  certificates  to  Lon- 
don testifying  that  they  are  of  the  same  size,  and  qualified  to  serve  in  the 
same  company?” — (Ev.  I.  145.]) 

And  Edinburgh  complains,  that  her  (popriKol  are  not  admitted 
among  the  ^aptei/re?  of  the  London  College ! — But  we  have  been 
delayed  too  long  from  the  opinion  of  the  Visitors  themselves. 

“ On  the  subject  of  the  Preliminary  Education  which  should  be  required 
of  candidates  lor  Degrees  in  Medicine,  we  have  had  much  deliberation, 
and  received  a great  deal  of  evidence.  It  has  appeared  to  us  to  be  a 
matter  of  great  importance,  that  the  persons  who  are  to  practice  Medicine 
should  be  men  of  enlightened  minds,  accustomed  to  exercise  their  intel- 
lectual powers,  and  familiar  with  habits  of  accurate  observation  and 
cautious  reflection ; and  that  they  should  be  possessed  of  such  a degree 
of  literary  acquirement  as  may  secure  the  respect  of  those  with  whom 
they  are  to  associate  in  the  exercise  of  their  profession.  We  therefore 
thought  it  an  indispensable  qualification  for  a Medical  Degree  that  the 
individual  should  have  some  reasonable  acquaintance  with  the  Greek  and 
Latin  languages,  and  with  Mathematics  and  Philosophy;  and  though 
strong  doubts  have  been  expressed  by  many  of  the  Medical  Professors  as 
to  the  expediency  of  rendering  this  an  essential  condition,  from  an  appre- 
hension that  it  might  prevent  many  persons  from  taking  the  benefit  of  the 
instruction  in  Medical  Science  to  be  obtained  in  the  Universities,  we  have 
found  our  opinion  on  this  point  confirmed  by  every  one  of  the  eminent 
Physicians  and  Surgeons,  not  belonging  to  the  Universities,  whom  we 
examined,  as  well  as  by  some  of  the  Medical  Professors  themselves  ; while 
we  have  also  been  fully  satisfied,  by  a due  consideration  of  the  matter 
itself,  and  of  the  evidence  before  us,  that  there  is  no  solid  ground  for  the 
apprehensions  entertained.”  (Gen.  Rep.  56.) 

Those  of  the  medical  professors  interested  in  the  higher  num- 
ber and  lower  quality  of  degrees  were,  however,  averse  from  such 
preliminary  discipline ; and  the  following  is  the  comment  by  the 
Visitors  on  the  attempted  reasoning  of  these  professors. — And 
first  as  to  the  inutility,  maintained,  of  liberal  learning  for  a phy- 
sician : 

“ The  amount  of  this  would  seem  to  be,  that  literature  is  a positive  evil 
to  a Physician  ; that  it  unfits  him  for  the  habits  and  state  of  mind  which 
he  ought  to  cultivate ; and  that  it  will  be  an  obstacle  to  his  success  in 
practice.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  the  learned  Medical  Faculty 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


653 


could  have  intended  to  go  so  far  as  this  ; hut  it  is  plain  that  there  is  much 
fallacy  in  the  assertions,  for  it  can  scarcely  he  called  reasoning,  which  they 
here  adduce.  It  is  unquestionably  true,  that  if  a man  were  to  devote 
himself,  in  the  manner  stated,  to  Literature  and  Science,  making  these 
the  chief,  or  almost  the  exclusive  objects  of  his  pursuit ; he  would  not  be 
a good  Physician  : hut  this  is  not  at  all  what  is  intended  ; the  sole  object 
being,  that  a Physician  should  have  that  liberal  education  which  is  im- 
plied in  a course  of  University  attendance.  By  acquiring  this,  the  mind 
would  be  invigorated  for  any  intellectual  pursuit,  and  it  could  superinduce 
no  habit  disqualifying  for  the  activity  of  exertion,  or  for  mingling  in  so- 
ciety as  a medical  man  must  do.  Such  education  also,  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, would  be  completed,  or  nearly  so,  before  medical  pursuits  com- 
menced, certainly  long  before  practice  was  attempted,  and  would  not 
therefore  have  the  effect  which  is  here  supposed.”  (Hep.  Ed.  187.) 

Next,  as  to  the  effect,  argued  by  the  Medical  Faculty,  that  an 
elevation  in  the  standard  of  Doctoral  competency  would  he  fol- 
lowed by  a reduction  in  the  number  of  Doctors.  On  this  the 
Visitors  remark : 

“It  is  thus  represented,  that  because,  which  is  undoubtedly  true,  there 
are  men  who  practice  with  little  or  no  literary  attainment,  the  general 
tone  of  the  profession  should  be  lowered,  or  at  least  that  no  attempt  should 
be  made  to  elevate  it,  because  the  expense  being  thus  increased,  the  num- 
ber of  enlightened  Graduates  would  be  diminished,  and  practice  would 
be  surrendered,  much  more  than  it  is,  to  those  of  inferior  qualifications. 
But  this  reasoning  is  far  from  being  conclusive  There  is,  it  is  to  be 
lamented,  too  great  a disposition  in  many  to  prefer  quackery  to  sound 
Medical  Science ; and  by  those  who  do  so,  the  literature  of  medical  men 
will  not  be  held  in  much  estimation.  But  as  no  one  would  contend  that, 
on  this  account,  quackery  should  be  preferred  to  knowledge,  upon  the 
same  ground  it  would  seem  that  want  of  literature  should  not  be  preferred 
to  learning.  In  fact,  the  preparatory  education  for  which  some  contend, 
does  not  interfere  in  the  slightest  degree  with  the  medical ; it  only  tends 
to  make  the  practitioner  a more  enlightened  man.”  (Rep.  Ed.  188.) 

For  myself,  I am  however  inclined  to  think,  that  were  the  De- 
gree in  Medicine  raised  in  Edinburgh  to  its  ancient  and  legitimate 
literary  eminence  (though  the  profession  might  then  attract  many 
whom  it  does  not  now),  the  number  of  Edinburgh  graduates 
would  he  greatly  decreased.  But  so  it  ought.  The  present  pro- 
portion is,  in  truth,  not  honorable  to  the  University,  and  useless, 
nay  pernicious  to  the  public.  The  effect,  I repeat,  is — to  deprive 
the  nation  of  what  a University  was  privileged  to  secure — an 
ascertained  class  of  liberally  educated  physicians  ; for  thus  the 
highest  degree  is  reduced  to  a level  with  the  lowest  license,  the 
only  difference  being,  that  more  has  been  paid  for  the  higher 
name,  and  that  the  larger  price  has  gone  into  different  pockets. 
By  the  reduction  of  the  physician  to  an  unlearned  practitioner, 


654 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


it  is  not  Medicine  only,  as  a liberal  study,  which  has  suffered ; 
it  is  not  only  that  the  bodies  of  the  lieges  have  been  turned  over 
to  the  murderous  confidence  of  ignorant  dogmatics  (See  above 
p.  252).  The  learning  of  its  medical  profession  is  a foot  in  the 
tripod  of  a country’s  erudition  ; and  this  foot  being  broken,  the 
whole  tripod,  that  is  the  whole  professional  and  liberal  learning 
of  a country,  loses  a principal  support.  (See  above,  p.  330,  sq.) 

The  Visitors  then  proceed  to  adduce,  in  support  of  a liberal 
education  in  the  medical  graduate,  the  evidence  of  the  three  phy- 
sicians, at  the  time,  of  the  highest  professional  reputation  in  this 
city — Dr.  John  Thomson,  Dr.  Abercrombie,  and  Dr.  Davidson. 
The  first  two  are  well  known  as  authors  ; I therefore  quote  only 
the  opinion  of  the  last,  whom  all  who  knew,  admired,  not  only 
for  his  rare  medical  skill,  but  for  his  great  general  talent  and 
most  varied  acquirements. 

“ The  first  point  I would  remark  on  is  Preliminary  Education.  The 
first  subject  that  attracted  my  attention,  in  reflecting  upon  the  Education 
of  Medical  Graduates,  was  that  of  Preliminary  Instruction,  for  which  hut 
very  slight  provision  is  made  in  the  Statuta  Solennia  of  this  University,  an 
acquaintance  with  Latin  being  only  required  ; while  the  means,  till  lately, 
employed  to  ascertain  the  proficiency  of  the  Students,  even  in  that  lan- 
guage, do  not  appear  to  be  the  best  suited  for  the  purpose.  I can  not  help 
thinking  that  more  extensive  literary  and  scientific  education  should  be  re- 
quired from  those  who  mean  to  take  out  a Medical  Degree,  as  extensive 
as  can  reasonably  be  expected  in  young  men  of  seventeen  or  eighteen,  at 
which  age  the  study  of  Medicine  will  probably  commence.  I conceive 
that  the  branches  of  Preparatory  Education  should  be  Greek,  Latin,  French, 
and  Mathematics  ; while  Natural  Philosophy,  Logic,  Moral  Philosophy, 
and  Natural  History,  may  be  acquired,  either  before  beginning  the  study 
of  Medicine,  or  may  be  attended  to  along  with  the  Medical  Classes.  I 
presume  that,  though  Natural  Philosophy,  Logic,  and  Ethics,  will  proba- 
bly be  studied,  either  at  this  or  some  other  University,  Languages,  with 
Mathematics,  may  be  acquired  wherever  such  instruction  can  be  procured ; 
and  that  the  proficiency  of  the  Students  in  those  branches  of  knowledge 
may  be  certified  either  by  Diplomas,  Certificates  from  respectable  Schools 
or  Academies,  or  by  their  undergoing  an  Examination  by  the  Professors 
of  this  University.  If  I were  asked  the  reasons  for  recommending  a more 
extensive  Preliminary  Education  for  Medical  Graduates,  I should  be  puz- 
zled, not  from  the  difficulty  of  discovering  them,  but  from  the  fear  of  that 
ridicule  which  attaches  itself  to  advancing  arguments  in  favor  of  an  opin- 
ion which  is  so  manifestly  correct  as  to  require  no  support.  A prelimin- 
ary Scientific  and  Literary  education  appears  to  be  the  best,  if  not  the  only 
proper  preparation  of  the  youthful  mind  for  entering  upon  the  study  of  so 
extensive  and  difficult  a subject  as  Medicine,  where  an  immediate  demand 
is  made  for  close  attention,  much  discrimination,  and  an  acquaintance  with 
many  subjects  not  strictly  Medical.  Experience  has  convinced  me  that 
those  Students  whose  minds  have  been  previously  cultivated,  make  the 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


655 


most  steady  and  rapid  progress  in  their  new  pursuits,  which  are  much  less 
difficult  to  them  than  to  those  who  are  totally  unscientific  and  deficiently 
educated.  I know,  besides,  that  it  is  a common  subject  of  regret  among 
most  Physicians,  as  it  is  with  myself,  that  they  did  not  make  use  of  youth, 
leisure,  and  opportunity,  in  laying  a broad  and  deep  foundation  of  general 
knowledge,  on  which  to  rest  their  Medical  acquirements.  I may  be  per- 
mitted to  add,  that  were  I not  convinced  of  the  necessity  for  a liberal  edu- 
cation, preliminary  to  the  study  of  Medicine,  I should  surrender  my  doubts 
to  the  authority  of  much  wiser  men,  in  England,  Ireland,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy,  by  whose  influence  it  has  been  established  in  the  Medical 
Schools  of  those  countries ; nor  should  I be  inclined  to  submit  less  willing- 
ly to  the  decision  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts  in  this  College,  who  strongly  rec- 
ommended a preparatory  education  for  the  Medical  Graduates,  in  a Memo- 
rial presented,  I believe,  to  the  Senatus  Academicus  (which  I had  the  ad- 
vantage of  perusing).  A competent  knowledge  of  Greek  appears  to  be 
requisite  for  the  Medical  Students,  from  the  fact  that  much  of  the  language 
and  terminology  of  Anatomy,  Medicine,  Botany,  &c.,  is  derived  from  that 
language,  not  only  from  the  Greeks  having  been  our  earliest  masters  in 
many  of  the  sciences,  but  also  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  from  such  terms 
being  short,  expressive,  and  explanatory,  and  ill  supplied  by  the  tedious 
circumlocutions,  of  modern  tongues.  With  these  terms,  of  constant  occur- 
rence both  in  lectures  and  in  books,  the  uneducated  Student  can  not  fail  to 
be  puzzled ; and  he  must  either  content  himself  with  ignorance  of  their 
import,  or  bestow  much  time,  and  sutler  no  very  agreeable  fatigue,  in  hunt- 
ing out  their  etymology.  Independently  of  all  these  reasons,  it  appears  to 
me,  at  least  unseemly,  that  the  members  of  a learned  profession  should  be 
ignorant  of  the  language  in  which  those  wrote  who  were  their  original  in- 
structors, and  whose  works  are  still,  after  the  flight  of  ages,  by  no  means 
unworthy  of  serious  and  attentive  perusal.  It  seems,  moreover,  peculiarly 
unfitting  that  the  Magnates  of  the  Medical  Profession  (those  who  have 
acquired  either  real  or  imaginary  dignity  from  Degrees,  to  which  some 
privileges  belong),  should  not  possess  the  standard  education  of  gentlemen, 
nor  be  able  to  take  that  station  in  society  which  a cultivated  intellect  is 
entitled  to  assume.” — (Rep.  Ed.  180,  Ev.  I.  503.) 

The  Visitors  then  go  on  to  say  : 

“ There  is  much  other  evidence  to  the  same  effect ; but  it  is  sufficient 
to  point  out  the  leading  views  upon  the  subject ; the  particular  grounds 
of  opinion  it  would  be  impossible,  within  tjie  limits  of  this  Report,  to  detail. 
The  conclusion  to  be  deduced  seems  unquestionably  to  be  decidedly  in 
favor  of  a superior  Preliminary  Education  to  that  which  is  now  re- 
quired. This  can  be  obtained,  apparently,  without  the  slightest  hard- 
ship : the  more  elementary  parts  of  it  being  procured  previously  to  the 
commencement  of  medical  studies,  and  the  more  advanced  during  the 
prosecution  of  those  studies  ; an  arrangement  which  it  is  in  evidence  could 
without  difficulty  be  made.  It  would  thus  not  be  essential  that  there 
should  be  the  Degree  of  Master  of  Arts,  but  merely  that  there  should  be 
an  acquaintance  with  the  learned  languages  and  other  branches  of  knowl- 
edge ; and  by  combining  with  the  Medical  Classes  what  can  be  acquired 
only  at  a University,  the  residence  in  Edinburgh  would  not  be  prolonged. 
The  character  of  the  Medical  Profession  wrould  thus  be  much  raised,  and 
provision  made,  as  has  been  already  stated,  for  spreading  throughout  the 


656  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 

country  enlightened  and  well-informed  men,  who  might  he  instrumental 
in  increasing  to  a great  degree  the  advantages  to  he  derived  from  social 
intercourse,  while  they  would  have  access  to  sources  of  enjoyment  pecu- 
liarly valuable  in  the  sequestrated  situation  in  which  many  Medical  Prac- 
titioners must  spend  the  great  part  of  life.” — (Rep.  Ed.  189.) 

To  conclude  this  part  of  the  subject : 

We  have  here  two  diametrically  opposite  opinions.  On  the 
one  side,  against  the  demand  of  a liberal  accomplishment  in  the 
physician,  we  have  six  out  of  the  seven  holders  of  an  academical 
monopoly,  a body  strongly  and  exclusively  interested  in  the 
creation  of  medical  graduates,  at  the  lowest  qualification,  and  in 
the  greatest  number.  On  the  other  side,  we  have  the  authority 
of  all  Universities  out  of  Scotland,  and  of  the  ivliole  disinterested 
intelligence,  in  this  and  every  other  country,  professional  and 
non-professional,  intra  and  extra-academical.  The  Medical  Fac- 
ulty— the  monopolizing  body — of  this  University,  spoke,  I doubt 
not,  only  as  it  thought.  But  as  the  opinions  of  men  in  general, 
are,  in  general,  only  a reflex  of  their  interests  ; so  it  is  difficult 
even  for  a mind,  however  vigorous  and  independent,  to  resist  the 
magnetic  influence,  as  it  were,  of  the  ordinary  minds  with  which 
it  acts  in  consort : and  thus  is  to  be  explained,  the  otherwise  in- 
explicable fact,  that  men  of  high  intelligence  and  the  most  upright 
intentions  are  so  often  found  engaged  in  the  championship  of  meas- 
ures, which,  had  they  acted  of  and  from  themselves,  they  would 
intellectually  and  morally  contemn.  In  fact,  from  individual  mem- 
bers of  the  Medical  Faculty,  and  their  personal  accomplishments, 
might  be  drawn  a signal  manifestation  of  the  fallacy  of  its  con- 
junct Report.  But  this  is  needless.  As  Hobbes  has  well  observed : 
— Were  it  for  the  profit  of  a governing  body,  that  the  three  angles 
of  a triangle  should  not  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  the  doctrine 
that  they  were,  would,  by  that  body,  inevitably  be  denounced, 
as  false  and  pernicious.  The  best,  certainly  the  most  curious, 
examples  of  this  truth,  are,  indeed,  to  be  found  in  the  History 
of  Medicine — and  of  medicine,  too,  when  yet  a learned  and  phi- 
losophical profession.  For  this,  on  the  one  hand,  is  nothing  else 
than  a marvelous  History  of  Variations:  and,  on  the  other,  only 
a still  more  marvelous  history  of  how  every  successive  variation 
has,  by  medical  bodies,  been  first  furiously  denounced,  and 
(though  always  laughed  at  by  the  wiser  wits)  then  bigotedly 
adopted.  Homoeopathy  and  the  Water  Cure  are,  now  and  here, 
blindly  anathematized  as  heretical ; in  the  next  generation,  it  is 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


657 


not  improbable,  that  these  same  doctrines  may  be  no  less  blindly 
preached,  as  exclusively  orthodox. — Such  is  poor  human  nature  ! 
Such  is  corporate,  such  is  medical  authority  ! 

The  next  point  is  the  Examination  for  medical  degrees.  On 
this  the  Visitors  thus  report : 

“ The  Examination  for  Degrees  in  Medicine  have  hitherto  been  con- 
ducted by  the  Members  of  the  Medical  Faculty,  exclusive  of  the  Professors 
of  the  Medical  Classes  recently  instituted  by  the  Crown,  and  each  Candi- 
date has  been  required  to  pay  a sum  of  Ten  Guineas,  which  is  divided 
equally  among  the  Examining  Professors. 

“ We  are  of  opinion  that  this  system  is  liable  to  very  serious  objections. 
The  emoluments  of  the  Professors  who  examine  ought  not  to  depend  on  the 
number  of  Candidates  for  Degrees.  At  present  the  fees  drawn  by  the 
several  Professors  from  this  source  are  very  considerable,  in  consequence 
of  the  great  number  of  Candidates  ; and  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that 
the  number  of  Degrees  conferred  has  been  continually  increasing  during 
many  years,  in  a proportion  much  greater  than  corresponds  to  the  rate  of 
increase  in  the  number  of  Students  attending  the  Medical  School  of  Edin- 
burgh. 

“ No  explanation  has  been  given  of  this  extraordinary  increase  in  the 
number  of  Degrees,  and  we  are  satisfied  that  it  can  not  be  accounted  for 
from  any  external  causes.  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  present  system  has 
a necessary  tendency  to  render  the  Examinations  less  strict  than  they 
might  otherwise  be,  and  practically  to  loiuer  the  standard  of  qualifications 
in  the  estimation  of  the  Faculty.  It  is,  besides,  scarcely  to  be  doubted, 
that  there  must  be  a natural  reluctance  in  Professors  to  reject  Candidates, 
to  many  of  whom  the  fees  paid  to  the  Examiners  may  be  a very  serious 
sacrifice.  Although  most  of  the  Professors  in  the  Medical  Faculty  enter- 
tain opinions  adverse  to  any  extension  of  the  subjects  of  examination,  and 
are  strongly  impressed  with  the  idea  that  the  importance  and  value  of 
the  University  as  a School  of  Medicine  ought  to  be  estimated  by  the  num- 
ber of  the  Degrees  annually  conferred,  an  entirely  different  opinion  has 
been  strongly  expressed  by  all  the  other  Physicians  and  Surgeons  whom 
we  have  examined,  being  persons  very  extensively  engaged  in  the  practice 
of  their  profession.  It  should  seem  to  us,  that  the  value  of  the  Degree 
must  bear  a proportion  to  the  nature  of  the  qualifications  required  for  it ; 
and  we  have  already  observed,  that  it  does  not  appear  to  us,  that  either 
the  reputation  of  the  University  as  a School  of  Medicine,  or  the  number 
of  Students  resorting  to  it  for  instruction,  will  be  regulated  merely  by  the 
number  of  those  who  may  obtain  Degrees.  It  has  never  been  found,  in 
regard  to  objects  of  such  importance  in  professional  pursuits,  that  the  risk 
of  failure  has  tended  in  any  degree  to  diminish  the  number  of  those  en- 
deavoring to  qualify  themselves  for  attaining  them.” — (Gen.  Rep.  64.) 

What  is  here  said  by  the  Visitors  is  most  true. 

As  to  their  first  observation  : — Nothing  can  be  more  inconsistent 
with  every  principle  of  academical  policy  than  to  make  it  the 
private  interest  of  an  examiner  to  be  remiss  or  perverse  in  the  per- 


658 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


among  others,  in  three  ways.  For,  in  the  circumstances  of  the 
Edinburgh  medical  examinations  : it  is,  1°,  made  directly  the 
interest  of  the  examiner,  to  pass  as  many,  to  reject  as  few  candi- 
dates, as  possible  ; 2°,  it  is  made  indirectly  his  interest,  to  allow 
extra  attendance  on  his  class  to  compensate  for  deficiency  in  the 
examination  ;l  and  3°,  he  is  enabled  to  exercise  with  impunity, 
his  favor  or  disfavor  in  the  passing  or  rejection  of  any  candidate. 
— Theoretically,  this  examination  is  thus  utterly  vicious  ; neither 
is  theory  here  contradicted  by  experience.2 

Nor  is  their  second  observation  less  correct.  As  to  the  large- 
ness of  the  relative  number  of  Medical  Degrees  granted  by  the 
University  of  Edinburgh  : — this,  so  far  from  being,  in  my  opinion, 
matter  of  honor  and  satisfaction,  should,  in  the  circumstances, 
cause  only  humiliation  and  regret.  For  it  exhibits  nothing  but 
decline; — decline  in  the  number  of  medical  students — decline  in 
the  requirements  of  examination — decline  in  the  qualification  of 
the  candidates.  Comparing  the  first  decade  of  the  present  half 
century  with  the  last : — we  find  the  medical  students  in  the  former 
nearly  doubling  in  number  those  in  the  latter ; whereas  the 
medical  degrees  are,  in  proportion  to  the  students,  nearly  thrice 
as  numerous,  being,  in  the  former,  somewhat  less  than  one  to 
fifteen,  in  the  latter,  somewhat  less  than  one  to  five.  And  this 
too,  though  in  the  former,  only  a three  years  medical  study  in 
anf  University  was  required  ; wdiile  in  the  latter,  such  a study 
during/twr  years,  and  one  at  least  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh , 
became  necessary.  Now  what  does  this  evince  ? — Firstly,  That 
the  University  is  trading  on  its  former  credit,  a trade  which  if 
suffered  to  continue  must  end  in  a bankruptcy  of  that  credit  itself. 
For,  secondly,  its  degrees  are  now  granted  to  an  inferior  and  more 
numerous  order  of  students  ; which,  thirdly,  appears,  because  the 
proportional  increase  has  taken  place  along  with,  and  in  conse- 
quence of,  a diminution  in  the  requirement  of  literary  and  liberal 
qualification  in  the  examinee ; while,  fourthly,  it  is  manifest, 


1 It  is  well  known,  that  the  power  of  medical  examination  secures  attendance  on  the 
class  of  the  examiner,  even  though  such  attendance  be  not  required  for  a Degree. 
Hence  the  anxiety  to  be  admitted  a medical  examiner  in  this  University,  howbeit  with- 
out a participation  in  the  direct  emoluments  of  the  labor. 

2 The  late  Professor  Leslie,  in  his  evidence  taken  by  the  Visitors,  and  speaking  of 
the  medical  department  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  says  : — “ It  is  too  severe  a 
trial  on  human  nature  to  have  one’s  duty  set  in  direct  opposition  to  his  interests.  No 
real  reform  in  the  curriculum  can  ever  be  effected  but  by  the  application  of  extrinsic 
and  paramount  authority.” — (Ev.  I.  155.) 


REPORT  OF  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


659 


that  students  now  resort  to  this  medical  school,  chiefly  for  the 
sake  of  its  facile  and  unlettered  Doctorate,  for,  as  four  years  of 
medical  lectures  in  a University  are  here  necessary  for  the  degree, 
the  whole  number  of  medical  pupils  in  attendance  on  this  Uni- 
versity is  little  more  than  four  times  the  number  of  the  gradu- 
ates whom  it  annually  turns  out. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  students  in  medicine  are  attracted  to 
Edinburgh  chiefly  by  the  bribe  of  its  degree;  and  that  at  least 
the  English  candidates  are  almost  exclusively  those  who  are 
either  too  illiterate  to  satisfy  the  liberal  requirements  even  of 
the  London  University  (for  Oxford  and  Cambridge  are  here  out 
of  question),  or  professionally  too  incompetent  to  stand  the  test 
of  the  impartial  examination  there  organized.  When  the  literary 
qualifications  for  our  Scottish  medical  degrees  are  raised  to  a level 
even  with  the  lowest  standard  of  other  British  Universities,  and 
when  our  Scottish  academical  examinations  are  rendered  un- 
biassed criteria  of  professional  competency  ; then  will  the  number 
of  our  medical  graduates  afford  an  index  of  the  relative  eminence 
of  our  medical  school ; — but  not  till  then.  Should  matters  go  on 
as  hitherto ; if,  now  there  be  no  certainty,  so,  soon  there  will  be 
no  probability,  that  even  the  “small  Latin  and  no  Greek,”  still 
nominally  required,  will  be  furnished  by  the  medical  candidate 
and  exacted  by  the  medical  examiner.  “ ’Tis  Latin,  and  can  not 
be  read this  which  the  late  Dr.  Gregory  predicted  would  soon 
be  the  rule  in  his  profession,  is  certainly  no  longer  the  exception: 
nay,  even  English  grammar  and  spelling  are,  by  the  confession 
of  Edinburgh  Medical  Professors,  luxuries,  but  not  necessities, 
for  those  whom  our  Universities  proclaims  to  the  world,  as  merit- 
ing and  having  received  her  “Highest  Honors  in  Medicine.” 
Latin  is  now,  as  Greek  was  before  1823  ; — it  is  nominally  re- 
quired for  an  Edinburgh  medical  degree,  and  an  examination 
as  to  sufficiency,  is  left  to  the  Medical  Faculty.  But  in  1826, 
scarcely  three  years  after  Greek  was  dropped  from  the  Edinburgh 
requirements  for  a physician,  we  have  the  highest  authority  in 
that  Faculty  declaring,  “ that  not  one  medical  man  in  five  hundred 
reads  Greek.”  And  yet  only  three  short  years  before,  the  Medi- 
cal Faculty  was  professedly  reading  and  examining  in  Greek, 
nay  certifying  to  the  sufficiency  of  all  its  graduates,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Hippocrates — the  language  now  authoritatively  declared 
(what  was  long  known  in  fact),  to  be  professionally  obsolete. 
Such,  however,  is  a specimen  of  free  professorial  examination. 
Again  : in  1825,  the  necessity  of  speaking  and  of  understanding 


660 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 


spoken  Latin  was  formally  taken  off  both  Professor  and  Student ; 
a candidate’s  Latinity  was  left  hereafter  to  be  tried  by  the  same 
examiners  as  was,  heretofore,  his  knowledge  of  Greek  ; and  now, 
after  the  operation  not  of  three  but  of  nearly  thirty  years — now, 
after  reducing  the  examination  from  the  level  of  a third , to  a 
level  of  all  the  students,  how  many  are  there — in  five  hundred 
medical  graduates  of  Edinburgh,  let  us  say — who  read  Latin  ? 
In  fact,  though  not  without  advantages,  in  certain  respects,  this 
measure  has  left  us  no  security,  that  either  medical  graduate  or 
medical  professor,  should  henceforward  be  able  to  make  any  use 
of  the  language  of  the  learned — the  language  in  which  nineteen 
in  the  score  of  medical  notabilities  have  been  written.  And 
from  the  illiterate  and  nameless  multitude  of  this  fallen  and  fall- 
ing profession,  the  courted,  canvassed,  cajoled,  concussed  electors 
— the  incompetent  crowd  (not  certainly  without  its  competent 
individuals  also),  to  whom  has  been  abandoned  the  patronage  of 
this  University,  are  still  left  (apart  from  occasional  notoriety  of 
merit)  to  nominate,  by  chance,  favor,  or  intrigue,  among  others, 
its  medical  professors  ; and  these  medical  professors,  now  consti- 
tuting the  predominant  influence  in  the  Senatus  Academicus, 
take  upon  them,  and  are  quietly  allowed,  to  administer,  accord- 
ing to  their  lights,  the  affairs  of  this  intended  school  of  learning, 
and  to  lavish  for  their  personal  interest,  and  not  for  the  common 
good,  trilsts  fondly  confided  to  the  Senatus,  when  the  Senatus 
was  still,  comparatively,  a learned,  intelligent,  and  well-balanced 
body.  Indeed,  if  the  law  do  not  avert  the  evil,  the  Reid  Trust, 
instead  of  a resource  toward  the  great  ends  of  the  University — of 
the  teachers  not  more  than  of  the  taught — seems  destined  to  be 
degraded  into  a fund  for  reckless  litigation,  into  a fund  for  the 
private  profit  of  the  trustees,  and  medical  trustees,  in  particular 
(See  p.  381.) 

The  history  of  Universities — in  truth,  of  all  human  institutions, 
lay  or  clerical,  proves  by  a melancholy  experience,  that  semi- 
naries founded  for  the  common  weal,  in  the  furtherance  of  sound 
knowledge,  are,  if  left  to  themselves — if  left  without  an  external 
and  vigilant,  an  intelligent  and  disinterested  supervision,  regularly 
deflected  from  the  great  end  for  which  they  were  created,  and 
perverted  to  the  private  advantages  of  those  through  whom  that 
end,  it  was  confidently  hoped,  would  be  best  accomplished.  And 
this  melancholy  experience  is,  though  in  different  forms,  almost 
equally  afforded  in  all  our  older  British  Universities ; for  all  of 
these  the  State  has  founded  and  privileged,  but  over  none  has  it 


REPORT  OE  THE  ROYAL  UNIVERSITY  VISITATION. 


661 


ever  organized  any  adequate  controlling  power.  And  what  is 
the  consequence  ? What  is  their  condition  ? What  ought  they 
to  he,  and  what  are  they  ? Corrupt  all ; — all  clamant  for  reform. 
But  unless  the  reform  come  from  without,  we  neecrtiot,  in  any 
University,  have  any  expectation  of  a reform  coming  from  with 
in.  Left  to  itself,  there  is  no  redemption ; 

“ Ipsa  sui  merces  erit,  et  sine  vindice  praeda.” 

Our  only  hope,  a hope,  indeed,  long  deferred,  is  a reform  from 
without — from  above — from  the  Supreme  Civil  Power.  In  re- 
gard to  Edinburgh,  it  would  be  peculiarly  simple  to  expect  a 
correction  of  the  evils  prevalent  in  that  University,  from  the 
bodies — either  that  in  which  the  corruption  has  originated,  or  that 
by  which  it  has  been  tolerated,  or  rather — we  should  say  in 
charity — not  observed.  It  would,  indeed,  be  positively  foolish  to 
call  to  the  Senatus  Academicus — the  Senatus  as  now  constituted, 
— “ Arise  ! awake  /”  It  would  be  more  rational  to  invoke  even 
the  Town  Council ; but  if  the  State  do  not  interfere,  then  this 
University  must,  with  others,  abide  the  alternative — “ he  for  ever 
fallen  /”  Surely,  however,  the  State  can  not  always  issue  costly 
Commissions,  and  yet,  never  afterward  heed  their  recommenda- 
tions. In  the  cases  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  reform  may  indeed 
be  difficult ; but  in  the  case  of  Edinburgh,  nothing  could  be  more 
easy.  In  fact,  the  most  essential  improvements  are  in  general 
manifest,  and  even  urged  in  the  Reports  of  the  two  Commissions ; 
and  these,  we  may  now  confidently  hope,  will  not  long  remain 
neglected,  seeing  that  G-overnment  seems  seriously  engaged  on 
an  inquiry  into  the  English  Universities. 

But  I have  dwelt  too  long  upon  this  subject,  and  shall  only 
add  : — that  the  experience  of  Edinburgh,  like  the  experience  of 
every  other  University  in  which  the  same  practice  has  been  pur- 
sued, proves,  that  an  examination  by  professors  exclusively — by 
all  the  professors  of  a faculty1 — and  by  professors  left  to  their 


1 When  limited  to  a few,  responsibility  is  concentrated  ; but  when  (as  now  in  Edin- 
burgh), the  right  of  examination,  and  consequently  the  benefit  of  an  indirect  compul- 
sion on  attendance,  is  conceded  to  all  the  members  of  this  Faculty,  all  become  inter- 
ested in  certain  measures,  responsibility  is  attenuated  to  a minimum,  and  the  whole 
body  does,  what  a part  of  it  would  not  be  bold  enough  to  attempt.  Since  the  previous 
sheet  was  printed,  above  four  months  ago,  I see  that  the  medical  examiners  have  been 
publicly  accused  of  rejecting  a candidate,  not  for  incompetence,  but  on  the  confessed 
ground  that  he  was  supposed  favorable  to  a medical  theory,  rising  dangerously  in 
opinion,  and  not  in  unison  with  the  medical  theory  of  his  examiners.  On  such  a step 
— such  an  injustice — such  an  absurdity,  the  old  sectional  examiners  would  not  have 
ventured.  If  the  charge  be  well  founded,  an  Edinburgh  medical  graduate  may  now 
be  an  ignorant,  unable  to  spell  his  mother  tongue,  but  must  not  be  a proficient,  pro- 


662  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (A.) 

own  discretion,  and  without  even  the  obligation  of  oath,  statute 
or  publicity,  is  utterly  worthless,  as  a criterion  of  competency  in 
the  candidate  for  an  academical  degree.  Without  entering  on 
details,  I -rould  only  say  in  general,  that  to  redeem  the  Edin- 
burgh medical  degree,  even  to  respectability,  there  are  required 
the  three  following  conditions  : 

1°.  An  extra-professorial  examination,  to  ascertain  whether  the 
candidate  possess  the  general  literary  and  scientific  knowledge 
necessary  for  any  liberal  profession. 

2°.  An  examination,  either  wholly  extra-professorial,  or,  at 
least,  with  extra-professorial  judges  (who  should  also  be  examin- 
ers), to  ascertain  the  professional  qualifications  of  the  candidate. 

3°.  The  examiners  and. judges : — to  be  adequate  to  their  func- 
tions ; to  act  by  rule ; publicly,  as  far  as  possible ; and,  now  as 
formerly,  here  as  elsewhere,  under  the  obligation  of  a solemn 
oath. 

These  are  the  requisites  of  mere  respectability ; but  were  the 
candidates  impartially  and  ably  classified  on  a sufficient  standard, 
the  examination  might  be  raised  to  a higher  value. 

The  recommendation  now  made  to  introduce  other  examiners 
for  a degree  beside  the  academical  lecturers,  is  no  anomaly,  is  no 
innovation.  It  is.  in  fact,  a return  to  principle — to  the  custom 
of  all  academical  antiquity,  a return  even  to  the  practice  of  the 
University  of  Edinburgh  itself,  to  wit,  in  its  first  bestowal  of 
medical  degrees.  Then,  the  doctors  of  the  Edinburgh  College  of 
Physicians  were  called  in ; indeed,  the  graduation  fee  which  has 
since  been  left  to  the  “Medical  Faculty”  of  the  University,  be- 
longed to  the  Library,  and  was  thence  taken,  to  bestow  it  on 
these  extra-academical  examiners,  in  compensation  of  their  non- 
official trouble. — I may  add,  that  had  the  Town-Council,  in  their 
recent  regulation  touching  the  medical  degrees  of  this  University, 
limited  the  qualifying  attendance  to  the  courses  given  by  medical 
graduates , and  more  especially  by  Edinburgh  medical  graduates, 
there  could  not  possibly  have  been  any  valid  doubt  with  regard 
to  the  legal  competency  of  such  regulation,  which  would,  in 
fact,  have  been  only  a step  toward  a state  of  true  academical 
legality. 


fessing  to  think  for  himself.  So  certain  also  are  now  the  opinions  of  a majority 
touching  the  very  practice,  and  in  the  very  body,  where,  heretofore,  medical  skepticism 
was  always  in  proportion  to  medical  wisdom  ! Our  Gregorys  and  Thomsons — what 
would  they  now  say  to  this  1 See  p.  252,  note. 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL. 


(B.)  THE  EXAMINATION  AND  HONORS  FOR  A DEGREE  IN 

ARTS,  DURING  CENTURIES  ESTABLISHED  IN  THE  UNI- 
VERSITY OF  LOUVAIN. 

I have  previously  referred  (p.  403)  to  this  Appendix,  for  a 
statement  in  regard  to  the  examination  for  degrees  hy  the  Uni- 
versity of  Louvain,  in  its  Faculty  of  Arts  ; which,  though  over- 
looked by  all  academical  historians,  is,  I think,  the  best  example 
upon  record  of  the  true  mode  of  such  examination,  and,  until 
recent  times,  in  fact,  the  only  example  in  the  history  of  Univer- 
sities worthy  of  consideration  at  all.  And  as  I shall  have  occa- 
sion to  make  a reference  to  this  examination,  from  the  Appendix 
upon  Oxford,  it  may  be  convenient  to  insert  here,  what  I should 
otherwise  have  postponed. 

The  University  of  Louvain,  long  second  only  to  that  of  Paris 
in  the  number  of  its  students  and  the  celebrity  of  its  teachers, 
and  more  comprehensive  even  than  Paris  in  the  subjects  taught; 
was  for  several  centuries  famed,  especially,  for  the  validity  of  its 
certificates  of  competency — for  the  value  of  its  different  degrees. 
It  is  recorded  by  Erasmus  as  a current  saying,  “ that  no  one  can 
graduate  in  Louvain  without  knowledge , manners , and  age." 
But  among  its  different  degrees,  a Louvain  promotion  in  Arts  was 
decidedly  pre-eminent ; because,  in  this  Faculty,  the  principles 
of  academical  examination  were  most  fully  and  purely  carried 
out.  I am  acquainted,  I think,  with  all  the  principal  documents 
touching  this  illustrious  school ; and  beside  the  Privilegia,  or 
collection  of  statutes,  &c.  (1728),  possess  the  relative  historical 
works  of  Lipsius  (1605),  of  Gframmaye  (1607),  of  Vernulseus 
(1627  and  1667),  of  G-olnitz  (1631),  of  Valerius  Andreas  (1636 
and  1650),  of  the  Zedlerian  Lexicon  (1738),  and  of  Reiffenberg 
(1829,  sq.)  But  strange  to  say,  I have  found  no  articulate  ac- 
count of  its  famous  examinations,  except  in  the  Academia  Lov- 
aniensis  of  Vernulaeus  ; and  from  that  book,  with  a short  pre- 
liminary extract  from  the  Fasti  of  Andreas,  I translate  the 
following  passages. 

Valerius  Andreas. — “ Philosophy,  from  the  very  commence- 


664  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (B.) 

ment  of  the  University,  was  wont  to  be  taught,  partly  in  private 
houses,  partly  in  ‘ the  Street ’ or  public  School  of  Arts  (where, 
indeed,  the  prelections  of  two  chairs  in  that  Faculty,  to  wit, 
Ethics  and  Rhetoric,  are  even  now  publicly  delivered),  the  Mas- 
ters themselves  teaching  each  his  peculiar  subject  at  a fixed  and 
separate  hour ; until,  in  the  year  1446,  by  the  authority  of  the 
Faculty  [private  tuition  was  abolished,  and]  four  Houses  were 
appropriated  to  licensed  instruction  in  Philosophy,  [some  eight 
and  twenty  other  Colleges  belonging  to  it,  being  left  to  supply 
board  and  lodging  to  the  students.]  These  four  Houses  are  com- 
monly called  Pcedagogia,  and,  from  their  several  insignia,  go  by 
the  names  of  the  Lily,  the  Falcon,  the  Castle,  the  Hog — The 
Languages  (Hebrew,  Greek,  and  Latin),  thereafter  obtained  their 
special  Professors  in  the  Trilingual  or  Buslidian  College — The 
chair  of  Mathematics  (though  its  subject  had  been  previously 
taught),  was  founded  in  the  year  1636.” — (Pp.  9,  243,  249.) 

Yernuljeus,  L.  ii.  c.  6.  “ On  Study  and  Degrees  in  the 

[Louvain]  Faculty  of  Arts. 

- - - “ Let  us  now  speak  concerning  Study,  which  in  this  Fac- 
ulty is  two-fold. 

“ The  study  of  Philosophy  is  accomplished  in  two  years.  For 
there  is  given  nine  months  to  Logic,  eight  to  Physics,  four  to 
Metaphysics  ; while  the  three  last  months  are  devoted  to  Repe- 
titions of  the  whole  course  of  Philosophy. — [‘  Account  is  also 
taken  of  Moral  Philosophy,  taught  on  Sundays  and  Holidays, 
by  the  public  Professor,  in  ‘ the  Street’  or  School  of  Arts,  and  in 
the  Psedagogia  by  domestic  Professors.’ — (Y.  Andreas',  p.  242.)] 

“ The  exercises  of  this  philosophical  study  take  place  in  four 
G-ymnasia,  called  Pcedagogia.  In  each  of  these  there  are  four 
daily  prelections,  two  before,  two  after,  noon ; - - - - and  each 
House  has  four  Professors  of  Philosophy,  two  of  whom  are  called 
Primaries,  two  Secondaries.  These  Professors  divide  among 
them  the  whole  course  of  Philosophy.  And  first,  in  Logic : The 
Primaries  expound  the  Introduction  of  Porphyry,  Aristotle’s  Cate- 
gories, and  his  books  of  Prior  and  Posterior  Analytics  ; while  the 
Secondaries,  after  an  explanation  of  the  Elements  of  Logic,  lec- 
ture upon  Aristotle’s  books  of  Enouncement,  Topics,  and  Soph- 
isms. In  Physics  and  Metaphysics'  [I  omit  the  enumeration  of 


1 Compare  Valerius  Andreas,  pp.  242,  243. 


EXAMINATIONS  IN  LOUVAIN. 


665 


books,]  the  Primaries  teach  at  the  hours  of  six  and  ten  of  the 
morning  ; the  Secondaries  at  two  and  four  of  the  afternoon ; and 
the  hearers  for  one  hour  take  down  the  dictates1  of  their  instructor, 
while  for  another  they  are  examined  and  required  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  the  prelection  which  they  have  again,  in  the  interval, 
considered. 

“ The  exercises  of  Disputation  are  either  private  or  public. 

“ The  private  are  conducted'  in  the  several  Psedagogia,  and  in 
kind  are  two-fold. — In  the  first  place,  the  students,  at  certain  fixed 
hours,  contend  with  each  other,  on  proposed  questions,  note  each 
other’s  errors,  and  submit  them  to  the  judgment  of  the  Professor ; 
and  he,  thereafter,  assigns  place  and  rank  to  the  more  learned. — 
Besides  these,  on  each  Monday  and  Friday,  there  are  Disputations 
held  on  points  of  Logic  and  Physics,  over  which  one  of  the  Pro- 
fessors in  rotation  presides.  These  commence  in  January,  and 
end  in  June. 

“ The  public  Disputations  take  place  in  the  common  School 
of  Arts,  which  is  called  1 The  Street;’  and  these  also  are  of  two 
kinds. — In  the  first  place,  on  Mondays  and  Fridays,  during  Lent, 
the  Physical  auditors  of  all  the  Gymnasia,  divided  into  certain 
classes,  compete  among  themselves  for  glory  ; one  prescribing  to 
another  the  matter  of  disputation. — Besides  these,  there  are  eight 
other  Disputations,  carried  through  on  Sundays,  and  which  com- 
mence in  January.  There  are  present  all  the  Physical  hearers 
with  their  Professors,  and  in  these  they  severally  make  answer 
during  an  hour  on  certain  predetermined  theses ; and  are  oppugned 
by  the  Prior  Bachelor  (that  is,  by  him  who  has  been  chosen  from 
the  more  learned),  and  thereafter  by  others. 

“ The  Honors  or  Degrees  which  are  obtained  in  this  Faculty 
are  those  of  Bachelor , Licentiate , Master.  Previous  to  these 
there  is  one  public  act,  that  of  Determination , as  it  is  called. 
Therein  the  students  of  Logic,  in  a public  meeting  of  the  whole 
University,  severally  state  their  opinion  on  some  Ethical  question 
proposed  by  the  Preses,  who  is  one  of  the  Professors.  In  this 
manner  they  profess  themselves  Students  of  Philosophy,  but  ob- 
tain no  degree. 


1 The  Faculty  had  not  a printed  cursus  on  these  departments,  as  on  Logic.  The 
Commentaries  by  the  Masters  of  Louvain  on  the  books  of  the  Organon,  are  among 
the  best  extant.  But  the  objects  of  study  in  all  the  Paedagogia  were  uniform;  and 
all  the  pupils  could  be  equally  examined,  &c.,  against  each  other  in  the  general  con- 
course of  the  University. 


666  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (B.) 

“ The  Baccalaureate  is  here  two-fold.  The  one  is  obtained  on 
examination  after  a three  months’  study  of  Physics  ; the  other, 
after  the  completion  of  the  course  of  Metaphysics,  and  a public 
responsion  touching  Philosophy  in  general. 

“ For  the  License , the  candidates  of  all  the  Gymnasia  are  pre- 
sented in  a body  to  the  Venerable  Faculty  of  Arts  ; and  on  that 
occasion,  and  in  their  presence , their  future  Examiners  (that  is 
the  [eight]  Primary  Professors,  of  all  the  Gymnasia,  nominated 
by  the  Gymnasiarchs),  make  solemn  oath , that  they  will  be  in- 
fluenced by  no  private  favor,  but  rank  each  candidate  in  the 
strict  order  of  merit. — The  examination  then  begins.  This  is 
two-fold  ; the  one  is  called  the  Trial , the  other  the  Examination 
[proper.]  For  each,  the  whole  body  of  candidates  is  divided  into 
three  Classes.  The  First  Class  consists  of  twelve,  to  wit,  three 
from  each  of  the  Gymnasia,  students  namely,  who  by  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Professors  stand  highest  in  learning.  The  Second 
Class , in  like  manner,  comprehends  twelve,  the  three,  to  wit, 
who  from  the  four  Gymnasia  are  named  as  nearest  in  proficiency 
to  the  first.  To  them  [of  the  second  class,]  are  added  twelve 
others,  called  Aspirants.  The  Third  Class  is  composed  of  all 
the  rest.  Those  who  are  of  the  First  Class  are  [each]  examined 
for  about  three  hours  on  all  the  branches  of  Philosophy  ; those 
who  are  of  the  Second,  for  two  hours ; those  who  are  of  the  Third, 
for  half  an  hour  ; and  this,  both  in  what  is  called  the  Trial,  and 
in  the  Examination  proper.  The  several  examiners  write  down 
the  answers  of  all  the  candidates,  read  them  over  again  at  home, 
and  determine  [what  in  their  several  opinions  should  be]  the  order 
of  all  and  each,  and  write  out  the  list.  The  Examination  fin- 
ished, the  examiners,  on  a day  appointed,  consign  their  lists  of 
arrangement  to  the  Dean,  who  delivers  them  to  the  Gymnasiarchs. 
They  consult  among  themselves,  and,  by  an  ingenious  device, 
calculate  the  suffrages  of  arrangement,  and  appoint  to  each  can- 
didate his  true  and  unquestionable  rank. 

“ When,  however,  the  First  or  highest  ( Primus ) is  proclaimed, 
the  bell  is  tolled  in  his  Gymnasium,  for  three  days  and  nights, 
and  holiday  celebrated.  I pass  over  the  other  signs  of  public 
rejoicing.  This  honor  is  valued  at  the  highest,  and  he  who  ob- 
tains it  is  an  object  of  universal  observation.  On  the  third  day 
thereafter,  in  the  public  School  of  Arts,  the  candidates  are,  in 
this  fashion,  proclaimed  Licentiates : — In  the  first  place,  the  Dean 
of  the  Venerable  Faculty,  after  a public  oration,  presents  the  can- 


EXAMINATIONS  IN  LOUVAIN. 


667 


didates  to  the  Chancellor  [who  on  this  occasion  ranks  superior  to 
the  Rector.]  He  (the  Chancellor)  then,  having  propounded  a 
question,  orders  the  Primus  to  afford,  in  the  answer,  a specimen 
of  his  erudition,  he  himself  acting  as  opponent.  The  names  of 
all  the  others  are  then  proclaimed  by  the  Beadle,  in  the  order 
established  by  the  Gfymnasiarchs,  on  the  votes  of  the  examining 
Professors.” 

L.  ii.  c,  8.  On  the  celebrity  of  the  [Louvain]  Faculty  of 
Arts.  u - - * - Nearly  two  hundred  candidates  annually  merit 
the  Laurel  of  Arts ; ivliat  other  University  confers  so  many  ? The 
emulation  prevalent  between  all  the  [Houses,]  Blasters , and  Stu- 
dents of  this  Faculty , and  which  though  intense  is  void  of  envy, 
for  in  study  discord  is  concordant ; — this  emulation  braces  both 
the  diligence  of  the  teachers,  and  the  application  of  the  taught. 
And  while  they  who  stand  first  in  the  classification,  merit  and 
receive  especial  honor,  while  they  who  stand  last,  are  almost 
equally  disgraced;1  the  issue  is,  that  no  labor  is  spared  either  by 
the  Professors  in  teaching,  or  by  the  Pupils  in  learning.  The 
ambition  of  all  is  here  honorable  and  hard-working.” 

The  result  of  this  excellent  scheme  of  examination  is — that  a 
degree,  taken  in  the  University  of  Louvain,  was  always  accounted 
respectable,  and,  if  connected  with  a high  place  upon  the  list, 
superior  to  any  other  throughout  Christendom.  And  this  too 
when  the  relative  eminence  of  its  Professors  had,  from  a vicious 
patronage  (partly  in  the  hands  of  the  Academical,  partly  in  the 
hands  of  the  Municipal,  body),  declined  beneath  the  level,  more 
especially,  of  the  Dutch  and  Italian  Universities.  For  these 


1 It  does  not  appear  that  there  were  in  Louvain  any,  at  least  any  adequate,  rejec- 
tions.— Universities,  which  have  not  lavished  their  degrees  on  mere  standing,  or  mere 
professorial  attendance  (to  say  nothing  of  inferior  considerations),  have  endeavored  to 
make  their  examinations  respectable,  in  three  ways  : which  ways  also  admit  of  junc- 
tion ; for  any  two  of  them  may  be  combined,  while  the  whole  three  may  also  be 
united.  These  are,  1°.  Rejection  of  incompetent  candidates,  by  relation  to  some 
minimum  of  knowledge  ; 2° . Classification  of  candidates,  by  their  proficiency  in  rela- 
tion to  certain  amounts  of  knowledge  ; 3°.  Subordination  of  candidates  determined 
merely  by  their  inferiority  in  knowledge,  relatively  to  each  other.  The  Edinburgh 
medical  degrees,  as  they  formerly  were  given,  may  stand  as  an  example  of  the  first; 
the  Louvain  and  quondam  (1)  Cambridge  degrees  in  Arts  (had  Cambridge  published 
and  arranged  its  Polloi),  may  afford  instances  of  the  second  added  to  the  third  ; while 
those  of  Oxford,  for  nearly  half  a century,  may  supply  the  specimen  of  a combination 
of  the  first  and  second. — A union  of  the  whole  three  is  the  condition  of  a perfect 
examination.  The  condition  I say ; for,  besides  that  condition,  there  are  further 
requisites  of  such  perfection ; as  the  competence  of  examiners,  their  obligation  to 
impartiality  established  upon  oath,  the  publicity  of  the  examination,  and  the  adequate 
appointment  of  its  subjects. 


668 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (B.) 


Universities,  while  sedulous  and  successful  in  filling  their  Chairs 
with  the  most  illustrious  teachers,  were  always  unfortunately 
remiss  in  the  bestowal  of  their  academical  honors.1 

1 In  the  scattered  biographies  of  the  distinguished  alumni  of  Louvain,  I find  it 
almost  uniformly  recorded,  what  was  their  rank  in  the  graduation  list  of  Arts.  Of 
these  I chance  to  have  noted  a few,  which  I may  give  in  chronological  order. — In 
1748,  Pope  Hadrian  VI.  is  Primus;  in  1504,  M.  Dorpius  is  5th;  in  1507,  R.  Tap- 
perus  is  2d  ; in  1522,  H.  Trivcrius  is  Primus  ; in  1527,  F.  Sonnius  is  Primus  ; in 
1529,  C.  Jansenius  is  Primus;  in  1542,  H.  Elenus  is  Primus;  in  1556,  H.  Cuyckius 
is  Primus,  and  H.  Gravius  is  5th  ; in  1558,  J.  Molanus  is  6th  ; in  1561,  M.  Hovius 
the  canonist  is  only  46th,  and  G.  Estius,  the  great  theologian,  7th  ; in  1572,  however, 
the  greater  L.  Lessius  is  Primus  ; in  1575,  P.  Lombardus,  Archbishop  of  Armagh, 
is  Primus ; in  1599,  Du  Trieu,  the  logician,  is  Primus ; in  1604,  C.  Jansenius 
(from  whom  the  Jansenists)  is  Primus  ; in  1606,  the  philosopher  Fromondus  is 
3d,  &c.  &c.  &c. 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL 


(C.)  ON  A REFORM  OF  THE  ENGLISH  UNIVERSITIES,  WITH 

ESPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  OXFORD;  AND  LIMITED  TO 

THE  FACULTY  OF  ARTS. 

Any  project  for  the  reform  of  old  and  wealthy  schools,  like  the 
great  English  Universities,  is  beset  with  difficulties,  if  practical 
possibility  is  to  be  combined  with  theoretical  (not  to  say  perfec- 
tion, but)  improvement.  It  is  comparatively  easy  to  devise  the 
scheme  of  a faultless  University,  if  we  are  allowed  to  abstract 
from  circumstances.  It  is  easy,  even,  to  discover  and  to  expose 
defects.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  trace — how  an  ancient  institution 
may  gradually  degenerate — how  certain  private  interests  may 
succeed  in  gaining  a preponderance  over  the  common  good — 
how  these  interests,  if  left  unchecked,  may  introduce,  foster,  and 
defend  the  most  calamitous  abuses — until,  at  length,  the  semi- 
nary may  be,  de  facto , the  punctual  converse  of  itself,  de  jure. 
And  such,  in  truth,  is  the  condition  of  the  Universities  of  Oxford 
and  Cambridge ; for  no  greater  contrast  can,  even  be  conceived, 
than  are  exhibited  by  these  venerable  schools,  in  what  they  actu- 
ally are,  and  in  what  they  profess,  and,  as  controlled  by  statute, 
must  profess  themselves  to  be.  In  two  of  the  preceding  articles, 
(pp.  383-457),  I have  endeavored  to  signalize  and  to  explain, 
how  these  Universities,  as  seminaries  of  education,  present  an 
almost  diametrical  opposition  between  their  actual  and  their  legal 
existence.  By  statute,  they  are  organized  as  schools  of  Theology, 
Law,  Medicine,  and  (as  a preliminary  of  all  liberal  professions) 
of  the  liberal  Arts ; but,  in  fact,  the  only  instruction  which  they 
now  afford,  is  in  the  lowest  department  of  this  last  faculty  alone. 
Intra-academical  study  is  now  illegally  commuted  with  extra- 
academical  standing.  Degrees — privileged  certificates  of  com- 
petency— evacuated  of  all  truth,  are  now  lavished  without  the 
legal  conditions  of  university  instruction  and  university  examina- 
tion. In  short,  the  public  incorporation  and  its  public  instruction 
are  now  illegally  extinguished  ; illegally  superseded,  but  not  rea- 


670 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


sonably  supplied  by  the  private  Houses  and  their  private  tuition. 
In  fine,  the  statutes  of  the  institution  are  now  only  performed 
through  a system  of  perjury,  disgraceful  to  the  school,  disgrace- 
ful to  the  country,  and  as  pervasive  in  these  Universities,  as  it  is 
fortunately,  elsewhere  unexampled. 

So  much  I have  alleged,  because  so  much,  I am  convinced,  is 
true.  But  I would  not  assert,  that  what  has  been  irregularly 
abolished,  is  all  deserving  of  restoration,  nor,  that  what  has  irre- 
gularly  sprung  up,  is  all  deserving  of  abolition.  On  the  contrary, 
the  very  fact,  that  a state  of  right  could  have  been  so  totally,  and 
yet  so  quietly,  reversed,  affords  a presumption  that  what  was 
passively  abrogated,  was  itself  but  feeble ; and  though,  with 
proper  fostering,  the  feeble  might  have  ultimately  waxed  strong, 
still  it  would  be  a rash  conclusion,  that  in  the  old  and  legal  there 
was  nothing  but  good,  in  the  new  and  intrusive  nothing  but  evil. 
At  present,  waiving  all  discussion  in  regard  to  the  professional 
Faculties,  and  limiting  our  consideration  to  the  school  of  liberal, 
or  general  education — to  the  fundamental  Faculty  of  Arts  alone  ; 
it  will  more  than  suffice  for  what  we  can  at  present  even  perfunc- 
torily accomplish,  to  inquire  : — How  do  the  English  Universities, 
how,  in  particular,  does  Oxford,  the  principal  of  these,  execute 
its  one  greatest,  nay,  now,  its  one  only  educational  function — 
cultivate , in  general,  the  mental  faculties,  prepare  its  alumni  for 
any  liberal  pursuit  in  life,  by  concentrating  their  awakened 
efforts,  in  studies  ( objectively ) the  most  important,  and  ( subjec- 
tively) the  most  improving  ? 

In  attempting  an  answer  to  this  question,  it  is  requisite  to  fol- 
low out  a certain  order.  For,  it  is  evident,  that  before  proceeding 
to  consider  what  ought  to  be,  we  should  have  previously  ascer- 
tained what  is,  accomplished.  I shall,  accordingly,  inquire  and 
endeavor  to  determine — first  of  all,  what  Oxford,  as  an  instru- 
ment of  education,  does  actually  perform — Oxford  as  it  is  ; and 
thereafter,  how,  in  consistency  with  its  institutions,  it  may,  in 
this  respect,  be  improved — Oxford  as  it  might  be- 

I.  Oxford  as  it  is. — It  would  be  difficult,  perhaps  impossible, 
to  determine,  with  sufficient  accuracy,  the  general  efficiency  of 
Oxford,  as  compared  with  any  other  University.  But  Oxford,  as 
it  now  exists,  is  not  a single  educational  organ.  It  is  a congeries 
of  such  organs  ; each  of  its  twenty-four  private  Houses  consti- 
tuting one;  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  public  University,  in  its 
Examination  for  the  primary  degree,  affords  an  irrecusable 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


671 


standard  by  which  we  may  very  accurately  measure  the  relative 
efficiency  of  these  several  organs.  If,  therefore,  we  find,  that 
these,  compared  among  themselves,  afford,  in  the  Examination, 
for  a series  of  years,  very  different  and  still  very  uniform  results ; 
we  shall  be  entitled  to  infer,  that  one  House  is  comparatively  a 
good,  another  comparatively  a bad,  instrument  of  education  ; — be 
warranted  to  determine,  even  on  an  Oxford  standard,  what  every 
Oxford  House  does,  may,  and  should  accomplish ; — be  enabled,  in 
fine,  to  generalize  the  circumstances,  by  which  such  accomplish- 
ment is  there  furthered  or  impeded  ; — and,  consequently,  to  judge 
what  are  the  most  feasible  measures,  for  the  reform  and  improve- 
ment of  this  University.  The  same  comparison,  with  the  same 
results,  may  also,  it  is  evident,  be  instituted  between  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  same  House  at  one  period,  and  its  efficiency  at 
another. 

Taking,  therefore,  as  the  standard  of  academical  proficiency 
the  public  Examination  in  its  two  Departments,  and  its  four 
Classes  of  Honor  ; I proceed  to  apply  this  to  the  several  Houses. 
And  (as  shown  in  the  following  Table, ) in  two  different  ways  : the 
one  giving  the  comparative  eminence  of  those  educated  in  each 
House  (there  I.)  ; the  other,  the  comparative  eminence  of  those 
who  in  each  House  act  as  educators  (there  II.) 

In  reference  to  the  Instructed : The  Table  shows  of  each  House 
the  number  of  its  undergraduates  (a)  ; then  the  absolute  number 
of  the  honors  obtained  by  them  in  each  department  and  in  every 
class  (b,  c)  ; then  the  absolute  number  of  Double  Firsts  (d) ; 
lastly,  the  number  of  First  Class  Honors  in  either  department  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  competitors  (g,  h)  ; but  previously, 
by  the  same  relation,  the  classes  of  each  department  valued  from 
lowest  to  highest,  as  1,  2,  3,  4 (e,  f).  On  this  proportion  in 
L.  H.,  proceeding  only  to  the  first  decimal,  I have  arranged  the 
Houses ; when  equal  in  L.  H.,  their  difference  in  D.  M.  has  then 
determined  the  order.  I have  taken,  as  a sufficient  period,  the 
ten  years  ending  with  1847 ; (the  Calendar  of  1848  being  the 
only  one  within  my  reach  when  the  Table  was  abstracted ;)  and 
I was  compelled  (for  the  same  reason)  to  make  the  number  of 
undergraduates  of  the  last  year  stand  for  an  average  of  the 
whole  ten. 

In  reference  to  the  Instructors : The  Table  shows,  in  each 
House  : first,  absolutely,  the  amount  and  quality  of  the  Academi- 
cal Honors  belonging  to  its  several  educators,  whether  Tutors  or 


TABLE 


Showing  the  comparative  efficiency  of  the  Oxford  Houses,  as 
Seminaries  of  Education. 


Houses 


I.  The  Instructed. — Undergraduates  (from  1838  to  1847),  their 


g arranged 

| according  to 

(a) 

jj  their  propor- 

Honors  absolutely. 

Honors  in  proportion  to  their  numbers. 

s tion  ol  valued 

jj  graduation 

Num- 
ber in 
1847. 

9 Honors,  pri- 
ll marily  in 

B Literte  Hu- 
maniores ; 
by  (e.) 

From  1838  to 

(b) 

Literae  Hum. 
Classes. 

(c) 

Disc.  Math. 
Classes. 

(d) 

Double 

Firsts. 

Classes  valued** 
and  added. 

First  Classes. 

1847. 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

iv. 

i. 

ii. 

- 

. 

IV. 

(e) 

(f) 

( 

2) 

(h) 

Hum. 

Math. 

Hum. 

Math. 

Balliol 

84 

17 

21 

22 

30 

6 

a 

4 

6 

3 

1 : 0 

4 

1 : 1 

2 

i 

5 

1 : 14 

Merton j 

38 

3 

14 

12 

10 

4 

2 

i 

1 : 0 

4 

1 : 1 

6 

i 

13 

1 : 9 

Corpus 

24 

6 

6 

2 

9 

2 

1 

3 

1 : 0 

4 

1 : 1 

7 

i 

4 

1 : 12 

Lincoln  

56 

9 

13 

15 

12 

1 

2 

3 

2 

1 : 0 

5 

1 : 3 

1 

i 

6 

1 : 56 

University  . . . ] 

63 

8 

13 

16 

11 

4 

4 

3 

5 

i 

1 : 0 

6 

1 : 1 

6 

i 

8 

1 : 16 

Wadham 

87 

4 

17 

29 

22 

1 

6 

4 

13 

1 : 0 

6 

1 : 2 

0 

i 

22 

1 : 87 

Magdalen  .... 

27 

2 

8 

9 

8 

1 

2 

1 : 0 

6 

1 : 5 

4 

i 

13 

0 : 27 

St.  John’s .... 

66 

7 

9 

11 

15 

3 

6 

1 

2 

2 

1 : 0 

7 

1 : 1 

9 

i 

9 

1 : 22 

Christ  Church 

186 

7 

30 

35 

35 

3 

11 

9 

16 

1 : 0 

8 

1 : 2 

4 

i 

27 

1 : 62 

Exeter  

New  Col- 

134 

6 

16 

32 

25 

5 

4 

4 

9 

1 

1 : 0 

8 

1 : 2 

7 

i 

22 

1 : 27 

lege 

20 

1 

3 

3 

7 

2 

1 

1 : 0 

8 

1 : 2 

9 

i 

20 

0 : 20  1 

Brazenose  . . . 

95 

2 

10 

27 

18 

5 

4 

3 

10 

1 . 0 

9 

1 : 2 

0 

i 

47 

1 : 19 

Queen’s  

74 

3 

8 

14 

20 

2 

2 

2 

8 

1 

1 : 0 

9 

1 : 3 

2 

i 

27 

1 : 37  1 

; Oriel 

82 

6 

10 

11 

15 

2 

2 

4 

1 

1 : 0 

9 

1 : 4 

6 

i 

15 

1 : 41  S 

Trinity 

83 

9 

6 

9 

13 

3 

3 

2 

5 

1 

1 : 1 

0 

1 : 2 

8 

i 

9 

1 : 28 

Worcester  . . . 
St.  Mary’s 

94 

8 

10 

8 

12 

1 

1 

1 

4 

1 : 1 

0 

1 : 7 

2 

i 

12 

1 : 94  | 

Hall 

33 

1 

2 

4 

9 

1 

5 

] : 1 

2 

1 : 4 

7 

i 

33 

0 : 33 

Jesus  

Magdalen 

57 

6 

5 

ii 

1 

2 

1 : 1 

5 

1 : 9 

5 

0 

57 

1 : 57 

Hall  

85 

3 

11 

8 

19 

1 

2 

5 

1 : 1 

6 

1 : 7 

1 

1 

28 

0 : 85 

Pembroke. . . . 

72 

1 

5 

9 

4 

1 

1 

1 : 1 

8 

1 : 14 

0 

1 

72 

1 : 72 

New  Inn 

| Hall 

' St.  Alban’s 

28 

1 

1 

2 

3 

1 

1 

1 

1 : 2 

0 

1 : 4 

0 

1 

28 

1 28 

! Hall  

8 

1 ... 

1 : 2 

7 

0 : 8 

0 

0 

8 

o 

CD 

| St.  Edmund’s 

i 

< Hall 

32 

2 

5 

1 

1 

1 : 3 

G 

1 :1 1 

0 

0 

32 

0 : 32  1 

[All  Souls  .... 

4 

1 

1 : 4 

0 

0 : 

4 

0 

4 

0 : 4 P 

i 

1532 

104 

220 

285 

314 

45 

63 

41 

106 

10 

I 

* Mathematical  Reader, 
and  Philosophy  R. 

Fourth  = 1. 


f Latin  R; 
IT  Divinity  R. 


t Greek  R.  ||  Rhetoric  R.  $ Logic 

**  Class — First  — 4,  Second  = 3,  Third  — 2, 


T A B L E — Continued  ; 


Showing  the  comparative  efficiency  of  the  Oxford  Houses,  as 
Seminaries  of  Education. 


II.  The  Instructors  ; (as  in  1847),  their 


Numbers,  Kinds,  and  Honors. 


Numbers  in  proportion  to  their  First  Class  Honors. 


(i) 

Tutors  (also  Readers.) 

(k) 

Readers  (only.) 

(1) 

Literag  Humaniores. 

(m) 

Disciplines  Mathematics. 

H. 

1 

M. 

H. 

2 

M. 

Ii. 

3 

M. 

4 

H.  M. 

H. 

1 

M. 

2 

H.  M. 

3 

H.  M, 

Teachers 
in  gen. 

Tutors. 

Readers. 

Teachers 
in  gen. 

Tutors. 

Readers. 

1—0 

l- 

-0 

l- 

-0 

l- 

-2ir 

1— 1*§ 

5 

5 

3 

3 

2 

2 

5 

1 

3 

0 

2 

1 

[i- 

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l- 

-0 

2- 

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3 

2 

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l- 

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l- 

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3 

2 

3 

2 

3 

0 

3 

0 

1- 

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2- 

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l- 

-2 

... 

3 

2 

3 

2 

3 

0 

3 

0 

1- 

-0 

2- 

-0 

l- 

-1 

1- 

-i* 

4 

3 

3 

2 

1 

i 

4 

2 

3 

1 

1 

1 

2- 

-2 

2- 

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4 

0 

2 

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4 

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2 

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2 

0 

2 

0 

2 

1 

2 

1 

2- 

-2 

2- 

-0 

2 

0 

2 

0 

2 

0 

2 

0 

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1- 

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0- 

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2 — Ot 

O 

1 

5 

1 

2 

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3 

0 

5 

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2 

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5 

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2 

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3- 

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2—0 

2- 

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... 

4 

1 

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4 

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1- 

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4 

2 

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1 

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5 

1 

3 

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2 

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5 

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3 

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2 

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‘ 

3 

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3 

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3 

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1 

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0 

: 

66  : 

29 

49  : 

26 

17 

3 

66  : 

15 

49 

8 

17 

7 

tt  From  the  Calendar  of  1851,  the  Instructors  being  accidentally  not  marked  in  that  of  1848. 
tt  Until  lately  New  College  exercised  its  unhappy  privilege  of  examining  and  passing  its  own  members, 
as  candidates  for  a degree. 

Uu 


674 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

Readers  (i,  k)  ; and  secondly,  the  Highest  Honors,  in  either  de- 
partment, in  proportion  to  the  number  of  these'  educators  (1,  m). — 
This  latter  part  of  the  Table  is  (for  the  reason  assigned)  wholly 
calculated  on  the  year  1847.*  1 

Looking,  then,  to  the  Table,  and  to  its  first  part ; — we  here 
see,  that  one  House  differs  marvelously  from  another  in  what  it 
performs.  The  esprit  de  corps  is  fully  as  remarkable  in  Colleges 
as  in  Regiments ; although  individual  competency  and  courage 
must,  on  the  average,  he  pretty  much  the  same  in  all.  Thus, 
while  one  Regiment  is  for  generations  known  as  the  “ fighting,” 

another  as  “the  flying, so  (what  is  more  intelligible),  in 

one  College  a first  class  is  merely  of  commonplace  respectability, 
while  in  another  it  is  a kind  of  secular  dignity,  and  not  to  be 
plucked,  there  even  confers  an  enviable  distinction. 

Comparing,  therefore,  the  Houses  in  Literal  Humaniorcs  : — In 
this  department,  we  find  that  four  Houses  (two  Colleges  and  two 
Halls),  containing  above  a hundred  undergraduates,  have  during 
the  decade  no  First  Class  Honors  at  all. — Again,  discounting 
these,  and  comparing  only  the  Houses  which  have  compassed  this 


1 This  Table  thus  affords  (apart  from  inaccuracies),  not  the  very  truth,  but  only  a 
sufficiently  close  approximation  to  it. 

The  number  of  Undergraduates,  in  the  several  Houses,  ought  to  have  been  calcu- 
lated, not  on  one,  but  on  an  average  of  all  the  ten  years. — The  same  applies  to  the 
Instructors.  Their  average  academical  eminence,  for  the  several  Colleges,  ought  to 
have  been  estimated  by  a comparison  of  every  year,  and  not  assumed  on  the  last 
alone.  But  as  I was  unable,  as  stated,  when  the  abstract  was  made,  to  accomplish 
this,  the  Table  must  stand  as  it  is  ; for  I have  neither  time  nor  patienc^to  reconstruct 
it.  Nor  do  I think,  that  the  result  would  vary  in  any  point  of  importance  ; for  col- 
legial accommodation  has  been  long  inadequate  ; and,  at  the  same  time,  lodging  out 
during  the  first  four  years  is  not  allowed  ; while  the  standard  of  instruction  in  a House 
does  not  frequently  nor  rapidly  change.  It  might,  however,  be  interesting,  had  we 
Tables  of  the  kind,  adequately  executed — say  for  every  five  years. 

In  regard  to  the  valuation  of  the  Classes,  on  which  I have  arranged  the  Houses,  in 
their  educational  eminence,  I have  a remark  to  make. — This  valuation  is  unfavorable 
to  First  Classes  ; therefore,  to  the  higher  Colleges,  which  preponderate  in  Highest 
Honors.  For,  while  the  three  inferior  classes  testify,  that  a candidate  is  above  one 
minimum,  they  testify  that  he  is  below  another ; whereas,  the  First  Class,  while  it 
testifies  that  a Candidate  is  above  a certain  minimum,  takes  no  account  of  how  much 
or  how  little  he  exceeds  it.  It  thus  contains ‘and  equalizes  the  most  unequal  profi- 
ciencies ; that  which  is  just  competent,  and  that  which  is  far  more  than  competent. 

I was,  however,  unwilling  that  any  possible  objection  should  be  taken  on  the  ground 
that  the  valuation  was,  in  any  respect,  arbitrary.  Accordingly,  I allow  every  advant- 
age to  those  Houses  which  rejoice  in  their  amount  of  respectable,  though  humbler 
honors. 

A Double  First  evidences  both  talent  and  a power  of  application.  But  it  only 
proves  that  a candidate  (with  competent  ability)  has  prepared  himself  in  two  comple- 
ments, each  equal  to  the  amount  required  for  a First  Class.  Of  more  it  testifies  no- 
thing. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


675 


distinction,  we  find  that  one  College  is,  on  this  standard,  eighteen 
times  more  efficient  than  another. — Finally,  the  same  discount 
being  made,  the  valued  classes  afford  a similar  result ; some 
Colleges,  by  a full  average,  in  this  the  principal  department,  ap- 
proving themselves  four  and  a half , and,  the  discount  not  made, 
ten  times  better  instruments  of  education  than  others. 

In  Disciplines  Mathematicce,  the  difference,  if  less  important, 
is  hardly  less  signal.  During  the  decade,  seven  Houses,  (three 
Colleges  and  four  Halls),  and  with  an  average  of  undergraduates 
considerably  above  two  hundred,  show  no  First  Class  Honors  ; — 
and  of  these,  tioo  (a  College  and  a Hall)  have  no  Honor , even  of 
the  lowest. — Again,  discounting  these,  and  taking  only  the  Houses 
which  have  attained  to  a first  class,  still  we  find  in  this  respect, 
one  College  more  than  ten  times  superior  to  another. — Finally, 
making  the  same  discount ; on  the  criterion  of  the  whole  Honors 
valued , College  excels  College,  as  an  educational  organ  by  nearly 
a twelve-fold  difference. 

But  in  the  last  place  {discounting  All  Souls  and  the  Halls),  and 
taking  the  half  proportion  of  the  highest  College  as  a mean,  we 
have  the  following  results  : 

L.  H. — In  Valued  Classes  : three  Colleges  are  of  the  very  mean 
(1 : 0 • 8) ; eight  above  ; and  eight  below  it. — In  First  Classes  : 
of  the  mean  (1 : 8),  we  have  one  college ; above  it  three ; and 
below  it  fifteen. 

D.  M. — In  Valued  Classes  : we  have  of  the  mean  (1 : 2 • 4)  one 
college  ; above  it  seven  ; and  below  it  eleven. — In  First  Classes  : 
there  are  above  the  mean  (1 : 18)  four  colleges  ; and  below  it 
fifteen d 


1 I may  append  the  following  proportions,  though  I see  there  are  probably  several 
minor  inaccuracies.  But  I can  not  go  through  the  labor  of  correction  ; more  especial- 
ly as  they  are  irrelevant  to  my  argument,  and  do  not  affect  the  general  result. 


A)  Literce  Humaniores.  Proportion  of — 

All  classified  (923),  to  all  (here)  unhonored  graduates  (1932?),  as 1 : 21 

The  three  higher  classes  (609),  to  all  graduates  below  them  (2110),  as 1 : 3' 5 

The  two  higher  classes  (324),  to  all  graduates  below  them  (2395),  as 1 : 7'0 

The  highest  class  (104),  to  all  graduates  below  it  (2615),  as 1 : 25 ' 3 

The  highest  (104),  to  all  other  classes  (819),  as 1 : 8 0 

B)  Disciplines  Mathematicce.  Proportion  of — 

All  classified  (255),  to  all  (here)  unhonored  graduates  (26181),  as 1 : 10  3 

The  three  higher  classes  (149),  to  all  graduates  below  them  (1902),  as 1 : 13  0 

The  two  higher  classes  (108),  to  all  graduates  below  them  (1943),  as 1 : 18  0 

The  highest  class  (45),  to  all  graduates  below  it  (2006),  as 1 : 40 ' 1 

The  highest  (45),  to  all  the  other  classes  (210),  as  1 : 5 0 


676  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

Now,  it  may  well  be,  that  the  very  best  of  these  Houses  ac- 
complishes far  less,  than  in  other  circumstances,  it  might.  But 
this  is  not  proved — at  least  not  obtrusively.  It  is,  however, 
proved,  that  some  of  the  Oxford  Houses,  throwing  out  the  worst, 
and  judging  only  by  the  most  favorable  criterion — that  some  of 
the  Oxford  Houses  noiv  perform,  as  academical  instruments,  five 
— ten — -fifteen — ay  twenty  times  more  than  others.  But  it  is 
clear,  that,  unless  from  ignorance  or  compulsion,  no  one  in  his 
senses  would  employ  a workman,  pay  him  too  the  wages  of  a 
first  rate  artificer,  who  is  worse — not  to  say,  five,  ten,  twenty 
times  worse,  than  a brother  operative.  Yet  the  father,  who  would 
deem  it  unimaginable  to  send  his  son  to  a second-rate  dancing- 
school,  complacently  enters  him  of  a tenth-rate  College ; where 
the  youth  is  soon,  by  precept  and  example,  accomplished  for  life 
— as  a conceited  ignoramus,  a hopeless  idler ; while  the  State 
standing  by,  tolerates,  nay  protects  the  illegal  monopoly,  which  a 
body  of  men,  wholly  unqualified,  as  a body,  for  instructors,  have 
long  usurped,  in  the  privileged  seminaries  of  the  English  Church 
and  of  the  English  nation. 

Looking  again  to  the  Table  in  its  second  part,  we  see,  in  some 
degree,  how  these  startling  differences  arise.  We  see,  that  the 
relative  eminence  of  the  Houses,  estimated  by  the  academical 
honors  of  the  taught,  is  not  at  variance  with  the  academical  dis- 
tinction of  the  teachers.  We  see  further,  how  the  general  aca- 
demical eminence  of  the  instructors,  is  not  such  as  to  qualify 
them  to  assume,  far  less  exclusively  to  engross,  the  function  of 
academical  education.  A competent  education  supposes,  that  the 
educator  possesses  two,  and  two  conjunct,  qualities : 1°,  that  he 
should  be  able  to  aid,  to  aid  but  not  to  relieve,  his  pupil  in  the 
effort  of  attaining  knowledge  : 2°,  that  he  should,  in  his  own  per- 
son, exhibit  a pattern  of  learning,  capable  of  inspiring  his  pupil 
with  discontent  at  any  present  advancement,  and  a resolution  to 
be  satisfied  with  no  humble  acquisition.  These  conjunct  condi- 


C)  Both  Departments.  Proportion  of- — 


All  the  Mathematical  (255),  to  all  the  Literary  Honors  (923),  as 1 : 3’ 6 

Exclusive  honors  in  D.  M.  (1361)  to  exc.  honors  in  L.  H.  (8221),  as 1:  6'0 

Men  honored  (9581),  to  men  unhonored  (1796),  as  1 : 19 

First  class  in  D.  M.  (45),  to  First  class  in  L.  H.  (104),  as 1 : 23 

Men  of  First  class  in  L.  H.  not  in  D.  M.  (791)  to  whole  class  (104),  as 1:  1'3 

Men  of  First  class  in  D.  M.  not  in  L.  H.  (101)  to  whole  class  (45),  as 1:  4' 5 

Double  Firsts  (10),  to  all  other  graduates  (28551),  as 1 :285'5 

Double  Firsts  (10),  to  all  other  honored  graduates  (958  1),  as 1 : 95 '8 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


677 


tions,  the  collegial  instructors  of  Oxford  are  seen,  by  the  Oxford 
standard  itself,  not  only  not  to  fulfill,  hut  actually  to  reverse. 
“ Ignorance  on  stilts.”  For  they  are,  in  general,  unable  either  to 
assist  their  pupils  in,  or  to  animate  them  to,  an  ever  higher  pro- 
gress ; whereas  they  are  peculiarly  adapted  to  infect  them  with 
discouragement,  to  affect  them  with  disgust,  or  to  lull  them  into 
a self-satisfied  conceit. — ( To  say  nothing  of  the  Halls :) 

As  to  Liter ee  Humaniores,  the  Highest  Honors  are  not,  even 
in  this  primary  department,  attained  by  the  great  body  of  those 
who  assume  the  collegial  office  of  education. — Of  Instructors, 
sixty-six  in  number,  above  a half  (37)  are  not  of  the  First  Class ; 
of  the  Tutors , in  number  forty-nine,  nearly  a half  (23)  are  simi- 
larly deficient ; and  the  same  is  true  of  about  five  sixths  (14)  of 
the  seventeen  simple  Readers.  Only  a single  College  (Balliol* 1) 

1 It  afforded  me  great  satisfaction  to  find,  that  Balliol,  the  oldest  College  in  the 
University,  stands  so  decidedly  pre-eminent  in  this  comparative  estimate  of  the  present 
efficiency  of  its  Houses  ; a College,  in  which  I spent  the  happiest  of  the  happy  years 
of  youth,  which  is  never  recollected  but  with  affection,  and  from  which,  as  I gratefully 
acknowledge,  I carried  into  life  a taste  for  those  studies  which  have  constituted  the 
most  interesting  of  my  subsequent  pursuits. 

I.  Looking  to  the  Instructed . 

In  the  first  place,  the  Honors  being  absolutely  considered. — Here,  not  distinguishing 
the  two  departments  : — Balliol  surpasses  every  other  House  in  the  number  of  these, 
high  and  low,  indifferently  added  (117) — except  Christ  Church  ; but  Christ  Church,  by 
far  the  largest  House  in  the  University,  while  it  exceeds  Balliol  in  the  number  of 
Honors,  of  all  kinds  and  degrees,  by  one-fourth  (29),  exceeds  it  also  in  the  number  of 
competitors  for  these  by  five-fourths  (102). — Again,  distinguishing  the  departments  : — 
Balliol,  maintains  the  same  superiority  in  either,  as  in  both. — Of  Highest  (or  First 
Class ) Honors ; Balliol,  of  all  the  Houses,  exhibits — most  in  the  combined  departments 
(23) — most  in  the  Liter  a.  Humaniores  (17) — most  in  the  Discipline  Mathematics:  (6). 
In  the  first  and  second  respect,  its  Honors  are,  in  fact,  nearly  double  those  of  any  other 
House  ; while  Christ  Church,  a College  so  much  more  numerous,  shows  only  of  these, 
in  the  L.  H.,  seven,  in  the  D.  M.,  three. 

In  the  second  place,  considering  the  number  of  Honors  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  undergraduates  : — Balliol  stands  first,  whether  we  confound  the  two  departments  or 
distinguish  them. — And  taking  the  Highest  Honors : Balliol,  in  like  manner,  propor- 
tionally surpasses  every  other  House,  whether  the  First  Classes  be  drawn  indifferently 
from  both  departments  or  specially  from  each  : — with  exceptions  of  two  lesser  Colleges  ; 
it  being  very  slightly  surpassed  by  Corpus  in  L.  H.,  by  Merton  and  Corpus  in  D.  M. — 
Balliol,  likewise  stands  highest  in  the  amount,  absolute  and  proportional,  of  its  “ Double 
Firsts ” — three  : this  number  being  only  not  a third  of  the  complement  obtained  in  all 
the  Colleges  during  the  decade  ; St.  John's  alone  exhibiting  more  than  one. — Finally, 
valuing  the  classes,  by  making  the  fourth  a fourth  part  of  the  first,  Balliol  (though  this 
valuation  be  hardly  fair,  and  hardly  fair  to  it),  still  predominates,  both  in  the  conjoined 
departments  ; and,  with  two  exceptions  of  close  equality,  in  these  as  severally  distin- 
guished.— Of  the  relative  superiority  of  Balliol  in  the  inferior  classes  of  Honor  in 
either  department,  I must  refer  to  the  Table. 

(In  referring  to  the  Calendar  of  1851,  which  I have  recently  obtained,  I find  that  the 
relative  superiority  of  Balliol,  is  still  more  decisively  marked  during  the  three  following 
years.  With  far  less  than  half  the  number  of  competitors,  Balliol  carries  off  three 
times  (9)  the  number  of  the  highest  literary  honors  obtained  by  the  largest  College, 


678 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


has  all  its  instructors,  and  these  here  amount,  to  five , of  the  High- 
est Class ; whereas,  in  three , no  instructor  whatever  exhibits  a 


Christ  Church  (3);  while  Merton  and  Corpus,  the  Colleges  which,  in  this  respect,  are 
nearest  to  Balliol,  show  during  these  years  no  literary  First  Classes  at  all. — In  the 
valued  classes,  Balliol  is  also  superior  (to  say  nothing  of  Christ  Church)  to  both  Merton 
and  Corpus,  in  L.  H.  ; but  is  rather  inferior  to  these  in  D.  M. — Balliol,  University,  and 
Christ  Church  have  also  each  a Double  First.) 

II.  Looking  to  the  Instructors. 

Balliol  is  the  only  House  (as  stated  in  the  text),  in  which  all  the  Teachers  (Tutors 
and  Readers)  are  First-Class-men ; and  the  only  College  in  which  these  are  all  First 
Class  men  in  L.  Id.  Balliol  likewise  surpasses  every  other  House,  both  in  the  absolute, 
and  in  the  proportional  number  of  Highest  Honors  shown  by  its  Instructors  in  the  two 
departments,  taken  together ; as  also  in  the  department  of  L.  H.  alone. — Indeed,  only 
two  Colleges  besides  Balliol  (Merton  and  Exeter),  have  even  all  their  Tutors  of  the 
First  Class  in  L.  H.,  and  in  the  former  of  these  the  Tutors  are  only  two.  In  Christ 
Church  and  Jesus  the  five  Instructors  have,  in  either  department,  among  them,  only  a 
single  Highest  Honor. — Balliol,  in  fine  is  the  only  College  in  which  the  Readers  are 
all  distinguished  by  the  same  Highest  Honor  ; with  the  single  exception  of  University, 
and  in  that  College  there  is  only  a single  Reader.  These  are  three  out  of  sixteen. 
(Of  the  Mathematical  department,  as  of  minor  importance,  I say  nothing.) 

This  relative  superiority,  both  in  teacher  and  taught,  shows  how  greatly  collegial 
and  academical  efficiency  is,  in  the  present  state  of  the  English  Universities,  dependent 
on  the  character  of  the  Tutors,  and  consequently,  on  the  personal — on  the  accidental 
qualities  of  a Head  ; for  the  Head  possesses  in  practice  the  nomination  of  Tutors,  and, 
in  general,  the  value  of  the  instruction  is  determined  by  him.  And  Dr.  Jenkyns,  as 
Master  of  Balliol,  may  fairly  claim,  for  his  own,  the  comparative  excellence  of  his 
House  ; as  mainly  is  it  to  his  zeal,  intelligence,  and  liberality  (though  the  merit  of  his 
predecessor  ought  not  to  be  forgotten),  that  this  College  has  now  long  occupied  so 
great,  and  yet  so  unobtrusive,  a pre-eminence  among  the  educational  institutions  of 
Oxford.  The  undergraduates  of  Balliol  are  not  drawn  from  the  chosen  pupils  of  a 
great  classical  school;  they  are  not  elected  to  the  College  for  their  previous  acquire- 
ments, and  after  a wide  competition  ; they  are  not  a few  foundation  scholars,  but,  by 
a great  preponderance,  independent  members.  A certain  minimum,  indeed,  of  scholar- 
ship is,  I believe,  now  wisely  made  a requisite  of  admission.  But  the  main  reason  of 
the  average  superiority  of  the  Balliol  men,  in  the  final  examination,  must  be  sought 
for,  in  a better  awakening  within  the  College,  of  their  studious  activity,  and  in  their 
superior  tuition.  The  single  advantage  which  Balliol  may  claim,  is — that  its  Fellow- 
ships are  open  ; and  the  instructors,  therefore,  may  be  all  competent  to  the  work. 
Merton,  the  second  College,  both  in  true  historical  antiquity,  and  in  educational  emi- 
nence, has  great  advantages,  from  its  Portionists  (14),  a large  proportion  of  its  under- 
graduates, being  (to  say  nothing  of  its  clerks)  elected  by  the  College,  after  a trial  of 
comparative  merit,  and  from  a large  sphere  of  competition.  But  nothing  could  stand 
against  Corpus,  the  third  College  as  an  educational  institution,  if  it  did  not  burden  it- 
self by  an  exjra  weight  of  Gentlemen  Commoners  (6).  The  “ Scholars”  (20),  who 
constitute  the  far  greatest  amount  of  its  undergraduates,  are  all  elected  by  the  College 
from  a wide  enough  circle  ; they  are,  therefore,  in  a great  measure,  picked  men.  And 
so  in  Lincoln,  University,  and  the  other  higher  Colleges.  All  this  only  enhances  the 
merit  of  Balliol.  But  how  much  of  collegial  efficiency,  with  and  apart  from  such 
advantages,  is  owing  to  the  character  of  a Collegial  Head,  is  known  to  those  who 
have  any  practical  acquaintance  with  the  English  academical  system.  By  him,  through 
the  spirit  which  he  diffuses,  is  principally  determined  the  literary  level  of  the  Fellows, 
and  altogether,  I may  safely  assert,  the  efficiency  of  the  Tutors.  But  to  raise,  of 
necessity,  the  standard  of  tutorial  competency — to  stimulate  effectually,  certainly,  uni- 
versally, the  exertion  of  the  student — and  to  direct  it,  withal,  on  the  most  improving 
applications  ; these  are  the  primary  conditions  of  any  beneficial  change  in  the  present 
routine  of  the  University  and  Colleges. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


679 


similar  Honor.  Seven  colleges  show  their  instructors  thus  classi- 
fied, in  only  the  proportion — of  one  in  five  (2) — of  one  in  four  (1) 
— of  one  in  three  (4).  And  so  forth. 

The  Disciplines  Matliematicce  are,  in  difficulty  and  importance, 
greatly  inferior  to  the  Liter®  Humaniores  ; but,  even  to  this 
inferior  department,  the  collegial  teachers  are,  as  a body,  obtru- 
sively inadequate. — The  Tutors,  the  principal  and  only  regular 
instructors,  while  not  less  than  one-half  of  them  have  been  of  the 
First  Class  in  L.  H.,  show  less  even  than  a sixth  part  of  the  body 
in  the  First  Class  of  D.  M.  They  are  even  excelled  in  this  by 
the  mere  Readers.  None  of  the  Colleges  shows  this  Honor  in  the 
highest  proportion ; none,  in  fact,  shows  it  in  a higher  proportion 
to  the  number  of  instructors,  than  as  one  to  three , except  two 
(Queen’s  and  University)  ; while  in  five  the  instructors,  and  in 
ten  the  Tutors,  are  destitute  of  it  altogether. — And  so  forth.* 1 

This  is  just  the  result  we  should  anticipate  from  knowing  two 
things  : — Firstly,  that  the  collegial  body  (Fellows  and  Head)  was 
not  in  general  constituted  by  capacity  and  learning ; — Secondly, 
that  this  body  had  been  allowed  furtively  to  usurp,  from  the  Uni- 
versity, the  whole  function  of  academical  instruction.  Hence 
may  be  explained  : — 1°,  The  lamentable  inefficiency  of  the  system 
as  a whole  ; — 2°,  The  mighty  difference  between  College  and  Col- 
lege, as  academical  instruments,  either  from  the  chronic  accident 
of  a better  constitution,  or  from  the  temporary  accident  of  a bet- 
ter collegial  staff,  and,  consequently,  a better  collegial  spirit ; — 
and  3°,  From  this  last  accident,  the  remarkable  contrast  of  a Col- 
lege with  itself,  in  respect  of  its  comparative  efficiency  at  one 
period,  and  its  comparative  inefficiency  at  another.  The  Table 
manifests  the  two  former ; and  it  may  be  proper  here  to  say  some- 
thing in  illustration  of  the  third. 

But  now,  as  I can  afford  only  to  be  brief,  I must  limit  the 
consideration  to  a single  College,  and  to  First  Classes.  I shall, 
however,  take  as  the  example,  the  most  numerous,  and  in  some 

1 I am  fully  aware  that  an  Examination  like  that  of  Oxford,  is  (to  speak  only  of  the 
L.  H.)  more  to  be  relied  on  as  a test  of  scholarship  than  of  original  talent — in  so  far 
as  these  can  be  divorced  ; and  that  other  evidence,  say  that  of  an  able  book,  ought  to 
be  subsequently  taken  into  the  estimate.  But  however  limited  (and  of  its  impartiality 

I have  never  heard  a doubt),  this  Examination  ought,  in  the  absence  of  any  other 
proof,  so  far  to  be  relied  on  ; more  especially  when  a candidate,  not  of  very  nervous 
temperament,  has  aimed  at  academical  distinction.  But,  in  the  ease  of  the  collegial 
instructors,  such  supplementary  or  countervailing  evidence  can  rarely  be  adduced  ; 
for,  with  two  or  three  honorable  exceptions,  none  of  them  have  enabled  the  world  to 
gage  their  competency,  by  publication. 


680  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

respects  the  most  favorably  appointed  College1  in  the  University 
— Christ  Church.  Of  the  times  to  be  compared,  the  one  shall  be 
the  period  of  thirty  years  from  the  first  institution  of  classified 
examinations  for  the  degree,  in  1807  ; the  other,  the  period  of 
ten  years  ending  in  1847  (the  year  with  which  the  Calendar 
before  me  terminates).  The  one  year  (1837)  intermediate 
between  these  two  periods,  is,  for  uniformity  and  the  convenience 
of  numeration,  omitted.  The  former  period,  be  it  observed,  I 
shall  call  the  three  decades , the  latter  the  one  decade. 

Double  Firsts. — In  the  three  decades  Christ  Church,  com- 
mencing the  series,2  shows  of  these,  twenty-nine  ; while  all  the 
other  Houses  have,  among  them,  only  thirty-two.  The  former 
and  latter  have  thus,  on  an  average,  severally,  about  one  Double 
First  a year : but  the  honor,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of 
undergraduates,  is  in  Christ  Church  (with  its  186),  rather  more 
than  1:6;  in  the  other  Houses  (with  their  1346),  rather  more 
than  1 : 42.  The  College  is  thus  seven  limes  superior  to  the  Uni- 
versity.— In  the  one  decade,  things  are,  however,  marvelously 
changed.  For  while  the  other  Houses  maintain  the  proportion 
of  1 : 45 ; Christ  Church,  having  now  no  Double  First,  sinks  to 
the  negative  proportion  of  0 : 186 — disappears. 

First  Classes  in  Literce  FLumaniores. — In  the  three  decades 
Christ  Church  can  boast  of  these  honors — ninety-seven  ; that  is, 
in  their  proportion  to  the  number  of  undergraduates  as  1:1'9; 
whereas  the  other  Houses,  together,  have  of  these  only  two  hun- 
dred and  forty ; that  is,  in  the  same  proportion,  as  1:5-6. 
Christ  Church,  in  this  respect,  is  thus  ahead  of  the  University, 
in  a three-fold  proportion. — The  superiority  is  however  reversed 
in  the  one  decade  : Christ  Church  now  showing  a proportion  of 
only  1 : 9 • 0 ; while  the  rest  of  the  University  shows  a propor- 
tion of  1 : 4 • 6 — that  is,  beats  the  College  by  two  to  one. — In  the 
three  decades,  of  these  honors : Christ  Church  has  an  annual 
average  of  3 ' 2 ; the  other  Houses  an  annual  average  of  only 
8 ' 0. — In  the  one  decade,  on  the  contrary,  Christ  Church  exhibits 
only  an  annual  average  of  0 • 7 ; while  the  other  Houses  exhibit 
an  annual  average  of  9 • 7.  Christ  Church  has  thus  fallen  to  little 


1 I say  only  “ in  some  respects for  the  “ Students”  of  Christ  Church  are  of  those 
collegial  “ institutions”  which  Bishop  Coplestone  justly  calls  “ the  worst''  (above  p. 
395);  and  Christ  Church  admits  a more  numerous  body  of  Gentlemen  Commoners, 
the  academical  opprobrium,  than  any  other  House  in  the  University.  (See  below. 1 

2 At  the  head  of  the  series  stands — Robertus  Peel. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


681 


more  than  a fifth  of  its  former  height ; whereas  the  University  at 
large  has,  by  nearly  a fifth,  arisen. 

First  Classes  in  Disciplines  Mathematicce. — In  the  three  de- 
cades, Christ  Church  has  of  these,  seventy-two  ; that  is,  in  the 
proportion  of  honors  to  numbers,  as  1 : 2 - 4 ; while  the  other 
Houses  have  of  these  only  a hundred  and  thirty-six  ; that  is,  in 
the  same  proportion,  as  1:10-  0.  The  College  thus  heats  the 
University  by  more  than  four  to  one. — In  the  one  decade,  how- 
ever, this  relation  of  superiority  is  again  reversed ; the  University 
now  heating  the  College  by  more  than  two  to  one  : for  while 
Christ  Church  has  sunk  to  a proportion  of  1 : 21  * 0 ; the  other 
Houses  continue  to  show  that  of  1 : 10  ■ 2. — In  the  three  decades, 
the  annual  average  of  Christ  Church  is,  2 • 4 ; of  the  University 
at  large,  4 • 5. — But  in  the  one  decade,  while  Christ  Church  has 
only  0 • 3 ; the  general  average,  per  annum,  is  4 • 2.  Thus  the 
efficiency  of  the  other  Houses  remains  nearly  stationary ; whereas 
that  of  Christ  Church  has  dwindled  even  to  an  eighth. 

Such  is  the  remarkable  contrast  of  a College,  in  the  spirit  of 
study,  to  itself : Christ  Church,  in  the  former  period,  rising  as 
proudly,  far  above  the  level  of  the  University,  as,  in  the  latter, 
it  has  subsided  humbly,  far  beneath  it.  A display  of  the  causes 
of  this  declension  I leave  for  those  competent  to  the  task ; hut  it 
will  he  found,  I am  assured,  in  the  higher  instruction  and  the 
higher  example,  consequently,  in  the  higher  standard  and  higher 
determination  to  attain  it,  once  so  honorably  prevalent  in  the 
society,  and  now  so  unhappily  suspended.  But  such  fluctuations 
— such  lamentable  falls  are  only  possible  in  an  ill-regulated  Uni- 
versity ; and  it  should  be  the  aim  of  any  academical  improvement 
of  Oxford,  no  longer  to  abandon  the  welfare  of  its  students  to  the 
accidents — of  private  effort,  the  exception,  of  private  remission, 
the  rule,  hut  securely  to  preserve,  by  public  measures,  in  equable 
and  proper  tension,  the  exertion  of  all  its  alumni. 

Such  (apart  from  all  consideration  of  the  objects  taught)  is  the 
present  state  of  educational  efficiency  in  the  Oxford  Houses,  as 
exhibited  by  the  standard  of  the  Oxford  Examination.  The  in- 
stitution of  this  standard  was,  indeed,  decisive ; it  constitutes 
even,  as  will  hereafter  he  apparent,  an  epoch  in  the  fortunes  of 
the  school.  It  is  destined,  in  the  long  run,  to  raise  the  Univer- 
sity to  its  ancient  supremacy  above  the  Colleges — or  rather  the 
Colleges  to  their  proper  level ; nor  needs  it  any  wizard  to  foresee, 
that  the  public  Examination  must  issue  in  the  overthrow  of  the 


682 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


present  private  and  depressing  usurpation.  For  meting,  to  a 
certain  extent,  the  proportion  of  ability  and  acquirement  found 
in  its  several  graduates,  this  their  relative  proficiency  it  signalizes 
and  publishes  to  the  world.  The  world  is  thus  now  enabled,  as 
it  was  always  entitled,  to  ask  : — Why  should  the  public,  and  ex- 
clusively privileged , education  of  Oxford  be  abandoned  to  those 
— whether  College  Heads  or  College  Tutors — whom  Oxford  her- 
self reports , as  comparatively  incompetent ; and  this , moreover , to 
the  banishment,  from  academical  usefulness  of  those  whom  Ox- 
ford also  reports,  to  be  of  the  worthiest  among  her  sons  ? The 
answer  is  precise.  This  is  done  : 1°,  because  the  Heads  of  the 
collegial  interest,  were  for  a certain  personal  advantage  in  the 
state  and  church,  unconstitutionally  raised  by  a detestable  prime 
minister  (by  Archbishop  Laud),  to  government  and  supremacy 
in  the  University,  though,  as  a body,  wholly  unable,  from  their 
lights,  and  still  less  inclined  from  their  interests,  to  administer 
the  University,  in  furtherance  of  its  essential  ends.  2°,  Because 
the  collegial  bodies  have,  through  their  Heads,  for  their  private 
behoof,  and,  in  violation  of  oath  and  statute,  superseded  the  Uni- 
versity in  the  office  of  instruction.  3°,  Because  these  bodies  not 
being,  in  general,  constituted  by  merit,  their  members,  though 
latterly  monopolizing  all  privileged  education,  have  been,  in  gen- 
eral, unable  to  reach  even  the  higher  ranks  of  academical  suffi- 
ciency, far  less  the  eminence  which  ought  to  be  required  of 
academical  instructors.  And  this  last  fact — that  the  collegial 
monopolists  of  university  education  are  not  in  general  the  persons 
to  be  constituted  into  the  guides,  patterns,  preceptors  of  studious 
youth : — this  is  proved,  in  the  first  place,  by  the  standard  of  aca- 
demical sufficiency,  the  examination  for  degrees ; and  in  the 
second,  by  a comparison,  through  an  adequate  period,  of  one 
House  with  another,  and  even  of  one  House  with  itself,  in  regard 
of  its  efficiency  as  an  instrument  of  education.  For  though  the 
standard  of  the  Examination  be  far  too  limited,  and  even  within 
its  limits  far  from  perfect ; still,  on  the  average,  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  other  evidence,  it  must  be  relied  on ; and  this  we  may 
more  securely  do,  when  we  find  that  the  public  eminence  of  its 
instructors,  and  the  public  eminence  of  its  graduates,  are,  in  a 
College,  not  only  not  discordant,  but  far  more  in  unison  than 
might,  perhaps,  have  been  anticipated.  Now  judging  by  this 
combined  standard,  unless  the  collegial  interests,  as  a whole,  had 
been  altogether  incompetent  to  the  work  of  academical  instruc- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  IS. 


683 


tion,  and  left,  in  fact,  without  interference  to  do  as  little  as  it 
chose,  the  following  results  could  not  have  been  afforded.  For, 
as  we  have  seen  ( abstracting  from  All  Souls  and  the  Halls), 
College  varies  from  College,  as  an  educational  instrument : — 1°, 
in  the  more  important  department  of  L.  II.,  on  the  higher  stan- 
dard of  First  Classes,  eighteen-fold,  and  on  the  standard  most 
favorable  to  mediocrity  of  Valued  Classes,  from  four  to  five-fold ; 
2°,  in  the  less  important  department  of  D.  M.,  above  ten  times 
on  the  more  ambitious  criterion  of  First  Classes,  and  nearly 
twelve  times  on  the  humbler  criterion  of  Valued  Classes. 

This  difference  of  House  and  House  ought,  indeed,  to  fill  us 
with  astonishment;  at  least  it  utterly  astonished  me.  For  though 
prepared  to  expect  not  a small,  I was  wholly  unprepared  for  the 
mighty,  contrast  which  the  collegial  comparison  in  the  Table 
manifests.  I was  aware,  of  course,  that  men — that  youths  are 
in  ordinary  little  more  than  the  passive  reflectors  of  the  education 
which  they  chance  to  receive ; but  I was  certainly  pre-disposed 
to  rate  far  higher  the  exceptive  number  of  those,  who,  in  a Uni- 
versity like  Oxford,  would  pursue  their  studies  independently  of 
all  external  constraint,  and  to  whom  the  offices  of  a Tutor  should 
prove,  in  fact,  more  impediments  than  aids.  Others  too  there 
were,  and  in  numbers  not  to  he  overlooked,  whom  no  tuition 
could  avail  to  raise  out  of  the  low  level  to  which  native  incapac- 
ity had  doomed  them.  Finally,  there  were  many,  who  sought, 
privately  and  without  their  College,  for  the  tuition  which  they 
could  not,  satisfactorily  at  least,  find  publicly  or  within.  All 
these  classes  were  distributed  throughout  the  Houses,  and  all  it 
behooved  to  take  into  account,  as  tending  to  bring  the  Houses  to 
an  average  equality.  On  this  equalizing  tendency  I had  calculated 
much — too  much  indeed.  For  the  statistics  of  the  Table  show 
how  uniformly,  notwithstanding  every  equalizing  tendency,  rank 
in  the  academical  examinations  is  the  result  of  a right  prepara- 
tory tuition,  and  how  rarely  the  honors  of  the  University  are 
won,  except  by  competitors  trained  to  victory  through  a course 
of  sound  collegial  discipline.  But  such  a discipline,  though  such 
be  its  effect,  how  seldom,  if  ever,  is  it  now  afforded  by  the  Col- 
leges— in  full  efficiency  ? For,  admitting  that  the  higher  and 
fewer  Colleges  perform,  in  Oxford,  all  that,  as  educational  insti- 
tutes, shey  should  and  can ; still  on  the  other  hand,  the  lower 
and  more  numerous  Houses  are  seen,  on  the  criterion  of  the 
University  itself,  to  fail  most  signally  in  this  essential  function, 


6S4 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


which  they  pretend,  and  that  exclusively,  to  discharge.  Yet,  in 
the  midst  of  this  manifold  and  obtrusive  defalcation,  the  Church 
and  the  State  look  on ; the  nation  is  quietly  defrauded  of  the 
education  for  which  it  has  especially  provided ; while  the  exclu- 
sive privileges  are  still  suffered  to  subsist,  long  after  the  condi- 
tions, on  which  alone  these  were  originally  conceded,  have  been 
illegally  suspended.  “ Not  individual  persons  only,”  says  the 
great  Herder,  “hut  schools  and  universities,  outlive  themselves. 
In  semblance,  their  body  still  survives,  while  the  soul  has  long 
been  fled,  or  they  glide  about,  like  shades  of  the  departed,  among 
the  figures  of  the  living.  Once  were  they  so  useful,  and  there 
lay  in  them  the  germ  of  a great  development.  But  all  has  its 
appointed  limit.  The  form  which  still  remains  has  overlived  it- 
self. Alas  ! to  what  a century  do  they  recall  us  ! To  the  strange 
tastes  of  long  buried  generations  ! There  they  stand,  establish- 
ments of  a by-gone  time,  in  all  its  pressure ! They  follow  not 
the  genius  of  the  age,  and,  incapable  of  renewing  with  it  their 
youth,  have  thus  fallen  from  their  ancient  usefulness.”  But  the 
English  Universities,  and  Oxford  in  particular,  though  ancient, 
are  not  so  much  superannuated  as  diseased.  Though  enfeebled, 
certainly,  they  do  not  so  much  manifest  the  symptoms  of  death, 
as  of  a suspension,  or  rather  metastasis,  of  life;  for  their  original, 
their  statutory  constitution  is  superseded,  but  superseded,  not  for 
public,  but  for  private,  advantage.  The  better  hope,  therefore, 
of  their  restoration.  For  the  old  and  legal  is  gone  ; while  no  re- 
spect is  due  to  the  modern,  which  has  only  too  long  been  suffer- 
ed perfidiously  to  usurp  its  place.  Oxford  may,  indeed,  be  re- 
sembled to  a venerable  oak  ; whose  abated  vigor  is  diverted  from 
heart  to  bark,  but  this  cortical  life,  now  only  manifested  in  its 
suckers,  is,  in  fact,  wholly  expended  in  these  parasitic  offshoots, 
which,  while  they  waste  without  replacing,  are  allowed  to  repre- 
sent, as  they  conceal,  the  parent  tree. 

“ Slat  magni  nominis  umbra. 

Qualis  frugifero  quercus  sublimis  in  agro 
Exuvias  veteres  populi,  sacrataque  gestans 
Dona  ducum ; nec  jam  validis  radicibus  hserens, 

Pondere  fixa  suo  est,  nudosque  per  aera  ramos 
Effnndens,  trunco,  non  frondibus,  efiicit  umbram  : 

At  quamvis  pvimo  nutet  casura  sub  Euro, 

Et  quamvis  eircum  sylvac  se  robore  tollant, 

Sola  tamen  colitur.” 

II.  Such  being  Oxford  as  it  is,  I now  proceed  to  Oxford  (I 
shall  not  say,  as  it  should,  but)  as  it  might  be.  For  I would  pro- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


685 


pose  a scheme  of  improvement,  manifest  and  easy ; but  not  insin- 
uate that  a better  might  not  he  devised.  In  fact,  as  already 
indicated,  I look  not  alone  nor  principally  to  what  is  theoretically 
the  best,  hut  to  what  is  practically  the  most  feasible.  I limit 
myself,  likewise,  to  the  fundamental  faculty,  that  of  Arts  or  libe- 
ral instruction,  and  to  the  lower  department  of  that  faculty — to 
that,  in  which  alone  the  University  now  pretends  to  educate. 
From  all  higher  and  more  ambitious  proposals  I refrain ; refrain 
from  all  schemes  of  reform,  which  may  lightly  he  desired,  but 
may  not  lightly  be  accomplished.  I would  suggest  obvious  reme- 
dies for  obvious  vices  ; and  should  prefer  making  use  of  the  means 
already  in  appliance,  to  seeking  after  others  which  may  specula- 
tively he  superior.  Accordingly,  were  the  institutions  of  domes- 
tic superintendence  and  tutorial  instruction,  even  in  themselves 
defective,  I should  be  unwilling  to  supersede  them ; for  the  simple 
reason,  that  they  are  already  established,  and  consuetudinary.  It 
is  easy  also  to  wish,  that  Headships  and  Fellowships  were,  as 
they  ought  to  he,  made  the  reward  of  literary  eminence  ; hut  such 
a wish,  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  realize.  To  found, 
therefore,  a scheme  of  academical  reform  on  this  or  any  similar 
ideal,  would  he  to  frustrate  it  by  anticipation.  Any  measure  of 
practical  reform  ought,  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  to  attempt  only 
to  remove  intolerable  abuses,  and  to  cure  them  only  by  the  least 
violent  substitutions.  This,  at  least,  in  the  first  instance  ; for 
Reformation  should  be  gradual.  The  great  end  toward  perfec- 
tion is,  indeed,  to  initiate  improvement.  Every  step  forward 
necessitates  an  ulterior  advance  ; so  true  is  the  adage  which  old 
Hesiod  has  sung — ’H/ryy  tf/Mau  Travros.  Thus  the  Oxford  Exam- 
ination statutes  were  the  first  efforts  of  the  University  to  rise  out 
of  the  slough  of  abasement  into  which  it  had  long  subsided  ;*  and 


1 Before  the  Examination  Statutes  passed,  after  the  commencement  of  the  present 
century,  Oxford  awarded  her  degrees,  from  first  to  last,  without  trial,  and  independ- 
ently of  acquirement. — Crousaz,  writing  in  1725,  says  : — “ In  Oxford  the  new  philos- 
ophy is  known  as  little  to  its  members  as  to  the  Australian  savages  ; and  M.  Bernard 
pleasantly  Temarks,  that  these  worthies  are  a century  or  two  behind  their  age,  and 
perhaps  will  so  eternally  remain.  The  spirit  of  Protestantism  is  hardly  breathed  in 
Oxford.”  (Logique,  P.  I.,  S.  i.,  c.  6.) — Wendeborn,  who  traveled  through  England 
before  1788,  gives  an  amusing  account  of  the  Prases,  Respondent,  and  the  three  Op- 
ponents, consuming  the  statutory  time  in  profound  silence,  and  the  study  of  a novel 
or  other  entertaining  work.  (Beschreibung,  &c.,  III.  p.  218,  219.) — A similar  de- 
scription of  the  ceremonial  is  given  by  Vicesimus  Knox  (who,  if  I recollect,  was  him- 
self of  Oxford).  It  will  be  found  in  his  Moral  Essays,  but  the  book  is  not  at  hand. — 
Cambridge,  till  lately,  if  not  to  the  present  day,  bestows  its  degree  on  all  and  sundry 
who  bring  up  a minimum  of  mathematics. 


686  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

the  Examination,  now  affording  an  undeniable  rule,  by  which  to 
evince,  that  the  Oxford  Houses  do  not,  in  general,  perform  their 
arrogated  office  of  instruction,  in  any  satisfactory  degree,  at  once 
annihilates,  by  stultifying,  all  resistance  on  their  part,  while  it 
can  not  fail  of  determining,  in  public  opinion,  the  necessity  of  an 
academical  reform.  But,  in  truth,  the  most  zealous  champions 
in  the  cause,  may  be  looked  for  in  those  intelligent  individuals, 
whom  accident  has  connected  with  the  collegial  interest,  and  in 
the  less  efficient  Houses  ; for  it  is  they  who  will  naturally  be  most 
impressed  with  the  academical  inadequacy  of  their  colleagues — 
most  ashamed  of  the  inferior  level  of  their  Colleges — and  most 
active  in  originating  and  carrying  out  any  feasible  measure  of 
improvement. — But  the  Examination  not  only  manifests  the 
urgency,  it  likewise  affords  the  possibility,  of  reform.  Through 
the  influence  of  the  Examination,  the  standard  of  literary  qualifi- 
cation has  in  Oxford  been  gradually  rising ; and  accordingly  the 
melioration  would  now  be  easy,  which  formerly  could  have  only 
resulted  in  failure.  Though  far  inferior  to  the  Oxford  Examina- 
tion, that  of  Cambridge,  as  earlier,  caused  likewise  an  earlier 
advance.  For  without  such  a criterion,  how  perverse  soever  it 
may  be,  the  collegial  elections  would  now,  as  heretofore,  be  there 
throwing  merit  out  of  account : and  there  the  Tutors  might  still 
be  whistling  to  their  pupils  the  old  tune,  which,  as  pupils,  had 
been  piped  to  them  ; — Cambridge  might  still  be  Cartesian  in 
Physics,  as  Physics,  are  still,  indeed,  its  peculiar  Philosophy,  and 
Mathematics  all  its  Logic. 

In  the  subsequent  observations  I shall  pursue  the  following 
order : — i.)  Recapitulate  the  contrast  between  the  legal  and  ille- 
gal in  the  education  which  the  great  English  Universities,  and  in 
particular  Oxford,  afford  in  their  fundamental  faculty; — ii.)  State 
the  ends , the  full  accomplishment  of  which  constitutes  the  perfec- 
tion of  an  University,  as  a school  of  liberal  study  ; — iii.)  Compare 
the  means , now  at  work,  especially  in  Oxford,  with  the  ends  which 
such  a seminary  ought  to  fulfill ; — and  iv.)  Suggest  such  changes 
as  may  most  easily  be  made,  to  render  that  school  a more  efficient 
instrument  for  the  purpose  of  general  and  preparatory  education. 

i.)  Contrast  between  the  legal  and  illegal,  in  the  education  which , 

with  more  especial  reference  to  Oxford,  the  English  Universi- 
ties afford  in  their  fundamental  faculty. 

1°,  Be  jure  : The  necessary  academical  discipline  is  public  and 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


687 


common  ; given  by  the  University  in  public  prelection  and  public 
exercise. — De  facto:  The  sole  academical  discipline  is  private  and 
peculiar  ; given  by  the  several  Houses  in  their  domestic  tuition. 
(See  pp.  386,  387,  436,  439.) 

2°,  Dejure  : The  University  stands  provided  with  a large  staff 
of  Prselectors  or  Professors.— De  facto  : These  are  now  extinct, 
with  the  exception  of  a few,  that  remain  11  the  shadows  of  a 
name.”  All  public  Exercise,  of  old  thought  justly  more  import- 
ant than  prelection,  is,  in  like  manner,  defunct — nay,  even  for- 
gotten. (See  pp.  390,  394,  421,  439,  440,  442.) 

3°,  Dejure:  The  domestic  instructor  or  Tutor,  is  any  respect- 
able graduate,  chosen  by  the  pupil,  nor  does  it  even  appear  that 
they  must  be  of  the  same  House ; and  the  Tutor’s  principal  func- 
tion is,  by  statute,  to  look  after  his  pupil’s  hair,  clothes,  and 
catechism. — De  facto  : The  Tutorial  office  is  exclusively  usurped 
by  the  College  Fellows,  who  are  seldom  Fellows  from  any  literary 
merit ; out  of  them  the  Tutor  is  nominated  by  the  College  Head, 
who  is  seldom  Head  for  his  ability  or  learning ; 1 to  a Tutor,  so 


1 I have  elsewhere  (p.  395,  sq.)  shown,  how  the  collegial  foundations  were,  in  Ox- 
ford, not  intended  to  supply  ability,  but  to  relieve  want ; and  that  their  members  were, 
in  general,  not  dependent  for  their  appointment  on  any  academical  merit.  In  addition 
thereto,  and  with  special  reference  to  the  Heads,  I may  adduce  the  testimony  of  Mr. 
Ward , late  Fellow  of  Trinity  College,  and  Deputy  High  Steward ! of  the  University  of 
Oxford.  In  the  Preface  to  his'translation  of  the  Oxford  University  Statutes  (1845) 
he  says : 

“ There  is  nothing,  therefore,  in  the  original  destination  of  a Head  of  a College,  or 
in  the  statutory  terms  of  his  elevation,  which  involves  his  aptitude  for  a governor  of 
the  universal  academical  body.  But  is  he  at  all  better  qualified  for  the  purpose  under 
the  alterations  of  the  old  collegiate  constitutions,  which  a change  of  the  national  reli- 
gion. and  no  less  of  the  national  manners,  has  effected  in  the  long  course  of  four  or 
five  hundred  years  1 The  maintenance  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Faith  being  the  ground- 
work of  collegiate  foundations,  the  founders  have,  in  almost  all  cases,  insisted  on  their 
establishments  being  governed  by  an  ecclesiastical  person  ; and  even  where  the  stat- 
utes are  not  imperative  on  this  point,  the  natural  course  of  things  leads  to  the  same 
result.  Of  all  the  nineteen  Colleges,  only  one  at  this  time  is  governed  by  a layman. 
The  Heads  of  Colleges  are,  as  has  been  said  before,  elective  ; and  it  will  readily  ap- 
pear, that  if  the  founders  themselves  left  the  general  advantage  of  the  University  quite 
out  of  view,  while  considering  the  qualifications  of  their  principal  College  officer,  the 
interest  and  position  of  the  statutory  electors  are  nearly  concerned  not  to  supply  the 
defective  ingredient.  On  the  avoidance  of  the  Headship,  one  place  is  of  course  gained 
by  every  Fellow  who  has  a vested  interest  in  the  foundation,  but  an  adroit  exercise 
of  the  franchise  may  convert  the  single  vacancy  into  two  or  more  steps  of  advance- 
ment to  the  junior  members,  and  the  election,  in  consequence,  usually  falls  on  the  in- 
cumbent of  the  best  living  or  other  office  or  preferment  belonging  to  the  society,  and  his 
promotion  creates  a fresh  vacancy,  perhaps  a series  of  vacancies.  But  it  may  be  said 
that  the  motive  of  interest  would  only  attach  to  a portion  of  the  electors  ; another 
remains,  which  must  equally  affect  the  whole  body,  or  at  least  the  residents.  All  the 
College  codes  give  most  extensive  powers  to  the  Plead  of  the  society ; he  must  be 
constantly  in  residence,  too,  within  the  same  precincts  as  the  Fellows;  it  stands  to 


688 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


qualified  and  appointed,  every  intrant  to  University  and  College 
must  subject  himself ; and  on  this  Fellow,  or  his  associate  Tutors, 
is  the  University  now  wholly  dependent  for  all  the  academical 
discipline  afforded  to  the  alumnus.  (See  pp.  391-398,  421. 

As  contrary  to  reason,  contrary  to  statute,  and  contrary  to  oath, 
the  present  system  (if  system  it  may  he  called),  can  not  long  en- 
dure. The  necessity  of  perjury  must  he  made  to  cease  ; law  and 
fact  must  again  he  brought  into  union,  and  their  subsequent 
separation  should  be  precluded.  Finally,  the  actual  ought  to  be 
approximated  to  the  rational.  Such  approximation  is  not,  how- 
ever, to  be  accomplished  by  a mere  return  from  the  modern  and 
illegal  to  the  old  and  statutory.  For  though  the  statutory  con- 
stitution of  the  University  and  its  instruction  was,  in  former  ages, 
far  superior  to  the  mutilated  fragment  of  education  now  long 
alone  precariously  attempted  by  intrusive,  interested,  and  incom- 
petent means,  it  would,  as  has  been  said,  be  a rash  inference  to 


reason,  therefore,  that  a much  more  effective  and  natural  consideration  in  the  choice 
of  a future  next-door  neighbor,  who  should  be  a censor,  and  must  be  a superior,  will 
be  his  character  for  complaisance  and  inoffensivencss,  rather  than  any  overstrained  anx 
iety  for  the  honor  or  advantage  which  will  accrue  to  the  University.  A good , easy  Head 
of  a clerical  club  will  be  in  much  greater  demand  among  its  thirty  or  forty  Fellows  and 
incumbents , than  a gifted  sage , if  any  such  the  society  possesses,  who  will  exert  himself 
to  improve  the  system  of  instruction  pursued  in  the  University. 

“ If,  therefore,  the  disposition  to  acquiesce  in  the  existing  state  of  things  within 
the  walls  of  his  own  College,  constitutes,  in  all  likelihood,  the  most  operative  recom- 
mendation for  the  Head  of  a House,  what  hopes  can  be  fairly  entertained  that  he  will 
be  more  energetic  in  his  accessory  character  of  a Governor  of  the  general  academical 
corporation  1 But  it  is  only  necessary  to  look  to  their  own  volume  of  the  Caroline 
statutes,  to  form  a judgment  of  the  legislative  capacity  of  the  Board  ; for  they  have 
there  put  it  on  record,  under  the  name  of  Additions  to  Laud’s  Code.  The  staple  of 
these  additions  is  the  substitution  of  one  form  of  words  for  another,  equally  untrue  or 
inapplicable  to  the  present  times  ; fresh  incense  offered  to  mere  rank  and  wealth,  and 
new  sumptuary  enactments,  which  must  be  illusory,  so  long  as  Laud’s  Statute  (Tit. 
iii.  sect.  1)  is  suffered  to  remain  unrepealed,  and  to  drive  all  the  Undergraduates  of  the 
University  into  some  twenty  Colleges  and  Halls,  never  calculated  by  their  founders  for 
the  superintendence  of  a fifth  of  their  existing  numbers.  It  may  be  sufficient  here  to 
state,  generally,  that  at  about  the  commencement  of  the  present  century  it  became 
apparent  to  the  University  itself,  that,  either  from  the  natural  working  of  the  Caroline 
Code,  or  from  its  formalities  only  having  been  kept  up,  while  its  spirit  had  been  allow- 
ed to  expire,  Oxford  had  virtually  abdicated  instruction,  and  was  converted  into  a mere 
market  of  degrees  for  those  persons  who  could  throw  away  the  time  and  afford  the 
pecuniary  means,  which  had  become  the  chief  conditions  for  acquiring  them.  An  ef- 
fort was  therefore  indispensable,  and  the  University  was  saved  from  extinction  as  a 
nursery  of  learning,  by  the  New  Examination  Statute — a vast  improvement,  no  doubt, 
upon  the  previous  method,  but  still  confessedly,  at  the  present  day,  after  forty  years 
experience,  and  a multitude  of  amendments,  liable  to  very  great  and  striking  objections. 

“ From  a legislative  body,  composed  like  that  which  has  been  described,  it  is  hope- 
less to  expect  any  comprehensive  scheme  of  reformation  proceeding  from  itself : perhaps 
it  is  also  unreasonable,  for  it  never  has  legislated  independently  on  a great  scale,”  &c 
(P  x.  sq.) 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


689 


conclude,  that  what  is  old,  and  even  statutory,  is  all  good ; — that 
what  is  new,  and  even  illegal,  is  all  vicious.  This  leads  us  to  the 
second  head  of  consideration. 

ii.)  The  Ends  which  a University  in  its  fundamental  faculty , 
that  is,  as  a seminary  of  liberal  accomplishment,  is  bound  to 
propose. 

But  before  stating  the  ends  of  a University,  it  is  proper  to 
premise  a distinction  and  explanation.  For  a University  in  ordi- 
nary, and  in  ordinary  acceptation,  involves  two  very  different 
things : — involving  1°,  what  is  properly  the  University,  a school, 
to  wit,  for  liberal  or  general  knowledge  : and  2°,  a collection  of 
special  schools,  for  one,  two,  three,  or  more  of  the  learned  profes- 
sions. In  the  former  respect,  the  student  is  considered,  as  an  end 
unto  himself ; his  perfection,  as  a man  simply,  being  the  aim  of 
his  education.  This  is  the  end  proposed  in,  what  is  academically 
known  as,  the  Faculty  of  Arts  or  of  Philosophy.  In  the  latter 
respect,  the  learner  is  not  viewed  as  himself  an  end , that  end 
being  now  something  out  of  himself : for  not  his  perfection  as  a 
man,  but  his  dexterity  as  a professional  man — in  a word,  his  use- 
fulness as  an  instrument,  has  become  the  aim  of  his  scientific  pre- 
paration. This  end  is  that  proposed  in,  what  are  academically 
known  as,  the  Faculties  of  Theology,  Law,  Medicine,  &c. ; and 
in  this  relation,  a University  is,  in  fact,  only  a supplemental  and 
contingent  aggregation  of  special  schools,  the  only  connection  that 
these  have  with  each  other,  or  with  the  University,  being,  that 
they  all  hold  out  to  be  liberal,  that  is,  they  all  hold  out  to  educate 
to  professions  which  presuppose  always  a liberal  accomplishment, 
if  not  always  an  education  in  the  liberal  faculty,  or  faculty  of  arts. 
In  certain  Universities,  indeed,  and  in  certain  of  their  professional 
faculties,  a degree  is  now  given  without  a liberal  education ; but 
in  these  cases,  the  profession  lias  ceased  to  he  liberal  or  learned, 
and  the  instruction  by  the  academical  faculty  is  really  that  of  a 
mere  special  school.  Pro  tanto,  the  University  has,  in  fact, 
illegally  abrogated  itself;  and  it  would  he  difficult  to  say,  whether 
the  English  or  the  Scottish  Universities  have  acted  more  contrary 
to  law  and  common  sense,  in  their  grant  of  medical  degrees,  the 
former  without  professional,  the  latter  without  liberal,  education. 
The  latter  certainly  is  the  more  dangerous  to  the  public,  if  the 
more  profitable  to  the  medical  professors. — Nor  is  historical  fact 
here  at  variance  with  philosophical  theory.  This  distinction  of  a 

Xx 


690  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

University  into  tivo  parts — into  a part  essential  or  fundamental, 
and  into  a part  contingent  or  accessory,  is  shown  in  the  chrono- 
logical develomnent  of  academical  institutions.  The  older  Uni- 
versities  (as  Paris,  Oxford,  &c.)  originated  in  the  fundamental 
Faculty  of  Arts,  the  other  Faculties  being  subsequently  by  acci- 
dent, and  at  different  times,  one  or  more  of  them,  annexed.  And 
at  present,  the  English  Universities,  though  still  allowed  to  exer- 
cise the  privilege  of  granting  degrees  in  the  special  faculties, 
have,  it  may  be  fairly  said,  long  virtually  abandoned  the  relative 
instruction ; so  that  Oxford  and  Cambridge  are  now  what  they 
were  at  first — schools  exclusively  of  liberal  instruction,  but  of 
liberal  instruction,  it  should  be  added,  not  in  all,  but  only  in  cer- 
tain arbitrary  branches. 

Limiting,  therefore,  our  view  by  the  limitation  of  the  English 
Universities,  to  the  essential  faculty  alone,  the  abstract  ends 
necessarily  proposed  by  a University  may  be  stated,  as  in  all, 
three : — 1°,  to  supply  competent  instruction  ; 2°,  to  excite  the 
requisite  exertion ; and  3°,  to  grant  a true  certificate  of  pro- 
ficiency. These  being  the  ends  which  a University  necessarily 
proposes,  the  degree  in  which  it  accomplishes  these,  will  neces- 
sarily determine  the  degree  of  its  perfection. 

To  accomplish  these  abstract  ends,  a University  must  employ 
certain  concrete  means.  But  though  means  are  necessarily  con- 
ducive to  ends,  it  is  not  necessary  that  each  several  end  should 
be  exclusively  effected  by  its  several  mean.  One  mean  may  con- 
duce to  several  ends,  and  one  end  may  be  subserved  by  a plu- 
rality of  means  ; nay,  what  is  directly  an  end,  may  also  indi- 
rectly operate  as  a mean.  Thus,  the  Examination  for  a certifi- 
cate of  proficiency,  i.  e.  for  a Degree,  though  its  immediate  end 
be  the  ascertainment  of  a certain  minimum  of  learning,  yet,  me- 
diately, this  Examination,  with  its  proximate  end,  may  become 
a powerful  mean  toward  another  #nd,  the  excitement,  to  wit,  of 
exertion  in  the  student.  This,  therefore,  makes  the  disintrica- 
tion  and  abstract  distinction  of  the  ends  and  means  proposed  by 
a University  inconvenient,  and  without  detail  impossible  ; accord- 
ingly, in  conformity  to  convenience,  I shall  simply  enumerate 
(attempting  no  speculative  classification),  as  ends,  all  that  a 
University  should  accomplish,  although  these  accomplishings 
may,  strictly  considered,  often  partake  more  of  the  character  of 
means. 

First  end — As  a University,  even  in  all  its  faculties,  can  not 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


691 


teach  the  omne  scibile,  and  as  there  is  an  order  and  subordina- 
tion among  the  departments  of  knowledge ; a University,  more 
especially  in  its  fundamental  faculty,  is  hound  to  secure  by  pre- 
ference those  studies  which,  supposed  by  the  others,  are  neces- 
sary, not  only  on  their  own  account,  hut  for  the  sake  of  ulterior 
progress.  In  other  words  : a University,  though  it  can  not  com- 
pass the  cycle  of  knowledge,  is  required  to  supply  its  introduc- 
tion. This  manifest  principle  has,  however,  too  frequently  been 
neglected  in  our  modern  Universities — nay,  even  reversed.  Teach- 
ing every  thing,  they  teach  nothing : — 

NrjTTLOL,  ovk  ivorjcrav  oaw  rrXeov  tj/uav  n ravros. 

Second  end — A University  should  supply  competent,  and  ex- 
clude incompetent,  instructors.  This  supposes  that  the  instructor 
should  possess  not  merely  an  empirical  knowledge  of  his  subject, 
but  a philosophical ; that  he  should  know  it,  not  merely  as  a 
complexus  of  facts,  but  as  a system  of  effects  and  causes  ; and 
that,  besides  his  synthetic  comprehension  of  the  whole,  he  should 
have  analytically  examined  how  the  parts  are  dependent  on  each 
other,  and  how  they  mutually  concur  to  the  constitution  of  the 
whole.  If  he  teach  an  author,  he  must  be  familiar,  not  merely 
with  the  work  he  teaches,  but  with  all  the  writings  of  his  author, 
and  the  relative  opinions  of  the  learned.  If  he  teach  a doctrine, 
he  must  be  acquainted  with  it,  not  merely  in  itself,  but  in  its 
connections,  scientific  and  historical.  In  short,  as  Aristotle  admi- 
rably shows — “ The  one  exclusive  sign  of  a thorough  knowledge 
is  the  power  of  teaching.”  (Metaph.  I.  i.)  But  how  many 
teachers  are  destitute  of  all  this  knowledge,  and  never  even  sus- 
pect their  deficiency ! How  many  confidently  profess,  who  are 
wholly  unqualified,  to  instruct ! — But  beside  his  ability  to  teach, 
an  academical  instructor  should  be  actuated  by  a good  will.  He 
should  be  ready  to  solve  any  difficulty  propounded,  and  to  afford 
aid  and  advice  to  his  pupils  in  the  conduct  of  their  studies. 
This  was,  indeed,  enjoined  by  statute  in  several  of  the  older 
Universities ; and  in  Oxford  the  public  Readers  (now  defunct) 
were  required  to  remain  for  a certain  time  daily  after  lecture,  in 
order  to  answer  all  pertinent  questions  that  might  be  put  to 
them. 

Third  end — A University  ought  likewise  to  place  conspicuously 
before  the  eyes  of  the  student,  and,  of  course,  more  especially  to 
secure  in  its  instructors,  high  living  examples  of  erudition  and 


692  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

ability.  For,  in  proportion  as  the  academical  standard  is  elevat- 
ed, will  be  the  discontent  of  its  alumni  with  any  pitch  of  attain- 
ment inferior  to  the  highest,  and  their  consequent  effort  toward  an 
ever  loftier  accomplishment ; whereas,  the  natural  result  of  a low 
standard  in  the  teacher,  will  be  (independently  of  other  evils) 
self-contentment  and  conceit,  or  disgust  and  inertion,  in  the  taught. 
The  beginning — the  middle — the  end,  indeed,  of  wisdom,  is  the 
consciousness  of  ignorance ; the  consciousness  of  ignorance  is  thus 
the  condition  of  progress.  Hence  the  aim  of  every  intelligent 
governor  of  a University  has  been,  even  apart  from  formal  in- 
struction, to  obtrude  the  highest  patterns  of  learned  talent  on  the 
immediate  observation  of  its  teachers  and  its  taught,  in  order  to 
repress,  in  all,  any  tolerance  of  mediocrity  : aware,  with  Bion, 
that  “ The  conceit  of  knowledge  is  the  arrestment  of  progress;” 
as  with  Seneca — “ Multos  potuisse  ad  sapientiam  pervenire,  nisi 
putassent,  se  pervenisse.”  This  enlightened  policy  I have  else- 
where endeavored  to  illustrate.1  (See  pp.  359-362.) 

Fourth  end — As  the  student  comes  (or  must  be  supposed  to 
come)  to  the  University  without  a love  of  knowledge  for  its  own 
sake,  as  indeed  he  comes  there,  not  with  studious  habits  already 
formed,  but,  in  fact,  with  these  to  be  acquired  ; and  as  there 
are  likewise  objects  of  strong  alien  interest  continually  soliciting 
him  to  remit  his  efforts  ; a University  is  bound  to  apply  such 
external  incitements  as,  by  relation  to  his  previous  dispositions, 
may  overbalance  all  counter  seductions,  and  render  his  studies, 
from  the  first  to  the  last,  more  pleasurable  than  their  intermission. 
For,  as  Isocrates  and  Aristotle  have  well  expressed  it : — “ The 
roots  of  dicipline  are  bitter,  while  the  fruits  are  sweet;”  and 
as  Plato,  followed  by  his  greater  disciple,  untranslatably  says : — 
“ Ildv  r/6o^ > Suz  e#09.”  Such  a stimulus  is  furnished  in  the  desire 
of  distinction — in  the  goad  of  emulation — affections  strong  in  all, 


1 The  universal  sense  of  mankind  has  indeed  established  this  as  a maxim  of  educa- 
tion. The  following  rise  to  my  recollection  : 

The  Arabian  Sage  : — “ A man  is  wise,  so  long  as  he  seeks  after  wisdom,  but  a fool 
when  he  conceits  it  to  be  mastered.” 

The  Rabbi  Eleazar  : — “Where  there  is  no  reverence,  there  is  no  instruction.” 

“ Bratsicanus  asked  of  Erasmus — How  a man  might  become  learned  1 Tift  imme- 
diate answer  was  : — 1 If  he  haunted  the  company  of  the  learned  ; if  he  listened  sub- 
missively to  the  sayings  of  the  learned  ; if  he  diligently  read  and  re-read  the  writings  of 
the  learned;  but  above  all,  if  he  never  deemed  that  he  himself  was  learned.''  ” 

This  may  enable  us  to  solve  the  seeming  paradox  : — In  a country,  where  learning 
is  rare,  the  men  of  learning  are  common  ; in  a country,  where  learning  is  common,  the 
men  of  learning  are  rare. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


693 


Irat  cliaracteristically  strongest  in  the  young  (“  lovers  of  honor, 
yet  still  more  lovers  of  victory”) ; and  these,  if  they  he  constantly 
and  efficiently  applied,  determine  a sedulous  application  in  the 
pursuit  of  knowledge,  even  while  such  application  may  still  he 
irksome  in  itself.  “In  learning,”  says  Bacon,  “the  flight  will 
be  slow  [and  low]  without  some  feathers  of  ostentation ;”  and 
thus  is  it,  that,  through  emulation  and  the  passion  for  distinction, 
we  are  enabled  to  fulfill  his  precept: — “As  man’s  nature  runs 
either  to  herbs  or  weeds,  let  us  seasonably  water  the  one  and  de- 
stroy the  other.”  For,  while  mental  effort  is  the  one  condition  of 
all  mental  improvement,  yet  this  effort  is  at  first  and  for  a time 
painful : positively  painful,  in  proportion  as  it  is  intense ; and 
comparatively  painful,  as  it  abstracts  from  other  and  positively 
pleasurable  activities.  It  is  painful,  because  its  energy  is  imper- 
fect, difficult,  forced.  But,  as  the  effort  is  gradually  perfected, 
gradually  facilitated,  it  becomes  gradually  pleasing ; and  when, 
finally  perfected,  that  is,  when  the  power  is  fully  developed,  and 
the  effort,  changed  into  a spontaneity,  becomes  an  exertion  abso- 
lutely easy,  it  remains  purely,  intensely,  and  alone  unsatiably 
pleasurable.  For  pleasure  is  nothing  but  the  concomitant  or  reflex 
of  the  unforced  and  unimpeded  energy  of  a natural  faculty  or  ac- 
quired habit ; the  degree  and  permanence  of  the  pleasure  being 
also  ever  in  proportion  to  the  intensity  and  purity  of  the  mental 
energy.  The  great  postulate  in  education  is,  therefore — to  induce 
the  pupil  to  enter  and  to  persevere  in  such  a course  of  effort,  good, 
in  its  result,  and  delectable,  but  primarily  and  in  itself  irksome. 
“ There  is  no  royal  road  to  learning.”  “ The  Gfods,”  says  Epi- 
charmus,  “ sell  us  every  thing  for  toil ;”  and  the  curse  inherited 
from  Adam,  that  “ in  the  sweat  of  his  face,  man  should  eat  his 
bread,”  holds  good  of  every  human  acquisition.  For,  “man  liv- 
eth  not  by  bread  alone  ;” 

“ Vivere 

Non  esse  solum  vescier  sethere, 

Sed  laude  viitutisque  fructu 

Egregiam  satiare  mentem.” 

And  with  immediate  reference  to  the  young ; it  would  be  pecu- 
liar folly  to  expect,  that  they,  especially,  should  be  ever  made  to 
climb  the  hill  of  knowledge,  stinted  of  their  natural  requirements 
by  the  way — the  refreshment  of  honor,  the  stimulant  of  compe- 
tition. These  affections  are  implanted  in  us,  implanted,  conse- 
quently for  the  wisest  purposes  : and  although  they  may,  of 
course,  be  misapplied,  the  inference,  from  the  possibility  of  their 


694  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

abuse  to  the  inexpediency  of  their  employment,  is  futile.  Nothing, 
indeed,  can  evince  a profounder  ignorance  of  human  nature,  or  a 
more  disgraceful  neglect  of  the  most  efficient  means  within  its 
grasp,  than  for  a University — than,  indeed,  for  any  seminary  of 
education,  to  leave  unapplied  these  great  promoting  principles  of 
juvenile  activity;  and  passively  to  take  for  granted,  that  its  pu- 
pils will  act  precisely  as  they  ought,  though  with  every  tempta- 
tion seducing  them  from  effort,  and  no  appropriate  inducement 
supplied  in  favor  of  studious  exertion. 

Fifth  end — As  knowledge  (man  being  now  considered  as  an 
end  to  himself)  is  only  valuable  as  it  exercises,  and  by  exercise 
develops  and  invigorates,  the  mind  ; so  a University,  in  its  liberal 
faculty,  should  specially  prefer  those  objects  of  study  which  call 
forth  the  strongest  and  most  unexclusive  energy  of  thought,  and 
so  teach  them  too,  that  this  energy  shall  be  most  fully  elicited 
in  the  student.  For  speculative  knowledge,  of  whatever  kind,  is 
only  profitable  to  the  student,  in  his  liberal  cultivation,  in  as  much 
as  it  supplies  him  with  the  object  and  occasion  of  exerting  his 
faculties  ; since  powers  are  only  developed  in  proportion  as  they 
are  exercised,  that  is,  put  forth  into  energy.  The  mere  possession 
of  scientific  truths  is,  for  its  own  sake,  valueless  ; and  education 
is  only  education,  in  as  much  as  it  at  once  determines  and  enables 
the  student  to  educate  himself.  Nor  is  there  time  to  lose.  In 
fact,  it  is  now  or  never;  for,  as  Rousseau  truly  says  : — “ L’inha- 
bitude  de  penser  dans  la  jeunesse  en  ote  la  faculte  durant  le 
reste  de  la  vie.” — The  objects  of  knowledge,  which  combine  more 
entirely  this  end  with  the  first,  ought  thus  to  be  the  principal 
branches  of  primary  academical  education.  To  determine  what 
these  objects,  what  these  branches  are,  would  lead  us  into  a dis- 
cussion which,  at  present,  I willingly  avoid  ; but  the  educational 
exercises  employed  by  Universities  in  calling  forth  the  self  acti- 
vity of  their  alumni,  are  the  following : — 1.  Examination ; 2. 
Disputation ; 3.  Repetition ; 4.  Written  Composition ; 5.  Teach- 
ing, in  order  to  learn  ; 6.  Conversation  with,  questioning  of,  the 
learned  ; 7.  Social  study. — Of  these  in  detail. 

1.  Examination. — By  this  is  meant  Examination  in  the  course 
of  study : and  perhaps,  in  the  circumstances  of  our  modern  Uni- 
versities, this,  of  all  academical  exercises,  is  the  one  most  gene- 
rally useful ; provided  it  be  fully  and  fairly  carried  out — which 
it  rarely  if  ever  is. — In  the  first  place,  it  affords  a good,  if  not, 
indeed,  the  best  of  fields,  in  which  emulation  may  be  exerted  ; 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


693 


but  the  condition  of  this  exertion  is  that  the  competitors  he  keen. 
Keen  however  they  will  be,  if  the  examination  be  regular,  fre- 
quent, and  well  conducted — if  their  own  number  be  large,  and 
the  individuals  not  too  unequal — finally,  if  the  competition  be 
public,  and  the  accruing  honor  signal.  Examination  is  thus  in- 
incompatible with  inertion. — In  the  second  place,  it  constrains  to 
accurate,  minute,  and  comprehensive  study — in  a word,  secures 
the  knowledge  of  a subject,  in  whole  and  in  part,  in  itself  and  in 
its  relations  ; (a  repetition  of  the  words,  either  of  the  book  read 
or  of  the  lecture  heard,  should,  of  course,  be  disallowed).  It  thus 
calls  out  self  activity,  and  requiring  clear  and  distinct  thinking, 
both  in  examiner  and  examinee,  counteracts  the  prevailing  pesti- 
lence of  slovenly,  desultory,  effeminate  reading. — In  the  third 
place,  it  educates  to  presence  of  mind. — In  the  fourth , to  prompt 
and  precise  expression. — In  the  fifth,  it  abates  conceit,  and  con- 
vinces of  deficiency. — In  the  sixth,  it  impressively  teaches,  even 
the  mere  auditor. 

Examination  can  be  realized  in  two  forms — forms  which  may, 
indeed,  should  be  combined.  For  it  is — 1°  oral ; 2°  in  writing 


1 The  following  is  a very  compendious  abridgment  of  what  Melanchthon  says  in 
praise  of  academical  Examinations,  in  his  Declamation  De  Studiis  Adolescentum 
(15291)  The  whole  oration  is  well  worthy  of  perusal  : it  will  be  found  in  his  Decla- 
mationes,  t.  i.,  p.  486  ; in  the  Selects;  Declamationes,  t.  i.,  p.  465  sq.  ; in  the  Corpus 
Reformatorum,  vol.  xi.  p.  181  ; and  in  other  collections. — “No  academical  exercise 
can  be  more  useful  than  that  of  Examination.  It  whets  the  desire  of  learning,  it  en- 
hances the  solicitude  of  study,  while  it  animates  the  attention  to  whatever  is  taught. 
Every  student  is  alarmed,  lest  aught  should  escape  him  which  it  behooves  him  to  ob- 
serve. This  anxiety  incites  him  also  to  canvass  every  thing  with  accuracy,  knowing 
that  he  must  fully  and  perspicuously  explain  his  understanding  of  each  several  doc- 
trine. In  this  fear,  is  found  the  strongest  stimulus  to  the  labor  of  learning  ; without 
it,  study  subsides  into  a cold,  sleepy,  lifeless  formality.  What  we  have  only  heard  or 
read,  come  to  us  like  the  shadows  of  a dream,  and  like  the  shadows  of  a dream,  depart ; 
but  all  that  we  elaborate  for  ourselves  become  part  and  parcel  of  our  intellectual  pos- 
sessions. But  this  elaboration  is  forced  upon  us  by  examination  ; examination,  there- 
fore, may  be  called  the  life  of  studies,  without  which  reading,  and  even  meditation,  is 
dead. — Against  prejudice  and  error,  there  is  no  surer  antidote  than  examination  ; for 
by  this  the  intellect  is  explored,  its  wants  detected  and  supplied,  its  faults  and  failings 
corrected. — Examination,  likewise,  fosters  facility  of  expression,  counteracts  pertur- 
bation and  confusion,  inures  to  coolness  and  promptitude  of  thought. — Not  less  useful 
is  examination  in  restraining  the  course  of  juvenile  study  within  legitimate  bounda- 
ries. Nothing  is  more  hurtful,  as  nothing  is  more  common,  than  vague  and  tumultu- 
ary reading,  which  inflates  with  the  persuasion,  without  conferring  the  reality,  of  eru- 
dition. Wherefore,  if  examination,  brought  no  other  advantage  than  that  it  counter- 
acts the  two  greatest  pests  of  education,  found,  indeed,  usually  combined,  sloth,  to  wit, 
and  arrogance  ; — for  this  reason  alone  should  examination  be  cherished  in  our  Univer- 
sities. Against  sloth  there  is  no  goad  sharper  or  more  efficacious  than  ‘examination ; 
and  as  to  arrogance,  examination  is  the  very  school  of  humility  and  improvement. 
By  no  other  discipline  is  a soaring  conceit  so  effectually  taken  down  ; and  this  is  the 
reason,  why  self-satisfied  pretenders  ever  fly  examination,  while  those  who  think  less 


696 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

2.  Disputation. — This  exercise  is  now  obsolete,  in  fact,  through- 
out our  British  Universities,  and  has  only  a very  partial  and  pre- 
carious existence  in  any  other.  Disputation  is,  however,  in  a 
certain  sort,  the  condition  of  all  improvement.  In  the  mental  as 
in  the  material  world,  action  and  reaction  are  ever  in  proportion ; 
and  Plutarch  well  observes,  that  as  motion  would  cease,  were  con- 
tention taken  out  of  the  physical  universe,  so  all  human  progress 
would  cease,  were  contention  taken  out  of  the  moral.  Academical 
disputation,  in  fact,  requiring  calls  out,  and  calling  out  educates 

of  the  little  that  they  know,  than  of  the  much  that  they  know  not,  resort  to  it  as  the 
most  efficacious  mean  of  improvement.” 

The  subject  of  academical  Examination  is  also  treated  well  and  at  great  length  by 
a distinguished  contemporary  of  Melanchthon,  the  Flemish  theologian  Hyperius,  but 
with  more  especial  reference  to  his  professional  department.  See  his  Opuscula  Theo- 
logica  (1570),  pp.  364-436.  After  these  older  authorities  in  favor  of  examination, 
independently  of  its  manifest  utility,  it  may  surprise  us,  that  this  exercise  has,  it  may 
be  roundly  averred,  been  long  obsolete  in  the  Protestant  Universities  of  the  Empire  ; 
for  the  “ Examinatoria ,”  occasionally  and  privately  opened  by  individual  professors,  to 
such  students  as  may  choose  to  attend,  are  not  worthy  of  being  mentioned  as  excep- 
tions. It  is  not,  however,  difficult  to  explain  the  want ; though  Holland,  and  there- 
after Germany,  are  the  countries,  where  learning  has  long  flourished  most  unexclu- 
sively  in  all  its  departments,  and  the  Universities  comprised  the  largest  complement 
of  the  most  learned  men.  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  excellence  of  their  academical 
patronage,  supplying  the  Universities  with  the  highest  quality  of  erudition,  a course 
of  professorial  lectures  afforded  to  the  student  instruction,  better  probably  than  the  best 
publication  upon  the  subject.  These  lectures,  therefore,  afforded  what  could  not  other- 
wise be  so  well  obtained  ; and  though  merely  teaching,  the  University  was  not  super- 
fluous— as  elsewhere. — But  in  the  second  place,  what  is  of  far  more  importance,  there 
was,  in  general,  no  compulsion  of  attendance  on  any  one  academical  course.  In  Ger- 
many, a professor  had  no  monopoly  of  subject ; he  could  lecture  on  any  branch  be- 
longing to  his  faculty,  though  that  had  been  previously  selected  by  a colleague  ; and 
the  same  could  every  other  professor,  ordinary  or  extraordinary,  indeed  any  qualified 
graduate  of  the  faculty,  do  by  him  : indeed  no  exclusive  privilege  was  accorded  to 
any  course.  In  these  circumstances,  there  being  no  compulsion  on  attendance,  exam- 
ination could  not  be  enforced  ; while,  contemned  by  professors,  and  not  desired  by 
students,  it  naturally  fell  into  desuetude.  It  was  even  opposed,  and  that  on  high  au- 
thority, as  contrary  to  academic  liberty.— In  the  third  place,  it  was  less  required  in 
Germany  than  in  other  countries  ; for,  to  say  nothing  of  other  causes,  literary  merit 
being  there  always  secure  of  promotion,  and  no  literary  merit  there  taken  upon  trust, 
the  result  was  (in  the  words  of  a celebrated  professor  of  Goettingen),  that  “ the  indus- 
try of  the  German  students  was  so  great,  that  it  became  more  requisite  to  restrain 
them  from  over-work,  than  to  excite  them  to  a profitable  employment  of  their  time,” 
&c. — (Meiners,  kurze  Darstellung  - - d.  Goettingen  (1808),  p.  36.) 

Still,  the  want  of  examination  in  the  German  Universities  was  felt  by  intelligent 
writers  on  the  theory  of  education  ; and  beside  the  incidental  testimonies  in  approval 
of  the  exercise,  to  be  found  in  the  treatises  on  academical  instruction  by  Fichte, 
Schlciermacher,  Tittmann,  and  others,  its  restoration  was  in  1825  formally  argued  by 
the  celebrated  Professor  Eichsta;dt  of  Jena,  in  two  solemn  addresses  to  the  University, 
in  his  capacity  of  Programmatarius,  or  Public  Orator,  entitled — “ Be  Examinibus  in 
Academias  Revocandis.”  But  Eichstcedt  was  not  peculiarly  qualified  for  the  work; 
and  had  he  merely  reprinted  the  Declamation  of  Melanchthon,  of  which,  however,  he 
was  unaware,  he  would  have  done  more  toward  the  result  for  which  he  contended, 
than  by  his  own  eloquence  in  its  commendation. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


697 


to,  the  most  important  intellectual  virtues  ; — to  presence  of  mind, 
to  dominion  over  our  faculties,  to  promptitude  of  recollection  and 
of  thought,  and  withal,  though  animating  emulation,  to  a perfect 
command  of  temper.  It  stimulates  also  to  a more  attentive  and 
profounder  study  of  the  matters  to  he  thus  discussed ; it  more 
deeply  impresses  the  facts  and  doctrines  taught  upon  the  mind ; 
and,  finally,  what  is  of  peculiar  importance,  and  peculiarly  ac- 
complished by  rightly  regulated  disputation,  it  checks  all  tendency 
toward  irrelevancy  and  disorder  in  statement,  by  astricting  the 
disputants  to  a pertinent  and  precise  and  logically  predetermined 
order  of  the  evolution  of  their  reasonings.  Accordingly,  in  the 
best  of  the  older  Universities  (as  in  Louvain),  nothing  was  taught 
by  prelection  in  the  fundamental  faculty,  which  was  not  also  gone 
over  in  the  exercises  of  disputation  and  examination.1 

1 The  greatest  contrast  between  the  older  education  afforded  in  the  Universities  and 
the  more  modem,  is  perhaps  displayed  in  regard  to  the  exercise  of  Disputation  ; and, 
assuredly,  the  comparison  is  not  in  favor  of  the  latter. — -Before  the  invention  of  print- 
ing, Universities  were  useful,  nay  indispensable,  as  organs  of  publication  and  learned 
intercourse.  They  were  comparatively  few  in  number  ; spoke  one  learned  language  ; 
professed  a common  faith;  the  crowds  whom  they  attracted  from  the  most  distant 
countries  were  immense  ; and  one  academical  teacher  might  then  dispense  to  hundreds, 
it  might  be  to  thousands,  the  information  of  which,  except  in  such  a literary  centre, 
they  could  hardly  have  become  aware.  Yet  these  same  schools  justly  considered  their 
function  of  prelection  as  in  importance  greatly  inferior  to  their  function  of  exercise; 
and  among  the  exercises  which  they  sedulously  inforced,  that  of  disputation,  regular 
and  frequent,  was  the  principal.  With  this,  indeed,  no  other  academical  act  was  per- 
mitted to  interfere.  During  the  seasons  of  disputation  all  other  instruction  was  sus- 
pended ; and  every  mean  employed  to  secure  an  auditory  the  most  numerous. — On  the 
other  hand,  since  the  art  of  printing  has  totally  superseded  the  Universities,  as  instru- 
ments of  publication  ; and  since  their  indefinite  multiplication  in  every  country,  the 
divisions  of  religion,  the  introduction  of  the  vernacular,  combined,  in  general,  with  ex- 
clusive privileges  to  individual  chairs,  and  vicious  systems  of  appointment  to  these 
chairs  themselves,  have  reduced  Universities,  from  cosmopolite  and  catholic,  to  local 
and  sectarian  schools,  schools  likewise  often  monopolizing  instruction,  but  with  in- 
structors comparatively  inferior  both  in  ability  and  learning  : strange  to  say,  the  whole 
function  of  a University  is  now,  for  the  most  part,  concentrated  in  the  useless  office  of 
communicating  information  ; that  is,  the  academical  teacher  or  professor  reads  to  Ilia 
auditors  a course  of  lectures  upon  subjects  which  they,  with  far  greater  convenience, 
might  study  for  themselves  in  books — -lectures,  too,  which  were  they  ever  printed,  no 
one  would  probably  ever  dream  of  reading  ; while  disputation  (if  not  every  other  ex- 
ercise), which  public  seminaries  alone  can  realize,  is  utterly  abandoned  and  even  un- 
known.— Thus  the  Universities,  of  old,  ably  and  faithfully  discharged  their  higher  and 
their  lower  duties  ; whereas  of  late,  they  attempt,  too  frequently,  only  what  is  of  least 
importance,  and  attempt  this  minor  duty,  only  through  inefficient  means. — But  could 
disputation,  the  practical  exercise  of  reasoning,  be  again  restored  (of  course,  in  the 
vernacular  of  the  disputants,  and  perhaps  less  limited,  than  of  old,  to  mere  logical  form) 
I have  no  doubt  that  it  would  constitute  an  era  in  academical  efficiency.  Lord  Bacon 
has  indeed  recommended  this.  For  while  testifying,  that  the  practice  of  disputation 
renders  the  mind  prompt  and  all-sided,  he  proposes  the  establishment  of  what  he  calls 
a College  of  Controversies.  By  such  an  institution  would  be  obtained  all  the  advant- 
ages of  a Debating  Society,  but  with  others  of  the  highest  importance,  which  are 


698 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


3.  Re])etition. — As  the  end  of  study,  is  not  merely  to  compass 
the  knowledge  of  facts,  but  in  and  from  that  knowledge  to  lay  up 

hereby  not  supplied ; at  the  same  time  the  serious  disadvantages  would  be  corrected, 
which  adhere  to  the  practice  of  dabate,  when  not  under  logical  regulation  and  intelli- 
gent control.  (In  a professional  education  for  the  bar,  an  institute  for  practice,  under 
a competent  professor,  in  which  all  the  steps  of  a legal  process  should,  by  the  students 
themselves,  be  regularly  gone  through  from  first  to  last,  and  in  concrete  examples  of 
every  variety  of  action — this  would  inure  them  to  oral  and  written  pleading  before 
commencing  practice,  and  compendiously  supply,  what  can  not  now  be  obtained  at  all 
from  books  or  lectures,  and  to  obtain  which,  however  inadequately,  months  and  years 
arc  often  spent  in  an  attorney’s  or  writer’s  office — a knowledge  of  form.) 

As  it  is,  indeed,  and  out  of  school,  all  profitable  study  is  a silent  disputation — an 
intellectual  gymnastic  ; and  the  most  improving  books  are  pre'welv  those  which  most 
excite  the  reader — to  understand  the  author,  to  supply  what  he  h...  mitted,  and  to  can- 
vass his  facts  and  reasonings.  To  read  passively,  to  learn — is,  In  reality,  not  to  learn  at 
all.  In  study,  implicit  faith,  belief  upon  authority,  is  worse  even  than,  for  a time, 
erroneous  speculation.  To  read  profitably,  we  should  read  the  authors,  not  most  in 
unison  with,  but  most  adverse  to,  our  opinions  ; for  whatever  may  be  the  case  in  the 
cure  of  bodies,  enantiopathy  and  not  homoeopathy,  is  the  true  medicine  of  minds.  Ac- 
cordingly such  sciences  and  such  authors,  as  present  only  unquestionable  truths, 
determining  a minimum  of  self-activity  in  the  student,  are  in  a rational  education,  sub- 
jectively, naught.  Those  sciences  and  authors,  on  the  contrary,  as  constrain  the 
student  to  independent  thought,  are,  whatever  be  their  objective  certainty,  subjectively, 
educationally,  best. — In  this  respect,  no  writer  is  to  be  compared  with  Aristotle.  For 
while  his  doctrine  is,  on  every  point,  pre-eminently  worth  the  knowing,  still  it  is  never 
to  be  adequately  known,  without  considerable  effort.  He  condenses  always  the  most 
meaning  in  the  fewest  words  ; he  omits  whatever  may  by  attention  be  supplied  ; he  can, 
in  fact,  only  be  rightly  understood,  or  intelligently  admired,  by  a reader,  who  is  familiar 
with  his  writings  as  a whole,  and  not  unable  to  wrestle  with  the  writer.  Add  to  this, 
that  the  philosopher  is  an  ancient ; and  the  ancient  associations  of  thought  and 
language  are  so  different  from  the  modern,  that  their  study  necessarily  educates  the 
mind  to  a liberal  expansion,  in  emancipating  it  from  those  fetters  which  the  accidental 
custom  of  time  and  country  would  otherwise  impose. — But  what  renders  the  study  of 
Aristotle  so  peculiarly  profitable  for  the  more  advanced  student,  renders  the  Aristotelic 
works  no  less  improper  as  a primary  exercise  of  thought ; nor  would  it,  in  fact,  be 
more  absurd  to  inflict  the  food  and  exercise  of  Milo  on  the  tyro  athlete,  than  to  intro- 
duce an  unpracticed  thinker  to  philosophy,  through  the  speculations  of  the  Stagirite. 
An  Alma  Mater  should  consider,  with  the  Apostle,  that  its  alumni  at  first  “ have  need 
of  milk,  and  not  of  strong  meat ; but  that  strong  meat  belongeth  to  them  as  are  of 
perfect  age,  and  exercised  to  discern  both  good  and  evil.” 

Of  authorities  in  commendation  of  this  exercise  there  need  be  no  end.  I shall  quote 
only  one,  but  he  one  of  the  highest ; — the  elder  Scaliger.  “Vives  says — ‘ We  profit 
more  by  silent  meditation  than  by  dispute.’  This  is  not  true.  For,  as  from  the 
collision  of  stones  [light],  so  from  the  collision  of  minds  truth,  is  struck  out.  I myself 
am  an  example.  For  often  do  I meditate  alone,  long,  and  intently;  but  without  an 
antagonist — unless  I fight,  all  is  in  vain.  A master  indeed  excites  us  to  higher  activity 
[than  a book] ; but  an  opponent,  be  it  by  his  obstinacy,  be  it  by  his  wisdom,  is  to  me 
twice  a master.”  The  words  of  Vives  show,  in  what  limitation  this  illustrious  thinker 
meant  his  doctrine  to  be  understood.  “ But  in  the  sciences  of  contemplation,  for  medi- 
tation and  exercise,  we  have  silent  thought  and  a pondering  of  the  counter  reasons  ; 
thus  do  we  penetrate  more  deeply  into  the  knowledge  of  a thing,  than  by  dispute  or 
altercation,  which  more  frequently  confuses  than  sharpens  the  judgment.”  Both  are 
right,  and  both  their  recommendations  should  be  conjoined.  Vives  proposes  one  sort 
of  intellectual  effort,  for  one  sort  of  science  ; Scaliger,  too  exclusively,  perhaps,  pro- 
poses another,  for  all  sciences,  and,  from  his  own  personality,  for  all  men.  For,  socth 
to  say,  the  Prince  of  Verona  in  his  pride,  and  pride  of  strength,  was  somewhat  of  the 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


699 


materials  for  speculation ; so  it  is  not  the  quantity  read,  but 
the  degree  of  reading,  which  affords  a profitable  exercise  to  the 
student.  Thus  it  is  far  more  improving  to  read  one  (good)  book 
ten  times,  than  to  read  ten  (good)  books  once ; and  “ non  multa 
sed  multum ,”  little  perhaps,  but  accurate,  has,  from  ancient  times, 
obtained  the  authority  of  an  axiom  in  education,  from  all  who 
had  any  title  to  express  an  opinion  on  the  subject.  “ He  who 
lives  every  where  is  at  home  no  where  the  friend  of  all  is  the 
friend  of  none ; nor  is  there,  intellectually,  a more  contemptible 
character,  than  a Margites,  “ in  omnibus  aliquid,  in  toto  nihil.” 
And,  as  they  are  not  the  healthiest,  who  eat  the  most,  but  who 
digest  the  best ; so,  a University,  as  an  intellectual  gymnasium, 
should  consider,  that  its  “ mental  dietetic”  is  tonic,  not  repletory 
— that  its  function  is  not  to  surfeit,  but  to  stimulate,  curiosity — 
not  to  pour  in  a maximum  of  information,  but  through  its  inform- 
ation (be  it  much  or  little),  to  draw  forth  a maximum  of  thought. 
He,  therefore,  who  reads — to  remember,  does  well ; to  under- 
stand, does  better  ; but  to  judge,  does  best. — Nor  did  the  Univer- 
sities of  old  repudiate  the  principle  ; and  the  academical  distinc- 
tion of  Lectio  Cnrsoria  and  Lectio  Stataria  would,  were  it  ex- 
plained, show  that,  in  them,  theory  and  practice  were  in  unison.* 1 

Our  modern  stand,  however,  in  this  respect  signally  contrasted 
with  our  ancient,  schools.  For  if,  in  theory,  all  authorities  be  at 
one,  in  regard  to  the  importance  of  this  principle ; how  few  are 
now  the  Universities  which  carry  it  out  fairly  into  practice  ? 
Nay,  even  in  some  of  them,  where  it  is  not  actually  violated,  the 
usage  has  been  accidentally  determined — less  by  enlightened 
views,  than  by  the  convenience  of  their  teachers. 


literary  gladiator.  His  great  work  is,  indeed,  purely  polemical : yet  how  many  subtle 
thoughts  and  important  truths,  all  admirably  expressed,  does  not  this,  as  indeed  all  the 
writings  of  that  extraordinary  genius,  contain,  amid  a mass,  it  may  be  allowed,  of  now 
uninteresting  matters  1 

1 The  older  Universities,  and  particularly  Louvain,  constrained  Repetition  (recapit- 
ulation, revisal)  by  statute.  See,  among  others  Vernulaeus,  p.  281 — Wvttenbach 
(Praef.  ad  Eel.  Hist.  p.  xxix.)  notices,  that  the  wisdom  of  our  ancestors  had  destined 
vacations,  not  only  for  the  health  and  recreation  of  student  and  professor,  but  princi- 
pally “ ad  repetitionem  instaurationemque  studiorum. — Hasc  feriata  repetitio,  ut  per 
otium  et  minorem  festinationem  facta,  plurimum  valet  ad  interiorem  intelligentiam ; 
plurimum  habet  et  voluptatis  continua  progressuum  animadversione,  et  incitamenti  ad 
studii  laborisque  constantiam.” — In  Goettingen,  and  some  other  German  Universities, 
there  is  an  order  of  inferior  academical  instructors,  whose  competency  is  guaranteed 
by  public  appointment ; they  are  called  Repetents,  and  go  over  with  the  students  the 
professorial  lectures.  But  there  the  professorial  lectures  are  worth  that  trouble  ; and 
the  Repetents  supply  in  part,  but  only  in  part,  the  want  of  public  examination,  &c. 


TOO  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

Independently,  also,  of  its  intrinsic  importance,  as  a fundamen- 
tal maxim  of  education,  the  principle  acquires  a relative  import- 
ance, as  a prophylactic  against  the  pernicious  influence  of  the 
world  in  after  life.  In  this  respect,  more  especially,  holds  good 
— “ Non  scholse,  sed  vitae,  discendum.”  For  in  the  bustle  of  life, 
few  are  able  to  realize  what  they  may  deem  the  best ; and  all  of 
us  are,  more  or  less,  seduced  into  the  knowledge  of  a thousand 
things,  tending  only  to  amuse,  tending  only  to  distract  and  dissi- 
pate the  mind.  Superficiality  (better  expressed  by  the  Greek 
nu\v7rpa<yfjLocrvvr],  by  the  German  Vielwisserey),  is,  in  the  world, 
indeed,  the  order  of  the  day.  Ours  is  emphatically  “ the  reading 
age  and  the  many  are  now  sure  to  accord  their  admiration, 
not  to  the  scholar  who  really  knows  the  best,  but  to  the  sciolist, 
who  apparently  knows  the  most.  To  counteract  this  hapless 
tendency,  there  is  nothing  but  a good  education — a sound  erudi- 
tion ; but  as  these  are  now  unfortunately,  in  this  island  espe- 
cially, at  a sorry  pass,  with  all  our  information,  so  various  and 
so  vast,  we  stand,  as  individuals,  intellectual  dwarfs,  in  contrast 
to  the  giants — the  ignorant,  but  thinking,  giants  of  antiquity. 
“ Cuncta  nihilque  sumus.”  (See  p.  46.) 

4.  Written  Composition. — By  this  is  understood  an  ordinary 
exercise  in  the  course  of  academical  instruction,  and  is  either 
combined  with,  or  apart  from,  oral  examination.  As  an  im- 
proving effort,  both  of  thought  and  its  expression,  writing  has 
generally  been  commended.  It  is  unnecessary,  therefore,  to  dwell 
upon  its  uses.  But  to  become  fully  and  certainly  profitable,  it  is 
astricted  to  conditions. — 1°.  The  writing  should  be  more  or  less 
limited,  that  is,  be  in  answer  to  questions,  more  or  less  articulate. 
The  student  should  not  be  left  to  roam  at  large  ; but  be  made  to 
think  precisely  and  pertinently,  by  confining  him  to  certain  defin- 
ite points. — 2°.  The  composition  should  be  strictly  and  intelli- 
gently criticised. — 3°.  It  should  be  read,  at  least  written  with 
the  hope  of  being  read,  before  a large  auditory ; and  according 
to  its  merits,  it  should  obtain  immediate  approbation,  and  co-op- 
erate toward  ultimate  honor. 

5.  Teaching , in  order  to  learn. — The  older  Universities,  all 
of  them,  regarded  the  exercise  of  teaching  as  a necessary  con- 
dition of  a perfect  knowledge ; in  recent  times,  the  Universities 
have,  with  equal  unanimity,  neglected  this.  Yet  there  can  be 
no  doubt,  I think,  of  the  superior  wisdom  of  the  more  ancient 
practice.  For  teaching,  like  “ the  quality  of  mercy,  is  twice 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


701 


blessed ; it  blessetli  him  that  gives  and  him  that  takes.”  At 
present,  we,  of  course,  consider  teaching,  only  in  the  former  re- 
lation— only  as  the  instruction  of  others,  is,  itself,  an  instruction 
of  ourselves. — We  have  already  seen  ( Second  end,  p.  691),  that 
no  one  can  rightly  teach,  who  is  not  fully  cognizant  of  the  matter 
to  he  taught.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  preparation  for,  and 
the  very  process  of,  instruction,  react  most  beneficially  on  the 
knowledge  of  the  instructor — if  the  instructor  be  what  (intellec- 
tually and  morally)  he  ought.  If  so : Teaching  constrains  him 
to  a clear  and  distinct  consciousness  of  his  subject,  in  its  several 
bearings,  internal  and  external ; it  brings  to  his  observation,  any 
want  or  obscurity,  lurking  in  his  comprehension  of  it  as  a whole ; 
and  urges  him  to  master  any  difficulty,  the  solution  of  which  he 
may  have  previously  adjourned.  The  necessity  of  answering  the 
interrogations  of  others  compels  him,  in  fact,  to  interrogate  and 
to  answer  himself.  In  short,  what  he  had  learned  synthetically, 
he  is  now  obliged,  for  the  inverse  process  of  instruction,  to  study 
analytically.  But  a combination  of  analysis  and  synthesis  is 
the  condition  of  a perfect  knowledge,  and  as  to  a perfect  knowl- 
edge— 

“ Quodque  parum  novit,  nemo  docere  potest.” 

This,  however,  as  has  been  said,  supposes,  that  he  who  prac- 
tices instruction,  has  the  requisite  talents  and  dispositions.  If 
its  conditions  be  not  performed,  what  is  called  (but  is  not  real) 
instruction,  is  not  an  improving  act,  in  either  relation.  It  is,  at 
best,  a mechanical  effort ; a mere  pouring  out  of  what  had  been 
previously  poured  in.  And  yet,  too  many,  even  of  our  academi- 
cal instructors,  are  no  better.  Professing  to  teach,  teaching  is 
for  them  no  self-improving  process ; and  as  to  their  pupils — “Ils 
siffleront  de  jeunes  Perroquets,  comme  ils  ont  ete  siffie  eux- 
memes,  lorsqu’ils  apprirent  a devenir  Perroquets.” 

Nor  must  it  be  supposed,  that  the  older  Universities,  though 
enjoining,  nay,  even  enforcing,  the  practice  of  instruction,  as  a 
mean  of  learning,  abandoned  the  higher  academical  teaching  to 
the  prelusive  efforts  of  these  student-doctors.  On  this,  the  mon- 
ostich  of  Dionysius  Cato  states  their  precept  and  their  practice : 

“Disce,  sed  a doctis  ; indoctos  ipse  doceto.”1 

1 I have  already  (pp.  388,  441.  442)  stated,  how  Universities  as  they  arose  and 
flourished,  during  the  middle  ages,  made  instruction,  by  the  learner,  a necessary  ex- 
ercise toward  a more  perfect  learning.  Every  Bachelor,  or  incomplete  graduate,  was 
required,  in  arder  to  qualify  him  for  the  higher  degree,  to  teach  certain  books  or  sub- 


702 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

6.  Conversation  with,  interrogation  of,  the  learned. — This 
may  be  reduced  to  the  head,  either  of  exercise  by  the  taught,  or 
of  instruction  by  the  teacher.  More  properly,  however,  to  the 


jects  ; and  every  Master  or  Doctor  was  compelled  by  statute,  and  frequently  on  oath, 
to  teach  ( rcgerc , regere  scholas),  for  a certain  period,  which  was  commonly  two  years, 
immediately  subsequent  to  graduation.  During  that  period  of  compulsory  prelection, 
he  was  said  to  be — neccssaric  regens ; thereafter,  if  he  chose  to  exercise  his  right  of 
lecturing  publicly,  or  in  the  University,  he  was  styled — regens  ail  placitum.  Important 
academical  privileges  were,  usually,  accorded  to  the  Regents ; and  to  them  was,  more 
or  less,  intrusted  the  ordinary  government  of  the  University.  In  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge, the  distinction  of  the  two  Academical  Houses  (the  Congregation  and  Convo- 
cation of  the  former,  the  Regent  and  Non-Regent  Houses  of  the  latter),  is  founded 
upon  the  distinction  of  regent  and  non-regent ; the  signification  of  these  terms  had, 
however,  for  at  least  a century  and  a half,  been,  in  these  venerable  schools,  confess- 
edly forgotten.  (P.  442.)  But  in  the  English  Universities,  though,  by  statute,  en- 
titled publicly  to  teach,  and  though  still  there  actually  a member  of  the  legislative 
and  ruling  body;  the  graduate  would,  if  he  now  attempted  to  exert  it,  be  probably 
denied  his  right  of  lecturing  in  “the  Schools.” — In  the  Universities  of  Germany,  on 
the  contrary,  though  the  graduate  has  there  lost  his  ancient  power  of  academical 
government,  he  still  retains  his  privilege  of  academical  teaching ; for  it  is  only  requi- 
site that  he  should  farther  write,  and  formally  defend,  what  is  called  a “ Dissertatio 
ad  locum,”  to  enable  him  to  lecture  in  the  University,  on  any  subject  within  the 
compass  of  his  faculty,  and  to  have  his  course  or  courses  announced  in  the  public 
“ Series  Prselectionum.”  The  opportunity  thus  afforded  to  all  graduates  of  publicly 
manifesting  their  learning  and  their  ability,  as  teachers,  is,  with  the  admirable  sys- 
tem of  academical  patronage,  a main  cause  of  the  uniform  excellence  of  the  German 
Protestant  Universities,  as  organs  of  information. — In  other  Universities,  though  the 
degree  of  Doctor  or  Master  be,  now  as  of  old,  the  express  conferring  of  a right  aca- 
demically to  teach,  this  right  is,  however,  de  facto , now  universally  of  no  avail. 

During  the  middle  ages  then,  this  exercise  was  justly  regarded  as  of  the  highest 
importance.  The  Pseudo-Boethius  (De  Disciplina  Scholarum,  c.  5 — probably  Thomas 
Cantipratensis,  who,  in  the  first  half  of  the  thirteenth  century,  gives  a curious  de- 
lineation of  the  academical  usages  of  his  time),  speaks  of  this  exercise  as  follows  : — 
“Tertio,  quosdam  habeat  [studiosus  adolescens,]  queis  secreta  doceat  librosque  legal, 
aliisque  rudimentis  informet ; ut  sic,  intellecta  sciat,  scitaque  exprimere  discat,  et 
expressione  frequenti  usum  comparet.  Usus  magisterium  propinat ; alios  namque 
docere,  est  proprite  facultati  indulgere.”  An  account  is  then  given  of  the  modes  by 
which  an  audience  was  secured.  This  one  scholastic  testimony  must  stand  for  all  ; 
since  there  is  no  limit  to  the  mediaeval  authorities  in  commendation  of  the  exercise. 
The  following,  however,  are  a few,  which  recur  to  me,  of  the  many  metrical  forms, 
under  which  the  precept  became  academically  current : 


In  fine  : 


“ Condita  tabescit,  vulgata  scientia  crescit.” 
“Discere  si  quoeris  doceas  ; sic  ipse  doceris: 

Nam  studio  tali  tibi  proficis  atque  sodali.” 

“ Multa  rogare  ; rogata  tenere ; retenta  docere  : 

Haec  tria  discipulum  faciunt  superare  magistrum.” 
“ Disce,  doeeque  alios,  sic  tute  doceberis  ipse ; 

Atque  tua;  solito  certior  artis  eris.” 


Qui  docet,  is  discit ; qui  perdiscit,  docet  ille : 
Doctus  ut  evadas,  suadeo— Disce,  Doce.” 


“ Docendo  discismus”  has  even  subsided  into  an  adage,  not  in  Latin  only.  The 
Italian — “ Insegnando  s’  impara,”  is  an  example. 

From  a remote  antiquity,  however,  all  philosophic  thinkers  concurred  in  the  same 
truth.  “To  teach,”  says  Plato,  “is  the  way  in  which  we  learn  most  and  best.” 
And  while  Plato  may  represent  the  Greeks,  Seneca,  enouncing — “ Homines  dum 
docent  discunt,”  declares  what  he  himself  repeats,  and  what  is  frequently  confirmed 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


703 


former.  For  it  supposes,  both  an  extra  activity  of  the  student 
in  a questioning  of  his  instructor,  and  likewise  an  extra  informa- 
tion thereby  drawn  forth  from  the  instructor,  either  in  the  shape 
of  the  special  solution  of  an  individual’s  difficulties,  or  of  the  spe- 
cial direction  for  an  individual’s  pursuits.  Nothing  can  be  more 
useful  in  a course  of  study,  than  this  privilege  of  interrogating 
those  who  are  able  to  afford  us  satisfaction.  Every  one  who,  by 
his  unaided  efforts,  has  succeeded  in  conquering  any  department 
of  knowledge  out  of  the  ordinary  routine,  knows,  that  he  was 
arrested,  often  long,  by  difficulties  which  could  at  once  have  been 
removed  by  a master  of  the  subject,  either  solving  them  himself, 
or  directing  to  where  their  solution  might  be  found.  He  knows, 
in  short,  that  half  his  labor  might  have  been  profitably  spared. 
“ The  questioning  of  the  wise,”  says  the  Arabian  adage,  “ is  the 
half  of  wisdom;”  and  as  the  German  proverb  expresses  it — “Mit 
fragen  wird  mann  weiss.”  “ Multa  rogare,”  &c.,  has  been  al- 
ready quoted  as  an  academical  brocard. — (P.  702.)  Accordingly, 
it  has  been  the  aim  of  every  competent  University,  to  supply  the 
alumnus  with  such  assistance.  Hence  the  Conversatoria  of  the 
German  schools  ; and  in  Oxford,  when  the  education  was  still 
common,  public,  and  legal,  we  have  the  following  retained  among 
the  Caroline  Statutes  “ Moreover,  at  the  end  of  Lecture,  the 
several  Professors  shall  tarry  for  a time  in  the  Schools  : and  if 
any  scholar  or  hearer  wish  to  argue  against  what  they  have 
advanced  in  lecturing,  or  may  otherwise  have  any  doubt,  they 
shall  listen  to  him  with  kindness,  and  satisfy  the  difficulties  and 
questions  proposed  to  them.” — (T.  iv.,  S.  ii.,  § 4.) 

7.  Social  Study. — We  are  social  animals.  “ Man  is  the  sweet- 
est thing  to  man  he  is  happier  in  company  ; and  in  company 
his  memory  and  understanding  are  more  alert.  He,  therefore, 
ofljen  studies  better,  when  he  does  not  study  alone.  It  is  an  ap- 
ophthegm of  Hebrew  wisdom  : — “ Obtain  for  thyself  a preceptor 
from  whom  thou  may’st  learn,  and  a companion  with  whom  thou 


by  the  other  philosophers  of  Rome. — Again,  Clement  of  Alexandria  may  stand  a 
guarantee  for  the  Christian  fathers  : — “ The  teacher  adds  to  his  learning,  and  is  fre- 
quently a fellow  disciple  with  those  whom  he  instructs.” — Finally,  since  the  revival 
of  letters  the  same  unanimity  of  opinion  is  manifest.  For  passing  over  the  exagger- 
ation of  those  who,  like  Ringelberg,  would  elevate  this  exercise  into  a one  exclusive 
mean  of  education,  all  authority  acquiesces  in  the  more  temperate  conclusion  of 
Vives  : — “ Idcirco,  nihil  est  ad  magnam  eruditionem  perinde  conducens,  ut  docere.” 
And  to  terminate  with  the  testimony  of  a learned  Oxford  pralector,  logician,  and 
divine ; Bishop  Sanderson  used  to  say  “ I have  learned  much  from  my  master, 
more  from  my  equals,  but  most  of  all  from  my  disciples.” 


704  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

may’st  study.”  It  is,  in  fact,  as  conforming  to  this  requisite  of 
our  human  nature,  that  those  Universities  which  compel  their 
alumni  to  live  in  common,  can  best  vindicate  the  utility  of  aca- 
demical Houses  ; for,  in  the  community  of  a college  life,  the  social 
conditions  of  study  are  most  fully  and  certainly  supplied.  In  a 
college,  especially  in  a college  not  too  small,  each  pupil  may  select 
a companionship  of  study,  conformed  to  his  wants,  in  numbers, 
age,  ability  and  pursuit — a society,  of  which  the  members  are 
able  to  assist  and  encourage  each  other,  by  a community  of  labor, 
and  by  a sympathy  or  fellowship  in  feeling — “ av^cjuXoa-ocpelv, 
(Tv/u^ikoX.o'yeZv,  /cal  a vvev  9 overtake tv.”  Even  Homer,  after  noticing 
the  suggestive  influence  of  man  on  man,  observes,  “ That  the  lone 
thinker’s  thoughts  come  slight  and  slow.”  To  him,  indeed,  we 
trace  the  origin  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  adage — “ Unus  homo, 
nullus  homo ;” — a truth,  which  propagated  by  Plato,  Aristotle, 
and  subsequent  philosophers,  had  of  old  subsided  into  a common 
maxim  of  academical  education. 

Sixth  end. — A University  is  farther  bound  to  grant  Degrees  to 
those  of  its  alumni  who  have  accomplished  their  academical 
course,  testifying  to  a certain  proficiency  in  their  studies  ; and 
to  this  end,  it  is  also  bound  to  have  them  tried,  by  competent, 
impartial,  and  conscientious  Examiners.  If,  moreover,  the  can- 
didates be  placed — 1°,  in  certain  classes,  according  to  their  amount 
of  learning ; or  2°,  arranged  according  to  their  superiority,  in 
reference  to  each  other  ; or  3°,  what  is  best,  both  these  schemes 
of  classification  be  combined  : — in  this  case,  a high  or  low  rank 
in  the  classification  will  be  regarded  as  an  honor  or  a disgrace, 
and  the  Examination,  especially  if  compulsory,  and  the  candi- 
dates numerous,  becomes  a powerful,  though  not  the  one  suffi- 
cient, mean  of  stimulating  the  activity  of  the  student. 

Seventh  end. — But  besides  the  more  arduous  studies,  whjch 
prepare  for  others,  and  more  powerfully  exercise  the  mind ; and 
besides  the  Instructors  and  Examiners  competent  to  promote 
thinking,  and  to  pitch  high  the  standard  of  intellectual  attain- 
ment : there  is  to  be  considered  another  class  of  sciences,  with 
their  teachers — the  Physical,  to  wit.  These  sciences — easy  and 
attractive  in  themselves,  and,  as  commonly  cultivated  to  some 
extent  at  least,  it  is  even  disgraceful  not  in  some  degree  to  know 
— require  for  their  profitable  study,  in  private,  the  public  exhibi- 
tion of  costly  experiments,  apparatus,  and  collected  objects.  This 
exhibition  a University  ought  to  supply ; and,  at  the  same  time, 


OXFORD  AS  TT  MIGHT  EE. 


705 


as  a necessary  concomitant,  a competent  monstrator.  As  amus- 
ing, popular,  and  facile  in  themselves,  these  sciences  need  no 
external  stimulus  ; and  as  not  the  conditions  of  progress,  either 
objective  or  subjective,  it  would  be  even  an  inversion  of  the  prime 
purpose  of  a University,  in  its  general  faculty,  to  apply  it.  In 
these,  all  that  a University  can  safely  require,  is  a certain  amount 
of  proficiency.  Its  honors,  at  least  its  higher  honors,  should  be 
reserved  as  an  encouragement  to  the  more  invigorating  and  fun- 
damental studies  ; hut  which,  as  less  popular,  and  for  a time  more 
irksome,  are,  if  not  externally — if  not  peculiarly  promoted,  sure 
to  be  neglected.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  always  a consider- 
able number,  a majority  even  of  its  alumni,  incapable  of  progress 
in  the  higher  departments,  but  whom  it  is  not  right  in  a Univer- 
sity, as  alma  mater , altogether  to  neglect.  To  these,  who  would 
otherwise  be  left  to  idleness  and  its  consequences,  the  physical 
sciences  present  an  attractive  and  not  an  unimproving  object  of 
occupation.  As  Augustin  says: — “Patiantur  Aquilse  duin  pas- 
cuntur  Columbse.”  The  doves,  however,  should  not  be  tended  to 
the  neglect  of  the  eagles.  To  discover,  and  to  recall  to  unity, 
in  Physics  as  in  Mathematics,  require  inventive  ingenuity  and 
general  ability  ; — though  Bacon  certainly  asserts,  in  commenda- 
tion of  his  method  of  discovery,  that  it  actually  “ levels  the  aris- 
tocracy of  genius.”  But,  in  either,  merely  to  learn  what  has  been 
already  detected  and  detailed,  calls  out,  in  the  student,  the  very 
feeblest  effort  of  thought.  Consequently,  these  studies  tend  the 
least  to  develop  the  understanding : and  even  leave  it,  for  aught 
that  they  thus  effect,  in  a state  of  comparative  weakness  and 
barbarism.  (See  pp.  46-47,  267-312,  318  sq.,  609  sq.,  669  sq.) 
But  as  the  many,  not  incognizant  of  this,  have  no  conception 
even,  of  a higher  cultivation,  the  Universities,  if  conformed  to 
popular  views,  would  be  abased  to  the  very  lowest : 

“ Fallitur  et  fallit,  vulgi  qui  pendet  ab  ore.”  1 


1 There  is  a sort  of  knowledge,  both  interesting  in  itself,  and  deserving  even  to  be 
academically  enforced,  which  ought  to  be  derived  from  books  alone ; being  peculiarly 
inappropriate  for  professorial  instruction,  indeed  for  any  academical  discipline.  I mean 
every  collection  of  results,  which  students,  and  even  professors,  take,  and  must  take, 
only  on  report ; for  these  results,  are  mere  facts,  to  be  passively  believed,  satisfying 
our  curiosity  at  no  expense  of  thought,  and  hardly  even  cultivating  the  memory.  Yet 
such  departments  of  knowledge,  modern  wisdom  has,  in  some  Universities,  established, 
even  as  imperative  courses.  One  sufficing  example  may  be  taken  from  Ethnology ; 
which,  from  the  relation  of  languages,  supplies  us  with  information,  anterior  to  all  his- 
toric record,  touching  the  migration  of  nations,  and  with  the  only  certain  basis,  on 
which  to  divide  and  subdivide  mankind,  according  to  the  affinity  of  race.  This  doc 

Y Y 


706 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C). 

Eighth  end- — But  an  University,  besides  its  exhibitions  for  the 
sciences  of  nature,  ought,  moreover,  to  supply  its  alumni  with  a 
complement  of  books,  selected  in  accommodation  to  their  studies 
and  reasonable  wants,  which  are  by  no  means  unlimited,  and  with 
every  convenience,  which  is  easily  afforded,  for  consultation  and 
reading ; even  though  it  do  not  accord  to  them  the  privilege  of 
taking  the  works  out,  and,  for  a time,  may  deny  them  access  to 
its  more  extensive  libraries. 

Ninth  end. — A University  should  likewise  possess  a competent 
board  of  regulation  and  academical  patronage.  But  the  condi- 
tions of  the  competency  of  such  a board  are — 1°,  that  it  should 
be  responsible , and  fully  conscious  of  its  responsibility  (therefore, 
properly  nominated,  small,  not  transitory,  not  absolute,  and 
sworn) ; 2°,  intelligent  and  well  informed;  and  3°,  as  far  as  pos- 

trine,  most  curious  and  important  in  itself,  is,  as  a result  to  be  taken  upon  trust,  so  limit- 
ed, that  it  may  be  comprised  in  a brief  book — in  fact,  in  a single  table ; whereas,  if 
intelligently  known,  that  is  in  its  grounds,  it  supposes  an  acquaintance  with  some  ten, 
twenty,  fifty — in  truth,  with  above  a hundred  languages  and  dialects.  Now,  to  insti- 
tute a chair,  for  a professor  to  retail  his  second-hand  opinions,  is  sufficiently  foolish  ; 
but  the  lectures  would  be  equally  inept  for  academical  education,  were  the  professor, 
instead  of  speaking  on  the  authority  of  others,  himself  a Mezzofanti  and  a Grimm,  in 
one  ;■ — himself  cognizant  of  all  the  relations  of  all  the  languages  on  which  he  founds  : 
for  the  pupils  would  still  be  only  passive  recipients  of  another’s  dicta,  and  their  com- 
parative philology,  at  least,  would,  at  best,  be  the  philology  of  parrots. 

“ Dico  ego,  tu  dicis,  turn  denique  dicit  et  ille  : 

Dicta  sed  htBc  toties,  nil  nisi  dicta  docent.” 

Ethnology  is  thus  misplaced,  in  being  made  a subject  of  academical  discipline. 
Objectively,  an  important  knowledge,  it  remains,  subjectively,  an  unimproving  mecha- 
nism. How  different  in  its  effect  is  another  philology  ! For  nothing  can  better  exer- 
cise the  mind,  than  a rational  study,  either  of  the  grammar  of  a known  language,  or 
of  universal  grammar,  illustrated  by  the  languages  with  which  a student  is  acquainted. 
Here  every  doctrine  of  the  teacher  may  be  elaborated  by  the  taught.  Yet  this  most 
valuable  science  (an  applied  Logic  and  Psychology),  and  most  profitable  exercise  of 
mind,  is  wholly  neglected  in  our  Universities  ; though,  as  I have  said  before,  and  I 
speak  not  without  experience,  to  compass  Sanctius  and  his  commentators  is  a far  more 
improving  effort  than  to  master  the  Principia  of  Newton. 

In  this  point  of  view,  even  History  is  not  a proper  subject  of  academical  discipline, 
at  least  modern  history,  more  especially  in  the  vernacular,  and  apart  from  the  active 
examination  and  pondering  of  authorities.  For  though  of  great  importance  in  itself, 
mere  historical  reading  does  not  necessarily  call  forth,  exercise,  and  develop  the  higher 
powers  of  thought.  Moreover,  the  field  of  history  is  too  extensive ; and  where,  in  a 
University,  it  is  at  all  adequately  taught,  there  is  hardly  a limit  to  the  historical  courses. 
In  the  German  Universities  (and  in  their  circumstances,  I do  not  say  improperly),  his- 
tory is  made  an  especial  object  of  instruction  ; and,  counting,  I found  that  in  a single 
University,  for  a single  semester,  the  historical  courses  announced  in  the  “ Verzeich- 
niss,"  amounted,  in  all  the  faculties,  to  eighteen.  In  fact,  if  a mere  academical  course 
of  historical  lectures  be  compulsory,  and  not  better  than  the  best  book  upon  the  subject, 
it  is  not  merely  superfluous — it  is  a nuisance.  It  is  most  proper,  however,  in  a Uni- 
versity to  require  for  its  Degree  in  Arts,  a competent  amount  of  historical  reading, 
though  it  do  not  accord  to  such  knowledge  its  higher  honors  ; and  it  should  likewise 
designate  the  most  fitting  books  for  its  examination,  to  the  attention  of  the  student. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


707 


sible,  with  every  motive  for , and  no  motive  against , the  perform- 
ance of  its  duties.  But  on  the  problem — how  to  obtain  such  a 
board  ? I have  already  treated  in  detail.  (See  pp.  345-382). 

Tenth  end. — As  a condition  of  the  second , third , and  ninth 
ends,  it  is  requisite,  that  a University  should  be  able  to  offer  some 
not  inadequate  reward  for  the  ability  and  learning  required  in  its 
instructors.  Ability  and  learning  should  hold  their  value  in  the 
academy  as  in  the  world  ; for  as  Tacitus  expresses  it — “ Sublatis 
studiorum  pretiis,  studia  ipsa  peritura.” 

It  is  not  necessary,  it  is  not,  indeed,  expedient,  that  the  emolu- 
ment of  an  academic  place  should  be  uniform,  by  whomsoever 
filled.  For  thus,  one  individual  would  obtain  comparatively  more, 
another  comparatively  less,  than  he  deserves — Thersites,  in  a 
division  of  the  booty,  would  share  equally  with  Achilles.  Each 
instructor  should,  therefore,  as  far  as  possible,  receive  only  what 
he  equitably  merits,  and  what  he  is  relatively  worth,  his  emolu- 
ments, of  course,  rising  with  his  reputation,  and  as  he  may  ap- 
prove himself  of  greater  value  to  the  institution ; for  the  evils 
are  not  less  from  raising  mediocrity  than  from  depressing  excel- 
lence. This  is  the  principle  fairly  and  fully  acted  on  in  the  Ger- 
man Universities.  Heyne,  the  illustrious  veteran,  drew  ten  times 
the  salary  of  Heyne,  the  promising  junior,  Professor  ; and,  though 
in  these  there  be  not  any  academical  monopoly,  no  one  is  ap- 
pointed to  the  difficult  and  important  office  of  public  instructor 
who  has  not  publicly  manifested  his  competence  to  instruct.  In 
this  island  all  is  the  reverse.  We  pamper  ignorance,  and  starve 
learning.  An  income  permanent,  and  nearly  determinate,  is  con- 
nected with  each  academical  place ; to  this  place,  comparative 
merit  with  no  certainty  regulates  the  appointment ; and  the  most 
lucrative  places  are  in  general,  those  opened  to  the  commonest 
qualifications.  With  us,  Thersites  obtains  a far  larger  -share  of 
the  booty  than  Achilles. 

The  English  Universities  are  called  the  wealthiest  in  Europe; 
and  so  they  are — but  not  as  educational  establishments.  No 
other  Universities  possess  such  mighty  means  ; but  in  none  are 
the  means  so  unprofitably  expended — expended,  in  fact,  seldom  in 
favor  of  learning  and  education,  but  frequently,  nay  generally, 
in  counteraction.  Of  this  deficiency  Lord  Bacon  was  well  aware. 
For  though,  in  his  time,  the  University  still  educated,  its  chairs, 
or  public  readerships,  were  most  inadequately  remunerated ; so 
that  the  world  and  the  professions  abstracted,  then  as  now,  the 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


708 

talent  which  found  no  appropriate  recompense  in  either  “ seat  of 
learning.”  Bacon  has  thrice  solemnly  addressed  the  Crown,  and 
the  Nation,  on  this  want ; — in  The  Advancement  of  Learning , 
in  the  De  Augmentis  Scie?itiarum,  and  in  the  Advice  about  the 
Charterhouse.  These  testimonies  are  substantially  the  same ; 
and  in  the  following  extract  (besides  emending  the  quotations),  I 
have  inserted  from  the  second  and  third,  what  is  not  contained  in 
the  first,  and  somewhat  condensed  the  whole. 

“ And  because  founders  of  Colleges  do  plant,  and  founders  of  Lectures 
do  water,  it  followeth  well  in  order,  to  speak  of  the  defect  which  is  in 
public  Lecttires.  Namely,  in  the  smallness  and  meanness  of  the  salary 
which  in  most  places  ( especially  among  us),  is  assigned  unto  them, 
whether  they  he  lectures  of  [the  liberal]  Arts,  or  of  Professions.  It  hath 
been  my  ancient  opinion  and  observation,  that  in  the  Universities  of  this 
realm,  which  I take  to  be  of  the  best  endowed  Universities  of  Europe, 
there  is  nothing  more  ivanting  toward  the  flourishing  state  of  learning, 
than  the  honorable  and  plentiful  salaries  of  such  readers.  For  it  is  neces- 
sary to  the  progression  of  sciences  that  Readers  he  chosen  of  the  most  able, 
and  sufficient  men  ■.  as  those  which  are  ordained  for  the  generating,  and 
propagating  forever,  of  sciences,  and  not  for  transitory  use.  This  can  not 
he,  except  their  condition  and  endowment  be  such  as  may  content  the 
ablest  man  to  appropriate  his  whole  labor,  and  continue  his  whole  age  in 
that  function  ; and  therefore  must  have  a proportion  answerable  to  that 
competency  ol  advancement,  which  may  he  expected  from  the  practice  of 
a profession.  So  as,  if  you  will  have  sciences  flourish,  you  must  observe 
David’s  military  law,  which  was — 1 That  those  which  tarried  with  the 
baggage  should  have  equal  part  with  those  which  went  down  into  the 
battle,’  else  will  the  baggage  be  ill  attended.  So,  Readers  in  sciences 
are,  indeed,  the  guardians  of  the  stores  and  provision’s  of  science,  whence 
men  in  active  courses  are  furnished,  and  therefore  ought  to  have  equal 
entertainment  with  them.  For  surely,  Readers  in  the  chair  are  as  parents 
in  the  sciences,  and  deserve  to  enjoy  a condition  not  inferior  to  their  chil- 
dren that  embrace  the  practical  part ; else  no  man  will  sit  longer  in  the 
chair  than  till  he  can  walk  to  a better  preferment : and  if  the  fathcrrs  in 
sciences  be  of  the  weakest  sort,  or,  through  the  meanness  of  their  entertain- 
ment, be  but  men  of  superficial  learning , it  will  come  to  pass  as  Virgil 
saith — 

‘ Invalidique  patrurn  referent  jejunia  gnati.’  ” 

(Works,  by  Montagu,  ii.  94 ; viii.  80  ; v.  380). 

Eleventh  end. — 

“ Qua?  sedes  erit  Emeritis  1 quae  rura  dabuntur 

Quae  noster  Veteranus  arett” 

It  is  evident,  and  therefore  requires  no  argument,  that,  no  less  to 
secure  the  instruction  and  example  of  distinguished  teachers  (the 
second  and  third  ends),  than  in  justice  to  these  teachers  them- 
selves; the  academical  Emeritus  should  be  enabled  to  retire, 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


709 


when  no  longer  competent  to  discharge  his  function,  either  ade- 
quately to  the  advantage  of  others,  or  suitably  to  his  own  strength. 

Twelfth  end , and  last. — A University  should,  if  possible,  afford 
to  its  alumni  the  means  of  living  academically  together  ; for  thus 
can  the  possibility  of  social  study  most  effectually  he  realized. 
(See  p.  703.)  But  this  can  seldom  be,  even  partially,  attempted  ; 
and  indeed,  if  certain  conditions  (besides  the  mere  adequacy  of 
accommodation  to  demand)  he  not  fulfilled,  the  evil  of  such  an 
arrangement  may  greatly  outweigh  the  good.  These  conditions, 
to  speak  only  of  the  more  essential,  are  three. — In  the  first  place, 
the  enforcement  of  this  regulation  should  not  operate  as  an  exclu- 
sion, or  even  as  a tax.  The  students  should  he  enabled  to  live  as 
cheaply  (and  this  without  degradation),  in  the  privileged  Houses 
of  a University,  as  they  otherwise  could  in  private  lodgings  ; and 
this  supposes  that  the  rates  in  all  these  Houses  should  be  equita- 
bly regulated,  and  certain  of  them,  at  least,  accommodated  to  the 
means  of  the  poorer  alumni. — In  the  second  place,  if  the  Univer- 
sity he  not  limited  to  a single  religious  sect,  those  dissenting  from 
it  should  be  able  to  select  a House,  in  which  their  attendance  on 
domestic  worship  shall  not  he  felt  as  a violation  of  their  religious 
principles. — In  the  third  place,  an  effectual  superintendence 
should  be  maintained  in  the  several  Houses ; every  member 
should  he  himself  constrained  to  propriety  of  conduct,  and  se- 
cured against  any  disturbance  of  his  studious  tranquillity  by 
others.  If  this  he  not  accomplished,  Colleges  and  Halls  become, 
in’ fact,  academical  nuisances — they  are  not  aids  hut  impediments 
of  study. — This  concludes  our  second  head  of  consideration. 

iii.)  Comparison  of  the  Means , now  at  ivork,  especially  in 
Oxford,  and  the  Ends  there  actually  effected,  with  the  Ends 
which  a University , as  a school  of  liberal  study,  ought  to  accom- 
plish- 

In  reference  to  the  first  end  (p.  691) — that  a University,  in  its 
fundamental  faculty,  and  as  the  organ  of  a liberal  education, 
should  make  a selection  of  the  studies,  not  only  good  in  them- 
selves, hut  useful  as  the  prerequisite  of  others  ; — this  primary 
condition  Oxford  in  part  fulfills,  in  part  does  not  now  attempt. 

In  the  first  place,  as  to  the  objects  of  the  liberal  and  prepara- 
tory study  afforded  by  this  University,  there  is,  I think,  not  one 
undeserving  of  preference,  not  one  which  ought  to  he  omitted. 
But, 


710 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


In  the  second  place,  in  these,  though  there  he  nothing  to  take 
away,  there  is  not  a little  to  restore ; for  the  Oxford  curriculum 
now  abandons  both  Philosophy  itself  and  the  philosophical  treat- 
ment of  what  it  professes  to  teach — an  abandonment  in  which  it 
is  opposed  to  its  own  ancient  and  still  statutory  constitution,  to 
the  actual  practice  of  all  other  Universities  (Cambridge  alone  ex- 
cepted), and  to  the  opinion  of  every  authority  in  education  of  the 
least  account.  Nor,  indeed,  can  the  present  practice  of  the  old 
English  Universities,  in  this  respect,  afford  the  smallest  counte- 
nance to  the  omission ; for  Philosophy  and  philosophical  teaching 
were  in  them  necessarily  surrendered,  when  the  education  supplied 
by  the  University  was  transferred  to  those  who,  as  a body,  were 
wholly  inadequate  to  Philosophy  and  philosophical  teaching.  Is 
this  denied  ? The  denial  is  refuted  by  the  history  of  the  usurpa- 
tion ; nor  has  the  proof  ever  been  attempted,  either  in  Oxford  or 
in  Cambridge,  either  publicly  or  privately,  that  the  abandon- 
ment was  made  for  any  better  reason,  than  that  the  sphere  of 
instruction  behooved  to  be  conformed  to  the  average  capacity  of 
the  collegial  interest,  which  has  latterly  administered  the  whole 
necessary  education  of  the  Universities.  Such  a proof  was  im- 
possible ; and  if  possible,  would  have  been  suicidal — as  philoso- 
phical. Aristotle,  in  his  Exhortative,  observes  : — “ If  to  philoso- 
phize be  right,  we  must  philosophize  to  realize  the  right;  if  to 
philosophize  be  wrong,  we  must  philosophize  to  manifest  the 
wrong ; on  any  alternative , therefore,  philosophize  ive  must.”  (El 
pev  (piXoao(fyr)Teov,  (pcXoaotprjTeow  teal  el  pi]  (piXoaocppreov,  (fukoaotpp- 
T6ov  TrdvTOJS  apa  (piXoaocfir/Teov.)1  “ Philosophy  is  to  be  studied,” 
says  Clement  of  Alexandria,  “ were  it  even,  that  it  may  be  scien- 
tifically despised  and  Averroes  asserts,  that  “ it  belongs  to  the 
philosopher  alone,  to  contemn  philosophy.” — Accordingly,  no  dem- 
onstration of  the  kind  has,  in  the  English  Universities,  ever  been 
essayed  ; such,  indeed,  was  never  dreamt  of ; and  the  science  of 
philosophy  proper  dropt  naturally  from  the  cycle  of  academical 


1 The  author  of  Hudibras  (in  his  Reflections  upon  Reason)  curiously  coincides  with 
the  Stagirite  in  this  : — “ There  is  nothing  that  can  pretend  to  judge  of  Reason  [Phil- 
osophy] but  itself : and,  therefore,  they  who  suppose  that  they  can  say  aught  against 
it,  are  forced  (like  jewelers,  who  beat  true  diamonds  to  powder  to  cut  and  polish  false 
ones),  to  make  use  of  it  against  itself.  But  in  this  they  cheat  themselves  as  well  as 
others.  For  if  what  they  say  against  Reason,  be  without  Reason,  they  deserve  to  be 
neglected  ; and  if  with  Reason,  they  disprove  themselves.  For  they  use  it  while  they 
disclaim  it ; and  with  as  much  contradiction,  as  if  a man  should  tell  me  that  he  can 
not  speak.” 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


711 


teaching,  when  found  beyond  the  general  competence  of.  the  aca- 
demical teacher. 

Yet  is  Philosophy  (the  science  of  science — the  theory  of  what 
we  can  know  and  think  and  do,  in  a word — the  knowledge  of 
ourselves),  the  object  of  liberal  education,  at  once  of  paramount 
importance  in  itself,  and  the  requisite  condition  of  every  other 
liberal  science.  If  men  are  really  to  know  aught  else,  the  human 
faculties,  by  which  alone  this  knowledge  may  be  realized,  must 
be  studied  for  themselves,  in  their  extent  and  in  their  limitations. 
To  know — we  must  understand  our  instrument  of  knowing. 
“ Know  thyself”  is,  in  fact,  a heavenly  precept,  in  Christianity 
as  in  heathenism.  And  this  knowledge  can  be  compassed  only 
by  reflection — only  from  within:  “ Ne  te  qusesieris  extra.”  It 
tells  us,  at  once,  of  our  weakness  and  our  worth  ; it  is  the  disci- 
pline both  of  humility  and  of  hope.  (See  p.  585-592).  On  the 
other  hand,  a knowledge,  drawn  too  exclusively  from  without,  is 
not  only  imperfect  in  itself,  but  makes  its  votaries  fatalists,  mate- 
rialists, pantheists — if  they  dare  to  think ; it  is  the  dogmatism 
of  despair.  (See  p.  297-302.)  “ Laudabilior,”  says  Augustin — 

“ laudabilior  est  animus,  cui  nota  est  infirmitas  propria,  quam 
qui,  ea  non  respecta,  moenia  mundi,  vias  siderum,  fundamenta 
terrarum  et.  fastigia  coelorum,  etiam  cogniturus,  scrutatur.”1  We 
can  know  G-od  only  as  we  know  ourselves.  “ Noverim  me, 
noverim  Te,”  in  St.  Austin’s  prayer  ; St.  Bernard  : — “ Principale, 
ad  videndum  Deum,  est  animus  rationalis  intuens  seipsum ;” 


1 This  might  stand  a motto  for  the  doctrine  of  the  Conditioned.  It  is  from  the 
proem  to  the  fourth  book  De  Trinitate.  The  scheme  of  pantheistic  omniscience,  so 
prevalent  among  the  sequacious  thinkers  of  the  day, 

(“  Raging  from  Reason,  and  on  phantasms  fed,'’) 
would  have  found  little  favor  with  the  religious  and  philosophic  nescience  of  St.  Austin 
Evolved  from  “ the  Nothing,”  “ the  All”  of  this  theory,  at  the  first  exorcism  of  a rigor- 
ous interrogation,  relapses  into  nothing  ; 

“Et  redit  in  nihilum  quod  fuit  ante  nihil.” 

Strauss,  the  Hegelian  theologian,  sees  in  Christianity  only  a mythus.  Naturally  : for 
his  Hegelian  “ Idea,”  itself  a myth,  and  confessedly  finding  itself  in  every  thing,  of 
course,  finds  in  any  thing  a myth;  “ Chirnsera  chimseram  parit.” — I have  never,  in 
fact,  met  with  a Hegelian  (and  I have  known  several  of  distinguished  talents,  both 
German  and  British),  who  could  answer  three  questions,  without  being  driven  to  the 
confession,  that  they  did  not,  as  yet,  fully  comprehend  the  doctrine  of  their  master, 
though  believing  it  to  be  all  true.  Expectants — in  fact  “Papists  in  philosophy!” — 
Hegel  himself,  not  long  before  his  death,  made  the  following  declaration  : — “ I am 
downcast  about  my  Philosophy.  For,  of  all  my  disciples,  one  only  understands  it  ; 
and  he  does  not.”  {Blatter  f.  liter.  Unterhall.  No.  351.  Dec.  1831;  et  alibi.)  The 
one  disciple,  I presume,  was  Gabler  ; but  did  Hegel  understand  himself  1 I am  told, 
that  Hegelianism  is  making  way  at  Oxford.  This  may  be  good  or  it  may  be  bad  : the 
doctrine  is  good  to  controvert ; it  is  bad  to  believe. 


712  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

and  even  Averroes  : — “Nosce  teipsum,  et  cognosces  creatorem 
tuum.” 

Nor  is  the  omission  of  philosophy  from  an  academical  curri- 
culum equivalent  to  an  arrest  on  the  philosophizing  activity  of 
the  student.  This  stupor,  however  deplorable  in  itself,  might 
still  he  a minor  evil ; for  it  is  better,  assuredly,  to  be  without 
opinions,  than  to  have  them,  not  only  speculatively  untrue,  but 
practically  corruptive.  Yet,  even  this  paralysis,  I say,  is  not 
accomplished.  Right  or  wrong,  a man  must  philosophize,  for  he 
philosophizes  as  he  thinks ; and  the  only  effect,  in  the  present 
day  especially,  of  a University  denying  to  its  alumni  the  invigo- 
rating exercise  of  a right  philosophy,  in  their  abandonment,  not 
only  without  precaution,  but  even  prepared  by  debilitation,  to 
the  pernicious  influence  of  a wrong ; — “ Sine  vindice  praeda.” 
And  in  what  country  has  a philosophy  ever  gravitating,  as  theo- 
retical toward  materialism,  as  practical  toward  fatalism,  been 
most  peculiar  and  pervasive  ? 

Again — Philosophy,  the  thinking  of  thought,  the  recoil  of 
mind  upon  itself,  is  the  most  improving  of  mental  exercises,  con- 
ducing, above  all  others,  to  evolve  the  highest  and  rarest  of  the 
intellectual  powers.  By  this,  the  mind  is  not  only  trained  to 
philosophy  proper,  but  prepared,  in  general,  for  powerful,  easy, 
and  successful  energy,  in  whatever  department  of  knowledge  it 
may  more  peculiarly  apply  itself.1  But  the  want  of  this  superior 
discipline  is  but  too  apparent  in  English  literature,  and  especially 
in  those  very  fields  of  erudition  by  preference  cultivated  in  En- 
gland. 

For  example,  and  be  it  here  spoken  in  all  praise : no  study  has 
been  more  anxiously  encouraged,  and  more  sedulously  pursued 
in  England,  than  Classical  Literature ; and  among  English 
scholars,  two  at  least  may,  for  natural  talent,  of  a certain  kind 
at  least,  be  ranked  among  the  most  distinguished  philologers  of 
Europe.  Yet,  of  English  scholars  as  a class,  both  now  and  for 
generations  past,  the  observation  of  Godfrey  Hermann  holds  good  : 


1 Kant  and  Ruhnkenius  were  early  friends  and  fellow-collegians  at  Koenigsberg  ; but 
the  genius  of  each  seemed  then  (as  we  learn  from  Wyttenbach)  strongly  to  incline 
toward  the  studies  in  which  the  other  afterward  reigned  paramount.  And  truly,  the 
best  progymuastic  of  philosophy  is  the  theory  of  language  ; and  how  necessary  is 
philosophy  and  the  practice  of  speculation  to  any  progress  of  account  in  the  higher 
philology,  Ruhnken  has  himself  authoritatively  declared  in  his  “ Elogium  Hemster- 
husii.”  Wyttenbach,  Ruhnken’s  successor,  great  as  a critical  scholar,  was  hardly  in. 
ferior  as  a philosophical  critic.  See,  besides  his  own  works,  passim,  his  Life  by  Mahne. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


713 


— “ They  read  but  do  not  think  ; they  would  be  philologers,  and 
have  not  learnt  to  philosophize.”1  The  philosophy  of  a philology 
is  shown  primarily  in  its  grammars,  and  its  grammars  for  the  use 
of  schools.  But  in  this  respect,  England  remained,  till  lately, 
nearly  two  centuries  behind  the  rest  of  Christendom.  If  there 
were  any  principle  in  her  pedagogical  practice,  “ Gaudent  sudo- 
ribus  artes,”  must  have  been  the  rule ; and  applied  it  was  with 
a vengeance.  The  English  schoolboy  was  treated  like  the  Rus- 
sian pack-horse ; the  load  in  one  pannier  was  balanced  by  a coun- 
ter weight  of  stones  in  the  other.  Educationally,  England  for 
generations  crept  by  the  heavy  waggon  while  other  countries  were 
flying  by  the  rail.  His  Majesty  Gfeorge  III.  sent  a collection  of 
the  English  classical  school  books  to  Heyne ; and,  among  others, 
the  Eton  and  Westminster  grammars,  Greek  and  Latin,  astonish- 
ed, as  well  they  might,  the  great  scholar  and  educationist.  All 
the  philological  monstrosities,  perversions,  confusions,  which  in 
the  manuals  of  other  countries  had  been  long  thrown  out,  stood 
in  these  embalmed.  The  unhappy  tyro  was  initiated  in  Latin, 
through  a Latin  book  ; while  the  ten  declensions,  the  thirteen 
conjugations,  which  had  been  reduced  to  three  and  two  by  Weller 
and  Lancelot,  still  continued,  among  a mass  of  other  abominations, 
to  complicate,  in  this  country  alone,  the  elementary  instruction 
of  Greek.  Half  a century,  even  after  the  judgment  of  Heyne, 
the  old  routine  continued.  But  all  has  now  been  changed — ex- 
cept the  cause  : for  the  same  inertion  of  original  and  independent 
thought  is  equally  apparent.  As  formerly,  from  want  of  think- 
ing, the  old  sufficed  ; so  now,  from  want  of  thinking,  the  new  is 
borrowed.  In  fact,  openly  or  occultly,  honorably  or  dishonorably, 
the  far  greater  part  of  the  higher  and  lower  philology  published 
in  this  country  is  an  importation — especially  from  Germany  : but 
so  passive  is  the  ignorance  of  our  compilers,  that  they  are  often 
(though  affecting,  of  course,  opinions),  unaware  even  of  what  is 
best  worthy  of  plagiarism  or  transplantation. 

1 The  author  of  “ Philosophical  Arrangements”  and  of  “ Hermes”  may  be  perhaps 
objected.  “ Exceptio  probat  regulam.”  Mr.  Harris  had  long  left  the  University  of 
Oxford,  “ where”  (in  the  words  of  his  son  Lord  Malmesbury),  “ he  had  passed  the 
usual  number  of  years  as  a gentleman  commoner  of  Wadham  College,”  before  he  began 
even  to  read  Aristotle  or  to  inquire  into  the  Greek  philosophy  ; and  he  was  led  to  the 
consideration  of  universal  grammar  by  no  book  of  the  academical  cycle,  either  then  or 
since,  but  by  the  “ Minerva”  of  Sanctius.  That  Mr.  Harris  was  a tardy  student  of 
philosophy,  is  shown,  perhaps,  in  his  want  of  self-reliance,  in  his  prejudice  in  favor  of 
authority — at  least  of  ancient  authority.  But  truth  is  not  the  property  of  the  old  or 
of  the  new  ; “ nondum  occupata,”  it  frequently  belongs  to  neither. 


1 14  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

Theology — Christian  theology  is,  as  a human  science,  a philo- 
logy and  history  applied  by  philosophy ; and  the  comparatively 
ineffectual  character  of  our  British  theology  has,  for  generations, 
in  the  case  of  England,  mainly  resulted  from  the  deficiency  of 
its  philosophical  element.  The  want  of  a philosophical  training 
in  the  Anglican  clergy,  to  he  regretted  at  all  times,  may  soon, 
indeed,  become  lamentably  apparent,  were  they  called  on  to  resist 
an  invasion,  now  so  likely,  of  certain  foreign  philosophico-theo- 
logical  opinions.  In  fact,  this  is  the  invasion,  and  this  the 
want  of  national  preparation,  for  which,  even  at  the  present 
juncture,  I should  he  most  alarmed.  On  the  Universities, 
which  have  illegally  dropped  philosophy  and  its  training  from 
their  course  of  discipline,  will  lie  the  responsibility  of  this  sin- 
gular and  dangerous  disarmature ; shared,  indeed,  with  the 
Church  and  State,  which  have  both  passively  and  permissively 
looked  on. 

In  reference  to  the  second  end.  (P.  691.) — A University,  if  it 
accomplish  the  purpose  of  its  institution,  is  bound  to  supply  com- 
petent and  to  exclude  incompetent  instructors.  But  this  end,  is 
it  fulfilled  by  the  agencies  now  dominant  in  Oxford  ? 

To  answer  this  question,  we  have  only  to  look  at  the  preceding 
Table  (p.  672),  for  there  we  have  exhibited  in  contrast,  not  differ- 
ent Universities  pursuing  different  studies,  but  the  same  Univer- 
sity distributing  its  instruction  among  many  private  Houses ; 
each  House  pursuing  the  same  studies,  but  by  different  instruct- 
ors ; and  at  last,  the  comparative  success  of  the  several  domestic 
instructions,  after  a four  years’  continuance  fairly  tested  and 
formally  proclaimed  by  the  University,  through  its  public  board 
of  Examination.  But  that  Table,  while  it  does  not  show  that 
instruction,  even  as  afforded  in  the  very  highest  Colleges,  is  of  a 
degree  and  quality  such  as  it  might  and  should  be ; clearly  shows, 
however,  that  the  instruction  afforded  in  the  lower  Houses  is  such, 
as  is  discreditable  for  the  University,  the  Church,  the  State,  to 
have  been  ever  tolerated ; were  that  instruction,  even  verbally, 
conformable  to  statute,  and  not,  as  it  is,  diametrically  opposed 
both  to  the  spirit  and  to  the  letter  of  academical  law. 

Rejecting  then  the  Halls,  comparing,  on  this  standard,  only 
the  Colleges,  and  judging  not  by  years  but  by  decades,  we  see 
that  instruction  in  one  College  is  less  efficient  than  that  in  ano- 
ther ; and  this  to  a degree,  not  lurking  under  any  fractional  dif- 
ference, but  obtruded  on  observation  by  an  integral  sinking  of 


715 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 

college  beloiv  college  to  nearly  twenty  depths.1  Nay,  on  the  same 
standard,  we  find  a similar  declension  manifested  between  the 
educations  afforded  by  the  sayie  college , during  one  decade  and 
during  another.  (P.  680,  sq.) 

The  Table  likewise  shows,  that  if  the  two  departments  which 
the  University  professes,  and  which  the  Colleges  and  Tutors  are, 
de  facto , exclusively  authorized,  to  teach,  the  whole  collegial 
Tutors  (49)  have  only,  of  their  body,  in  L.  H.,  about  a half  (26), 
in  D.  M.,  about  a sixth  (8),  of  the  First  Class.  Consequently, 
if  there  he  any  connection  between  superior  knowledge  and  su- 
perior tuition,  Oxford  now  abandons,  indifferently,  the  work  of 
education  to  competent  and  incompetent  hands ; and  the  mighty 
differences  of  result  could  not,  therefore,  hut  occur,  unless  com- 
petence and  incompetence  were  throughout  the  Houses  equally 
distributed — which  they  fortunately  are  not. 

Such  are  the  facts,  unparalleled  out  of  the  old  English  Uni- 
versities, and  evinced  by  the  statistics  of  the  Oxford  Examination 
itself.  And,  however  astonishing,  with  a knowledge  of  the  cir- 


1 I see  in  the  late  discussions  concerning  medical  practice  and  medical  statistics, 
that  less  than  an  eightieth  part  of  the  difference  in  success,  which  thus  discriminates 
Coliege  from  College,  would  prove  far  more  than  decisive  of  the  comparative  truth 
and  falsehood  of  rival  medical  theories.  It  is  admitted  on  all  hands,  that  if  Homoeo- 
pathy cure,  even  under  one  in  four,  more  than  Allopathy,  it  must  at  once  triumph- 
antly supersede  its  opponent.  The  whole  question  regards  the  reality  of  the  difference  ; 
which  here  may,  there  can  not,  be  disputed.  But  imagine  ! — A series  of  eighty  Hos- 
pitals, each  confessedly  losing,  on  the  average,  a fourth  of  the  patients  more  than  its 
antecedent ; and  all  fiercely  defended.  Defended  by  enstasis  : — as  realizing,  together, 
a single  system  of  cure,  and  that  the  one  best  possible  ! Defended  by  antiparastasis  : 
— as,  at  any  rate,  the  Hospitals  have  a vested  right  to  cure  or  kill ; and  [though,  in 
fact,  their  monopoly  of  treatment  had  originally  been  usurped  through  breach  of 
trust,]  that  it  would  be  the  climax  of  injustice  to  deprive  them  and  their  governors 
of  the  profitable  privilege  to  physic  the  lieges  as  they  chose  ! Yet  what  is  this  but 
the  Oxford  educational  system  and  its  defense ; substituting  only  minds  for  bodies, 
Houses  for  Hospitals,  and  a decrement  by  integers  instead  of  a decrement  by  frac- 
tions 1 — In  one  respect,  indeed,  this  is  soothing.  It  shows,  however  unsatisfactory 
be  the  present  state  of  Medicine,  that  its  theories,  the  most  confiictive,  vary  by  a 
difference  less,  a hundred  times,  than  the  same  practice  of  the  same  theory  of  Educa- 
tion varies  even  in  the  same  seminary,  but  in  different  hands ; that  nature,  at  least, 
is  far  stronger  against  the  Doctor  (whom  we  can  not  correct),  than  against  the  School- 
master (whom  we  can).  In  fact,  Saul  slaying  his  thousands,  and  David  his  ten  thous- 
ands, is  but  a type  of  the  inferiority  of  one  Educational  seminary — of  one  Oxford 
College  to  another.  This,  assuredly,  is  not  consolatory  ; but  a correction  of  the  evil 
is  within  our  power. 

The  Rev.  Mr.  Sewell,  Tutor  of  New  College,  and  otherwise  an  able  man,  has  of  late 
gravely  proposed — to  send  out  to  the  great  towns  of  England  tutorial  missions,  from 
the  bodies  thus  so  brightly  illuminating  Oxford  ; professedly,  in  order,  that  any  change 
may  be  averted  from  the  system  of  education  which  has  wrought  so  admirably  in  that 
University,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  communicate  the  benefit  of  such  system  to  the 
lieges  at  large  ! 


716 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


cumstances,  all  is  easy  of  explanation.  Let  us  only  recollect 
two  things:  In  the  first  place,  that  instruction,  as  the  most  im- 
portant, is  the  most  difficult,  of  arts ; and  in  the  second , that 
Oxford,  in  violation  of  oath  and  statute,  and  apparently  regarding 
education  as  a matter  either  of  no  importance  or  of  no  difficulty, 
now  leaves  this  function  to  he  engrossed,  at  hazard,  by  a class 
of  men,  who,  as  a class,  are  wholly  unequal  to  the  office — an 
office  for  which  indeed  they  were  never  dreamt  of  even  by  their 
founders.  For  : — 1°,  the  actually  authorized  education  of  Oxford 
(to  say  nothing  of  Cambridge)  is,  de  facto,  monopolized  by  the 
Collegiate  Fellows  ; — 2°,  the  qualifications  of  an  individual  for 
Fellow  of  a College  are,  usually,  quite  distinct  from  his  talent, 
learning,  or  capacity  of  teaching; — 3°,  out  of  these  incompetent 
Fellows,  the  Tutors,  if  not  self-constituted,  are  nominated,  in 
general,  by  an  incompetent  Head  ; while  4°,  out  of  the  low  aver- 
age of  these  incorporated  Heads  and  Fellows,  a few,  by  the 
favorable  circumstances  of  their  foundation  and  other  accidents, 
rise  to  a variable  pitch  of  educational  proficiency.  Thus  unable 
rightly  to  teach,  even  what  had  been  specially  proposed,  the  Ox- 
ford Tutors  are  of  course,  in  general,  still  less  able  to  resolve  the 
difficulties  or  to  guide  the  reading  of  their  pupils.  Questions, 
all  but  elementary,  must,  indeed,  naturally  cease ; for  these 
would  be  found,  commonly,  useless  by  the  one  party,  and  not 
convenient  by  the  other.  “ Percontatorem  fugito.”  Schleier- 
macher  truly  says,  that  the  distance  maintained  by  an  academi- 
cal teacher  toward  the  taught,  is  usually  in  the  ratio  of  his  in- 
competence. (G-edanken,  &c.,  p.  66.) 

It  is  thus  manifest,  and  on  its  own  standard,  that  the  academi- 
cal education  of  Oxford  is  now  conducted  by  those  inadequate  to 
the  function,  even  as  lowered  toward  their  level. — So  much  for 
the  second  end. 

In  reference  to  the  third  end.  (P.  691).  This  (the  proposing  to 
the  student,  more  especially  in  his  instructors,  patterns  of  high 
learning  and  ability) — this  end  is  not  only  unfulfilled  by  the 
University  of  Oxford,  it  is  even  frequently  reversed. 

Should  the  student  not  penetrate  below  the  surface — not  find 
what  duties  have,  heretofore,  been  violated,  in  suppression  of  the 
University  instruction,  by  the  University  guardians;  still,  he  will 
have  painfully  obtruded  on  his  view,  the  example  of  a flagrant 
disregard  of  learning  in  this  “ chosen  seat  of  learning.”  Here  he 
will  see  the  education  of  himself  and  other  alumni  handed  over 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


717 


by  the  public  Alma  Mater  to  the  private  and  fortuitous  nursery 
of  a College ; and  there  he  may  find  himself  consigned  to  the 
tuition  of  an  individual,  not  even  of  undetermined  qualification, 
but  who  stands  perennially  pilloried  by  the  University  itself, 
marked  as  of  slender  acquirements  in  knowledge,  and,  therefore, 
as  incompetent  to  teach.  He  thus  makes,  by  times,  the  untoward 
discovery,  that  literary  merit  is  of  very  minor  account,  even  in 
our  most  venerable  seminaries ; and  this,  if  there  be  aught  in 
him  worth  the  cultivating,  ends,  in  a contempt  of  the  teacher,  or 
in  a disgust  at  what  is  taught,  or  in  a self-satisfied  contentment 
with  his  own  humble  attainments.  The  only  hope  for  him  is  to 
see  through  the  corruption — to  place  himself  above  the  seminary 
— to  rely  upon  himself.  All  this  is  the  converse  of  what  a Uni- 
versity ought  to  strive  after.  For  it  should  be  above  its  alumni ; 
a school,  not  of  vanity  and  sloth,  but  of  humility  and  exertion ; 
and  the  tyro  should  there  be  made  to  mete  himself,  not  with 
Thersites,  certainly,  but,  if  possible,  with  Achilles. — (See,  as  pre- 
viously referred  to,  p.  359,  sq.) 

In  reference  to  the  fourth  end.  (P.  692.) — In  determining 
strenuous  study,  through  the  excitement  of  honor  and  emulation, 
this  school  accomplishes  much  less  than,  with  its  means,  might 
easily  be  done ; although  in  this  respect,  and  compared  with 
many  other  Universities,  Oxford  is  not  undeserving  of  encomium. 
To  this  end,  the  effect  of  domestic  education  is  small ; that  of  the 
University  Examination , considerable. — Of  these  in  their  order. 

It  is  evident,  without  descending  to  the  fact,  that  there  can  be 
little  or  no  emulation  among  students,  as  divided  among  the 
houses,  and  subdivided  among  the  Tutors  ; for  the  conditions  of 
emulation — numbers , equality , publicity — are  all  awanting.  In 
truth,  competition,  in  such  circumstances,  instead  of  honor,  re- 
ceives only  derision.  So  much  indeed  is  virtually  confessed  by 
Bishop  Coplestone.1  “ The  heaviness  of  solitary  reading  is  reliev- 
ed by  the  number  which  compose  a class : this  number  varies 
from  three  or  four  to  ten  or,  twelve  : a sort  of  emulation  is  awak- 
ened in  the  pupil,”  &c.  In  the  circumstances  of  his  reply,  more 
perhaps  could  not  have  been  admitted  ; and,  in  point  of  fact,  emu- 


1 A Reply  to  the  Calumnies,  &c.,  p.  146. — I may  notice,  that  what  Dr.  Coplestone 
in  the  context,  says  of  tutorial  instruction,  is  rather  a statement  of  its  possible  virtues 
— which  in  his  own  tuition,  I have  no  doubt,  were  realized — than  of  its  actual  qualities, 
as  manifested  by  the  immense  majority  of  the  Tutors. 


71S 


APPENDIX  111.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


lation  in  the  collegio- tutorial  discipline  of  Oxford  may  be  practi- 
cally thrown  out  of  account. 

The  only  excitement  of  study,  through  the  desire  of  honor, 
worthy  of  account  in  Oxford,  is  that  resulting  from  the  Examina- 
tion for  a degree  of  A.B.,  and  the  classifying  of  candidates  there- 
with connected.  And  this,  in  so  far  as  it  extends,  is  beneficial ; 
but  its  influence  is  limited.  In  the  first  place,  the  influence  does 
not  operate  in  full  effect  throughout  the  curriculum  of  academical 
study.  It  acts  weakly  and  irregularly  at  first,  and  only  acquires 
continuity  and  strength  as  the  academical  course  draws  to  a con- 
clusion. In  the  second  place,  the  influence  does  not  operate  on 
all.  It  determines  no  application  in  the  many  who  are  not  to 
graduate.  It  determines  also  no  application  in  those,  neither  few 
nor  feeble,  who  are,  or  deem  themselves,  from  any  cause  (as  want 
of  perseverance,  want  of  nerve,  the  distraction  of  favorite  pursuits, 
&c.)  unable  to  attain  a higher  honor,  and  have  no  ambition,  per- 
haps a positive  dread,  to  be  commemorated  for  a lower.  On  these 
the  classification,  if  it  have  any  effect,  acts  only  for  evil ; as  it 
constrains  the  candidate  to  limit  the  books,  which  he  studies  and 
gives  up,  to  such  a minimum,  as  may  not  risk  his  being  honored 
and  recorded.  It  is  a great  improvement  in  the  new  Statute, 
that  this  positive  evil  of  the  present  Examination  is  therein  ob- 
viated ; for  the  names  of  all  who  pass  are  henceforth  to  be  pub- 
lished, be  they  honored  or  not. 

In  reference  to  the  fifth  end.  (P.  694.) — This  end  is  the  elicit- 
ing in  the  student  the  fullest  and  most  unexclusive  energy  of 
thought : 1°,  by  presenting  to  him  the  most  suitable  objects  of 
study ; and  2°,  by  teaching  these  through  the  most  suitable 
exercises. — Of  these  in  detail. 

As  to  the  objects : — The  more  arduous  studies,  those  which, 
requiring,  draw  forth  the  highest  and  most  improving  activity  of 
mind — Philosophy  proper  (the  thinking  of  thought,  the  science 
of  what  can  and  can  not  be  known),  and  a philosophic  treatment 
of  the  sciences  in  general ; — these,  as  a matter  of  necessity,  must 
be  excluded  from  an  education  monopolized  by  an  interest,  like 
the  collegial  of  Oxford,  constituted,  not  by  ability  and  acquire- 
ment, and  teaching,  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  taught,  but  for  the 
profit  of  the  teacher.  For  an  instruction,  in  objects,  methods, 
means,  can  never  possibly  transcend  the  average  level  of  the 
instructors.  The  honor  of  the  University,  and  the  advantage  of 
its  alumni,  are  here,  therefore,  now  subordinated  to  the  capacity 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


719 


of  those,  who  were  rarely  incorporated  for  any  capacity  of  aca- 
demical teaching,  though  usurping  exclusively  the  office ; while 
what  is  the  comparative  height  and  depth  of  their  actual  capacity 
for  that  office,  and  on  an  Oxford  standard,  the  Table  shows. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  the  studies  fostered  in  Oxford  being  those 
which  demand  a higher  capacity,  and  elicit  any  maximum  of 
thought,  it  was  requisite  to  prefer  such  as  could  be  best  reduced 
to  an  inferior  level,  to  mechanism  and  routine.  And  though 
impossible  for  a University  to  exclude  all  philosophical  authors 
from  the  academical  cycle ; yet  philosophy  was  taught  not  as 
food  for  speculation,  but  in  the  dicta  of  these  authors  as  peremp- 
tory and  decisive ; while  the  student’s  knowledge  was  guaged, 
not  by  his  systematic  comprehension  of  a work  in  its  totality, 
parts  and  relations,  but  only  by  the  accuracy  (and  that  is  not  to 
be  contemned)  with  which  he  might  have  committed  to  memory 
the  very  terms  of  its  definitions,  in  the  very  language  of  its 
writer. 

As  to  the  exercises  ; their  existence  and  utility  were  of  course 
regulated  by  the  capabilities  of  the  exerciser. 

Examination  (p.  695)  limited  to  the  petty  numbers  of  the  pu- 
pils, and  by  the  ability  and  knowledge  of  the  Tutor,  was  too  fre- 
quently, if  it  took  place  at  all,  a perfunctory,  occasional  and 
useless  form. 

Disputation  (p.  696)  long  obsolete,  was,  except  as  a dead  for- 
mality, in  Oxford  totally  forgotten. 

Repetition  (p.  698)  is  the  exercise  which  has  been  most  success- 
fully practiced  in  Oxford ; this,  indeed,  the  examination  for  a 
degree  made  necessary.  Herein  there  is  every  thing  to  praise  ; 
and  had  the  study  been  needs  as  intelligent  as  sedulous,  and 
directed  as  much  to  understand  as  to  remember,  there  would 
have  been  almost  nothing  left  even  to  desire. 

Written  Composition.  (P.  700.).  Not  one  of  the  conditions  of 
this  exercise  are  in  Oxford  collegially  fulfilled — except  in  small 
measure,  and  by  unusual  accident. — The  student  is  not  compelled 
to  think  for  himself,  by  being  limited  to  definite  parts  of  a definite 
subject ; but,  if  the  form  of  a written  composition  be  occasionally 
required,  he  is  left  to  satisfy  the  demand  by  any  production,  how- 
ever vaguely  pertinent,  and  therefore,  perhaps,  not  even  his  own. 
— There  is  no  one  bound,  no  one  probably  inclined,  if,  indeed, 
any  one  competent,  to  criticism. — Finally,  there  is  no  numerous 
audience  to  listen ; and  so  far  from  any  stimulus  to  exertion,  a 


720 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


painstaking  writer  would  by  his  fellows  be  only  derided  as  a 
painstaking  dunce. 

Teaching , in  order  to  learn.  (P.  700.) — This  is  not  now  in 
Oxford,  indeed  not  now  in  any  of  our  present  Universities,  em- 
ployed as  an  improving  exercise  in  the  course  of  learning.  But, 
in  Oxford,  as  the  Tutors  are  generally  neither  old  in  years,  nor 
few  in  numbers ; therefore,  if  individually  well  selected,  and  then- 
tuition  such  as  to  necessitate  an  all-sided  instruction  of  them- 
selves, the  tutorial  system  might  justly  claim,  as  a reflex  mean 
of  erudition,  some  peculiar  advantages.  But,  alas  ! a Tutor’s 
appointment  and  teaching  are  so  much  mere  matters  of  routine, 
that  little  or  no  profit  can  accrue  to  himself  from  the  exercise  of 
his  function.  Instruction  has  been  too  long  and  too  generally, 
in  Oxford,  as  elsewhere,  the  “ sifflement  des  Perroquets nor, 
unless  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  in  regard  to  teaching  and  knowl- 
edge (p.  687)  be  egregiously  wrong,  can  the  modern  discipline  of 
that  University  make  (as  a system)  pretension  to  respect,  or  even 
toleration  ? 

Conversation  with , interrogation  of,  the  learned  (p.  702),  is  an 
exercise  to  be  at  once  discounted ; for  no  one  will  hold,  that  an 
Oxford  Fellow-Tutor  is  now,  ex  officio , to  be  presumed,  either 
wise  himself,  or  a fountain  of  wisdom  to  inquiring  pupils.1 

Social  Study  (p.  703)  is  an  exercise  which,  as  it  can  be  best 
realized  in  the  community  of  an  academical  House,  affords  an 
advantage  more  than  compensating  for  certain  disadvantages 
which  frequently  result  from  such  an  arrangement.  In  this 
view,  therefore,  I think,  that  the  Colleges  are,  and  that  the  Halls 
might  be,  profitable  institutions  ; — but  the  best  as  now  existing, 
are  capable  of  great  improvement. 

In  reference  to  the  sixth  end  (p.  704) — the  grant  of  a Degree 
or  authentic  certificate  of  proficiency.  To  say  nothing  of  their 
personal  and  professional  character,  and  judging  only  from  the 
mode  of  their  appointment,  and  the  sacred  obligation  under  which 
they  must  ever  consciously  act ; I should  confidently  rely  on  the 


1 The  following  note  should  have  been  appended  to  the  quotation  (p.  703)  from  the 
Caroline  Statutes  : — This  regulation,  as  to  a questioning  of  the  Professor,  is  an  inhe- 
ritance devolving  from  the  middle  ages — the  mere  repetition  of  an  ancient  statute.  It 
is  found,  almost  in  the  same  words,  as  a law,  in  the  Italian  and  Spanish  Universities, 
and  throughout  the  Colleges  in  every  Catholic  country  belonging  to  the  Society  of 
Jesus.  In  like  manner,  the  German  Protestant  Universities,  in  general,  secure,  by 
public  authority,  this  privilege  of  interrogating  the  academical  instructor; — I remem- 
ber the  fact,  in  reference  to  Goettingen,  Erlangen,  Greifswalde,  Marburg,  &c. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


721 


moral  rectitude  of  the  Oxford  Examiners.  This,  indeed,  I have 
never  heard  called  in  question,  either  as  regards  the  Oxford  or 
the  Cambridge  Masters  ; and  in  this  fundamental  condition  of  the 
value  of  a degree  and  relative  classification,  these  Universities 
stand  in  honorable  contrast  to  most  others. — As  to  the  compe- 
tence of  the  Examiners,  irf  reference  to  the  objects  of  examina- 
tion, the  same  is  true.  But  these  objects,  like  the  objects  of  in- 
struction, I must  hold  to  be  inadequate,  in  as  much  as  they  do 
not  comprise  Philosophy  and  sundry  of  the  philosophical  sciences. 
(See  p.  710,  sq.)— In  another  respect,  I think  that  a far  more 
definite  line  should  have  been  drawn  between  the  higher  honors, 
which  in  the  new  Examination  Statute  are  attached  to  the  depart- 
ments necessary  for  a degree,  and  the  lower,  there  assigned  to 
branches  of  study  left  optional  to  the  candidate.  For  a class  of 
honor  in  any  one  department  is  ostensibly  the  same  as  a class  of 
honor  in  any  other. — Nor  can  I think,  that  more  might  not  be 
done  to  evince  the  comparative  proficiency  of  individuals.  For 
though  no  one  should  reach  a third,  second,  or  first  class,  without 
a definite  amount  of  learning  ; still  the  several  candidates  within 
that  class  might  be  easily  subordinated  by  comparative  merit,  and 
not  left  to  the  tumultuary  grouping  of  an  alphabetical  arrange- 
ment.— But  of  this  again. 

In  reference  to  the  seventh  end  (p.  704,)  the  public  Exhibitions 
necessary  for  the  study  of  the  Physical  sciences.  On  the  present 
state  of  Oxford  in  this  respect  I am  hardly  qualified  to  speak. 
As  to  the  mode  of  instruction  in  these  sciences,  I shall  have 
occasion  to  say  somewhat  in  the  sequel. 

In  reference  to  the  eighth  end  (p.  706,) — the  supply  of  the 
students  with  a complement  of  Books  suited  to  their  scientific 
wants — Oxford,  publicly  or  privately,  has  done'  nothing.  The 
libraries  of  the  several  colleges  are,  I believe  (like  the  Bodleian 
and  Radcliffe),  still  closed  against  the  undergraduate ; nor  in- 
deed have  the  Blouses,  in  general,  such  selections  of  books  as 
would  be  rightly  useful  to  him  in  the  guidance  and  promotion 
of  his  studies. 

In  reference  to  the  ninth  end  (p.  706,) — a responsible  and  com- 
petent board  of  Regulation  and  Patronage — Oxford  has  none. 
The  need  of  it  is  shown  by  centuries  of  illegality  and  abasement. 

In  reference  to  the  tenth  end  (p.  707,) — the  adequate  Remuner- 
ation of  the  University  Teachers  ; — as  University  teaching  is  now 
virtually  extinct  in  Oxford,  there  can  be  no  question  about  its 

Zz 


1 22 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


adequate  remuneration.  Indeed,  the  conjoined  facts — the  ancient 
deficiency  of  this  recompense — its  independence  on  the  exertion 
of  the  incumbent,  and  his  consequent  tendency  to  do  nothing — 
the  vicious  modes  of  nominating  professors,  the  nomination, 
therefore,  of  incompetent  prselectors — the  disinclination  of  the 
new  rulers  of  the  University,  the  hfeads  of  Houses,  to  do  ought 
to  raise  the  public  instruction,  which  they  were  sworn  to  im- 
prove— in  fine,  even  their  active  co-operation  toward  its  actual 
extinction ; these  conjoined  facts  soon  had  their  natural — their 
necessary  result.  The  public  or  academical  education  was  nulli- 
fied, if  not  formally  annulled  ; the  private  or  domestic  silently 
succeeded  to  its  place ; and  the  Fellow  who  rarely  obtained  his 
appointment  in  College  from  literary  merit,  superseded  the  Pro- 
fessor, who  ought  in  the  University,  to  have  been  elected  to  his 
chair  for  that  alone — but  who,  at  last,  had  become  so  contempti- 
ble, that,  except  when  an  endowment  could  be  converted  into  a 
sinecure,  was,  without  reclamation,  not  even  nominally  elected 
at  all.  Most  of  the  public  prselectorships  or  academical  chairs, 
thus  have,  and  have  long  had,  an  existence  only  in  the  Statute- 
book.  (See  pp.  418-422,  439-442.) 

In  reference  to  the  eleventh  end  (p.  708,) — a Provision  for  aca- 
demical Emeriti — with  this,  it  is  almost  needless  to  say,  that 
Oxford  is  wholly  unprovided. 

In  regard  to  the  twelfth  and  last  end  (p.  707,) — the  accommo- 
dation of  the  academical  members  in  Academical  Houses  (Halls 
or  Colleges) — Oxford  supplies  this,  but  not  under  all  the  three 
conditions  to  their  full  extent.  The  first  is  not  adequately  ful- 
filled. The  second  does  not  at  present  emerge.  The  third  is 
fairly  performed. 

I have,  in  these  previous  observations,  been  compelled — com- 
pelled in  the  interest  of  truth — to  show,  in  various  respects,  that 
the  education  now  afforded  in  the  University  of  Oxford,  is  not 
such  as  it  ought  to  be.  But  though  no  attentive  reader  can  sup- 
pose, from  my  strictures  upon  this,  that  I am,  by  preference,  an 
admirer  of  any  other  British  University  : still  I think  it  proper 
explicitly  to  state — that  I regard  our  British  Universities,  as 
though  in  different  ways,  all  lamentably  imperfect ; and  while 
none,  in  my  opinion,  accomplishes  what,  under  right  regulation 
it  might,  I should  yet  be  mortified  to  have  it  thought,  that  I could 
institute  a comparison  where  there  is  no  medium,  far  less  dis- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


723 


parage  one  inadequate  instrument  to  the  praise  of  any  other. 
Oxford  is  here  only  collated  with  Oxford ; and  for  aught  that  I 
have  said,  however  imperfect  may  he  the  education  of  that  Uni- 
versity as  tested  by  its  own  standard,  I might  still,  without  at 
least  self-contradiction,  hold  that  the  discipline  of  Oxford  consti- 
tutes, in  so  far  as  it  goes,  the  very  best  academical  discipline  in 
the  British  empne.  In  point  of  fact,  with  the  present  unfortunate 
organizations  of  professorial  appointment,  I hardly  think  that  the 
Professors  of  the  British  Universities  would,  as  a body,  show  a 
higher  average  than  the  Oxford  Tutors,  if  we  had  their  relative 
capacity  meted  by  a standard  like  the  Oxford  Examination. 
They  are,  pro  tanto , in  general,  unknown  quantities. 

I now  proceed  to  the  last  head  of  distribution. 

iv.)  Suggestion  of  such  Changes  as  may  most  easily  be  made , 
to  render  the  University  of  Oxford  a more  efficient  instrument 
for  the  purpose  of  general  and  preparatory  education. 

As  already  premised,  I do  not  mean  to  hazard  the  suggestion 
of  measures  which  would  here  realize  any  ideal  of  a perfect  Uni- 
versity. I propose  only  easy  and  manifest  remedies  for  evils 
intolerable  even  to  ordinary  reason.  It  is  self-evident,  that  if 
Fellowships,  Headships,  &c.,  were  made  the  just  rewards  of  aca- 
demical merit,  these  offices,  themselves  enhanced  indefinitely  in 
estimation,  would  constitute  an  apparatus  of  powerful  agencies, 
which,  as  they  have  hitherto  impeded,  would  now  he  turned  to 
promote,  the  ends  of  the  University  ; and  Oxford,  raised  from  her 
present  humble  and  ambiguous  condition,  would  henceforward 
stand  proudly  forth  as  the  most  efficient  mean,  perhaps,  of  educa- 
tion in  the  world.  But  this,  however  I may  wish,  I would  not 
venture  to  propose. 

A University  only  exists,  as  it  executes  the  functions  of  its 
existence ; education  is  the  one  sole  function  for  which  it  was 
created  : as  an  organ  of  education,  the  University  of  Oxford  (and 
what  is  true  of  Oxford  is  true  of  Cambridge)  has  been  long  sus- 
pended ; its  existence,  therefore,  is  in  abeyance.  The  statutory 
education  being  suppressed  in  the  public  University,  a precarious 
education  has  been  attempted  in  the  four-and-twenty  private  but 
privileged  Houses  ; while  these,  unconnected  with  the  University 
and  with  each  other  as  seminaries  of  instruction,  are  merely  a 
local  aggregation  of  so  many  private  and  irresponsible  schools, 
their  only  academical  correlation  being,  that  they  all  send  up 


724 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


their  pupils,  as  candidates  for  a degree,  to  be  examined  by  the 
central  hoard  appointed  by  the  University.  This  public  examina- 
tion, as  we  have  seen,  shows,  of  itself,  that  these  twenty-four 
Houses  are,  in  general,  most  inefficient  private  schools  ; one  sink- 
ing below  another  to  such  a depth,  that  the  lowest  of  the  twenty- 
four  is  almost  twenty-four  times  lower  than  the  highest. 

The  Houses  and  their  Heads  have  contrived,  however,  to 
swamp  the  University.  Have  they  elevated  themselves  ? Butin 
restoring  the  public  reality  of  education  against  the  private  and 
usurping  semblance — in  restoring  the  University  against  the  Col- 
leges ; we  ought  not  to  imitate  the  precedent  of  the  Houses,  we 
ought  not  to  swamp  them.  Our  policy  ought,  in  fact,  to  be  direct- 
ly the  converse.  “ To  Reform,  not  to  Rescind,”  should  be  the 
maxim.  Restoring  the  University,  we  should  not  supersede  the 
Colleges ; but,  on  the  contrary,  enable  the  best  to  do  far  more 
than  they  can  now  accomplish,  and  compel  the  worst  to  become 
the  rivals  of  the  best.  Let  our  reform  be  that  of  Bacon — with- 
out bravery,  or  scandal,  or  assentation,  either  of  old  or  new  ; and 
taking  counsel  of  every  time,  if  our  changes  be  rational,  let  us 
not  be  startled  should  they  be  compulsory.  They  ought,  how- 
ever, to  be  gradual;  beneficial  to  the  public,  but  not  unjust  to 
individuals  : announced,  long  enough  before  they  are  carried  into 
execution ; and  no  duty  suddenly  required  of  any  to  which  he  is 
not  bound  to  be  competent.  Our  procedure  should  be  the  same  in 
our  seminaries  of  either  kind  ; in  both  we  should  prefer  ingraft- 
ing to  extirpation — were  it  only  for  parsimony  of  time.  For  thus, 
as,  in  our  gardens,  the  idlest  stock  may  by  a prudent  treatment  soon 
rise  into  a fruitful  tree  ; so,  in  our  Universities,  the  least  effective 
College  may  by  a judicious  introduction  of  new  measures  spring 
at  once  to  unexpected  usefulness  and  honor  : 

— “ Nec  longum  tempue,  et  ingens 
Exiit  ad  cselum  ramis  felifcibus  arbos, 

Miraturque  novas  frondes  et  non  sua  poma.” 

In  the  ensuing  observations,  I shall  consider : — a)  Things  pri- 
mary or  constitutive ; b)  Things  secondary  or  complemental. 

a)  Things  primary  or  constitutive.  Under  this  head  the  dis- 
cussion divides  itself  into  Jive  parts,  in  as  much  as  it  regards  : — 
1.  The  Objects  of  instruction  ; 2.  The  Instructors  or  kind  of  per- 
sons privileged  to  teach ; 3.  The  Instruction  and  its  modes ; 4. 
The  Excitement  to  study ; 5.  The  Degree  or  certificate  of  pro- 
ficiency. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


725 


1.  The  Objects  of  instruction.  (Pp.  691  and  709  sq. ;)  694 
sq.  and  718  sq. 

From  what  has  been  previously  said  it  is  apparent,  that,  in  my 
opinion,  there  is  much  good,  and  not  a little  deficient,  in  the  ob- 
ject-matter  of  the  Oxford  education. 

In  the  first  place,  I hold,  that  the  study,  there  pursued,  of  phi- 
lology, and  in  general  of  classical  antiquity,  is  of  the  highest 
utility  ; both  (objectively)  as  supplying  the  prerequisites  of  ulte- 
rior knowledge,  and  (subjectively)  as  a discipline  of  mind.  In 
relation  to  the  former,  I have  above  (pp.  326-337),  endeavored  to 
show,  that  classical  studies  are  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
liberal  professions,  more  especially  to  Theology  ; and  in  reference 
to  the  latter,  I would  only  object  that,  as  too  mechanically  taught, 
in  Oxford,  these  studies  do  not  become  the  mean  of  sufficiently 
awakening  the  learner  to  a vigorous  self  activity.  In  a word,  the 
philological  teaching  is  there  not  philosophical  enough.  Even  the 
higher  grammar,  a science  most  important  in  itself,  and  compris- 
ing problems  of  the  most  interesting  and  profitable  discussion,  is, 
educationally  at  least,  wholly  neglected  ; the  philology,  the  object 
of  tuition  in  the  College,  and  of  examination  in  the  schools,  rarely 
rising  above  an  empirical  knowledge  of  the  phraseology  of  this  or 
that  classical  author. 

But  in  the  second  place,  this  omission  of  philosophical  grammar 
from  the  cycle  of  University  studies,  is  only  part  and  parcel  of 
the  omission  of  philosophy  itself  along  with  the  more  central  of 
the  philosophical  sciences.  On  this  unhappy  omission,  academi- 
cally unexampled  out  of  England,  in  violation  even  of  English 
academical  statute,  and  contrary  to  all  opinions — universally  the 
most  respectable,  and  specially  the  most  respected  in  Oxford,  I 
have  already  spoken,  and  may  hereafter  have  occasion  to  speak. 
As  noticed,  Philosophy,  in  Oxford,  as  in  Cambridge,  was  only 
left  untaught,  when  the  ordinary  instructor  had  become  incapa- 
ble of  teaching  it.  The  raising  of  the  teacher  in  these  schools  is, 
therefore,  a prerequisite  to  the  restoration  of  philosophy.  And  of 
that  anon. 

2.  The  Instructors,  or  persons  privileged  to  teach.  (Pp.  691 
and  714  sq. ; 692  and  716). 

Speaking  only  of  the  fundamental  faculty — there  are  two  kinds 
of  Instructors  to  whom  Universities  confide  the  performance  of 
their  essential  duty — the  business  of  education.  These  we  may 
call  Professors  and  Tutors ; although  the  distinction  in  function 


726  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

may  not,  especially  in  former  ages,  and  in  foreign  countries,  cor- 
respond  always  to  the  distinction  in  name.  By  Professor , I 
mean  a teacher,  exclusively  privileged,  to  deliver  from  his  own 
resources  and  at  his  own  discretion,  a course  of  lectures,  on  a 
certain  department  of  knowledge,  to  the  whole  academical  alumni. 
By  Tutor , I mean  a teacher,  among  others,  privileged  to  see  that 
his  peculiar  pupils  (a  section  of  the  academical  alumni)  read  and 
understand  certain  hooks — certain  texts,  codes,  departments  of 
doctrine,  authorized  by  the  University.  Tutors  are  now,  de  facto 
at  least,  the  only  necessary  instructors  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge  ; 
Professors  alone  are  known  in  the  other  British,  as  in  all  foreign, 
Universities. 

Instruction  by  Tutors,  and  instruction  by  Professors,  have, 
severally,  peculiar  advantages  ; there  are  certain  conditions  which 
each  system  specially  supposes  ; and  this  or  that  Tutorial,  this 
or  that  Professorial,  application  will  be  good  or  bad,  as  the  condi- 
tions of  the  special  system  are  or  are  not  fulfilled  in  it.  Com- 
paring these  together  in  themselves,  that  is,  all  else  being  sup- 
posed equal: — 

The  peculiar  advantage  of  the  Professorial  instruction  is — that 
requiring  a small  complement  of  teachers,  these  may  individually 
all  be  of  a higher  learning  and  ability ; and  consequently  in  so 
far  as  higher  individual  learning  and  ability  afford  a superior 
instruction,  the  Professorial  system,  if  properly  organized,  is  pref- 
erable to  the  Tutorial,  even  at  the  best.  But  in  so  far  as  the 
efficiency  of  an  education  depends  on  the  greater  number  of  its 
teachers ; or,  in  so  far  as  the  condition  of  higher  learning  and 
ability  is  not  adequately  supplied,  the  Professorial  system  is  infe- 
rior to  the  Tutorial,  as  the  Tutorial  ought  to  be.  But  as  each,  if 
properly  organized  and  applied,  has  thus  its  several  utilities  ; we 
shall  find,  that  as  practically  realized  in  this  kingdom,  the  con- 
ditions of  neither  have  been  fulfilled. 

Professorial  System. — The  fundamental  condition  of  this 
scheme  is  the  superior  qualification — learning , ability , and 
didactic  skill — of  the  Professor.  But  how  greatly  this  condition 
has  been  neglected,  is  shown  in  the  wretched  modes  of  academ- 
ical appointment  prevalent  in  this  country.  (See  pp.  368-381.) 

Tutorial  System. — There  are  three  conditions  of  the  efficiency 
of  this  scheme:  1°,  The  application  of  the  Tutorial  numbers; 

. 2°,  The  competency  of  the  individual  Tutors  ; 3°,  The  sufficiency 
of  the  academically  authorized  books. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


727 


As  to  the  first  condition,  and  looking  merely  to  Oxford,  no  at- 
tempt has  been  made  to  draw  the  Tutors  from  their  isolation  in 
the  private  houses,  and  to  employ  them,  in  larger  or  smaller  plu- 
ralities, in  exercising  the  academical  alumni , collected  into  Uni- 
versity or  public  classes.  And  yet,  the  greatest  and  most  dis- 
tinctive mean  of  Tutorial  efficiency  has  thus,  in  the  English 
Universities,  remained  unapplied.  With  a staff  of  very  incom- 
petent Tutors,  this  measure  could  not,  indeed,  he  accomplished. 
It  could  not  even  he  attempted.  But  the  necessity  of  its  appli- 
ance would  forthwith  determine  an  elevation  of  Tutorial  qualifica- 
tion. Those  who  had  deemed  themselves,  and  had  been  deemed 
by  others,  not  incompetent  for  the  function,  so  long  as  tuition 
lurked  a torpid  routine  in  the  privacy  of  a college,  would  no 
longer  appear  even  tolerable,  so  soon  as  their  inferiority  was 
brought  into  public,  and  into  public  comparison  with  the  superi- 
ority of  others.  A beneficial  competition  would  thus  be  deter- 
mined between  the  instructors  ; all  would  endeavor  to  excel,  and 
none  he  content  to  remain  very  far  inferior-.  The  necessity  of 
taking  measures  for  the  better  appointment  of  Tutors  would  soon 
follow,  if  this  improvement  had  not  indeed  preceded  ; and  the 
students  (besides  the  other  benefits  of  such  a class)  would  thus 
enjoy  the  triple  advantage — of  being  variously  exercised  by  a 
competent  number  of  competent  instructors — of  hearing  the  same 
object  considered  by  different  intellects  in  different  views — and 
of  having  placed  before  them  the  highest  academical  examples  of 
erudition  and  ability.  But  such  an  organization  of  public  classes 
under  appointed  Tutors,  for  the  daily  exercise  of  the  students  in 
general  in  their  common  studies — this,  as  I said,  has  never  been 
attempted  in  either  of  the  only  two  Universities  in  which  the 
Tutorial  system  has  prevailed ; and  yet  this  application  is  the 
very  mean  through  which  that  system  can  realize  its  chief  ad- 
vantages. For  a plurality  of  Tutors  can  do  what  can  he  done  by 
no  individual  Professor. 

As  to  the  second  condition — the  competency  of  the  several 
Tutors — this  has  not  only  not  been  fulfilled ; but  on  the  contrary, 
(as  repeatedly  observed),  the  Tutorial  office  has  been  abandoned 
by  the  University  to  the  private  incorporations,  the  members  of 
which  are,  in  general,  neither  Collegial  Heads  nor  Collegial  Fel- 
lows, from  any  literary  merit.  It  is  certainly  true,  that  the 
University  is  not  so  totally  dependent  on  individual  competence 


728  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

in  the  teacher,  where  the  Tutorial  system  prevails,  as  where  the 
Professorial.  'Still,  however,  it  is  dependent  in  a great  degree ; 
and  the  memorable  and  melancholy  consequences  of  the  neglect, 
in  Oxford,  of  the  Tutors’  competency  are  more  than  sufficient  to 
manifest  the  clamant  urgency  for  a prompt  and  fundamental  re- 
formation of  the  abuse.  (See  pp.  671,  sq).  One  prospective 
measure,  corrective  at  least  of  the  evil  in  the  mass,  presents  it- 
self obtrusively.  By  statute,  the  condition  of  becoming  Tutor  is 
not  a Fellowship  but  a Degree.  (P.  393,  &c.)  The  monopoly 
of  privileged  Tutorial,  that  is,  now  of  academical,  instruction  by 
the  members  of  the  private  incorporations,  is  an  illegal  usurpa- 
tion. I would,  therefore,  suggest,  that  no  one  should,  henceforth, 
be  eligible  for  this  office  (which  by  the  proceedings  of  the  Heads 
of  Houses  themselves,  has  long  been  privileged  and  public),  who 
has  not  taken  Primary  Highest  Honors ; and  that  he  should 
only  be  competent  to  act,  at  least  as  University  Tutor,  in  that 
department  wherein  he  shall  have  so  graduated.  I am,  of  course, 
aware,  that  some  first  class  men  may  turn  out  comparatively 
poor  instructors ; and  that  some  laudable  instructors  may  stand 
comparatively  low  in  the  Examination.  But  still,  these  are  the 
exceptions.  And  although  it  might  be  proper  to  have  a mean  of 
conferring  tutorial  eligibility  for  special  reasons,  still  it  can  not 
but  be  advantageous,  to  lay  down  a highest  academical  honor  as 
the  general  condition  of  becoming  Tutor.  This  would  at  once 
abolish  the  present  unparalleled  system  of  abuse ; which,  com- 
paring the  educational  establishments  of  Oxford  only  with  them- 
selves, allows  one  House  to  sink  below  another  to  some  ten  or 
twenty  depths. — But  as  it  is  of  consequence,  that  the  several 
Tutors  should  be  connected  with  individual  Houses,  it  being  of 
importance  that  College  should  rival  College  for  the  honors  of  the 
University ; and  as  there  is,  at  present,  no  other  authority  to 
which  this  patronage  could  be  safely  confided  : I am  not  prepared 
to  say,  that  the  appointment  of  Tutor  should  be  withdrawn  from 
the  Collegial  Head. — At  the  same  time,  in  the  smaller  Colleges,  it 
might  be  advantageous,  if  two  at  least  combined,  and  had  in  com- 
mon a single  complement  of  Tutors. — Could  not  government  be 
induced,  to  make  a laudable  exception  of  its  arbitrary  patronage, 
so  that  the  Tutor  (always  generally  in  orders),  who  is  not  a 
Fellow,  might,  after  a meritorious  period  of  instruction  claim  a 
benefice  in  the  Church  ? Equitably,  a higher  proportion  of  the 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


729 


fee,  which  the  student  ought  now  to  pay  for  his  superior  educa- 
tion, should  he  allowed  to  those  Tutors  who  do  not  enjoy  the 
benefit  of  a Fellowship  and  its  results. 

The  third  condition  of  the  Tutorial  system  is,  the  sufficiency  of 
the  academically  authorized  books. — This  condition,  if  adequately 
fulfilled , gives  in  my  opinion,  a decided  advantage  to  the  Tutorial 
over  the  Professorial  scheme  of  education — at  least  as  the  latter 
is  now  constituted  in  this  kingdom ; (and  if  combined  with  the 
second  condition,  even  over  the  Professorial  in  its  most  perfect 
organization  abroad.)  For — 

In  the  first  place,  as  existing  among  ourselves,  the  Professor  is 
not  improbably  unequal  to  his  office ; no  method  of  academical 
patronage  prevalent  in  Britain  being  good — one,  in  fact,  is  only 
more  vicious  than  another.  The  standard  of  academical  compe- 
tence is,  consequently,  low ; and  the  Professor  too  often,  even  on 
that  low  standard,  an  inadequate  instructor.  But  on  this  matter 
I need  not  at  present  enter,  having  already  treated  of  it  in  detail. 
(See  pp.  345-381.) 

In  the  second  place,  the  doctrine  of  a Professor  is  at  best  only 
the  opinion  of  an  individual. — If  appointed  by  an  incompetent, 
an  irresponsible,  a partial  authority,  he  is  probably  of  merely  or- 
dinary talents,  or  of  merely  ordinary  information  ; in  either  case, 
therefore,  his  opinions,  on  the  subject  which  he  has  an  academical 
monopoly  to  teach,  are  not  worth  the  knowing. — If  the  Professor 
be  a man  of  talent,  his  ingenuity  may  easily  mislead  both  himself 
and  others;  and,  exempt  from  criticism,  he  may  continue  to  pro- 
pagate for  decades,  with  the  authority  of  a privileged  teacher  and 
the  contagion  of  admiring  pupils,  doctrines  not  only  theoretically 
false,  but  practically  dangerous  ; doctrines  which,  if  published  to 
the  world,  are  lightly  analyzed  into  a tissue  of  sophistry  and  half 
knowledge.  It  may  indeed  be,  that  a Professorial  course  is  trust- 
worthy and  instructive,  supplying  a want  in  the  patent  literature 
of  the  subject ; or  affording  a useful  introduction  to  its  study. 
But  this  is  rare.  How  few  academical  courses  have  been  thought 
worthy  of  the  press,  even  by  self-love  or  the  partiality  of  friend- 
ship ; and  of  those  which  have  actually  been  published,  how  few 
have  the  public  thought  worthy  of  perusal ! But  for  the  chance 
of  such  a possibility,  I hardly  think,  that  a great  University,  like 
Oxford  (which  has  at  its  disposal  a large  and  costly  staff  of  Tutors, 
and,  therefore,  is  not,  like-  poorer  Universities,  dependent  on  Pro- 
fessors), would  be  wise,  in  preferring  the  dangerous  probabilities 


730  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

of  our  present  Professorial  system,  or  even  the  favorable  contin- 
gencies of  any  better  which  it  is  ever  likely  to  compass.  It 
would,  in  my  humble  opinion,  be  far  safer  to  elevate  its  actual 
education  by  Tutors  ; than,  subverting  that,  to  return  to  its  old 
education  by  Professors  (still  statutory  though  this  be),  even 
with  the  best  prospects  of  improvement.1 

In  the  third  place,  there  are  in  all  or  most  of  the  departments 
of  knowledge  which  a University,  in  its  fundamental  faculty, 
ought  by  preference  to  teach,  certain  essential  parts,  certain  pri- 
mary or  preparatory  truths,  certain  books  even,  which  it  is  of  the 
utmost  consequence,  that  a student  should,  above  all  and  before 
all,  be  made  familiar  with.2  But  these,  for  the  very  reason  that 


1 I have  latterly,  in  some  subordinate  points,  modified  my  opinion  on  the  Professorial 
and  Tutorial  systems,  in  reference  to  Oxford,  and  in  reference  to  each  other ; and  this 
principally  from  three  considerations. 

In  the_/irst  place,  I was  formerly  inclined  to  professorial,  as  the  chief  academical 
instruction,  not  certainly  on  its  own  account  (for  I always  held,  that  what  is  good  in 
a lecture  would  be  better  in  a book) ; but  because  I saw  therein  the  only  mean  of  col- 
lecting the  students  in  large  classes  : regarding  a large  class  as  the  necessary  condi- 
tion of  exercise  ; and  deeming  exercise,  if  not  the  sole,  as  the  paramount,  function  of 
a University  in  its  general  education.  I had  even,  in  theory,  imagined  a plurality  of 
Professors  on  the  same  subject,  in  order  to  reduce  the  class  of  auditors  to  the  possi- 
bility of  being  exercised  ; thinking,  perhaps,  too  much  of  the  utility  of  professorial 
competition  and  the  example  of  ancient  Padua,  too  little  of  the  countervailing  evils 
and  the  example  of  Universities  in  general.  But  though  this  plan  has  been  also  ad- 
vocated by  my  learned  friend,  Mr.  Bonamy  Price,  in  his  late  ingenious  “ Suggestions 
for  the  extension  of  Professorial  teaching  in  the  University  of  Oxford,”  I can  not 
now  maintain  it.  It  had  not  formerly  occurred  to  me,  that  this  exercise  might  be 
effected,  and  better  effected,  by  other  means  than  the  Professor.  Of  this  I am  now 
persuaded.  For,  were  the  Tutors  merely  raised  to  their  proper  level  as  instructors, 
as  without  difficulty  could  be  done,  they  might  then  easily  be  drawn  from  the  College, 
and  each,  like  a Professor,  applied  as  an  individual  in  the  exercise  of  University 
classes.  Nay,  as  the  proper  execution  of  this  office  requires  numbers,  the  Tutors,  in 
their  plurality,  could  discharge  it  better  than  is  possible  by  all  the  exertions  of  any 
single  exerciser — of  any  Professor. 

In  the  second  place,  a maturer  reflection  has  convinced  me — that  while  the  Tutors 
ought  not  to  be  abolished  but  improved  ; their  subjection,  as  subordinates  to  the  per- 
sonal and  arbitrary  instruction  of  a Professor,  would,  by  men  of  standing  and  intelli- 
gence, be  felt  as  degrading,  even  were  the  Professor  raised  to  what  he  ought  to  be, 
and  as  simply  intolerable,  were  the  Professor  to  remain  at  the  present  British  level, 
that  is,  be  no  better  than  themselves. 

In  the  third  place,  if  the  Professorial  system,  for  the  non-physical— the  non-exhibi- 
tory  studies,  were  again  restored,  and  still  more  if  a plurality  of  Professors  lectured 
on  the  same  science,  there  could  either  no  longer  be  any  unity  in  the  examination  for 
a degree,  or  the  subjects  of  examination  must  be  divorced  from  the  teaching  of  the 
academical  instructor. 

To  these  three  considerations  there  may  be  added  a fourth ; — the  improbability,  that 
even  if  the  Professorial  system  were  re-established,  it  would  be  established  on  a pro- 
per footing,  that  is,  on  a footing  such  as  is  not  yet  realized  in  any  University  of  this 
kingdom,  and  to  the  realization  of  which  within  herself,  Oxford  would  make  undoubt- 
edly a strenuous  resistance.  But  such  was  the  hypothesis. 

c In  truth,  all  the  older  (as  indeed  some  of  the  later)  Professorial  “ prelections.” 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


731 


they  are  certain,  while  they  at  once  supersede  his  speculations 
and  occupy  his  course  ; are  apt  to  he  omitted,  or  slurred  over, 
or  given,  without  reference  to  their  author,  even  hy  a Professor 
not  ignorant  of  their  relations  and  importance.  The  advantage  of 
the  taught  is  thus,  too  often,  sacrificed  to  the  glory  of  the  teacher ; 
the  unhappy  learner  being  inflated  by  the  syllabub  of  novel  para- 
dox, not  nourished  by  the  bread  of  ancient  truth.  The  reverse 
of  this  a University  ought  to  insure.  And  in  the  documents 
which  an  alumnus  ought  by  preference  to  study,  there  is  more 
than  sufficient  to  exhaust  the  curriculum  of  Arts.  A series  of 
such  documents  therefore  the  University  of  Oxford,  having  adopt- 
ed the  plan  of  Tutorial  instruction,  is  even  bound  to  provide  and 
privilege  ; as  the  materials  of  private  study  by  the  pupils — of 
explanation  by  the  Tutors  in  the  Colleges — and  of  exercise  by  the 
Tutors  in  the  “ schools.” 

But  coming  to  the  great  question — Is  this  condition  hy  Oxford 
adequately  fulfilled? — To  this  we  must,  without  qualification, 
emphatically  answer — No.  Indeed  every,  the  remotest  requisite 
toward  this  fulfillment  remains  still  unsupplied.  There  has  in 
Oxford  been  no  attempt  even  to  organize  an  intelligent  board  by 
whom  such  designation,  selection  and  collection  might  be  care- 
fully, and  continually  made.  The  business  of  such  a board  of 
studies  is  neither  easy  nor  temporary.  The  right  performance 
of  its  duties  supposes  great  learning  and  great  judgment ; and  its 
decisions  of  one  year,  it  should  be  ready  to  revise  and  even  to 
reverse,  the  next.  It  ought  to  be  actuated  by  no  motive  but  the 
scientific  interest  of  the  student ; and,  of  course,  in  its  choice  of 
works  for  academical  reading,  it  would  regard  as  foolish  any  lim- 
itation by  country  or  by  school.  But  such  a selection  is  not  more 
difficult  than  necessary.  A University  which  employs  a tutorial 
or  semi-tutorial  system  is  bound  to  have  its  own  series  of  approv- 


were  only  explanatory  of  books  ; and  the  various  departments  of  the  Faculty  of  Arts, 
throughout  the  Universities  of  Europe,  owe  their  constitution,  in  fact,  to  Aristotle, 
whose  different  works  (either  in  his  plain  text,  or  in  this  text  and  a commentary,  or 
in  an  abstract  from  this  text)  were  what  the  “ Reader”  attempted — were,  indeed,  what 
alone  he  was  permitted  to  expound.  The  older  Professors  were  therefore  intermediate 
between  our  present  Professors  and  our  present  Tutors.  In  Louvain,  for  example 
(p.  664,  sq.),  the  Professors  of  the  Psedagogia  bore,  perhaps,  even  more  analogy  to 
College  Tuto-rs  than  to  University  Professors.  The  older  academical  instructors  thus, 
in  fact,  united  what  more  recently  have  been  severed.  Nor  was  the  union  useless  ; 
for  beside  combining  the  advantages  of  the  two  systems  of  teaching,  professorial  and 
tutorial,  it  comprised  others  of  far  higher  consequence,  in  an  unexclusive  employment 
of  all  the  means  of  exercise  and  excitation. 


732 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


ed  books,  for  its  own  cycle  of  approved  studies  ; and  among  the 
“ academical  courses”  which  have,  in  consequence,  been  collected 
and  composed,  we  possess  some  of  the  most  valuable  contribu- 
tions which  have  ever  been  made  to  learning  and  philosophy. 
But  in  this  respect,  Oxford  has  done  absolutely  nothing — beyond 
(to  say  nothing  of  religion)  some  indication  of  the  vaguest  in  its 
Examination  Statutes  touching  the  age  and  character  of  the  clas- 
sical works  to  which  the  candidate  is  limited.  As  once  and  again 
repeated,  the  central — the  peculiarly  academic  province  of  specu- 
lative philosophy  or  philosophy  proper  is,  in  modern  Oxford  as  in 
modern  Cambridge,  ignored.  And  in  both,  as  has  been  also  no- 
ticed, for  the  same  reason — the  average  inability  of  the  Tutors. 
The  easier  parts  of  Aristotle’s  system  were  indeed  still  retained ; 
but  these  might,  in  the  circumstances,  have  been  as  well  omit- 
ted ; because,  read  as  fragments,  and  by  minds  undisciplined  to 
abstraction,  they  could  neither  be  understood  themselves,  nor 
stimulate  the  intellect  to  understand  aught  else.  There  was  no 
gradation  from  the  easy  to  the  difficult,  from  the  new  to  the  old. 
Philosophy  was  taught,  philosophy  was  learned  more  by  rote  than 
by  reason ; and  an  abrupt  intrusion  of  the  tyro  thinker  into  the 
Ethics  or  Politics  of  the  Stagirite  might  discourage  or  disgust 
even  a potential  Montesquieu.  Logic  alone  was  studied  in  a 
modern  summary.  But  here  too  the  unphilosophical  character 
of  the  Oxford  philosophical  discipline  is  apparent.  That  Univer- 
sity, having  formerly  adopted,  still  adheres  to  the  Compendium 
of  Aldrich,  not  because  Aldrich  was  a learned  dialectician,  but  an 
academical  dignitary  ; and  the  book,  not  overvalued  by  its  able 
author,  after  leading  and  misleading  Oxford  logicians,  during 
former  generations,  at  last  affords  a more  appropriate  text  for 
their  corrections  during  the  present.1  But  should  Alma  Mater 
thus  lag  behind  her  alumni  ? 

3.  The  Instruction  and  its  modes. — (Pp.  695,  sq.,  and  718,  sq.) 

The  mode  of  instruction  is  varied  by  the  various  character  of 
its  objects.  The  knowledge  which  depends  on  the  ocular  demon- 
stration of  costly  collections  and  experiments ; — this  knowledge, 
easy  and  palpable,  requiring  an  appliance  more  of  the  senses  than 
of  the  understanding,  can  be  fully  taught  to  all,  at  once,  by  one 
competent  demonstrator.  The  teaching  of  the  natural  or  physical 


1 See  Mr.  Mansel’s  Notes  on  the  Rudimenta  of  Aldrich.  Of  these,  without  dispa- 
ragement to  the  Dean,  it  may  be  said — “ La  sauce  vaut  mieux  que  le  poisson.” 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


733 


sciences  ought,  therefore,  as  I have  already  observed,  to  he  Pro- 
fessorial. On  the  contrary,  the  sciences  which  result  less  from 
perception  than  from  thought,  and  which  principally  require, 
that  the  understanding  of  the  learner  should  be  itself  vigorously 
applied  ; these  sciences,  having  no  external  exhibition,  are  not 
astricted  to  individual  teaching,  and  if  many  can  more  effectually 
rouse  the  mind  of  the  learner  to  elahorative  exertion  than  one, 
will  best  he  taught  by  a well  organized  plurality  of  teachers — in 
other  words,  through  a good  Tutorial  system.  This  good  Tuto- 
rial system , which  supposes  always  a competency  in  the  indivi- 
dual, is  a combination  of  the  private  instruction  by  a Tutor  in  the 
College , and  of  the  public  discipline  by  Tutors  in  the  University . 

The  most  important  academical  sciences — the  cognitions,  best 
in  themselves,  best  as  preparative  for  others,  and  best  cultivating 
the  mind  of  the  student,  are  all  of  this  latter  kind.  I would, 
therefore,  prefer  for  them,  perhaps  absolutely,  and  certainly 
under  the  circumstances  of  Oxford,  the  improved  Tutorial  system. 
This  supposes  two  conditions.  It  supposes — 

1°,  Collegial  instruction  by  a Tutor — collegio-tutorial  classes. 
— The  student  having  by  himself  attentively  perused,  and,  as  far 
as  possible,  mastered  a certain  portion  of  a certain  book,  goes  up 
along  with  his  class-fellows  of  the  same  college  to  the  Tutor’s 
lecture.  Here  the  pupil  reads,  repeats,  and  is  examined ; his 
mistakes  are  corrected,  his  deficiencies  supplied,  and  his  diffi- 
culties solved.  The  Tutor,  now  never  an  inferior  graduate,  has 
his  zeal  and  emulation  stimulated  toward  an  ever  higher  instruc- 
tion of  his  pupils  ; conscious,  that  from  day  to  day  they  are  to 
be  publicly  tried,  publicly  collated,  and  that  his  own  character 
and  competence  will,  though  indirectly,  assuredly  be  meted  by 
theirs.  The  pupils,  on  their  part,  are  actuated  still  more  strongly 
by  the  like  feelings  ; for  their  honor  is  directly  interested  in  going 
down,  as  well  as  possibly  prepared,  into  the  important  and  public 
contest  of  the  University  class.  Thus  it  is,  that  new  life  and 
strength  would,  under  the  improved  system,  be  inspired  into  the 
collegial  tuition ; and  it  might  then  be  said  of  the  Colleges  of 
Oxford,  no  less  truly  than  of  the  Colleges  of  Louvain  (p.  667), 
“ here  no  labor  is  spared,  either  by  the  Tutors  in  teaching,  or  by 
the  Pupils  in  learning.”  This  further  supposes — 

2°,  University  discipline  by  Tutors — academico-tutorial  classes. 
— The  students  who,  in  the  several  Houses,  and  under  their  sev- 
eral Tutors,  have  been  prepared  in  the  same  book,  are  now  to  be 


734  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

collected  for  further  examination,  &c.  into  a public  or  University 
class.  But  as  the  number  of  such  students  might  be  so  great, 
(trenching  perhaps  on  four  hundred),  that  they  would,  if  congre- 
gated into  a single  class,  baffle  exercise ; and  as,  at  the  same 
time,  it  is  of  vital  importance  for  the  sake  of  competition,  that 
the  classes  should  not  be  made  too  small,  it  might  hit  the  mean, 
so  to  divide  them,  that  a hundred  and  fifty  being  the  maximum, 
the  correlative  University  classes  might  probably  be  three. 

In  these  classes  (which  might  meet  for  an  hour  on  five,  or  for 
an  hour  and  a half  on  four  days  of  the  week),  the  students  should 
be  exercised  in  examination,  oral  and  written,  in  compositions  to 
be  strictly  criticised  and  read,  &c. ; and  so  called  up  (as  by  the 
lottery  of  an  alphabet),  that  it  shall  be  impossible  to  anticipate 
the  occurrence.  These  classes  to  be  each  conducted  by  at  least 
three  Tutors  ; who  may  either  remain  in  one,  or  circulate,  more 
or  less  rapidly,  through  all.  It  might  be  better,  probably,  to 
have  the  Tutors  specially  appointed  to  the  University  classes, 
though  the  appointment  ought  only  to  be  temporary ; and  a cer- 
tain emolument  should,  likewise,  be  attached  to  this  function. 
The  office  of  University  Tutor  would  thus  be  rendered  at  once 
of  higher  honor  and  of  greater  responsibility.  In  a class  one 
Tutor  should  act  as  Prseses  ; but  on  what  principle  this  pre-em- 
inence should  be  regulated,  is  a matter  indeterminate  and  of 
minor  importance.  No  Tutor  should  examine  or  criticise  his  own 
pupils — Tutor  and  pupil  should,  in  fact,  be  separated  in  all  rela- 
tive to  academical  honors.  In  an  exercitation  of  the  students 
the  plurality  of  the  Tutors  affords  great  advantages  over  the  in- 
dividuality of  a Professor  ; and  in  such  an  exercising  is  comprised 
the  most,  and  the  most  peculiar,  of  the  benefits  which  academi- 
cal instruction  affords.  For  Tutors  being  once  competent  to  the 
work,  may  be  indefinitely  multiplied  according  to  its  exigencies; 
whereas  a Professor,  if  he  do  not,  as  he  generally  does,  altogether 
neglect  the  labor,  yet  limits  and  must  limit  it,  to  the  narrow 
sphere  of  his  individual  capabilities. 

The  exercise  of  the  student  in  the  University  classes,  should 
be  partly  exigible,  partly  ultroneous.  The  former  would  simply 
qualify  for  a degree,  through  a mere  certificate  of  attendance ; 
whereas  the  latter  would  afford  the  mean  toward  distinction  and 
class  honors. 

Attendance  on  all  the  University  classes  should  not  be  requisite 
for  graduation,  but  only  on  a certain  number.  Some  classes  may 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


735 


fee  too  elementary  for  some  students  ; and,  on  the  contrary,  some 
students,  though  not  undeserving  of  a degree,  may  want  the 
scholarship  or  capacity  necessary  for  some  classes. — Attendance 
to  be  secured  and  ascertained,  by  a catalogue  called  daily,  or  at 
irregular  intervals. — Certain  classes  to  vary  annually  their  books. 

The  University  classes,  in  general,  ought  to  commence  and 
finish  with  the  academical  year — that  is,  in  the  terms  of  Michael- 
mas and  Trinity ; and  attendance  during  three  of  these  years 
should  be  required  for  a degree.  This  would,  of  course,  necessi- 
tate a modification  of  the  irregular  entrance  and  the  irregular 
attendance,  still  tolerated  in  the  English  Universities.  The  va- 
cations might  perhaps  remain  unchanged ; for  these  cessations 
in  the  University  classes  could  be  usefully  employed  as  seasons 
of  domestic  repetition  or  revisal.  (See  p.  699,  note.)  But  on 
this  and  other  matters  of  detail,  I avoid  speaking.1 

1 There  is  another,  though  a minor,  and  merely  collegial,  abuse,  which  could  not 
survive  the  congregation  of  the  academical  youth  for  serious  study  in  unexclusive 
classes  ; — -I  mean  the  foolish  distinction  of  what  (to  say  nothing  of  another,  that  of 
“ Nobleman,”)  is  usually  called  “ Gentleman  or  Fellow  Commoner and  which,  though 
too  contemptible  for  notice  in  the  text,  may  be  dispatched  in  a foot-note.  To  those 
ignorant  of  the  English  collegial  system,  be  it  known  then,  that  for  payment  of  an 
extra  rate  of  Tutor’s  fees,  room  rent,  &c.,  an  intrant  is  admitted  into  certain  Houses, 
under  the  above  designation — dines  at  a different  table  from  the  other  undergraduates 
— walks  about  in  a peculiar  garb — and  is  specially  privileged  to  neglect  the  ordinary 
discipline,  the  ordinary  necessity  of  study.  “ The  Gentlemen  Commoners”  are,  I 
find  in  Oxford,  now  in  number  nearly  a hundred  ; constituting  a sixteenth  part  of  the 
whole  undergraduates.  They  are  admitted  by  a majority  of  the  Halls — by  a minority 
of  the  Colleges. 

In  every  point  of  view,  the  distinction,  name  and  thing,  is,  apart  from  the  lucrative 
return  to  certain  parties,  utterly  absurd. 

It  is  grammatically  absurd.  The  word  “ Gentleman ” properly  means — “ man  of 
family  but  the  collegial  distinction  can  now  be  purchased  by  any  ; and  is,  indeed, 
peculiarly  affected  by  those  who  have  no  other  pretension,  but  this  same  purchase, 
to  the  inverse  appellation. — It  is  historically  absurd.  For  though  of  old,  birth  and 
wealth  might,  here  as  elsewhere,  hold  some  mutual  proportion ; in  this  country,  at 
least,  they  now  hold  and  have  long  held,  none. — It  is  statistically  absurd.  For  while 
in  aristocratic  Germany  (where  blood  is  legally  discriminated  and  privileged),  a Prince 
even  of  the  Empire  frequents  his  father’s  University  in  the  plain  guise  of  an  ordinary 
“bursch;”  in  democratic  England,  where  blood  is  not  discriminated,  far  less  privi- 
leged, by  law,  and  in  the  richest,  oldest  and  most  venerable  of  our  national  Universities, 
each  aspiring  Snohson  publicly  ventilates  his  private  purchase  of  an  ironical  gentility 
in  silk  and  velvet.  Here,  we  see,  in  one  College,  a far  descended  nobleman,  assiduous 
in  study  as  a simple  commoner ; and  there,  the  issue  of  a topping  tradesman,  the 
scion,  perhaps,  of  his  lordship's  tailor,  idly  rustling  it  as  “ Le  Bourgeois  Gentilhomme,” 
in  the  next — It  is  socially  absurd.  For  if  “ Gentleman”  be  taken  in  its  popular  ac- 
ceptation, for  “ man  of  honor,”  its  attribution  to  a few  is  a gratuitous  and  groundless, 
insult  upon  the  many.  But,  in  both  its  acceptations,  the  collegial  distinction  is, 
socially  considered,  a matter  either  of  scandal  or  of  contempt. — It  is  politically  absurd. 
For  the  Crown  itself,  while  it  creates  a nobleman,  is  unable  to  create  a gentleman. 
Gentlemen,  however,  the  English  colleges  presume  to  make  and  unmake.  But  in 
truth,  their  conservative  Heads  do  what  in  them  lies  radically  to  level  ranks,  by  sub- 


736 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


4.  The  Excitement  to  Study.  (Pp.  692,  sq.,  and  717,  sq.) 
Emulation  is  the  one  motive  to  diligence  which  the  student 

verting  in  their  Houses  the  natural  aristocracy,  of  which,  for  a paltry  gain,  they  con- 
sent to  prostitute,  vulgarize  and  render  ridiculous  the  very  name.  With  these  col- 
legial heralds  (as  with  some  heraldic  colleges), 

— “ titulos  regina  Pecunia  donat 
El  genus  et  proavos,  sordesque  parentis  honestat.” 

— It  is  academically  absurd.  For  the  distinction  is,  throughout  Christendom,  known 
only  in  the  English  Universities.  In  these,  it  is  even  unknown  to  the  public  and 
statutory  University,  cither  of  Oxford  or  of  Cambridge  ; it  originates  exclusively  in 
the  license  usurped  by  the  private  Houses,  the  Houses  through  which  the  national 
seminary  has  been  illegally  superseded  ; and  even  of  these,  it  is  tolerated  only  in  a. 
minority  of  the  Colleges,  in  a majority  of  the  Halls,  as  an  excuse  for  certain  extra- 
ordinary charges,  while  in  the  (educationally)  best — indeed,  in  most  of  the  Houses, 
it  has  been  abolished,  as  at  once  a nuisance  and  an  opprobrium.  But  the  abuse  is 
carried  to  its  climax — carried,  indeed,  into  another  category,  by  being  made,  in  many 
cases,  a mean  of  pecuniary  extortion.  Accommodation  in  a licensed  House  is,  in 
the  English  Universities,  necessary,  and,  at  the  same  time,  now  limited  ; a long  pre- 
vious application  is  requisite  for  admission  into  the  better  Houses ; and  the  others 
are  thus  able,  without  leaving  their  lodgings  unlet,  to  compel  the  intrant  to  compound 
for  the  sham  title  and  the  suicidal  privileges,  which  are  paid  for — and  despised.  Nor 
by  these  colleges  cap  it  be  said — “ My  poverty  and  not  my  will  consents  for  to  aggra- 
vate still  farther  the  disgrace,  the  wealthiest  foundations  are  the  principal  extortionists. 

But,  finally  and  principally,  it  is  educationally  absurd.  The  Houses  profess  to 
afford  the  means  of  education,  to  replace,  in  fact,  of  themselves,  the  University  ; and 
yet,  in  so  far  as  they  maintain  this  distinction,  they  do  all  within  their  power,  to 
frustrate  the  whole  scantling  of  instruction  which  they  now  dispense.  For,  as  re- 
gards the  members  themselves  styled  “ Gentlemen  Commoners  — these,  admitted, 
ostensibly  for  education,  are  relieved  from  educational  discipline,  albeit  precisely  those 
for  whom  such  discipline  is  most  imperiously  requisite.  They  are  virtually  told,  in- 
deed, by  collegial  wisdom,  that  though  academical  residence  may  be  a fashionable 
form,  academical  study  is  of  very  trivial  importance. — And,  as  regards  the  other 
members  : — there  is  thus  authoritatively  introduced,  fostered,  paraded,  and  imposed, 
in  what  ought,  in  what  professes,  to  be  a domestic  society  for  sedulous  application, 
a contagious  example  of  favored  idleness,  insubordination,  and  contempt  of  knowl- 
edge. “ It  is  at  College  above  all  places,”  says  Napoleon  (Bourrienne,  I.  xxv.)  “ that 
equality  should  prevail.”  At  least,  the  only  inequality  recognized  in  a seminary  of 
education  should  be  that  of  intellect  and  learning.  In  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  how- 
ever, some  Houses  still  think  differently.  To  pay  more,  to  learn  less,  in  them  obtains 
academical  distinction — is  actually  proclaimed,  in  these  foci  of  illumination,  the  cri- 
terion of  a “Gentleman!” — Especial  honor  is  therefore  due  to  those  “gentlemen,” 
who  prove  themselves  not  idlers,  though  thus  collegiaily  privileged,  nay  encouraged 
to  be  idle. 

The  absurdity  is,  however,  so  singular,  so  flagrant,  so  perverse,  and  withal  so 
vulgar ; that,  while  at  present  in  the  reawakening  spirit  of  the  Universities,  it  only 
languishes  in  the  privacy  and  division  (“Divide  et  impera,”)  of  the — not  best  Col- 
leges and  Halls : the  snobbism  would  perish  forthwith  (if  from  no  other  cause)  under 
public  ridicule,  were  the  students  once  again  collected  into  classes  in  the  public 
schools  ; — though  I do  not  imagine,  that  the  patrons  of  the  practice  would  in  these 
venture  to  propose  “ reserved  seats.”  But  as  the  distinction  is  personally  profitable, 
and  as  to  some  minds,  what  is  personally  profitable  appears  always  to  be  universally 
expedient  (“What  will  not  man  defend  1”)  we  may  be  sure,  that  for  this,  among 
other  motives,  will  any  restoration  of  a public  and  university  education  be  strenuously 
resisted' — if  possible  ; for  a recovery  of  the  University  to  health,  would  infallibly,  at  once, 
determine  a cure  of  this  scabies  debilitatis  in  that  learned  body.  And  the  Houses — they 
can  not,  surely,  always  be  allowed,  both  to  subvert  and  to  dishonor  the  University. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


737 


may  be  safely  supposed  to  bring  with  him  to  the  University  ; and 
this  motive,  as  we  have  seen,  Oxford  does  not  fully  employ.  To 
correct  this  deficiency,  there  are  certain  conditions  which  it  is 
requisite  to  fulfill. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  the  conditions  of  publicity , num- 
bers, and  co-equality . These  would  be  conjunctly  supplied,  were 
the  alumni  of  the  University  once  again  collected  from  the  privacy 
of  Hall  and  College  into  the  publicity  of  the  academic  “ Schools” 
— from  classes  of  an  average  of  seven  or  eight  (Coplestone’s  esti- 
mate) to  classes  of  a hundred  or  a hundred  and  fifty. 

In  the  second  place,  the  competition  roused  in  large  and  public 
classes  can  alone  supply  the  deficiencies  of  the  public  examination 
for  a degree,  viewed  as  an  instrument  of  emulation ; for  in  them 
may  the  stimulus  be  applied  to  all,  and  to  all  during  their  whole 
course  of  academic  study. 

In  the  third  place,  the  condition  of  exercise  (Examination,  Dis- 
putation, Writing,  &c.)  as  the  mean  through  which  the  learner 
may  distinguish  himself,  can  alone,  or  alone  in  any  adequate 
degree,  be  made  effective  in  large  and  public  classes.  For  only 
in  exercise  can  the  powers  of  a competitor  be  drawn  forth  into 
energy ; and  as  only  in  such  classes  is  exercise  available,  so  only 
in  such  classes  can  that  energy  be  compared,  estimated,  and  ade- 
quately honored. 

This  honor  may  be  awarded  by  the  suffrage,  either  of  the 
whole  class  (taught  and  teacher)  or  by  the  Tutors  alone.  A com- 
bination of  the  two  would,  I think,  be  preferable ; and  perhaps 
thus  : — Suppose  that  the  students  of  the  same  book  are  distribu- 
ted into  three  University  classes ; each  amounting  to  the  maxi- 
mum of  a hundred  and  fifty.  At  the  close  of  the  academical 
year,  let  the  (regular)  attenders  of  a class  designate  by  suffrage, 
say  thirty  (or  twenty)  of  their  number,  as  worthy  of  the  first, 
second,  &c.,  place  of  honor.  These  honored  students  may  be 
divided  into  decades.  The  nine  decades  may  then  be  taken  by 
the  Tutors  of  the  three  classes  acting  together ; the  students  of 
the  corresponding  decade  all  tried  against  each  other ; and  the 
whole  thirty  finally  subordinated  in  the  order  of  merit.  This 
ultimate  arrangement  would  thus  be  partly  the  work  of  the  pu- 
pils, partly  of  the  Tutors. — The  whole  division  into  decades  may, 
however,  and  perhaps  profitably,  be  omitted ; the  final  distribu- 
tion of  the  ninety  places  of  honor  among  the  ninety  preferred 
students,  being,  with  any  adequate  restriction,  left  to  the  Tutors. 

3 A 


738 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


Before  the  suffrages  of  a class  are  taken,  a solemn  promise  (in 
fact  an  oath)  of  conscientious  performance  of  duty  to  he  required 
of  all  voters  by  the  presiding  Tutor  ; and  (to  make  the  perform- 
ance more  easy)  the  suffrages  to  he  given  in  writing,  with  the 
voter’s  signature,  to  he  known,  therefore,  only,  as  counted  by 
the  Tutors.  The  Tutors  themselves  to  promise  in  like  manner. 
The  list  of  honors  to  be  printed  in  large  characters  ; a copy  sent 
to  each  House  ; and  one  framed  and  hung  up  in  some  public 
place  of  the  University.  It  should  appear  perhaps  in  the  Cal- 
endar. 

5.  The  Degree  or  Certificate  of  Proficiency  in  Arts.  (Pp.  704, 
and  720,  with  663,  sq.) 

It  is  proper,  in  the  first  place,  to  state  what  Oxford  has  done 
in  this  respect.  And  here  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  the  past 
and  the  prospective  legislations  of  the  University,  establishing, 
as  they  do,  two  very  different  schemes  of  Examination  for  this 
degree. 

By  the  past  legislation  of  the  University,  I mean  that  com- 
mencing in  1807.  In  this,  down  to  the  present  time  (to  say 
nothing  of  the  Responsions),  1°,  there  was  only  a single  exam- 
ination, and  this  first  competent  in  the  thirteenth  term  or  com- 
mencement of  the  fourth  year;  and  2°,  in  that  examination  there 
were  only  two  Departments  of  trial  and  distinction — the  Literce 
Hmnaniores,  and  the  Disciplince  Mathematics  et  Physicce — 
which  latter  was  wholly  optional  to  the  candidate.  So  far  all 
was  uniform.  But  several  steps,  through  several  statutes,  mul- 
tiplied the  classes  of  honor  in  each  department,  from  two  to  four  ; 
persons  in  the  same  class  being  always  accounted  equal,  and 
alphabetically  arranged. 

By  the  new  statute  (passed  in  1850,  and  to  commence  in  the 
Easter  Examination  of  1853),  the  preceding  scheme  is  changed 
in  sundry  important  points. — Besides  the  Responsions — there  are 
to  be  two  Examinations , with  two  relative  Classifications : the 
First,  commencing  with  the  eighth  and  ending  with  the  twelfth 
term ; the  Second,  commencing  with  the  thirteenth  and  ending 
with  the  eighteenth  term  (normally  at  least  and  for  honors). — 
The  First  of  these  Examinations  has,  as  of  old,  two  Departments, 
and  these  nearly  the  same  ; to  wit,  Greek  and  Latin  Literature , 
and  Pure  Mathematics — which  last  is  now,  as  formerly,  wholly 
optional.  Each  of  these  departments  is  to  have  only  a First  and 
Second  Class  of  Honor.  In  these  classes  all  the  candidates  are* 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


739 


as  hitherto,  equal — their  names  being  alphabetically  arranged. 
For  the  first  time,  the  names  of  those  who  pass  without  honor 
are  to  be  published. — The  Second  Examination,  which  is  new,  has 
four  departments,  or,  as  they  are  not  happily  called,  “Schools 
to  wit,  Humane  Letters — Mathematical  and  Physical  Sciences 
— Natural  Science — Jurisprudence  and  Modern  History.  Each 
of  these  departments  has,  what  is  old,  four  Classes  of  Honor,  in 
which  the  names  follow  alphabetically,  and  are  of  course  pub- 
lished. But  besides  these  classes,  the  names  of  those  who  merely 
pass,  are  henceforth,  as  in  the  first  examination,  to  be  also  re- 
corded.— To  qualify  for  a degree,  it  is  necessary  to  pass  again  in 
the  department  of  Humane  Letters , and  (besides  attending  two 
courses  of  Public  Lectures  in  the  University)  to  pass  in  some  one 
of  the  other  three. 

Neither  of  these  schemes,  though  both  in  certain  respects  are 
praiseworthy,  seems  to  me  such  as  ought  to  satisfy  a University, 
and  that  the  University  of  Oxford.  In  so  far  as  encouragement 
is  thus  given  to  pursuits  useful,  as  well  objectively  in  the  pursuit 
of  other  studies,  as  subjectively,  in  the  cultivation  of  the  student's 
mind,  they  are  of  course  deserving  of  approbation.  But  these 
ends,  neither  scheme  of  examination  appears  at  all  adequately  to 
accomplish.  In  fact,  while  the  former  shows  as  imperfect  and 
redundant,  the  latter  shows  not  only  as  imperfect  and  redundant, 
but  even  as  suicidal. 

In  the  first  place,  the  imperfection , common  to  both  the 
schemes,  is  manifested  in  the  want — academically  unexampled 
out  of  the  illegal  condition  of  the  English  Universities — of  a 
really  philosophical  department,  for  study  and  examination.  But 
of  this  I have  already  spoken  (pp.  710,  sq.) 

In  the  second  place,  the  redundance , common  to  both,  lies  in 
the  mathematical  department  (pure  and  applied).  Mathematical 
study,  it  is  perhaps  idle  to  repeat,  we  here  consider,  not  in  its 
objective  relation  as  a mean  in  or  toward  certain  material  sciences ; 
but  in  its  subjective  relation  exclusively,  as  a mean  of  cultivating 
the  capacity  itself  of  thought.  In  this  point  of  view,  I have 
already  shown,  and  at  great  length  (pp.  257-324,  640-670),  that 
it  is  useless,  even  detrimental,  if  not  applied  temperately  and 
with  due  caution ; for  instead  of  invigorating,  it  may  enervate  the 
reasoning  faculty,  and  is,  therefore,  a study  undeserving  of  an 
indiscriminate  encouragement  in  a liberal  education  of  the  mind. 

In  this  relation,  Oxford  seems  at  fault,  in  both  its  schemes  of 


740 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


examination.  In  the  former,  the  Mathematical  sciences  obtained 
one  of  the  two  departments  between  which  the  academical  grad- 
uation trial  was  divided  ; though  Oxford,  leaving  always  these 
sciences  wholly  optional  to  the  candidate,  stands  in  favorable  con- 
trast with  Cambridge.  For  this  University  making  Mathematics, 
and  Mathematics  alone,  a passport  to  its  degree  and  relative  dis- 
tinctions ; in  fact,  seemed  as  if  it  acted  on  the  futile  inscription 
falsely  imagined  over  Plato’s  school. 

In  the  prospective  statute  the  inconsistency  is,  perhaps,  even 
enhanced.  For  here,  though  Mathematics  are  still  always  option- 
al, they,  however,  constitute  ostensibly  a moiety  of  the  first  ex- 
amination. But  the  policy  of  the  Oxford  Convocation  in  conced- 
ing to  the  Discipline  Mathematics  a half  of  the  whole  academi- 
cal honors,  is  shown  to  be  unwise,  even  by  the  evidence  drawn 
from  the  Oxford  examinations  themselves.  And  thus  : 

Looking  firstly  to  the  Instructed. — For  the  decade  from  1838 
to  1847,  we  have  the  following  results  : All  the  honors  in  D.  M. 
(255)  bear  the  proportion  to  all  the  honors  in  L.  H.  (923)  of  some- 
what more  than  a fourth.  Again,  about  four-fifths  (79  out  of  106) 
of  the  First  Class  of  L.  H.  are  in  no  class  of  D.  M.  at  all ; whereas 
only  about  one-fiftli  (10  out  of  48)  of  the  First  Class  of  D.  M.  are 
in  no  class  of  L.  H Finally,  there  are  six-sevenths  of  men  classed 
in  L.  H.  who  are  in  no  class  of  D.  M.  (822  to  124) ; whereas  there 
is  hardly  more  than  a half  (136  out  of  260)  of  those  having  an 
honor  in  D.  M.  and  no  honor  in  L.  H.  In  fact,  those  taking  a 
Mathematical  honor  amount  even  to  a number,  thus  compara- 
tively small,  in  consequence  of  the  comparative  facility  by  which 
such  a distinction  can  always  be  obtained. 

Looking,  secondly , to  the  Instructors. — The  Table  (p.  673) 
exhibits  a still  more  striking  illustration  in  reference  to  them ; 
for  the  teachers,  and  in  particular  the  tutors,  should,  if  at  all  com- 
petent to  their  function,  manifest  a greatly  larger  proportion  of 
highest  honors  in  a department  specially  encouraged  by  the  Uni- 
versity, than  the  undergraduates  at  large,  even  of  the  highest 
colleges.  But  mark  what  is  the  case.  Nineteen  Houses  alone 
have  any  recognized  Tutor ; the  other  five  are  consequently 
beyond  criticism.  Of  the  nineteen : Out  of  the  highest  twelve , 
only  tioo  (5  and  7)  have  even  a single  Tutor  in  this  First  Class ; 
and  no  House  has  more.  Mathematical  talent  rises,  however,  as 
the  Houses  sink.  Of  these  the  next  lower,  and  but  for  one  the 
lowest,  six,  show  each  a Tutor  thus  honored.  There  are,  conse- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


741 


quently,  in  all,  eight  Tutors  with  the  highest  (that  is  the  one  not 
disqualifying)  Mathematical  distinction,  and  forty-one  without 
it ; a proportion,  in  other  words,  of  less  than  a sixth. — And  to 
descend  even  to  the  lowest;  five  Houses  (four  Colleges  and  one 
Hall),  have  among  their  Tutors  no  honors  whatever;  while  three 
Colleges  rejoice  in  a third  class  ; and  three  also  in  a second. 

I am  far  from  disparaging  the  present  members  cf  the  Univer- 
sity of  Oxford,  for  this  deficiency  in  Mathematical  study.  On  the 
contrary,  I think  that  the  indifference  to  Mathematical  distinction, 
there  now  manifested,  both  by  teachers  and  by  taught,  is  cer- 
tainly not  greater  than  the  educational  inexpediency  of  mathe- 
matical study  might  amply  warrant.  But  granting  this,  the  prac- 
tice of  Oxford,  if  its  attribute  be  prudence,  condemns  the  wisdom 
of  its  own  legislature.  Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  more  irrational, 
than  for  a University  specially  to  encourage,  and  to  encourage, 
too,  at  the  expense  of  others,  a study,  both  so  worthless  in  itself 
as  an  educational  mean,  and,  notwithstanding  all  external  and 
factitious  fostering,  so  justly  rated  at  the  proper  value  by  its  own 
members  in  general,  teachers  as  well  as  taught.  Is  this  denied  ? 
The  dilemma  then  emerges  : — If  Mathematics  be  truly  deserving 
of  academical  protection , in  a course  of  liberal  education,  what 
must  be  thought  of  a University  which  abandons  so  indispensable 
a science  to  twenty-four  seminaries — to  forty-nine  Tutors,  only 
eight  of  whom — are  not  proved  comparatively  incompetent  to 
teach  it  ? If,  on  the  other  hand,  this  science  be  unworthy  of  aca- 
demical encouragement , what  must  be  thought  of  a University, 
which,  at  the  cost  of  the  other  moiety  of  its  instruction,  accords 
to  a subjectively  useless  or  detrimental  study  one-half  of  its  formal 
education , one-half  of  its  formal  honors  ? 

In  leaving  the  Mathematical  disciplines  always  optional  to  the 
candidate,  Oxford  acted,  in  my  opinion,  rightly.  But  why, 
regarding  Mathematical  study  as  of  so  ambiguous  a use,  as  to  be 
wholly  unnecessary,  even  to  those  whom  it  distinguished  by  the 
highest  honors,  Oxford  should  still  accord  to  so  doubtful , so  dis- 
pensable a study,  a full  half  of  its  professed  education,  and  a full 
half  of  its  proclaimed  distinction  ; — this,  I confess,  appears  to  me 
an  insoluble  contradiction.  From  the  new  Examination  Statute, 
we  have  seen,  that  Mathematics  (pure  and  applied),  are  to  consti- 
tute one  of  the  three  optional  “ Schools,”  in  the  second  examina- 
tion. So  far,  so  reasonably.  But  why  in  the  First  Examination, 
pure  Mathematics  should  be  still  left,  though  still  always  unin- 


742  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

forced,  to  counterbalance,  in  appearance,  the  all-important  cycle 
of  imperative  instruction,  comprised  under  the  name  of  Greek 
and  Latin  Literature ; — what  is  this  but  a remnant  of  the  old 
inconsistency — of  the  former  futile  attempt  at  conciliating  two 
conflictive  opinions  ? 

In  the  third  place,  the  new  or  prospective  statute  is  suicidal ; 
for  it  tends  to  reduce  the  value  of  the  very  honors  which  it  pro- 
poses to  enhance.  This  effect  is  direct ; and  results  not  from  one, 
but  from  many  various  causes. 

1°.  To  speak  first  of  the  same  department : — The  value  of  an 
Honor  depends  upon  its  unity. — What  is  prized,  as  singular,  is 
disregarded  or  contemned,  as  plural.  The  imagination,  in  fact,  is 
no  longer  agreeably  affected  ; it  must  even  exert  itself,  and  not 
unpainfully,  to  escape  confusion.  How  much  more  satisfactory 
is  it,  on  the  present  scheme,  to  be  of  a First  Class,  with  its  one 
possible  contingency;  than,  on  the  future  scheme,  to  be  of  a First 
Class,  certainly,  but  of  a First  Class  varying  for  better  for  worse, 
uncertainly  to  any  of  the  seven  unequal  combinations  of  a highest 
honor  in  the  same  department.  Thus,  the  division  of  the  honor 
into  two  is,  for  its  own  value,  for  its  own  efficiency,  to  be  depre- 
cated. No  harm,  on  the  contrary,  could  have  ensued — indeed,  it 
would  have  been  a manifest  improvement — to  allow  the  candi- 
date to  divide  his  examination,  to  give  up  one  class  of  books  or 
subjects  at  an  earlier  period,  another  at  a later,  and  then  to  have 
all  his  answers  taken  conjunctly  into  account,  in  determining  his 
rank  in  one  ultimate  and  first  published  classification.  But  of  this 
again. 

2°,  An  Honor  is  prized  in  proportion  to  its  rarity.  But  tiventy 
classes,  comprising  six  First  Classes  of  Honor,  are  henceforth  to 
be  awarded,  where  eight  and  tioo , respectively,  were  heretofore 
conceded ; academical  Honors  therefore  will  incontinently  become 
cheap  and  vulgar,  from  their  very  numbers. 

3°,  But  what,  besides  vulgarity  and  cheapness,  reduces  Honors 
to  the  lowest,  is  that,  though  nominally  equal,  these  are  not  the 
equal  rewards  of  equal  talent  and  exertion.  This  absurdity  at 
once  debases  a whole  system  of  Honors’;  what  had  previously 
been  respected,  is  now  indiscriminately  despised.  Such  a result 
will,  I am  constrained  to  think,  be  the  natural,  even  the  neces- 
sary. consequence  of  the  new  statute.  We  have  here  four  or  six 
rows  of  Honors — of  Classes,  the  same  in  name,  in  rank,  in  num- 
ber, and  assigned  to  four  or  six  co-ordinate  departments  of  knowl- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


743 


edge.  Apparently,  and  for  aught  that  the  statute  intimates,  all 
these  co-ordinate  departments  and  corresponding  classes  convey 
to  a candidate  the  same  amount  of  honor.  He  is  equally  by  the 
University  a supremely  distinguished  graduate,  whether  he  be 
First  Class  in  one  or  other  of  the  departments.  And  yet  the 
truth  is,  that  here  there  can  be  no  proportion  between  depart- 
ment and  department,  between  class  and  class.  A man  may  fail 
after  long  years  of  toil  in  meriting  the  Highest  Honor  in  one 
department,  who  may  obtain  it  in  another,  by  the  amusing  occu- 
pation of  a few  weeks.  The  absurdity  is  however  carried  to  its 
climax,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  University  here  stimu- 
lates the  shorter,  easier,  more  attractive,  but  less  useful  study,  to 
a neglect  of  the  study,  more  useful,  though  less  attractive,  easy, 
and  short.  The  University,  in  fact,  thus  errs  in  a sixfold  man- 
ner. In  encouraging,  what — 1°,  needs  no  encouragement;  and 
2°,  is  less  deserving  of  it ; in  not  adequately  encouraging,  what — 
3°,  needs  encouragement;  and  4°,  is  more  deserving  of  it;  for, 
5°,  it  awards  the  same  amount  of  honor  to  the  brief,  facile, 
amusing,  and  to  the  tedious,  difficult,  irksome  ; thus  6°,  pro- 
moting what  requires  and  merits  no  protection,  at  the  expense, 
even,  of  what  pre-eminently  does  both.  Many  years  ago,  I con- 
tended (p.  340)  that  of  all  British  Universities,  Oxford  (from  acci- 
dental circumstances,  indeed),  stood  alone,  in  affording,  however 
inadequately,  to  solid  learning  the  preference  and  encouragement 
academically  due ; and  stated  it  as  my  “ conviction,  that  if  the 
legislature  did  its  duty,  Oxford  was  the  British  University  sus- 
ceptible of  the  easiest  and  most  effectual  regeneration.”  But  this, 
if  the  present  statute  be  allowed  to  stand,  I can  no  longer  even 
hope  ; and  now  that  this  ancient  school  itself  has  been  drawn  into 
the  vulgar  vortex,  I contemplate  nothing  but  our  Universities, 
one  and  all,  declining  into  popular  seminaries  for  a cultivation  of 
the  superficial,  the  amusing,  the  palpable,  the  materially  useful. 
Were  it  indeed  attempted,  under  this  statute,  to  equalize  a class 
in  one  department  with  the  corresponding  class  in  another,  the 
attempt,  if  possible,  would  conduce  only  to  render  matters  worse. 
For  example,  could  a highest  Honor  in  the  “ Natural  Sciences,” 
only  be  obtained  like  a highest  Honor  in  the  co-ordinate  depart- 
ment of  “Humane  Letters,”  after  an  arduous  and  engrossing 
study  during  many  years  ; then  would  application  be  diverted 
from  the  fundamental,  total,  and  comparatively  useful,  to  the 
adventitious,  fragmentary,  and  comparatively  useless.  But  this 


744 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

is  impossible.  The  Natural  Sciences  are  essentially  easy  ; requir- 
ing comparatively  little  talent  for  their  promotion,  and  only  the 
most  ordinary  capacity  for  their  acquisition.  Their  study,  there- 
fore, does  not  cultivate  the  mind.  As  Bacon  remarks  of  induc- 
tion applied  to  physical  pursuits  : — “ Nostra  via  inveniendi  scien- 
tias  exaequat  fere  ingenia,  et  non  multum  excellentise  eorum  re- 
linquit.  . . . Heec  nostra  (ut  ssepe  diximus),  felicitatis  cujusdam 
sunt  potius  quam  facultatis,  et  potius  temporis  partus  quam 
ingenii.”  (N.  0.  i.  § 122.)  In  thus  honoring  the  easy  and  amus- 
ing, equally  with  the  difficult  and  painful,  our  Alma  Mater  imi- 
tates the  nurse  who  would  bribe  the  child  by  the  same  reward, 
to  a dose  of  bitters  or  to  a sugar  plum.  The  comparative  inutil- 
ity of  all  the  new  “ Schools ,”  with  the  old  department  of  Mathe- 
matics, is  indeed  virtually  confessed  in  the  prospective  statute  it- 
self. For  the  candidate  is  herein  allowed  to  omit  all  of  these 
except  some  one  ; the  University  thus  according  its  highest  Honor 
to  his  proficiency  in  a kind  of  knowledge  which  it  admits  to  be 
unnecessary,  and  although  he  may  be  no  proficient  in  any  knowl- 
edge of  any  of  the  kinds  which  it  proclaims  as  indispensable. 
The  only  commendation  merited  by  this  statute,  is,  that  it  shows 
in  favorable  contrast  to  the  Cambridge  Examination  Graces  of 
1848, 1 of  which  it  is,  however,  manifestly  an  imitation.  For  both 


1 This  is  saying  little  in  favor  of  the  Oxford  Statute,  for  the  Cambridge  regulation 
equals  even  the  worst  measures  in  that  University,  and  is  wholly  unparalleled  in  any 
other.  The  thing  is  not  only  illegal,  but  beneath  criticism  ; if  regarded  as  aught 
higher  than  a tax  on  the  undergraduates  of  Arts,  in  favor  of  all  and  sundry  who,  in 
the  Cambridge  spectral  faculties  of  Law,  Medicine,  &c.,  are  accidentally  decorated 
with  the  nominal  status  of  Professor.  The  students  of  the  Liberal  Arts  are  taxed  for 
the  profit,  among  sundry  others,  of  two  Professors  of  Medicine,  two  of  Law.  But 
while  thus  commended  to  special  sciences,  which  no  other  University  has  ever  even 
proposed  to  the  alumni  of  its  general  faculty,  the  Cambridge  student  of  this  faculty 
has  no  opportunity  afforded  him  of  becoming  acquainted  with  what  all  other  Universi- 
ties, and  Cambridge  itself  by  statute,  justly  regard  as  the  most  essential  of  preparatory 
disciplines.  This  new  regulation  is,  indeed,  only  the  last  of  a series  of  illegalities, 
calculated,  not  for  the  permanent  good  of  the  nation  and  University,  but  for  the  tempo- 
rary advantage  of  the  usurping  interest.  In  Cambridge  the  student  is  now,  and  has 
long  been,  taught,  not  what  and  how  he  ought  to  learn,  but  what  and  how  it  is  possi- 
ble— it  is  convenient  for  that  interest  to  teach  him. — Even  in  the  preparatory  faculty, 
ho  is,  therefore,  treated  to  Mathematics,  not  to  Logic  ; inured  to  calculate  like  a machine, 
not  disciplined  to  reason  like  an  intelligence.  The  easier  sciences — Physics — Physi- 
ology— Physic  even,  are  presented  to  him  at  random,  and  in  various  forms  ; Psychology 
and  the  more  arduous  gymnastic  of  philosophy,  in  none.  His  attention  is  multifariously 
expanded  on  the  world  without ; but,  never  is  his  reflection  contorted  on  the  world 
within.  If  many  things,  both  right  and  wrong,  be  taught  him  of  material  forces,  he 
learns  nothing  whatever  of  mental  powers  ; and  though,  perhaps,  superficially  indoc- 
trinated touching  the  functions  of  his  body,  he  is  left  scientifically  uninstructed,  that 
he  even  has  a soul. — In  all  this  illegal  Cambridge  (with  the  partial — I say  the  partial 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


745 


measures  innovate  in  the  same  ways ; both  curiously  invert  the 
very  purpose  of  an  academical  honor ; and  both  seem  more  or 
less  intended  to  bestow  on  the  Professors  who,  in  any  defunct 
faculty  of  the  University,  chance  to  have  a titular  existence,  a 
certain  profit  out  of  the  candidates  proceeding  in  the  still  living 
faculty  of  Arts. 

The  principles  which  I have  stated  of  academical  education, 
(pp.  691,  693,  704,  sq.,  710,  sq.,  720),  would  here  require  the 
following  fulfillments.  (It  is  proper,  however,  parenthetically  to 
premise,  that  I here  say  nothing  of  Religion.  In  this  "respect,  I 
wholly  acquiesce  in  the  views  of  the  Oxford  legislature — that  a 
certain  amount  of  theological  information  should  be  required  of 
candidates,  but  that  theology  ought  not  to  be  proposed  as  a study 
in  the  faculty  of  Arts,  from  which  academical  distinction  should 
be  won.) 


exception  of  illegal  Oxford),  stands  alone. — Indeed,  whatever  mechanism  for  the  time 
the  Tutors  were  capable  of  teaching,  that  in  Cambridge  has  been  always  sure  of  being 
academically  proclaimed — the  one  thing  wrorthy  to  be  academically  taught.  Above  a 
century  and  a half  ago,  Philosophy  was  tutorially  contracted  to  the  easy  mechanism 
of  Physics,  and  extended  to  the  easier  mechanism  of  Mathematics.  For  sixty  years, 
as  has  been  said,  after  the  appearance  of  the  “ Principia,”  the  physical  doctrines  of 
Newton  were  treated  by  the  Tutors  of  his  own  University  as  false  and  perplexing  in- 
novations, and  the  (self-styled)  romances  of  Descartes,  who  also  confessed  the  anti- 
logical  effect  of  mathematical  study  (p.  271) — continued  to  be  there  collegially  incul- 
cated, as  the  only  elements  of  a sound  and  scientific  education.  Compelled,  at  length, 
to  follow  the  age  and  its  intelligence,  for  fifty  years,  Newtonianism  in  Physics  and 
Mathematics  remained  in  Cambridge  the  symbol  of  academical  orthodoxy.  But,  finally, 
for  the  last  fifty  years,  the  most  mechanical  Mathematics — the  algebraic  analysis, 
educationally  condemned  by  Newton  (p.  305) — has  risen  to  a decided  predominance  in 
Cambridge  ; and  that  school  is  now  at  once  anti-Newtonian,  anti-Cartesian,  anti- 
geometric. Of  what  value,  then,  are  the  recent  opinions  of  the  Cambridge  Syndicate 
or  Cambridge  Senate,  in  regard  to  “ the  superiority  of  Mathematics,  as  the  basis  of 
General  Education!”  Would  they  seriously  maintain  (the  reverse  of  all  authority,  as 
indeed  of  obtrusive  fact),  that  mathematicians,  out  of  mathematics,  reason  better  than 
their  neighbors ! 

The  very  constituting  of  interested  parties  into  the  official,  and  (even  exceptionally) 
unsworn  arbiters  of  sufficiency  and  distinction,  would  be  decisive  of  the  new  “ Triposes” 
— for  the  absurdity  does  not  apply  to  the  old.  In  every  University  where  such  impolicy 
has  been  followed,  as.  indeed,  it  too  generally  has,  degrees  and  academical  honors  have 
there  become  contemptible.  But,  in  this  instance,  Cambridge  abandons  the  function 
of  trial  and  classification  to  these  ex  officio  examiners,  who,  in  all  respects  unlike  the 
other  special  examiners,  are  both  unrestrained  by  any  form  of  obligation,  and  yet  beset 
by  interests  of  various  kinds,  inciting  them  to  attract  competitors  from  the  old  Triposes 
to  the  new,  by  rendering  the  honors  of  the  easier  and  more  amusing  studies,  more  easy 
also  of  attainment.  The  Oxford  statute  avoids  many  of  these  errors.  The  examiners 
it  appoints,  are  specially  constituted  ad  hoc — sworn — and  not  interested  ; nor  does  it 
tax  the  students  of  Arts  for  the  Professors  of  Law,  Medicine,  &c. — But  as  if  to  con- 
summate the  absurdity  of  the  Cambridge  regulations,  while  the  aspirants  of  the  new 
Triposes  are  left  absolutely  free,  no  one  is  allowed  to  compete  for  Classical  distinction 
who  has  not  previously  taken  a Mathematical  honor  ! 


746  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

1°,  The  University  should  confine  its  highest  honors  to  those 
departments  of  study  which  ar e'most  arduous , being,  at  the  same 
time,  subjectively  and  objectively  most  useful.  This  would  limit 
the  departments  thus  honored  to  two ; the  one  of  which  may  he 
denominated  that  of  Humane  Letters , the  other,  that  of  Philoso- 
phy. The  former  is  of  empirical,  the  latter  of  rationed  knowledge. 

Empirical  knowledge  is  a knowledge  of  the  fact.  Humane 
Letters  would  thus  comprehend  all  dexterity  at  language,  all 
familiarity  with  literary  products,  all  acquaintance  with  histori- 
cal record.  This  department,  by  the  conditions  stated,  should  in 
a great  measure  he  limited  to  the  domain  of  Greek  and  Roman 
letters. 

Rational  knowledge  is  a knowledge  of  the  cause  or  reason. 
Philosophy  would  thus  comprehend — in  a proximate  sphere,  the 
science  of  mind  in  its  faculties , its  laivs,  and  its  relations  (Psy- 
chology, Logic,  Morals,  Politics,  &c.) ; in  a less  proximate  sphere, 
the  science  of  the  instrument  of  mind  (Grammar,  Rhetoric,  Poetic, 
&c.);  in  a remoter  sphere,  the  science  of  the  objects  of  mind 
(Mathematics,  Physics,  &c.).  The  conditions  stated  would  ex- 
clude this  last  section  from  the  department  of  highest  honor ; for 
the  sciences  which  it  comprises  are  subjectively  too  unimproving 
and  objectively  too  eccentric,  too  vast,  and  withal  too  easy,  if 
not  too  attractive,  to  he  proposed  as  academical  disciplines  of 
preparation.  The  Oxford  distinction  of  the  Mathematical  and 
Physical  sciences,  into  a department  by  themselves,  is  therefore, 
I think,  right ; as  right,  also,  the  leaving  the  study  of  that  depart- 
ment to  the  option  of  the  candidate.  I must,  however,  dissent 
from  Oxford  theory  (contradicted,  as  has  been  seen,  by  Oxford 
practice),  which  elevates,  or  has  elevated,  this  section  of  science 
into  one  of  the  two  departments  of  highest  honor;  for  I would 
not  only  divide  (what  is  still  confounded),  the  Literce  Humaniores 
into  the  two,  and  two  exclusive,  departments  of  highest  honor, 
but  relegate  the  Discipline^  Mathemctticce  to  a lower  order,  of 
which  I am  soon  to  speak.  The  present  confusion  of  the  Empir- 
ical and  the  Rational  in  the  one  department  of  Literce  Human- 
iores , originated  in  the  inability  of  the  Tutors,  as  at  present  con- 
stituted, to  teach  Philosophy  as  it  was  taught  of  old,  and  as  by 
statute  it  should  be  taught  still.  The  elevation  of  the  University 
teacher  is  consequently  a condition  of  the  restoration  of  Philoso- 
phy to  its  proper  place ; and  of  these  I have  previously  spoken 
(pp.  710-717.) 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


747 


Leaving  then  Humane  Letters  and  Philosophy  (apart  from  the 
Mathematical  and  Physical  sciences),  as  two  departments,  afford- 
ing two  several  series  of  primary  honors ; it  is  evident,  that  as  pro- 
ficiency in  either  or  in  both  of  these  affords  the  exclusive  qualifi- 
cation for  a highest  academical  distinction,  so  a minimum,  not 
in  one  hut  in  each,  ought  to  he  established  as  the  condition  of  a 
degree  at  all.  What,  however,  the  amount,  and  what  the  con- 
tents of  these  minima  should  he — this  as  a matter  of  detail  I 
overpass. 

When  a candidate  aspires  to  honors,  as  I have  already  said, 
it  might  he  an  improvement  to  allow  him  to  give  up  his  hooks 
and  take  his  trial,  in  part,  before  a last  examination ; provided, 
that  a plan  could  he  devised,  whereby  the  value  of  his  two  ex- 
aminations could  he  fixed,  added,  and  duly  rated  in  a decisive 
classification.  Of  this  I shall  speak  in  the  sequel. 

2°,  Besides  the  departments  of  study,  which,  as  most  arduous 
in  themselves,  and  also  most  useful,  both  subjectively  as  mental 
disciplines,  and  objectively  as  conditions  of  an  ulterior  progress 
in  knowledge,  merit  pre-eminent  encouragement  in  the  funda- 
mental faculty  of  a University : there  are  other  departments, 
which  it  is  proper  that  a University  should,  in  a loiver  degree , 
promote ; care  being  taken,  that  the  minor  favor  shown  to  the 
latter,  do  not  interfere  with  the  higher  favor  due  to  the  former. 
All  the  studies  not  the  necessary  conditions  of  a degree  are  to  he 
excluded  from  its  higher  distinctions ; and  this,  by  the  admission 
of  a University  itself.  Thus  Oxford,  in  leaving  (rightly,  I have 
said),  Mathematics  to  he  taken  up  or  not  for  examination,  as  the 
candidate  may  himself  think  fit,  virtually  confesses,  that  as  a 
mathematical  minimum  is  not  a requisite  for  its  degree,  so  a 
mathematical  proficiency  is  not  an  attainment  to  he  distinguished 
by  its  highest  honors.  For  (as  a selection  must  he  rigorously 
made),  a University  ought  not  to  encourage  by  its  chief  distinc- 
tion a science  which  it  does  not  view  as  of  absolute  necessity ; 
since  thus  it  would  frustrate  even  its  own  end,  by  promoting  the 
unessential  at  the  expense  of  the  essential.  This  must,  in  fact, 
tend  to  frustrate  even  the  honor  itself.  For  the  competitors  would 
he  few,  the  standard  low,  and  the  distinction  consequently  under- 
valued. And  of  what  account  are  the  mathematical  honors  in 
Oxford,  we  have  already  seen.  It  may,  indeed,  be  doubted, 
whether,  in  that  University,  these  honors  do  not  operate  as 
much  in  counteracting  the  study  of  Literce  Humaniores,  as  in 


748  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

promoting  the  discipline  for  which  they  were  exclusively  organ- 
ized. 

On  this  special  ground  (and  independently  of  the  general  pro- 
priety of  the  measure),  Mathematics  ought,  in  Oxford,  to  he  re- 
legated to  that  lower  order  of  sciences,  proficiency  in  which  should 
entitle  a candidate  to  honor  certainly,  hut  to  honor  decisively  in- 
ferior in  degree  to  that  awarded  to  excellence  in  the  sciences 
comprised  in  the  higher.  Beside,  therefore,  the  superior  studies, 
in  which  a certain  minimum  of  progress  is  necessary  for  an  aca- 
demical degree,  and  to  the  various  pitches  of  proficiency  in  which 
the  various  amounts  of  highest  academical  honor  are  due ; a 
University  may,  further,  reasonably  require,  as  a condition  of 
its  degree,  a certain  competency  in  some  one  or  more  of  certain 
inferior  studies,  and  it  may  also  reward  any  greater  progress  in 
these,  by  an  inferior  honor.  Of  this  order  are  many  branches  of 
knowledge  which,  as  easier  and  more  attractive,  do  not  require 
external  promotion,  or  which,  as  less  useful,  subjectively  and 
objectively,  do  not,  by  comparison,  deserve  it.  Of  this  order  are 
all  “the  schools”  in  the  new  Oxford  statute,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Literse  Humaniores ; these  ought  not,  I think,  to  appear 
here  at  all.  But  to  this  secondary  order  of  alternatively  optional 
studies,  about  which,  as  less  essential,  we  need  be  less  scrupu- 
lous, I would  add  a certain  mastery  of  the  principal  modern  lan- 
guages. For,  assuredly,  the  candidate  who  is  able  to  follow  out 
his  pursuits,  without  impediment,  through  French,  German, 
Italian,  &c.,  is  less  unworthy  of  a degree,  than  the  candidate  who, 
ignorant  of  these  tongues,  still  passes  for  the  minimum,  or  even 
obtains  an  honor  in  some  of  the  secondary  departments. 

But  again  : A University,  like  Oxford,  which  employs  Tutorial 
instruction,  and  consequently  limits  the  academical  study  of  the 
pupil  to  a determinate  series  of  approved  books,  has,  at  its  dis- 
posal, certain  powerful  means  of  insuring  and  ascertaining  the 
proficiency  of  candidates  for  a degree;  and  should  these  remain 
unapplied,  the  University  may  justly  be  reproached  for  neglecting 
or  for  not  understanding  the  peculiar  advantages  of  its  peculiar 
system. 

The  first  of  these  advantages — is  the  capability,  in  so  far  as 
that  may  be  expedient,  of  regulating  the  order  of  academical 
Study.  The  objects  of  this  study  are  not  all,  are  not  even  for 
the  most  part,  isolated  from  each  other.  Many  stand  in  consecu- 
tion. Certain  subjects,  certain  books,  can  only  be  profitably 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


749 


studied  after  others.  A University,  like  Oxford,  can  therefore 
usefully  prescribe,  not  only,  in  general,  that  the  higher  shall 
always  presuppose  the  lower  ; hut  articulately,  what  are  the  sub- 
jects, and  what  the  books,  which  ought  to  he  consecutively 
studied.  This  is  even  a duty  for  such  a University ; and  the 
series  being  once  promulgated,  there  is  no  hardship  on  the  candi- 
date for  a degree  in  being  subsequently  obliged  to  accommodate 
his  reading  to  the  proper  order  of  study.  Such  a regulation, 
though  it  ought  not,  of  course,  to  be  carried  beyond  certain  hounds, 
will  naturally  cause  the  greater  number  of  the  hooks  given  up  by 
candidates  to  be  the  same ; and  this  identity,  in  the  object  matter 
of  examination,  will  render  it,  as  we  shall  see,  a very  easy  prob- 
lem to  ascertain  with  the  minutest  accuracy  the  comparative 
proficiency  of  examinees. 

The  second  of  these  advantages — is,  that  the  hooks  of  study 
and  examination  being  limited,  these  Books  can  be  comparatively 
rated  ; that  is,  a determinate  value  (to  he  expressed  therefore  by 
a certain  number),  may  he  publicly  assigned  to  each.  If  a candi- 
date answer  the  questions  proposed  to  him  on  any  hook,  all  and 
all  fully,  he  would  naturally  he  entitled  to  the  whole  number  at 
which  the  book  is  rated.  Should  a candidate  fall  short  of  this 
completeness  and  accuracy,  the  value  of  his  answers  could  be 
expressed  by  any  smaller  number,  down  even  to  zero ; nay,  if  it 
were  requisite,  a negative  number  might  punish  his  presumption, 
and  fall  to  be  deducted  from  any  positive  amount  which  he  might, 
otherwise  obtain.  Did  the  answers  transcend  simple  plenitude 
and  correctness,  a number  above  the  full  value  of  the  hook  might, 
hut  only  as  an  extraordinary  exception,  be  allowed. — I need  hardly 
add,  that  a hook  may  have  a value  in  more  than  one  department; 
it  may,  for  example,  avail,  and  variously,  in  Humane  Letters,  or 
in  Philosophy,  or  in  both.  A separate  estimate  should  therefore 
he  assigned  to  it  in  reference  to  each. 

The  third  of  these  advantages — is,  that  the  several  Classes  can 
be  determinate ly  valued , and  this  value  with  great  utility,  publicly 
made  known.  The  several  books  being  articulately  rated ; and 
the  rule,  by  which  their  amount  can  he  made  available  by  candi- 
dates, being  understood ; it  follows,  even  as  a matter  of  course, 
that  the  University  should  state  the  amounts — the  numbers, 
which  being  attained  in  a certain  department,  would  entitle  to 
its  several  classes. 

The  fourth  of  these  advantages — is,  that  instead  of  leaving 


750 


APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 


them,  as  at  present,  unarranged,  we  might  have  Candidates  of 
the  same  class  placed  therein  before  and  after  other , according  to 
the  rated  value  of  their  examinations  ; nay,  if  numbers  were 
affixed  to  names,  the  men  of  one  class  and  of  one  examination 
might  be  brought  into  collation  with  those  of  another.  Were  this 
arrangement,  indeed,  realized  in  the  case  of  First  Classes  alone, 
still  would  the  principal  advantage  of  the  measure  be  compassed. 
For  it  is  only  in  a First  Class  that  signal  risings  of  individual 
above  individual  are  possible ; but  for  a University,  without 
necessity,  to  equalize  such  differences,  is,  if  not  unjust,  certainly 
inexpedient.  In  this  respect  Louvain  and  even  Cambridge  may 
afford  a profitable  example  to  Oxford. 

The  fifth  advantage — is,  that  there  might  thus  be  one  Honor 
and  a double  Examination.  It  would  be  a great  improvement  if 
the  object-matter  of  examination  could  be  taken  up  in,  at  least, 
one  installment ; and  this  persuasion  seems  to  have  determined 
the  views  of  the  Oxford  legislature,  in  recently  dividing  the  exam- 
ination for  Liter ce  Humaniores  and  Disciplines  Mathematicce  into 
two.  But,  as  already  stated,  I can  not  but  regard  their  division 
of  the  honor  along  with  the  examination  as  most  unfortunate: 
though,  indeed,  not  having  adopted  such  subordinate  measures  as 
have  now  been  detailed,  it  would,  for  them,  have  been  impossible 
to  render  a double  trial  available  to  a single  classification.  I say, 
that  it  is  expedient  to  divide  the  Examination:  and  this,  were  it 
only  that  the  candidate  might  be  more  accurately  and  fairly 
tried ; while  less  superiority  would  accrue  to  the  merely  animal 
advantages  of  a stronger  memory  and  of  stronger  nerves.  The 
single  prerequisite  of  this  would  be — that  the  value  of  the  first 
examination  were  noted,  preserved,  and  added  to  the  value  of  the 
second. 

The  sixth  advantage — is,  that  the  Examination  might  be  ren- 
dered at  once  far  more  accurate  and  far  more  easy.  A large 
proportion  of  the  candidates  would  give  up  the  same  book.  To 
these,  called  into  the  “ schools”  together,  a series  of  questions 
prepared  and  printed  for  the  occasion,  might  be  proposed;  and 
the  (unassisted)  answers  returned  in  writing  before  leaving  the 
room.  These  answers  being  perused  by  the  Examiners,  each 
paper  could  be  rated  at  its  value,  and  that  value  placed  to  the 
credit  of  the  candidate.  In  this  manner  the  trial  would  in  a 
great  measure  be  easily  and  accurately  gone  through.  (There 
is  no  reason,  it  may  be  observed,  why  the  examination  of  candi- 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


751 


dates  should  he  completed  in  consecutive  days  ; nor  need  an  ex- 
amination in  writing  supersede  any  oral  questioning.) 

Such  a standard,  as  these  last  five  advantages  suppose  to  he 
accurately  instituted  and  accurately  applied,  Oxford  does  not 
attempt ; but  leaves  it  to  each  of  her  transient  Examiners  to  ex- 
temporize a criterion  for  himself,  or  rather  to  classify  candidates 
as  he  may,  according  to  his  individual  lights,  and  temporary 
impressions.  That  Universities  in  general  do  nothing  more,  is 
an  invalid  answer.  For  the  Universities,  in  which  the  Profes- 
sorial or  unrestricted  system  of  instruction  prevails,  can  at  best 
only  lavish  degrees  according  to  a rude  appraisement ; and  are 
wholly  unable  (what  indeed  they  right  rarely  attempt)  to  classify 
candidates,  even  in  the  vaguest  or  most  capricious  manner.  Ox- 
ford, therefore,  in  adopting  the  Tutorial  or  restricted  system  of 
instruction,  should,  in  tolerating  its  peculiar  disadvantages,  be 
able  to  turn  its  peculiar  advantages  to  account. — But  to  conclude : 
I am  therefore,  convinced,  that  it  would  be  no  ordinary  improve- 
ment on  the  late  Oxford  Examination  Statute,  if,  prospectively, 
a regulation  were  adopted,  in  principle  at  least,  to  the  following 
effect : 

Two  several  Orders  of  Study  to  be  requisite  for  examination 
toward  a degree  in  Arts  ; and  in  these  the  gradations  of  profi- 
ciency to  be  rewarded  by  two  several  Orders  of  academical  Honor. 

The  First  or  superior  order  to  have  two  Departments,  to  wit, 
Humane  Letters  and  Philosophy.  Certain  lowest  competencies, 
in  both  of  these,  to  be  necessary  for  a degree  ; while,  in  each  (as 
now),  a higher  proficiency  to  merit  the  honor  of  a corresponding- 
class,  if  not,  moreover  (by  a more  accurate  arrangement),  indivi- 
dual rank  among  the  candidates  similarly  classified.  The  Classes 
of  Honor,  as  hitherto,  may,  in  each  department,  be  three  or  four. 

The  Second  or  inferior  order  may  comprehend  an  indefinite 
number  of  departments — departments  at  least  which  it  is  not 
here  necessary  to  specify.  From  the  candidate  (as  in  the  pro- 
spective statute),  should  be  required  a minimum  in  one  depart- 
ment, if  not  in  more,  which,  however,  may  be  chosen  by  himself ; 
and  the  honor  of  a corresponding  class  to  be  assigned,  as  at  pres- 
ent, to  every  higher  proficiency  in  the  several  departments. 

Care,  however,  should  be  taken,  to  mark,  and  that  obtrusively, 
the  difference  between  the  honors  belonging  to  the  Orders  of  the 
absolutely  necessary,  and  of  the  partially  optional,  studies.  This 
might  be  done,  by  maintaining  the  two  orders  and  their  exam- 


752  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

inat.ions  sufficiently  distinct,  by  the  following  or  other  differences 
(the  two  first  of  which  are  employed,  but  that  inadequately,  in 
the  recent  Statute) : 1°,  Distinction  of  Time ; the  higher  order 
preceding  the  lower,  as  its  condition.  2°,  Distinction  of  Exam- 
iners ; different  individuals  being,  for  each  order,  appointed  to 
this  function.  3°,  Distinction  of  Object  Matter ; no  department 
of  the  prior  order  being  repeated  in  the  posterior.  4°,  Distinction 
of  Name ; the  one  order  being  called  by  Primary , the  other  by 
Secondary , or  some  such  discriminative  appellation. 

Before  the  examination  of  the  Primary  Order  can  be  undergone, 
three  full  courses,  three  Academical  Years  (p.  735),  to  be  com- 
pleted ; and  this  examination,  for  honors  at  least,  must  be  taken 
within  a year  thereafter.  The  examination  of  the  Secondary 
Order,  at  least  for  honors,  should  in  like  manner  be  limited  to  a 
certain  period. 

As  enacted  by  the  new  Statute,  the  names  of  all,  whether 
honored  or  not,  to  be  published  under  the  department  in  which 
they  pass. 

Taking,  finally,  a general  retrospect  of  the  preceding  scheme 
of  academical  education,  this  is  seen  to  comprise  various  utilities. 

It  would  restore  the  University . It  would  bring  back  academ- 
ical education  to  its  true  and  ancient  significance ; reconnecting 
the  Houses  and  their  private  instruction  with  the  University  and 
its  public  discipline.  » 

It  loses  none  of  the  advantages  in  the  present  domestic  or 
tutorial  system,  but  would  correct  the  manifold  imperfections  of 
that  system,  as  actually  applied.  For  it  would  determine  a far 
higher  efficiency ; making,  at  the  same  time,  that  efficiency  se- 
cure and  general ; whereas  the  lower  efficiency,  as  at  present 
furnished,  is  not  only  contingent,  but  rare,  not  only  limited,  but 
confined  to  a few.  As  things  now  are,  one  House  may  be  an 
instrument  of  education,  comparatively  real ; and  others,  such 
instruments  only  in  name ; nay,  even  in  the  same  House,  study 
may  be  in  vigorous  activity  at  one  time,  at  another  in  supine 
inertion.  But  this  scheme,  if  realized,  would  allow — no  House 
to  fall  educationally  asleep — no  Head  to  gratify  his  personal 
preferences  at  the  expense  of  his  official  obligations — no  incom- 
petent Tutor  to  hide  his  obstructive  nullity  in  the  obscurity  of 
Hall  or  College.  For,  while  it  would  elevate  the  Tutor  from  a 
private  into  a public  instructor  ; in  raising  his  dignity  and  emolu- 
ment, it  would  raise  also  his  qualifications,  usefulness,  and  duties. 


OXFORD  AS  IT  MIGHT  BE. 


753 


It  commits  in  a beneficial  contest  (“  ar/adi)  S’  epos  7/Se  /3poTot(u,’’) 
House  with  House,  Tutor  with  Tutor,  Pupil  with  Pupil ; applies 
equably  the  stimulus  of  emulation  to  all,  from  the  commence- 
ment of  the  academical  curriculum  until  its  termination.  It 
opens,  in  fact,  a new  field  of  exercise  and  excitation ; leaving  no 
one  to  inertion,  be  he  teacher  or  be  he  taught,  but  goading  each 
unceasingly  to  the  best — according  to  his  kind  of  duty,  and  in 
proportion  to  the  measure  of  his  powers. 

Restoring,  it  would  constrain  the  University : — to  employ  its 
instructors  in  the  most  edifying  ways  ; — to  propose,  not  what  can 
most  conveniently  be  taught,  but  the  best  objects,  in  the  best 
order,  and  in  the  best  books  ; — to  measure  accurately  the  amount 
of  energetic  talent  usefully  employed  ; — and  to  reward  this,  by 
proportionate  and  appropriate  distinction. 

Far,  therefore,  from  superseding  the  Examination  for  a Degree, 
it  would  prepare  the  candidate,  subjectively  and  objectively,  to 
undergo  it ; enabling  him  to  remedy  his  defects,  and  rendering 
it  a more  effectual  and  certain  test  of  his  proficiency. 

I should  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of — 
b)  Things  secondary  or  supplemental.  But  matters  principal 
have  extended  to  such  a length,  that  I must  not  enter  upon  others 
which,  though  of  importance  only  as  conditions  of  the  former, 
could  not  possibly  be  discussed  within  a narrower  compass. — Of 
these  there  are  two,  more  especially  meriting  attention,  but  to 
which  I can  only  allude. 

The  first — is  a scheme  of  academical  Patronage  and  Regula- 
tion, accommodated  to  the  circumstances  of  the  English  Univer- 
sities, more  proximately  of  Oxford.  And  here,  beside  the  subject 
in  its  more  essential  relations,  it  would  be  requisite  to  consider 
the  impediments  which  an  improved  regulation  of  these  schools 
would  inevitably  encounter  from  parties — in  the  Universities 
themselves — in  the  Church  and  its  patrons — in  the  G-overnment 
for  the  time — and  in  various  influential  interests  throughout  the 
nation  ; impediments  so  great  and  numerous,  that  we  may  regard 
almost  as  chimerical  the  hope  of  seeing  these  institutions  raised 
to  the  perfection,  implied  in  a due  accomplishment  of  the  great 
ends  for  which  they  were  established.  In  fact,  my  suggested 
plan  of  improvement  for  Oxford,  was  partly  founded  on  a con- 
viction, that  a tutorial  instruction  depends  less,  for  its  efficiency, 
on  the  virtues  of  an  academical  superintendence  and  appointment, 
than  does  a professorial.  (On  these  virtues  see  pp.  345-382.) 

3 B 


754  APPENDIX  III.  EDUCATIONAL.  (C.) 

The  second — is  a scheme  for  the  erection  of  new  Halls.  This 
would  be  a return,  in  part,  to  the  ancient  custom  of  the  Univer- 
sity ; and  must  inevitably  take  place,  were  an  increased  resort 
of  students  determined  to  Oxford — unless,  what  we  need  not 
contemplate,  domestic  superintendence  should  here  (as  in  Cam- 
bridge), be  relaxed,  for  the  pecuniary  interest  of  the  existing 
Houses.  New  Halls  should  be  erected  : — 1°,  to  supply  additional 
demand  for  entrance  ; 2°,  to  prevent  or  remedy  a slovenly  tuition 
in  the  older  Houses ; 3°,  to  keep  down  (independently  of  more 
direct  measures)  the  expense  of  the  Colleges,  and  to  afford,  a 
cheaper  education  to  the  poorer  students ; 4°,  to  accommodate 
dissenters,  were  they,  without  a surrender  of  their  principles, 
admitted  for  education  to  these  national  seminaries  (pp.  467,  sq., 
510,  sq.) ; and  5°,  to  remunerate,  in  their  Headships  especially, 
academical  zeal  and  ability. — Of  course  the  new  Halls  should  be 
of  a better  constitution  than  the  old. 

The  other  measures  under  this  head,  as — a general  taxation 
of  the  necessary  collegial  expenses — the  means  of  remunerating 
the  academical  instructors — of  retaining  talent  in  the  University 
— and  oi  pensioning  emeriti — libraries — musea,  &e. ; these,  how- 
ever important,  I can  at  present  only  name. 


INDEX. 


Absolute,  the  : ( see  Unconditioned)  ; 

meanings  of  term,  20  ; as  contrasted, 
and  as  convertible,  with  Infinite,  20 ; 
used  by  Cardinal  Cusa,  594 ; Absolute 
Identity,  60. 

A,  E,  I,  0,  (the  logical  symbols)  of  Latin 
origin,  129  ; and  taken  from  the  first 
two  vowels  of  Affirmo,  and  the  first  and 
second  of  Nego,  619. 

Agrippa  (Cornelius),  his  counsel  touching 
a reform  of  the  University  of  Cologne, 
452. 

Aldrich  (Dean),  his  Logic®  Compendium, 
126,  139,  140,  143,  149,  150,  168,  732. 

Algebra.  See  Mathematics. 

Alphabet  of  Thought,  Table  of,  &c.,  567, 
sq. 

Altdorf,  University  of,  371,  477. 

Apocalypse,  opinions  regarding  its  canon- 
icity,  496. 

Archytas,  the  treatise  on  the  Categories 
under  his  name  a forgery,  140. 

Aristotle  : his  Categories  exclude  the  Un- 
conditioned, 32  ; not  borrowed,  140  ; 
metaphysical,  141  ; his  merits  in  regard 
to  Logic,  ib.  ; his  logical  system  not 
perfect,  142  ; text  in  his  Ethics  emend- 
ed, 268  ; apparently  anticipates  the 
doctrine  of  the  Conditioned,  592  ; char- 
acter of  his  writings,  698  ; on  necessity 
of  philosophical  study,  710 ; quoted 
passim. 

Assurance,  Special  Faith,  &c.,  in  earlier 
Protestantism,  the  condition  and  crite- 
rion of  a true  Faith,  now  generally  sur- 
rendered, 486 ; held  by  English  and 
Irish  Churches,  but  not  by  their  Church- 
men, 486  ; this  return  toward  Cathol- 
icism unnoticed,  486,  487. 

Augustin  (Saint),  his  conciliation  of  free 
grace  and  free  will,  588 ; quoted  passim. 

Austin  (Mrs.),  526. 


Bacon  (Lord) : quoted,  as  to  professorial 
endowments,  708  ; as  to  the  compara- 
tive facility  of  the  inductive  and  phys- 
ical sciences,  744  ; et  alibi  passim. 


Balfour  (Robert),  his  character  as  a phil- 
osopher and  logician,  122. 

Balliol  College,  Oxford,  its  academical 
eminence,  677,  sq. 

Barbara,  Celarent,  &c.,  of  Latin  original, 
and  not  borrowed  from  the  Greek ; 
probably  by  Petrus  Hispanus,  129. 

Barbarism  of  mind,  and  a knowledge  of 
facts,  compatible,  46-48,  705. 

Baynes  (Mr.  Thomas  Spencer),  163. 

Benson  (Mr.  Robert),  Memoirs  of  Collier, 
189. 

Berkeley  (Bishop),  an  unknown  treatise 
by,  186. 

Bernard  (Saint),  his  conciliation  of  free 
grace  and  free  will,  589  ; quoted  pluries. 

Blemmidas,  his  Greek  words  for  mood 
and  figure  taken  from  the  Latin  Bar- 
bara, Celarent,  &c.,  129.  See  619. 

Boerhaave  (Herrmann),  254. 

Boole  (Prof  ),  273. 

Bossuet’s  accuracy  vindicated,  486. 

Breadth  and  Depth  of  notions.  See  Logic. 

Broun  (Mr.  James),  121. 

Brown  (Dr.  Thomas),  his  philosophy  of 
Perception,  49-102  ; his  series  of  mis- 
takes, ib.  ; results  of  his  doctrine,  100; 
his  doctrine  of  Causality,  576,  580. 

Bucer  (Martin),  his  character,  491. 

Bursa,  the  name  by  which  an  authorized 
House  for  the  habitation  and  superin- 
tendence of  academical  scholars  was 
called  in  Germany,  404—406. 

Buschius  (Hermannus).  See  Epistolse 
o.  v. 

Butler  (Samuel)  quoted,  on  the  necessity 
of  philosophizing,  710  ; on  the  fact  of 
consciousness,  69. 


Cajetan  (Cardinal),  his  doctrine  in  regard 
to  the  conciliation  of  prevision,  pre- 
destination, and  free  will,  589. 

Calvinism,  current  representation  of,  er- 
roneous, 590. 

Cambridge  University  : its  forced  study 
of  Mathematics  unimproving  to  the 
mind,  and  conducing  to  idiocy,  mad- 


756 


INDEX. 


ness,  death,  308,  324,  638,  sq.  ; why  so 
deleterious  an  exaggeration  there  main- 
tained, 320  ; its  Colleges  about  the  last 
seminaries  in  Europe  in  which  the 
Newtonian  physics  superseded  the  Car- 
tesian, and  why  1 308,  321  ; its  present 
study  of  mathematics  condemned  by 
Newton,  305  ; absurdity  of  the  recent 
Examination  Graces,  744 ; its  Divines 
the  precursors  of  the  German  Rational- 
ists and  their  followers,  498,  499. 

Camerarius  (Gulielmus),  his  character  as 
a philosopher  and  logician,  124. 

Canvassing  of  academical  patrons,  372, 
643. 

Cartes  (Des) : his  employment  of  the 
word  Idea,  and  his  doctrine  of  Percep- 
tion, 75,  77,  sq.  ; the  first  of  math- 
ematicians, he  despised  and  renounced 
mathematics,  271,  sq.  ; which  he  soon 
even  wholly  forgot,  283 ; called  his 
philosophy  a Romance,  295. 

Categorical.  See  Logic. 

Categories  : Aristotelic,  32,  141  ; of 

Thought — by  Kant,  23,  34 — by  Cousin, 
16 — by  Author,  24,  567,  sq. 

Catholic  Italian  Universities,  their  re- 
ligious liberality,  356,  360,  362. 

Causality,  notion  of : its  origin,  575,  sq.  ; 
relation  of,  ipso  facto,  thought  as  con- 
ditioned, 40,  41  ; conspectus  of  the 
various  theories  for  its  explanation, 
575,  sq.  ; explained  by  a new  theory, 
that  of  the  Conditioned,  581,  sq.  ; 
moral  and  religious  character  of  this 
theory,  585,  sq. 

Causes,  always  more  than  one,  575,  584, 
alibi. 

Chevallier  (Professor),  257. 

Churches  of  Germany,  England,  and  Scot- 
land, their  character,  332-340. 

Church  History  best  or  worst  of  disci- 
plines, 494. 

Churchmen,  English  and  Scottish,  in 
different  ways,  have  a bad  professional 
education,  332-338,  sq.  ; and  the  worst 
possible  test  of  competency,  338. 

Classical  learning,  its  conditions,  325- 
343;  1°.  a classical  training  required 
for  the  three  learned  professions,  326, 
Law  328,  Medicine  330,  Theology  330- 
337  ; 2°.  efficiency  of  schools  and  uni- 
versities, 326,  337-340. 

Collier  (Arthur),  his  Idealism,  185-201  ; 
his  life,  190. 

Collins  (Anthony),  unknown  treatise  by, 

186. 

Common  Sense,  69,  90,  94,  195. 


Comprehension  and  Extension  of  notions. 
See  Logic. 

Conception.  We  can  conceive  or  think 
(have  a notion  or  concept  of)  what  we 
are  unable  to  imagine  or  represent,  20 ; 
but  what  we  represent  or  imagine,  that 
we  may  think  or  conceive,  ib. 

Concepts,  Notions.  See  Logic. 

Conditioned  (the),  philosophy  of,  19,  sq., 
567,  sq. ; converse  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Unconditioned,  574 ; probably 
adopted  by  Aristotle,  592  ; science  of 
ignorance,  574  ; explains  Causality, 
&c.,  581,  sq.,  eminently  religious,  22, 
587,  sq.,  591,  sq. 

Conditions  of  Thought,  table  and  detail 
of,  567-573. 

Consciousness  : only  of  the  limited,  26  ; 
not  a special  faculty,  53  ; facts  of,  69, 
90  ; involves  judgment,  573,  sq.  ; Aris- 
totle and  the  older  Greeks,  with  the 
Romans,  until  the  Latin  language 
ceased  to  be  a living  tongue,  employed 
(with  rare  exceptions)  no  psychological 
term  for  Consciousness,  57,  115. 

Conversation  with  the  learned,  702,  sq. 

Coplestone  (Bishop),  his  confusion  of  the 
Colleges  with  the  University  of  Oxford, 

395,  501  ; various  testimonies  by,  395, 

396,  428,  670,  718. 

Cosmothetic  Idealism,  or  Hypothetical 
Realism,  or  Hypothetical  Dualism,  62, 
192. 

Coste  (Pierre),  his  explanation  of  Locke’s 
passage  touching  the  creation  of  mat- 
ter, 200. 

Cousin  : his  genius  and  character,  9,  43, 
48  ; his  philosophy  in  general,  9-44 ; 
advocate  of  Rationalism,  14  ; his  doc- 
trine of  the  Infinito-Absolute,  30  ; his 
report  on  Prussian  Schools,  526-563  ; 
his  merits  as  a reformer  and  promoter 
of  Popular  Education,  531,  532  ; what 
he  has  done  for  France  can  not  be 
without  benefit  for  this  and  other  coun- 
tries, 532  ; his  observations  on  the  law 
in  France  for  the  instruction  of  the 
people,  557-562. 

Craniology  fundamentally  false,  600. 

Croke  (Richard),  208. 

Crotus  (Rubianus).  Sec  Epistolce  o.  v. 

Cudworth  (Dr.  Ralph),  an  unknown  treat- 
ise by,  186  ; on,  302. 

Cullen  (Dr.  William),  his  character,  238- 
246. 

Cultivation  of  mind  in  no  proportion  to 
the  mind's  possession  of  facts,  but  in 
proportion  to  its  energy,  47-49,  320. 


INDEX, 


757 


Curators : plan  of  academical  Patronage 
and  Government  through  them  ; by 
Author,  379 ; by  Burgh  Commission- 
ers, 644. 

Cusa  or  Cusanus  (Cardinal),  his  doctrine 
of  Learned  Ignorance,  594 ; from  this 
have  sprung  the  modern  theories  of  the 
Absolute,  595 ; this  Prince  of  the 
Church  anticipated  Copernicus  and 
Galileo  in  the  true  theory  of  the  Heav- 
ens, ib. 


Dalgarno  (George),  his  writings,  174-184. 

Davidson  (Dr.  J.  Henry).  654. 

Deaf  and  Dumb,  history  of  the  attempts 
at  their  education,  175-184;  the  testi- 
monies by,  or  in  relation  to,  of  Agricola 
(R.)  176,  Aristotle  176,  Bacon  179, 
Bonnet  (P.)  177,  Bulwer  (J.)  180,  Dal- 
garno 181,  l3igby  (Sir  K.)  177,  Epee 
(Abbe  de  1’)  181,  Fabricius  ab  Aqua- 
pendcnte  179,  Galen  176,  Holder  180, 
Lana  179,  Molinaeus  (the  jurist)  176, 
Montanus  (P.)  179,  Pontius  (P.)  177, 
Robertson  (Father)  180,  Stewart  (D.) 
181,  Vallesius  (F.)  177,  Vives  177, 
Wallis  179. 

Degree  or  Intension,  as  a condition  of 
thought,  573. 

De  Morgan  (Prof.)  as  a logical  critic  and 
reasoner,  609-639. 

Depth  and  Breadth  of  notions.  See  Logic. 

Des  Cartes.  See  Cartes. 

Dialectic.  See  Logic. 

Disputation,  as  an  exercise  of  mind,  696, 

sq- 

Dissenters.  See  Universities,  English. 

Doce  ut  Discas,  342,  700,  sq. 

Doubt,  the  condition  of  knowledge, 
591 

Dousa  (Janus)  as  Curator  of  Leyden, 
359,  sq. 

Duncan  (Mark),  his  character  as  a logi- 
cian, &c.,  123,  sq. 

Durham,  “ University”  of,  has  no  legal 
right  to  grant  Degrees,  471,  sq. 


ipso  facto,  as  conditioned,  40,  41, 
575,  sq. 

Empirical.  See  Experience. 

England : English  indifference  to  philos- 
ophy, 186  ; abuse  of  the  term  Philos- 
ophy, 272,  610  ; national  disregard  of 
oaths,  449,  518 ; church  the  creation 
of  the  civil  magistrate,  nay  of  the  King 
alone,  333,  sq.  ; established  clergy  have 
no  professional  education,  336,  436, 
470  ; English  theology  weak  from  want 
of  philosophy,  and  could  not  now  be 
trusted  in  the  threatened  polemic,  714, 
Universities  (see  Universities) ; popular 
education  the  worst  in  Christendom, 
530 ; Anglican  Church  holds  Assur- 
ance, 486. 

Enthymeme.  See  Logic. 

Eobanus.  Sec  Hessus. 

Epistol®  Obscurorum  Vivo  rum  : character 
and  authorship  of  this  satire,  202-237  ; 
its  authors  three,  225  ; to  wit,  Hutten 
221,  Crotus  221,  and  Buschius  225 
theories  of  its  authorship,  218  ; r 
tributed  greatly  to  the  Reform  .i°n~ 
213,  214 ; mistakes  about,  2'  ~°f!’ 

edited  by  Muench,  231,  and  I ‘ A / 
mund,  233.  Roter' 


Eschenbach  (Professor),  his  t , 

n II-  - ro  • -r&nslation  of 

Collier  s Clavis,  189. 

Examination  as  an 
695,  sq. 


Examinations  for  academical  de  . k 
Louvain,  663,  s^.  . as  academical  stim- 
ulus, in  Oxford,  718  737 
Exeter,  Dr.  P'ailpotts  (Bishop  of),  on  ad- 
mission of  Dissenters  to  the  English 
Universities,  500,  sq. 

Existence,  as  a category  of  thought, 


Experience,  all  notions  from  or  empirical, 
which  we  can  think  non-existent,  321 
323,  573. 

Extension.  See  Space. 

Extension,  and  Intension  or  Comprehen- 
sion of  notions.  See  Logic. 


Edinburgh,  University  of : its  defects, 
338,  369-372,  381,  640-662;  its  De- 
grees in  Arts,  646,  sq.  ; in  Medicine, 
330,  352,  648,  sq.  ; how  given  now, 
658,  sq.  ; by  what  means  these  degrees 
might  be  restored  to  respectability,  662. 

Education  of  Deaf  and  Dumb.  See  Deaf 
and  Dumb. 

Education  of  the  People,  See  Popular 
Education. 

Effect  and  Cause,  relation  of,  thought,  j 


Faculty  of  University,  what,  475,  et  alibi. 

Faith,  true  or  saving,  formerly,  in  Prot- 
estantism, implied  Assurance  or  Special 
Faith,  486. 

First  and  Second  notions,  distinction  of 
139. 

Formal  and  Material,  distinction  of.  See 
Logic. 

French  Sensualist  philosophy,  10. 

Fries,  Astronomy  and  Fate,  Psychology 
and  Design,  202. 


758 


INDEX. 


Fromondus,  his  statement  of  a curious 
theory  of  perception,  56. 

Gatto  (Sig.  Lo),  Italian  translator  of  these 
Philosophical  Discussions,  passim. 

Gentlemen  Commoners,  in  Oxford  and 
Cambridge,  a collegial  emolument,  but 
an  academical  nuisance,  735. 

Geometry  See  Mathematics. 

Germans : character  of,  202 ; rise  of 
classical  studies  among,  204  ; their  de- 
moralization after  the  Reformation,  489. 

German  : rational  philosophy,  12 ; uni- 
versities, 362-364,  403^105  ; the  theol- 
ogy less  orthodox  than  the  philosophy, 
483  ; schools  for  the  people,  538-563  ; 
strong  interest  in  education,  shown  from 
the  number  of  works  on  that  subject 
published  in  Germany,  551. 

God  known  and  unknown,  22 ; a certain 
analogy  of  Man  to  God,  26  ; to  know 
God,  we  must  know  ourselves,  711. 

Goettingen,  University  of,  364. 

Graduates,  all  have  a right  to  lecture  pub- 
,'icly  in  the  English  Universities,  388, 
442,  sq. 

Grotiu.s  (Hugo)  follows  the  Scaligers  in 
sinking  the  wisdom  of  a Learned  Igno- 
rance, 596. 

Hampden  (Bishop),  his  Aristotle's  Phil- 
osophy, 169. 

Hare  (Archdeacon):  his  counter  criti- 
cism, in  defense  of  Luther,  considered, 
484-597 ; his  knowledge  of  theology  , 
and  of  Luther’s  writings,  with  the 
trustworthiness  of  his  statements  and 
translations,  ib.  ; his  misapprehensions 
and  misrepresentations  of  Bossuet,  ib.  ; 
ignorant  even  of  Anglican  principles, 
486,  487,  495  ; attempts  to  defend 
Luther  only  on  a few  points,  and  even 
on  these  few  has  uniformly  failed,  496. 

Harris  (Mr.,  of  Salisbury),  713. 

Hegel : his  doctrine  of  the  Absolute,  28, 
30  ; to  him  the  Absolute  equal  to  the 
Nothing,  28 ; refutation  of  and  by 
Schelling,  30;  his  confusion  of  Con- 
tradictories and  Contraries,  31  ; on  his 
philosophy,  595,  711. 

Hessus  (Helius  Eobanus)  on,  228,  234  ; 
why  called  King  1 See  Addenda. 

Hispanus  (Petrus)  not  a Plagiarist,  129. 

Hoffmann  (Frederic),  253;  his  Fuge 
Medicos , &c.,  252. 

Huber  (Professor),  “The  English  Uni- 
versities,” character  of  that  book,  525. 

Hume,  his  opinion  about  mathematical 


truth  mistaken  by  Dr.  Whewell,  266  ; 
despised  mathematical  study,  266,  304. 
Hutten  (Ulrich  v.)  See  Epistols  o.  v. 
Hypostasis,  term,  597. 

Hypothetical.  See  Logic. 

Hypothetical  Realism,  or  H.  Dualism,  or 
Cosmothetic  Idealism,  62,  192. 


Idea,  or  representative  object,  63  ; history 
of  the  word,  75 ; what  in  the  Cartesian 
philosophy,  77. 

Idealism,  its  various  degrees  or  species, 
61,  191  ; grounds  of,  193  ; why  the 
Schoolmen,  Mallebranche,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, orthodox  Catholics,  avoided  this 
doctrine,  196. 

Ignorantia  Docta  summa  sapientia,  43, 
591-596.  Testimonies  quoted — Anony- 
mus,  Arabian  Sage,  Aristotle,  Arno- 
bius,  Augustin,  Ghrysologus,  Chrys- 
ostom, Cusa,  Democritus,  Grotius, 
Palingenius,  Pascal,  Petrarch,  Piccol- 
omini  (.-Eneas  Sylvius),  Pliny,  Rabbis, 
the  Scaligers,  Socrates,  Tertullian, 
Theodoret,  592-597.  See  Knowledge, 
Occult  Causes. 

Imagination.  See  Conception. 

Induction.  See  Logic. 

Infinite,  the  : (see  Unconditioned)  ; what 
properly,  21,  28  ; verses  on,  44. 

Inglis  (Sir  Robert  Harry,  Bart.)  on  admis- 
sion of  Dissenters  to  English  Universi- 
ties, 500,  sq. 

Intellectual  Intuition,  14;  of  Schelling, 
27 ; in  Cusa,  595. 

Intension,  or  Degree,  as  a condition  of 
thought,  573. 

Intension  and  Extension  of  notions. 
See  Logic. 

Intuitive  (or  Presentative)  and  Represent- 
ative Knowledge,  58,  sq. 

Irish,  their  scholastic  pugnacity,  barbar- 
ism, and  acuteness,  14. 

Italian  Universities,  their  religious  liber- 
ality in  calling  Protestants  of  learning 
to  their  chairs,  356,  360,  362. 


Jacobi,  noble  passage  of,  on  Providence 
and  Fate,  301. 

Jenkyns  (Verv  Rev.  Dr.),  as  Master  of 
Balliol,  678' 

Johnson  (Rev.  Arthur),  translation  of 
Tennemann’s  Manual,  103-119. 
Judgment  involved  in  Consciousness, 
573,  sq. 

Judgments.  See  Logic. 

Kant  : his  philosophy,  13  ; his  doctrine 


INDEX. 


759 


of  the  Unconditioned,  22  ; his  Categor- 
ies, 23,  34,  146 ; against  Common 
Sense,  97 ; his  Logical  purism,  145 ; 
sublime  passage  from,  contrasting  the 
Moral  Law  and  the  Stellar  Universe, 
300;  on,  712. 

Knowledge  : does  it  imply  an  analogy  of 
Subject  and  Object  1 67  ; of  Mind  and 
of  Matter  is  only  phenomenal  or 
relative,  597.  Testimonies  for  this 
relativity — Albertus  Magnus,  Aristotle, 
Averroes,  Augustin,  Bacon,  Boethius, 
Bruno,  Campanella,  Gerson,  Kant,  Leo 
Hebreus,  Melanchthon,  Newton  (Sir 
Isaac),  Piccolomini  (F.),  Scaliger  (J. 
C.),  Spinoza,  597-600.  See  Ignorantia 
Docta,  Occult  Causes. 


Lambert,  his  Syllogistic,  636. 

Law,  how  far  its  study  supposes  classical 
scholarship,  328,  sq.  ; proposed  Prac- 
ticum  for,  698. 

Lening  (John),  his  character,  490,  491. 

Leyden,  University  of,  356-362. 

Liberty  moral,  doctrine  of,  585,  sq. 

Locke,  his  advice  to  William  III.  to  re- 
form the  Universities,  452 ; on,  200. 
See  Perception. 

Logic  : its  fortune  in  Scotland,  121  ; in 
Oxford,  124;  in  Cambridge,  123;  in 
Dublin,  124;  History  of,  140;  whatl 
131  ; its  derivation,  137  ; Abstract, 
Concrete,  136  ; a Formal  science,  137, 
138,  139,  145;  Pure  and  Applied,  141, 
alibi. 

Notions,  Simple  Terms. — First  and 
Second  Notions,  139.  Categories  of 
Aristotle,  not  a logical  distribution, 
141.  Breadth  or  Extension,  and  Depth 
or  Intension  or  Comprehension,  171, 
sq.,  628,  sq.,  Table  of,  631. 

Judgments,  Propositions.  — Eight 
forms  of,  162,  619,  sq.  Quantification 
of  the  Predicate,  161,  162,  627.  Com- 
prehension or  Depth,  and  Extension  or 
Breadth,  628,  sq. ; remarkable  omission 
of  this  distinction,  172.  Affirmation 
and  Negation,  counter  procedure  of, 
612,  sq.,  631 ; their  Particularity  two- 
fold, 623,  sq.  Tables  of  their  rela- 
tions, 620,  625. 

Reasonings,  Syllogisms. — All  logical 
inference  hypothetical,  140  ; but  all 
mediate  inference  categorical,  603,  607 ; 
our  Hypothetical  syllogisms  not  those 
of  Aristotle,  150 ; Categorical,  what 
the  different  meanings  of  the  term,  152  ; 
Analytical  and  Synthetical,  whatl  604, 


sq. ; Objection  of  Petitio  Principii  does 
not  apply  to  the  Analytical  Syllogism, 
therefore  not  to  any,  604  ; Figured  and 
Unfigured,  whatl  604,  sq.  ; Argument, 
what  properly,  148  ; Ultratotal  Quan- 
tification of  the  middle  term,  636 ; 
Order  of  Premises,  632  ; Enthymeme, 
what  vulgarly,  and  what  to  Aristotle, 
&c.,  153,  sq.  ; Deduction,  logical,  160, 
sq. ; Induction,  logical,  its  true  nature, 
157-173  ; author’s  one  Canon  of  Syl- 
logism, 603,  605  ; this  thoroughgoing, 
without  exceptions,  607,  618. 

Propositions  and  Syllogisms. — Mod- 
ality of,  Extra-logical,  or  only  of  an 
Applied  Logic,  141,  145,  158,  634, 
sq.  ; what  allowable,  148,  634;  Hy- 
pothetical propositions  and  syllogisms, 
what  and  how  to  be  divided,  150; 
Quantification  of  the  Predicate  in  pro- 
positions and  syllogisms,  161,  162,  627, 
sq.  ; on  this,  as  the  foundation  of  a 
new  Analytic,  602-608 ; Notations, 
logical,  606,  608,  620  ; should,  if  com- 
petent, be  able  to  exhibit  the  thirty-six 
moods,  by  thirty-six  several  diagrams, 
608. 

Authors  quoted  in  reference  to 
Logic,  apart  from  those  reviewed  : — 
Agricola  154,  Aldrich  140,  143,  Alex- 
ander 156,  Ammonius  156,  Apuleius 

153,  Aristo  Chius  127,  Aristotle  135, 
138,  142,  146,  151,  153,  162,  170, 
171,  172,  Averroes  135,  Bacon  144, 
Balfour  (Robert)  122,  Boethius  150, 
151,  Browne  (Sir  Thomas)  158,  Buf- 
fier  134,  Cardanus  152,  Chalmers  or 
Camerarius  (William)  123,  Corydaleus 

154,  Cusa  (Cardinal)  128,  Dempster 
(Thomas)  123,  Duncan  (Mark)  123, 
134,  Dupleix  122,  Erasmus  121,  Fac- 
ciolati  155,  156,  Gillies  145,  Kirwan 
134,  Leibnitz  121,  Lovanienses  153, 
Magentinus  156,  Majoragius  154,  Man- 
sel  148,  Pachymeres  156,  Pacius  165, 
Philoponus  155,  Phrissemius  154,  155, 
Rabbis  141,  Ramus  147,  149,  Saint 
Hilaire  142,  147,  151,  Scaliger  (Joseph) 
121,  Scaynus  154,  Servetus  121,  Sex- 
tus Empiricus  155,  Urquhart  (Sir 
Thomas)  122,  Valla  147,  Vives  134, 
147,  Vossius  (J.  G.)  152. — Authors  only 
referred  to,  omitted. 

Louvain,  University  of,  371,  402,  409, 
477  ; its  Examinations,  665,  sq. 

Luther : some  obnoxious  opinions  of, 

484-496  ; a mistake  in  the  report  of 
his  Table-Talk  corrected,  touching  Ec- 


760 


INDEX. 


clesiastes,  492  ; his  rejection  of  the 
book  of  Esther  established,  493,  494 ; 
also  his  rejection  of  the  Epistle  of  St. 
James,  495  ; favorable  to  Polygamy, 
&c.,  489-492  ; hejd  (originally  at  least) 
a heterodox  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
necessity  of  human  action,  486. 


Maimonides  (Moses),  quoted  touching 
Esther,  494. 

Mallebranche,  or  Malebranche,  his  vision 
of  all  things  in  God,  whence  borrowed, 
198. 

Manilius,  verses  of,  26. 

Mansel  (Rev.  H.  L.),  129,  323,  732. 

Matter  and  Material  used  not  in  the  sense 
of  body  and  bodily,  but  for  that  circa 
quod,  in  quo,  and  ex  quo,  13,  138,  146. 

Material  and  Formal,  distinction  of.  See 
Logic. 

Materialism,  61. 

Mathematics,  study  of : what  its  utility 
as  an  exercise  of  mind,  257-324  ; does 
not  educate  to  a general  evolution  of 
the  faculties ; but,  if  too  exclusively 
pursued,  contracts  and  debilitates  the 
mind,  267-312,  638,  sq.  ; not  a logical 
exercise,  318,  sq.,  609,  sq.  ; only  dif- 
ficult because  too  easy,  281  ; inclines 
to  credulity  and  scepticism,  294 ; to 
the  former,  294-298 ; to  the  latter, 
298-302  ; generally  of  little  use,  and 
soon  forgotten,  311  ; relation  of  to 
Logic,  262 ; Geometric  process  culti- 
vates the  imagination,  not  the  under- 
standing, 276  ; may  possibly  conduce 
to  continuous  attention,  302-307 ; but 
other  studies  better  for  this,  309  ; 
Algebraic  process,  in  particular,  posi- 
tively deleterious  as  a mental  gym- 
nastic, 304-319. — Authorities  and  in- 
stances adduced  : — Albertus  Magnus 

276,  D’Alembert  271,  282,  288,  St. 
Ambrose  299,  Ammonius  Hermiae  276, 
Arcesilaus  282,  Aristo  Chius  282, 
Aristotle  265,  267,  274,  278,  280,  284, 
311,  Arnauld  279,  St.  Austin  299, 
Bacon  (Lord)  303,  Bacon  (Roger)  277, 
282,  Baillet  (Adrian)  271,  Barbeyrac 
291,  Basedow  292,  Bayle  282,  299, 
Berkeley  287,  299,  Bernhardi  268, 
Boole  273,  Buddeus  291,  Cicero  280, 
Clarendon  290,  Le  Clerc  291,  Coleridge 
278,  Colerus  281,  Condillac  296,  Darics 
281,  Descartes  271,  281,  Digby  (Sir  K.) 

277,  Feldenus  291,  Fonseca  279,  Frac- 
astorius  276,  Fries  302,  Gassendi  290, 
Gibbon  292,  Goethe  270,  S’Gravesande 


287,  Gregory  (Dr.  John)  299,  Gundling 
299,  Du  Hamel  278,  303,  310,  Hippon- 
icus  282,  Horrebovius  281,  Huet  281, 
Hume  266,  304,  Huygens  279,  Jacobi 
301,  St.  Jerome  299,  Kant  277,  300, 
Kepler  296,  Kirwan  293,  309,  Klumpp 
270,  281,  Leibnitz  279,  Leicester  290, 
Leslie  (Sir  John)  266,  Lichtenberg  281, 

288,  Monboddo  300,  Morgenstern  269, 
Newton  (Sir  Isaac)  296,  305,  Niemeyer 
281,  Pascal  286,  Pemberton  305,  Phil- 
oponus  276,  Picus  (Joannes)  296,  Plato 
265,  303,  311,  Poiret  296,  299,  Proclus 
265,  Proverbs  282,  Prussia  (Queen  of) 
296,  Quarterly  Review  308,  Salat  294, 
Scaliger  (Joseph)  282,  Scaliger  (Julius 
Csesar)  601,  Seneca  265,  311,  Socrates 
311,  Sorbiere  290,  De  Stael  293,  297, 
301,  309,  Stewart  (Dugald)  286,  295, 
298,  304,  Thiersch  306,  Vico  306,  Vives 
290,  Voltaire  295,  Walpole  (Horace) 
293,  Warburton  281,  291,  297,  303, 
Weidler  281,  Von  Weiller  269,  Whiston 
296,  Wolf  (Chr.)  281,  Wolf  (The  Phil- 
ologer)  283,  Xenophon  310,  Zwinger 
281. — Reasoning  of  mathematicians  out 
of  mathematics,  examples  of,  314-324, 
609-639.  See  also  740-745. 

Medical  Degrees.  See  Edinburgh. 

Medicine : on  the  revolutions  of,  246- 
256  ; doubtful  whether  a blessing  or  a 
curse,  252  ; how  far  it  supposes  schol- 
arship, 330,  654,  sq.  ; contemned  by 
physicians,  252,  656  ; profession  of 
physician  in  this  country  now  requires 
no  liberal  learning,  659,  sq. 

Meiners,  his  testimony  touching  academ- 
ical patronage,  366  ; quoted,  696. 

Melanchthon,  quoted : on  Examinations, 
696  ; et  alibi  pluries. 

Melander  (Dionysius),  his  character,  490. 

Memory,  55. 

Metaphysics.  See  Philosophy. 

Michaelis,  his  testimony  regarding  aca- 
demical patronage,  365. 

Miller  (Sergeant),  hie  testimony,  442,  452, 
516. 

Modality,  a material  affection  of  the  pre- 
dicate (or  subject)  to  be  excluded  from 
Pure  Logic.  141,  sq.,  145,  sq.,  634,  sq. 

Morgan.  Sec  De  Morgan. 

Muenchhausen  (Baron  V.)  as  Curator  of 
Goettingen,  364,  sq. 

Natural  Realism  or  Dualism,  61. 

Necessitas  Consequents  et  necessitas 
Consequentis,  or  Formal  and  Material 
(or  Real)  Necessity,  146. 


INDEX. 


761 


Necessity  moral,  doctrine  of,  391,  sq. 

Newton  (Sir  Isaac) : his  unknown  theory 
of  the  creation  of  Matter,  200  ; educa- 
tionally condemned  the  algebraic  pro- 
cess, 305  ; a religious  dreamer,  296. 

Nihilism,  61. 

Non-Natural  Subscription,  513. 

Notations,  syllogistic.  See  Logic. 

Nothing,  the,  = the  Absolute,  by  what 
Absolutists  maintained,  28,  594 ; in 
reference  to  this  doctrine,  574,  594,  711. 

Notions  or  Concepts.  See  Logic. 


Oath  and  Subscription  held  of  light  ac- 
count in  England,  449. 

Object.  See  Subject. 

Occult  Causes  should  be  recognized,  600. 
Testimonies  for  this — Alstedius,  Scal- 
iger  (J.  C.),  Voltaire,  601.  See  Un- 
conditioned ; Knowledge  ; Ignorantia 
Docta. 

Oken,  his  doctrine  of  the  Absolute,  or  the 
Nothing,  28. 

Oxford:  legal  and  illegal,  386,  sq.,  436, 
440,  687 ; that  University  still  main- 
tains the  principle  of  encouraging  solid 
erudition,  340  ; therefore  with  its  mighty 
means  the  most  capable  of  being  raised 
to  the  highest,  340,  384;  Testimonies 
to  its  former  abject  state,  420,  685  ; 
Table  of  its  Houses  in  the  order  of  their 
efficiency  as  educational  organs,  672, 
673  ; these  Houses  so  compared,  671- 
684,  715  ; as  it  is,  669,  sq.  ; as  it 
might  be,  688,  sq.  ; Examination  Stat- 
utes. See  Universities  English. 


Padua,  University  of,  354. 

Paris,  University  of,  400-402. 

Parr  (Rev.  Dr.),  his  reprint  of  Collier, 
&c.,  186. 

Pascal,  passage  of,  explained,  596. 

Patronage  of  Universities.  See  Univers- 
ity Patronage. 

Peacock  (Dean),  his  testimony,  415,  525. 

Pearson  (George,  B.D.,  Christian  Advo- 
cate of  Cambridge),  his  objections  to 
the  admission  of  Dissenters  into  the  En- 
glish Universities  considered,  479,  sq.  ; 
his  knowledge  of  German  Theology,  ib. 

Peisse  (M.),  the  able  French  translator 
of  these  Philosophical  Discussions,  his 
notes,  passim. 

Perception:  philosophy  of,  56-102;  dif- 
ferent meanings  of  the  term,  81  ; testi- 
monies quoted  touching  (beside  Reid 
and  Brown), — Alexander  Aphrodisi- 
ensis  57,  Aristotle  47,  57,  75,  94, 

3 : 


Arnauld  78,  79,  80,  81,  82,  Bacon  48, 
53,  Berkeley  96,  Brucker  88,  Buchanan 
(David)  75,  Clarke  (Dr.  Samuel)  86, 
88,  Le  Clerc  85,  86,  Cousin  85,  Crou- 
saz  88,  Descartes  77,  96,  Digby  (Sir 
Kenelm)  86,  Durandus  59,  Fichte  97, 
D.e  la  Forg.e  77,  Fromondus  57,  Geno- 
vesi  85,  88,  Goclenius  75,  S’Grave- 
sande  88,  Hesiod  90,  Hobbes  79,  Hook 
85,  Hume  96,  Jacobi  97,  Kant  89,  97, 
Leibnitz  59,  74,  82,  87,  89,. Lessing  46, 
Locke  83,  84,  Lucretius  69,  76,  90, 
Mallebranche  or  Malebranche  78,  87, 
96,  Melanchthon  75,  Michael  Ephesius 
57,  Nemesius  57,  Newton  (Sir  Isaac) 
85,  Norris  67,  Philoponus  57,  Plato  46, 
57,  Plotinus  88,  Plutarchus  Athenien- 
sis  57,  Roel  79,  Royer-Collard  78,  88, 
Scaliger  (Julius  Ctesar)  48,  75,  Schel- 
ling  96,  Sergeant  85,  Simplicius  57, 
Tennemann  96,  Tertullian  54,  Them- 
istius  57,  Thomasius  (Christian)  88, 
Tucker  85,  Voltaire  89,  De  Vries  79, 
Willis  85,  Wolf  78,  82,  89. 

Perjury,  testimonies  touching,  of  Au- 
gustin and  Tillotson,  448,  449  ; of  San- 
derson and  Berkeley,  518. 

Philip,  the  Magnanimous,  Landgrave  of 
Hesse,  his  polygamy,  489-492. 

Philosophy  : what,  13,  21 ; what  it  means 
in  Britain,  272,  610;  notices  of  its  for- 
tune in  Germany,  12 ; in  France,  10,  45  ; 
in  Scotland,  1 1 ; study  of,  its  utility,  46  ; 
even  to  be  refuted,  must  be  studied, 
710  ; man  philosophizes,  as  he  thinks, 
710  ; a philosophy  of  man  prerequisite 
to  a philosophy  of  God,  71 1 ; self-knowl- 
edge, the  doctrine  of  humility,  711.  See 
Conditioned.  Six  schemes  of, — Natu- 
ral Realism,  Absolute  Identity,  Idealism, 
Materialism,  Nihilism,  Cosmothetic  Ide- 
alism, 61,  also  191,  sq.  ; terms  Philos- 
ophy and  Philosophical,  applied  in 
England,  and  especially  in  Cambridge, 
to  physical  and  mathematical  science, 
185,  272,  309,  319,  610. 

Physic  contemned  by  Physicians,  252. 

Physical  study  less  improving  to  the 
mind,  47,  705  ; Bacon’s  testimony  to 
this,  705,  744  ; tends  to  irreligion,  300, 
sq.,  et  alibi. 

Pillans  (Prof),  defense  of  classical  in- 
struction, 325,  340,  343.  . 

Pisa,  University  of,  355. 

Plato,  inscription  over  his  school — (“  Let 
no  one  ignorant  of  geometry  here 
enter”),  a comparatively  modem  fiction, 
271,  310. 


762 


INDEX. 


Ploucquet,  his  Canon  of  Syllogism,  618, 
636. 

Polygamy  permissible,  an  original  doctrine 
of  the  Lutheran  Reformers,  489-493. 

Pope  (Alexander),  illustrated,  595. 

Popular  Education,  now  determined  in 
England  by  the  Reform  Bill,  526-530  ; 
its  progress  in  France,  531-533  ; should 
be  made  obligatory  in  this  country  as  in 
Germany,  539;  seminaries  in  Germany 
for  the  training  of  schoolmasters  (Nor- 
mal schools),  547-552 ; in  Prussia, 
534-563. 

Presentative  (or  Intuitive)  and  Represent- 
ative knowledge,  58,  sq. 

Price  (Mr.  Bonamy),  730. 

Proctors,  Oxford,  were  allowed  the  salaries  1 
of  the  professorships,  which  they  co- 
operated in  illegally  suppressing,  440,  sq. 

Professorial  and  Tutorial  Systems  com- 
pared, 726,  sq. 

Professorial  Examination  for  Degrees 
always  worthless,  if  exclusive,  645- 
662,  745. 

Proposition.  See  Logic. 

Protension.  See  Time. 

Prussian  popular  education,  533-563. 

Psellus  (Michael  the  younger),  not  the 
author  of  the  Synopsis  Organi,  129. 

Psychology,  only  a developed  conscious- 
ness, 53.  See  Philosophy. 

Pythagorean  philosophers ; the  frag- 
ments and  treatises  under  their  name, 
all  spurious,  140. 

Qualities  of  Matter,  Primary,  Secundo- 
primary, and  Secondary,  61,  88. 

Rationalism  (properly  Intellectualism), 
12  ; as  a scheme  of  philosophy,  to  Kant 
a mere  delusion,  13. 

Ravaisson  (M.),  592. 

Reason  and  Consequent,  law  of,  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  Logic,  159,  alibi;  is  only 
in  Logic  an  evolution  of  the  law  of 
Non-Contradiction,  ib. 

Regent  and  Non-regent  (terms  not  un- 
derstood in  the  English  Universities), 
explained,  389,  442. 

Reid,  his  doctrine  of  Perception,  31-102. 

(General),  his  trust,  381,  660. 

Relativity,  the  principal  Condition  of 
thinking,  569,  sq. 

Remi  (Abraham),  a verse  of,  13. 

Repetition,  as  an  exercise,  698,  sq. 

Representation,  properly,  only  of  what 
can  be  actually  and  adequately  imag- 
ined. See  Conception. 


Representative  knowledge,  58,  63. 
Reuchlin : his  character,  210 ; his  rela- 
tion to  the  Epistols  Obscurorum  Vir- 
orum,  211  ; an  unedited  letter  by,  234; 
on  this  letter,  235,  sq. 

Royer-Collard,  his  character,  12. 
Rubianus  (Crotus).  See  Epistol®  o.  v. 
Ruhnkenius,  712. 


Saint  Hilaire  (M.  Barthelemy),  142,  147, 
151. 

Sanderson  (Bishop),  his  Logic®  Com- 
pendium, 126  ; quoted,  703. 

Scaliger  (Joseph  Justus) : his  paramount 
learning,  282,  360,  alibi ; his  verses  on 
the  text  of  his  father,  touching  the  lim- 
itation of  our  knowledge,  596. 

(Julius  Caesar) : an  Oxonian,  432  ; 

on  the  wisdom  of  voluntary  ignorance, 
&c.,43,  596,  601  ; on  disputation,  698. 

Scepticism,  what,  91. 

Schelling,  his  doctrine  of  the  Uncondi- 
tioned, 26  ; refutation  of  and  by  Cousin 
and  Hegel,  30. 

Schloiermacher  on  academical  patronage, 
368  ; quoted,  716. 

Schoolmen,  ignorantly  despised,  144 

Schools,  Scottish  Grammar  Schools  : 
greatly  too  few,  and  the  Universities 
thus  brought  to  attempt  their  supply, 
in  vain,  337,  sq.  ; the  bad  organization 
of  their  classes,  342. 

Scots,  their  character  for  philosophical 
and  general  talent,  121,  122,  375,  sq. 

Scottish  : — Philosophy,  1 1 ; Theology  has 
for  two  centuries  been  null,  332-336, 
376  ; Church,  its  attempts  to  import 
from  Holland  learned  divines,  335 , its 
Veto  Act,  336  ; Grammar  Schools,  de 
ficient  in  numbers,  338  ; defects  of  their 
classes,  341 ; Law,  329;  Medicine,  330 ; 
Scholarship  and  classical  training,  337- 
340,  376,  377  ; Universities,  368-381  ; 
Popular  Education,  as  inferior  to  that 
of  Germany,  as  superior  to  that  of  En- 
gland. See  Schools. 

Self  and  Not-self,  as  a condition  of 
thought,  569. 

Self-activity,  at  once  the  mean  and  the 
end  of  education,  indeed,  of  all  knowl- 
edge, 46,  sq.,  693,  sq.,  698,  sq.,  alibi. 

Seneca,  quoted  692,  702,  et  passim. 

Sewell  (Rev.  Mr.)  715. 

Social  study,  703. 

Space,  or  Extension,  known  only  as  con- 
ditioned, 35,  36  ; as  a condition  of 
thought,  572. 

Stahl  (George  Ernest),  250. 


INDEX. 


763 


Stewart  (Dugald),  146,  181, 189,  194,  288, 
294,  297,  304. 

Strauss,  the  Hegelian  divine,  711. 

Subject,  Subjective,  and  Object,  Object- 
ive ; meaning  of  terms,  13;  as  a condi- 
tion of  thought,  569,  570  ; distinction 
very  vague  and  vacillating,  13,  570. 

Subscription  to  articles  of  faith,  its  obliga- 
tion frustrated  by  the  English  Universi- 
ties, 449,  512.  513. 

Substance  and  Phaenomenon  : ipso  facto , 
conditioned,  36  : as  a condition  of 

thought,  570  ; meaning  of  term,  597. 

Syllogism.  See  Logic. 


Teaching,  as  an  exercise  toward  learn- 
ing, 342,  700,  sq. 

Tennemann,  translation  of  his  Manual  by 
Johnson,  103-119. 

Terms.  See  Logic. 

Tests,  religious.  See  Universities,  En- 
glish, and  Subscription. 

Theology:  supposes  scholarship,  330,  sq., 
376,  sq.  ; Scottish,  long  therefore  null, 
332,  sq.,  376  ; not  independent  of  phil- 
osophy ; English,  therefore,  has  been 
long  very  feeble,  714. 

Thinking.  See  Thought. 

Tholosanus,  his  testimony  as  to  meaning 
of  University,  475. 

Thomson  (Prof.  John),  his  character  and 
life  of  Cullen,  240-256. 

(Rev.  William),  129,  163,  619, 

620. 

Thought,  Positive  and  Negative,  568 ; 
Conditions  of  positive  thought,  567, 
sq.  ; to  think  is  to  condition,  143. 

Time,  or  Protension,  or  Duration,  known 
only  as  conditioned,  35,  36  ; as  a con- 
dition of  thought,  571. 

Truth,  speculative,  an  end,  not  ultimate, 
but  subordinate  to  the  cultivation  of 
mind  by  its  speculation,  46-49. 

Tutor,  in  Oxford,  the  office  of,  by  statute 
open  to  all  graduates,  even  to  Bachelors 
of  Arts,  392,  413  ; nor  need  the  Tutor 
and  Pupil  be  of  the  same  House,  460  ; 
Table  of  Tutorial  eminence  throughout 
the  Oxford  Houses,  673;  Tutorial  and 
Professorial  systems  compared,  725- 
730  ; condition  of  Tutor,  should  be  a 
highest  graduation  of  honor,  728.  See 
Universities,  English. 


Unconditioned  (the) : what,  19  ; incon- 
ceivable, 21,  27-29  ; not  the  indiffer- 
ence of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  which, 
as  contradictories,  exclude  each  other, 


28,  35 ; Kant’s  doctrine  of,  22  ; Schel- 
ling’s  doctrine  of,  25  ; Hegel’s  doctrine 
of,  30  ; Cousin’s  doctrine  of,  30  ; Au- 
thor’s doctrine  of,  20,  24,  567,  sq.  ; 
doctrine  of  the  Conditioned,  a contrast 
to  the  doctrine  of  theUnconditioned,  574. 

Absolute  (the),  what  properly,  19,  20; 
what  etymologically,  20. 

Infinite  (the),  what  properly,  21,  28, 
33  ; verses  on,  44. 

Testimonies  quoted  on  the  Uncon- 
ditioned (beside  Cousin,  Kant,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  Oken),  Aristotle  33,  Augustin 
22,  Jacob  Boehme  28,  Buddhists  28, 
Goethe  17,  Frederic  Jacobi  27,  28,  Jo- 
annes Sarisburiensis  27,  Manilius  26, 
Orpheus  29,  St.  Paul  22,  Platonists  and 
Fathers  27,  29,  Plotinus  27,  Plutarch 

27,  St.  Prosper  27,  Rejected  Addresses 

28,  Remi  14,  Scaliger  (Julius  Caesar) 
596,  Seneca  27,  Varro  28,  &c. — See  also 
Ignorantia  Docta,  and  Knowledge,  rel- 
ativity of,  and  Occult  Causes. 

University  : meaning  of  the  term,  470- 
478  ; ends  which  it  should  accomplish, 
689-709  ; properly,  the  general  school 
for  liberal  instruction,  the  Faculty  of 
Arts;  the  other  Faculties  being  only 
special  Schools,  690. 

Universities,  Old  and  New  contrasted, 
697 ; British,  all  need  regeneration  or 
reform,  661,  723,  et  alibi. 

Universities,  English  : their  present  ille- 
gality, 383-429,  430-457 ; consist  of 
the  University  proper  and  of  the  Col- 
leges, 3g6  ; the  University  not  a con- 
geries of* Colleges,  395,  450,  462,  501  ; 
a right  Collegial  or  Tutorial  system  in 
combination  with  a right  University  or 
Professorial  system  affords  the  condition 
of  a perfect  academical  discipline,  398. 
— Oxford  (more  particularly),  its  present 
illegality,  384  ; history  of  its  legal  sys- 
tem, 387-394  ; history  of  its  illegal  sys- 
tem, 394-429 ; these  contrasted,  436, 
437 ; illegal  suppression  of  the  Uni- 
versity or  Professorial,  and  illegal  in- 
trusion of  the  Collegial  or  Tutorial 
instruction,  389-399 ; vices  of  the  latter, 
as  actually  constituted,  394-399;  rela- 
tive importance  of  Collegiate  institutions 
— in  the  Italian  Universities,  400 — in 
Paris,  400-403 — in  Louvain,  402,  663, 
sq. — in  German  Universities,  403,  406 — 
history  of  their  rise  and  progress  in  the 
English  Universities,  406-429;  how  the 
Halls  fell,  and  from  their  ruins  the  Col- 
leges arose,  409-413  ; how  the  Tutor 


764 


INDEX. 


superseded  the  Professor,  413-422 ; 
how  this  was  accomplished  through  a 
violation  of  oath  and  statute  by  the  Col- 
legial Heads,  418-447,  421-429 ; by 
them  perjury  enforced  on  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  University,  421-426,  519, 
448,  525  ; this  common  to  Cambridge 
and  its  Heads,  415  ; the  obligation  of 
subscription  to  religious  articles  thus 
sublated,  448,  512,  513  ; while  the  value 
of  the  University  education  was  lowered, 
its  expense  was  raised,  for  the  profit  of 
the  Colleges,  and  to  keep  the  academi- 
cal numbers  down  to  their  means  of 
accommodation,  418  ; a reform  must 
come  from  without,  451  ; testimonies 
of  Crevier,  Locke,  and  Agrippa  to  this, 
429, 452.  Reviewer’s  allegations  against 
the  governors  of  the  English  Universi- 
ties vindicated,  and  his  charges  only 
those  of  the  statutes  themselves,  426- 
429.  Table  of  the  Oxford  Houses,  in 
the  order  of  their  comparative  efficiency, 
as  organs  of  education,  672,  673  ; plan 
for  the  improvement  of  collegial  and 
academical  instruction,  725-753.  En- 
glish Universities,  how  and  how  not 
wealthy,  707,  sq. 

Universities : English,  on  admission  of 
Dissenters  to,  458-499,  500-525  ; supe- 
rior liberality  in  this  respect  of  the  Italian 
Universities,  which  admitted  Protest- 
ants, even  as  Professors,  356,  sq.  ; 
claim  of  Dissenters  for  admission  into 
the  public  University  of  the  strongest 
and  clearest,  458-T63  ; not  so  clear  and 
strong  into  the  Colleges,  45^-462,  509  ; 
ignorant  confusion  of  theUniversity  with 
the  Colleges  generally  prevalent,  462, 
463,  501  ; game  at  cross-purposes  by 
the  friends  and  opponents  of  this  meas- 
ure, 459,  462,  463,  500,  sq.  ; how  Dis- 
senters to  be  admitted  without  violating 
principle  of  domestic  superintendence, 
464-469 ; and  without  violating  prin- 
ciple of  religious  instruction,  469,  576, 
477-480.  Do  religious  Tests  in  Uni- 
versities ensure  in  them  religious  teach- 
ers 1 — the  negative  maintained,  480- 


499 ; these  of  old  abandoned  in  the 
Italian  Universities,  and  latterly,  after 
the  German,  in  the  Dutch,  482.  Have 
the  Heads  of  the  English  Universities 
proved  faithful  Trustees'!  No,  503- 
514.  Are  the  academic  oaths  obligatory 
and  permanently  obligatory  on  all  mem- 
bers of  the  English  Universities  to  resist 
the  admission  of  Dissenters ! 514-522: 
Oxford  Heads  agreed  to  propose  a re- 
peal of  the  academic  tests,  and  why 
their  resolution  was  rescinded,  514. 

University  Patronage  : theory  and  history 
of,  345-382 ; character  of  this  trust, 
346 ; its  end,  347 ; conditions  of  its 
proper  organization,  349-354  ; in  Pad- 
ua, 354 — in  Pisa,  355 — in  Leyden,  356- 
362 — in  German  Universities,  362 — in 
Goettingen,  364  ; German  authorities, 
Michaelis  365,  Meiners  366,  Schleier- 
macher  368  ; in  the  Scottish  Universi- 
ties, 368  ; by  a Municipality,  368-372  ; 
here  patrons  solicited  as  for  a favor,  and 
this  not  felt  as  an  insult,  371,  643  ; by 
University  itself,  372-377 ; by  the 
Crown,  377 ; systems  of  Scottish  pa- 
tronage have  wrought  as  ill  as  possible, 
375-377 ; patronage  by  Curators  the 
best,  378  ; plan  for  their  appointment  in 
Edinburgh,  379-381  : recommendation 
of  by  Burgh  Commissioners,  644,  sq. — 
See  640,  sq.,  for  Edinburgh. 


Vernunft  and  Verstand,  modern  German 
reversal  of,  12,  14. 

Vives,  quoted,  698,  703,  and  elsewhere. 


Ward  (Mr.  G.  R.  M.),  his  translation  of 
the  Oxford  Statutes  and  Preface,  525  ; 
extracts  from,  687,  sq. 

Whately  (Archbishop),  his  Elements  of 
Logic,  128-169. 

Whewell  (Rev.  Dr.)  on  the  study  of  Math- 
ematics, 257-324  ; his  letter,  with  re- 
plies, 313-324. 

Whole  and  Part.  See  Logic. 

Wilson  (Professor  John),  576. 

Woolley  (Rev.  Dr.),  159. 

Wyttenbach,  699,  712. 


THE  END. 


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